# Transcript of Record — William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Transcript of Record
- **Published:** January 1, 1910
- **Citation:** 216 U.S. 494

## Text

/#

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 190€)

No. @8.99,

THE WILLIAM CRAMP AND SONS SHIP AND ENGINE
BUILDING COMPANY, APPELLANT,

us. |

THE UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

FILED MARCH 3, 1908.

(21,054. )

(21.054.)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
CCTOBER TERM, 1908.

No. 306

THE WILLIAM CRAMP AND SONS SHIP AND ENGIN
BUILDING COMPANY, APPELLANT
THE UNITED STATES
APPEAL FROM TITE COURT OF CLAIMS
INDEN
Original Pris
Caption
Stiterment of fiitie petition, &e
Vinended petition
Exhibit \o Contraet for tl t ! boat Ni
Septerbn ', |
i idl cot pocur 1h pon
( Bill ot puurt i 1} 1 wh
Traverse (
{reument snd sulmiss
Order for re-argunient '
Re-wreumient aid submission
Findings of fact y
Conclusion of law is
Opinion {s
Judginen vi
Application for appert
Order allowing sppernt
Clerk's certitiont ‘
jivonp & Prerweiien Nt Prixtrens, Wasutsarosx, D.C... May 11, 1900

WM. CRAMP & SONS SITIP AND ENGINE BLDG. CO Vide (Ue Ge

| H Petition lied Aaeeniled Pet (rid

In the Court of Claims

ae Winniam Cramp & Soxs Suie vxp Exeixe 2 ILDING Com-

VARY
Vs

THe Usirep Srares

Phe claimant filed its original petition April 24. 1401. and subse
quently, to wit, on Mareh PS. 1908. by leave of Co moaned in leu of
sted ortetial petition, t filed its sare nde petition hich is as feod-
lows

THe Wintiam Cramp & Sons Site & Exaine Borppixe CoMPANY,
Chratresint.

Tue Ustrep Srares
Lanended Petition tpiad kahit fs | i. (
}Iiled Mareh PS. p9a3

To the Tlonorsibole Chief istics sid J iWdoes of the Court

of Claims of
the United States

The claimant. The Willian Cramp W Sens Ship & Engine Build-

the Company. a corporation Inearporated wider the hows of the State
of Pennsvivanias respectfully shows

1. On or about September 24. PSO. che the United
States, represent | by thr NA tine secretal it ihe N entered into
a contract, a copy of which is hereunto annexed. marked Exhibit: A.

and hiade prart hie reat. whereby HL Wats. cthnen

Hooother things, agreed
"_ pes ' .
Phat the elatiians Wotld. da aecoredsmes with ce ream taws, planes

and specilications, construct for the Unite) States i eertatn vessel
destamated as “Battleship No. S27 with her Ititigs ~pecitied and
certain af her equtpmient: saved vessel to bi constricted with her ma.

chiners enedies and boilers conmplete a their parts and

’ TUPLE abies pie! Col vered 1 thie Naw Vord Leaoue [x]-

and. Penueviversia. to sued perso Secretary of the
Navy meeht designate. within three vears trem: iy date of the con-
tract. to with on oor before Si plember 24. W899, Phat the claimant
Would. in accordance with the said spec iientions ane Prisatis, furnish
all of the material to be used in the comstruetion of the hull and
machinery of the said vessel That the clainant las rapidly
ils possible, furnish all workine drawihhe@s and: tey Plates necessary to

1—306

2 THE WILLIAM CRAMP & SONS SHIP AND
‘

show the dinieistens atid shape o. eawehi and every arinor plate re-
quired ior the construction of the said) vessel, Including those to be
provided for hier side and diagonal armor, turrets, barbettes, cise
lates, Coming towers. animunition tubes and. the protections for
her gaos and lomdling positions, such drawings and templates to shov
ithe Positions and sizes of the bolt holes therein. ‘That the Clatineant
would furnish all of the armor and its accessories which night bs
required for the construction of the protective deek of said yesse!
That the clatwant would care for and preserve from injury the said
vessel and all of the waterial: provided for or used in her construs
tion during the progress of the contract work, and would keep lie
and all of the said raaterials. including these to be furnished by thi
clatinant and those to be furnished by the United States, duly in
sured against fire ond marine risks. breakage of wives, and risks of
laubching, uintil her Prelipe tary or conditional UECOD LATICO? Hy thre
United States. the loss. if any, te be pavable to the Secretary of the
Navy.

Irn eonsideration the reof the United States verecd 1) to pay the
Clalit Certain sts of tenev: (2) to furnish the Clatmant all
armor pactes to be teed tn the com=trietion of certain parts of the said

vessel, rretudiig her which the Uriited States diod Aaa a a !

