# Opposition Brief — Employers Insurance Company of Wausau v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 541 U.S. 1027

## Text

No. 03-1199

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF WAUSAU,
Petitioner,
V.
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of Wisconsin

RESPONDENT JOHNSON CONTROLS’
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MATTHEW J. FLYNN

Counsel of Record

JEFFREY O. DAVIS

KEITH A. BRUETT

MATTHEW J. DUCHEMIN
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
411 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53202
(414) 277-5000

Se

COUNTER QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 15.2, Johnson Controls
objects to the question presented by the Petition because it does
not accurately reflect the proceedings below. If this Court
grants the Petition, the following would be an additional
question that the Court would need to address prior to reaching
the issue raised by the petitioner:

DID THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT, IN FACT,
RULE SUA SPONTE THAT A GOVERNMENT “PRP
LETTER” SEEKING AN ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN
UP WAS A “SUIT” TRIGGERING AN INSURER’S
DUTY TO DEFEND WHEN (1) JOHNSON CONTROLS
BROADLY SOUGHT REVIEW OF THE CONTINUING
VIABILITY OF A PRIOR DECISION ADDRESSING
THAT QUESTION, WITHOUT LIMITATION ON
WHAT PORTIONS OF THAT DECISION WERE THE
SUBJECT OF THE PETITION, (2) ALL BRIEFS
SPECIFICALLY RAISED AND ADDRESSED WHY
INSURANCE COVERAGE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT
DEPEND ON THE EXISTENCE OF A LAWSUIT, (3)
THE CO-DEFENDANTS / CO-RESPONDENTS’
COORDINATED RESPONSE BRIEFS EXPRESSLY
ARGUED THAT A “PRP LETTER” WAS NOT A “SUIT”
AND (4) THE “PRP LETTER AS SUIT” ARGUMENT
WAS EXPRESSLY MADE BY BOTH SIDES DURING
ORAL ARGUMENT?

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Respondent
states that it has no parent corporation, nor does any publicly
held company own 10% or more of its stock.

ll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
COUNTER QUESTIONS PRESENTED ..0......ccccccccececececeecececee. i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .........cccccccececceseee. ll
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..00............ccccccescssssosssscscsosecececeee. l
A. N@GIPC OF TS Cage...............eccecrsceserseroressecetesacecccsese, I
B. City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co. and
Ee l
C. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ Treatment
of Johnson Controls Under the
Edgerton/Hills Framewotk...............ccccccccsececescseseeeees 3
D. Proceedings Before the Wisconsin Supreme
| itis Aida icdiohepsiviasasicossanioevassodsoninsass 5
! REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .........ccccccccccececee- 8

A. This Is Not an Appropriate Case for the

Court to Consider Whether Sua Sponte
Decision-Making by an Appellate Court

Constitutes Due Process Violation ..............ccccccce000. 8

B. The Constitution Does Not Prohibit
Appellate Courts from Declaring the Law
I ea Natccasiicsscinieicesdoanesivaconycheriesiisrtevesvecvewsien 13

gle arccdsnansecacyasoensesssiohackonendsasadasnsavs 19

RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX A: Employers Insurance
Company of Wausau’s Motion For
Extension Of Time Filed With Wisconsin
ial os cdc asendianiosiursdpaeninses A-1 -3

RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX B: Excerpts From Brief
And Appendix Of The Travelers Indemnity
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ili

RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX C: Excerpts From
Employers Insurance Of Wausau’s

Memorandum In Support Of Its Motion For
Reconsideration

SPOOR HORE HEHEHE HEHEHE EEE EEE EEE HEHEHE EERE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES
Page
Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 CB PE Rivanvcecxolncnnics 14
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) .c.cccccccccccoceceeeco-cc. 14

Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F.Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1956)......18-19

Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of

Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) coccccccccccccsecececeecececececccc. 16
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 LY | ASR Seas 18
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 SERRE A et 14
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.
PED EOE tisesarcenniinaganideae an re eae 16, 17
City of Los Angeles v. David, 123 S.Ct. 1895

AMEE. stinenauiienlewiaisnhaiceb ain eee eee 15
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 CI ceosaioccene 14-15
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 SOD cisinistseateccasne 14

Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526

FID Uivsissidbstede imemuscsicnenieeraaenmen ate ae ene 14

Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374

I evicindiswaagucctlstaehva taba lenght per 9

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) .........0...ceceseccsseseoeeosoee... 14

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ..cccccccccssccseesceseees 15
Vv

Michelin Tire Corp. v. W.L. Wages, 423 U.S. 276

SPP T TEE vavscvnasieuhisinstadaciiaeundas eaneeaiigl alcakaie aaa ee 14

Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

PT BG ORE CU” CW, FOI osc scosccscsisenscavsssietrntie tates 19

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) cecccccccccsscscccsssseesseseee 4

Turn-Key-Tech, LLC v. National Film Lab. Inc., 2003

WL 22097823 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 2003) ............ccccccccecsccssseeeee 16

United States v. International Bus. Machines Corp.,

PF Ss SOP EOD cceissursvicostninisdeslecamradanmninate en 14

Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Century Indemnity

Ce, 190 F6 TOT TT, 19D) otc cticieniae 4
STATE CASES

Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co.,

JOO Ih. W 26 ZES (Wis. CO Amn, 1996). occcccccsecsscésssensesevaivces 3

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior

COPE, BOF 36 POC, BOOED crecessicdcntsccrcricues 10

City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d

463 (Wis. 1994) cert. denied 514 U.S. 1017 (1995) wo... ]

D.J.L. v. Armour Pharm. Co., 704 A.2d:104 (N.J.

Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997) ..essecsssssessessesseseeenee suki eaiabiee siden 19
General Casualty Co. v. Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718 (Wis.
PRET iis ssinin is cantons pecan desppbidinsnceh to cini eae a 2
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, :
OW A BOT COP IB: BOD s jcsnsnccvsncncnnuaticnwaennatiees 2

School District of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins.
Cos. 484 N.W.2d 314 (Wis. 1992) woocccccccccsessesessssescsecseees 11

v1

School District of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins.

Cos., 488 N.W.2d 82 (Wis. 1992) .o..cccccececceesesescssescseceeees 11

State v. Weber, 476 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. 1991) ....cccccccccceeeseceees 9

Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993) .....ccccccceeeeee. 19
DOCKETED CASES

Turn-Key-Tech LLC v. National Film Laboratory Inc.,

No. 03-1138 (pet’n for cert. filed February 3, 2004)............. 16

FEDERAL STATUTES

Fe As Be ig, URE wisncncssnsiovsnssnsectbonibicedtemnsssniansebunsciinisune 2
STATE STATUTES

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MOE ONCE Ne Be OT BO ORIN LO EERE NOT IE TOE BG RE OE: ONT ITY AES ty

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of this Case

This Petition arises out of a 15 year old environmental
insurance coverage dispute involving the interpretation of
comprehensive general liability (““CGL”) insurance policies
issued to Johnson Controls, Inc. (“Jenson Controls”). Johnson
Controls filed suit in 1989 seeking insurance coverage for
amounts it paid or would have to pay for third party property
damage, including actual and potential claims under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), and state law equivalents.
The defendants, including the petitioner, Employers Insurance
Company of Wausau (“Wausau”), were numerous insurance
companies who had issued CGL policies providing primary and
excess liability coverage to Johnson Controls over a 40 year
timeframe. Wausau was one of two “primary” insurers, the
other being Travelers Indemnity Company (“Travelers”). The
underlying liabilities for which coverage was sought arose out
of alleged contamination at 21 separate sites.

