# Opinion — Hendrick v. Maryland

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opinion
- **Published:** January 1, 1915
- **Citation:** 235 U.S. 610

## Text

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612 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.
Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 235 U. 8.

The act is an illegal attempt to regulate interstate com-
merce.

Passing into or through States of the Union in auto-
mobiles is an act of interstate commerce.

The matter of interstate transportation of passengers
is one capable of uniform regulation and legislation, and
is thus exclusively within the domain of Congress and
wholly apart from regulation or interference on the part
of the States.

Where, in subjects requiring uniformity of legislation,
such as interstate transportation of passengers, the state
law comes into direct conflict with the commerce clause,
it is illegal, although a bena fide attempt to exercise the
police power of the State.

The exaction of license and registration fees as con-
ditional to the privilege of the use of the roads of the State
of Maryland is av attempt to regulate interstate com-
merce directly, and imposes a burden on such commerce.

The Maryland law is unconstitutional, as violative
of the rights of citizens of the United States to pass into
and through Maryland.

The Motor Vehicle Law discriminates unconstitutionally
against the residents of the District of Columbia.

The Motor Vehicle Law is further unconstitutional,
in that it is not a bona fide exercise of the police power of
the State, but an unlawful attempt to collect revenue for
the State.

The law is unconstitutional in that the registration
fees provided for and graded according to differing scales
of payment have no relation to the necessary expense of
identifieation or control of motor vehicles, and consti-
tutes arbitrary, unequal, unfair, and class legislation, and
does not insure to the citizens of the United States equal
protection of the laws.

The tax imposed is not laid as compensation for the
use of the roads.

HENDRICK « MARYLAND. 61s
235 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error,

In support of these contentions see Adams Express Co,
vy. The Auditor, 166 U.S. 976; Bowman vo Co & NOW. R.R.,
125 U. 8. 465; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289; Chy
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97
U.S. 566; Covinglon Bridge v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204;
Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Farge v. Stierens, 121 U.S.
230: Fed. Cas., No. 18260; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1;
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196; Hen-
derson Bridge Co. v. Mayor, 141 U. 8. 679; Hendrick v.
Maryland, 115 Maryland, 552; Int. Text Book Co. v.
Pigg, 217 U.S. 91; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U.S.
423; Leisy v. Hardin, 100 U.S. 135; Leloup v. Mobile,
127 U. 8. 640: License Cases, 5 How. 504, 592; Mobile
Co. v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691; Moran v. New Orleans, 112
U.S. 69; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 75; Pickard v. Pullman
Co., 117 U.S. 34; Pullman Co. v. Twombly, 29 Fed. Rep.
667: Railroad Co. v. Hasen, 95 U.S. 465; Robbins v.
Shelby Co., 120 U.S. 489; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall,
394: State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; United States v.
Col. & N. W. R. R., 157 Fed. Rep. 325; Welton v. Mis-
sourt, 91 U.S. 295; Williams v. Fears, 50 L. R.A.
685: Cooley on Const. Lim., Sth ed., p. 501; Cooley on
Taxation, 2d ed., p. 99; 8 Cye., p. 1042; Miller on
Const. Law, p. 260; Publie General Laws of Maryland,
1910, ch. 207, $$ 131, 182, 133, 1386, 187, 138, 140d, 1400,
140p, 140r.

Mr. Enos S. Stockbridge and Mr. Edgar Allan Poe,
Attorney General of the State of Maryland, for defendant
in error:

The act of 1910 is a valid exercise of police power by
the State of Maryland.

There are not any new or unusual principles involved
in this ease, but simply the application of doctrines long
recognized, and at this late date thoroughly crystallized.
Since Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 208, this court has ree-

+

Argument for Defendant in Error. 235 U.S.

bt OCTOBER ‘TERM, 1014.

ognized the right of the States to regulate and control
their highways under what is termed ‘‘the police power.”
Cardwell v. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205; Phillips v. Mobile,
208 U.S. 472; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. 8. 352, 411;
New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; Barbier v. Connolly, 118
U.S. 27, 31; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana, 115 U. 5.
650, 661; Jones v. Brim, 165 U.S. 180, 182; Glouccster
Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 215; Slaughter
House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 63; Escanaba Trans. Co. vy.
Chicago, 107 U. S. 678; Lake Shore v. Ohio, 173 U.S.
285, 303; Robbins v. Shelby Co., 120 U.S. 489.