hb ?
ie :
and stacks. fish i ( ' }

any ’ . ; s : ! igi
Jott and cleanniie | Cx COonneetiopm gn boplers 1o7

ENGINE BUILDING CO. VS. TILE UNITED STATES,

March, 1900.—Overhanling ere-. se

ENGINE BUILDING CO. V8. THE UNITED STATES, 25

Provided That nothing hereon 580
ESN
1.633
195

1

32 YHE WILLIAM CRAMP & SONS SHIP AND

Maintenance and upekeep of propelling machinery :
Septeniber, Iso Overhauling fire-reom blowers.
cleanite boilers, running temporary steane pipes.
cleaning feed-tanks and running pumps subse-
quent to 24th... 6. eect eee ences L11..
October, ISO9—-Examining and lubricating cylin-
ders and pistons, rHnniig temporary bilge suction
pipe. lubricating and greasing circulating puraps,
overhauling fire-room blowers, and tightening up
Cee COAG SOT os is ses hae eee 6s ee LUSZ
November, IS99— Cleaning condenser tubes, over:
hauling engine-room blower, rejointing fire-main
pipe. adjusting main bearings, cleaning boilers.
raining water-hoat suetion, overhauling drains
from fire-room: blowers. running pumps and ex
amining water service pipe and valves... 0...
December, 1890 Overhauling eress-head bras-e-.
fitting up temporary boilers for heating, running
suction pipe from temporary tank, running tem:
porary heater pipe, overhauling piston red pack
ine. running temporary steam: pipe. lubricating
air and feed pumps. and cleaning boilers... ... 2A7
January, 19000 Condueting temporary -team pipe
to stern tubes, getting boilers ready for steam,
ereasing pumps, examining piston reds and valve
stem packing, bracketing extension levers on tem
porary suction, donkey-mnan on temporary boiler,
bleeding auxiliary feed pipes, and putting covers
on temporary LO EN ae oO eer gene os
February, 1900-—Drilling for and running water
hont suetion, donkey-man on temporary boiler,
running pumps. cleaning feed tanks, putting fish
oil in boilers and stacks, fish oiling tubes, renew
ine auxiliary steam joints, and cleaning back
connection in boilers... 0.000.000... tM Sere a
March, 1900— Overhauling eross-head) guides and
slippers. runing temporary steam pipe, putting
fish oil in boiler tubes. running pumps, overhaul:
ing erank shaft. donkey-man. watchman, over:
hauling erank pins. running water boat suction,
firing temporary boiler, cleaning and greasing
machinery, repacking valves in fire-room, assem
bline and adjusting enides.. 00.0.2... a
April, 1990 Overhanling packing in piston stuffing
hoxes, disconnecting temporary boiler, running
pumps, overhauling guides, connecting temporary
steam) pipes. cleaning and greasing machinery,
overhauling blowers, examining and adjusting
suspension links, overhauling stop valve gear,
donkev-man 348

BO]

ENGINE BUILDING CO, VS. THE UNITED STATES,

May, 1900—-Running purnps, pumping bilge, don-
kev-man, rejoining auxiliary steam valves, clean-
ing boilers, disconmectiirg and removing Ler po-
rary steani pipe, examiing feed putuip pistons,
overhauling auxiliary feed puraps. overhauling
fire and bilge putops. overhauling main feed
pumps, examining MeConib strainers, examining
sanitary: opurmps. cleaning and greasing mia-
chinery, examining bilge suction plugs, overhaul
Ine thrust bear Walter ser 1ee, rerori tie howler
drain pipe. overhaul
safety valve gear ;

June, 1900-— Adjusting turning engine. running

Pultips. donkev-miat, overhauling biloe suetion

© lnbricators. overhauling

plug COM ke. it Jointing TLUEEN TEDL feed drains, over-
hauling drains from dyname-roome. overhauling
joints, steam) to crane. rejornting auxiliary steam
and exhaust pipes. : a

July. 1900—Donkev-rian. rutting putaps. over
hauling and rejotnting stecm to deek machiners
getting boilers ready for steam. overhauling
boilers, turning miachiners

4s

August. 19000—Donkev-man. enuimeer. rejornting
wuNiliary steam drains. cleaning and greasing
machinery, examining math and auxthiary steam
joints. running blowers and purips. overhauling

=

steam Gari S¥St@M). rejqornting heoiler nanhole
plates. overhauling off serviee. tightening joints
}

in Water bottom. orf stowine pistons. tightening

manhole covers. theahtemmmye joints on evlinders
eXumiining pistons. cleaning berlers. examining

valve chests. exatiiniing putups

rt

plenrber, 100 Cleaning botlers. donkev-man,
enorme er, ele | hie mn | ore mane rope bina ry; tioht
ening main auxiliary stesa and exhaust joint
October, LQOQ 2 Clenrntne
meer, VUE putipyes. clennine tiny! GTCUSING Mr,
chinery te Oet. 16. L900) ine a
B50 tons biturineus conl. at S3 S1.050 00
424 eals. fish oil at Dre 140 SO
:

, $
horlers donkey Prieith, EMO

56 gals. lubricating otf at GO. q

200 Tbs. waste. at He 1? 00

Total

Less overcharges On) bar Ol miaehinists inh miaintersanes
and upkeep of propelling machinery, 13.575 hours,
tl 7 cents per how

Making i tots! aut

h—300

—"

—

33

248 .98

V4 ool

200.48

A41 40

Qs Sf

329 S4

46 40

N90 25

799 66

34 THE WILLIAM CRAMP & SONS SHIP AND

Conclusion of Law.

Upon the foregotng findings of facet the court decides as a con
clusion of law that the petition be distuissed and judgrient ordered
for the defendants under the authority of the case of United Stat,
vy. Woe. Cramp & Sons, ete. (206 UL S.. 118).

Opinion.
Per Curiam:

The contract tn this case. respecting the language of the tinal re
lease upon the completion of the vessel and the payient of the ve
serve therein mentioned, is the same as in the ease of Cited States v.
Cramp and Sous (206 US. LIS). wherein the court said

“The sixth Clause of this paragraph Hiatkes ~pectal provision fo
the last payment. to be tiade ‘when all the conditions, covenants, and
provisions of said contract shall have been performed and fultilled
by and on the part of the party of the first parts and ton the execu
tion of a final release to the United States im such forme as shall be
approved by the Secretary of the Navy, of all claims of any kind or
description under or by virtue of said contract. Evidently the
parties contemplated and specially provided by this stipulation that
the whole matter of the contract should be ended at the time of thi
final release and the last payinent. That which was to be releawesd
was ‘all clattas of any kind or description under or by virtue of said
contract. Manifestly. ineluded within this was every claim: arising
not merely from a change in the specifications, but alse @rowing ov
of delay caused by the Government. The language is not alon
‘claims under’ but ‘clatmie by virtue’ of the contract — chains of
any kind or description. ATL the claims for whieh allowances wer
made in the judginent of the Court of Claims come within one or thi
other of these causes. Tt imay be that, strictly speaking. they were
not claims under the contract, but they were clearly claims by virtua

of the contract. Without it ne sueh elatuis could diave arisen
49 Now, it having heen providod in oaedveunee thie the contrac

should he closed by the execution of a release of this scope |
can not be that the company, when it signed the release. underston
that some other or lesser release was conteniplited. Tt riust hav
understood that it was the release required by the contraet—a re
lease intended to be of all elaims of any kind or deseription under or
by virtue of the contract. and that the form of words which thi
Secretary had approved was used to express that purpose. * * *
It is only by reason of the performance of the contract in the ear
struction of the vessel that these elaine arise. Bit for the contract
and the construction of the vessel ander it, there would be ne sted
claims. * * * Tf parties intend to leave some things open and
unsettled their intent so to do should be rinde minifest”

