# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In re Banks

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1994
- **Citation:** 513 U.S. 826

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
ae ee Pa ae

932088 AUC 1 81995

re

Dre

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

DR. SIMON BANKS, J.D. T/A JOB PROTECTORS
FORMER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

Petitioner
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dr. Simon Banks, J.D.

Job Protectors

Former Administrative Law Judges
468 M Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20024
[202] 554-5627

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QUESTION PUT FORTH

Whether federal courts, in a removed case under 42
U.S.C. § 1443, [where petitioner allege and shows
inability to enforce federal rights in the state courts
notwithstanding the doctrine(s) set forth ‘n District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,]
have jurisdictional authority to protect federal rights, to
vacate, alter, enjoin continued enforcement of a final
judgment issued by a State Court of Appeals resulting in
an injunction arising out of a state law that conflict with
federal laws and where continued enforcement of the
State Court of Appeals injunction unwarrantly violate
clearly established rights arising under federal laws
providing for equal civil rights, and where changed

conditions, newly established staie/muscipal policy,

custom, practice and laws, reflect that continued

4h

Oe CORRAL yf BR Fee eh SPD a RN ge Nae Pay

enforcement of the injunction unwarrantly perpetuate

discrimination and violate clearly established federal and

constitutional rights.

UEP PD aN VR EES AL ROA 9 SRE ok Be a

UST OF PARTIES
The following parties appeared below.
PARTY PETITIONER:
Dr. Simon Banks, J.D.
468 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024
[202] 554-5627
PARTY RESPONDENT:
Stuart Pierson, Esq.
Chairman,
District of Columbia
Court of Appeals
Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of Law

500 Indiana Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

; a vy ie” a ue Mii tghe! jf #) J ~~ = * 4 * ca" 7 2 ‘ a fhe ‘4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CSRS FOIE POU ccccccscsiesstensdcoccnentens ii
Rae GF PURNE Ee cetrvscscscscessccidadeceteul iiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Fs BI asaccccencscicsresceminel ixiv

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATUTES

LEGLISLATIVE MATERIALS

iv

SS ie “5 z .* _ . "% -. =a. Ya Ss; * ¥ 7 *@ ene

We BEE Betccccceccescccsovcascestocesoovssooess ixxiv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............0csscccccseees 1
RPP etsisecevecvccccccccescctscccsescocceses 1-7

CET A Rccncdndoveccorcccsvecessctsteceovestes 65

Banks v. Dixon, et al No. 91-3099,

Banks v. District of Columbia Government, et al 89-

CBF) ..cccccossoses 3,16,18,32,63

Banks v. Edwards [DCRAI], et al, USCA No.
96-GOGB, CMiccsecesestattinnn 3,16,32,62

Banks v. Teitelman, et al, 93-0152,

scccceccseseseocseccsaqseues 3,16,18,32,63

B v. j thori ice Of
Law, 538 A.2d 1120 (D.C. 1988)
eeneitistas 2,..21,33,48,55

Committee _of U.S. Citizens Living In Nicaragua vy.

Reagan, 859 F.2d 929....... 4l

Council vy. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465
U.S. 209, 104 S.Ct. 1020.......... 12,29,43

Dedd v. Rue, D.C. Ohio 1979, 478 F. Supp.

EST ne eee 58

of A v. F , 460
Be I i iceccscscscsact iv
Family Divison Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie,

72S F.2d 695, 701, n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Firestone Co. v. &
Co., C.A. Md. 1970, 431 F.2d 1199, cert denied, 91 s.-t.

Friedman v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 822
F.29 423, U.S.C.A. Comst. Art. 4, § 2, d.

Georgia v. Rachel, et al, 384 U.S. at 782):

Gotkin v. Miller (1957, CA N.Y.) SM F.2d

CO Beidicicwediiiicntd 10

i r. et al v. District of ia, et al

U.S.C.A. D.C., No. 91-7164, decided June

BI99B...coccoscsceces 54
Melton _v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 f.2d
TOE. .ccccccccccccccccsocecoccscsocecees a

Meritor Savings Banks v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66

Monell vy. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436

Nat. Treasury Employees U. v. U.S. Merit Systems, 743

New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 234.
Ie ne EO EN TS 1,29,42

New York Times Co. v. United States (1971) 403 U.S. 713
Pembour vy. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct.

oo eer 45

Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

Phillip Waqne, Inc. vy. Leser, 239 U.S. 207

AD iececccccccseveccecccovesvocseoees 42 Piper, supra, 470 U.S.
at 284, 105 S.Ct. a 12,29,43

Prentis_v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 2I1 U.S. at

affirmed 309 F.2d 634.

Republic steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653, 85 S.
Ct. 614 (1964).

Simon vy. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774 (1980)

ixi

Thermtron u Inc. v. H rfer, 423 U.S.

ni ion T . x

Goodwin v. Karnuth, D.c. N.Y. 1947, 74 F. Supp.

Wallace _v. District of Columbia Unemployment

Compensation Board, D.C. App., 289 A.2d 885
| 31

United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Assr:.. 322

7

U.S. 533 (1944).

Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 84] F.2d U.S.C.A.

Ss MEE Dkdccécccesodceed 4]

Virginia v. Rivers, 100 U.S. 313 p. 794-

Pi ssuhshevactonctcbindsncnsees 38
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37.......... 46

THE COURT BELOW
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
For The District of Columbia Circuit denied rehearing en
banc on May 20, 1993.
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed on
August 18, 1993, accordingly, the appeal is timely.
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (certiorari) and (c) (important and

unsettled questions) of this court.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATUTES

District of Columbia Human Rights Act, Title 34,
2-38,

District of Columbia Comprehensive Merit
Personnel Act, [CMPA], D. C. Code Ann., Sec. 1-606 et.
Seq.

DCRA’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act,
[CPPA] D.C. Code §28-3901(a)(6), §28-3903(c)(2)(C), §
28-390 4(a),(CbD ) and (d)
5. | ae 8,9,11,13,17,19,37,45,54,58,62

District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act.D.C.

Code § 11-2501, 11-2501(a), et. seq., (1981).......... 31,34
D.C. Code § 1-1509(b) DCAPA........... 34
14 DCMR § 3201.1 *1986),.............. 34

District of Columbia Human Rights Act, as amended, 31

DCR 56, D.C. Law 2-38, D.C. Code §§ 1-2501-1-2557.

District of Columbia Register, Commission On Human
Rights Guidelines, a ree aa s
Fee Dncivsnaiiieuidiielisiibiiaicbiiaeibabtias 27

District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals Form,

Page 2, Part V 431, Designation of

AS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES & HEARING

BE rciccinicinnccscensinsindsens 28
MEMO OF WARREN CRUISE, DIRECTOR

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE
APPEALS CHANGING THE TITLE “HEARING
EXAMINER" TO “ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE" ....28

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT RULES:

District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 49 on
Unauthorized Practice of Law, previously, D.C. Ct. App.
R. 46 II (b)(1) (1984).
oneauieavacenseune 2,5,7,8,12,14,19,20,21,25,30,33,37,43,45,4
9,37,40,54,55,61,62,63
[Effective January 1, 1985, Rule 46-11 was renumbered
as Rule 49.]

