# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — AirTran Airways, Inc. v. Branche

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 540 U.S. 1182

## Text

supreme Court, U.%

{LED
03 oF DEC 182003

No. 03-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.
MICHAEL F. BRANCHE,

Respondent.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES CourT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

R. PAUL ROECKER, Esq. E.uiot H. SCHERKER, Esq.
GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A. Counsel of Record
450 South Orange Avenue GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.
Suite 650 1221 Brickell Avenue
P.O. Box 4923 (32802-4923) Miami, FL 33131
Orlando, FL 32801 (305) 579-0579

(407) 418-2383

Attorneys for Petitioner

184671 ce)

COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-3321 * (800) 359-6859

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the Florida Whistleblower Act, Fla. Stat.
§ 448.102, is pre-empted by the Airline Deregulation Act,
49 U.S.C. § 41713, as amended by the Whistleblower
Protection Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121.

2. Whether the panel’s decision by the Eleventh Circuit
conflicts with the authoritative decisions of other United
States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue.

Il

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner, AirTran Airways, Inc., is a wholly owned
subsidiary of AirTran Holdings, Inc.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ......

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .....

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TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............

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SUPUUIU OREN occ ence scrssnes inh

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .......

ameeeeers OF IE CASE .... 2. eee ene.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...

A.

The decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals presents decisional conflict with
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. ......

Conflicting circuit court decisions on the
pre-emptive effect of the Deregulation Act as
amended by the Whistleblower Program on
state whistleblower statutes present a
compelling reason for the Court’s review. ..

Page

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Contents

1. The Principles of Pre-emption .......

2 ee EG gk ocho eee eneass

3. The Bleventli Circuit ...............

CONCLUSION

2 66 64 OO @ Ob @ 84 4S O62 Oo BOO OE OOO OE Oe SD

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TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases .
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219
fy: | nn Sree eee aera ere nes Prt spenru mi cancer Ke aa 5
Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, Inc., 286 F.3d 488 (8th Cir.
PE ees kaa e Ree ee 7) i Me ao
Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259
(Si Cas. TOPS CU OOREY) c oc cb ke eeu yeanees 6,9, 10
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504
LEED 6 kn 45 oe4 55 vee eee eee eee 5, 6,8
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141
CRUD 6 foie ee eee 5

Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) .. 7,13

Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861
(2000) cee KR ee ee q&a

Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (Sth Cir.
ee eee es ee aeeeere 6,9, 11, 2

Marlow v. AMR Services Corp., 870 F. Supp. 295
(ar. FON: THe 6. ch acnuaie bee weaene eee 9, 11, 13

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374
CRF ska ons ese keene ee eee 5, 7,8

v1

Cited Authorities
Page

Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.

og ty | CT eee E ee Pee Pees mente 5
Regner v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 652 N.W.2d 557

a ee eee ree re 9, 11
Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164

ee Be CSG Cte. UGE ob oe ke eae ee ve 10
Statutes
Ss Oe SELEY kc cet bawakee eae ee ees l
OR EED os eh K ev Seeds cake eens passim
ee UES sd os vS.o se poe ee ae Pe
eee NE bcs Saab a uw ee vneeeeeceeeees 7
Fla Stat. § 448.102 .................. Bile rere i, 1
Rules

5te S| err er yer ores ee 4

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TABLE OFAPPENDICES

Appendix A — Opinion Of The United States Court
Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit Filed August
i Ser ey Per ee paw eer ye

Appendix B — Order And Judgment Of The United
States District Court For The Middle District Of
Florida, Tampa Division Dated And Filed August
(Se Sree errs er tar a ee

Appendix C — Order Of The United States Court
Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit Denying
Petition For Rehearing En Banc Filed October 2,
2003

Page

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33a

a

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit granting appeal by Plaintiff and ordering
the case to be vacated and remanded to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida was issued
on August 21, 2003, and is reproduced in the Appendix at A.

The Order by United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment was issued on August 27, 2002, and is reproduced
in the Appendix at B.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit was entered on August 21, 2003 and the
Petition for Rehearing En Banc was denied on October 2,
2003 (Appendix C). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
49 U.S.C. § 42121 — Attached in Appendix D.
49 U.S.C. § 41713 — Attached in Appendix D.

Fla. Stat. § 448.102 — Attached in Appendix D.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent Michael Branche filed a single-count
complaint in state court which alleged a retaliatory discharge
of his employment under the Florida Whistleblower Act.
Mr. Branche alleged that he was employed by AirTran
Airways, Inc. (“AirTran”) as an aircraft inspector at Tampa
International Airport, with responsibility to conduct safety
inspections of AirTran’s aircraft after they had been serviced
by AirTran’s maintenance crew but prior to takeoff. Petitioner
AirTran removed the case to federal district court on the basis
of diversity.

Mr. Branche alleged in the Complaint that on June 30,
2001, an AirTran DC-9 airplane landed in Tampa with one
of its two engines running at a temperature that exceeded
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) safety guidelines,
a condition that could result in engine failure, and that
Mr. Branche recommended to AirTran’s Tampa maintenance
manager that the engine be inspected. He further alleges that
the manager and two maintenance workers climbed into the
aircraft’s cockpit and conducted a “high powered run” to
ascertain the plane’s airworthiness, but that none of the three
were qualified to undertake this diagnostic maneuver and in
doing so violated FAA regulations. Mr. Branche also avers
that the AirTran employee qualified to perform these tests
was present at the Tampa airport.

Respondent Branche goes on to allege that the engine
overheated in flight after departing to Atlanta, that the
plane was subsequently taken out of service, and that he
investigated that particular engine the next day and learned
that it had overheated on two separate occasions during the
preceding two weeks. Two days later Mr. Branche informed

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3

the FAA of AirTran’s regulatory violations, and four days
after that he filed a union grievance asserting that the
maintenance manager and the two mechanics had performed
an unauthorized high powered engine run. Respondent
Branche alleges that later in the month he was fired for a
time card violation and theft of two hours of pay, but that the
true reason for his discharge was retaliation for reporting
AirTran violations to the FAA.

Following discovery, AirTran moved for summary
judgment on the ground that Mr. Branche’s claim under the
Florida Whistleblower Act was pre-empted by the Airline
Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (the “Deregulation
Aci”), amendéd by the 1999 Whistleblower Protection
Program, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (the “Whistleblower Program’’).
The district court granted summary judgment, and
subsequently entered judgment for AirTran. Mr. Branche
~ appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The court
posed the question for consideration as whether Mr. Branche’s
claim significantly affects air carrier “services” as that term
is used in the pre-emption provision of the Deregulation Act.
The court held that this is “a close question” made “especially
difficult” by the fact that the Whistleblower Program contains
a remedy which parallels the one available under the Florida
Whistleblower Act “for plaintiffs in Branche’s position.”
342 F.3d at 1250-51.

The court’s decision acknowledges that the Whistle-
blower Program was held to pre-empt a state whistleblower
cause of action in Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, Inc., 286 F. 3d 488
(8th Cir. 2002). Nonetheless, the court construed the
Whistleblower Program in the manner that Botz rejected,
to reach an opposite conclusion with respect to the pre-
emption of Mr. Branche’s state law whistleblower claim.

4

Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment for AirTran and
remanded for further proceedings. AirTran filed a petition
for rehearing en banc which was denied, following which
AirTran timely filed this certiorari petition. ‘

~- REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
A. The decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

presents decisional conflict with the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals.

This case addresses the pre-emptive effect on state
whistleblower statutes of the 3-year old Whistleblower
Program amendment to the Deregulation Act. The Eleventh
Circuit decision brought for review applies that pre-emptive
effect in a manner which directly conflicts with an application
of the same federal statute by the Eighth Circuit, and with a
growing number of courts which have been called upon to
consider precisely the same issue. To date, the Court has never
addressed this issue.

rr OO Te

oe

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision provides a textbook
example of the type of case which the Court has said will
prompt its consideration for review — a circuit court decision
“in conflict” with another circuit court decision on “the same ‘
‘important matter.” Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). |

B. Conflicting circuit court decisions on the pre-emptive
effect of the Deregulation Act as amended by the
Whistleblower Program on state whistleblower statutes
present a compelling reason for the Court’s review.

The principles for determining the pre-emptive effect of
a federal statute on a state statute are well-established by the

aa

5

decisions of the Court. The courts start with an assumption
that state police powers are not superseded unless Congress
has made clear a desire for pre-emption.' The pre-emption
analysis is then guided by a determination of congressional
intent, either express or implied,” beginning with the plain
language of the statute.’ The particular language to be
construed in this case was the federal prohibition against state
laws having the force and effect of a federal statute “related
to... service of an air carrier,”* and the language of the
protections and remedies written into the Whistleblower
Program.°

The term “related to” in this statute has already been
held by the Court to have a “broad scope” and an “expansive
sweep,’° in further of the Whistleblower Act’s “overreaching
deregulatory purpose.”’ Before the enactment of the
Whistleblower Program in 1999, the term “service” had also

1. E.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 151
(2001).

2. E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516
(1992).

3. E.g., Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.
189, 194 (1985).

4. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).
5. 49 U.S.C. § 42121.

6. Morales v. Trans WorldAirlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 385
(1992)).

7. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 229, n.5
(1995).

6

been given a broad scope in furtherance of that congressional
purpose in en banc decisions of the Fifth and the Ninth
Circuits.®

In the decision now brought for review, the Eleventh
Circuit has acknowledged that enactment of Whistleblower
Program was designed by Congress to provide protection and
federal remedies for the specific kind of action taken by
Mr. Branche in this case.? The Eleventh Circuit has also
acknowledged, and in fact found “more compelling,” the
broad definition of the term “service” articulated by the Fifth
Circuit in Hodges.'® Yet the court drew conclusions from
the applicable legal principles which are diametrically
opposed to the principles drawn by the Eighth Circuit from
the same statutory language, congressional intent, and
common law interpretations. The result is a decision which
seriously devalues congressional intent with respect to the
Whistleblower Program that Congress engrafted onto the
Deregulation Act, and poses a circuit conflict which only
the Court can resolve.

1. The Principles of Pre-emption

4

It is well settled that Congress may demonstrate its intent
to pre-empt state law either implicitly or explicitly.’ It is

8. Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (Sth Cir.
1995 (en banc)); Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259,
1265-66 (9th Cir. 1998 (en banc)).

9. Branche v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d at 1251.

10. 342 F.3d at 1257.

11. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.

er

7

also well settled that neither the inclusion of an express pre-
emption clause nor a saving clause bars the ordinary working
of conflict pre-emption principles."