That language evidently has reference to the contract and its nm
quirements and therefore when the contract tn ternis mroavides that

the reserve or final payment will be made “when all the condition.

1
i
1
{

ENGINE BULLDING CO. VS. THE UNITED STATES oO

covenmts, and provisions of said contract shall have been performed
and fulfilled by and on the partof the party of the fist part,” the
clan wats, pon such pravrnent, obligated to sten the release pro-
vided by the terms of the contract releasing the Government from
“all claims of any kind or deseription under or by virtue of said
contract And. strive eel Court dy the cast cited holds that the re
ease of all clans growing out of the construction of the vessel
without whieh such elaine would wot have
of the contract and settled. as the court save. all
the partios iis : melding unliquidated
clatms——the Seeretury of the Nave in respect thereto mot only had
thre rioht fo weeept stich release in the Interest of the Crovernmient,
brit ttieler thi contract it was bias duty toda so

Therefore it rrntast bo hele threat. when the vessel was complet d
he reserve patd. the rights of the parties were determined by the

contract self and) ried thre lerroviaee of the releuse It follows th

arisen Was a recognition
disputes hetween

to chums sted Upon

ind

oni the auithrorit of ths, or! cited the petition Tritist ay dismissed,
whieh fs necorea nol lorie thiel bdorient i~ ordered to by entered for
the defendant

mo) y Judame ntoof the Court

No Aopen)
Mik Wittiam Crawe anp Soxs Sup asp Exaise Borpixe
COMPANY

Pie UNirep Srares

Ata Court of Clatms held tr the (atv of Washington on the 8d

lav of February, T9OS. judgment was ordered to be entered as fol

premises tire

ty fi] Onistele Viatteo aot the {
do order, adjudee and deeree that the petition thi

fendanits, and
latmcant. Phe Wallin tu & Sons Ship and Eneoine Iuildine
Conmipeaniy bi supvel thie cltpie ~ hereby Manni

By rie COUR’

tilrance of. Appeal

Poe Wiettaw Crawe wwe Sox, Sump any Exarse Br ILDING
(iu ~~ S } 1 phil
Tite ( BD: STATES
Ire hie rie rit 1! ley 114 thre tu ‘ } eel ‘ ol thie
he fol ) 1 4aays " { on oe .¢0 lef’ ‘ this elay
t. bn t Thorens ) Ieediy hil | Po) | poly {

ob WM. CRAMIE & SONS SHIIIP AND ENGINE BLDG. CO. VS, U. 8.

wid gives notice of an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States,
MeCAMMON & HAYDEN,
Attorneys for Claimant
Filed February 4, 1908

FEBRUARY 5, 1908
Ordered that the above application for appeal be allowed as
praved for
By rue COURT

_te

VII Certificate,
In the Court of Claims
No. 22535

Tue Witniam Cramer axp Sons Suip anxp ExGixne Burtping
COMPANY
vs,

The Unitvep States

I, John Randolph, Assistant Clerk Court of Claims, hereby certify
that the foregoing are true transeripts of the pleadings in the above-
entitled cause: of the findings of fuet and conelusion of law: of the
Opinton of the Court: of the Hhiedorrenst of the Court distiissing the
petition: of the application for, and allowanee of, appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States

Thy testin Oni\ whereof | have hereunto set mis hand and affixed
the seal of said Court of Claims this 2ilat dav of Mebruary, 1908

[Seal Court of Claims. |
JOIN RANDOLPH,
Asst Clerk, Court of Claims

Mridorsed on cover) File No 2b.054. Court of Claims. Term No
8060 The William Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine Building Com-
pany. appellant, ox. The United States. Filed March 3d, 1908, File
No. 21.054.

1)
Ty Me iy :

Jak,

ek ihrdge toon te §
4 ‘ \. ¥

oe hoo

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Ocrorer Team, 1909.

No. 92.

THE WILLIAM CRAMP AND SONS SHTIP AND
ENGINE BUILDING COMPANY. Apperrtanr.

THE UNITED STATES.
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT.

STATEMENT OF TITE CASE.

This ts an appeal by the Cramp Company, claimant below,
from the judgment of the Court of Claims, dismissing its
petition (pp. 33-36). The claim in suit is for breach of
contract. The contract was entere] into by the claimant
and the United States, represented by the Secretary of the
Navy, on September 24. 1896. It related to the construe-
tion of a battleship, now known as the U.S. S. “Alabama.”
The claimant undertook : to provide all material, to be used
in the construction of the vessel, except certain armor plate ;
to construct her in conformity with certain laws, specifica-
tions and plans: that she should meet certain re-
quirements: and to deliver her to the United States. com-
plete in all respects, within three vears from the date of the
contract; also to keep the vessel and all materials provided
for use in her construction, insured for the benefit of the
Secretary of the Navy, against loss or damage by fire and
other risks. up to the time of her delivery to the United

