# Opposition Brief — Imperial County Air Pollution Control District v. Sierra Club

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 542 U.S. 919

## Text

5

No. 03-1334

s ipreme Co U.S.
FILED

MAY 2 1 2004

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IMPERIAL COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT

PETITIONER
VU.

SIERRA CLUB, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION

THEODORE B. OLSON
Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

THOMAS L. SANSONETTI
Assistant Attorney General

D. JUDITH KEITH
Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217

GUEST AVAILABLE COPY |

RAGS 52 BAT RR RS OS REET EY GINA oS BRR VERRIER DL RR br

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding
arbitrary and capricious the finding of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) that the State of California had
established that the Imperial Valley Planning Area’s
nonattainment of the national ambient air quality standards
for particulate matter of 10 microns or less by the
applicable attainment date under the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. 7401 et seq., was due to emissions from sources in
Mexico.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in remanding
EPA’s finding to the Agency with instructions that the
Imperial Valley Planning Area be reclassified from a
moderate to a serious nonattamment area.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def.
Comet, 608 U.S. 67 (10GB) 2... cece cccccees 10
Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light
SORE MPC MEMEMPURD occ cccaccvcvevveseccevcecss 8
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729
i eee eee eho ce sway cabdabevenaes 8-9, 11
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) .......... 14
INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) ............... 13, 14
INS v. Yi Quan Chen, 527 U.S. 1016 (2002) ......... 14
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. |
ee a kas a ts chan een 7-8, 10 |

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm M ut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) .... 10-11

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seg. ..............005. 2
EE, PED ite wecevacevccssunta 3
OP, POD oe cee cdewcevevicccce 3
§§ 108-109, 42 U.S.C. 7408-7409 ................... 3
eS Oe MPU, CORUM) nev cscenvscsccvecscccccs 3
§ 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2) 1... cece cc ee 3
§ 179B(d), 42 U.S.C. 7509a(d) ............. 2, 3, 4, 6,10
eR 3
EE Be 3
§ 188(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7513(b)(2) «2.2.2.2... ee eee 2,4

(IIT)

IV

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page
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§ 190(b)-(e), 42 U.S.C. TEIG(D)-(e) 0... ccc cece ec cence 3
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8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(4) (1994) (repealed by Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Div. C, Tit. III, § 306(b), 110 Stat.

I oe ae ban Se a ere ere eee bok ie ee 14
40 C.F .R. Pt. 50:
ee es ace ee eRe SOREN E SEO eas 3, 6
gS Eee Te Terre TT TTT COT TTR TTT ree re ee 6
Miscellaneous:

State Implementation Plans for Serious PM-10 Non-
attainment Areas, and Attainment Date Waivers
for PM-10 Nonattainment Areas Generally Ad-
dendum to the General Preamble for the Imple-
mentation of Title I ofthe Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, 59 Fed. Reg. 41,998 (1994) ............ 4

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 03-1334

IMPERIAL COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT,
PETITIONER

Vv.

SIERRA CLUB, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-16a) is
reported at 346 F.3d 955,and theamendment to the opinion
(Pet. App. 17a-19a) is reported at 352 F.3d 1186.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
October 9, 2003, and amended on December 18, 2003. A
petition for rehearing was denied on December 18, 2003
(Pet. App. 17a-19a). The petition for a writ of certiorari
was filed on March 17, 2004. The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

ae

2

STATEMENT

Petitioner seeks review of a decision of the court of
appeals arising from rulemaking under the Clean Air Act
(CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., by the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA promulgated
a rule pursuant to CAA Section 179B(d), 42 U.S.C.
7509a(d), in which the agency found that California had
established to EPA’s satisfaction that, but for wind-borne
emissions of particulate matter of 10 microns or less (PM-
10) emanating from the bordering nation of Mexico, the
Imperial Valley Planning Area (Imperial County) would
have attained CAA standards for PM-10 by the applicable
attainment date. Pet. App. 65a-9la. Asa result of that
determination, Imperial County was not subject to a find-
ing that it had failed to attain the PM-10 standards and
thus was not reclassified from a “moderate” to a “serious”
non-attainment area under CAA Section 188(b)(2), 42
U.S.C. 751&b)(2). Pet. App. 65a.