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 101 (a) (3), D.C. App. Pro Hac Vice

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT RULES
District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals Rules,
District of Columbia Commission On Human Rights

14 DCMR § 3292,1 (1986).

ixvii

FEDERAL STATUTES:
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA or Act), 5
U.S.C. § 7501-7543, Pub. L. No.

95-454, 92 Stat. 111 (Codified as amended) by 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-8913

EN iiiciersaneveees 21
i rirccsicsveses 22,27,55
5 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. IV 1980), 37
PASTE aE 27
5 U.S.C. § 3105.......... 36,53
5 U.S.C. § 2302
28 U.S.C. § 1443
..+.8,10,37,38,44,58
28 U.S.C. § 1446 ........000- 10
28 U.S.C. § 1981
. 28 U.S.C. § 1983.........064 45,47
; 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(b), 217, 261, 605 and
Be | ORE 22,26,36,55
| 29 C.F.R. § 1614.605..........00000 26,55

29 C.F.R. § 1614.106............006 26,36
29 C.F.R. § 1614.214(b).........000000. 55
29 C.F.R. § 1601.70,......:000000- 26,36
42 U.S.C. § 1981,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4,
Pte
42 U.S.C. 2000¢-12
42 U.S.C. § 2000¢,........000006. 19,26,36
42 U.S.C. § 2000, Section 706,
42 U.S.C. § 12101,
Pub. L. 89-554 § 79-554
$706, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (1985)
Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act,
Civil Rights Act, 1964

BOTs 22,36,38,44
37 Fed. Reg. 16787, Aug. 19, 1972

Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989

(Public Law No. 101-12)

Civil Rights Act of 1964........ 38,44

Section 717 of 1964 Civil Rights Act,

Public Law No. 102-166, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.

26 Stat. 209, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1.

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961-1964
soccocnsessoocoseseessescoessoseoooes 32

Executive Orders:

Executive Order 11246. Executive Order 11246
precludes discrimination in the use of federal funds by
recipients of federal funds.,

Executive Order 11222,

Manual For Administrative Judges....... 27

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

Senator Kastenmeier, 110 Cong. Rec. 6551;

Senator Kuchel, 110 Cong. Rec. 6564; Senator
Dodd, 110 Cong. Rec. 6955-6956,
S. Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978),

124 Cong. Rec. S14267 (daily ed. Aug. 24,
1978)(Statement of Sen.Ribicoff). See also Carducci y.
Regan, 714 F.2d 171.

Federal Personnel Manual, ch. 771 (Oct. 1981);
OMB Manual § 355 (April 1982),

Legislative History of the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, at 636, 639 (Comm. Print 1979)

Legislative History of D.C. Code, Pub. L. No. 90-614, §
10, 82 Stat. 1208 (Oct. 1986); H.R. Rep. No. 202, 90th
Cong. Ist Sess. (1967); S. Rep. No. 1581, 90th Cong. 2d.
Sess. (1968)

37 Fed. Register/1687, Aug. 19, 1992..27

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED:

First Amendment to the United States
Commitee, .ccccscccccccccsees 11,19,29

Fifth Amendment to the United States
Comsthtthets.

Fiche hibiip AA © cfdaiige = ©

4

In 1991, the District of Columbia Office of

leyee Appeals spanged the title “Hearing
Geeetnoes to "Administrative Judge”, although their
position of record is “Hearing Examiner”.
Subsequently, the District of Columbia Consumer and
Regulatory Affaire changed the title “Hearing
Examiner” to “Administrative Judge", and some of
ite employees utilized the title "Administrative
Law Judge” although their position of record is
"Bearing Examiner.”

*S These actions by the D.C.C.A., the CUPL,
the DCRA, violates the Supremacy Clause. The Court
has stated: “States have oblgation, under supremacy
clause, to protect federally guaranteed civil
rights as zealously as would federal courts. Rachel

v. State of Ga., 86 S.Ct. 1783.
25

The actions of the DCCA of enforcing

conflicting provisions of DCCA Rule 49
against Banks by adjudicating Banks’
representation of clients before
administrative agencies pursuant to D.C.
App. Ct. R. 49 as constituting
unauthorized practice of law, is
discriminatory and the enforcement of Rule
49 conflict with federal laws and rights
arising under federal laws that a

reasonable person would know. ?°

“when federal law is passed under authority
of Constitution, it is supreme, and state law in
conflict therewith must yeild. Pritchard v. Downie,
D.c. Ark. 1962, 201 F. Supp. 893, affirmed 309 F.2d
634.

16 pitle VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.213, 29 C.F.R. §
214.(b)-217, 261, 605 and 606, 29 C.F.R. §
1614.605, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106, 29 C.F.R. §
1601.70, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.61 [precluding reprisal
against complainant's representative; EEOC
Directive Transmittal and Order 570.001, dated

26

Sept. 1987, EEOC Order 572, dated March 12, 1979,
"Definitions, fh., provides: “Employee
Representative. "An attorney or other person
designated by the employee, in writing, who is
willing to act on the employee's behalf in matters
involving a proposed or actual suspension.." ; 5
C.F.R. § 1201.31(b), provides: "A party may choose
any representative so long as the person is willing
and available to serve"; 5 U.S.C. § 1201.31;
Federal Register, Thursday July 10, 1986, Part II
Merit Systems Protection Board 5 CFR Part 1201
Practice and Procedure, Final Regulation, at §
1201.31, Representation provides:

"(a) A party to an appeal may be represented
in any matter relating to the appeal. The parties
shall designate their representative. (b) A party
may choose any representative so long as the person
is willing and available to serve.”

The Merit Systems Protection Board Appeals
Form Page 2, Part V 431, Designation of
Representative, provides:

“You may represent yourself in this appeal, or you
may choose Bag -rmy to represent you.
Vv ttorne

District of Columbia Register, souuteetens on
Human Rights Guidelines, Page 3, at 3202.3
provides:
"The representative of a party before the
Commission does not have to be an attorney”
District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals
“Appeals Form", Part III, Hearing 47; specifically
provide that employee representative(s) do not have
to be an attorney.