2

States. In consideration of this the United States assumed
two independent obligations: (1) To furnish part of the
armor to be used in the construction of the vessel, more
particularly described as all “such as may be required in the
construction of the side and diagonal belts, turrets, barbettes,
casemates, conning towers, ammunition tubes, and protec-
tion for the guns and loading positions.” and to “deliver

said armor and armor bolts at the ship vard of the party of

the first part (Cramp Company ) within the times and in the
order required to carry on the work properly.” (2)
To pay the Cramp Company the sum of $2,650,000;
this being made pavable in’ thirty instalinents, some
of which were to be paid as the work progressed, some upon
the delivery and preliminary acceptance of the vessel, and
the balance. including a special reserve of $60,000,
upon the vessel's final acceptance and the execution
by the builders of a release to the United States “in such
form as shall be approved by the Secretary of the Navy, of
all claims of any kind or description under or by virtue of
this contract” (p. 14). Final acceptance was not to occur
until the vessel should have been in the actual service of
the Government not exceeding five months. It was stipu-
lated: (1) Tf the delivery of the vessel should be delayed.
bevond the expiration of the building period of three years,
the builder would become liable for liquidated damages to
be deducted from its compensation, unless such delay were
caused by act of the United States, or by certain other cir-
cumstances beyond the builder's control. (2) The builder
was required to submit all questions with regard to delays
to the Secretary of the Navy and his decision as to their
cause and extent was made binding upon both parties; (3)
In case the Secretary should find that. the builder's work
was being delayed by acts of the United States or its offi-
cers or agents, the builder was to be allowed “‘a correspond.
ing extension of the building period” (pp. 4-15. 21, Find
ing IT).

7”

aa

3

Upon the execution of the contract thy claimant made

all preparations necessary for the commencement of the
work, undertaken. On December 2, 1896, the vessel's keel
was laid and thereafter her construction progressed with
due dispatch, and she would have been completed and ready
for delivery within the contract period if the United States
had delivered her armor as and in the manner undertaken Ds
it (p. 21). By the middle of February, 1898, the construe
tion of the vessel had progressed to a point where it became
necessary for the builders to have her internal armor, in or-
der that work upon her might proceed properly. ‘This
was a portion of the armor that the Government had agreed
to furnish. It was to constitute part of her strueture in
the same sense as her keel and frames. The first instalment
of it was not delivered to the builders until December 22,
1898, and the last instalment was rot delivered unti! Mareh
11, 1899, Notwithstanding the hindranee and combat

rassment caused by the lack of the internal armor. the
builders proceeded with their work as rapidly as possible
in so far as it could be done at all (p. 21). On May 18,
1898, the vessel was launched. \ccording to the official
estimate, the contractor's work was then about Hiftv-live per
centum completed (p. 22). On June 9, 1898, over ty enty
months after the execution of the contract in suit and nearly
four months after the lack of internal armor began to de-
lay the builder’s work on the vessel, the United States en

tered into a contract with the Bethlehem [ron Company by
which the latter agreed to manufacture and deliver certain
armor, including that which the Government had under

taken to provide for the “Alabama,” deliveries of. the
armor to begin in December, 1908. The Cramp Company
had nothing to do with that contract. nor was it apprised by
the contract in suit of the manner in which the Government
would procure the armor which it undertook to contribute
The Government had given no order for that armor, nor

Daehn oral eh ao el

4

taken steps to procure it, before June 9, 1898. In his re-
port, dated June 30, 1898, the Navy Department's represen-
tative at the Cramp Company's ship-yard, said:

“It is estimated that on June 30, 1898, the vessel
(Alabama) was 6O per cent completed. The con-
tractor’s trial, final completion and delivery of the ves-
sel to the Government will depend entirely upon the
delivery of the armor and armament, and the ship
should be ready for final delivery to the Government
within two months after the receipt of the armor and
armament at the shipbuilding yard.”

He stated further that the probable date of the vessel's
completion was September 24, 1899, provided that all of
her armor were delivered cithout undue delay (p. 22)

After launching. in order that work upon the vessel
might procecd in due course, it became necessary for the
contractor to have certain parts of her external armor.
This was not delivered until much later, nor were
the deliveries of armor of the several classes made
in the order necessary to carry on the work properly. The
first instalment of external armor was delivered on April 5,
1899, and the last of them, as late as June 7, 1900— seen that the law precluded
the Secretary of the Navy from entertaining the question of
the claimant's damage, and that he refused to entertain the
claim in suit on the ground that he had no authority in law
ty do so.

Velson vs. Pickwick Co. (30 Il. Apps., 333). This was
an action for breach of a contract by which Nelson, the
appellant. had undertaken to do certain painting and glaz-
ing on a building which was being erected by the Pickwick
Company, appellee. The specifications provided that the
work should be completed by a certain date, and that if
Nelson failed to do so, penalty at the rate of $25.00 per
iy should he deducted from his compensation; also, that
Nelson should co-operate with the other contractors
and arrange to avoid delay. The specifications were in
print and the court assumed that all the contractors were
bound by like provisions. The contract required the work
to be done under the supervision of architects. It reiter-

Bd

ated the provision for the deduction of $25.00 per day for
each day’s delay, but provided:

“Should delay be caused by other contractors, to
the positive hindrance of the contractor hereto, a just
and proper amount of extra time shall be allowed by
the architects, * * * and in case the said parties
shall fail to agree as to the * = * amount of
extra time, the decision of the architects shall be final
and binding.”