The Sierra Club petitioned for review, challenging
EPA’s rule, and the court of appeals granted the petition
and remanded with imstructions that EPA reclassify
Imperial County from a moderate to a serious nonattain-
ment area. Pet. App. la-16a. Petitioner Imperial County
Air Pollution Control District petitioned for rehearing and
moved to stay the mandate pending filing of the petition
herein. Jd. at 18a-19a.' The court of appeals denied
rehearing but granted the stay. [bid.

1. The CAA establishes a comprehensive program for
controlling and improving the nation’s air quality through

' Petitioner is the local governmental agency charged with ad-
ministering and enforcing the requirements of various air quality laws,
including the CAA, in Imperial County. Pet. App. 3a. Petitioner was
an intervenor-respondent below.

3

both state and federal regulation. Under the CAA, EPAis
directed to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for air pollutants at levels requisite to protect
public health and welfare. 42 U.S.C. 7408-7409. EPA
promulgated NAAQS for various pollutants, including PM-
10. See 40 C.F.R. Pt. 50. The PM-10 NAAQS relevant
here requires that PM-10 in ambient air in a given area of
the United States not exceed the regulatorily prescribed
level for more than one day per year. 40 C.F.R. 50.6(a).

The States have primary responsibility for ensuring
compliance with the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. 7407(a). Once
EPA promulgates a NAAQS, each State must formulate a
state implementation plan (SIP) that provides for the at-
tainment, maintenance, and enforcement of the NAAQS.
42 U.S.C. 7410(a). Each State’s SIP is subject to EPA’s
review and approval. 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2).

EPA designated areas of the countryas “attainment” or
“nonattainment,” based on whether each area satisfied the
PM-10 NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. 7407(d). EPA is required to
classify PM-10 nonattainment areas as “moderate” or
“serious.” 42 U.S.C.7513. All PM-10 nonattamment areas
were initially designated as “moderate” and were required
to achieve attainment by December 31, 1994. 42 U.S.C.
7513(a) and (c). If attainment was not achieved by that
date, then EPA was to rediassify the nonattainment area as
“serious” and to require that the nonattainment area im-
pose more stringent controls on sources of pollution and
achieve attainment by December 31, 2001. 42 U.S.C. 7513
(b)-(c).

CAA Section 179B(d), 42 U.S.C. 7509a(d), provides an
exception to reclassification. Under Section 179B(d), if a
State establishes to EPA’s satisfaction that a nonattain-
ment area would have timely attained the PM-10 NAAQS
“but for emissions emanating from outside the United

renee |

4

States,” then the nonattainment area will not be reclassi-
fied from “moderate” to “serious.” 42 U.S.C. 7509a(d); see
42 U.S.C. 7513(b)(2). In 1994, EPA issued administrative
guidance (EPA Guidance) setting forth suggested infor- |
mation and methods for evaluating the impact on a PM-10
nonattainment area of emissions emanating from
sources in a country bordering the United States.” Pet.
App. 4a-5a.

2. Imperial County is located in southeastern Cali-
fornia, and shares approximately 80 miles of border with
Mexico. Pet. App. 2a-3a. The County was classified as a
moderate PM-10 nonattainment area and was required to
attain the NAAQS by December 31, 1994. Jd. at 4a.
During the period 1992-1994, the PM-10 standards were
exceeded at various monitoring stations in the County on
seven days. Jd. at 26a. EPA, however, took no action to
reclassify Imperial County. In 2000, respondent Sierra
Club filed suit in the United States District Court for the

* See State Implementation Plans for Serious PM-10 Nonattain-
ment Areas, and Attainment Date Waivers for PM-10 Nonattainment
Areas Generally; Addendum to the General Preamble for the Imple-
mentation of Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 59 Fed.
Reg. 41,998 (1994).