5 U.S.C. § 3105.5372. and 7521 (Supp. lv
1980) provides: - The Title “Hearing Examiner” was
changed to “Administrative Law Judge” by United
States Civil Service Commission regulation on Aug.
19, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 1687, and by statute on
March 27, 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. lv 1980).
See Manual For Administrative Law Judges Prepared
for the Admiistrative Conference of the United
States, Published in 1972, Revised Edition 1982, by
Merritt Ruhlen Administrative Law Judge, Retired;

Circular of Maria Lucia Johnson, confirmed by
the United States Senate as Vice-Chair of U.S.
Merit Systems Protection Board, 1983, upon her

27

The enforcement policy of DCCA
violate Petitioner's federal
constitutional rights under the Const.
Amend. 1, right to speak of his former
employment title “Administrative Law

Judge" with the District of Columbia

Senate testimony that she was a "former
Administrative Law Judge with the District of
Columbia Rental Accommodations Office, and formerly
Chief Administrative Judge, D.C. Temporary Appeals
Panel, at 43 provides: *...She has also been...an
Administrative Judge with the District of Columbia
Rental Accommodations Office (RAO);

Certification of Simon Banks & Associates by
the Government of the District of Columbia Minority
Business Opportunity Commission, Charlotte G.
Chapman, chairperson, certified and registering
Simon Banks & Associates as “Administrative Law
Judge & Hearing Examiners, Legal Consultants”,
Certification Number 3495, dated February 21, 1980;

Memorandum of Warren M. Cruise, Esq.
Executive Director of District of Columbia Office
of Employee Appeals, dated November 8, 1991,
provides:

“Re: Title Change of Hearing

examiners. Beginning November 12,

1991, the title of “Hearing Examiner”

is to change to “Administrative

“. This change should be made on

all outgoing documents which now

contain the title “Hearing Examiner".

Decisions written on or after November

12, 1991 should reflect this title

change.”

28

Government .?? The speech restriction

constitute prior restraint and is

17 These unwarranted speech restrictions have
been held unconstitutional by the Courts.
D.C.C.A.'s continuing injunction precluding Banks
from using his former title “Administrative Law
Judge", while it permits the employees of the
District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals and
the District of Columbia Consumer and Regulatory
Affairs Agency, to change the name of its “Hearing
Examiners” to “Administrative Law Judge”, without
punishment or similar prohibition, operates as an
unreasonable restraint on the liberty of contract
in violation of U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 5. See
Careleton Scryw Products Co. v. Fleming, C.C.A.
Minn. (1974), 126 F.2d 537, and D.C.C.A.'s action
violates Banks rights under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. See Friedman v. Supreme Court of

yirajala, 822 F.2d 423, U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, §
2, Ci. I.
D.C.C.A.'s discriminatory enforcement of Rule
49 against Banks violates Article IV, § 2 of the
Constitution which provides:
"Citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of Citizens of the

several states.” See New Hampshire v. Piper, 470
U.S.284."
Further, D.C.C.A.'s discriminatory

enforcement of D.C.C.A. Rule 49, does not bear a
substantial relationship to the District of

Columbia Government's ligitimate/rational
objectives. Piper, supra, 470 U.S. at 284, 105
S.Ct. at 1279; United Building & Construction

ad Vv. ° i , 465

U.S. 209, 104 S.Ct. 1020.

"Congress intended doctrines of federal law
uniformly to prevail over inconsisgtent local
rules," Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650, 653, 85 S.Ct. 614 (1964).

“Federal regulations preempt state law or
municipal ordinance. U.S. ex - Goodwi
Karnuth, D.C. N.Y. 1947, 74 F. Supp. 660.

29

arbitrary, capricious, and prejudicial to
Petitioner's rights and, constitute an
abuse of discretion and is further in
violation of the District of columbia
Administrative Procedures Act, ([DCAPA]}.
D.C. Code, §1-1501, in that it deprives
Petitioner of due process of law and
substantive procedural rights. The
D.C.C.A.-CUPL in its enforcement of D.C.
App. Ct. Rule 49 arbitrarily, irrationally
ignored, failed to credit or follow the
rules of the administrative agencies
providing for lay representation of
parties before the D.C. Office of Employee
Appeals [D.C. OEA], and the D.C. Office of
Human Rights, the EEOC and the Merit
Systems Protection Board and

Administrative Agencies of the United

30

States, in violation of law.?® The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
opined, in Wallace v. District of Columbia
Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.
App., 289 A.2d 885 (1972), District of
Columbia Agencies must comply with the
DCAPA -- specifically, D.C. Code, §1l-
509(d), when enforcing conflicting rules
and grant the parties their appropriate
procedural rights -- that any conflicting
practices were superseded by the DCAPA.
Banks alleged in his removal
pleadings that the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals Committee on Unauthorized

18

COURT OF APPEALS REQUIRED TO FOLLOW
AGENCY'S CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE IF
THAT On I SIBLE

The Court of Appeals was obliged to follow
construction of statute by agency charged with its
administration if that construction was “reasonably

See Nat. Treasury Employees U. v. U.S. Merit
Systems, 743 F.2d 895, at 898 (1984).

31

”

Practice of Law discriminatorily and
selectively perceives and unlawfully
maintains that his representation of
clients before administrative agencies of
the District of Columbia and of the United
States constitute unauthorized practice of
19 and that this

perception/misconception which governs

19 stuart Pierson, Chairman of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, with the consent and
knowledge of the D.C. Court of Appeals, has
repeatedly stated to virtually all clients of Banks
that Banks’ representation of parties before
administrative agencies that permit lay
representation, constitute unauthorized practice of
law for purposes of creating a hostile work
atmosphere for Banks and to influence complaints
and breach of contracts against Banks. This false
and malicious representation of fact has been aided
and abeted by the actions of cooperating defendants
Banks sued in related cases for for facilitating
boycotts against Banks and for engaging in
restraint on trade and RICO conspiracies against
Banks. Banks’ client list have been turned over to
the D.c. Court of Appeals and Stuart Pierson by
RICO participants and co-conspirators which include
state and federal employees of the District of
Columbia Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, the
District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeal, and
the United states Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, in Banks v. D.C. Government, et al, 89-
0871, Banks v. Dixon, Civil Action 91-3099 {a/k/a
Banks v. Aubrey H. Edwards, et al, No. 94-5058 -
USCA DC] Banks v. Teitelman, et al 93-152 [a/k/a

n s tv el Teitelman, et al,
No. 94-557 -- USCA DC]

32

perception/misconception which governs
DCCA-CUPL's prosecution and persecution of
Banks has been condoned by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals in violation of
clearly established law that a reasonable

person would know. See Brookens v.
Committee On Unauthorized Practice of Law, 538

A.2da 1120 (1988)

20 In Brookens the Court opined, "Lay
Practice Before D.C. Agencies," holding:

"Since 1979, Brookens has appeared on
behalf of clients at hearings before the
Rental Accommoations Office. The
Committee urges that these appearances
constitute the practice of law, and
because Brookens is not a member of the
District of Columbia Bar, these
appearances constitute the unauthorized
practice of law as defined in D.C. App. R.
49 (b). Following a hearing on the issue,
the court held:

"Respondent's activities before the Rental
Accommodations Office must be considered
in a different light. Because Rule 49
does not deal with representation of
others before administrative agencies, and
because in this instance respondent's
activities before the Rental
Accommodations Office were authorized

33

under the rules of that agency, the Court
concludes that respondent has not engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law, and
has not violated Rule 49, by representing
persons other than himself before the
Rental Accommodations Office." Mem. Op. at
9.

