# Appendix — Culuton v. United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386001_0711%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 540 U.S. 1111

## Text

App. i

TABLE OF CONTENTS — APPENDIX

Page
Opinion, United States v. Culliton, 300 F.3d
els sisssasevesistcorsscescesccccesee App. 1
Opinion, United States v. Culliton, 328 F.3d
Nee rc iisissssssuscrvererserssssccsece App. 12
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Culliton,
No. 00-10599, August 25, 2008 ..................seeeees App. 27
Amicus Letter of Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association, TOG T/SGO/0G.......................sccecereeeee App. 28

FAA form 8500-8 for James Michael Culliton
i iiseiridesecnserssssevesseresccesee App. 32

App. 1

APPENDIX 1
300 F.3d 1139

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. JAMES M. CULLITON, Defendant-Appellant. ~

No. 00-10599

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

June 12, 2002, Argued and Submitted,
San Francisco, California

August 22, 2002, Filed
NOTICE:
THIS OPINION WAS WITHDRAWN BY THE COURT.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:

Opinion withdrawn by, Substituted opinion ‘at United
States v. Culliton, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 8134 (9th Cir.
Cal., Apr. 30, 2003)

PRIOR HISTORY:

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California. D.C. No. CR-99-00537-EJG.
Edward J. Garcia, District Judge, Presiding.

DISPOSITION:

Defendant’s conviction reversed.
COUNSEL:

Richard Staff, Sacramento, California, for the defendant-
appellant.

App. 2

James P. Arguelles, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Sacramento,
California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

JUDGES:

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Michael Daly Hawkins and
Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge
Hawkins.

OPINION BY:

Michael Daly Hawkins
OPINION:

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:

Culliton appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001
for making false statements on a medical form submitted
to the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”). He argues
the form is fundamentally ambiguous and therefore the
district court should have dismissed the indictment.
Joining the only other circuit to address the issue,’ we
conclude that the challenged questions on the FAA form
are sufficiently confusing, vague and overbroad as to invite
selective prosecution. Consequently, we reverse Culliton’s
conviction.’

* See United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1991).

* Nothing in this opinion should be read to restrict the ability of
the FAA to continue to use this form to elicit medical information from
prospective and current pilots and to respond to false or inaccurate
statements on the form as a basis for administrative discipline,
including license forfeiture.

Me

App. 3

BACKGROUND

James Culliton is an aviation lawyer and pilot. In
August 1995, he reclined in a chair that broke and tipped
over, which caused him to hit his head on a credenza
nearby. Following the accident, Culliton was treated for
vision problems, dizziness, headaches, memory loss and
depression. As a result of his injuries, Culliton brought a
private civil action against three defendants, eventually
reaching a settlement with two of them. The third, Viking
Office Products, asserted a defense of insurance fraud and
refused to settle. Apparently dissatisfied with available
civil relief, Viking decided to seek criminal sanctions,
transferring Culliton’s confidential medical records to its
private investigators who in turn convinced California
State investigator, Alberto Perez, to seek criminal prosecu-
tion. Perez first sought out the Sacramento County Dis-
trict Attorney's office, which declined to file a criminal
complaint. Undeterred, Perez took the matter to the
United States Attorney’s office, which presented the
information to a grand jury. The grand jury returned an
indictment for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which
prohibits making materially false statements on matters
within the jurisdiction of the federal government.»

* The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, states in relevant part:

Whoever . . . knowingly and willfully -
(1) falsifies, conceals or covers up . . . a material fact; [or]

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent ...
statement or representation;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.

App. 4

The basis for that indictment occurred in June 1997
when Culliton had filled out a federal FAA Form 8500-8 to
obtain an airman medical certificate.‘ Culliton checked the
NO box to the three issues mentioned in the following
question:

18. Have you ever had or have you now, any of
the following? Answer “yes” for every condition
you have ever had in your life. In the EXPLA-
NATION box below, you may note “PREVI-
OUSLY REPORTED, NO CHANGE?” only if the
explanation of the condition was reported on a
prior application for an airman medical certifi-
cate and there has been no change in your condi-
tion.: ... (b) dizziness or fainting spells, ... (d)
eye or vision trouble except glasses, [and]... (m)
mental disorders of any sort: depression, anxiety,
etc.

Culliton appealed after being convicted and sentenced.

ANALYSIS

This case presents the question whether the district
court erred in submitting this matter to the jury because
the questions which prompted the defendant’s false
statements are so fundamentally ambiguous that the court
should have dismissed the indictment under Section 1001
as a matter of law. Generally speaking, the existence of

* Form 8500-8 is submitted every year by pilots seeking recertifica-
tion and includes about 40 yes/no questions. The origins of this case
were recounted in Culliton’s brief and in the excepts of record. The
details were not contested by the government in either its response to
Culliton’s motion to dismiss or in its brief on appeal.

App. 5

some ambiguity in a falsely answered question will not
shield the respondent from a perjury or false statement
prosecution. United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d
Cir. 1977). Normally, it is for the jury to decide which
construction the defendant placed on a question. Id. If
however, a question is “excessively vague, or ‘fundamen-
tally ambiguous,” the answer may not, as a matter of law,
form the basis of a prosecution for perjury or false state-
ment. United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir.
1987) (citing United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d
Cir. 1986)), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.
Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 486 n.3, 137 L.Ed.2d 107, 117 S. Ct.
921 (1997). Ryan determined that this point is reached
“when it is entirely unreasonable to expect that the defen-
dant understood the question” or when persons of ordinary
intellect cannot agree on the question’s meaning. Ryan,
828 F.2d at 1015.

This Court has not previously addressed the question
of excessive vagueness in the Section 1001 context. But we
have addressed this issue in the analogous context of 18
U.S.C. § 1623 (false statements to a grand jury or court).
See United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526 (9th Cir. 1991).

A question is fundamentally ambiguous when it
is not a phrase with a meaning about which men
of ordinary intelligence could agree, nor one
which could be used with mutual understanding
by a questioner and answerer unless it were de-
fined at the time it were sought and offered as
testimony.