B. City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co. and
Its Progeny

Five years into this case, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin decided City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co.,
517 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1017
(1995), in which it held that costs incurred in responding to
property damage caused by environmental contamination were
not “damages” and that a letter from a government agency
identifying the recipient as a “potentially responsible party”
under CERCLA and demanding that it initiate a clean-up
(known as a “PRP letter”) was not a “suit” triggering an
insurer’s duty to defend.

arrears

Relying on Edgerton, the trial court dismissed Johnson
Controls’ lawsuit. Johnson Controls appealed. In the
meantime, Wisconsin law in this area continued to evolve. As
explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the decision on
which review is sought, Edgerton was flawed in many ways,
and was immediately and strongly criticized in Wisconsin and
across the country. (App. 53a-54a). Edgerton’s flaws were
particularly acute, and obvious, in cases where an insured was
joined in a third party lawsuit seeking clean-up costs under 42
U.S.C. §§ 9607 and 9613 — the notion that a claim for
monetary reimbursement of costs incurred to repair damaged
property was not a claim for “damages” under a liability
insurance policy seemed impossible to square with basic tort
and insurance law principles. (App. 27a). Ultimately, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that Edgerton did not apply
where the insured faced a lawsuit seeking previously incurred
costs. General Cas. Co. v. Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718 (Wis. 1997).
However, rather than overrule Edgerton, the court distinguished
it, stating that Edgerton continued to stand for the proposition
that “receipt of a letter from the EPA or DNR requesting a party
to propose a remediation plan does not constitute a ‘suit seeking
damages’.” Hills, 561 N.W.2d at 725. |

Taken together, Edgerton and Hills meant that insureds
who cleaned up environmental contamination themselves did
not have coverage, while those sued by third parties for the
same type of clean-up costs did have coverage. An anomalous

' The Wisconsin court’s decision to distinguish Edgerton rather than overrule
it, was one the court later came to regret. In Johnson Controls, Justice
Crooks, the author of Hills, separately concurred in the majority opinion to
lament the court’s failure to previously overrule Edgerton, given the
opportunity it had to do so in Hills. Johnson Controls Inc. v. Employers Ins.
Co. of Wausau, 665 N.W.2d 257, 297 (Wis. 2003) (“In retrospect, it seems
quite clear that we should have overruled, not distinguished, Edgerton six
years ago.”). (App. 62a).

consequence of these decisions, at least as they began to be
construed by the lower courts of appeals, was that an insured’s
right to insurance coverage depended on variables that were not
in the policy and seemingly made little sense, such as the
identity of the claimant as a government or non-governmental
party, the stage of the underlying proceedings, and whether the
insured had been joined in an actual lawsuit. See, e.g., Amcast
Indus. Corp. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 584 N.W.2d 218 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1998).

i. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ Treatment
of Johnson Controls Under the Edgerton/Hills
Framework

In 1998, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals issued a
decision that attempted to reconcile Edgerton and Hills as they
applied to this case. The court of appeals created a generic
matrix of site “categories” and remanded the case to the trial
court to apply its analysis to the 21 sites at issue. The
categories were:

Category 1. “[A]n insured who is responsible for the
contamination cleans up the site pursuant to a directive issued
by a government under [CERCLA] ... or its state counterparts.”

Category 2. “[A]n insured is responsible for at least
part of the contamination of a site that it does not own, but has
not been directed by a government to remediate the site. A
governmental agency has, however, directed others responsible
for the contamination ... to clean it up, and they sue the insured
to recover the clean up costs attributed to the insured.”

Categories 3 and 4. “[T]he insured is responsible for at
least part of the contamination of a site that it does not own, and
has been directed by a government to remediate the site but has
not done so. The insured is sued either by the government to
recover money it spent to clean up the site [Category 3], or by

3

the site’s owner or others also responsible for the contamination
who cleaned up the site at the government’s direction
[Category 4].”

(App. 98a-100a).

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that sites falling
into Categories 1, 3 or 4 did not trigger coverage under CGL
policies covering “damages”, while Category 2 sites did trigger
coverage.” The court of appeals remanded this case to the trial
court for fact-finding and entry of a “global judgment”. (App.
103a-104a).

On remand, Johnson Controls supplied a factual record
addressing the four categories. Despite this record, the tnal
court found that none of the 21 sites were covered. As part of
its decision, the trial-court noted that coverage was precluded at
sites involving a PRP letter because “there is no active ‘suit’ or
‘suit for damages’ as defined by Edgerton.” (App. 127a; see
also App. 129a, 133a, 134a, 137a, 138a, 140a).

Johnson Controls appealed the trial court’s ruling as to
application of the categories, but also reserved the right to
appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court the continuing validity
of Edgerton. The court of appeals affirmed, though in doing so
it noted the “arbitrary” distinctions that Edgerton had produced,

* The analysis of categories 3 and 4 relied upon reasoning in a case from the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Century
Indemnity Co., 130 F.3d 787 (7" Cir. 1997), in which an insured who had not
complied with an administrative order was compared to a life insurance
beneficiary who murders his or her spouse. Based upon this analogy, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that an insured should not be able to
“transmute” a non-covered claim into a covered one through “intentional
wrongdoing” — by disregarding a clean-up “directive” that came before a
“suit” that would have triggered a defense and coverage. /d.

4

while nonetheless acknowledging that it had no choice but to
apply those distinctions, since “this is the law set by our
supreme court and we are obligated to apply this law.”
(App. 88a).

D. Proceedings Before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court

In January 2002, Johnson Controls petitioned the
Wisconsin Supreme Court for review of the court of appeals
decision. In its Petition to the Wisconsin court, Johnson
Controls sought review of the following question (among
others): ?

Should City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co., 184
Wis.2d 750, 517 N.W.2d 463 (1994) be overruled in
light of the “arbitrary” and “debatable” distinctions it
has produced and the discrediting of authorities upon
which it relied?

(App. 149a-150a).

The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the case
without limitation on the issues presented. In the brief it
subsequently filed with that court, Johnson Controls argued that
insurance coverage for environmental liability should not
depend on the existence of an actual lawsuit, the stage of the
underlying claim at the time of any clean-up or settlement for
which coverage was sought, or the identity of the claimant as a
government or non-government party.

The insurers, including Wausau, sought an extension of
time from the Wisconsin Supreme Court to file response briefs.
(R-App. A-1). The insurers informed the court that an
extension was needed to “permit Wausau and the dozens of
other Defendants-Respondents the necessary time to coordinate

5

ee

their briefing efforts.. .” (R-App. A-1). The court granted the
requested extension and the insurers did indeed seem to have
allocated briefing responsibility. | Two principal briefs—
submitted by counsel for each of the “primary” insurers on the
case, Travelers and Wausau—were filed, with joinders filed by
the many excess insurers in the case.

Both respondent briefs expressly argued the reasons
why pre-suit liability should not be covered. Contrary to
Petitioner’s suggestion in its Petition to this Court, the “PRP
letter as suit” issue was expressly briefed. Travelers’ brief
provided a detailed argument that a PRP letter was not a “suit”
in a section of its brief titled: “A PRP Letter Or The State
Agency Equivalent Is Not A Suit”. (R-App. B-1).

Also contrary to Wausau’s suggestion in its Petition to
this Court, the “suit” issue was expressly argued before the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. At oral argument, counsel for
Johnson Controls reiterated the point made in its briefs that
coverage for environmental liability should not depend upon the (1
existence of a lawsuit. Moreover, counsel expressly noted that .
the Court should reconsider its original ruling in Edgerton that a
PRP letter was not a “suit”:

We had a PRP letter. And a PRP letter is the start of
something adversarial and coercive and extremely
dangerous and extremely costly. I commend the Utah
case to you, Quaker State, in which the full panoply of
harsh things that can happen to somebody who ignores
a PRP is set out some detail. The Indiana case,
Travelers Indemnity, who said, you know, the other
half of the CGL policy says, and I just want to read it, it
says, “the company shall have the right and duty to
defend any suit against the insured seeking damages
account of such property damages.” That’s separate

6

from the duty to indemnify, I mean that’s separate from
the duty to pay all sums legally obligated. In this case
you don’t even have to get to the duty to defend in my
judgment because we put our insureds on notice and
they abandoned and therefore we did what we had to
do. But there’s a respectable body of law around the
country which we cited to this Court that increasingly
has been speaking with one voice that says that the
word suit is ambiguous. Justice Abrahamson in dissent,
I believe, in Edgerton made that point and I think that
point’s made by a lot of other judges.

Oral Argument, available at www.wicourts.gov/ra/011193.ram

Counsel for Travelers responded to this portion of
Johnson Controls’ oral argument on the “suit” issue:

In urging the Court to overrule the Edgerton decision,
Johnson Controls is asking the Court to take contract
terms that it has previously found to have clear and
unambiguous meanings, namely suit and damages, and
could now hold these terms mean _ something
completely different than the Court previously said they
meant.... The key dispositive issue before the Court of
Appeals and the precedents of this Court, which the
Court of Appeals faithfully applied, is what do the
terms “suit” and “damages” mean in the context of the
CGL policy. This Court has found that suit means a
lawsuit filed in a Court of law and damages does not
include response costs under CERCLA or similar state
regulatory statutes. It is difficult to imagine anything
that would be more contrary to the principles of stare
decisis than Johnson Controls’ request that this Court
now announce that these terms again mean something
completely different. Jd.

On July 11, 2003, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued
a decision reversing the court below. (App. la — 63a) In its
decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the mere
stage of proceedings of an underlying claim could have no
logical bearing on whether that claim was covered by insurance.
An insurer’s duty to indemnify was triggered once the insured
was required to spend money for a clean-up. Consistent with
this ruling the Wisconsin court went on to observe that an
insurer’s duty to defend was triggered because, given the
practical realities of CERCLA proceedings, a PRP letter should
be considered a “suit” for insurance purposes. (App. 34a —
41a). In short, the court overruled Edgerton in its entirety.