"The Committee advances two main arguments
designed to establish that the court's
ruling is erroneous. First, the Committee
argues that any District of Columbia
agency regulation that purports to permit
anyone other than an attorney licensed to
practice law in the District of Columbia
to appear on behalf of clients is invalid
because it exceeds the scope of the
Distict of Columbia Administrative
Procedure Act. D.C. Code §§ 1-1501 et seq.
(1981). D.C. Code § 1-1509 (b) provides
in part that "[e]very party [in a
contested case] shall have the right to
present in person or by counsel his case
or defense.." The Committee argues that
D.C. Code § 11-1509 (b) should be
interpreted to limit a litigant in an
agency proceeding to one of two choices:
representing himself or hiring an active
membe of the District of Columbia Bar to
act as counsel. Accordingly, the
Committee asks this court to find that the
agency rule at issue in this case, 14 DCMR
§3202.1 (1986), is ultra vires this part
of the D.C. Administrative Procedure
Act....--

",.,...The Committee urges that the agency
rule, 14 DCMR 3202.1 is ultra vires D.C.

34

Code § 1-1509 (b) which provides that
"l[e]very party in a contested case] shall
have the right to present in person or by
counsel his case or defense." The
Committee argues that because the
regulation is ultra vires the District of
Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, it
is invalid. We disagree.

"On its face, D.C. Code § 1-1509 (b)
articulates the rights of a party to
representation in contested cases before
administrative agencies of the District of
Columbia. Since the provision lists a
party's minimum entitlements - pro se
appearance or representation by counsel -
it leaves open the possibility that a
gency might wish to expand those in the
legislative history of this right to
include, perhaps, lay representation. ..."
",.....-Nothing in the legislative history
of this D.C. Code provision suggests
otherwise. Pub. L. No. 90-614, § 10, 82
Stat. 1208 (Oct. 21, 1986); H.R. Rep. No.
202, 90th Cong., list Sess. (1967); S. Rep.
No. 1581, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968)..Indeed, the only reference to the
stutorily provided breadth of
representation due parties in contested
cases is to be found in Senat's summary of
the Bill's provisions..".." We hold,
therefore, that the regulations of the
Rental Accommodations Office authorizing
lay representation of a party not ultra
vires D.C Code § 1-1509 (b)."

35

Petitioner alleged that he hae been
deni.g and cannot enforce in the state
cour. of the District of Columbia his
righ, under federal law. The federal law
inVO.ed providing Petitioner with federal
righ, yHdet iaws, ules, regilatione
afforging Hae B4uai Givil #ighte.?!
Thesg fadatad #ighhd HEAVIER HAELELAHAE, A
non-yemee ft the Hiaheteh BF FAtHnte
Bar, with the Fight te Fepreaent partier
before administrative agencies of the
United States and before 706 state
agencies that contract with the United

States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission for the right to investigate

These rights include but are not limited to:
Title VIE of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, Section Pi? of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
Executive Order 11246, § U.S.C, § BLOB, 29 C.F.R,
s 3623,320¢0) 29 S LEL3 DLP, BEL, OE and €O46, and
29 C.BLR, $ LOLA, 106, 29 C.FLR, § 1619, 608, and 29
C.F.R, § 18901, 79,

46

and econeiliate diserimination ecomplainte,
D.C.C.A. Rule 49 and DCRA's Consumer
Protection Procedures Act, [CPPA] D.C.
Code § 28-3904 (1991), unreasonably,
impermissibly and irrationally
discriminates against Petitioner atid
peOHibite the eeeteiee oF these federal
biqlita;, AHA ANTE 49 Ane Lhe Bi heeeaHeHe
LHaFARY FHFLNAE Aepeivee Hanke At bheee
federat Fighke by making +h HAlawhut for
Banks to exercise these federal rights,
The Court has authorized removal in
cases setting forth deprivation of federal
rights under state law. See 28 U.S.C. §

1443. See Georgia v. Rachel, et al, 384

U.S. 780, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379
U.S. 306.2?

The D.C. Court of Appeale, hae selectively
authorized Stuart Pierson and DC CUPL to

create a hostile work environment, ?°

in the removal petition were true, prosecution in
ae etate court, under a peeeeee similar to the
sane etatues is famm, denied ma fist)

al "tat : st

Trae

7

ay
if -
rr °

i rit +

leave so eit for racial renqens,
(a4) ... @ basis for peer! = the equivalent of
a state statute 7. > pretieres

a requirement Becy pry one Seaee fl

Lapreials “eas 9) Sata eh
, 100 u.s. 303; ’ 00

u.s. p. 794-604.

Banks allege that the D.C.C.A. by and through ites
— ees, 0.C.C.A. CUPL, particularly James
Schaller and Stuart Pierson, Chairman and former
Chairman of 0.C.C.A. CUPL, respectively, and others
peo ae in concert with them influenced Banke’

ients to relinquish their contractual obligation
with Banks, influenced Banks’ clients to falsely
etate that they believed Banks is a licensed member
ef the Dietrict of Columbia Bar notwithstanding
their having executed disclosure statements to the
te eat \3 B.. a renee on Pan
privacy protec personnel information about Banks
and Banke’ cliente te be published ia violation of
the privacy act and in violation ef 5 08,0,

38

frustrate and oth ey wise interfere with

Banks! ability to enforce his federal

rights and contracts arising out of Banks’

exercise of federal rights by allowing

Stuart Pierson te “SC ‘the power and

infiuenee of the B.65 COUFt Of Appeals to

waste the ddentitie® Of Banks’ clients
aid theteathae taéiyence Banks' clients to
fits Samptatnke agaénst Banks and these
compleinpte heave keep utilized by Stuart
Pierson [Chairman 0D.C.C.A. CUPL] to

selectively prosecute Banks and influence

552(a), that CUPL stigmatized and interferred with
Banks’ contracts, contractual relations, and
ability to make and enforce contracts, caused self-
serving false, adverse, stigmatizing information to
be published in the Legal Times, a co-defendant of
D.C.C.A. CUPL, in @ case brought by Banks, and that
these actions were done with impugnity, condoned by
D.C.C.A., When CUPL substantially relied upon
absolute immunity of D.C.C.A. and its employees
bes carrying out these malicious, wrongful attacks
By, and van abus ereating a hostile work

sive work environment for

gr violation law. The Supreme Court

banks the contents ea an abusive and hostile

werk environment. See

Qeresa Harris v. Forklift

®2~168, decided Nov. 9, 1993, citing

Sector Savihsa Banks s,Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66
(1d88)