The EPA Guidance identifies five examples of information and
methodology that may be used: (1) monitoring PM-10 level and wind
speed and direction near the border, and correlating changes in PM-10
levels with changesin wind direction; (2) inventorying domestic PM-10
emissions in the nonattainment area’s vicinity and demonstrating that
those emissions did not cause exceedance of the PM-10 NAAQS; (3)
analyzing ambient sample filters for specific types of particles
emanating from the bordering country; (4) comparing mventories of
PM-10 emission sources, and the relative magnitude of PM-10 emis-
sions, for foreign and domestic sources; and 6) performing air dis-
persion or receptor modeling to quantify the relative impact of domestic
and foreign sources of PM-10 on the nonattainment area. Pet. App.
5a-6a.

>

District of Columbia, seeking to compel EPA to reclassify
the County as aserious nonattainment area. That suit was
resolved by a consent decree, in which EPA agreed to make
a reclassification determination for the County by October
9,2001. Jd. at 6a.

In August 2001, EPA issued a proposed rule that
included two possible alternatives. Pet. App. 20a-64a.
Under the first alternative, EPA proposed to find that
California had established to EPA’s satisfaction that, but
for wind-borne emissions emanating from Mexico, Imperial
County would have attained the PM-10 NAAQS by
December 31, 1994, and therefore should not be re-
classified. Jd. at 24a-33a. Under the second alternative,
EPA proposed to find that Imperial County failed to attain
the NAAQS and should be reclassified. Jd. at 33a-37a.

The first alternative, which EPA ultimately adopted in
its final rule, was based on petitioner’s July 2001 “Imperial
County PM-10 Attainment Demonstration” (Attainment
Demonstration). Pet. App. 24a. Consistent with the EPA
Guidance, the Attainment Demonstration contained data
from various sources, including PM-10 monitors located in
Imperial County, spatial plots, wind roses, back tra-
jectories, and a model based on an inventory of emissions
sources in the County.’ Jd. at 26a-31a.

With respect to the PM-10 monitors, EPA proposed to
conclude that, for five of the seven days that the PM-10
NAAQS was exceeded, “the analysis clearly supports the
conclusion that but for the transport of emissions from

: Spatial plots reflect the concentration of PM-10 measure ments at
various monitoring stations in a given area. Pet. App. 15a n.7. A
windrose diagram shows the percentage of time that wind blows from
each compass direction for various ranges of wind speed. /d. at 15a
n.8. A back trajectory is a map that, by measuring wind speed and
direction a certain distance above the ground, shows the most likely
source of a given parcel of air that hits a monitor. Jd. at 15a n.9.

6

Mexico,the PM-10corcentrations would not have exceeded
the standard.” Pet. App. 27a. The other two exceedances
occurred on January 19 and 25, 19938, at the Brawley
monitoring station twenty-one miles north of the County’s
border with Mexico. Jbid.’ The proposed findings noted
that “there are less data on which to base an analysis” for
those two days. Jbid. Nonetheless, in light of the
“magnitude of emissions in the City of Mexicali” just south
of the border, the proposed finding concluded that “[t]he
emissions from Mexico are likely to have contributed to the
PM-10 concentration at the monitor, although it is difficult
to precisely quantify the extent of the contribution.” bid.
See also zd. at 54a (“{[G]iven the number of hours with a
southerly wind direction, and the closeness of the ex-
ceedance to the standard, it is likely that, but for transport
from Mexico, [the Jamary 19] exceedance would not have
occurred.”); 7d. at 55a (similar for January 25 exceedance).

The Sierra Club submitted adverse comments on the
proposed rule, contending, inter alia, that California failed
to show that Imperial County’s exceedances of the PM-10
NAAQS on January 19 and 25, 1993, were caused by
emissions from Mexico. See Pet. App. 75a-76a. EPA
promulgated a final rule on October 19, 2001, finding that
California had made the requisite showing under CAA
Section 179B(d) and thus Imperial County would not be
reclassified. Jd. at 65a-91a.

; Adjusting the two actual exceedances to account for days not

sampled, 40 C.F.R. Pt. 50, App. K, established that the expected
number of exceedances was 4.3 days per year, which is above the
regulatory standard of one day per year and would ordinarily require
reclassification as a serious nonattainment area. Pet. App. 11a; see 40
C.F.R. 50.6(a).