Following the Wisconsin court’s decision, the insurers
filed motions for reconsideration. Amicus briefs were also filed
and accepted by the court. Among the issues extensively
briefed in Wausau’s motion was that the court should
reconsider its holding that a PRP letter was a “suit.”
(R-App. C-5-12). The motion for reconsideration was denied.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE.PETITION

A. This Is Not an Appropriate Case For the Court to
Consider Whether Sua Sponte Decision-Making by
an Appellate Court Constitutes a Due Process
Violation

Petitioner asks this Court to establish a rule that
appellate courts should be prohibited, as a matter of
constitutional law, from ruling on a point of state law unless
that point is presented to the appellate court for review and
briefed and argued by the parties, and the parties have a full
opportunity to be heard on the point. As a preliminary matter,
whatever the merits of such a rule, this is not an appropriate
case for its consideration. The question of whether a PRP letter
is a “suit” was presented to the Wisconsin court for review, it

8

was briefed, it was- argued, and the parties had ample
opportunity to be heard on it. If this Court grants the Petition, it
would likely never reach the issue for which review is sought.

Johnson Controls’ petition for review to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court expressly asked, among other things, whether
Edgerton should be “overruled.” (App. 149a-150a). This
statement of the issue sufficiently raised the continued validity
of that case, including that portion addressing whether a PRP
letter constitutes a “suit” under a standard CGL insurance
policy.’

In its opening brief, Johnson Controls argued at length
that an insurer’s duties arise prior to the filing of an actual
lawsuit. The reasoning in support of this argument applies with
equal force to the specific question of whether a PRP letter is a
“suit” for insurance purposes.*

* The Supreme Court of Wisconsin interprets its appellate rules to
permit consideration of “arguments” not addressed by the parties, as long as
they are fairly contained within the “issue” presented for review. State v.
Weber, 476 N.W.2d 867, 868 (Wis. 1991) (holding that a statement of the
issue permits consideration of all supporting arguments, even if the
supporting argument is not addressed by parties). This Court’s Rule 14.1(a)
addresses the same scenario. Under Rule 14.1(a), this Court may consider
arguments not addressed by the parties if they are “fairly included” within the
question presented in the petition. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
513 U.S. 374, 379-80 (1995) (considering an argument fairly included in the
petition although not argued by the parties). Under Johnson Controls’ broad
statement of the issue of whether Edgerton should be overruled, the court
could properly consider all aspects of Edgerton, including the “PRP letter as
suit” portion of that case, even in the absence of argument by the parties.
Although this avenue is available to appellate courts, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin did not need to rely on this rule of decision-making because the
“suit” argument was actually briefed and argued by the parties.

* The degree to which these issues are intertwined is demonstrated by a
decision by the California Supreme Court, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of
London v. Superior Ceurt (“Powerine”), 16 P.3d 94 (Cal. 2001), where the

9
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———E

That these arguments are related is evidenced by the
insurers’ coordinated response briefs, which expressly
addressed the specific question of what is a “suit.” Petitioner’s
co-defendant, Travelers, devoted an entire section of its brief to
the “suit” argument. In a section of its brief entitled “A PRP
Letter Or The State Agency Equivalent Is Not A Suit”,
Travelers argued at some length that Johnson Controls had
“merely received PRP letters, similar letters or notices
requesting remediation” and that this correspondence did not
constitute a “suit” under Wisconsin law. (R-App. B-1).

Contrary to what is claimed in the Petition, the question
of what is a “suit” was also addressed at oral argument. As
demonstrated by excerpts from oral argument, quoted in the
Statement of the Case above, counsel for both Johnson Controls
and Travelers expressly argued the point. Citing specific case
law, counsel for Johnson Controls argued that the coercive and
costly nature of a PRP letter triggers an adversarial process.
Counsel for Johnson Controls also suggested that a substantial
body of case law has found the word “suit” in a CGL policy
ambiguous. Counsel for the insurers responded to this
argument by noting that the definition of the terms “suit” and
“damages” was the “key dispositive issue” before the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.? Counsel went on to note that “this Court

California Supreme Court had found that there was no duty to indemnify for
“damages” unless and until there was a duty to defend, which was not
triggered until there was a “suit”, and that since a PRP letter was not a “suit”
an insured receiving such a letter had no coverage. The insurers argued the
Powerine rationale to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which expressly
rejected it. (App. 47a).

° As with briefing, the dozens of insurers in this case delegated their
argument to two attorneys, one representing Wausau and the other Travelers.
Counsel for Travelers made the oral argument regarding “suit.”

10

[the Wisconsin Supreme Court] has found that suit means a
lawsuit filed in court.”

Finally, on reconsideration Wausau (and the other
insurers) had the opportunity to make, and did make, all of the
same arguments Wausau now says it was deprived from making
on the “suit” issue. There is nothing to suggest that the
Wisconsin court refused to reconsider the case for any reason
other than that it did not find those arguments persuasive.°

The issue presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court
provided notice and opportunity to argue the meaning of the
term “suit,” and that argument was, in fact, made. There is no
basis in the record to suggest otherwise. The facts of this case
do not provide a meaningful opportunity for this Court to clarify
whether sua sponte statements of law by appellate courts are
constitutionally prohibited as violations of due process.

It is thus no answer in this case to suggest, as Wausau
does, that at “some point” there exists an imaginary, ill-defined

* Wausau is simply wrong in claiming that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
may deny such a motion “for any reason, or, as in this case, for no reason at
all.” Pet’n at 19. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s procedures on
reconsideration are set forth in that Court’s internal operating procedures
which provide that reconsideration “will ensue only when the court has
overlooked controlling legal precedent or important policy considerations or
has overlooked or misconstrued a controlling or significant fact appearing in
the record.” Wis. S. Ct. IOP 2 J (emphasis added). There is no basis to
suggest or conclude that the Wisconsin Supreme Court does not follow these
procedures. Indeed, as recounted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Johnson Controls (App. 8a), the principal case on which Edgerton had relied
was School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 488 N.W.2d 82 (Wis.
1992). That case had originally been decided in favor of the insured. School
Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 484 N.W.2d 314 (Wis. 1992). Upon
the insurer’s motion for reconsideration, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
withdrew its original decision and issued a decision in favor of the insurer,
without further briefing or re-argument.

11

line that appellate courts cannot constitutionally cross in this
area. Wherever such a line may exist, it was not crossed in this
case. Indeed, it is telling that Wausau also acknowledges that
appellate courts can “undoubtedly” in some situations examine
issues sua sponte, but says little about what those circumstances
are. Pet’n p. 3. Is it where there is no mention of the issue at
any stage of appellate court proceedings? Wausau would fail to
meet such a test, given what was briefed and in the oral
argument transcript. Is it where there is no state law procedure
allowing the point to be addressed at reconsideration? Wausau
would fail here too, since Wausau was afforded every right to,
and did, challenge the court’s “suit” ruling on reconsideration
under Wis. Stat. § 809.64. At bottom, Wausau is left only with
its complaint — the real reason it has come to this Court — that
this decision “might” cost it “tens of millions of dollars” due to
its effect in other cases. But the fact is, the insurer defendants
had the opportunity to argue the issue, they did argue the issue
and the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against them.
Whatever this Court’s views may be on sua sponte decision-
making, there is no reason for this Court to take review in this
case.’

’ The complexity of the factual record, together with its underlying legal
framework, would also suggest that this is not the right case, from a resource
allocation standpoint, for examination of the due process issue set forth in the
Petition. In order to determine whether any due process violation is so
egregious that it outweighs Wisconsin’s strong interest in developing its law,
this Court would need to gain an understanding of a 15 year old case record,
involving 21 Superfund sites, activities spanning over 40 years, and 30 plus
insurers, involving years of discovery and two trips to the Wisconsin court of
appeals against the backdrop of a ten year on-going legal controversy in
Wisconsin over the Edgerton decision. The Court would be required to
determine whether or not the issue of an insurer’s pre-suit obligations—
which was a primary focus of the parties’ briefing—would fairly encompass
a ruling that a pre-lawsuit PRP letter should constitute a “suit” for insurance
purposes, particularly where the specific “PRP letter as suit” point was
expressly addressed in the insurers’ coordinated briefing effort and by both

12 \

—e a

a

meeeeeinns

B. The Constitution Does Not Prohibit Appellate
Courts from Declaring the Law Sua Sponte

The rule proposed by Wausau—that there should be a
constitutional bar on an appellate court ruling on a point of state
law unless it is fully presented to the court for review through
the written briefs of the parties prior to a motion for
reconsideration—is not a rule that this Court need, or should,
consider adopting at this time. Indeed, such a rule would
deprive appellate courts of needed flexibility in carrying out
their law-making function, and would fly in the face of decades
of judicial practice, including within this Court, where
important points of law have, in the Court’s discretion, long
been crafted without the full, or even any, development of those
points in the parties’ briefs or arguments.