49

others to prosecute Banks for exercising
rights under federal laws providing for
equal civil rights under the pretext of
prosecuting D.C. Ct. App. Rule 49.
Notwithstanding Banks’ restricted
representation of parties before federal
administrative agencies and administrative
agencies of the District of Columbia that
do not require a license to practice law,
Banks has been denied and cannot enforce
these statutory and federal rights in the
courts of the District of Columbia.
D.C.C.A. and its Committee "CUPL" and
the District of Columbia Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs Agency has selectively
interpreted and enforced D.C. App. R. 49
against Banks as_ precluding the
representation of parties before
administrative agencies by persons whom

are not licensed to practice law in the

District of Columbia and whom purport to
be the functional equivalent of a member
of the District of Columbia Bar. See Op.
of D.C.C.A. in In re Simon Banks, No. 91-
AA-883 (Decided December 6, 1993) thereby
violating Banks' rights protected by the
First Amendment, the Due Process Clause,

24 the Equal Protection Clause and the

24 The actions of the DCCA-CUPL, DCCA and
District of Columbia Consumer & Regulatory Affair
are irrational and effectively denies Banks due
process rights. The Courts have held that an
irrational decision denys substantive due process,
See Shelton v. Station, 780 F.2d 475. The actions

are arbitrary and unreasonable. See Unity Ventures
v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend
5S. In

. , 859 F.2d 929, the court held:
“Substantive due process prevents governmental
power from being used for purposes of oppression or
abuse of government power tht shocks the
conscience, or action that is legally irrational in
that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate
state interest.

The Courts have opined: “Due process includes
an impartial tribunal. See Melton v. City of
Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706. See further, Board of

, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.

Regents v. Roth
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
The courts have granted mandamus against

judge where there was clear usurpation of power
and/or where the court has acted arbitrarily and in
disregard of appropriate safeguards, i.e. in
violation of established procedural rights. See
F e Ti 4 Ve e &

41

25

Privileges and Immunities Clause.

-, CA. Md. 1970, 431 F.2d 1199, cert
er 91 s.ct. 1196.

The Courts have held that: "Citizens of the
United States are afforded Constitutional
protection against deprivation of property without
due process of law. Such protection is available
to persons arbitrarily deprived of their rights by
state and federal action whether under guise of
legislative authority or otherwise. See
Wagne, Inc. v. Leser, 239 U.S. 207 (1915); Gotkin
v. Miller (1957, CA N.Y.) 514 F.2d 125;

(1972), 408 U.S. 564 (1972);

F v. ev 72), 407 U.S. 167; Perry v.
Sinderman (1972) 408 U.S. 593, and 42 U.S.C. §
1983.

The D.C. Code [DCAPA] § 1-1509 sets forth the
procedures required of District of Columbia
Agencies, and the rights of parties in contested
cases -- and the legal rights, duties, or
privileges of specific parties and _ their
representatives as required by law. Chevy Chas

‘ Vv P
D.C. App., 327 A.2d 310 (1974), and agency actions
may be set aside when the agency's action does not
accord a party the procedural rights provided by
the D.C. Code, 1-1509(b) See Carey v. District

t Comp. Bd., D.C. App. 304 A.2d 18

U
(1973).

The Courts have opined: "The concept of
Substantive Due Process invest judges with
uncanalized discretion to invalidate federal and
state action that violates the constitution. See

| | ‘n_v. Falk, 818 F.2d
1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1987).

25~The Privileges and Immunities Clause
provide that:
“Citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens of the serval

states." See New Hampshire v. Piper,
42

D.C.C.A. Rule 49 conflicts with
constitutionally proteded federal laws and
are preempted pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause.*® Banks further alleged that the
D.C.C.A. Rule 49 has been selectively
applied to him, by custom, policy and
practice of D.C.C.A. in a dissimilar and
discriminatory manner, because of his
race, Black, and because Banks filed civil

complaints against the D.C. Court of

470 U.S. 284.

Further, D.C.C.A.'s discriminatory
enforcement of D.C. App. R. 49 against Banks does
not bear a substantial or rational relationship to
the District of Columbia Government’s ligitimate
objectives. Piper, supra, 470 U.S. at 284, United

Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 209.

The Court has stated: “States have an obligation,
under the supremacy clause, to protect federally
guaranteed civil rights as zealously as would

federal courts. Rachel v. State of Ga., 86 S.Ct.
1783.

“When federal law is passed under authority
of Constitution, it is supreme, and state law in
conflict therewith must yeild. Pritchard v. Downie,
D.C. Ark. 1962, 201 F. Supp. 893, affirmed 309 F.2d
634.

43

Appeals for condoning the unlawful

activities of James Schaller, Stuart
Pierson and CUPL.

Banks alleged in his removal petition
that from 1984 to the present he has been
and is being prosecuted in connection with
his attempt to exercise federally
guaranteed rights conferred pursuant to
the civil rights act of 1964,*’ because
he is Black and because he is an advocate

against discrimination in the workplace,

27

The Supreme Court in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. at
792, stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
---"is clearly a law conferring a specific right of
racial equality, for in § 201 (a) it guarantees to
all the “full and equal enjoyment" of the
facilities of any place of public accommodation
without discrimination on the ground of race. By
that language the Act plainly qualifies as a "law
providing for ...equal civil rights" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1). ... The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 endows the defendants with a
right not to be prosecuted for such conduct.

" As noted, § 201 (a) guarantees to the
defendants the equal access they sought. section
203 then provides that, "No person shall...(c)
punish or attempt to punish any person for
exercising or attempting to exercise any right or
privilege secured by section 201 or 202.”
(Emphasis supplied.) 78 Stat. 244.

44

and because he regularly brings
discrimination complaints against
employers represented by members of the
District of Columbia Bar. Banks allege
that the actions of DCCA-CUPL and DCRA in
its enforcement of D.C. App. Ct. R. 49 is
violative of rights protected by 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. *8 Banks further allege that he

- SECTION 1983
In 1979 Congress extended Section 1983 to

make it available as a remedy for deprivations of
federal rights by officials acting under color of
the laws of the District of Columbia. Pub. L. No-
170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284 (1979). In amending
Section 1983 Congress intended to put citizens of
the District of Columbia on the same footing as
citizens of the states. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No.
96-548, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 1 (1979) (purpose of
legislation is “to give citizens of the District of
Columbia rights equal to those of citizens in the
states and territories of the United States”).
Congress thus intended that federal jurisdiction
should extend to vindicate the federal rights of
citizens of the District of Columbia in the same
way it extends to citizens of the states.

In a case such as the instant case where the
official policy is to selectively and
discriminatorily enforce D.C.C.A. Rule, 49, DCRA-
CPPA and other laws against Banks, the court has
held such official policy unlawful. See Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658, 690 (1978), See also Pembour v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.s. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986).