Congress has explicitly addressed the issue of pre-
emption through an express pre-emption clause set forth in
the Deregulation Act, and through the 1999 amendment to
the Act which created the Whistleblower Protection Program.
That Program offers a remedy for air carrier employees, such
as Mr. Branche, that parallels the Florida Whistleblower Act.
The Deregulation Act’s express pre-emptive effect is given
context and purpose by the Whistleblower Program,
which illustrates the types of claims Congress intended the
Deregulation Act to pre-empt.'? The congressional goal of
ensuring that the price, availability and efficiency of air
transportation should rely primarily on market forces and
competition is substantially furthered by the Whistleblower
Program’s creation of a uniform standard for dealing with
employee complaints of air-safety violations.'* The Eleventh
Circuit’s decision, in contrast to that of the Eighth Circuit,
destroys the uniformity for which the Whistleblower Program

12. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000);
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) (pre-emption may
be found where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.)

13. See Botz, 286 F.3d at 495-56.

14. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a)(6) and (a)(7) (1994) (declaring
Deregulation Act’s policy of fostering a sound regulatory system that
responds to the public’s needs and reaches decisions promptly);
Morales, 504 U.S. at 378 (explaining that Congress added the pre-
emption provision to the Deregulation Act “[t]o ensure that the States
would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own”).

8

was expressly enacted, by casting federal pre-emption
decision-making into the abyss of piecemeal, case-by-case
analysis.

2. The Eighth Circuit

In Batz, the Eighth Circuit specifically. addressed the
scope of pre-emption under the Deregulation Act in the
context of a claim under a state whistleblower claim which
alleged a retaliatory discharge for an employee’s report of
safety violations to the FAA — the exact same context
presented to the Eleventh Circuit in this case. The Eighth
Circuit held that the Deregulation Act pre-empts claims
arising under state whistleblower statutes which are “related
to” prices, routes, or “services” of an air carrier.'°

The court reached that conclusion after considering
the purpose of Congress as expressed in the plain language
of Act, as directed by Cipollone. 505 U.S. at 516 (1992).
The court also examined the statutory intent of the Act as
expressed in Morales, 504 U.S. at 390 (1992), and the Court’s
determination that the courts must give a broad meaning to
the phrase “related to” and to the pre-emptive purpose of the
Act with respect to all state enforcement actions which have
a “connection with or reference to airline rates, routes,
or services.” 504 U.S. at 375. Following the Court’s reasoning
in those cases, the Eighth Circuit concluded that FAA
violations will result in the grounding of an airplane, and
that any grounding is related both to airline services and to
the transport of passengers from one place to another.

15. See Botz, 286 F.3d at 491.

ne cit —~ ella,

9

The analysis and reasoning of the Eighth Circuit is also
reflected in decisions of a federal district court in Hawaii
and a Minnesota appellate court, both of which found federal
pre-emption of state whistleblower statutes based on an
interpretation of the term “services.” In Marlow v. AMR
Services Corp., 870 F. Supp. 295 (D. Haw. 1994), the court
held that the Hawaii Whistleblower’s Protection Act was pre-
empted by the Deregulation Act on the grounds that jetbridges
were an integral part of air carrier services regardless of who
maintains them, and that jetbridge maintenance is included
within the meaning of carrier “services.” In Regner v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 652 N:W.2d 557 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002) the court held that a state whistleblower act claim was
pre-empted by the Deregulation Act because an aircraft
mechanic can interrupt services by grounding an aircraft for
mechanical failures.

3. The Eleventh Circuit

In Branche, the Eleventh Circuit also engaged in a
construction of the pre-emption provision of the Deregulation
Act, the Whistleblower Program and case law from other
courts, including Hodges and Charas. Using the same
materials as the court in Botz, the court denied federal pre-
emption of Branche’s claim of a retaliatory discharge for
reporting violations of safety regulations to the FAA. The
court concluded that Branche’s claim does not implicate any
arena in which airlines compete, and does not relate to any
“service” of an air carrier within the meaning of § 41713.'°

The court viewed the pre-emption clause of the
Deregulation Act as promoting maximum reliance on

16. Branche, 342 F. 3d at 1259-61.

10

competing market forces, to shape the airline industry, as
opposed to state regulation. On that basis, the court held that
since the Florida Whistleblower Act does not explicitly
address airline services, the only possible basis for pre-
emption would be if the Act has a significant impact on airline
services which are tied to market forces. Failing to find any
impact in the Florida statute, the court held that the
Deregulation Act did not universally pre-empt claims brought
under the Florida law. ;

The gravamen of the court’s decision is the notion that
the phrase “related to the ... services” of an air carrier in
the Deregulation Act’s pre-emption clause encompasses only
those actions with a connection or reference to the elements
of air travel that are bargained for between passengers and
air carriers.'’ The court acknowledged that this includes both
the physical transportation of passengers and the incidents
of that transportation over which the airlines compete,'® but
reasoned that Mr. Branche’s retaliatory discharge claim did
not relate in any notable way to the transportation of
passengers or affect airline “services” as defined in decisions
of the Third and Ninth Circuits.'®

The court further found that Mr. Branche’s retaliatory
discharge claim did not significantly affect any bargained-
for element of air carrier operations, as defined by the Fifth

17. Id. at 1258.

18. Id. at 1259.

19. Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186
(3d Circ. 1998); Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 169 F.3d 594
(9th Cir. 1999) (“service” defined as things such as frequency and
scheduling of transportation and the selections of markets).

11 :

and the Seventh Circuits.*° This analysis by the court resulted
in a decision which directly conflicts with the Eighth Circuit
on the same essential facts — namely, a claim of retaliatory
discharge for reporting violations of federal regulations to
the FAA, with the possible resulting consequence that aircraft
would be grounded or delayed in departure.

As noted earlier, the Eighth Circuit’s decision is not the
only one with a like conclusion regarding the effect of safety
violations on air carrier “services.” Regner involved a
plaintiff responsible for airline mechanics who alleged his
termination for reporting safety violations to the FAA
(like Mr. Branche in this case). The Regner court found that
an aircraft mechanic can interrupt services by grounding an
aircraft for alleged mechanical violations, in recognition that
Congress’ amendment of the Deregulation Act to include the
Whistleblower Program was an attempt by Congress to
address the issue of pre-emption for whistleblower claims
brought by aggrieved employees.?!

In Marlow, the court also held, largely in reliance on the
Fifth Circuit’s Hodges decision, that the state whistleblower
law was pre-empted because jetbridge maintenance is integral
to airline services. The court logically reasoned that jetbridge
maintenance affects boarding procedures, which in turn have
a direct affect on airline services.” It is significant that the

20. Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (Sth Cir.)
(elements of air carrier service include such items as ticketing,
boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage
handling in addition to transportation itself); Travel All Over the
World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996).

21. 652 N.W.2d at 562.

22. 870 F. Supp. at 298.

12

Eleventh Circuit also relied on the Hodges decision, but
reached exactly the opposite conclusion on whether the
reporting of violations of required FAA safety requirements
can result in the grounding of an airplane and, thereby, affect
transportation “services.”

The Eleventh Circuit failed to recognize that Mr. Branche’s
identification of unauthorized service personnel performing
a safety inspection prior to the plane’s departure to Atlanta,
and his reporting alleged safety violations to the FAA,
were precisely the type of “service” issues which will cause
aircrafts to be grounded. A grounded aircraft would be taken
out of service for a proper inspection, for maintenance, and
for repair, with the effect of making the aircraft unavailable
and cause the cancellation of scheduled passenger
transportation. Thus, there is a direct correlation between
the detection and reporting of safety violations and the
scheduling and routes flown by an aircraft — precisely the
form of “services” which airlines provide to their customers.

Significantly, the court’s decision completely ignores the
fact that airlines compete on the basis of reliability and on-
time performance. Airline customers are keenly. aware of
the experience and records of airlines in these regards.
Maintenance issues, obviously, directly impact schedules
and reliability — factors of particular interest to passengers.
Yet the Eleventh Circuit’s turgid analysis disregards what
the Eighth Circuit found compelling — to wit, the economic
impact of grounding an aircraft, and its resulting effect on
service and the physical transportation of passengers. _

In sum, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision has completely
overlooked the fact that employment actions, and specifically
the alleged firing of employees for calling attention to

|

13

improper inspections and reporting safety violations to the
FAA, necessarily and inescapably affects the transport of
passengers and their marketing choices, as incidents of air
carrier “services.”

One of the most significant deficiencies in the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision for purposes of this Court’s jurisdiction is
its failure to give adequate consideration to the scope of the
Whistleblower Program as it relates to pre-emption. The court
reasoned that any inference from the enactment of the federal
remedies provided in that Program would be a species of
“implied” pre-emption, which the court presumed to be
inapplicable because of the express pre-emption clause in
the Deregulation Act.** This Court has repeatedly held that
the inclusion of an express pre-emption clause does not
foreclose considerations of implied pre-emption.” Unlike
the Eleventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit duly noted that the
pre-emptive effect of the Deregulation Act was in fact
bolstered by Congress’ enactment of the Whistleblower
Program.”°

The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis with respect to the
Whistleblower Program counters congressional intent that
there be uniformity in remedies for whistleblowers. By
requiring an ad hoc, case-by-case analysis of the issue based
on the particular timing and nature of the safety acts of airline

23. See, e.g, Marlow, 870 F. Supp. at 299.
24. 342 F.3d at 1263-64.

25. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869; Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. at 287.

26. Botz, 286 F.3d at 497.

14

employees, the court has obliterated any hope of uniformity
in the application of the Whistleblower Program.

CONCLUSION

There are diametrically opposed decisions from the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits regarding the important issue
of pre-emption of state whistleblower statutes by the
Deregulation Act now ameaded by the Whistleblower
Program. The effect of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is to
create conflict on an issue of increasing importance
throughout the nation.

Based on the foregoing, AirTran respectfully requests
that the Court grant certiorari to resolve this split of authority,
and to restore uniformity to the remedial measures Congress
has provided for airline safety.

Respectfully yours,
R. PAuL RoEcKER, Esq. ELLioT H. SCHERKER, Esq.
GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A. Counsel of Record
450 South Orange Avenue GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.
Suite 650 1221 Brickell Avenue
P.O. Box 4923 (32802-4923) Miami, FL 33131
Orlando, FL 32801 (305) 579-0579

(407) 418-2383

Attorneys for Petitioner

la

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT FILED AUGUST 21, 2003

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-14920
D.C. Docket No. 01-01747-CV-8-T-30M
MICHAEL F. BRANCHE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC., a foreign corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida

(August 21, 2003)

Before MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and
RESTANT, Judge.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

This case ultimately requires us to determine whether a
claim brought by appellant Michael Branche (“Branche’’)
against his former employer, Airtran Airways, Inc.
(“Airtran”), pursuant to Florida’s Whistleblower Act,
Fla. Stat. § 448.102, is expressly pre-empted by the federal

* Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.