While we are not aware of any recent trend of the type
claimed by Wausau in which this discretion has been expanded,
we are aware that appellate courts—including this Court—have
long felt unconstrained to announce new rules of law without
briefing, where deemed necessary to the orderly and proper
development of the law. No less a rule of law than the Erie
Doctrine was decided without the issue having been raised by
the parties. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 6441938);
accord Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)
(sua sponte consideration of whether to impute liability for
punitive damages under agency principles); United States v.
International Bus. Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996) (sua

sides at oral argument. This Court would then need to delve into the
underlying policies concerning Wisconsin law, and the extent to which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s lawmaking function in this particular case
outweighs any potential concerns of the individual litigants concerning notice
and an opportunity to be heard.

13

sponte decision that federal statute is unconstitutional); Arcadia
v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1991) (sua_ sponte
consideration of issue “antecedent to” the dispute); Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (sua sponte consideration of rules

governing habeas review); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79

(1986) (sua sponte consideration of peremptory challenge

framework); Michelin Tire Corp. v. W.L. Wages, 423 U.S. 276

(1976) (sua sponte consideration of whether state statute is
unconstitutional); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (sua

sponte decision that exclusionary rule barring illegally obtained

evidence applies to the states through the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (sua

sponte consideration of issues to avoid reaching constitutional

question).

The most vocal criticisms of sua sponte decisions are
typically found in dissenting opinions. It is notable that, while
dissenting opinions in the cases cited above criticized the sua
sponte decisions of the majority as ill advised, none suggested
the decisions were a violation of due process. See Kolstad, 527
U.S. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jnternational Bus.
Machines Corp., 517 U.S. at 863 (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Teague, 489
U.S. at 330-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These dissenting
opinions confirm the absence of any constitutional mandate
prohibiting sua sponte decisions by appellate courts. Justice
Scalia has confirmed this point: “[T]he refusal to consider
arguments not raised is a sound prudential practice, rather than
a statutory or constitutional mandate, and there are times when
prudence dictates the contrary.” Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the absence of a
constitutional question, this Court has no reason, or jurisdiction,
to grant the Petition.

14

,

Even if the Due Process Clause were implicated by sua
sponte decisions of state courts declaring state law, there would
be no violation in this case. Due process is, as Wausau
acknowledges, a flexible concept. A due process analysis
involves the threefold balancing of the private interests affected
by the official action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the governmental
interest at stake. Matthews vy. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
(1976); City of Los Angeles v. David, 123 S. Ct. 1895, 1896
(2003).

When it comes to weighing these interests in the area of
an appellate court’s law-making function, the governmental
interest at stake has always been considered paramount. It is
not a “due process” violation when a court makes new law,
simply because some party who will be adversely affected by
the discharge of that function, claims not to have had an
opportunity to completely “brief” the issue. Indeed, by that
rationale, appellate courts, and legislatures for that matter,
would deprive parties of due process every day, for the law is
constantly evolving in ways that may have an adverse impact on
countless parties, sometimes severely so, without providing any
meaningful input or right to be heard on the issue. This Court
long ago held that such process is not required:

Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few
people, it is impracticable that everyone should have a
direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not
require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an
assembly of the whole. General statutes within the
state power are passed that affect the person or property
of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without
giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are
protected in the only way that they can be in a complex

15

society, by their power, immediate or remote, over
those who make the rule.

Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,
445 (1915). While this Court’s decision in Bi-Metallic was
applied to administrative action, the reasoning applies with
equal force to appellate courts in the exercise of their law-
making function. Judges of state courts of last resort have the
inherent power to declare the common law of the state.®

In this regard, Wausau’s reliance on what it
characterizes as the “similar” case of Brinkerhoff—Faris Trust &
Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) is misplaced. In
Brinkerhoff, the Missouri Supreme Court had imposed a newly
created procedural “exhaustion” requirement on the petitioner’s
claim that certain tax levies were being assessed in a
discriminatory manner, then found that the administrative
remedy that had to be exhausted was unavailable due to the
petitioner’s delay in seeking it. The problem was not that the
lower court had imposed the requirement sua sponte, but that
the new requirement in essence acted as an ex post facto
procedural bar. Indeed, in the course of its opinion, this Court
made it plain that this was the “due process” violation, when it
stated that “if the administrative remedy were still available to
the plaintiff, there would be no denial of due process. . .” Id.
at 455 n.9. Of course, to the extent the case could somehow be

8 For at least that reason, this case does not present “a similar action” to that
in Turn-Key-Tech LLC v. National Film Laboratory Inc., No. 03-1138 (pet’n
for cert. filed February 3, 2004). Pet’n at 3, 28. The case at bar involves a
statement of a rule of law by the highest court of a state, whereas Turn-Key-
Tech involves the Federal Circuit’s sua sponte modification of a district
court’s ruling on the facts in an infringement lawsuit. In Turn-Key-Tech, the
Federal Circuit dismissed the district court’s patent claim construction in
favor of its own sua sponte construction. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC v. National
Film Lab. Inc., 2003 WL 22097823 at *2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 2003).

16

2 Sic A ANN Be arenes Pade!

construed as condemning sua sponte appellate decision-making
as a “due process” violation, it would have been implicitly
overruled by the intervening decades of Supreme Court
precedent described above.

Finally, even if sua sponte decisions in some cases
could implicate the Due Process Clause, there exists no
violation in this case because Wausau does not assert an
adequate interest in “property” under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In that regard, it is important to note that Wausau
is not seeking certiorari review in order to escape the effects of
any money judgment or other specific court action that could
even potentially amount to a taking of a property interest
without an opportunity to be heard. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court did nothing more than declare the law and remand the
case back to the tnal court for further proceedings. Those
proceedings will likely include trial or summary judgment ‘on
numerous contested issues, and perhaps even further
proceedings in the Wisconsin appellate court system, before
there is any final judgment in this case.

Thus, assuming arguendo that the issue of Edgerton’s
continuing validity had not been raised in Johnson Controls’
petition to the Wisconsin court, assuming that the coordinated
briefing effort of the insurers had not raised it, assuming that it
was not raised at oral argument and assuming there was no
reconsideration process available to raise it, there still would be
no due process violation here. That the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in the process of overturning a bad case precedent that
presented a threshold bar to a claim for insurance coverage, also
took the occasion to re-examine a closely related subsidiary
issue that would likely come to the fore on remand and in other
cases, is hardly remarkable or unprecedented, and nothing more
than an exercise of that court’s institutional power to declare the

17

law and provide guidance to the parties and litigants in other
cases. Such an exercise presents no due process claim.

Due process is not required unless a party is being
deprived of an interest in “property” within the Fourteenth
Amendment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71
(1972). This Court, in Roth, noted that while it “has eschewed
rigid or formalistic limitations on the protection of due process,
it has at the same time observed certain boundaries.” Jd. at 572.
These boundaries require that “[t]o have a property interest in a
benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need
or desire for it. He must have more than a_ unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.” Jd. at 577.

Applying this definition of “property” to this case,
Wausau must show that it has a “legitimate claim of
entitlement” to a particular interpretation of the word “suit” by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. It is a showing Wausau cannot
possibly make. A party simply does not have a legitimate
entitlement to have an appellate court declare the law in any
particular manner, even when overruling a prior decision:

There is no vested right in the decisions of a court and a
change of decision does not deprive one of equal
protection of the laws or property without due process
of law. Even though prior decisions of a state court
have established a rule of property, a departure
therefrom in a subsequent decision does not, without
more, constitute a deprivation of property without due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D. Kan. 1956)
(citing O'Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 242 U.S.
20, 26-27 (1916)); accord Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner of

18

Internal Revenue, 147 F.2d 962, 963-64 (10th Cir. 1945); Ward
v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 288 (Ky. 1993); D..L. v. Armour
Pharm. Co., 704 A.2d 104, 115 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1997). Wausau has no property interest in the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s interpretation of “suit” and pronouncement of
state common law. Therefore, under no circumstances could
there be a due process violation, even if the issue had not been
briefed or argued by the parties prior to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s decision and on reconsideration.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Johnson Controls
respectfully requests that the Petition be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW J. FLYNN

Counsel of Record

JEFFREY O. DAVIS

KEITH A. BRUETT

MATTHEW J. DUCHEMIN
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
411 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53202
(414) 277-5000

19

APPENDIX A

SUPREME COURT
OF WISCONSIN

* * * *

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE
RESPONDENT’S BRIEFS

Defendant-Respondent Employers Insurance of Wausau A
Mutual Company (“Wausau”) respectfully moves this Court for an
Order, pursuant to Sections 809.14 and 809.82(2) of the Wisconsin
Statutes, granting Wausau and the other Defendant-Respondents a
short extension of time to file Respondent’s Briefs up to and
including July 2, 2002. Presently, Wausau’s Respondent’s Brief and
the Respondent’s Briefs of all of the other Defendant-Respondents are
currently due on June 11, 2002.