Id. at 1534 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). In the context of witnesses later being charged
for perjury, precise questioning has been determined as a
necessity for three reasons:

App. 6

to (1) preclude convictions grounded on surmise
or conjecture; (2) prevent witnesses from unfairly
bearing the risks of inadequate examination; and
(3) encourage witnesses to testify (or at least not
discourage them from doing so). Unfortunately,
line drawing is inevitable, for to precisely define
the point at which a question becomes funda-
mentally ambiguous, and thus not amenable to
jury interpretation, is impossible.

United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir.
1998) (citations omitted).

Our task then is to determine whether the Form
asked excessively vague questions. If we determine that
the questions were only “arguably ambiguous” or not
ambiguous at all, then the district court was correct to ask
the jury to determine whether it “could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant understood the
question as did the government and that, so understood,
the defendant’s answer was false.” Boone, 951 F.2d at 1533
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States
v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Absent
fundamental ambiguity or impreciseness in the question-
ing, the meaning and truthfulness of appellant’s answer
was for the jury.”).

In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362, 34 L.
Ed. 2d 568, 93 S.Ct. 595 (1973), the Supreme Court,
reversing a perjury conviction, ruled that “precise ques-
tioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of
perjury.” Convictions for false statements under Section
1001 are closely analogous. Therefore we must look to the
questions on the Form and see whether those questions
are sufficiently precise. See Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (“When
a line of questioning is so vague as to be ‘fundamentally

App. 7

ambiguous, the answers associated with the questions
posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the
perjury conviction. Inasmuch as the issue then becomes
one of legal sufficiency, a reviewing court may override a
jury determination.”) (internal citations omitted).

The government argues that Culliton’s answers to the
Form were properly submitted to the jury because the
district court instructed the jury that Culliton thought the
questions were ambiguous and that Culliton’s “under-
standing of the questions is a matter for the jury to de-
cide.” This begs the question: whether they were
sufficiently vague or ambiguous as to preclude prosecution
for a false statement.

At argument, the government acknowledged that the
FAA Form questions were capable of rendering innocent
responses objectively false. For example, the Form asks if
one has ever experienced dizziness. The government
conceded that a prospective pilot whose dizziness resulted
from once participating in the game of “Dizzy Izzy” could
still properly check “No” on the FAA Form.’ This response
would be both “innocently” true but objectively false,
thereby subjecting the respondent to criminal prosecution.

The same vagueness afflicts the other questions that
served as the basis for the indictment in this case. Culliton
was asked on the Form: Have you ever had mental disorders

5 “Dizzy Izzy” is a contest, often put on between innings of baseball
games, in which two spectators are invited down to the field, where
they place their foreheads on top of a baseball bat standing on the
ground and then circle the bat a number of times, after which they
must run in a straight line down the field.

App. 8

of any sort? This question tempts a range of answers. It
may invite a “Yes” answer from someone without any
history of diagnosis by a licensed clinician and it may elicit
a “No” answer from someone who has had a medical
diagnosis but disagrees with that diagnosis, perhaps
because another clinician rejected the earlier diagnosis.
Because the question is capable of several meanings,’ we
refuse to permit objectively false answers to the question
to serve as a basis for false statement prosecutions. The
uncertain nature of the question is precisely what makes
it sufficiently vague as to preclude criminal prosecution.

The question asking about eye or vision trouble
invites the same confusion. Someone who once had a bug
fly into an eye while riding a bicycle and had to stop to
remove it has had eye or vision trouble. Is it proper to
check the “No” box? Reasonable people might offer differ-
ent answers, but criminal prosecutions should not depend
upon those differing answers. (And at the very least, a
prosecution should not be contingent upon which person or
entity one has recently offended in an unrelated civil
lawsuit.)

The FAA itself has expressed concerns about the
vagueness of the Form in the past. The Broderick
Memorandum, a 1987 FAA document, noted that the FAA
needed to “think about changing the form and substance of
the questions asked in” Form 8500-8, in part because the

* The question may mean: “Do you think you have ever had a
mental disorder?” It is also capable of meaning “Have you been
diagnosed with a mental disorder?”

App. 9

“vague, qualitative, and evaluative nature of these ques-
tions” has made difficult the prosecution of people in the
past.’

Because the questions are confusing and capable of
various meanings, we do not think a conviction based on
answers to those questions is consistent with someone’s
protected Due Process rights - the questions invite the
arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests by selective
enforcement.

We are bound by the Supreme Court’s instructions on
vagueness as it pertains to criminal convictions. “Vague-
ness is constitutionally problematic when a criminal
statute either ‘fails to provide the kind of notice that will
enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it
prohibits[, or] may authorize and even encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.” City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67, 119 S. Ct. 1849,
(1999) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 903, 103 S. Ct. 1855, (1983)). It is not our conclu-
sion that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is “so vague and standardless
that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it
prohibits.” Rather, the Form that served as the basis for
the false statements is so vague that a conviction based

7 The government asserts that the Memo is only about “drug
convictions” and “alcohol-related driving convictions,” and that the
Memo is “silent on the topic of medical history questions of Form 8500-
8.” Its references to vagueness are therefore inapposite, claims the
government. We disagree. It is true that the Memo mentions questions
about convictions, but the Memo in no way indicates that the questions
that are vague are limited to those about convictions. The comment
about vagueness is in the last and separate paragraph. [See Supple-
mental Excerpts of Record at 145.]

App. 10

thereon “fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause.” 527 U.S. at 56. The Constitution does not permit
the government to “set a net large enough to catch all
possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside
and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should
be set at large.” United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221,
23 L. Ed. 563 (1876).

Here, the broad sweep of the language in the Form
violates the requirement that the government “establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Morales,
527 U.S. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted). Given
the unusual circumstances in which this case arose, we
are particularly leery of permitting prosecutors to use the
criminal laws as part of a “standardless sweep ... to
pursue their personal predilections.” Kolender, 461 U.S. at
358 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the defendant
notes, everyone has been dizzy in their life (perhaps by
playing childhood games) and everyone at some point has
headaches or anxiety. If all applicants answered yes to
these questions, the government would be forced to engage
in extensive and often unnecessary medical exams. Even
Dr. Silberman, the senior flight surgeon of the FAA, stated
that Form questions left it “up to the airman” to report
certain conditions. Thus, any prosecution on the basis of
such questions would necessarily be arbitrary.