]

7

With respect to the PM-10 exceedances, the final rule
concluded that “given the available information,” the
State’s analysis “of spatial plots, wind roses, and back
trajectories provides the best determination of PM-10
emissions transport from Mexico.” Pet. App. 76a-77a.
EPA recognized that one study—the “Imperial Valley/
Mexicali Cross Border PM-10 Transport Study”—had
analyzed the air quality and wind direction and speed on
the days on which the NAAQS had been exceeded, in-
cluding January 19 and 25, 1993, and found the air stagnant
on those days. Jd. at 77a. But EPA concluded that “the
State’s demonstration uses more meteorological data and
finds evidence that transport [of PM-10] from Mexico is
likely even with the stagnant conditions at the surface.”
Ibid. Although EPA “concedefd] that informa-tion is not
available to determine with confidencethe exact quantity of
PM-10 coming from Mexico,” EPA found that “the State
has diligently collected and analyzed available evidence and
has successfully demonstrated for each of the exceedance
days the probability that Imperial County would not have
violated the NAAQS but for the emissions emanating from
Mexico.” Jd. at 78a.

3. Pursuant to CAA Section 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
7607(b)(1), the Sierra Club petitioned for review of EPA’s
final rule, raising the same challenges to EPA’s decision as
in its comments. Pet. App. 8a. The court of appeals
granted the petition and remanded with instructions that
Imperial County be reclassified as “serious.” Jd. at 14a.

The court of appeals recognized that where “a court
reviewsan agency action ‘involving primarily issues of fact,’
and where ‘analysis of the relevant documents requires a
high level of technical expertise,’ we must ‘defer to the
informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.’ ”
Pet. App. 9a (quoting Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res.

8

Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)). The court also con-
cluded, however, that it “may not defer to an agency de-
cision that ‘is without substantial basis in fact.’ ” Ibid.
(quoting Federal Power Comm’n v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972)).

Having articulated those standards, the court inquired
whether the record supported the conclusion that the
exceedances of the PM-10 standard on Jamary 19 and 25,
1993, at the Brawley monitors were caused by emissions
from Mexico. The court concluded that the record showed
that on the days PM-10 exceedances were recorded at the
Brawley monitors, the winds in the County were blowing,
not from Mexico, but from another direction. Pet. App.
12a-13a. The court found that “EPA’s notion of what
constitutes a southerly wind [2.e., a wind from Mexico] is,
at the least, expansive and, at most, positively incorrect.”
Id. at 12a. Moreover, the court found that even if there
were a southerly component in the wind on those days, it
would be “of the west-southwesterly variety and thus does
not support [EPA’s] theory of transport from Mexico.” Jd.
at 18a. Finally, the court stated that, in its view, the record
also showed that County monitoring stations located
between the Brawley monitors and Mexico (and thus closer
to Mexico), rather than showing similar exceedances,
recorded much lower PM-10 levels than the Brawley
monitors. /d. at 10a-1la.

Based on its review of the record, the court concluded
that “there simply [was] no possibility that Mexican
transport could have caused the observed PM-10 ex-
ceedances” on the two days. Pet. App. 18a. The court
determined that, “{a]lthough the normal course of action
when the record fails to support an agency’s decision ‘is to
remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation,’ ” ibid. (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v.

re |

9

Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)), this was an “exceptional
case” in which a remand with instructions was appropriate.
The court stated that it “failfed] to see how further
administrative proceedings would serve a useful purpose;
the record here has been fully developed, and the
conclusions that must follow from it are clear.” Jd. at 13a-
14a. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions
“that the EPA classify Imperial Valley as a ‘serious’
nonattainment area.” Jd. at 14a.

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals, although incor-
rect, was primarily based on an analysis of the particular,
highly technical facts of this case. It does not conflict with
any decision of this Court or any other court of appeals, and
it presents no issue of exceptional importance. Further
review is therefore unwarranted.