Good cause exists for granting Wausau and the other
Defendant-Respondents this short extension of time to respond to
Plaintiff-Appellant Johnson Controls, Inc.’s (“JCI”) Brief and
Appendix. The requested three-week extension will permit Wausau
and the dozens of other Defendant-Respondents the [3]necessary time
to coordinate their briefing efforts and thereby minimize the number
and volume of Respondents’ Briefs filed with the Court.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s grant of
summary judgment to Wausau and the other Defendant-Respondents
on December 27, 2001. JCI filed a Petition for Review, which was
accepted by this Court pursuant to the Order, dated April 22, 2002, in
which JCI raised a number of issues concerning the Court of Appeals
ruling and expressly requested that this Court overturn existing
Supreme Court case law.

This Court’s Order provided that JCI’s Brief was due thirty
days thereafter, or May 22, 2002. The Order also directed that
defendants-respondents’ briefs be filed 20 days thereafter, or June 11,
2002.

This appeal stems from an insurance coverage dispute in
which JCI seeks coverage for costs that it allegedly incurred in
connection with alleged-environmental liabilities arising from
environmental contamination at 21 sites throughout the United States.
In addition to Wausau, more than two dozen other insurance
companies also are Defendants-Respondents in this appeal. In light
of the significance of the issues and the relief requested by JCI, each
of the Defendants-Respondents has a heightened interest in the
briefing of this appeal.

In any multi-party appeal, preparation of Respondents’ Briefs
that may be joined in by numerous Defendants-Respondents
necessarily requires additional time beyond what is typically required
to prepare a Respondent’s Brief in an [4Jappeal in which there is only
one or two Respondents. The additional coordination time is
necessary to allow each Respondent the opportunity to review,
comment upon, revise and approve the brief. Drafts of briefs must be
exchanged, reviewed, revised and approved by each Defendant-
Respondent. This procedure is particularly exacerbated because of
the large number of Defendant-Respondents in this case.

In addition, the final drafts of any Defendant-Respondent
Briefs likely will be subject to approval by one or more of the
Defendant-Respondents’ internal legal staff. This requires even more
additional time and coordination before one or more Defendant-
Respondent Briefs may be approved by all joining parties and filed
with the Court.

If granted this extension will allow Wausau and the more than

two dozen other Defendant-Respondents a total of 51 days to prepare
and file Defendant-Respondent Briefs. In light of the above, this is a

A-2

ah ees aletuln 4 Se datas APe

reasonable time period for Wausau and the Defendant-Respondents to
coordinate and minimize the number of Respondent’s Briefs. These
efforts will simplify and decrease the buraen on this Court because, as
a result, a limited number of Defendant-Respondents’ Briefs will be
filed as opposed to the possibility of dozens of such briefs being filed
if this extension is not granted.

[5]Therefore, based upon the foregoing, Wausau respectfully
requests that the Court grant an extension of time, up to and including
July 2, 2002, for Wausau and the other Defendant-Respondents to file
their Respondent’s Briefs. ;

* * * *

APPENDIX B

SUPREME COU
OF WISCONSIN

* * * *

BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
COMPANY

pdaliiect Radda

(b) A PRP Letter Or The State Agency
Equivalent Is Not A Suit.

Under the plain language of the CGL policies, an insurer’s
“duty to defend” is not triggered unless and until a “suit” has been
filed. With respect to many of the sites for which JCI seeks
coverage’, no lawsuit has been filed at all. Instead, JCI merely
received PRP letters, similar state letters or notices requesting
remediation. These letters and notices are not “suits,” as that term has
been defined under [33]Wisconsin law, and thus do not give rise to
any defense obligations on the part of the insurers.

The policy term “suit” has a plain and unambiguous meaning
under Wisconsin law. A “suit” is: “any proceeding by one person or
persons against another or others in a court of law in which the
plaintiff pursues, in such court, the remedy which the law affords
him, for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a night, whether
at law or equity.” State v. P.G. Miron Const. Co., Inc., 181 Wis. 2d
1045, 1053, 512 N.W.2d 499, 503 (1994). Thus, as this Court held in
Edgerton: “the primary attribute of a “suit” is that parties to an action
are involved in actual court proceedings, initiated by the filing of a

10

With respect to Travelers policies, no response costs suits have been
filed in connection with the Lakeland, Goshen and Compton Sites. (T-
Ap. 003, 065-067, 069-070)

complaint.” 184 Wis. 2d at 775 (emphasis added). See also
Accounting Data, Inc. v. McMurtrie, 78 Wis. 2d 89, 92, 253 N.W.2d
534, 535 (1977)(the term suit “applies to any proceeding in a court of
justice by which a party pursues the remedy which the law affords for
litigating a subject of controversy between adverse parties’”’)(quoting
Milwaukee L. H. & T. Co. v. Ela Co., 142 Wis. 424, 428, 125 N.W.
903, 905 (1910).

[34] Under this definition, a PRP letter or administrative notice
is not a suit. It is not a proceeding in a court in which the plaintiff
pursues a remedy. Indeed, the Edgerton Court rejected the mere
suggestion that PRP letters were the “functional equivalent” of a suit.
184 Wis. 2d at 776 (quoting Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d
731, 741 (1* Cir. 1990)). Such a status would not be good enough; as
this Court noted in Edgerton, “[either] there is a suit or there is not.”
184 Wis. 2d at 781.

For these reasons, the Court should reaffirm its holding in
Edgerton that the PRP letters and their state equivalent do not
constitute “suits” for purposes of the CGL policies.

* * * *

APPENDIX C

SUPREME COURT
OF WISCONSIN

* * * *

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF
WAUSAU’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION
kk
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ENT RRODUIC TION . ous sscccrscvcscievcnsvcvsccvrsscscenvensesesansievsnevens l
PIII Ec vikisncvecsccescavasducicnnsipsesevanaseecctaktoniernnnionsies 2
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW..............csccceececceeeseeeeeeees 5

Il. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS DECISION
ON THE “SUIT” ISSUE. ............sccsecsccescecscscessccenes 6

A. The Court Should Reconsider Its Decision
Because The “Suit” Issue Was Not Before

l. The “suit” issue was not decided by any of the
courts below, was not included in JCI’s
petition for review, and was not briefed or
argued by the parties before this court....... 6

Z The Court’s decision erroneously exceeded
the scope of judicial authority and review....8

B. The Court’s Sua Sponte Decision On The “Suit”
Issue Violates Wausau’s Constitutional Rights
To Due ProcesS..........sceeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeenees cess 12

III. | THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE DECISION
ON THE “SUIT” ISSUE BECAUSE IT OVERLOOKS
STARE DECISIS, INSURANCE CONTRACT
CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES, |
AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS..........+-- 14

A. The Decision Overlooks The Application
Of Stare Decisis To Edgerton’s Holding

On The “Suit” Issue.............sceeeeeeeeee eee e eee ee ees 14
# The Court’s decision overlooks the absence of
any changes or developments in the law on
whether a PRP letter is a “suit.”............- 15
ya There are no newly ascertained facts
that would require a result different
from Edgerton..........cscceceeeeeere ene ee eee 16
a. There has been no showing that Edgerton's
suit” decision has become detrimental to
coherence and consistency in the law........ 17

hea CREAT LEEPER

Pe 0 Pe ce On Es ten IOS

IV.

B. The Court’s Decision violates Long Established

Wisconsin Insurance Construction Principles......
ae The Court’s Decision Overlooks Important
Policy COMSIGCTANIONS. .........060ccccecscecsevees 21

THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS
DECISION THAT CERCLA RESPONSE COSTS
EE, CI aih x sknkapstacewsaetAlaviwhvaciesscces 23

A. Decision Overturns Established Wisconsin
Law On Insurance Policy Construction and
Fails To Correctly Analyze The Nature of
CERCLA ROGQONGE CORE... ..ssecrscscesecs p£

B. The Court’s Decision On The “Damages”
Issue Violates Principles of Stare Decisis... 28

l. No change or developments in the
law have undermined either the
principle requiring application of
unambiguous policy language or the
rationale of Edgerton's “damages”

DEI ciigiex hb acnaceeasonesadacaseeatied 28
Ya There are no newly ascertained facts

that would require a result different

NG CII ivi inccssttevsscedes 29

V.