Our holding that the Form does not survive constitu-
tional vagueness scrutiny is bolstered by the conclusions of
our sister Circuit, which has similarly found unacceptable

App. 11

convictions arising from false statements from this Form.”
See United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir.
1991). Although that decision focused on questions about
prior convictions, the Eleventh Circuit saw questions on
that Form as fundamentally ambiguous, therefore preclud-
ing criminal prosecutions under Section 1001.’ Specifically,
the Eleventh Circuit said “the government may not pro-
vide someone with a confusing and ambiguous form and
then prosecute when the answers are inaccurate.” Id. at
1102. We agree.

REVERSED.”

® There are some very minor (and for our purposes, irrelevant)
differences between the FAA Form under consideration in Manapat and
the one here.

* It is worth noting that the questions sparking the controversy in
Manapat, which asked respondents about prior convictions, required
answers that are far more objective than whether someone has or had a
mental disorder or vision trouble.

Because we reverse the conviction, we refrain from addressing
Culliton’s suggestion that the criminal prosecution was improper before
the FAA took administrative action.

0 ee

App. 12

APPENDIX 2
328 F.3d 1074

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. JAMES M. CULLITON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-10599

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

June 12, 2002, Argued and Submitted,
— San Francisco, California

April 30, 2003, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY:

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California. D.C. No. CR-99-00537-EJG.
Edward J. Garcia, District Judge, Presiding. United States
v. Culliton, 300 F.3d 1139, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17347
(9th Cir. Cal., 2002)

DISPOSITION:
Affirmed.

COUNSEL:
Richard Staff, Sacramento, California, for the defendant-
appellant.

James P. Arguelles, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Sacramento,
California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

App. 13

JUDGES:
Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Michael Daly Hawkins and
Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

OPINION:
ORDER

The opinion filed August 22, 2002, and appearing at
300 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002), is WITHDRAWN. It may not
be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district
court of the Ninth Circuit.

PER CURIAM:

James Culliton appeals his felony conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 for making false statements on a medical
form submitted to the Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”). Culliton bases his appeal on three legal theories:
First, the FAA form is fundamentally ambiguous and
therefore the district court should have dismissed the
Government’s false statement indictment. Second, Culli-
ton’s felony conviction resulted from selective prosecution
and therefore amounted to a denial of Due Process. Third,
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevented the district
court from presiding over Culliton’s indictment until, and
unless, the FAA first revoked his medical certification.

We reject all three theories and affirm Culliton’s
conviction, after a jury trial, for making knowing and
willful false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction
of the FAA.

BACKGROUND

James Culliton is an aviation lawyer, a pilot, and a
former inspector for the FAA. In August 1995, he reclined

App. 14

in a chair that broke and tipped over, causing him to hit
the back of his head against a credenza nearby. Following
the accident, Culliton sought treatment from various
health professionals, including a primary care physician,
an ophthalmologist, and a neurologist, for a variety of
medical problems. For almost two years after the accident,
Culliton complained of decreased vision in the right eye,
occasional double vision, dizziness, nausea, persistent
headaches, difficulty with concentration, personality-type
changes, and anxiety attack symptoms.

Culliton brought a personal injury action against
three defendants responsible for manufacturing and
retailing the defective chair. Two of the defendants agreed
to settle for $500,000 while the third defendant, Viking
Office Products, asserted a defense of insurance fraud and
refused to settle. At this point, the parties’ accounts of the
subsequent events diverge.

Culliton contends that Viking’s private detectives
convinced a state investigator for the California Depart-
ment of Insurance to pursue a fraud prosecution through
the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office. When
the D.A.’s office refused to proceed, the state investigator
prevailed upon the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District
of California to prosecute Culliton for false statements
made to the FAA about his medical history.

The Government maintains that this prosecution was
not “selective.” It asserts that Viking originally reported
its suspicion of insurance fraud to the county D.A.’s office
which, because of lack of funding, referred the matter to
the California Department of Insurance for further inves-
tigation. In the course of preparing its case, one of the
department’s investigators learned of Culliton’s false

App. 15

statements to the FAA. When the department determined
that it would not bring a fraud action, it referred the case
to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for possible federal prosecu-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The statute provides in
relevant part:

[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction
of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of
the Government of the United States, knowingly
and willfully — (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up
by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation; or (3)
makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.

The basis for the Government’s prosecution occurred
in June 1997 when Culliton, in the course of obtaining an
airman medical certificate, answered “No” to the following
three questions contained in FAA Form 8500-8:

Have you ever had or have you now, any of the follow-
ing? Answer “yes” for every condition you have ever had in
your life. In the EXPLANATION box below, you may note
“PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, NO CHANGE” only if the
explanation of the condition was reported on a prior
application for an airman medical certificate and there has

’ As the Privacy Act Statement attached to Form 8500-8 explains,
“the purpose of the information is to determine whether you meet
Federal Aviation Administration medical requirements to hold an
airman medical certificate or airman medical and student pilot
certificate.”

eae

-_

App. 16

been no change in your condition. See instructions page.
(Emphasis in original.) (b) dizziness or fainting spells —
Yes or No

(d) eye or vision trouble except glasses — Yes or No

(m) mental disorders of any sort: depression, anxiety, etc.
— Yes or No

The instructions page provides:

MEDICAL HISTORY —-Each item under this heading
must be checked either “yes” or “no.” You must answer
“yes” for every condition you have ever had in your life and
describe the condition and approximate date in the EX-
PLANATIONS box.

If information has been reported on a previous appli-
cation for airman medical certificate and there has been
no change in your condition, you may note “PREVIOUSLY
REPORTED, NO CHANGE” in the EXPLANATIONS box,
but you must still check “yes” to the condition. Do not
report occasional common illnesses such as colds or sore
throats.