2a

Appendix A

Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), 49 U.S.C. § 41713.
This question forces us, in turn, to decide whether Branche’s
claim significantly affects “air carrier services,” as that phrase
is used in the ADA’s pre-emption clause. This is a close
question that is rendered especially difficult by Congress’s
1999 amendment of the ADA to include the Whistleblower
Protection Program (“WPP’”’), 49 U.S.C. § 42121, a provision
that offers a remedy for plaintiffs in Branche’s position that
parallels the one available under Florida law. After thoroughly
considering the arguments raised by the parties and the
applicable caselaw, we conclude that Branche’s claim is not
pre-empted. Because the district court held contrarily, we
vacate its entry of final summary judgment in favor of Airtran
and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

I

The basic facts are these. Branche was first hired by
Airtran on September 2, 1998 as a maintenance controller,
and he subsequently was transferred to the position of
aircraft inspector at Tampa International Airport (“TIA”).
In fact, Branche was appellee’s only aircraft inspector at TIA.
In this capacity, appellant was required to conduct safety
inspections of Airtran’s aircraft after they had been serviced
by appellee’s maintenance crew but prior to takeoff. These
inspections were governed by FAA regulations, including
14 C.F.R. § 121.365(c),' which provides that this inspection

1. This subsection provides:

Each person performing required inspections in addition
to other maintenance, preventive maintenance, or
(Cont'd)

3a

Appendix A

function is to be exercised free from the oversight of the
maintenance department whose work the inspector reviews.
Branche says that during June, 2001, Guy Lewis, Airtran’s
maintenance manager at TIA, began exercising supervisory
authority over him in direct contravention of § 121.365(c).

Branche alleges that on June 30, 2001, an Airtran DC-9
airplane landed at TIA with one of its two engines running at
a temperature that exceeded Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”) safety guidelines, a condition that could have
resulted in engine failure. After perceiving this dangerous
condition, Branche recommended to Lewis that the engine
be subjected to a detailed physical inspection. Instead, Lewis
and two maintenance workers climbed into the aircraft’s
cockpit and conducted a “high powered run,” 1.e., began
running the engine at high power in an effort to ascertain its
air-worthiness. Appellant alleges that none of these
individuals were qualified to undertake this diagnostic
maneuver, and that as such they violated 14 C.F.R. § 65.81?

(Cont'd)

alterations, shall organize the performance of those
functions so as to separate the required inspection
functions from the other maintenance, preventive
maintenance, and alteration functions. The separation
shall be below the level of administrative control at
which overall responsibility for the required inspection
functions and other maintenance, preventive
maintenance, and alteration functions are exercised.

14 C.F.R. § 121.365(c).
2. This section provides:

(a) A certificated mechanic may perform or supervise

the maintenance, preventive maintenance or alteration
(Cont'd)

4a

Appendix A

in performing it. He further asserts that Paul Picarelli, an
employee who was authorized to perform high powered runs,
was present at TIA at the time, and that under § 65.81 Picarelli
should have been asked to test the engine in question. Branche
says that after the plane departed from TIA on June 30, 2001,
the engine overheated during its flight to Atlanta and the plane
subsequently was taken out of service. Moreover, he alleges
that the following day he investigated this particular engine
and learned that it had overheated on two separate occasions
during the preceding two weeks.

(Cont’d)

of an aircraft or appliance, or a part thereof, for which
he is rated (but excluding major repairs to, and major
alterations of, propellers, and any repair to, or alteration
of, instruments), and may perform additional duties in
accordance with §§ 65.85, 65.87, and 65.95. However,
he may not supervise the maintenance, preventive
maintenance, or alteration of, or approve and return to
service, any aircraft or appliance, or part thereof, for
which he is rated unless he has satisfactorily performed
the work concerned at an earlier date. If he has not so
performed that work at an earlier date, he may show his
ability to do it by performing it to the satisfaction of the
Administrator or under the direct supervision of a
certificated and appropriately rated mechanic, or a
certificated rep2'rman, who has had previous experience
in the specific operation concerned.

(b) A certificated mechanic may not exercise the
privileges of his certificate and rating unless he
understands the current instructions of the manufacturer,
and the maintenance manuals, for the specific operation
concerned.

14 C.F.R. § 65.81.

Sa

Appendix A

On July 2, 2001, Branche informed the FAA of Airtran’s
regulatory violations, and both he and Airtran subsequently
were contacted regarding his allegations. Airtran soon became
aware that Branche was the source of the FAA’s knowledge
of the incidents in question. On July 6, 2001, appellant filed
a formal union grievance in which he asserted that neither
Lewis nor the mechanics who accompanied him in the cockpit
were authorized to perform a high power engine run.
Then, on July 13, 2001, Airtran accused him of falsifying
his time card and stealing approximately two hours of pay.
Appellant denied the allegation. On July 23, 2001, Branche
was terminated based on this alleged time card violation.
Appellant posits that the true reason for his discharge was
retaliatory, i.e., to punish him for reporting Airtran’s
violations of FAA regulations.

Based on this pattern of dealing, on August 27, 2001
Branche filed this action in the Circuit Court for the
Sixth Judicial Circuit, in Pinellas County, Florida.
He advanced a single claim under Florida’s Whistleblower
Act, Fla. Stat. § 448.102. Airtran promptly removed the case
on the basis of diversity to the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida, where discovery proceeded.
On June 24, 2002, Airtran moved for final summary judgment
denying appellant’s claim, arguing that as applied in this case
the state Whistleblower Act was explicitly pre-empted by
the ADA, 49 U.S.C. § 41713. The district court agreed, and
granted Airtran’s motion on August 27, 2002. This appeal
ensued.

On appeal, Branche argues that the district court erred
by holding that the ADA pre-empts Florida’s Whistleblower

6a

Appendix A

Act, as applied in this case. He says that pre-emption under
the ADA exists only where the state law in question purports
to regulate airline prices, routes or services. In this case, he
argues, the relationship between Florida’s prohibition against
retaliatory discharges and these facets of air carrier operations
is too attenuated to give rise to ADA pre-emption. Airtran
responds that the scope of the ADA’s express pre-emption
provision is extremely broad, and that the connection between
the type of conduct prohibited by the Whistleblower Act and
air carrier “services” is sufficient to implicate the ADA’s pre-
emption clause. Moreover, appellee contends, Congress’s
enactment in 1999 of the WPP, 49 U.S.C. § 42121, supports
a finding of pre-emption here, as the WPP provides an
exclusive remedy for plaintiffs in Branche’s position.

II

We reView a summary judgment ruling de novo, applying
the same legal standard used by the district court. See Johnson
v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (11th Cir.2001).
In conducting this examination, we view the materials
presented and all factual inferences in the light most favorable
to the non- moving party. See Adickes v. §.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142
(1970). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden of demonstrating the
satisfaction of this standard lies with the movant, who must
present “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any”
that establish the absence of any genuine, material factual
dispute. Jd.

7a
Appendix A

As the Supreme Court observed in Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., “‘[p]re-emption may be either express
or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’s command
is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.’” 504 U.S. 374, 383,
112 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (quoting FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56-57, 111 S.Ct. 403, 407,
112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990)). In cases where Congress has chosen
to explicitly address the issue of pre-emption, however, it
generally is inappropriate to look beyond that provision to
imply pre-emption from the statute’s substantive dictates.
As the Supreme Court has stated:

When Congress has considered the issue of pre-
emption and has included in the enacted
legislation a provision explicitly addressing that
issue, and when that provision provides a “reliable
indicium of congressional intent with respect to
state authority,” “there is no need to infer
congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from
the substantive provisions” of the legislation. Such
reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of
expression unius est exclusio alterius: Congress’
enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive
reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that
reach are not pre-empted.

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517, 112 S.Ct.
2608, 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Malone v.
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 1190,
55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) and California Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282, 107 S.Ct. 683, 690,

8a

Appendix A

93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987) (opinion of Marshall, J.)). Although
the Supreme Court subsequently clarified that Cipollone does
-not establish an iron-clad rule against finding implied
pre-emption under a statute containing an express pre-
emption clause, see Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 US.
280, 287-89, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 1487-88, 131 L.Ed.2d 385
(1995), it recognized that “Cipollone supports an inference
that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-
emption.” Jd. at 289, 115 S.Ct. at 1488. In other words, where
a legislative enactment contains an express pre-emption
provision, we typically do not consider the issue of implied
pre-emption; our primary task is only to determine whether
the state law in question falls within the scope of the statute
expressly promulgated by Congress. See Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 2414, 150
L.Ed.2d 532 (2001) (“[Ol]ur task is to identify the domain
expressly pre-empted... .”).

Under the ADA, “a State, political subdivision of a State,
or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force
and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an
air carrier that may provide air transportation under this
subpart.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (emphasis added).
This pre-emption clause serves the ADA’s broader goal of
“promot[ing] maximum reliance on competitive market
forces” as opposed to state regulation in shaping the contours
of the airline industry. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513
U.S. 219, 230, 115 S.Ct. 817, 824, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995)
(citation and internal punctuation omitted). Accordingly, the
key question in *his case is whether Branche’s claim for
retaliatory discharge under Florida’s Whistleblower Statute,

9a
Appendix A

Fla. Stat. § 448.102(1),? is “related to” the “service of an air
carrier.”* To answer this basic question we must define the
terms “related to” and “service,” as used in § 41713.

In undertaking this inquiry, we are mindful that the
question of whether a federal statute expressly pre-empts a
state law is one that turns on “statutory intent, and we
accordingly ‘begin with the language employed by Congress
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’” Morales, 504
U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 2036 (quoting Holliday, 498 U.S. at
57, 111 S.Ct. at 407); see also Parise v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
141 F.3d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir.1998) (“Whether a federal
statute pre-empts state law is a question of congressional
intent.”) (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S.
246, 252, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2243, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994)).

In Morales, the Supreme Court defined the phrase
“related to,” as used in the ADA’s pre-emption provision.°
It said:

3. In pertinent part, this section of Florida law prohibits private
employers from “tak[ing] any retaliatory personnel action against an
employee because the employee has ... [d]isclosed ... to any
appropriate governmental agency, under oath, in writing, an activity,
policy, or practice of the employer that is in violation of a law, rule,
or regulation.” Fla. Stat. § 448.102(1).

4. No party argues that appellant’s claim is “related to” the
“price” or “route” of an air carrier.

5. At the time of the Morales decision, this provision was
codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), but its language was functionally
(Cont'd)

10a
Appendix A

For purposes of the present case, the key phrase,
obviously, is “relating to.” The ordinary meaning of
these words is a broad one—“to stand in some
relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain;
refer; to bring into association with or connection
with,”—and the words thus express a broad
pre-emptive purpose.