Since the automobile came into more or less common
use, this precise question has not been before this court;
but see decisions in state courts, holding such regulations
to be a proper exercise of this power. Ruggles v. State,
120 Maryland, 553, 561; Ayres v. Chicago, 239 Illinois, 237;
Commonwealth vy. Kingsbury, 199 Massachusetts, 542,
544; State v. Mayo, 106 Maine, 62; Brazier v. Philadelphia,
215 Pa. St. 297; Bozeman v. State, 7 Ala. App. 151; Unwen
v. New Jersey, 73 N. J. L. 529, aff'd 75 N. J. L. 500;
Kane v. Titus, 81 N. J. L. 594.

Although regulation by the States may incidentally
affect interstate commerce, nevertheless, such regulation
is valid until Congress does act. Minnesota Rate Cases,
230 U.S. 352, 411; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 333; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154
U.S. 204, 209; Robbins v. Shelby Co., 120 U.S. 489; Huse
v. Glover, 119 U.S. 548.

Legislation having for its purpose the regulation of
highways and the protection of life and property against
those using the highways, is a matter of local concern
and not national in its character. Mobile Co. v. Kimball,
102 U.S. 691, 697.

In the absence of any light on the question from the
record, the court cannot pass on the question as to whether
the amount of the licenses prescribed by the act in ques-

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HENDRICK ¢ MARYLAND. ols
235 U. 3. Argument for Defendant in Error.

tion bears any relation to the necessary expense of iden-
tification or control of motor vehicles operated in the
State of Maryland. Red “C” Oil Co. y. North Carolina,
222 U.S. 380; Atl. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190
U.S. 165; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U.S. 419;
Patapsco Guano Co. vy. North Carolina, 171 U. 8. 354;
Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. 8. 423, 429; Foote v. Mary-
land, 232 U.S. 494, 504.

The mere fact that the funds received by the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles are to be turned over to the
State Treasurer for the benefit of a road fund, does not
render this law invalid as a tax under the guise of the
police power. Morgan vy. Louisiana, 18 U.S. 455; Huse
v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 549; Cleary v. Johnston, 79 N. J.
L. 49; Hardin Storage Co. v. Chicago, 235 Illinois, 58, 68.

The fact that the law operates only on motor vehicles
does not create an unreasonable classification of vehicles
using the roads, and is not an unlawful discrimination
against a particular class. Jones v. Brim, 165 U.S. 180;
State v. Mayo, 106 Maine, 62; Christy v. Elliott, 216
Illinois, 31; State v. Swagerty, 203 Missouri, 517.

The Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to
abridge the police power of the State. If the act in
question is properly within the police power of the
State, this court will not inquire further. Lochner
vy. New York, 198 U. 8. 45, 538; Barbier v. Connolly, 118
U.S. 27; Minn. Rwy. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 33; L’Hote
y. New Orleans, 177 U. 8. 587, 596; Howse v. Mays, 219
U. S. 270, 282; Broadnax v. Missouri, 219 U. S. 285,
292; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691,
700.

Plaintiff in error was not engaged in interstate com-
merce. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. 8. 152, 161; Williams v.
Walsh, 222 U.S. 415, 422; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
189: Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. 8. 691, 702; Covington
Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. 8. 204; Hoke v. United

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616 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.
Argument for Defendant in Error. 235 U.S.

States, 227 U. S. 308, 320; Wabash &c. Ry. v. Illinois,
LIS U.S. 556, 572

In order to say that a person or thing is moving in in-
terstate commerce, the movement must be meri
Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665.

The right of the citizens to go to and he the States
of the Union is not based upon the theory that by so
doing they are engaged in interstate commerce. It is
expressly put upon another ground in Crandall v. Nevada,
6 Wall. 35, 44.

The act is not in conflict with the commerce clause,
although commerce between a State and the District
of Columbia is ogre commerce. Stoutenburgh v.
Hennick, 129 U. S. 141; Hanley v. Kansas &c. Ry., 187
U.S. 617.

The States or their agents, municipal or private, may
make and collect a charge for facilities rendered, and such
a charge is not a tax or burden on or interference with
interstate commerce, although it may incidentally affect
interstate commerce. In return for the additional facili-
ties and improved conveniences provided, States are per-
mitted to charge and collect reasonable compensation.

As to toll charges for the use of improved navigable
streams see Kellogg v. Union Co., 12 Connecticut, 7; Huse
v. Glover, 119 = S. 543, 548; Gloucester Ferry v. Pennsyl-
vania, 114 U.S. 196, 214: Sands v. Manistee River, 123
U. S. 288; ecieaihe Nav. Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 333; Thames Bank v. Lovell, 18 Connecticut,

As to bridges over navigable streams see Escanaba Co.
v. Chicago, 107 U. 8. 678, 683; The Binghamton Bridge,
3 Wall. 51; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S
204, 221.