Judge Gary delivering the opinion of the court said (pp

335 et seqg.):

“The principal question in the case is. whether this
provision for the allowance of extra time by the ar:
chitects is the only remedy of the appellant when de-
laved by other contractors. He was so delaved until.
by the rise in wages, it cost him $473.20 more than it
otherwise would have done to perform his contract.
The matter in controversy is, whether he shall recove!
that sum. There is parol testimony of a promise by
the general agent of the appellees, having authoriiy.
made to appellant when but a small part of the work
was done, and he claimed extra pay as condition of
going on with it, that the company would pay the ad-
ditional cost caused by such delay. But if the rights
of appellant were fixed by the contract. any promise
to pay him extra for doing what the contract bound
him to do would lack a consideration, unless special
circumstances would take the case out of the general
rule, as in Bishop vs. Busse, 69 IW, 403. and Cooke
ws. Murphy, 70 Ill, 96. There is a preponderance
of the testimony that such a promise was made.
and the probability that there was, as well as
the justice of the claim, are strongly supported
by the concurrent circumstances. Without — re.
citing that testimony and those circumsiances, hov- 3
ever, the case may safely be put upon the ground thai
‘the contract necessarily presupposes and implies, on
the part of the appellees, an obligation to supply’ that

36

upon which the appellant was to do his work. Broom's
Legal Maxims, 667. It was the legal duty of the ap-
pellecs to keep the work in such a state of forwardness
as to enable the appellant to perform his contract with-
in the limited time. See vs. Partridge, 2 Duer., 403.
The provision for the extra time was for the avoid-
ance of the penalty the appellant would incur tf he did
not complete his contract on time. In its language it
purports to be a benefit to him; an allowance, not a
deprivation, of his right to require the work to be in
readiness for him. Under a provision in the spectfica-
tions with other contractors, whose work preceded that
of the appellant, like that in the specifications for his
work, the appellees had in their hands indemnity for
the increase to the price of the appellant's work. If
they did not have such a provision it was their own
omission, the consequence of which is not chargeable
to appellant. If the appellees desired exemption from
their obligations under the contract, they should have
put such exemptions in clear language that would
have put appellant on his guard, and left no doubt as
to what was intended. * * * Itis only by the ap-
plication of the maxim, “EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO
\LTERIUS,’ that the claim of the appellant can be cut off;
that, as there is one consequence of delay caused by
other contractors declared, all others are, by that dec-
laration, exclided. But this maxim ‘is not of uni-
versal application, but depends on the intention of the
parties as discoverable upon the face of the instrument,
or of the transaction.” Broont’s Legal Maxims, 633.
The claim made by the appellant is not within the
clause quoted from the contract as to questions the ar-
chitects should decide. There is no question of the value
of extra work, nor is there any disagreement between
the parties relating to performance of the contract.
The amount which the appellant should recover 1f he ts
entitled to recover at all, being undisputed, the decree
is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to
allow to appellant $478.20 for his damages for delay.
as well as the amount due him upon the contract.”
See also: Frost vs. Rand, McNally & Co. (51 Ul.
App., 276).

ee

Del Genovese vs. Third Ave. R. Co. (13. N. Y. App. 412,
1897). The contract drawn in question related to an exca-
vation for the foundation of a power house. The com-
plaint set out two causes of action: one for an unpaid
balance of the contract price; the other for damages sus-
tained by plaintiff in consequence of numerous hindrances
and delays caused by agents of the defendant company.
The case went to a referee who found for the plaintiff, re-
porting that, in consequence of directions given by the ar-
chitect, defendant's agent, which the plaintiff was required
to obey, he had on certain occasions been obliged to suspend
work altogether and at other times had been greatly ob-
structed in his operations by the presence of material and
apparatus of other contractors engaged in doing other parts
of the work. After hearing on defendant's exceptions, the
referee's report was confirmed by the court and judgment
for the plaintiff entered. On appeal, the court in general
term affirmed the judgment, saying (p. 415):

“There can be no question but that, under this con-
tract, there was an ‘implied understanding by all the
parties that they (the plaintiffs) were to be unrestrict-
ed in the employment of means to perform it, and that
nothing which it was the ducyv of the owner to do to
enable the contractors to perform should be left un-
done.” and the question is whether there has been a
breach by the defendant of his implied understanding
of comrad..-* > *

Also (p. 422):

‘But what the contractor is entitled to is such op-
portunity to perform his contract as under all cireum-
stances, considering the nature of the work and what
the other contractors have to do, is reasonable: and
where the owner, 01 his representative, interferes in

38

such a way as to prevent one contractor trom having
such reasonable use of the premises, or such reason-
able opportunity to perform his contract, and damage
follows therefrom, there is no reason why he should
not be liable; and such a contract or duty will be more
readily implied where, as here, the time of the per-
formance of the contract ts limited.”

Also (p. 424):

“Ie also agree with the referee that the provision
of the contract allowing the architect to adjust and ar-
range a proper allowance for any loss of time by which
the contractor should be delayed on account of other
contractors, ts no defense to the claim of the plaintiffs
to be paid the damages sustained by reason of the un-
reasonable or improper act of the defendant in violat-
ing its agreement with them, Tt docs not appear that
the architect acted under this provision of the con-
tract, but if he had, it is clear that the only object of
the provision was to extend the time for the comple-
tion of the contract by the plaintiff in case of such a
delay caused by the other contractors in the proper
performance of their work. Two cases are cited:
Havdnville Min. & Mfg. Co, vs. Art Institute (39
Fed. Rep.. 484) where, under a somewhat similar pro-
sision in a contract, the defendant's contention was
adopted; and Nelson vs. The Pickwick Associated Co.
(30 I. App.. 333) where the contrary view was taken.
We agree with the referce that the latter case should
be followed.”

This decision was affirmed without opinion by the Court
of Appeals of New York. (162 N.Y. 614—1900. )

39
i

In support of their contention last mentioned counsel for
the Government cited a number of authorities, all of which
are readily distinguishable from the present case. These
will be reviewed.

Harmon on Contracts (p. 808 and Sec. 390), This is but
a statement of the rule that where parties enter into engage
ments with express stipulations it is to be presumed that
they have expressed all conditions by which they intend to
be bound, unless an intention to the contrary appears; also
that where an agreement has been reduced to writing the
parties will not be permitted to deny that they intended to
make the stipulation contained in the instrument. We are
not seeking to add one syllable to the contract, nor are we
attempting to deny that the parties meant what the contract
provides. We show that the Government covenanted to do
a certain thing and failed to do it and in consequence of
that failure the building company suffered damage. The
contract was essential to the existence of the breach but
the breach was not an act done under the contract. The
Government's default was extrinsic and in violation of the
contract. The building company’s right to recover dam-
ages accrued to it because of that vielation.