504 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 2037 (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1158 (Sth ed.1979)). The Court then analogized the
scope of § 41713 to that of ERISA’s similarly worded pre-
emption provision, which says that state laws are pre-empted
“insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan. . . .”
29 U.S.C. 1144(a) (emphasis added). It noted that it previously
had construed ERISA’s language to mean that a state law is pre-
empted—that is, “relates to” an employee benefit plan—” ‘if it
has a connection with or reference to such a plan.’” Morales,
504 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 2037 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2900, 77 L.Ed.2d
490 (1983)). The Court then held:

Since the relevant language of the ADA is identical,
we think it appropriate to adopt the same standard
here: State enforcement actions having a connection
with or reference to airline “rates, routes, or services”
are pre-empted under 49 U.S.C.[ ] § 1305(a)(1).

(Cont’d)

identical to that contained in its modern incarnation, § 41713.
See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 2036-37 (“Section
1305(a)(1) expressly pre-empts the States from ‘enact[ing] or
enforc[ing] any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision
having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services
of any air carrier....’”) (emphasis added).

lla

Appendix A

Id. Thus, so long as the state law action has a connection with

airline prices, routes or services, pre-emption under
§ 41713 is mandated.

This is so regardless of whether the state statute specifically
addresses the airline industry. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 386,
112 S.Ct. at 2038. Indeed, the Court explicitly rejected the notion
that “the ADA imposes no constraints on laws of general
applicability.” Jd. It said that:

Besides creating an utterly irrational loophole (there
is little reason why state impairment of the federal
scheme should be deemed acceptable so long as it is
effected by the particularized application ofa general
statute), this notion similarly ignores the sweep of the
“relating to” language. We have consistently rejected
this precise argument in our ERISA cases: “[A] state
law may ‘relate to’ a benefit plan, and thereby be
pre-empted, even if the law is not specifically
designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only
indirect.”

Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,
139, 111 S.Ct. 478, 483, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990)). Although
Morales does not define with particularity the circumstances
under which a state law “relates to” air carrier services,
it clearly says that the requisite connection exists where
“the law expressly references the air carrier’s prices, routes
or services, or has a ‘forbidden significant effect’ upon the
same.” United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d
323, 335 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting Morales, 504 US. at 388,

12a

Appendix A

112 S.Ct. at 2039). In this case, Florida’s Whistleblower Act
does not explicitly address airline services; accordingly, the only
possible basis for pre-emption is if it has a sufficient—i.e.,
significant—impact on those services.

Notably, however, the Court recognized that there are limits on
the scope of the ADA’s “related to” language. Specifically, it
said that ““‘[s]ome state actions may affect [airline prices, routes
or services] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner’ to
have pre-emptive effect.” Morales, 504 U.S. at 390, 112 S.Ct.
at 2041 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. at
2901 n. 21); see also Public Health Trust of Dade County v.
Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 295 (11th Cir.1993)
(“Because [plaintiff’s] design defect claims lie outside the pre-
emptive reach of section 1305, we conclude that those claims
are not pre-empted.”’).

Subsequently, in Wolens, the Court had an opportunity to
apply § 1305(a) as partially defined in Morales. At issue in
Wolens was whether IIllinois’s Consumer Fraud Act, a law of
general applicability, was pre-empted by the ADA.
In holding that it was, the Court said that the Consumer
Fraud Act

serves aS a means to guide and police the
marketing practices of the airlines; the Act does
not simply give effect to bargains offered by the
airlines and accepted by airline customers. In light
of the full text of the pre-emption clause, and of
the ADA’s purpose to leave largely to the airlines
themselves, and not at all to the States, the
selection and design of marketing mechanisms

—_

-_——_—

13a

Appendix A

appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation
services, we conclude that [section] 1305(a)(1)
pre-empts plaintiffs’ claims under the Consumer
Fraud Act.

Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228, 115 S.Ct. at 823-24.

For our purposes, Wolens is significant primarily for its
explanation of the purposes of the ADA and because it
directly ties the pre-emption inquiry to those purposes.
In particular, it makes clear that through the ADA Congress
sought to leave the bargained-for aspects of the air carrier-
air passenger relationship to the workings of the market, i.e.,
to prevent the states from “impos[ing] their own public
policies or theories of competition or regulation on the
operations of an air carrier.” Wolens, 513 U.S. at 229 n.5,
115 S.Ct. at 824 n.5 (citation and internal punctuation
omitted). By reaching only airline prices, routes and services,
§ 41713 may be seen as defining—albeit only generally—
the universe of such bargained-for elements of air carrier
operations. This focus on the bargained-for aspects of air
carrier service is perfectly consistent with the ADA’s purpose
of promoting competition within the airline industry;
air carriers compete in only a limited range of contexts,
e.g., fares, routes, timing, etc., which constitute the
bargained-for elements of its service. Accordingly, to pre-
empt state law claims concerning other elements of airline
operations that are not bargained for plainly would not further
the goal of promoting competition in the airline industry.

Although Wolens is thus helpful to the resolution of this
case, the Court did not expand on Morales’s definition of

14a

Appendix A

“related to,” nor did it define “service [of an air carrier],”
as uséd in the ADA’s pre-emption clause. Accordingly, these
definitional tasks fall to us. In tackling these questions, we
bear in mind the important general maxim that in cases where
the harm alleged is of a type that traditionally has been within
the remedial province of the states, as is that alleged by
Branche, see infra, “express preemption clauses must be
construed narrowly.” Jrving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d
764, 767 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Jaylor v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
875 F.2d 816, 823-24 (11th Cir.1989)).

Like the Supreme Court, we never have defined the term
“service,” as used in § 41713. However, several other courts
of appeals have weighed in on the meaning of the phrase
“service of an air carrier.” In Charas v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit held that “service”
“refers to such things as the frequency and scheduling of
transportation, and to the selection of markets to or from
which transportation 1s provided (as in, ‘This airline provides
service from Tucson to New York twice a day.’).” 160 F.3d
1259, 1265-66 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc), opinion amended
on denial of reh'g by 169 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).°®
By contrast, the court held that “service” does not encompass
things such as “the dispensing of food and drinks, flight

__attendant assistance, or the like.” Jd. at 1266. The court held
that this narrow reading of the term “service” was compelled
because a broader construction “effectively would result in
the pre-emption of virtually everything an airline does.
It seems clear to us that that is not what Congress intended.”

-_——_

6. The amendment to Charas was factual in nature and did not
involve any substantive legal facet of the en banc panel’s original
opinion. See 169 F.3d at 594-95.

: - , ok

15a

Appendix A

Id. Heavily influencing this reading of the ADA’s pre-emption
clause was the Ninth Circuit’s conviction that the pre-emption
of state tort law as applied to airlines would not further
Congress’s purpose of “avoid[ing] state interference with
federal deregulation,” id. at 1265, but rather would contradict
the maxim that “pre-emption provisions are narrowly and
strictly construed.” /d. at 1264.

The Third Circuit has agreed in general terms with the
approach to ADA pre- emption set forth in Charas. See Taj
Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 195
(3d Cir.1998) (holding that “the plaintiff’s defamation claims
are not pre-empted and may, therefore, proceed. Application
of state law in these circumstances does not frustrate
Congressional intent, nor does it impose a state utility-like
regulation on the airlines. We therefore conclude that the
plaintiff’s suit is simply ‘too tenuous, remote, or peripheral’
to be subject to pre-emption, even though Delta’s statements
refer to ticketing, arguably a ‘service.””’).

By contrast, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have construed
“service” more expansively. In Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held as follows:

“Services” generally represent a bargained-for or
anticipated provision of labor from one party to
another. If the element of bargain or agreement is
incorporated in our understanding of services, it
leads to a concern with the contractual

arrangement between the airline and the user of
the service. Elements of the air carrier service

l6a

Appendix A

bargain include items such as ticketing, boarding
procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage
handling, in addition to the transportation itself. These
matters are all appurtenant and necessarily included
with the contract of carriage between the passenger
or shipper and the airline. It is these [contractual]
features of air transportation that we believe Congress
intended to de-regulate as “services” and broadly to
protect from state regulation.

44 F.3d 334, 336 (Sth Cir.1995) (en banc) (citation omitted);
see also Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1433 (7th Cir.1996) (adopting the
definition of “services” set forth in Hodges).

Of these competing definitions, we believe that the Fifth
Circuit’s is more compelling. However, it is important to note
that this is a distinction that does not make a dispositive
difference in this case. For reasons that are more fully
delineated infra, Branche’s claim under Florida’s
Whistleblower Act is not pre-empted under either definition
of “services.” Indeed, his claim cannot be said to relate in
any meaningful way to the transportation of passengers from
one location to another, and accordingly it does not affect
“airline services” as defined by the Ninth and Third Circuits.
Similarly, appellant’s claim does not significantly affect any
bargained-for element of air carrier operations, and
accordingly it does not affect “airline services” even under
the broader reading of this term taken by the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits.

17a

Appendix A

Nonetheless, because the ultimate question in this case is
whether Branche’s state Whistleblower Act claim significantly
affects air carrier “services,” we are required to adopt a definition
of the term “services.” The broader reading of this term is
preferable for three primary reasons. First, we can perceive no
textual justification for a more truncated reading of “service.”
As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Hodges, this word generally
refers to any bargained-for exchange of an intangible benefit.
Indeed, the relevant dictionary definition of “‘service” is extremely
broad: “[A] useful labor that does not produce a tangible
commodity.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2075
(3d ed.1961); see also Hodges, 44 F.3d at 337 n.6 (stating that
“s|pecific references-to the words ‘service’ or ‘services’ in the
Code of Federal Regulations governing airlines are too numerous
to incorporate here,” and setting forth several substantively
diverse examples). Importantly, there is nothing in the text of
§ 41713 indicating that Congress intended to deviate from this
standard definition. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at
2036 (we “assum[e] that the ordinary meaning of that language
[used by Congress in the ADA’s pre-emption provision]
accurately expresses the legislative purpose’) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).

Second, 4s the Supreme Court plainly explained in Morales,
the ADA’s pre-emption clause is properly afforded an extremely
broad scope. See 504 U.S. at 383-84, 112 S.Ct. at 2037. The
Ninth Circuit’s reading of “services,” we believe, tends to
undermine this interpretive guideline set forth by the Supreme
Court. Indeed, no matter how broadly we construe the term
“related to,” see Morales, 504 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. at 2037,
if the scope of that phrase’s referent (the word “services’’) is

18a

Appendix A

sufficiently constricted, the scope of pre-emption under § 41713
will nonetheless be minimal.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, we do not share the
concern that a broad reading of “services” would result in the
pre-emption of “virtually everything an airline does.” Charas,
160 F.3d at 1266. As recognized in both Wolens and Hodges,
the purpose of the ADA’s pre- emption provision is to increase
“reliance on competitive market forces rather than pervasive
federal regulation.” Hodges, 44 F.3d at 335; see also Wolens,
513 U.S. at 228, 115 S.Ct. at 823. Plainly this purpose is not
served by interpreting the term “services” to include those aspects
of airline operations that are not bargained-for by carriers and
their passengers. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336 (“‘Services’
generally represent a bargained-for . . . provision of labor from
one party to another.”’) (citation omitted).

Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit recognized, “[a] facile analogy
to Morales and the ERISA pre-emption cases could suggest
that ‘services’ includes all aspects of the air carrier’s ‘utility’ to
its customers, hence, any state tort claim may ‘relate to’ services
as a result of its indirect regulatory impact on the airline’s
practices.” Hodges, 44 F.3d at 337-38. Thus, for example, state
law personal injury claims are not pre-empted, as evidenced by
the fact that the ADA requires airlines to carry liability insurance
“sufficient to pay, not more than the amount of the insurance, for
bodily injury to, or death of, an individual or for loss of, or damage
to, property of others, resulting from the operation or maintenance
of the aircraft... .” 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a). Unsurprisingly, airlines
do not compete on the basis of likelihood of personal injury, i.e.,

19a

Appendix A

onboard safety, and as such it does not undermine the pro-
competitive purpose of the ADA, as set forth in Wolens, 513
U.S. at 230, 115 S.Ct. at 824, to permit states to regulate this
aspect of air carrier operations.

Accordingly, we readily conclude that even if “services,” as
used in § 41713, is construed to encompass aspects of air carrier
operations beyond the transportation of passengers—1.e., the
trappings and incidents of that transportation like on-board food
and beverage services, ticketing and the like—its definition is
nonetheless still limited to the bargained-for aspects of airline
operations over which carriers compete. By contrast, those
elements of air carrier operations over which airlines do not
compete are not “services” within the meaning of the ADA’s pre-
emption provision, and state laws related to these elements are
not pre-empted. See, e.g., Alasady v. Northwest Airlines Corp.,
__FSupp.2d__, _ (D.Minn. Mar. 3, 2003) (“[T]his Court
concludes that ‘services of an air carrier’ is best construed as
the Fifth Circuit has done in Hodges. The procedures used to
move passengers from the terminal onto the plane in an orderly
fashion are an integral part of the customer’s experience of air
travel and are considered in evaluating the quality of their flight.
Boarding procedures are relevant to competition in the airline
industry. The Court therefore concludes that the term ‘service’
in § 41713(b)(1) encompasses boarding procedures.”);
Ducombs v. Trans World Airlines, 927 F.Supp. 897, 900
(N.D.Cal.1996) (“The majority of circuits that have dealt with
the issue ... have ... defined the scope of ‘services’
narrowly, limiting pre-emption to activity that is based on
economic decisions and that relates to the contractual features

20a

Appendix A

that are bargained for by passengers.”’). This limitation largely
mitigates the concern with overexpanding the reach of the ADA’s
pre-emption provision.

In short, the phrase “related to the . . . services of an air
carrier” means having a connection with or reference to the
elements of air travel that are bargained for by passengers
with air carriers. This includes not only the physical
transportation of passengers, but also the incidents of
that transportation over which air carriers compete.
This connection can be established by showing that the state
law_in question either directly regulates such services or, as
is relevant in this case, has a significant economic impact on
them. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 388, 112 S.Ct. at 2039;
Parise, 141 F.3d at 1465-66 (“For a law to be expressly
preempted by the ADA, a state must ‘enact or enforce a law
that relates to airline rates, routes, or services, either by
expressly referring to them or by having a significant
economic effect upon them.’” (quoting 7ravel All Over the
World, 73 F.3d at 1431)).

Just as state law personal injury actions generally have
been held not to be pre-empted under the ADA, employment
discrimination actions typically have been held to fall outside
the scope of the ADA’s pre-emption clause. See Newman y.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir.1999)
(holding California law barring physical disability
discrimination is not pre-empted by the ADA); Wellons vy.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 493, 495 (6th Cir.1999)
(holding that the plaintiff’s race discrimination claim was
not pre-empted); Parise, 141 F.3d at 1467-68 (holding that
the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim was not pre-empted

2la
Appendix A

by the ADA); Aloha Islandair Inc. v. Tseu, 128 F.3d 1301,
1303 (9th Cir.1997) (holding Hawaii law barring physical
disability discrimination is not pre-empted by the ADA);
Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 84
(2d Cir. 1997) (holding New York law barring age discrimination
was not pre-empted by the ADA).

It is true that an airline’s employment decisions may have an
incidental effect on its ‘“‘services,” as defined above, but as the
Second Circuit observed in Abdu-Brisson, “[p]ermitting full
operation of . . . [anti-]discrimination law[s] will not affect
competition between airlines—the primary concern underlying
the ADA.” 128 F.3d at 84. Indeed, employment standards fall
squarely within the traditional police powers of the states, and
as such should not be disturbed lightly. See Hawaiian Airlines,
512 US. at 252, 114S.Ct. at 2243 (“Pre-emption of employment
standards ‘within the traditional police power of the State’ ‘should
not be lightly inferred.’” (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 2222, 96 L.Ed.2d 1
(1987))); see also Botz v. Omni Air Int’l, 286 F.3d 488, 493
(8th Cir.2002). These holdings bear significantly on whether
Branche’s claim of retaliatory firing is pre-empted; at its root,
this case involves a simple employment discrimination claim, with
the prohibited basis for termination being not any inherent
characteristic of the employee such as race, gender or disability,
but rather his undertaking of protected activity.

Several courts have considered the specific question
presented in this case, i.e., whether a claim for retaliatory
discharge is pre-empted under § 41713, and although they
have recognized that such employment actions ultimately may

22a

Appendix A

affect in some way the transport of passengers or other incidents
of “service,” the majority of them have concluded that such claims
are not pre-empted. See Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d
590, 597-98 (Stk Cir. 1993) (holding that any connection between
the claim for retaliatory discharge and airline “services” was too
remote to give rise to ADA pre-emption); Espinosa v. Cont’l
Airlines, 80 F.Supp.2d 297, 301 (D.N.J. 2000) (rejecting the
argument that the plaintiff’s state whistleblower claim was pre-
empted based on the fact that it “ ‘related to’ the quality of
services rendered by an airline because it affect[ed] Continental’s
ability to discipline employees whose work is integral to
‘air services’ and to air safety”); Ruggiero v. AMR, Corp.,
1995 _ F.Supp.2d __ (N.D.Cal. Sept. 12, 1995). But see
Marlow v. AMR Servs. Corp., 870 F.Supp. 295, 299
(D.Haw.1994) (holding that the ADA did pre-empt a mechanic’s
claims that he was discharged in violation of state whistleblower
act and state public policy, allegedly for reporting health and
safety violations).

Put as simply as possible—and setting aside for the moment
the impact of Congress’s enactment of the WPP on our ultimate
holding in this case—given the particularities of Branche’s claim
that he was discharged for his post hoc reporting of Airtran’s
safety violations, we believe that this case is more analogous to
the majority of those cited above, and hold that appellant’s state
law claim is not pre-empted by the ADA. This is so essentially
because safety is not a basis on which airlines compete for
passengers, and as such is not something for which air travelers
bargain; it is implicit in every ticket sold by every carrier.
Accordingly, it does not serve the purposes of the ADA to pre-
empt state law employment claims related to safety. See Abdullah
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 373 (3d Cir.1999)

23a

Appendix A

(“Safe operations. . . are anecessity for all airlines. Whether or
not to conform to safety standards is not an option for airlines in
choosing a mode of competition. For this reason, safety of an
airline’s operations would not appear to fall within the ambit of
the ADA and its procompetition pre-emption clause.”); Smith v.
Am. West Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344, 347 (Sth Cir.1995) (“[T]he
Smiths’ claim is that the safety of their flight was jeopardized by
the airline’s permitting a visibly deranged man to board.
If appellants ultimately recover damages, the judgment could
affect the airline’s ticket selling, training or security practices,
but it would not regulate the economic or contractual aspects of
boarding. Any such effect would be ‘too tenuous, remote or
peripheral’ to be pre-empted by § 1305(a)(1).”) (citation
omitted); see also Lake Aircraft, 992 F.2d at 294-295
(tort claim for defective aircraft design not pre-empted
because not related to airline services). Although some safety-
related claims may be tied to air carrier services, the very
fact that they concern safety, standing alone, is insufficient
to demonstrate this nexus.’

7. It is true that in Parise we offered in dicta some indication
that we thought claims implicating air carriers’ safety concerns were
“related to” their services so as to give rise to ADA pre-emption.
See 141 F.3d at 1466 (“Although we are cognizant of Delta’s
compelling assertion that the threatening behavior in which Parise
allegedly engaged ‘relates to’ the valid safety concerns of an airline,
we conclude that the district court erred in finding Parise’s state age
discrimination action to be preempted by the ADA.”). However, we
noted that these safety issues were raised only as a defense to Parise’s
age discrimination claim (i.e., “the real reason we fired him was
that he was unsafe”), and that this diminished the force of Delta’s
argument for pre-emption. In this vein, we said that “[b]y way of
illustration, if Parise had claimed that Delta discriminated against

(Cont’d)

24a

Appendix A

(Cont’d)

him on the basis of a mental illness that sometimes caused biin to
exhibit violent tendencies and had relied on a state civil rights statute
protecting emotionally disabled individuals from termination due to
their disability, Delta’s argument in favor of pre-emption analytically
would carry greater weight.” Jd. at 1466 n. 3. Superficially, this
hypothetical is similar to the claim actually advanced by Branche—
that he was fired in retaliation for his reporting of unsafe maintenance
practices.

However, even were we to consider Parise’s dicta to be binding,
which plainly it is not, it would not require us to conclude that
Branche’s claim is pre-empted. There are two reasons for this.
First, the connection between the claim of the plaintiff in the Parise
hypothetical and airline services is much more direct than in the
present case. Indeed, violent behavior aboard an airplane has great
potential to disrupt the airline’s primary transportation function,
which is a “service” under even the restrictive definition set forth
by the Ninth Circuit. Thus, a claim based on a termination for
behaving violently is directly tied to this service. By contrast, as we
explain more fully, infra, Branche’s claim that he was fired for his
post hoc reporting of a diagnostic maneuver that violated FAA
regulations lacks this type of direct connection. Second and more
fundamentally, airlines certainly do not compete on the basis of
which one is the Jeast safe. Branche’s claim is simply that he
reported safety violations and was fired. This alleged punishment
for taking safety maintenance measures plainly does not pertain in
any respect to a ground on which airlines attempt to draw
passengers. Quite the contrary, as one court has recognized,
“a state law prohibiting retaliatory discharge for whistleblowing only
furthers the federal interest in the safety of the airline industry by
encouraging employers to report unsafe conditions.” Espinosa, 80
F.Supp.2d at 302.

ote ainlae,

—

25a

Appendix A

Thus, because Branche’s state Whistleblower Act claim is
fundamentally an employment discrimination claim that does not
implicate any arena in which airlines compete,
we conclude based on the foregoing analysis that his claim does
not relate to the services of an air carrier within the meaning of
§ 41713, and consequently is not pre-empted under that section.