As to use of wharves or docks see Cannon v. _ Orleans,
20 Wall. 577; Packet . v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Packet
Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. 8S. 423; Vick eos v. Tobin, 100

HENDRICK v. MARYLAND. 617
235 U. S. Argument for Defendant in Error.

U.S. 430; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. 8. 559; Trans-
portation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. 8. 691; Packet Co.
v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 548;
All. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 190 U.S. 160, 163.

As to the use of roads or streets see Tomlinson vy. In-
dianapolis, 144 Indiana, 142; Monongahela Nav. Co. v.
United States, 148 U. 8. 312, 333; Cleary v. Johnston, 79
N. J. L. 49; Kane v. Titus, 81 N. J. L. 594.

The police power is a very extensive one, and is fre-
quently exercised where it also results in raising a revenue.
Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. 8. 472, 478; Transportation
Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. 8. 691, 699; Packet Co. v. Aiken,
121 U.S. 444, 449; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 549.

Citizens of the States and United States have the
right to go into and leave any State of this Union without
hindrance. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Ward v.
Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430; Slaughter House Cases, 16
Wall. 36, 75.

A State may protect its own citizens and property,
although the exercise of this right by the State may in-
cidentally or remotely affect the right. Railroad Co. v.
Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 473; Minnesota Rate Cases, 239 U.S.
352, 406.

A State is justified in requiring those, who elect to use
on its highways a mode of travel that is abnormally de-
structive to that road, to compensate it for such use.
Kane v. Titus, 81 N. J. L. 594.

The act constitutes no unlawful discrimination against
residents of the District of Columbia. I[t is a proper exer-
cise by the State of its police power. The alleged dis-
crimination cannot be complained of under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Act could only be invalid under the
privileges and immunities clause, or the equal protection
of the laws clause. These clauses go no further than to
prohibit the States from imposing greater restrictions or
burdens on citizens of other States or the United States

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O18 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.
Opinion of the Court. 235 U.S.

than it does on its own citizens. The act conforms to this.
Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 480; Slaughter House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 77; Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239,
249, 256.

Residents of the District of Columbia are classified
differently from the residents of other States except
Maryland. This classification is a reasonable one, and
rests upon a well founded ground of distinction of which
the court will take judicial notice. The court will also
take judicial notice of the fact that there is no large city
in any other State so situated with respect to the borders
of Maryland. This is conclusive of the justness of the
classification. Heath v. Worst, 207 U.S. 388, 355; Patsone
v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144; Osan Lumber Co. v.
Bank, 207 U.S. 251; Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U.S.
618.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDs delivered the opinion of the
court.

Plaintiff in error was tried before a Justice of the Peace,
Prince George’s County, Maryland, upon a charge of
violating the Motor Vehicle Law. A written motion to
quash the warrant because of conflict between the statute
and the Constitution of the United States was denied; he
was found guilty and fined. Thereupon an appeal was
taken to the Circuit Court—the highest in the State
having jurisdiction—where the cause stood for trial de
novo upon the original papers. It was there submitted
for determination by the court upon an agreed statement
of facts grievously verbose but in substance as follows:

The cause was originally brought July 27, 1910, before
a Justice of the Peace for Prince George’s County by the
State against John T. Hendrick for violating § 133 of the
Motor Vehicle Law effective July 1, 1910. He is and then
was a citizen of the United States, resident and commorart

HENDRICK ve MARYLAND. G19
235 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

in the District of Columbia. On that day he left his office
in Washington in his own automobile and drove it into
Prince George’s County and while temporarily there was
arrested on the charge of operating it upon the highways
without having procured the certificate of registration
required by § 133 of the Motor Vehicle Law. He was
brought before a Justice of the Peace and fined fifteen
dollars after having been found guilty of the charge set
out in a warrant duly issued—a motion to quash having
been denied. Whereupon he filed his appeal. At the
time and place aforesaid he had not procured the certificate
of registration for his automobile required by § 133. Upon
the foregoing the court shall determine the questions and
differences between the parties and render judgment
according as their rights in law may appear in the same
manner as if the facts aforesaid were proven upon the
trial. Either party may appeal.