Even though Culliton recently sought medical treat-
ment for dizziness, vision problems, and anxiety symp-
toms, see supra, he answered “No” to each query recited
above. After a four day trial, a jury convicted Culliton of
knowingly providing false statements to a federal agency
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and the court imposed a
fine of $5,000. Culliton filed a timely notice of appeal. We
have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and affirm the judgment.

App. 17

ANALYSIS
I. Fundamental Ambiguity of FAA Form 8500-8

Culliton’s first argument on appeal is that the district
court should have dismissed his indictment because of the
“fundamental ambiguity” of FAA Form 8500-8 (“Form”)
and its questions. This circuit has not yet defined the
standard of review for the dismissal of a false statement
indictment based on fundamental ambiguity. We need not
do so here because the Form is not ambiguous under any
standard of review.

Generally speaking, the existence of some ambiguity
in a falsely answered question will not shield the respon-
dent from a perjury or false statement prosecution. See
United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1987)
abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wells, 519
U.S. 482, 486 n.3, 137 L. Ed. 2d 107, 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997).
It is for the jury to decide in such cases which construction
the defendant placed on a question. See United States v.
Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d Cir. 1977). If, however, a
question is “excessively vague, or ‘fundamentally ambigu-
ous,’” the answer may not, as matter of law, form the basis
of a prosecution for perjury or false statement. Ryan, 828
F.2d at 1015 (citing United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367,
375 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also United States v. Bonacorsa,
528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Absent fundamental
ambiguity or impreciseness in the questioning, the mean-
ing and truthfulness of appellant’s answer was for the

jury.”).
While this court has not had the occasion to consider
the effect of fundamental ambiguity in the specific context

of providing false statements to a federal agency in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, in United States v. Boone, 951

a aime ia tatiana ia

App. 18

F.2d 1526 (9th Cir. 1991), we addressed “ambiguity” in the
analogous context of providing false statements to a grand
jury or court in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. A question is
fundamentally ambiguous when “men of ordinary intelli-
gence” cannot arrive at a mutual understanding of its
meaning. See Boone, 951 F.2d at 1534 (quoting Lighte, 782
F.2d at 375).

Culliton describes the Form’s medical history ques-
tions as fundamentally ambiguous because they are
“unanswerable in any meaningful way” and “incompre-
hensible in the context in which they were presented.” He
argues that the questions “make no sense at all” because
“(njone of us can literally deny a history of dizziness,
headaches, vision problems, mental problems, and the
like.” Underlying these descriptions is his basic contention
that because the FAA questions permit different interpre-
tations by the questioner and respondent, they are funda-
mentally ambiguous and cannot serve as the basis for a
false statement prosecution.

However, a question is not fundamentally ambiguous
simply because the questioner and respondent might have
different interpretations. Rather, we must consider the
context of the question and Culliton’s answers, as well as
other extrinsic evidence relevant to his understanding of
the questions posed in the Form. See Boone, 951 F.2d at
1534 (“In evaluating ... the question’s ambiguity, the
court must consider the context in which the question was
asked... .”); see also United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 559,
562 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e must look to the context of the
defendant’s statement to determine whether the defendant
and his questioner joined issue on a matter of material
fact to which the defendant knowingly uttered a false
declaration.”). If Culliton’s responses were false as he

App. 19

understood the questions, “his conviction is not invalidated
by the fact that his answer to the question[s] might gener-
ate a number of different interpretations.” United States v.
Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1553 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted). .

Culliton does not claim that he believed his answers
were true at the time he filled out the Form. Instead, he
claims that he “didn’t answer some questions literally
because literal answers would have been unreasonable
and even impudent.” Culliton went so far as to “reasonably
interpret{ ] the spirit of the medical questionnaire to relate
to facts which may medically disqualify him from flying as
a command pilot” — which, under Culliton’s interpretation, |
did not include visual impairment, inability to concen-

trate, and neurological disorders. Culliton points to no

case, and indeed we have found none, that justifies an
applicant’s unilateral reinterpretation of questions on a
governmental form to comport with his own particular
goals.

Furthermore, a de novo examination of the Form does
not reveal fundamental ambiguity about questions that
ask whether a pilot has ever had any history of dizziness,
vision trouble, or mental disorders. We recognize, and the
Government concedes, that the Form’s questions are
capable of rendering innocent responses objectively false.”

2 ‘he FAA has expressed concerns about the possible vagueness of
the Form in the past. The Broderick Memorandum, a 1987 FAA
document, noted that the FAA needed to “think about changing the
form and substance of the questions asked in” Form 8500-8, in part
because the “vague, qualitative, and evaluative nature of these ques-
tions” has made difficult the prosecution of people in the past. If the
FAA sees fit to change the questions, it is well within its domain to do

(Continued on following page)

App. 20

A respondent might feel compelled to account for dizziness
experienced while playing harmless games, vision prob-
lems experienced while undergoing routine eye dilation,
and mental disorders experienced because of irrelevant
traumas. That a respondent might feel compelled to
answer “Yes” to each of these questions does not render
them “fundamentally ambiguous.” Rather, the respondent
has the option of explaining his or her answers in a sepa-
rate space provided on the Form.

As for those individuals who answer “no,” assuming
that the questions were not meant to be read literally, it
might indeed be unfair, as Culliton contends, to allow
government prosecution for innocent answers that are
objectively false. However, the law already provides
protection against that possibility. “Perjury requires that a
witness believe that the testimony he gives is false.”
Lighte, 782 F.2d at 372; see also United States v. Matthews,
589 F.2d 442, 445 (9th Cir. 1978) (the critical inquiry is the
meaning attached to the question by the accused); United
States v. Lattimore, 127 F. Supp. 405, 408 n.10 (D.D.C.
1955) (“It does not make any difference whether the
statements were in fact true or not — the defendant’s belief
as to their truth or falsity is the issue.”).