Importantly, however, there is one more issue that we must
consider before ultimately resolving this pre-emption question.
In 1999, subsequent to the majority of the decisions discussed
above, Congress enacted as part of the ADA the WPP, 49 U.S.C.
§ 42121, which provides that:

No air carrier . . . may discharge an employee or
otherwise discriminate against an employee with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because the employee. . .

(1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about
to provide (with any knowledge of the employer). . .
to the employer or Federal Government information
relating to any violation or alleged violation of any
order, regulation, or standard of the [FAA] or any
other provision of Federal law relating to air carrier
safety under this subtitle or any other law of the United
States...

49 U.S.C. § 42121(a). This provision represents a federal analog
to Florida’s Whistleblower Act.’ In evaluating whether the WPP

8. This is not to say, however, that the procedures for filing a
complaint under the WPP exactly mirror those provided by Florida’s
Whistleblower Act. For example, under the WPP the plaintiff cannot

(Cont’d)

26a

)

Appendix A

has any effect on the foregoing analysis, the question we must
ask is whether any aspect of that statute explains the proper
scope of the ADA’s pre-emption clause to a degree sufficient to
alter our conclusion that pre-emption is inappropriate here
because Branche’s claim does not relate to the bargained-for
aspects of air carrier operations.

Congress’s enactment of the WPP figured prominently in
the district court’s finding of pre-emption in this case and in Botz
v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488 (8th Cir.2002), the one circuit
court decision handed down since the WPP’s effective date to
address ADA pre-emption in the context of a state whistleblower
statute. Botz featured a claim brought by a flight attendant
pursuant to Minnesota’s whistleblower statute, under which
employers are prohibited from subjecting employees to any
adverse employment action in retaliation for the employee’s refusal
“to perform an action that the employee has an objective basis in
fact to believe violates any state or federal law or rule or

(Cont'd)

directly file a civil action against his employer, but instead must file
a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(1).
The Secretary then assesses the merits of the complaint and can either
find it to be without merit and deny it or, if the Secretary finds the
complaint to be meritorious, can order abatement of the violation,
reinstatement with back pay and/or compensatory damages.
See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(2) and (3). Any party aggrieved by the
Secretary’s order may obtain review of that order in the appropriate
circuit court of appeals. Under Florida’s Whistleblower Act, by
contrast, plaintiffs are not required to negotiate these administrative
obstacles to the adjudication of their claim in a judicial forum.
See Fla. Stat. 448.103(1)(a) (“An employee who has been the object
of a retaliatory personnel action in violation of this act may institute
a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction. . . .”).

Fn ne

SSS

———— —

27a

Appendix A

regulation. . . .” 286 F.3d at 492 n.6 (citing Minn.Stat. § 181.932,
subd. 1(c)). Botz alleged that she had been fired in retaliation for
refusing a flight assignment that she believed violated federal safety
regulations. The airline argued in response that Botz’s claim was
pre- empted under § 41713. In analyzing this contention, the
Eighth Circuit drew a straight line between a flight attendant’s
refusal to serve, federal regulations that prohibit the operation of
a flight with fewer than a minimum number of flight attendants,
and a resulting disruption of air service. In essence, the court
was especially concerned that the state whistleblower statute
functionally ensured the plaintiff’s ability to ground a plane, and
thereby disrupt the airline’s service. It thus categorized
Minnesota’s statute as “a state law that granted a flight attendant
or other air-carrier employee the right to refuse an assignment
that is essential to a carrier’s ability to provide its scheduled
services.” Id. at 496. Accordingly, it held, this law was related
to air carrier services within the meaning of § 41713. See id. at
496-97.

Notably, the court also found support for this holding in
Congress’s enactment of the WPP. It reasoned that in passing
the WPP Congress sought to impose a “more predictable
response to public air-safety complaints . . . than would likely
be possible if it had granted review in the courts of the fifty
States.” Botz, 286 F.3d at 497. It then rejected Botz’s
argument that “the WPP was not intended to pre-empt State
whistleblower protections because, if it had been, Congress
could easily have made such pre-emption express by
including language in the WPP indicating that it was a
whistleblowing air-carrier employee’s exclusive remedy.”
Id. It said:

28a

Appendix A

We think this turns the proper logic on its head. When
it fashioned the WPP, Congress was surely aware of
the ADA’s express pre-emption provision. It was
presumably aware, as well, that the Supreme Court
had determined that the provision had a broad
application and should be given an expansive
interpretation. Given this, we would expect Congress
to have directed language in the WPP to the issue of
federal pre-emption only if it had been Congress’s
intent that the WPP not exert any pre-emptive effect
upon state whistleblower provisions.

Id. Finally, the Eighth Circuit dismissed Botz’s reliance on
Espinosa, as well as several other cases that had rejected
pre-emption arguments under the ADA in the context of
retaliatory discharge claims, because “[e]ach of these cases
...relie[d] on the fact—a fact that is no longer true—that
the ADA provided no claim or remedy for air-carrier
employees discharged in retaliation for their whistleblowing
conduct. Such employees now enjoy protection under the
WPP.” Id. at 497 n.9.

After carefully considering the reasoning employed in
Botz and the enactment of the WPP, we remain convinced
that Branche’s whistleblower claim is not pre-empted.
As for the connection between retaliatory discharge claims
and airline services, we do not dispute the Eight Circuit’s
conclusion that the grounding of an airplane is related to airline
services, in particular, the transport of passengers from one place
to another. However, in this case, the connection—r, indeed,
the potential connection—between Branche’s actions and air
carrier services is far more attenuated than in Botz. As the Eighth

oe er =

29a

Appendix A

Circuit said, if a flight attendant refuses to fly and a replacement
cannot be found, FAA regulations prevent the plane from leaving
the gate, thereby disrupting service. Here, by contrast, we are
not concerned with the withdrawal of clearance for a plane to
take off based on mechanical concerns, but instead only with
Branche’s post hoc reporting of a FAA violation. The likely
consequence of reporting an unauthorized high powered run (as
opposed to the reporting of a malfunctioning engine) is an
investigation by FAA officials into the practices of Airtran’s TIA
mechanics, but not the grounding of the plane, which presumably
has either been mechanically cleared and flown away or grounded
for mechanical reasons independent of the subsequent report of
the improper diagnostic procedure. Had Branche claimed that
Airtran fired him in retaliation for refusing to allow a plane to
take off due to safety concerns, this would present a situation
closer to the one at issue in Botz. But that is not the claim
before us.’

As for the enactment of the WPP, this statute says nothing
whatsoever about pre-emption, an omission that is susceptible
to more than one interpretation. We could say, as the Botz court
did, that the absence of any discussion of pre-emption stemmed
from a Congressional assumption that the ADA already pre-
empted state whistleblower claims and that it was content with
maintaining this status quo. Although this certainly is plausible,
we believe that this interpretation ultimately is incorrect. Indeed,

9. As our employment of this analytical modality indicates, it is
the specifics of the retaliation claim, not the whistleblower statute,
that appropriately determine pre-emption. Thus, retaliation claims
brought under state whistleblower statutes must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis to determine the connection between the action
in question and airline services. In Branche’s case, this evaluation
reveals that this connection is extremely loose at best.

30a

Appendix A

the basis for the Eighth Circuit’s holding is simply that (1) at the
time of the WPP’s enactment Congress knew of the ADA’s
express pre-emption provision; and (2) it also was aware that
the Supreme Court had interpreted this provision broadly.

Although the first premise is undoubtable, it also is not
especially helpful. Congress’s knowledge of the provision
implies nothing about the legislature’s view of its scope.
As for the second, the Supreme Court has interpreted only
the phrase “related to.” See Morales, 504 U.S. at 384,
112 S.Ct. at 2037. To date it has not weighed in on the
meaning of “air carrier services.” Moreover and more
significantly, to the extent that Congress can be charged with
cognizance of judicial views regarding the scope of § 41713,
it must have known that the majority of courts to consider
the issue found state law retaliatory discharge claims not to
be pre-empted by the ADA. Against this background, it
becomes significantly less clear that in saying nothing about
pre-emption in the WPP Congress was somehow indicating
that it assumed state whistleblower claims to be pre-empted.
Indeed, an equally compelling argument could be made that
Congress was indicating its acquiescence in the view that
such state law claims are not pre-empted. Because the WPP
says nothing about pre-emption and this silence is ambiguous,
we find its enactment less probative of Congressional intent
regarding the pre-emption of state whistleblower claims than did
the Eighth Circuit.

As for the desire to enact a uniform means of resolving
whistleblower claims, to infer from the very enactment of a
federal remedy that Congress also intended to pre-empt all
remotely equivalent state law causes of action—as distinguished

3la

Appendix A

from divining Congress’s intent regarding the scope of its express
pre-emption provision (which, as stated, is ambiguous)—would
be a species of implied pre-emption, which we presume is
inapplicable where the statute in question features an express
pre-emption clause.'° See generally Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517,
112 S.Ct. at 2618. Simply stated, it is possible to point to a
multitude of substantive contexts in which parallel state and
federal remedies exist, see, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 496-97, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2256, 135 L.Ed.2d 700
(1996) (holding that a federal statutory remedy did not pre-empt
“substantively identical” state law remedies for precisely the same
conduct and harm), and the very enactment of a federal remedy,
without more, cannot cause us to expand the scope of an express
pre-emption provision to encompass and pre-empt all equivalent
state remedies. See generally id.

In deciding pre-emption, whether before or after the
enactment of the WPP, the question we must answer remains
the same: Is the state law in question “related to” air carrier
“services”? Though we do not wish to understate the
importance of this legislation, the WPP changed neither the
nature of Florida’s Whistleblower Act nor the language of
the ADA’s pre-emption provision in any meaningful way.
It simply added an additional remedy for plaintiffs seeking
to advance a retaliatory discharge claim. Because the WPP
says nothing about pre- emption, it leaves us in precisely the

10. Although as explained above a finding of implied
pre-emption is not forbidden where such statutes are concerned,
we perceive nothing in the WPP bearing in-any significant way on
Congress’s intent to pre-empt state law claims against air carriers
for retaliatory discharge that do not fall within the scope of the ADA’s
express pre-emption clause.