Higgins vs. Eagleton (34 N. Y. Supplement, 225). In
that case it appeared that the defendant had contracted to
sell the plaintiff a certain house of which the northerly wall
was a party wall and to convey the same to the plaintiff
free and clear of encumbrances except those entmerated
Defendant tendered a proper deed which plaintiff refused
to accept. on the ground that a wall of the house, other than
the northerly one, was a party wall and hence the adjoining
owner had rights which constituted an encumbrance upon

the property other than those specified. Plaintiff sued to

recover the sum which he had pat to bind the contract to

I atte Be foe 6

40

sell, and obtained judgment. On appeal this was affirmed,
the court holding that the description of the northerly wall
asa party wall clearly indicated that the other walls of the
house were independent structures. It is not perceived
how that case can shed any light upon the one now before
this court.

Aspen vs. Austen (5 O. B. D., 671). Plaintiff agreed
to manufacture material for the defendant and the latter
agreed to pay him for his services, at one speetfied rate per
week for two years, at a higher rate per week during a third
year, and then to take him into partnership. Before the
expiration of the three years defendant refused to proceed
under this arrangement. The plaintiff thereupon brought
his action, alleging an unlawful discharge by defendant con-
tending that the contract was one for continuous employ-
ment. The court held otherwise, saying:

se # * where words of recital or reference mani-
fested a clear intention that the parties should do cer-
tain acts, the courts have from these inferred a cove-
nant to do such acts, and sustained actions of covenant
for the non-performance, as if the instrument had
contained express covenants to perform them. But it
is a manifest extension of that. principle to hold
that, where parties have expressly covenanted to per-
form certain acts, they must be held to have impliedly
covenanted for every act fitting or even necessary for
the perfect performance of their express covenants.
Where parties have entered into written engagements
with express stipulations, it is manifestly not desirable
to extend them by anv implications. The presumption
is that, having expressed some, they have expressed all
the conditions by which they intend to be bound under
that instrument. It is possible that each party to the
present instrument may have contracted on the suppo-
sition that the business would in fact be carried on and
the service in fact continued during the three years,
and vet neither party might have been willing to bind

gM Dah

41

himself to that effect. and it is one thing for the court
to effectuate the intention of the parties to the extent
to which they have even imperfectly expressed them-
selves, and another to add te an instrament all such
covenants as, upon a full consideration, the court mits
deem fitting for completing the intentions of the par-
es, but which they either purposely or unintention-
ally, have omitted. The former is but the appheation

OF a rule of constryeti note that whereby is y ritten: the
latter adds to the ah harhionts hy cchich fla parties hace
Povegred themseloes. and Ls, Of COUrse, gnuite merely
cd, ws ot ell us liad / “toy ut he rf al yt trestice tM at .
application. The breach Vy re esstenod sassrmes thar

the defendant, at however great loss to himself. was
bound to continue his busines for three vears: but the
defendant has not covenanted to do so; he has cove
nanted only to pay weekly sums for three vears to the
plaintiff on the condition of his performing what, on
his part he has made a condition precedent: and the
plaintiff will he entitled to recover those sums, whether
he performs that or not, so long as he is ready and
willing to perform it, and. is prevented only by the
defendant from doing it. This then is the safe rule
for determining the rights of thee parties between
each other and no injustice fallk te the plainttt. Uf
he should assign a breach in the non-payment of the
weekly sums, it would be no answer for the defendant
to sav that he had discontinued the business and dis-

fl missed the plaintiff: the reply wonld be that he might,

fl indeed, if he please l do beth, but that he was still
hound to make the pavment which he had previously
covenanted to make.’

There ts nothing in that whieh comthets wath this claim
ant’s richt to recover. We sre pot askine the court to
imply a covenant of the government to provide armor plate
to enable us to set up the breach complained of. We are
not asking for anv addition to the Government's undertak-
ings. We show an express covenant (Par. 3) and its
breach He ask damages vot because th, Gocernminent

PO EE AE MN EEA AM AID, VRE tes of

im ;

42

agreed to pay them, but because it did nol furnish armies
as it had agreed.

Stephens vs. Sith (VO Wall, 321, 326). Congress hea
passed an act preseribing a method by which certain In-
dians could sell their lands. This was for the protection of

'

Indians to safeguard them against their own improvidence
8

and the cupidity of white men. The case turned upon the

validity of a sale by an Indian. The court said:

“It needs no argument or authority to show that the
statute having provided the way in which these half-
breed lands could be sold, by necessary implication pro-
hibited their sale in any other way. The sale im ques
tion not only contravened the policy and spirit of the
statute but violated its positive provision.”

The applicability of this to the present case is not ap-
parent.

Haydnville, ete. Co. vs. Art Institute (39 Fed. R., 484)
was an action, brought to recover a balance claimed to be
due under a contract for the construction of floors amd cer-
tain other work in a building and damages suffered by the
contractor in consequence of the delay of third parties.
who were already under contract to construct other parts
of the building. when the contract in question was made
The latter contained this clause :

“Should delay be caused by other contractors to the
positive hindrance of the contractor hereto, a just and
proper amount of extra time shall be allowed by the
architects, provided it (the contractor) shall have given
notice to said architects at the time of such hindrance
or delay.”

The specification, forming part of the contract provided

“That the first, second and third stories are ready
for those floors and the contractor may enter at once
upon said work: arches in these three stories to be

——
ore a eee f

id

completed on or before September 30th. The fourth
(attic story's reof and partitions) shall be completed
in 30 days after the contractor has received notice that
these stories are in readiness for his material.”