The established principles of insurance
contract construction and Edgerton 's
“damages” holding have not become
detrimental to coherence and
consistency in the law.......:-.-.+-+5+++ 29

The Court’s decision upsets
substantial reliance-based interests.... 32

C. The Court’s Decision Creates More
Uncertainty and Arbitrary Results..........--+- 33

::

The Court’s decision creates — rather
than corrects — arbitrary distinctions
regarding coverage for CERCLA
TESPONSE COSTS........--eeeeee reer essere’ 34

The Court’s decision creates arbitrary
distinctions regarding coverage in
other factual settings...........--..+++++36

The Court’s decision will cause
unnecessary litigation over insurance
policy construction.......-...++s+sss 37

THE COURT SHOULD DECLARE THAT THE
DECISION APPLIES PROSPECTIVELY ONLY... 37

CONCLUSION

The Court’s Decision Overrules
Clear Past Precedent On Which
Woarente ROMCG............cccccessccccces. 42

Retroaction Application in this Case
Will Not Further the Operation of
the Counts PRGHGIME............050.00000)00008 42

Retroactive Application of the Court’s
Decision Will Produce Inequitable
ME chaciunteneacssapeseacvayotks nae 43

eoee gt **

Ill. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS DECISION
ON THE “SUIT” ISSUE BECAUSE IT OVERLOOKS
STARE DECISIS, {NSURANCE CONTRACT
CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES, AND PUBLIC
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.

A. Tlie Decision Overlooks The Application of Stare
Decisis To Edgerton’s Holding On The “Suit”
Issue.

The decision is extraordinary as well because it overturns
established Wisconsin law on the “suit” issue with no explanation of
why departure from stare decisis was appropriate.

In the context of the “damages” issue, the decision explained
the importance of stare decisis and the standard by which the court
may, in extremely rare circumstances, depart from it. {| 94-95, 98-
99. Despite these statements of the doctrine’s importance and the
rigorous standards that must be met to overcome it, there is no
mention of how the standard is satisfied on the “suit” issue. See
93-119. The only explanation for overturning Edgerton on the
meaning of “suit” is a passing mention that “(t]he Edgerton court’s
definition [15]of “suit” gives us pause.” 4] 76 (emphasis added). At
best, however, that explains only that the present composition of the
Court now disagrees with Edgerton’s holding that a PRP letter is not a
“suit.” See J§ 77-92; J 135 (Wilcox, J., dissenting). Such an
explanation is insufficient, as the Court itself acknowledged in the
context of the “damages” issue. {| 33.

The Court now has made two diametrically opposed
statements concerning an insured’s “reasonable expectations” in
connection with the “suit” issue. Edgerton held that:

[T]he word “suit” is easily understood and
unambiguous to a reasonable policyholder. The proof

is in the decisions that hold that a “PRP letter” is the

“functional equivalent of a suit.” Either there is a suit
or there is not. When there is no suit, there is no duty
to defend.

184 Wis. 2d at 781 (emphasis added). In this case, the Court found
that an insured would have “reasonable expectations” directly
contrary to the holding in Edgerton: “fa] reasonable person in the
position of the insured would expect the insured (sic) to provide a
defense” in the context of a PRP letter.” 4] 85 (emphasis in original).

The Court’s decision overlooks the absence
of any changes or developments in the law
on whether a PRP letter is a “suit.”

There have been no developments or changes in the law of
Wisconsin that would justify a reversal of Edgerton’s “suit” holding.
Numerous well-respected courts have cited Edgerton’s holding on the
“suit” issue and relied upon its [16]rationale in reaching the same
conclusion. See, e.g., Foster Gardner Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Corp., 959 P.2d 265, 281-82 (Cal. 1998); Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp.
v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Ill. 1995).° Many

other courts have reached the same result.”

é There are no newly ascertained facts that
would require a result different from
Edgerton.

The dissent correctly observe. that “[t]his case does not
present us with a wholly new set of $. ts.” 4 135. The Court’s
decision fails to identify a single new fact since Edgerton that would
justify overturning its “suit” holding.

* See also CIM Ins. Corp. v. Masamitsu, 74 F. Supp.2d 975, 986 (D. Ha. 1999);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 418, 420 (Cal. App.
2d Dist. 1999).

” See Barry R.Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman, Handbook on Insurance
Coverage Disputes § 10.04{c][2](11" Ed. 2002), and cases cited therein.

C-7

In fact, although the parties never briefed the “‘suit” issue,
JCY’s brief actually demonstrates the correctness of Edgerton’s
holding and the inaccuracy of this Court’s assumptions concerning an
insured’s reasonable expectations. In arguing on the “damages”
issue, JCI’s brief contrasted PR,’ letters with other forms of
government action and explained that a recipient of a PRP lette? is
“not legally obligated to take any action.” JCI’s Brief at 7. JCI’s
brief further states “Parties receiving this type of preliminary
correspondence. . . are not legally [17]obligated to take any action.”
Id. JCI’s admission is contrary to the Court’s conclusions as to an
insured’s “reasonable expectations.”

a There has been no showing that Edgerton’s
“suit” decision has become detrimental to
coherence and consistency in the law.

Edgerton premised its holding on a plain and unambiguous
interpretation of the word “suit,” which has the same meaning in other
areas of Wisconsin law as it does in the context of insurance law. 184
Wis. 2d at 744 (citing State v. P.G. Miron Constr. Co., Inc.,181 Wis.
2d 1045, 1053 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994)). No Wisconsin decision
since Edgerton has ever suggested that the “suit” rule has been a
problem to apply or is in any way inconsistent with Wisconsin law.

B. The Court’s Decision Violates Long-Established
Wisconsin Insurance Construction Principles.

Not only does the Court’s decision violate principles of stare
decisis with respect to the “suit” issue, it also derogates well-settled
principles of insurance policy construction. It has long been the law
of Wisconsin that, where a provision in an insurance policy is
unambiguous on its face, courts should not engage in construction of
the unambiguous term. As the Court stated 25 years ago in Mercardo
v. Mitchell, 83 Wis. 2d 17, 25, 264 N.W.2d 532 (1978):

When no ambiguity exists, it is equally clear the court
cannot construe the policy. . . to include insurance
coverage that was not agreed to by the parties and for
which no premium was assessed or paid. To do so
would be to re-write the contract of the parties — a
power the court does not have.

{18]The Court confirmed these and other fundamental
principles in Folkman, just days after this decision. Not only did
Folkman confirm that “the first issue in construing an insurance
policy is to determine ‘vhether an ambiguity exists,” but it also cited
with approval other recent holdings of the court confirming that an
insured may not reasonably expect coverage contrary to plain and
ambiguous policy language. Folkman, 2003 WI 116, § 13. Thus,
Folkman quoted from Taylor v. Greatway Ins. Co., 2001 WI 93, 4 26,
245 Wis. 2d 134, 628 N.W.2d 916, as follows:

Because the definition of underinsured vehicle in each
of American Family’s policies is unambiguous
standing on its own and in the context of the whole
policy, we do not need to engage in construction to
determine Taylor’s reasonable expectations.

Folkman, 2003 WI 116, § 25 ar emphasis in original, bold
emphasis added).

In a radical departure from these long-standing rules, the
Court’s decision in this case suggests an entirely different analysis.
Without first finding any ambiguity in the “suit” language or even
addressing the fact that it had previously held the term “suit” to be
plain and ambiguous in various contexts, the Court, instead,
interpreted the terms according to its own conclusions of what JCI
would have “reasonably expected.” The Court’s actions clearly
violated Wisconsin law, as stated in Folkman, that a policyholder may
not have “reasonable expectations” of coverage that are contrary to
plain and unambiguous policy language.

[19]The Court’s conclusion as to the insured’s “reasonable
expectations” was based on the Court's analysis of a “PRP letter’
and several separate policy provisions relating to notice of an
“occurrence,” notice of a claim or suit, cooperation by the insured,
voluntary payments, the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify.
See J4 77-85. However, the Court’s conclusion is premised on
misstatements of Wisconsin law on several issues, disregards critical
language from the Wausau policies, and is contrary to the evidence of
JCI’s actual expectations. {| 84-85. Notably, in incorrectly
concluding that an insurer’s duty to defend is co-extensive with an
insured’s duty to give notice and cooperate, the Court ignores critical
language in the insuring agreement that provides:

[T]he company . . . may make such investigation and
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.

Edgerton, 184 Wis. 2d at 750 (emphasis added). Only by overlooking
this language, could the Court mistakenly conclude that the insurer’s
duty to defend “suits” must be interpreted broadly to mirror the
insured’s obligation to provide notice of an “occurrence, claim or
suit.” However, the foregoing policy language demonstrates that the
insured must give notice not only of “suits” so that the insurer may
defend, if necessary, but also of any “occurrence, claim or suit”
[20]so that the insurer can exercise its right to investigate and settle
“claims.” Moreover, by interpreting the term “suit” to include non-
lawsuit “claims,” the decision violates the fundamental principle of
insurance contract construction that all terms must be given meaning
and not be rendered mere surplusage. See Grotelueschen v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Wis. 2d 437, 451, 492 N.W.2d 131 (1992).

Finally, not only is the court’s analysis at odds with basic
principles of Wisconsin insurance law and the plain and ambiguous

0 As explained in the dissent, not all PRP letters are the same. {| 160. However,
because the Court did not cite to any PRP letter in the record issued to JCI or
quote from any of the language of any such PRP letter, the Court must have
been referring to a hypothetical PRP letter.