32a

Appendix A

same position as we occupied before considering this statute;
that is, it leaves us with our conclusion that the pre-emption
of Branche’s retaliatory discharge claim would not advance
the pro-competitive goals of the ADA, as outlined by the
Supreme Court in Wolens. Put differently, the WPP did not
render these claims any more related to the bargained-for
aspects of air carrier operations over which the airlines
compete. As such, although the enactment of this statute
renders the question of ADA pre-emption more difficult in
this case, we do not believe that the WPP changed the legal
landscape—or that it illuminated the intent of Congress to
pre-empt state law whistleblower claims—to a degree
sufficient to alter the conclusion that prior to its passage such
claims were not pre-empted.

Because the district court erroneously concluded that
Branche’s state law whistleblower claim was pre-empted by
the ADA, its summary judgment in favor of Airtran is vacated
and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

33a

APPENDIX B — ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, TAMPA DIVISION
DATED AND FILED AUGUST 27, 2002

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

Case No. 8:01-cv-1747-T-30MSS
MICHAEL F. BRANCHE,
Plaintiff,
v.

AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC.,

-~

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came on for consideration upon Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #23), supporting
memorandum (Dkt. #24), and Plaintiff’s memorandum in
opposition thereto (Dkt. #26). Upon review and for the reasons
set forth herein, the Court grants Defendant’s motion.

34a

Appendix B
BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND!

Plaintiff Michael F. Branche filed a Complaint in the Circuit
Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County,
Florida in August, 2001. On September 10, 2001, the action
was timely removed to this Court by Defendant on the grounds
of diversity jurisdiction. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to
remand. (Dkt. 14).

The Complaint alleges a single count for violation of
the Florida Whistleblowers Act, §448.101, et. seg., Fla. Stat.
This statute renders an employer liable to an employee for a
retaliatory personnel action based upon an employee providing
information to any appropriate governmental agency, person or
entity conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into an
alleged violation of the law, rule, or regulation. §448.102(2),
Fla. Stat. Subsection 3 of the Florida Whistleblower Act renders
an employer liable to an employee for retaliatory personnel action
based upon an employee’s objection to, or refusal to participate
in any activity, policy or practice of the employer which is in
violation of the law, rule or regulation.”

1. Defendant quotes the facts in its motion from Plaintiffs
Complaint, and Plaintiff’s response specifically adopts those facts.
As such, the facts are undisputed.

2. Plaintiff’s seeks to recover under the following provisions
of the Florida Whistleblower Act, §448.102 Fla. Stat., which reads
in pertinent part:

An employer may not take any retaliatory personnel

action against an employee because the employee has:
(Cont’d)

a

35a

Appendix B

Plaintiff, employed by Defendant as an airline inspector,
alleges that he objected to and refused to participate in
Defendant’s “illegal and dangerous policy and practice of
breaching the independence of the inspector function and
chain of command established by FAA regulations.” Plaintiff
claims that he observed violations of FAA regulations
regarding engine inspections, namely “improper high
powered engine runs.” Plaintiff alleges that he was fired as a
result of his objection, his refusal to participate in these practices,
and Plaintiff’s furnishing of information to the FAA and its
investigation of Defendant.’ Plaintiff also filed a union grievance
about this incident. Plaintiff alleges that the FAA was investigating
Defendant’s “illegal and dangerous policy and practices which,
among other things, violated FAA regulations, endangered lives
of co-workers, the public and public property.” (Complaint, 37).

(Cont'd)

... (2) Provided information to, or testified before, any
appropriate governmental agency, person, or entity
conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into an
alleged violation of « ‘a, rule, or regulation by the
employer; (3) Objected to, or refused to participate in,
any activity, policy, or practice of the employer which
is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.

3. Plaintiff alleges that he was fired for “falsifying his time
card and stealing approximately two hours of pay from Defendant
for time not worked;” a claim that Plaintiff contends is “baseless”
and a pretext for retaliatory discharge. (Complaint, §{/26-30).

36a

Appendix B

LEGALANALYSIS
Summary Judgment Standard

Motions for summary judgment should only be granted when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The
existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported summary judgment
motion; “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986) (emphasis in original). Throughout this analysis, the
judge must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in her favor.
Id. at 255.

This Court may not decide a genuine factual dispute at
the summary judgment stage. Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 1990). “[I]f factual issues
are present, the Court must deny the motion and proceed to
trial.” Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695
F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.1983). A dispute about a material
fact is genuine and summary judgment is inappropriate if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hoffman y.
Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1990).

37a

Appendix B

Is the Florida Whistleblower Act Preempted by Federal
Statute?

Defendars contends that Plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim
brought under Florida’s Whistleblower Act is preempted by
certain provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA).
The ADA contains a specific provision for preemption which
reads as follows:

Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political
subdivision of this State, or political authority of at
least 2 States, may not enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision having the force and
effect of law related to a price, route, or service
of an air carrier that may provide air transportation
under this subpart.

49 U.S.C. §41713(b)(1) (emphasis added). Defendant urges
the Court to construe the “related to” language broadly. Bozz v.
Omni Air International, 286 F.3d 488, 492 (8" Cir. 2002),
(citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374
(1992)).

Defendant points to a specific provision within the ADA that
provides federal whistleblower protection, 49 U.S.C. §42121,
which reads in pertinent part:

Discrimination against airline employees. — No air
carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier

4. The issue in Morales was whether a state law prohibiting
deceptive advertising was preempted by the ADA. In finding
preemption, the Court utilized a broad reading of the phrase “related
to” in the ADA’s preemption clause. Jd.

38a

Appendix B

may discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate
against an employee with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because the employee (or any person acting pursuant
to a request of the employee —

(1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to
provide (with any knowledge of the employer) or
cause to be provided to the employer or Federal
Government information relating to any violation or
alleged violation of any order, regulation, or standard
of the Federal Aviation Administration or any other

provision of Federal law relating to an air carrier’s
safety «under this subtitle or any other law of the United
States.

This statutory provision provides for a complaint process through
the Department of Labor, and procedures for investigation and
appellate review. Jd. Remedies include “affirmative action to
abate the violation,” reinstatement, including back pay and other
conditions of employment, and compensatory damages.
49 U.S.C. §42121(b)(3)(B). Defendant contends that this federal
whistleblower provision provides Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for
such conduct.

In addition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Complaint
fits squarely within the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Botz v. Omni
Air International, 286 F.3d 488 (8" Cir. 2002). Botz involved
a flight attendant plaintiff who was fired after refusing a flight
assignment that she believed violated federal regulations on flying
time. Reading the preemption clause language broadly, the Botz
Court found that Minnesota’s whistleblower statute was expressly

Sa sunetaneit

x —

—

Sea

39a

Appendix B

preempted by Congress in the ADA, a finding that was bolstered
by the enactment of the federal whistleblower protection in 2000,
and dismissed Botz’s complaint. Jd. at 492-97 (citing Morales
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992)).

Plaintiff disputes that his Florida Whistleblower Act claim is
preempted by federal law, in part because Plaintiff contends that
his claim is not “related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier.” Plaintiff further contends that the federal whistleblower
provision itself fails to contain the required express preemption
language, like the preemption language found in the ADA.

Plaintiff also attempts to factually distinguish Botz on the
grounds that Botz had a statutory right under the Minnesota
whistleblower law to refuse to provide flight service based on
her belief that her employer was violating the law.* Here, Plaintiff
contends that his reports to the FAA concerned actual safety
violations regarding an aircraft engine and were protected under
the Florida Whistleblowers Act. Plaintiff further argues that
“state law protection for employees reporting violations of FAA
regulations does not hamper competition because airlines do not
compete based on levels of safety.”

Plaintiff also points to other cases to support his position
that federal and state law claims may coexist. In Espinosa v.
Continental Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 2d 297 (D.N.J. 2000),
the court found that a retaliatory discharge claim similar to

5. The Minnesota statute specifically prohibited retaliation
against employees who report a violation of any federal or state law
in good faith or refuse an order to perform an action that the
employee has an “objective basis in fact” to believe violates federal
or state law. Botz, 286 F.3d at 492, n.6.

40a

Appendix B

Plaintiff’s (an aircraft technician who was terminated after
reporting mechanical problems) was not preempted by the ADA
because it would be unreasonable to find that a “retaliatory
discharge was related to the services provided by an air carrier.”
The second case, a Florida appellate decision, also involved an
aircraft repair station employee and specifically held that Florida’s
Whistleblower Act is not preempted by the ADA because
Florida’s Act “does not impinge on air carrier’s rates, routes or
services.” See Vanacore v. Unc Ardco, Inc., 697 So. 2d 892,
893 (Fla. 4" DCA 1997).

As Plaintiff correctly points out, as does the Botz Court,
neither of these cases was decided after the enactment of the
federal whistleblower protection provision set forth in 49 U.S.C.
§42121. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded by these cases
and instead, finds the Eight Circuit’s decision in Botz compelling.
See also Parise v. Delta Airlines, 141 F.3d 1463, 1466 n.4
(11" Cir. 1998) (addressing same federal preemption provision
in ADAas it relates to age discrimination claim — the “basis of
the cause of action [] conceivably would conflict with the
underlying purposes of the ADA and therefore give rise to a
finding of preemption’’).

In Botz, the Eighth Circuit found the state whistleblower
statue had a “forbidden connection” with both air carrier
routes and services under the “broadly applied” language of
the ADA’s preemption provision. The Court reasoned that
because the number of airline stewards is prescribed by
federal regulation, a steward’s refusal to serve on an assigned
flight could jeopardize service, a finding that was bolstered
by the enactment of the federal whistleblower protection
provision in 2000. See Botz, 286 F.3d at 495.

4la

Appendix B

As to the federal whistleblower provision, the Eighth Circuit
specifically noted that it was a “single, uniform standard for dealing
with employee complaints of air-safety violations,” and in doing
so, Congress “furthered its goal of ensuring that the price,
availability, and efficiency of air transportation rely primarily upon
market forces and competition rather than allowing them to be
determined by fragmented and inconsistent state regulation.”
Id. at 497. Commenting upon the complaint and review process
therein, the Court reasoned that review by federal courts of
appeal was a “more predictable” response to air-safety
complaints than possible if permitted in the courts of the fifty
states. Id.

This Court analogizes Plaintiff's claim to that in Borz. Plaintiff
alleges that the “improper high powered engine run” reported by
Plaintiff resulted in the jet being taken out of service. (Complaint,
420). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant’s violation of FAA
regulations and the FAA’s investigation of Defendant’s alleged
“illegal and dangerous” practices “endangered the lives of
co-workers, the public and public property.” (Complaint, 37).
These allegations bring Plaintiff’s claims within the prohibited
connection of an air carrier’s “price, route, or service” and they
are therefore preempted by federal law. Moreover, the Court is
persuaded that preemption is appropriate because the protections
afforded by the federal whistleblower provision in the ADA give
a federal agency (with review by federal courts of appeal) specific
authority to address the same conduct as the state statute.°

6. The Court is not persuaded that the “savings clauses”
in either the ADA or the state statute preclude its conclusion that
federal law preempts Plaintiff’s claim. See 49 U.S.C. §40120(c);
§448.105 Fla. Stat.