The court said:

“Taking this clause of the contract and the specifics
tions together, | construe them to mean this: that, if
the plaintiff was delaved by reason of the tardiness or
want of despatch on the part of the contractors, doing
the other classes of work upen the building, it should
he entitled to such further time for the c mpletion of
the work as the architects should allow: but |
(lo not see that there ts any provision that it is entitled
to peemmiary damages by reason of said delay. Evi
dently the parties anticipated that this contractor doing
only a part of the work. and that which was largely de- K;
pendent upon the completion of other classes of the

work by other contractors, must await the movements ‘
of these other contractors; and it seems to me that the é
stipulation for further time to complete the work in a
case of delay be other contractors implies that there §
is to be ne peemmiary compensation for such delay.” e

The line of reasoning adopted by the court was. clearly
this and was tenable on no other theory: The delay
was due te the defanh of third parties. When the
contract was made beth parties understood that other
persons were engaged te de other work upon the
hukling and that withemt his foute or that of the owner
plaintiff's work might be delayed beyond the period stipu-
lated by the default of these No. 92.
v.

THE UNrrep STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS,

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES.

STATEMENT.

Appellant, a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Pennsvlvamia, brought suit in the
Court of Claims for the sum of $78,584, alleging
failures on the part of the United States to comply
with its contract in the construction of a battle ship
referred to as No. 8 and now known as the Alabama.

Among other things, the contract contained the
following provisions: The United States was to fur-
nish certain armor and armor bolts to be used in the
construction of the vessel, including such as might
be “required in the construction of the side and
diagonal belts, turrets, barbettes, casemates, conning

213880-—10 |

»)

towers, ammunition tubes, and protection for the
euns and loading positions * * * and deliver
said armor and armor bolts at the shipyard of the
party of the first part within the times and in the
order to carry on the work properly.” (Ree., p. 6.)
The contractor was to put the armor in place on the
ship, build and equip the vessel in all other respects,
and complete the same in three vears from the date
of the contract. In case of failure to comply with
the contract, provision was made for a deduction of
$75 per day for the first three months ef such delay,
$150 per day for the second three months’ delay, and
$300 per day for all delays bevond the period of three
vears and six months from the date of the contract.
(Rec., p. 9.)

It was also provided that “all delays which the
Secretary of the Navy shall find to be properly at-
tributable to the party of the second part, or to its
officers, or agents, or any or either of them, to have
been delays operating upon the completion of the
vessel within the time specified therefor by the con-
tract, shall entitle the party of the first part to a cor-
responding extension of the period prescribed for the
completion of the vessel.” (Ree., p. 9)

“Tf upon the completion of the vessel, excepting
the fitting, fixing, placing, and securing of the armor
for her side and diagonal belts, turrets, barbettes,
cusemates, and conning towers, the party of the see-
ond part shall not have commenced the delivery of
such armor to the party of the first part, then and in

such case the vessel shill be subjected to the trial

3

provided for in the tenth cluase of the contract,”
and if upon such trial all the conditions of the contraet,
except as to such armor, should be fulfilled, the ves-
sel should be preliminarily aecepted: and if within
five months after sneh prelimingry acceptance the
United States should not bave commenced the de-
liverv of such armor, the vessel should be finally ae-

’
'

cepted and the cost of putting the amnor in place loft
to the determination of a board appointed for this
purpose, snd the cost of the same ss ascertained by
srtid bore spond be deducted fran the CORMErLET
price. But if before the fined trish or within five

montis after the preliainain aceeptainece, the Uited

States should “conmence snd continue with reason-
able diligence the delivery, of the armor.” the con-
tractor wes co put it in place in necordanee with the
contract. (Ree., pp. 5-7.)

The appellant failed and neglected to avail itself of
the provision of the third parngraph of the contract
providing for the preparation and completion of the
vessel for its trial without the fitting, fixing, placing,
and securing of the armor, and whieh it mieht have
done on the default of the Government to deliver the
same “within the times and in the order to carry on
the work properly.”

Payment was to be made in thirty equal instal-
ments as the work progressed, with a reservation of
IO per cent from each instalment. The last three in-
stalments, as well as the reservations provided for
from tie first twenty-seven, were not to be paid until

the pocliminary acceptance of the vessel: and for the

4

further protection of the United States and to cover
possible defects a special reserve of $60,000 was to be
retained by the United States until the final accept
ance of the vessel. (Ree., p. 14.)

Upon the full performance of its part of the con
tract the appellant was to receive the “special re-
serve, or surplus, if any, of said reserve fund * *
on the execution of a final release to the party of the
second part in such form as shall be approved by the
Secretary of the Navy, of all claims of any kind or de-
scription under or by virtue of this contract.” (Ree.,
p. 14.)

The United States, having no armor plant of its
own, was obliged to obtain, and did) obtain, the
armor from other contractors who failed to complete
the manufacture of the sume in time for delivery to
the appellant “within the times and in order re-
quired to carry on the work properly,” and in con-
sequence of this the completion of the vessel was de-
layed. By reason of the failure of the United States
to furnish the armor for the said ship when the same
was required by the contractor the completion of the
vessel was delayed for a period of three hundred and
eighty-seven days (Finding NII, Ree. p. 25) beyond
the original contract period, and was not delivered
to the United States until October 6, 1900.