C- 10

policy language, but its “suit” holding also guarantees additional
litigation, costs, and confusion for litigants and courts. !! Recently,
the Court has seen how just two words, “crystal clear,” in the decision
in Badger Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, 4] 46, 255 Wis. 2d

61, 647 N.W.2d 223, created a large and “unintended effect.”

Folkman, 2003 WI 116, § 30. Those two words spawned a series of
court of appeals decisions within the span of a year and “reveal[ed]
that our admonition of ‘crystal clarity’ has been used to alter the

analytical focus.” Jd.

The Court’s decision in this case promises much more of the

same. If permitted to stand, the decision will, no doubt, allow
creative lawyers to tie up the courts for years. Moreover, by

apparently allowing unsupported, purported subjective interpretations
to trump unambiguous policy language, the Court’s [21]decision
suggests an unending series of Catch-22 propositions for insurance

companies. Insurers will never be able to evaluate or limit the
coverage they write. Edgerton understood this problem:

Typically insurers assess the extent of the risks
insured under policies issued. The risk of liability
may then be spread among groups of insureds and
premiums assigned only after the extent of the risk is
determined. The original risk assessment becomes a
nullity if the language of the policy is redefined in
order to expand coverage beyond what was planned
for by the insurer in the contract of insurance.
Policies of insurance, premised upon a certain level of
predictability and assessment of risk at the time of
contracting, lose their effect without the inclusion of
certain basic definitions.

'' The Court’s attempt to minimize the fall-out from its decision by limiting its
holding to “PRP letters,” see J 87 n.37, will likely have no effect in restraining
arguments that the Court’s decision supports a new set of interpretations for

insurance policies in Wisconsin.

184 Wis. 2d at 779 n.26 (emphasis added). Contrary to the Court’s
suggestion, insurers and policyholders relied on Edgerton in
connection with liability policies issued decades ago because such
policies provide coverage for liabilities arising from “occurrences”
during the policy period regardless of when the claim is made against
the insured. Thus, these policies are just as available to be called
upon to provide coverage today as they were then they were first
issued.

C. The Court’s Decision Overlooks Important Policy
Considerations.

In addition to the problems enumerated above, the Court
overlooked significant policy considerations when it reversed course
on the “suit” issue. Policyholders may well assert entitlement for all
past “defense costs” allegedly [22]incurred for PRP letters within the
six years preceding the decision.'” In fact, Wausau already has
received numerous claims for defense coverage and been sued by
policyholders within weeks of the decision.

Numerous lawsuits likely will be filed raising the interplay
between the Court’s new “suit” holding and Wisconsin’s duty to
defend case law. See Mowry v. Badger State Mut Cas. Co., 129 Wis.
2d 496, 385 N.W.2d 171 (1986); Newhouse v. Citizens Security Mut.
Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 824, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993). Under Edgerton,
there was no question when a “suit” — and, therefore, an insurer’s
obligations to defend — began and ended. Now, an insurer faced with
a tender of defense of a PRP letter may find it impossible to satisfy its
obligations under Wisconsin law and thereby risk being found to have
breached its duty to defend and be estopped from asserting coverage
defenses. For example, without a lawsuit, it is difficult to determine
whether costs incurred by an insured are costs of defending the claim
or costs of satisfying any alleged liabilities arising from the claim. In
addition, an insurer may find that stays of regulatory activities

'2 The Wisconsin Statutes provide for a six-year statute of limitations on breach
of contract claims. See sec. 893.43, Stats; see also sec. 631.83(1)(d), Stats.

associated with a “PRP letter” may not be had while coverage
litigation proceeds. A policyholder thus may claim the insurer should
incur hundreds of thousands (if [23]not millions) of dollars in “free
defense” costs while coverage issues are being litigated.'°

In ruling on the “suit” issue, the Court overlooked these

important policy considerations and should reconsider tts decision.
* * *K *

' Similarly, with respect to numerous claims that were properly denied by
insurers over the years based on Edgerton, policyholders now may attempt to
use the decision to improperly assert that such denials constitute breaches of
contract and/or bad faith.

Supreme Coun. U.S. |
FILED

APR 7 - 2004

(4)

No. 03-1199

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF WAUSAU,
Petitioner,

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., e¢ al.,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

SCOTT J. RYSKOSKI SETH P. WAXMAN

GREENBERG TRAURIGLLP Counsel of Record

13155 Noel Road PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON

600 Three Galleria Tower REBECCAJ.K. GELFOND

Dallas, TX 75249 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING LLP

(972) 419-1250 2445 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037

PATRICK J. BOLEY (202) 663-6000

LARSON KING LLP

2800 Wells Fargo Place

30 East 7th Street
St. Paul, MN 55101
(651) 312-6500

eS A ALTACE wm

Phi Sci aie

ee eR ee ee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate J nsurance Co.,

588 N.W.2d 285 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) coohyesnninipelintiiictesnatebis 4
Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 {| 7
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) .ccccccecbececssssscoscoceeceseoses. 7
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) c.cccccccccsssecdecesee, cosoececeseeseee, 10
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of

Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) veces. leconcinsgnmnasisninnisens 8
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) .ecccc..\ececosesceoccoeeseees 8
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) .cccccccccccleccescescoccoeesece. 6
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,

Bn OFS CEI) nessressosesenosinimosttinanasiipiaamansb ait cacti. 8,9
City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co.,

517 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. 1994) .......ccccsesseccescesesssesesssseesessecoses 2
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) cecccccccccccoccecocoeees-.. 6
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 I ilicichisnciictdnases: 6
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ............... 7
General Casualty Co. v.- Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718

LAPD. NPN Divesceevinsh diitensodnnsge naan aan aera 3
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ...ccccccsssssscssescseseccsseoeesees 10
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526

i sitinnseicntinhuninisceniangiitiniiate ae eee ee 7
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S, 422

CRIA hixsinsicetnansinhersirsnisiciiehaaiilieitneiiea emma ence 10
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) cccccccccossccsoscoseeceeeceees.. 8
Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)....ccscccccsscssssschecssccosceseeccocessees 7
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) seccececce..-.... 7
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .cccccdceccescecoccoceccosees.,, 6
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

SOO AD Te DE CD sn cciscssniinapinsedaeceescinmstebintmratsiee nase 8
Nelson v. Adams USA, inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000) ................. 10

Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund
Insurance Co., 868 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Utah
1994), aff'd, 52 F.3d 1522 (10th Cir. 1995)...ccccccccccccoccecoeee. 4-

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 US. 337
SIPs onicstextnnivincisideisiisideilladupintiaiteto tein irre oar 10

iii

INC., 508 U.S. 439 (1998) ....cccsssssssscsssssssssesssssssssssseccccoseeccess.. 7
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.

1999); rev'd, 5380 U.S. 428 (2000) ....ssceccsssecssessssseccceeecsseeccs.. 6
United States v. IBM, 517 U.S. 843 S| eee 6
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety

Co., 874 P.2d 142 (Wash. 1994) 0... .cccccssecsscssessosseeseesseeecces... 4

STATUTES
a ss snchsesienicrcvonsaycssescsnieniveveninehsomemosncenssensaneeesse... 6
Wis. Stat. § 809.62(6) ..2.........corvvcsessessssseserecesssssesseeseeeeeeseossss.,,,. 4
MISCELLANEOUS
Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal Operating Pro-
COGUTES...cecreccesees AaeenaabahieetineNeden ee ebeetanebenswkennvesssersacnss 5

Respondent Johnson Controls, Ine. (JCI) presented to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court only the question whether
JCI’s liabilities for environmental response costs are “dam-
ages” within an insurer’s duty to indemnify under a general
liability insurance policy. Nothing in JGI’s petition for re-
view or briefs on the merits suggested that the court should
also consider whether a PRP letter is a “suit” within an in-
surer’s separate duty to defend. Yet the Wisconsin Supreme
Court decided the “suit” issue without notifying Wausau
that the issue was under consideration or affording it an op-
portunity to be heard on that question.’ JCI’s efforts to ob-
scure matters cannot retroactively alter those historical
facts.”

Those facts—lack of notice or an opportunity -to be
heard—establish that Wausau was denied due process.
JCI’s attempts to avoid that conclusion are based on false
premises. JCI overstates the due process principle that
Wausau advocates and thus never actually confronts the
conduct of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which did not
merely raise an argument not presented by the parties, but
sua sponte decided a matter that was separate and distinct
from the issue before it. As this Court and numerous lower
courts have recognized, such surprise judicial decisionmak-
ing violates due process. JCI also ignores the direct conse-
quences that adjudication, unlike legislation or agency rule-
making, has on the parties before the court. In this case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s action will cause substantial pe-
cuniary harm to Wausau. Wausau was therefore entitled to

' The court’s opinion recognizes that the two issues are separate.
The court addressed them in two separate sections of its opinion, one enti-
tled “Are CERCLA Response Costs Damages?” and the other “Do PRP
Letters Trigger the Insurer’s Duty to Defend?” See Pet. App. 16a, 34a.