42a

Appendix B

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #23) is
GRANTED for the reasons set forth herein. The Clerk is
directed to close the case and enter judgment in favor of
Defendant.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on this 27 day
of August, 2002.

s/ James S. Moody, Jr.
James S. Moody, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ae

43a

Appendix B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
Case No. 8:01-cv-1747-T-30MSS -
MICHAEL F. BRANCHE,
Plaintiff,
V.
AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC.,

, Defendant.

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Decision by Court. This action came before the Court. The
issues have heard and a decision has

been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is
entered in favor of the defendant.

Date: August 27, 2002

SHERYL L. LOESCH, CLERK

By: s/ Joanne Hueting
J. Hueting, Deputy Clerk

44a

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
EN BANC FILED OCTOBER 2, 2003

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-14920-DD
MICHAEL F. BRANCHE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AIRTRAN AIRWAY, INC., a foreign corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida

ON PETITION (S) FOR REHEARING AND PETITION(S)
FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion , lithCir., 19 , F2d_),

Before: MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and
RESTANI™*, Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition (s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no
member of this panel nor other Judge in regular active service

* Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.

45a

Appendix C

on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on
rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the Petition(s) for
Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

s/ [illegible]
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

46a

APPENDIX D — RELEVANT STATUTES
49 USCA § 42121

§ 42121. Protection of employees providing air safety
information

(a) Discrimination against airline employees.—No air
Carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier may
discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate against an
employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment because the employee (or any
person acting pursuant to a request of the employee)—

(1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide
(with any knowledge of the employer) or cause to be provided
to the employer or Federal Government information relating
to any violation or alleged violation of any order, regulation,
or standard of the Federal Aviation Administration or any
other provision of Federal law relating to air carrier safety
under this subtitle or any other law of the United States;

(2) has filed, caused to be filed, or is about to file (with any
knowledge of the employer) or cause to be filed a proceeding
relating to any violation or alleged violation of any order,
regulation, or standard of the Federal Aviation Administration
or any other provision of Federal law relating to air carrier
safety under this subtitle or any other law of the United States;

(3) testified or is about to testify in such a proceeding; or

(4) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate
in such a proceeding.

oat seas

ee

47a

Appendix D

(b) Department of Labor complaint procedure.—

(1) Filing and notification.—A person who believes that
he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated
against by any person in violation of subsection (a) may, not
later than 90 days after the date on which such violation
occurs, file (or have any person file on his or her behalf) a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging such discharge
or discrimination. Upon receipt of such a complaint, the
Secretary of Labor shall notify, in writing, the person named
in the complaint and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration of the filing of the complaint, of the
allegations contained in the complaint, of the substance of
evidence supporting the complaint, and of the opportunities
that will be afforded to such person under paragraph (2).

(2) Investigation; preliminary order.—

(A) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the date of
receipt of a complaint filed under paragraph (1) and after
affording the person named in the complaint an opportunity
to submit to the Secretary of Labor a written response to the
complaint and an opportunity to meet with a representative
of the Secretary to present statements from witnesses, the
Secretary of Labor shall conduct an investigation and
determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that
the complaint has merit and notify, in writing, the
complainant and the person alleged to have committed a
violation of subsection (a) of the Secretary’s findings. If the
Secretary of Labor concludes that there is a reasonable cause
to believe that a violation of subsection (a) has occurred, the
Secretary shall accompany the Secretary’s findings with a

48a

Appendix D

preliminary order providing the relief prescribed by paragraph
(3)(B). Not later than 30 days after the date of notification
of findings under this paragraph, either the person alleged to
have committed the violation or the complainant may file
objections to the findings or preliminary order, or both, and
request a hearing on the record. The filing of such objections
shall not operate to stay any reinstatement remedy contained
in the preliminary order. Such hearings shall be conducted
expeditiously. If a hearing is not requested in such 30-day
period, the preliminary order shall be deemed a final order
that is not subject to judicial review.

(B) Requirements.—

(i) Required showing by complainant.—The Secretary of
Labor shall dismiss a complaint filed under this subsection
and shall not conduct an investigation otherwise required
under subparagraph (A) unless the complainant makes a
prima facie showing that any behavior described in
paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a) was a
contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action
alleged in the complaint.

(ii) Showing by employer.—Notwithstanding a finding by
the Secretary that the complainant has made the showing
required under clause (i), no investigation otherwise required
under subparagraph (A) shall be conducted if the employer
demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel
action in the absence of that behavior.

49a

Appendix D

(iii) Criteria for determination by Secretary.—The
Secretary may determine that a violation of subsection (a)
has occurred only if the complainant demonstrates that any
behavior described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of
subsection (a) was a contributing factor in the unfavorable
personnel action alleged in the complaint.

(iv) Prohibition.—Relief may not be ordered under
subparagraph (A) if the employer demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the
same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that
behavior.

(3) Final order.—

(A) Deadline for issuance; settlement agreements.—Not
later than 120 days after the date of conclusion of a hearing
under paragraph (2), the Secretary of Labor shall issue a final
order providing the relief prescribed by this paragraph or
denying the complaint. At any time before issuance ofa final
order, a proceeding under this subsection may be terminated
on the basis of a settlement agreement entered into by the
Secretary of Labor, the complainant, and the person alleged
to have committed the violation.

(B) Remedy.—If, in response to a complaint filed under
paragraph (1), the Secretary of Labor determines that a
violation of subsection (a) has occurred, the Secretary of
Labor shall order the person who committed such violation
to—

50a

Appendix D

(i) take affirmative action to abate the violation;

(ii) reinstate the complainant to his or her former position
together with the compensation (including back pay) and
restore the terms, conditions, and privileges associated with
his or her employment; and

(iii) provide compensatory damages to the complainant.

If such an order is issued under this paragraph, the Secretary
of Labor, at the request of the complainant, shall assess
against the person against whom the order is issued a sum
equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses
(including attorneys’ and expert witness fees) reasonably
incurred, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, by the
complainant for, or in connection with, the bringing the
complaint upon which the order was issued.

(C) Frivolous complaints.—If the Secretary of Labor finds
that a complaint under paragraph (1) is frivolous or has been
brought in bad faith, the Secretary of Labor may award to
the prevailing employer a reasonable attorney’s fee not
exceeding $1,000.

(4) Review.—

(A) Appeal te Court of Appeals.—Any person adversely
affected or aggrieved by an order issued under paragraph (3)
may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which the violation, with respect
to which the order was issued, allegedly occurred or the
circuit in which the complainant resided on the date of such

Sla

Appendix D

violation. The petition for review must be filed not later than
60 days after the date of the issuance of the final order of the
Secretary of Labor. Review shall conform to chapter 7 of
title 5, United States Code. The commencement of
proceedings under this subparagraph shall not, unless ordered
by the court, operate as a stay of the order.

(B) Limitation on collateral attack.—An order of the
Secretary of Labor with respect to which review could have
been obtained under subparagraph (A) shall not be subject
to judicial review in any criminal or other civil proceeding.

(5) Enforcement of order by Secretary of Labor.

Whenever any person has failed to cor:c!y with an order
issued under paragraph (3), the Secretary of Labor may file
a civil action in the United States district court for the district
in which the violation was found to occur to enforce such
order. In actions brought under this paragraph, the district
courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief
including, but not limited to, injunctive relief and
compensatory damages.

(6) Enforcement of order by parties.—

(A) Commencement of action.—A person on whose behalf
an order was issued under paragraph (3) may commence a
civil action against the person to whom such order was issued
to require compliance with such order. The appropriate
United States district court shall have jurisdiction, without
regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
parties, to enforce such order.

52a

Appendix D

(B) Attorney fees.—The court, in issuing any final order
under this paragraph, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.

(c) Mandamus.—Any nondiscretionary duty imposed by
this section shall be enforceable in a mandamus proceeding
brought under section 1361 of title 28, United States Code.

(d) Nonapplicability to deliberate violations.—Subsection
(a) shall not apply with respect to an employee of an air
carrier, contractor, or subcontractor who, acting without
direction from such air carrier, contractor, or subcontractor
(or such person’s agent), deliberately causes a violation of
any requirement relating to air carrier safety under this
subtitle or any other law of the United States.

(e) Contractor defined.—In this section, the term
“contractor” means a company that performs safety-sensitive
functions by contract for an air carrier.

53a
Appendix D

49 USCA § 41713

§ 41713. Preemption of authority over prices, routes, and
service

(a) Definition.—In this section, “State” means a State, the
District of Columbia, and a territory or possession of the
United States.

(b) Preemption.—(1) Except as provided in this subsection,
a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority
of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,
or other provision having the force and effect of law related
to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide
air transportation under this subpart.

(2) Paragraphs (1) and (4) of this subsection do not apply to
air transportation provided entirely in Alaska unless the
transportation is air transportation (except charter air
transportation) provided under a certificate issued under
section 41102 of this title.

(3) This subsection does not limit a State, political
subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States
that owns or operates an airport served by an air carrier
holding a certificate issued by the Secretary of Transportation
from carrying out its proprietary powers and rights.

(4) Transportation by air carrier or carrier affiliated with
a direct air carrier.—

54a

Appendix D

(A) General rule.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority
of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,
or other provision having the force and effect of law related
to aprice, route, or service of an air carrier or carrier affiliated
with a direct air carrier through common controlling
ownership when such carrier is transporting property by
aircraft or by motor vehicle (whether or not such property
has had or will have a prior or subsequent air movement).

(B) Matters not covered.—Subparagraph (A)—

(i) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State
with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to
impose highway route controls or limitations based on the
size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature
of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor
Carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial
responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-
insurance authorization; and

(ii) does not apply to the transportation of household goods,
as defined in section 13102 of this title.

(C) Applicability of paragraph (1).—This paragraph shall
not limit the applicability of paragraph (1).

.
ee LS igh ihe a

55a
Appendix D
FLA. STAT 448.102

448.102. Prohibitions

An employer may not take any retaliatory personnel action
against an employee because the employee has:

(1) Disclosed, or threatened to disclose, to any appropriate
governmental agency, under oath, in writing, an activity,
policy, or practice of the employer that is in violation of a
law, rule, or regulation. However, this subsection does not
apply unless the employee has, in writing, brought the
activity, policy, or practice to the attention of a supervisor or
the employer and has afforded the employer a reasonable
opportunity to correct the activity, policy, or practice.

(2) Provided information to, or testified before, any
appropriate governmental agency, person, or entity
conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into an
alleged violation of a law, rule, or regulation by the employer.

(3) Objected to, or refused to participate in, any activity,
policy, or practice of the employer which is in violation ofa
law, rule, or regulation.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386001_0849%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