Federal intervention is warranted because

45

also represented a former’ secretary

employee of Stuart Pierson and the law
firm of Davis Wright Tremaine, for sexual
harassment. Davis Wright Tremaine employs
Stuart Pierson, Chairman of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of law. Banks has
filed suit against DCCA, DCCA-CUPL, James
Schaller, [former Chairman of DCCA-CUPL]
Jackson & Campbell [Schaller's law firm],

Stuart Pierson, and Davis Wright Tremaine

ee ee) ee Cd te. Aan el

eee eee

Petitioner cannot receive a fair and full day in
court on his federal constitutional claims by
raising them as a defense in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, or the District of
Columbia Courts based upon the consistent apparent
boycott of these federal rights. This case consist
of the extraordinary circumstances that Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 envision that provide that
federal courts may not enjoin on-going state
criminal proceedings. The United states District
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit

has not determined whether the Younger doctrine is
applicable to the federal courts in the District of

Columbia. See Family Division Trial Lawyers v.
Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 701, n.7 (D.C. Cir.1984).

The predicate for Younger abstension is simply
absent in this case.

46

{[Pierson's law firm]. Because Banks civil
suits, DCCA-CUPL has been subjecting Banks
to retaliation and reprisal through their
government positions, for purposes of
manufacturing defenses to the civil suits
and for purposes of oppressing Banks and
depriving Banks [a Black Male] of Civil
Rights, in violation of law. 42 U.S.C. §
1983.

‘ D.C.C.A. in In Re Simon Banks, 561
A.2d 158 (D.C. Appeals, 1987), CUPL
initially charged Banks with leading
untutored public members into believing
that he is a licensed member of the D.C.
Bar merely by holding out that he is
authorized to represent parties before
administrative agencies. Banks countered
with disclosure statements executed by

each client acknowledging that they were

advised that Banks and Job Protectors are

47

not licensed to practice law, that Banks
is a former administratrive law judge,
that Banks has a law degree, and that
Banks is an administrative trial advocate
whom is authorized to represent clients
before federal administrative agencies.
D.C.C.A. nullified Banks’ disclosure
statements opining that statements about
Banks experience as an administrative law
judge and trial advocate and J.D. misleads
the lay public, without the benefit of any
empirical data or survey of clients. The
court substantially based its decision
upon inferences against the evidence on
the record. D.C.C.A. then cited in its
opinion In In re Banks, 561 A.2d 158 (D.C.
1987, 1989) that the defense Banks raised,
regarding his federal rights and the pre-
emption clause, was an issue before the

court in another case. See Brookens v.

48

Committee On Unauthorized Practice of Law,
D.C. 538 A.2d 1120. (1989) Banks

previously [1975-1976] was employed with
the District of Columbia Commission on
Human Rights [DC COHR] as the Chief
Administrative Law Judge. The DC OHR and
the DC COHR's rules, regulations,
specifically provide in its regulatons and
rules that a license to practice law is
not required.?? After Banks advised
D.C.C.A. that he had in excess of 500
disclosures statements, where clients
acknowledge that they were aware that
Banks is not licensed to practice law, but
authorized to represent them pursuant to
statutory law, D.C.C.A. then arbitrarily
determined that Banks' disclosure

statments confused the entire general

29 section 106.8/10 of DCR 56, District of
Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, D.C.
Law 2-38, D.C. Code §§1-2501-1-2557

49

PUDIJSR, withns t acy etetietine) steady ar
any reasonable survey of Banks‘
clients.?°

Banks alleged in the removal of the
Case, that the D.C.C.A. Committee On
Unauthorized Practice of Law and the
D.C.C.A. has seized regulatory authority
Over Banks pursuant to an injunction for
purposes of forcing him out of business,
and thereafter the D.C.C.A. subjected
Banks to discriminatory boycotts and prior
restraint of bBanks' First Amendment
Rights, when it arbitrarily precluded
Banks from stating he is a _ former
administrative law judge or otherwise
using his employment history or describing
his representation of clients as an

“administrative trial advocate” as a

competitive tool to compete against white

30 gee In re Simon Banks, 561 A.2d 158, and
memorandum of Opinion.

50

members of the Rar. in wiolation of the

First Amendment, and in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. The failure of
D.C.C.A. to declare Banks' federal rights
and failure of D.C.C.A. to determine the
constitutionality of D.C.C.A. Rule 49,
resulted in the implementation of a series
of conspiracies in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act.

Banks alleged that the D.C.C.A.
boycotted review of his appeal of the case
per curiam and en banc, and that D.C.C.A.
boycotted his motion to vacate, amend or
alter the injunction because of the
pending civil actions and because Banks
filed a complaint against D.C.C.A. Appeals
and Judge Gallagher of D.C.C.A., through

subtle coordinated actions. The Supreme

51

Comrt Aefines boerctts 3) me beyeets
initiated by D.C.C.A. continues and has
been linked to other boycotts influenced
by the D.C.C.A., the D.C. Bar Association,
attorneys employed with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and
other entities controlled by members of
the District of Columbia Bar, whom
boycotted complaints filed by Banks and
boycotted Banks as the representative of
EEO complainants from 1987 to the present
date.

These participants in the boycotts
initiated by the 0D.C.C.A. thru its

Committee CUPL, further boycotted Banks'

31 The Supreme Court has defined a boycott,
at, St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,
438 U.S. 531 (1978, Vv
+, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), as:
"...refusals to deal involving the
coordinated action of multiple actors
++" "...TO boycott means to combine in
refusing to hold relations. See Family

Vv Vv.
725 F.2d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

52

heranse of his us€ Cf his former title

"Aaministrative Law Judge” and
participated in the interference with
Banks contractual relations, prosecution
and persecution of Banks although the
District of Columbia Consumer & Regulatory
Affairs and the District of Columbia
Office of Employee Appeals have changed
the title of “Hearing Examiner" to
"Administrative Judge”, in 1991, sua
sponte by a simple memo. This changed
circumstance warrants and merits
alteration of the injunction precluding
Banks from using or referring to the title
on the basis that the District of Columbia
Government had not adopted the change
affected by the United Civil Service

Commission.?* Thereafter Banks has been

32

37 Fed/ Reg/ 1687, August 19, 1972, and by statute
on March 27, 1978. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. lV)

53

{ |

systematically deprived of a declaration

of the constitutionality of D.C.C.A. Rule
49 pursuant to the judicial boycott and
continuous deprivation of equal protection
of the laws and subjected to retroactive
rulemaking by D.C.C.A and DCRA.??

Because of the D.C.C.A.'s failure to
declare and articulate the scope of Banks'

federal rights under federal law to

represent parties before administrative

agencies coupled with the ambiguity,

33

Petitioner allege that, In In Re Simon Banks

, No. 91-AA-883, decided December

6, 1993, the D.C.C.A. did loo[k] to the future and
co-authored and otherwise chang{ed}) existing
conditions by making a new rule. DCRA Consumer
Protection Procedures Act, [CPPA], D.C. Code § 28-
3904 (1991) to be applied thereafter to all or some
part of those subject to its power. See Prentis v.
, 211 U.S. at 226, and John

Vv

al U.S.C.A. D.C., No. 91-7164, decided June l,
1993.

See Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,
488 U.S. 204 (1988) where the Court held that such
a change in law constitute invalid retroactive
rulemaking.

54

conflicting signals and public
pronouncements of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of Law pursuant in its
enforcement and interpretation of
D.C.C.A.'s Rule 49, Banks has continuously
been a victim of the boycotts engaged in
and endorsed by the D.C.C.A. under the
pretext of enforcing D.C.C.A. Rule 49,
although clearly established law and
reason reflect that D.C.C.A. Rule 49 is in
conflict with the federal rights Banks
seek to exercise under clearly established
federal laws and District of Columbia
Administrative Law.** D.C.C.A. Ct. Rule 49

essentially maintain that any

34

29 C.F.R. §1614.214(b), 29 C.F.R. §1614.605, 29
C.F.R. § 1201.31. See also

Brookens v. Committee
Qn Unauthorized Practice of Law, 538 A.2d 1120
(1988).

55

representative capacity by a non-licensed
member of the Bar, that involves
interpreting, assessing and prosecuting
issues of law, constitute unauthorized
practice of law under D.C. Law, when said
actor is not a member of the District of
Columbia Bar. This provision has been
selectively and discriminatorily enforced
against Banks. As a result of the
selective prosecutorial conduct of DCCA
CUPL, Banks has suffered a continuing
violation of his constitutional and
federal rights under federal laws that
afford such right without the requirement.
This interpretation, however, is only
applied to Banks because he is Black,
while out-of-state white attorneys not
licensed to practice law in the District
of Columbia are not subjected to any

sanction or scrutiny with respect to their

56

regular practice before administrative
agencies. There are no pro hac vice
requirements for attorneys practing
before District of Columbia and Federal
Administrative agencies that are enforced
against attorneys, whom primarily are
white. In fact these white attorneys not
licensed to practice law in the District
of Columbia are given a “constructive
waiver" and are arbitrarily excluded from
the purview of D.C.C.A. Rule 49 and the
District of Columbia Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs Consumer Protection

Procedures Act [CPPA],°° while Banks is

35

See Opinion of D.C. Ct. of App. in In re Simon
Banks, No. 91-AA-883, at p."A" 43, [Decided Dec.
6, 1993] [See Dr. Simon Banks’ Petition For Writ of
Certiorari, - Banks v. DCRA] - where the court
provides:

“This court also exercises some
authority over the unauthorized
practice of law by nonlawyers, see
D.C. App. R. 49, but there is no
statutory or other authority to the
effect that our power over the
unauthorized practice of law is

57

vigorously singled out for’ selective
prosecution for his enjoyment and exercise
of the same benefits and privileges
afforded by federal law, in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend 14 §1.°°.

The D.C.C.A. has systematically and
historically not prosecuted white members
of the District of Columbia Bar and white
members of other state bars’~ that
represented parties before federal
administrative agencies located in the
District of Columbia. See D.C. Ct. App.R.
46 II (b)(1), the predecessor of D.C.C.A.

Rule 49. The Rule provides specific

exclusive. Although the Consumer
Protection Procedures Act excludes
from its purview the “professional
services of...lawyers,” D.C. Code §
28-3903 (c)(2)(C) (1991)."

36 The Equal Protection Clause of U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend 14 §1, is a “Law Providing Equal
Rights" within meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1443. See

Dedd v. Rue, D.C. Ohio 1979, 478 F. Supp. 975.

58

details regarding the import of the phrase
"practice of law,' R.46 II (b)(2) & (3),
and it also excludes from its scope
attorneys who are ‘participating...
before any court of the United States' or
‘before any department, commission or
agency of the United States." See also

Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774 (1980),

and Simon Banks v. District of Columbia

Department of Consumer and Regulatory
Affairs, No. 91-AA-883, decided December

6, 1993.

The Court's Committee treated the
Simones, whom are white, in a different
manner. See § ns v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d
774 (1980) [The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals withdrew its prosecutorial
actions against Morton L. Simons and
Barbara M. Simons when it was determined

that these New York attorneys, [not

59

licensed to practice law in the District
of Columbia, restricted their practice to
federal administrative agencies. ] [EMPHASIS
ADDED]

Although Banks stands on the same if
not greater footing as the Simonses, in
addition to the fact that Banks does
reflect in his stationary, business card
and business advertisements, that he
limits his representation before
administrative agencies, Stuart Pierson,
James Schaller, the CUPL and persons and
entities acting in concert with them have
sought to treat Banks in a dissimilar
manner from the way D.C.C.A. treats the
Simonses and other whites.

There is no dispute that the CUPL
have never presented or prosecuted any
case against Banks connected with any

representation on behalf of clients by

60

Banks before any court in the District of
Columbia.

D.C.C.A. on November, 1987 issued an
injunction based upon the preclusions set
forth in D.C.C.A. Rule 49 notwithstanding
the fact that Banks consistently required
his clients to execute a disclosure
statement acknowledging that they were
aware that Banks is not licensed to
practice law and that Job Protectors is
not licensed to practice law, but that
Banks is licensed thru the regulatory
rules of various administrative agencies
to represent parties before federal and
state administrative agencies whom afford
lay representation of parties. See In re
Simon Banks, 561 A.2d 158.

The District of Columbia Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs Agency [DCRA] in

conspiracy with’ the D.C.C.A. CUPL

61

promulgated new retroactive regulations in
1991 designed to subject Banks’ to
reprisal, on the basis of enforcing D.C.
App. Ct. Rule 49 and the injunction that
arose out of D.C.C.A.'s interpretation of
Rule 49, after Banks sued DCRA in 1989.
37 The New regulations, DCRA's Consumer
Protection Procedures Act, [CPPA] D.C.
Code § 28-3904 (1991) preclude non members
of the bar from even indicating that they
are the functional equivalent of a member
of the Bar, is overly broad and
unconstitutional.

The United States Government
Administrative Agencies established a

boycott operating in concert with

37

See simon Banks v. Aubrey H. Edwards, et al, USCA
DC No. 94-5058 [Aubrey H. Edwards was director of
DCRA. Banks sued DCRA for adopting new retroactive
rules in 1986, precluding Banks from representing
clients before the D.c. Rental Accommodations
office where Banks served as a Chief Hearing
Examiner and Administrative Law Judge}

62

employees of the D.C. Court of Appeals,
James Schaller and Stuart Pierson,
Chairmen of D.C.C.A. CUPL, and these
agencies that employed members of the D.C.
Bar interferred with Banks' ability to
make and enforce contracts in interstate
commerce, based upon Rule 49 and the
injunction that arose out of D.C.C.A.
CUPL's enforcement of D.C.C.A. Rule 49.
Banks sued D.C.C.A., EEOC, the Virginia
Bar, the D.C. Bar, and others’ for
establishing a Racketeering Conspiracy,
and for conspiring to deprive Banks of
civil rights, et cetera. Banks _v.
District of Columbia Government, 89-0871,
Banks v. Dixon, et al, 91-3099; Banks v.