: Although JCI suggests that a detailed review of the record would
be needed to determine what issues were before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court (Opp. 12 n.7), JCI itself does not rely on any part of the record not
discussed in the petition for certiorari or reprinted in the appendices al-
ready before this Court.

2

the protections of due process—protections that were de-
nied to it.

1. JCl’s argument that Wausau was aware that the
“suit” issue was presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court
defies reality and common sense. As amicus curiae CICLA
explains (CICLA Br. 14-15), whether a PRP letter is a “suit”
within the duty to defend is of paramount significance to in-
surers. Unlike the insurer’s indemnity obligation, which is
typically limited by policy limits, the insurer’s defense obli-
gation often is not, and the cost of defending an environ-
mental matter may well meet or exceed the indemnity costs.
Thus, the holding in City of Edgerton v. General Casualty
Co., 517 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. 1994), that a PRP letter is not a
“suit” was of immense importance to Wausau and the other
insurer parties. Any attempt to seek overruling of Edger-
ton’s “suit” holding would have been opposed at least as vig-
orously as Wausau opposed JCI’s effort to overturn Edger-
ton’s “damages” holding. But even though, according to JCI,
this surpassingly important issue was supposedly presented
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review, neither JCI nor
Wausau addressed that issue in the briefs, and the court
asked not a single question about it at oral argument.

Stripped to its essence, JCI’s position is that it raised
the “suit” issue in the question presented in its petition for
review and in a few comments by its counsel at oral argu-
ment. Neither contention is credible. JCI certainly did not
“broadly [seek] review of the continuing viability” of Edger-
ton “without limitation” (Opp. i). Rather, JCI’s petition pre-
sented a limited issue: “Should [Edgerton] be overruled in
light of the ‘arbitrary’ and ‘debatable’ distinctions it has pro-
duced and the discrediting of authorities upon which it re-

* JCI does not deny that the “suit” issue was not decided by the Mil-
waukee County Circuit Court nor raised in or decided by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, and that under well-settled Wisconsin practice, Wausau
could assume that the “suit” issue would not be decided in the first in-
stance by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Nor does JCI contest that it did
not raise the “suit” issue in its briefs on the merits. See Pet. 7-9, 25 n.25.

is)

&s;

: 3

ied?” Pet. App. 149a-150a. The “ ‘arbitrary’ and ‘debatable’
distinctions” clearly referred only to Edgerton’s “damages”
holding. See Pet. 6-8.’ That point was confirmed in the body
of JCI’s petition, where JCI discussed the “damages” issue
at length, but made no mention of the “suit” issue. See Pet. 9
n.6; Pet. App. 149a-152a.

JCI’s assertion that its counsel’s brief comments at oral
argument—eight sentences of his 30-minute argument—
provided Wausau with notice that the “suit” issue was under
consideration is equally meritless. First, all of counsel’s
comments on which JCI relies were made in response to a
question from the court on the “damages” issue. JCI’s
counsel understood that the question concerned the “dam-
ages” issue, for he reframed it as: “{I]f you... were to con-
sider [overruling Edgerton] in this case, why would you do it
in this case, ... was Edgerton improperly decided, and why
am I right that the CERCLA response costs are damages?”
In fact, no justice requested that counsel address the “suit”
holding of Edgerton.

Second, the few remarks of counsel on which JCI relies
were made (as JCI acknowledges) in support of its argument
that “coverage for environmental liability” (i.e., damages,
not defense costs) “should not depend upon the existence of

* The reference to “discrediting of authorities upon which [Edgerton |
relied” also clearly referred to the “damages” holding in Edgerton. As
explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in this case (Pet. App. 33a-
34a), two federal court cases on which Edgerton had relied in its “dam-

ages” holding were subsequently rejected by the highest courts of the
states whose laws those courts were applying.

® Justice Ann Walsh Bradley stated, “The argument is advanced that
this court has provided . . . a workable framework for handling these
cases,” and then asked, “why, now, in view of uncertainty and confusion
that may arise from overruling this, we should do it?” Her reference to
the “framework” clearly refers to decisions on the “damages” issue in
Edgerton and General Casualty Co. v. Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718 (Wis. 1997),
and the four-category “damages” framework of the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals in this case. See Pet. 6-7. A recording of the oral argument is
available at http://www. wicourts.gov/opinions/soralarguments.htm.

—

—— See

4

a lawsuit.” Opp. 6; see id. at 5. JCI’s position was that Wis-
consin “damages” case law was flawed and inconsistent be-
cause (under JCI’s interpretation) cleanup costs were
treated as “damages” if incurred in response to a govern-
ment lawsuit, but not as “damages” if incurred in response
to a PRP letter. Thus, JCI’s counsel referred to Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 874 P.2d 142
(Wash. 1994), for its holding that costs to comply with state
environmental statutes were “damages,” even though no
written demand (much less any lawsuit) was made against
the insured by a government agency. Weyerhaeuser did not
even address whether a PRP letter is a “suit” within an in-
surer’s defense obligation, and so JCI’s citation to it could
not have raised the “suit” issue for review. Indeed, JCI’s
counsel stated that an insurer’s defense obligation is “sepa-
rate from the duty to indemnify,” and that “[i]n this case you
don’t even have to get to the duty to defend.” Pet. 10 n.8."

Third, even if JCI’s counsel might have intended to
raise the “suit” issue, as a matter of law, his sparse com-
ments could not have given notice to Wausau that the issue
was before the court. Under Wisconsin law, issues may not
be raised for the first time at oral argument. See Wis. Stat.
§ 809.62(6); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 588
N.W.2d 285, 293 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). Thus, particularly in
light of the absence of any questioning from the court on the

* The other remarks relied on by JCI also were in support of JCI’s
“damages” argument. JCI’s counsel referred to the discussion in Quaker
State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 868 F. Supp.
1278 (D. Utah 1994), aff'd, 52 F.3d 1522 (10th Cir. 1995), of “the full pano-
ply of harsh things that can happen to somebody who ignores a PRP [let-
ter|” to support JCI’s argument that whether response costs are “dam-
ages” should not depend on whether there is a lawsuit against the insured.
Consistent with oral argument, JCI cited Quaker State in its petition for
review only for its “damages” holding. JCI’s counsel also referred to
“(t]he Indiana case, Travelers Indemnity,” which he described only as
setting forth the terms of an insurer’s defense agreement. But no such
case was cited in JCI’s petition or briefs, and this vague reference could
not have raised the “suit” issue for review. See Pet. 10 n.8.

5

“suit” issue, there was no reason for Wausau to think that,
contrary to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s own background
principle, JCI had raised that issue to the court.

JCI is thus left to argue (Opp. 5-7, 10) that the actions of
Wausau’s co-respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company,
somehow demonstrate that Wausau had notice. This argu-
ment is meritless. Travelers’ short discussion of the “suit”
holding of Edgerton merely responded to JCI’s argument
that “damages” coverage should not depend on the existence
of a lawsuit by pointing out that the distinction between a
PRP letter and a lawsuit is real and not arbitrary, and in-
deed was supported by the holding in Edgerton, in the con-
text of the duty to defend, that a PRP letter is not a “suit.”
Travelers was not responding to an argument that the court
should overrule its holding that a PRP letter is not a “suit.”
for JCI had made no such argument.”

2. JCI misstates the due process principle that Wau-
sau advocates. Wausau does not contend that courts may

"ICI’s conjecture (Opp. 5-6) that Wausau supposedly “allocated
briefing responsibility” for the “suit” issue to Travelers is simply false.
The three dozen defendant-respondents in the Wisconsin Supreme Court
sought additional briefing time to coordinate so that the court would not
be inundated with a brief from each party. Nonetheless, there was no
“allocatlion] of briefing responsibility” for specific issues as JCI specu-
lates. This is borne out by the fact that Wausau did not join in Travelers’
brief, Travelers did not join in Wausau’s brief, and several defendant-
respondents joined only in Wausau’s brief, but not Travelers’.

* ICI’s suggestion (Opp. 11 & n.6) that Wausau had a constitutionally
adequate opportunity to address the “suit” issue in its motion for recon-
sideration is baseless. JCI relies on a Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal
Operating Procedure that states that the court will grant reconsideration
only when the court has overlooked legal or factual points. That Internal
Operating Procedure—which is not binding on the court, see Wis. S. Ct.
IOP (Introduction)—plainly does not require the court to grant reconsid-
eration even when it has committed legal or factual error. Moreover, the
court is not obligated to give reasons when denying reconsideration, and it
gave none in this case. See Pet. App. 147a. The motion for reconsidera-
tion was ultimately nothing more than a plea to the court to change its
mind—an opportunity that was not a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386001_1125%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