In the face of ambiguity, a court may decide as a
matter of law to dismiss an indictment so long as the
defendant offers an innocent explanation for his testimony.
As we have discussed, Culliton has provided no such

so. This memorandum, however, does not change our conclusion that
any vagueness in these questions does not rise to the level of funda-
mental ambiguity.

App. 21

innocent explanation. The ambiguity he points to in the
questions — that read literally they seem to require disclo-
sure of every incident of dizziness or vision trouble, no
matter how minor or fleeting — simply does not account for
his failure to disclose the far more severe physical and
mental impairments that formed the basis of his personal

injury action.

Culliton relies heavily on United States v. Manapat,
928 F2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1991), in which the Eleventh
Circuit held that a prior version of Form 8500-8 was
fundamentally ambiguous despite the fact that the defen-
dant’s answers to two questions regarding her criminal
history were objectively false. However, as the district
court correctly pointed out in its order refusing to dismiss
Culliton’s indictment, Manapat concerned a different
version of the Form. More importantly, Manapat speaks to
the ambiguity that resulted when two questions about
criminal convictions were interspersed with a string of
medical history questions. See 928 F.2d at 1102. The court
concluded that an applicant might believe that the form
was asking about convictions that were related to medical
convictions, or that an applicant in good health could
check many items on the form without realizing that two
of the questions asked about criminal convictions, rather
than medical problems. Jd. at 1101. No such ambiguity
exists in this case. The Form, and the questions at issue,
deal exclusively with an applicant’s medical history. A
privacy statement and a detailed set of instructions
attached to the Form explicitly state that the purpose of
the Form is to establish the applicant’s physical fitness to
fly. Culliton has failed to demonstrate that the questions
he answered falsely are fundamentally ambiguous.

App. 22

II. Selective Prosecution

Culliton next urges us to overturn his false statement
conviction because it resulted from what he calls the
Government’s selective prosecution. He contends that “this
case would not have been prosecuted as a Title 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 case were it not for the underlying suspicion of
insurance fraud,” and therefore that his prosecution
essentially “amounts to prosecutorial abuse and a perver-
sion of any legitimate law enforcement function.”

This court has employed both a de novo standard and
a clearly erroneous standard when reviewing a selective
prosecution claim. See United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d
500, 503 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981) (adopting clearly erroneous
standard but recognizing that past cases have adopted an
implicit de novo standard). Because we hold that Culliton
has no viable selective prosecution claim under any
standard of review, we need not resolve any purported
difference. In cases where invidious selective prosecution
is alleged, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government. See United States v. Cuellar, 96 F.3d
1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1996).

7 In our criminal justice system, the executive branch

has “broad discretion” to decide whom to prosecute. Wayte
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547, 105
S. Ct. 1524, (1985) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457
U.S. 368, 380 n.11, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74, 102 S. Ct. 2485,
(1982)). However, prosecutorial discretion is not unfet-
tered, and selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws
is subject to constitutional constraints. See id. “The two
elements of a selective prosecution claim are that others
similarly situated have not been prosecuted and that the
allegedly discriminatory prosecution of the defendant was

App. 23

based on an impermissible motive.” United States v. Balk,
706 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The defendant has the burden of proving
both elements. United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935,
938 (9th Cir. 1992).

We examine Culliton’s selective prosecution claim
with the caveat that the “decision to prosecute is particu-
larly ill-suited to judicial review” because factors such as
the “strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deter-
rence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and
the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall en-
forcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Wayte,
470 U.S. at 607.

A de novo review of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government does not reveal an impermis-
sible motive driving Culliton’s prosecution. While it may
be true that the California Department of Insurance
suspected Culliton of fraud, it was under an independent
obligation to report its findings of Culliton’s false state-
ments to the FAA. As the Government correctly points out,
there is nothing inappropriate or vindictive about a state
law enforcement agency referring potential violations of
federal law to federal authorities. See Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 221, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437,
(1960) (in a case involving tainted evidence, the Court
emphasized that “[flree and open cooperation between
state and federal law enforcement officers is to be com-
mended and encouraged.”).

aii

App. 24

III. Primary Jurisdiction

Culliton’s final argument on appeal is that the district
court should have deferred consideration of his false
statement prosecution under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. This circuit has not yet diseussed the stan-
dard of review for the application of the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine. Because we can affirm the district court’s
decision not to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
under de novo review, we find it unnecessary to speculate
further on the proper standard in these types of cases.

The primary jurisdiction doctrine provides: “When
there is a basis for judicial action, independent of agency
proceedings, courts may route the threshold decision as to
certain issues to the agency charged with primary respon-
sibility for governmental supervision or control of the
particular industry or activity involved.” United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir.
1987) (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic No. 99, 400 U.S. 62, 68,

_27 L. Ed. 2d 203, 91 S. Ct. 203, (1970)). Culliton argues
that the district court should have deferred the Govern-
ment’s prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 until, and
unless, the FAA made independent findings of false state-
ments and initiated its own revocation proceedings.

Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies
in any particular situation depends on “the extent to
which Congress, in enacting a regulatory scheme, intends
an administrative body to have the first word on issues
arising in juridical proceedings.” Jd. at 1362 (citing United
States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 339, 3 L. Ed. 2d 354, 79 S. Ct.
457, (1959)). Certain factors are “uniformly present” in
cases where courts abstain from judicial action on a

App. 25

particular issue pursuant to the primary jurisdiction
doctrine. These include Congressional intent to imbue an
administrative agency with total responsibility to resolve
or address the particular issue and the need for expertise
or uniformity in the administration of such a decision. Id.
at 1363. Furthermore, while “competence of an agency to
pass on an issue is a necessary condition to the application
of the doctrine, competence alone is not sufficient.” Id.
“The particular agency deferred to must be one that
Congress has vested with the authority to regulate an
industry or activity such that it would be inconsistent with
the statutory scheme to deny the agency’s power to resolve
the issues in question.” Id.