Teitelman, et al, 93-0152.
D.C.C.A.' employees, James Schaller,

Stuart Pierson, CUPL, have initiated and

otherwise triggered retroactive

63

legislation and a boycott of Banks and Job
Protectors in the District of Columbia
DCRA, °° in the State of Virginia, in the
State of Maryland, and they are attempting
to establish a boycott of Banks/Job
Protections and retroactive legislation in
the State of Georgia for purposes of
discriminatorily depriving Banks of
federal rights in the 50 States throughout
the United States. See Pierson's letter
to Cooper, dated December 8, 1993 a
resident of the State of Georgia. °?
Thereby discriminatorily impairing

commerce in violation of the Sherman Act.

38 DCRA Consumer Protective Procedures Act,

Stuart Pierson, Chairman of District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, wrote to Banks’ client C. Roger
Cooper, whom resides in the State of Georgia, on
Decembr 8, 1993, urging Cooper, two days subsequent
to the D.C.C.A.'s decision dated December 6, 1993
in In Re Simon Banks v. DCRA, No. 91-AA-883, to
declare that he thought Banks was a licensed
attorney and the functional equivalent to a lawyer,
for prosecutorial reasons, prior to Banks being
afforded opportunity to appeal.

64

CONCLUSION

Banks request this Honorable Court to
remand the case to the United States
District Court for a hearing on the
merits, and direct the District Court to
determine the constitutionality of
D.C.C.A. Rule 49, and provide Banks with a
hearing on his motion to vacate the
injunction, and declare Banks' federal and
statutory rights to represent parties
before administrative agencies that
provide for lay representation of parties,
and to declare Banks' right to refer to
his former employment with the District of
Columbia Government as an Administrative
Law Judge as provided by the First
Amendment, and to determine Banks’ right
to refer to his service as provided by the
First Amendment, as that of an

“administrative trial advocate”

65

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DR. SIMON BANKS, J.D.
a/b/a Job Protectors
Former Administrative Law Judges

Petitioner,

Vv.
Civil Action No. 92-1504

STUART F. PIERSON, Chairman,
District of Columbia Court of
Appeals Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of Law,

Respondent.

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on
the Petitioner's Petion for Removal.
After careful consideration of the
petition, and for the reasons set forth in
the accompanying Memorandum, the Court
concludes that this case must be remanded.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that this case is remanded.

Date: JUL 13, 1992

JOHN GARRETT PENN

CHIEF JUDGE

APP-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DR. SIMON BANKS, J.D.
a/b/a Job Protectors
Former Administrative Law Judges

Petitioner,

Vv.
Civil Action No. 92-1504

STUART F. PIERSON, Chairman,
District of Columbia Court of
Appeals Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of Law,

Respondent.
MEMORANDUM

This matter is before the Court on
Plaintiff's Petition for Removal. On June
25, 1992, petitioner filed the petition
for removal. The underlying action that
petitioner seeks to remove is In Re Simon
Banks,+ D.C.C.A. No. 92-562, a civil
contempt proceeding brought by the
Committe on Unauthorized Practice of Law
in the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals concerning enforcement of that

1 The Court notes that petitioner has titled
the action to be removed as
£. Pierson. The Court, however, notes that the
action pending in the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals is titled In Re Simon Banks. Therefore, it
appears that petitioner has not properly removed
the pending action.

AAP-2

court's rules.

In his petition for removal,
petitioner alleges that he cannot
effectively enforce his rights in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
("Court of Appeals"). Petitioner alleges
that the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals Committee on Unauthorized Practice
of Law (the "Committee") is violating his
Civil Rights in the Committee's
enforcement of Rule 49 governing the
unauthorized practice of law. Petitioner
asserts that the that the Committee is
discriminating against petitioner based on
his race and that the Committee is
involved in a_ racketeering-conspiracy
against petitioner.

Upon consideration of the petition
for removal, the Court concludes that the
petition should be denied. The Court
cannot find a basis in law for
petitioner's petition for removal.

An appropriate Order accompanies this
Memorandum.

Date:_JUL 13, 1992

JOHN GARRETT PENN

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 92-8026
92cv01504

In re:

Simon Banks
dba
Job Protectors,

Petitioner

BEFORE: Silberman and
Henderson, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petition
for a writ of mandamus and the
preleliminary reply, it is

ORDERED that the petition for a writ
of mandamus be denied. The district court
properly denied Banks' petition for
removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443
because Banks failed to demonstrate that
the proceedings in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals ("DCCA")
deprives him of a right arising "under a
feder law ‘providing for specific civil
rights stated in terms of racial
equality,'" and that he "is ‘denied or
cannot enforce' the specified federal
rights" in that court. See Johnson v.

AAP-4

Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1974),
quoting ia v , 384 U.S. 780,
792 (1966). Further, this court is
without jurisdiction to issue a writ of
mandamus to the DCCA, or to review an
order of that court. See District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 476 (1983). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the preliminary
reply be returned to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law. See D.C.
Cir. Rule 7 (j) (1) (no responsive
pleading to a petition for a writ of
mandamus shall be permitted unless
requested by the court).

Per Curiam

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF APPEALS

No. 92-SP-652

In the Matter of:
Simon Banks,

Respondent.

Before: King and Sullivan, Associate
Judges and Newman,
Senior Judge.

ORDER

On consideration of the motions and
supporting affidavits of the Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of Law for a
temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction enjoining the
destruction of business record; an order
to show cause why the respondent should
not be held in contempt for violating this
Court's permanent injunction of November
23, a3e7) and an expansion of the
permanent injunction of November 23, 1987,
it is

ORDERED that the motion for an order
to show cause is granted, and that the
respondent shall show cause within 20 days
from the date of this order why he should
not be held in contempt for violating this

Court's injunction of November 23, 1987;
and it is

ORDERED that the motion for a
temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injuction is granted to the
extent that, prior to the final

disposition of this matter, the
respondent, the respondent's firm which is
doing business under the name "Job

Protector," and all persons, organizations
and affiliates in active concert or
participation with them are restrained
from destroying of otherwise disposing of
any books, records, computer media,
computer data, and any other tangible
objects of any kind in existence after
November 23, 1987 which relate, in any
manner to customers of respondent, the
respondent's firm "Job Protectors," or any
person, organization of affiliate. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for
an expanded permanent injunction is
premature, not ripe for disposition, and
hence is denied.

PER CURIAM

AAP-7

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386002_1022%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.