The Maryland legislature, by an act effective July 1,
1910 (ec. 207, Laws 1910, 168, at p. 177), prescribed a com-
prehensive scheme for licensing and regulating motor
vehicles. The following summary sufficiently indicates
its provisions:

The Governor shall appoint a commissioner of motor
vehicles, with power to designate assistants, who shall
secure enforcement of the statute. Before any motor
vehicle is operated upon the highways the owner shall
make a statement to the commissioner and procure a
certificate of registration; thereafter it shall bear a num-
bered plate. This certificate and plate shall be evidence
of authority for operating the machine during the current
year (§ 133). Registration fees are fixed according to
horse-power—six dollars when 20 or less; twelve dollars
when from 20 to 40; and eighteen dollars when in excess
of 40 (§ 136). No person shall drive a motor vehicle upon
the highway until he has obtained at a cost of two dollars
an operator’s license, subject to revocation for cause

Theo ae ae arb NAR Vip OT cee Ah OM SD RG ROS ONENESS

620 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 235 U.S.

(§ 137). Any owner or operator of an automobile, non-
resident of Maryland, who has complied with the laws of
the State in which he resides requiring the registration
of motor vehicles, or licensing of operators thereof, ete.,
may under specified conditions obtain a distinguishing
tag and permission to operate such machine over the
highways for not exceeding two periods of seven consecu-
tive days in a calendar year without paying the ordinary
fees for registration and operator's license (§ 140a); but
residents of the Distriet of Columbia are not included
amongst those to whom this privilege is granted (§ 132).
Other sections relate to speed, rules of the road, acci-
dents, signals, penalties, arrests, trials, fines, ete. All
money collected under the provisions of the Act go to the
commissioner, and except so much as is necessary for
salaries and expenses must be paid into the state treasury
to be used in construction, maintaining, and repairing
the streets of Baltimore and roads built or aided by a
county or the State itself. Section 140a is copied in the
margin. !

1“ 1400. Any owner or operator not a resident of this State who shall
have complied with the laws of the State in which he resides, requiring
the registration of motor vehicles or licensing of operators thereof and
the display of identification or registration numbers on such vehicles,
and who shall cause the identification numbers of such State, in accord-
ance with the laws thereof, and none other, together with the initial
letter of said State, to be displayed on his motor vehicle, as in this
subtitle provided, while used or operated upon the public highways of
this State, may use such highways not exceeding two periods of seven
consecutive days in each calendar year, without complying with the
provisions of Sections 133 and 137 of this subtitle; if he obtains from
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and displays on the rear of such
vehicle a tag or marker which the said Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
shall issue in such form and contain such distinguishing marks as he may
deem best; provided, that if any non-resident be convicted of violating
any provisions of Sections 140), 140c, 140d, 140e and 140/ of this sub-
title, he shall thereafter be subject to and required to comply with all
the provisions of said Sections 133 and 137 relating to the registration of

HENDRICK v. MARYLAND. 621
235 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff in error maintains that the act is void because
—It discriminates against residents of the District of
Columbia; attempts to regulate interstate commerce;
violates the rights of citizens of the United States to pass
into and through the State; exacts a tax for revenue—not
mere compensation for the use of facilities —according
to arbitrary classifications, and thereby deprives citizens
of the United States of the equal protection of the laws.

If the statute is otherwise valid, the alleged discrimina-
tion against residents of the District of C olumbia is not
adequate ground for us now to declare it altogether bad.
At most they are entitled to equality of treatment, and
in the absence of some definite and authoritative ruling
by the courts of the State we will not assume that upon
a proper showing this will be denied. The record fails
to disclose that Hendrick had complied with the laws
in force within the District of Columbia in respect of
registering motor vehicles and licensing operators, or that
he applied to the Maryland commissioner for an identi-
fying tag or marker—prerequisites to a limited use of
the highways without cost by residents of other States
under the plain terms of § 140a. He cannot therefore set
up a claim of discrimination in this particular. Only
those whose rights are directly affeeted can properly ques-
tion the constitutionality of a state statute and invoke
our jurisdiction in respect thereto. Hatch v. Reardon,
204 U. S. 152, 161; Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415,
423: Collins v. Texas, 223 U. 8. 288, 295, 296; Missouri,

motor vehicles and the licensing of operators thereof; and the Governor
of this State is hereby authorized and empowered to confer and advise
with the proper officers and legislative bodies of other States of the
Union and enter into reciprocal agreements under which the registra-
tion of motor vehicles owned by residents of this State will be recog-
nized by such other States, and he is further authorized and empowered,
from time to time, to grant to residents of other States the privilege
of using the roads of this State as in this section provided in return for
similar privileges granted residents of this State by such other States.”

22 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court: 235 U.S.

Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U. 5. 642, 648, and
cases cited.