Culliton contends that because the FAA Administrator
has the authority to suspend or revoke medical certificates
for false statements on FAA forms, it follows that no court
can entertain a criminal prosecution based on those same
false statements. However, simply because the FAA has
the competence to deal with false statements on its appli-
cations does not mean that Congress has conferred upon it
sole responsibility to penalize false statements, thereby
suspending the operation of a criminal statute of general
application.

Culliton points to 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 and 1133 as
examples of statutes that indicate Congress’ intent that
the FAA have the “first word” on all aviation matters.
There is little in the language and legislative history of
these provisions that comes close to substantiating such a
sweeping claim. While it is true that the FAA plays a vital
and major role in regulating aviation matters, Culliton
cannot point to anything in the pertinent statutory or
regulatory framework that prevents the Department of
Justice from prosecuting an individual for the felony of

App. 26

making false statements to a government agency. Fur-
thermore, while the FAA is competent to determine
whether an applicant has made false statements on a
certificate form, it is squarely within the province of the
Department of Justice to prosecute felonies of perjury and
false statements.’ See General Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d at
1366 (federal criminal litigation is an “executive function
within the exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General.”)
(quoting In Re Subpoena of Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 54 (2d
Cir. 1975)); see also Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426
U.S. 290, 305, 48 L.Ed.2d 643, 96 S.Ct. 1978 (1976)
(common law fraud against airline carrier was not within
primary jurisdiction of FAA because the “standards to be
applied in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation are
within the conventional competence of the courts”). Hence,
the district court properly proceeded with Culliton’s
prosecution.

AFFIRMED.

* Culliton cites Twomey v. National Transportation Safety Board,
821 F.2d 63 (1st Cir. 1987), and McCarthney v. Busey, 954 F.2d 1147
(6th Cir. 1992), to support his argument that the FAA and the National
Transportation Safety Board have internal procedures capable of
addressing false statements made by pilots. As we stated, competence
to render a particular decision does not, by itself, invoke the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.

App. 27

APPENDIX 3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF No. 00-10599
AMERICA, ‘D.C. No. CR-99-00537-EJG

Plaintiff-Appellee, Eastern District of
California, Sacramento

ORDER
(Filed Aug. 25, 2003)

v.
JAMES M. CULLITON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GOODWIN, HAWKINS and FISHER, Circuit
Judges.

The panel has voted unanimously to deny the petition
for rehearing. Judges Hawkins and Fisher have voted to
deny the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judge Good-
win recommended denial.

The full court has been advised of the petition for
rehearing en banc and no active judge has requested a
vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App.
P. 35.

_ The petition for rehearing is DENIED and the petition
for rehearing en banc is DENIED.

App. 28

APPENDIX 4

[LOGO] AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS
ASSOCIATION
421 Aviation Way ® Frederick, MD 21701-4798
Telephone (301) 695-2000 * FAX (301) 695-2375

SENT VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT
DELIVERY

July 29, 2003

Office of the Clerk

United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

95 Seventh Street

San Francisco, CA 94103

Re: United States v. James M. Culliton, No. 00-10599
Dear Clerk,

The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) is a
nationwide non-profit, membership organization, incorpo-
rated under the laws of the State of New Jersey, com-
prised of more than 400,000 individual pilots and aircraft
owners. AOPA’s members engage in the segment of avia-
tion known as “general aviation” which accounts for two-
thirds of the flying (in terms of hours flown) in the na-
tional airspace system.

It has just come to our attention that Mr. Culliton intends
to petition this Court for rehearing of its decision, United
States v. James M. Culliton, No. 00-1059 (April 30, 2003).
By this 2003 decision, the Court withdrew its 2002 deci-
sion and decided instead to affirm Mr. Culliton’s criminal
conviction for making false entries on a Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) medical application form. Because

App. 29

of the late and odd posture of this case, we are directing
this letter to your attention and request that you share it
with the Court, as you may deem appropriate.

On behalf of its members, AOPA is concerned with the ‘
potential impact of this Court’s 2003 decision and the
possible unintended consequences the decision may have
on individuals completing the medical application form in
the future. As it is recognized and conceded in this case,
some of the questions on the FAA’s Form 8500-8 are
ambiguous, vague, or subject to reasonably differing
interpretations, enough so that they are “capable of
rendering innocent responses objectively false.” See Culli-
ton, 00-10599, p. 5710. AOPA fears that the Court's
decision in this case could set a precedent under which
future respondents may be convicted for answering ques-
tions to the best of their knowledge and ability, with every
intention of giving complete and accurate answers, but the
answer is determined to be objectively false.

The Court writes, “That a respondent might feel compelled
to answer ‘Yes’ to each of these questions does not render
them ‘fundamentally ambiguous.’ Rather, the respondent
has the option of explaining his or her answers in a sepa-
rate space provided on the Form.” Jd. at 5711. Practically
speaking, though, innocent omissions may easily occur
because the instructions are not clear so as to limit the
scope of the answer the question is attempting to elicit and
because of an individual’s natural tendency not to disclose
each and every circumstance that could arguably fit within
the language of the question, nor would the FAA want or
expect them to reveal each and every circumstance, even if
each cold be explained away in a separate space or page.
This Court’s 2003 decision may have the future effect of
finding that innocent omissions, made in good faith and in

ee

App. 30

the interest of appropriate disclosure, nonetheless subjects
the individual to criminal prosecution.

The Court has indicated its awareness of this issue and its
determination to minimize its potential impact. To prevent
innocent omissions from becoming the basis for prosecu-
tion, the Court relies on the “knowing and willful” re-
quirement of 18 U.S.C. §1001(a), and the similar
requirement that a defendant must believe in the falsity of
the statement as he is making it for perjury to exist.
Culliton at 5711. However, this element may not always
effectively separate the innocent responders from those
who attempt to conceal their history in order to achieve
some gain. The requirement of the existence of knowing
and willful falsification could be satisfied in either case,
because when a respondent innocently and understanda-
bly decides not to report instances of childhood dizziness,
for instance, this decision is made with the full knowledge
that such dizziness did in fact occur. Therefore, under the
definition as it exists in the statutes and as it is applied by
the 2003 decision, by checking “No” on the form, the
respondent is denying something which he knows to be
technically true, but which he reasonably believes is not
required to respond to the question.