1. The court of appeals’ primary conclusion—that the
record was insufficient to support EPA’s condlusion that
the January 19 and 25 exceedances were caused by
transport of PM-10 emissions from Mexico—was mistaken.
Because reliable PM-10 emissions data from Mexico were
not available, EPA was not able precisely to quantify those
emissions and track their exact course to monitors in
Imperial County. Pet. App. 27a, 78a. Nonetheless, the city
of Mexicali just south of the border is a very substantial
source of PM-10, with emissions estimated to be equal to
the total for all of Imperial County. /d. at 29a. In addition,
EPA noted that the amount of the exceedances—162
micrograms per cubic meter on January 19 and 175 on
January 25, as compared with the NAAQS of 150—were
slight. Finally, EPA concluded in its initial analysis, which
formed the basis for its final rule, see zd. at 76a-78a, that
there was some wind from a southerly direction on the two
days. /d. at 53a, 54a.

10

EPA is entitled to substantial deference on highly
technical factual issues of this sort. The statute expressly
recognizes the need to grant EPA deference by requiring
the State to make a showing only “to the satisfaction of the
Administrator” that the NAAQS would have been satisfied
absent “emissions emanating from outside the United
States.” 42 U.S.C. 7509a(d). Especially in light of that
highly deferential standard, the court of appeals erred in
overturning EPA’s determination that the exceedances
were caused by transport of PM-10 from Mexico.

2. Although the court of appeals erred in concluding
that the record in this case was insufficient to support
EPA’s conclusion that emissions from Mexico caused the
PM-10 exceedances on January 19 and 25, further review
of that conclusion is not warranted. The court of appeals
correctly identified the governing legal standard. The
court noted that “where, as here, a court reviews an agency
action ‘involving primarily issues of fact,’ and where
‘analysis of the relevant documents requires a high level of
technical expertise, [the court] must ‘defer to the informed
discretion of the responsible federal agencies.’ ” Pet. App.
9a (quoting Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490
U.S. 360, 377 (1989)); see zbid. (quoting Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def: Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983), for the proposition that “[w]hen examining this kind
of scientific determination . . . a reviewing court must
generally be at its most deferential”). As the court of
appeals recognized, however, if “the agency offer[s] an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evi-
dence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise,” then the court may correct the agency’s
“clear error of judgment.” Jd. at 10a (quoting Motor

11

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

Because the court started from those correct legal
premises governing the standard of review in cases of this
sort, petitioner is mistaken in contending (Pet. 26) that
“{ajllowing the decision below to stand would pose a grave
threat to decades of jurisprudence founded on the basic
principle of judicial respect for agency expertise.” The
decision of the court of appeals rests primarily on the
court’s conclusionthat, “[b]ased onthe data and the reports
in the record, there simply is no possibility that Mexican
transport could have caused the observed PM-10 ex-
ceedances on January 19 and January 25.” Pet. App. 13a.
Although that analysis of the facts is mistaken, the mistake
is rooted in the highly technical factual record in this
particular case, and the effect of the court’s decision is
likely to be similarly limited. Further review is therefore
not warranted.

3. In addition to concluding that EPA had erred in
concluding that the January 19 and 25 exceedances were
caused by PM-10 emissions from Mexico, the court of
appeals took the unusual step of remanding with in-
structions “that the EPA classify Imperial Valley as a
‘serious’ nonattainment area.” Pet. App. 14a. That dis-
position was error. Nonetheless, because that error too is
largely fact-based and limite¢c °o the particular situation
present in this case, further » 7iew of the court’s deter-
mination to remand with instructions is not warranted.

a. This Court has explained that “[ilf the record before
the agency does not support the agency action, * * * the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand
to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744
(1985). Therefore, even if the court of appeals were correct

12

that EPA had erred in concluding that there was sufficient
evidence of winds blowing from the direction of Mexico to
support the conclusion that transport of PM-10 emissions
from Mexico had caused the exceedances on January 19
and 25, the court of appeals should have remanded the case
to EPA. In that way, the agency could have made the two
vital remaining determinations in this case with the benefit
of the court of appeals’ conclusion that its analysis of the
wind direction data had been mistaken. First, the agency
could have determined whether the remaining data in the
record were sufficient to support the State’s conclusion that
the emissions on January 19 and 25 had been caused by
transport of PM-10 from Mexico. Second, the agency could
have determined whether reopening the proceedings to
allow for further development of the record was
appropriate. Both of those determinations should have
been made in the first instance by the agency and not by
the court.