The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is
attended by constant and serious dangers to the public,
and is also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves.
Their success depends on good roads the construction and
maintenance of which are exceedingly expensive; and in
recent years insistent demands have been made upon the
States for better facilities, especially by the ever-increasing
number of those who own such vehicles. As is well known,
in order to meet this demand and accommodate the grow-
ing traffic the State of Maryland has built and is main-
taining a system of improved roadways. Primarily for
the enforcement of good order and the protection of those
within its own jurisdiction the State put into effect the
above-described general regulations, including require-
ments for registration and licenses. A further evident
purpose was to secure some compensation for the use of
facilities provided at great cost from the class for whose
needs they are essential and whose operations over them
are peculiarly injurious.

In the absence of national legislation covering the sub-
ject a State may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations
necessary for public safety and order in respect to the
operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles—those
moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And
to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles
and the licensing of their drivers, charging therefor rea-
sonable fees graduated according to the horse-power of
the engines—a practical measure of size, speed, and dif-
ficulty of control. This is but an exercise of the police
power uniformly recognized as belonging to the States
and essential to the preservation of the health, safety
and comfort of their citizens; and it does not constitute a
direct and material burden on interstate commerce. The
reasonableness of the State’s action is always subject to

a, BM STE 5 ARI ie EG DAM A dele CEN LN le ale) RAE SIN

HENDRICK v. MARYLAND. 623
935 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

inquiry in so far as it affects interstate commerce, and in
that regard it is likewise subordinate to the will of Con-
gress. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30, 31; Smith v.
Alabama, 124 U. 8. 465, 480; Lavwton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133, 136; N. Y.,N. HW. & H.R. R. v. New York, 165 U.S.
628, 631; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. 8. 366, 392; Lake
Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Ohio, 173 U.S.
985, 298; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. MeGuire, 219 U.S.
549, 568; Allantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U. 5. 280,
291.

In Smith v. Alabama, supra, consideration was given
to the validity of an Alabama statute forbidding any en-
gineer to operate a railroad train without first undergoing
an examination touching his fitness and obtaining a license
for which a fee was charged. The language of the court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Matthews, in reply to the
suggestion that the statute unduly burdened interstate
commerce and was therefore void, aptly declares the doc-
trine which is applicable here. He said (p. 480):

“But the provisions on the subject contained in the
statute of Alabama under consideration are not regula-
tions of interstate commerce. It is a misnomer to call
them such. Considered in themselves, they are parts of
that body of the local law wanich, as we have already seen,
properly governs the relation between carriers of pas-
sengers and merchandise and the public who employ them,
which are not displaced until they come in conflict with
express enactments of Congress in the exercise of its
power over commerce, and which, until so displaced,
according to the evident intention of Congress, remain
as the law governing carriers in the discharge of their
obligations, whether engaged in the purely internal com-
merce of the State or in commerce among the States.”

The prescribed regulations upon their face do not
appear to be either unnecessary or unreasonable.

In view of the many decisions of this court there can be

OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 235 U.S.

no serious doubt that where a State at its own expense
furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in
commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may exact
compensation therefor. The amount of the charges and
the method of collection are primarily for determination
by the State itself; and so long as they are reasonable and
are fixed according to some uniform, fair and practical
standard they constitute no burden on interstate com-
merce. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691,
699; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 548, 549; Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 329, 330;
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. 8. 352, 405; and authorities
cited. The action of the State must be treated as correct
unless the contrary is made to appear. In the instant case
there is no evidence concerning the value of the facilities
supplied by the State, the cost of maintaining them, or
the fairness of the methods adopted for collecting the
charges imposed; and we cannot say from a mere inspec-
tion of the statute that its provisions are arbitrary or
unreasonable.

There is no solid foundation for the claim that the stat-
ute directly interferes with the rights of citizens of the
United States to pass through the State, and is eon-
sequently bad according to the doetrine announced in
Crandall y. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. In that case a direct tax
was laid upon the passenger for the privilege of leaving
the State; while here the statute at most attempts to
regulate the operation of dangerous machines on the
highways and to charge for the use of valuable facilities.

As the capacity of the machine owned by plaintiff in
error does not appear, he cannot complain of discrimina-
tion because fees are imposed according to engine power.
Distinctions amongst motor machines and between them
and other vehicles may be proper—essential indeed—and
those now challenged are not obviously arbitrary or
oppressive. The statute is not a mere revenue measure

NORFOLK & WESTERN RY. ¢. HOLBROOK, 625
935 U.S. Statement of the Case.

and a discussion of the classifications permissible under
such an act would not be pertinent.
There is no error in the judgment complained of and
it is accordingly
Affirmed.

NO.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386002_0425%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.