The Court also states that, “In the face of ambiguity, a
court may decide as a matter of law to dismiss an indict-
ment so long as the defendant offers an innocent explana-
tion for his testimony.” Jd. at 5711. While this language
tends to reflect an intent not to allow responders to be
criminally prosecuted for innocent, albeit inaccurate,
responses, it appears that there may be too much latitude
afforded in future cases that would not, for practical
purposes, suffice to prevent the unwarranted prosecutions
and convictions of individuals. This Court’s decision places

App. 31

a tremendous burden on an unwary accused individual to
prove that his actions were innocent.

AOPA hopes to bring to this Court’s attention its concern
that despite the Court’s expectation that innocent omis-
sions may occur because of the potentially confusing
language of the form, and the court’s stated intention that
such omissions should not serve as grounds for prosecu-
tion, the Court’s 2003 decision, and the forthcoming
decision on Mr. Culliton’s petition for rehearing, could
form a precedent with unintended and overreaching
results. AOPA respectfully urges this Court to consider
any decision it renders that may address these issues SO as
not to encourage or support unwarranted prosecutions or
the ability to make an appropriate challenge in a future
case.

Sincerely,

/s/ Kathleen A. Yodice
Kathleen A. Yodice
Counsel to AOPA

cc: Attorney for Plaintiff United States:

James Arguelles
Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney’s Office
501 I Street, Suite 10-100
Sacramento, CA 95814

Attorney for Defendant James Culliton:

John Balazs

Attorney At Law

916 2nd Street, 2nd Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814

200-0212 “ON 18A0100"Y BWO

AA OO WW
C29 27 Caeg si
* htewe “W0) SIY) SJ1UedWOIIe Jey) JUaWa}

aS agg
ay} pueyssapun pue peas osje aney | “aw Oo} 11499 Wy4 fue jo adueNss! 10) SISEQ ayy }O Wed paapisuOs aq 0} ave Aoyy yeul-sdiGe | pue
abpajmouy Aw JO 1S9Q ay) 0} ansy PUe ajajdwOD Bue wd) VONed}dde sry UO aw Aq papiAoid Siamsue pue Sjuawalers ye JeYL Ajied Aqauay 4
“PSDHAPYED LOf1d IUSPNIS PUS 91831)| 28D [D1POyy 40 8)82;);U8D je21PaKy 40)

sogesydde ue ss pasn s wu0) sug ssejun Aide jou tsp. ‘saaamoy ‘1U96U0d HON ‘Y UBis enw uo} sy) Bujsn suosied liv °310N
“ION “LOY "S'N €2 :Aquoy Ny ‘juawwOd UajyM PUR Mataas Aw
Of ajqeyeae “Aut “HON 9) WOs) PsAlades VONFEWOJUI Vy) ByeW WeYS Yy4 au) ‘ISeNbas Aw uody ‘uONedjdde siyy ul papraosd vONeWIO,UI
(9A 0} HON a4) Ul PaUIE}UVOI UONew20jUI ay) 0} SSadTe 2 Sy @ 10) UONEZOWNE SaynyysuOd juasUCD Siyy (P1099) BuIAUP Aw Or BuIieyad
JONRWUO;UL YY¥4 BY) 0} YSHUINY OF "SA{DIYDA 10}0Wy JO jUaWLEdaQ a1e1S PayeUbisap e YONOIy) ‘(YON) saISIBay JaAUQ jeUONeN ayy azOy)Ne Aqasay |

$U01}818}99Q BujAjjsD pus 19;8;)6ay saayig jeuoNeN syuerdddy “oz

/ / vowpa SNO{ASIg $8P98I90S (26-2) -00SE UOs WY

"(LLSE “1004 “S90S_ @POD “SN Bt)
410g 40 ‘sueaA ¢ UeY) ds0W JOU PauOosiIduy
40 Q000'0SZ$ 03 dn pausy aq Aew “Aqua 10
"SuONeIUasesdas JO SjuawaleIS juaiNpNes
40 SNOINIy ‘asyey Aue sayew Oym 10 198;
JB1zajewW & @IAVp 10 ‘awayrs “42123 Aue Ag
GN $19A02 10 Sjeaauod ‘saiyisyes Aynyiiaa
pue Ajbuimouy $ajejiS paziun ay) 40
Aduabe 10 yuawpedap Aue 40 voijsipsiuni
Our UluM sayew Aue uy saAzs04um

- JDILON -

| Thy - Fou |
TO OTIS ISA | GOTO
. paynsusg jeud)ssajesg Wiley je BdA) pus “sseuppy “oweN neg

ON [] . (mojaq urBydxa) ee SIBDA € 1887] UIA jeuoresajoid weet OV SISIA “61

| a6eg suojonsysuj 29S

a SS ee ge i . ene fo
1G {
333 4° as, : / abwoyr ot Fapato) eee wt
$ap0} UONSy MarAaY B9CWRD ON, “ yayroden hisea : dd =a > 0%

@8n vv4 204 dBeg SUdINISUj 99g :suC}eURdx3

‘wies6010 YONje)/QeYes B 10 jBUOITBDNpe UB je

"(S@1U0}aj 40 SIOUEBWAPS!W)) aouBpualye ui payjnsas yoy 10 SaGaiaud 6ulaup 4O UONBIOAAs JO ‘UONje}/82UBD ‘UOISUaCSNS ‘jeluap ayy UL Payjnsas