b. Although the court of appeals should have allowed
the agency, in the first instance, to reevaluate its decision
in view of the court’s rejection of its initial determination,
the court’s error was again largely factual. If the court of
appeals were correct that “there simply is no possibility
that Mexican transport could have caused the observed
PM-10 exceedances on January 19 and 25,” Pet. App. 13a,
then the court’s failure to allow the agency to re-examine
the record in the first instance on remand would be of no
significance. Indeed, petitioner’s argument that the court
of appeals’ instruction on remand was erroneous is based
on the premise (Pet. 30) that “the totality of record
evidence * * * more than adequately supports EPA’s
expert decision that Mexican PM-10 emissions provided at
least that smallamount of influence necessary to cause the
slight ex-ceedances observed.” Further review is not

13

warranted to resolve the question whether petitioner or the
court of appeals is correct about that premise.

Moreover, it is unlikely that a remand would have led
the agency to reopen the proceedings in this case to permit
further development of the facts. The parties had a full
opportunity to develop the administrative record in this
case, and the courtof appeals’ decision turned on particular
historical events that occurred in January 1993, almost ten
years before te court of appeals’ decision. In those
circumstances, it is doubtful that the agency would have
found it useful to reopen the record to uncover new facts
that could influence the outcome in this case. Petitioner
itself does not identify any further useful data that likely
could have been obtained through further investigation.
For that reason as well, the court of appeals’ failure to
permit further development of the record in this case was
of limited significance.

c. Petitioner contends (Pet. 28-29) that the court of
appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court’s decision in
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Ventura, 537
U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam). In that case, the court of
appeals had reversed a determination of the Board of
Immigration Appeals(BIA) that an alien did not qualify for
political asylum because hehad not faced persecution when
he left his home country “on account of ” a political opinion.
Id. at 18. Having reached that conclusion, the court of
appeals went on to decide an issue that the BIA had not
reached—whether “conditions in [the home country] had
improved to the point where no realistic threat of per-
secution currently existed.” Jbid. The court of appeals
held that the conditions had not soimproved. This Court
reversed, holding that because “[t]he BIA has not yet
considered the ‘changed circumstances’ issue,” the court
of appeals “committed clear error” in making that deter-

14

mination itself in the firstinstance. Jd. at 17. The court of
appeals should have “giv[en] the BIA the opportunity to
address the matter in the first instance in light of its own
expertise.” [bid.

The Court’s holding in Ventwra is inapplicable here.
The issue the court of appeals decided in framing its
remand—whether the record supported a conclusion that
the two exceedances were caused by PM-10 transported
from Mexico—was not one that EPA had not yet had the
chance to address, as in Ventura. To the contrary, EPA
had considered and ruled on that issue in the decision under
review. Although, as argued above, the court of appeals
erred in reversing EPA’s determination on that issue, the
court’s error has little to do with the error identified in
Ventura.”

» The other two. decisions of this Court cited by petitioner (Pet. 26
n.8) are also inapposite. In /mmigration & Naturalization Service v.
Yi Quan Chen, 537 U.S. 1016 2002), the Court simply issued an order
vacating and remanding the lower court’s decision for further con-
sideration in light of Ventura. In Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992), the Court held that
the court of appeals erred in finding that a decision of the BIA was not
“supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole” under 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(4) (1994)
(repealed by Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Div. C, Tit. III, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612). The Court’s
decision had nothing to do with the circumstances under which a court
may remand a case to an agency with specific instructions after finding,
as the court did here, that the agency had erred.

15

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE B. OLSON
Solicitor General

THOMAS L. SANSONETTI
Assistant Attorney General

D. JUDITH KEITH
Attorney

May 2004

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386001_1248%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