(S)uouaauos ydiym (S)easuajjO ue Gulajoaul (S)UONDB aanBsjsiuWPB JO ($)UONDIAUOD AUB 40 Asoysiy (z) 40 ‘Grup @ 40 joyorje jo-.- | -
3typ82}U0U 4O AsO}SIHh \ Aad @ouantjul Sy) 4aPUN ary 20 ‘AQ Panedu ayy ‘AQ payeaxojuy ayum Buraup Burajoauy ($)UOD1AU0D Aue (tL) 50 mY nN
A
aBeg sudoNsysUy @ag — A10;81}4 UONSY SAHeujs}uIWPY 40/Pue UONDIAU0D
LiaBans 20 Ayjgesip ssauiy 20mg C4) “x] venerrpaw Guynbas ssauyars vonOW | O “b} — -padSyasvssewosie esidoiesey/ CO | OO ‘I aseesip Suny 28 ewysy F)} O 1
mojeg “MPA aS . dwane episiig 4) od —_ sayandia W0)0 4 a, ABsayye 20 sandy key A) o%
Jeyjdsoy 0) usjssimpy 1) 2) ‘n asnge 10 SIuapuadap joyedr}y 2\0 0 aun Uj poojg 40 auays Aauply 14; 0 ‘| rasne6 \da3x2 94gNGJ) UO)SIA 30 aAj f \0 8
BIULINTUY YNeIy 46 B44) 20) UOHZalay AT} Ot a $ SB] AR Uy SOUEYSGNs jefoyy aiqnout a (renee 10 *s2ay YDeUOSS a O ‘}] <\ ueseas Aue 10} sseusnojasuosuy A) | 2) *9
iil SSNQE BVUEISYNS 40 - WT aE pi
aaiasas Aseria Aq wompsalas je2jpaw ()| 4) °s bib a samen uC O.Uy <= 2 eanssesd poojg moj 40 uGin Al. Out. __ Weds Gupayes wo sseuizzn | j.0-49
~abseyosip jesypam Aw G)} 0 3} a je Liane rien Owys — —.- ajqnosy seinczen 10 uedy MB Co ‘G} - * ~seusepeay aseass 30 wanbas4 Ojp
Mee MOMPUOD. = ar os, + OM] SORT: Spat 1 HORPMOD Tee Tra HORE OES cone apt; MOPMPUOD. <> + — Og f sOQ-- Pe >“ ~uoRIpUCS raat | a ae
a eh ee se .26eg suoNofujsu; aeg “VONIPUCS 4N0A.ut @BusYy? OU Ueeq sey 0104) PUB BBQ Ad RHPEW uewse ni U01)801/dde s0ud 8 UO peOdes Sem = wean *3°

UOIIPUOD BU} JO uoneue|dxs OM I Ai rd eat ld ON 'G3.LHO0d3Y ATSNOIAZUd.. #10u Asus NOA ‘mojag xOq NOILVNV1dX3 04) UF
Tes 4 Sapp ang A an pet sade aagy OuIpUod Asad’ 2 B84, samsuy:, Buimojios ey} 50 AUB MOU NOA aasy 10 PRY Taad NOA aaey

ree rey ‘hep: age zs 4
ap “scoaind? Suleu Oy OT 8° O] co ioe
02% YS5 SS VR tree tthe: :

Aaeiuniiens 10 wonduasesd) uo}soipey Auy esr fyiueuns. no, oa’ ssi:

uoueaiddy |=. a Sonauane Seo Ei S23 (Ve 7 ‘

. 10d ON oO TOES ’ syjuow 9 138d aT 2180 OL "PL
uonesiddy jeaipaw yw 127 10 18g ‘OL “(Ajuo UBIIAID)) SUE, JON [BIOL

- Aioysii 1eP0 aL

bee rede Lata
“3 7268 ice

iin op: pue “a6

~

> Pk enw

mre
* 166 *90° une

_vonsujwexg - aed

160

tt.

a 2 2e- oom ene'aed i: ~ on s8®A (1) coral Ae ee
N pa 63, 2° cee See. Zpaxoaay 10 - if
asp e ‘papuadsns ‘pajuag usag 13003 argoiita9 | Pant uewsy vv4 snc, sey “EL NOIsT ‘. wan yOd “egeciis' “|e
A 2 a1: GE aoe ANVe- Pasty P30. 200799: NOTSTA “INVES TOABOES 1g
< a sphordura JE: | mt arnt SH3T- SATLIINN09 | uy SAW =: Fun
2 ; _waPMS [. .s01e6IA nso. ieiraMo 4. -: r . zz mates ars et
38u19 Oo. _ Deveand (7... 480u! tld 0: postu init wae pe ey pay Sore ad Samus Rc?
ee soronssur U6 \sye199e ty CO. ; oun ye | "GTESTITE) TEP TO sBeTD S720}: Spoopeneed mua

ot al 7 :PIeH (s)oreoNIH90 uewury 0 adAy-o4 |... sepa 19 tg u poauneard spgpunis) = SHOE i

= 1} -Eem8t Bee | Sz eH GMoug £7027 60

AR sa TAC TV WE, 9p Ge OOz we OT pers ear peed ss eh aa 10 ad

a

ee hae 9. = bn is

att dai cit
= 56 — = aati —_
E mem i peoya{tpArezens-asbt: -

as Siero ew UOTELLAD -L8RUS EN SQUEP:
ws oo oa {S8@sPpR-puB-eweU ns). ver Saye SUL

JLVOIdILYSO. LO Tid LNAGNLS ONV.....

‘=S8¥19 ——gresze 2LVOIsILYS9: Woda
: ‘panssL{aymuiy oud wapnis/e9

i “$5, YO6T 3) ee a

NEDO € 6-00S8 ussOy Wd 19 dod

cs? Se sa OE
WS Con Dp ry 7 b iH uae OS h / eon

12qQUNN auoydajat
saquinn Aynsaas je}20S ‘yp

— -—: 2:

——- -

- owes

sme wne

ee

qwen 1se4 “E
ayeoiyysad
jBDIPSW UBWiy
_... wog uoneayjddy ‘4

~LNIYd 4SV21d-
— ¢G Go? ye 1 fe papeys 104 1da9x3) a6eg siqf

arardiuing iene mona

awen jSi14

aed ay IOj!tg JUBPMS
Due (DIPaW VEU Y

WEN SIPPIW f
PEF} Puzssy 181
404 paddy ayesiyjiyag
" [e@sIpayw jo ssejD ‘Z-

a

i or pon waaee meat:

e=6e
'

i scl

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386001_0711%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.