Upon the request of the contractor made upon
the Secretary of the Navy appellant wats first noti-
tied on October 9, IS99, that “the provisions of the

ninth clause of the contract for the construction of

”

said vessel, relating to deductions from the contract
price tor delays, will be suspended for a reasonable
time, pending the final delivery of the armor, and the
pHestlon of the extension of time wall he determined
when the armor is oll delivered.” and later, on Octo-
her B31. 1900, the contract time for the completion of
the ship Wiis duly extended until the date of its pre
liminary acceptance, or October 22. 100,

Th consequence of this extension mo deduction on

neceotiil of delay Wilts piste fron {! e vontraet pice of

the ve el, Which Was pod to tire appellant in fall,
Fourtecnt) finding Court oof Claims, Ree. pp.
23 ane t

\fter (oe completion and delivery of the saip, nnd
on bee byarunsn in 9) 1901, the contractor sent a con hyper

. ’ Ms . . = y a | -
eation to the Seeretarv of the Navy, in wiaeb: elaim

tated i cores puenece ol tie frthepes nia delays of the

nited States. To this eoiinmimention, on February
13, POOL, the Secretary of the Nuva minde reply ly
letter, in Which statement was made to the effeet ticat
‘after a careful consideration of tie ibyeet, the
elain, beta for unliquidated damages, Is of a kind
the department has ne authority under thie tiaw to
entertain.” (Ree. p. 24)

(dni \pril by. FOOH, appellant, tiarotigh its counsel,
shige@est ed a form of Proviso TO SHCCOTMP EIN the final
release.

On April 17. 1901, the Seeretary of the Navy

made reply, in whieh the proviso suggested by the

6"
appellant was not accepted, but in its place the fol-
lowing was substituted:

Provided, that this release shall not be taken
to include claims arising under the said con-
tract other than those which the Secretary of
the Navy had jurisdiction to entertain. (Ree.,
p. 26.)

This was subsequently embodied in the final
release which was given which was identical in essen
tial particulars with that given tn the case of the
Indiana, and which was passed on by this court
(206 UL S., 11S), save as to the proviso.

The court below held that “by reason of the said
several failures and delays of the United States with
respect to the furnishing of the armor for the sid
battle ship, and the «ke lav in her completion and
difficulties experienced in her construetion conse-
quent thereon, the claimant was put to extra experise
in the performance of the contract ta suit and sts
tained damage to the amount of 449,792.66." This
is more fully set forth in the itemized schedule which
is embodied in the findings. (Ree. p. 50.)

Upon the foregoing facts the court distutssed the
petition and entered judgment in favor of the Govern-
ment on the authority of the opinion readered by
this court in the ense of United States vo teilliam
Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Company
(206 UL S., TIS), which was a elaim growing ont of
the construction of the battle ship /ndiana. The
battle ship /adiana was constructed by appellant

herein under a contract practically identiest in termes

with that in the ease at bar. and « final release was
given Which differs from the final relense in the
present case in but one respect, namely, the proviso
italicized in the Alabama release, reading as follows:
Provided, That this release shall nol hy tale al
lo include claims arising under the said contract
other than those which the Seer lary of the Navy

had jurisdiction locnleriain.
lor the convenience of the court copies of the final

releases in the two causes sre here set forth.

i chatiee of ' ! the eleventh clause ot
Shee compte bated) Newenul , lated September 24
[Sth ty 1 bretwe the Wail Hj. | f between the William
(ran) “ Shiiy a ” 4 ns Ship and Engine
Priti ‘ i il Pat i the firs
| ! | nited Sta party of
Penn= 9

tion of the vessel under it.“ By reason of
may well be considered as equivalent to “by
virtue of.” Tt is only by reason of the per-
formance of the contraet in the construction
of the vessel that these ¢laims arise. But for
the contract, and the construction of the ves-
sel under it, there would be no sueh elaims.
No payment of extra MONCVS Is necessary to
sustain this release. It is under seal, and the
contract is itself full consideration. As of
significance it must be borne in mind that the
relouse referred specifically to the sixth parar-
graph of the nineteenth elause of the contraet,
whieh provided for the character of the re-
lease. indeed, the general laneusee of the
release itseli and the mumber of words of de-
scription init show that it was the intent of
the Secretary of the Navy to have a final elos-
ing of all matters arising under or by virtue of
the contraet.

Stipulations of this kind are not to be shorn
of their effieieney by any narrow, technical,
und close construction. The general language,
“all and all manner of debts.” ete.. indieates
a purpose to make an ending of every matter
wrising under or by virtue of the contraet. If
parties intend to leave some things open and
unsettled, theirintent so to do should be made
manifest. Here was a contract involving
$5,000,000, and after the work was done, the
vessel delivered and accepted, and this release

14

.
entered, claims are presented amounting to
over $500,000. Surely the parties never in-
tended to leave such a bulk of unsettled mat-
ters.

Applving the foregoing to the case now under con-
sideration, Mr. Justice Peelle, spenking for the court
below, said:

That language evidently has referenee to the
contract and its requirements, and therefore
when the contract in terms provides that the
reserve or final payment will be made “when
all the conditions, covenants, and provisions
of said contract shall have been performed and
fulfilled by and on the part of the party of the
first part,” the claimant was, upon such pay-
ment, obligated to sign the release provided by
the terms of the contract releasing the Gov-
ernment from “all claims of any kind or de-
scription under or by virtue of said contract.”
And, since the court in the ense cited holds that
the release of all elaims growing out of the
construction of the vessel — without whieh such
Claims would not have arisen owes n recogni-
tion of the contract and settled, as the court
says, “all disputes between the parties as to
Claims sued upon’ including unliquidated
claims — the Secretary of the Navy in respect
thereto not only had the right to accept such
release in the interest of the Government, but
under the contract it was his duty to do so.

Counsel for appellant, referring to section 7, para-
graph 19, of the contract, say that the same was not
a present release (p. 15), but at the utmost an agree-
ment to release contingent upon the performance by

15

the Government of the considerations specified, and
follow this by the statement that “performance by
the Government of its covenant. to supply armor
failing, the builders’ agreement to release went with
it.”

Section 7 contains no reference, either direct. or
indirect, to “performance by the Government of its
covenants to supply armor,” nor does it in any manner
suggest this as a consideration for the release whieh
was to be given hy the contractor. Tt states specific-
ally (Ree., p. 14), “when all the conditions, cove-
nants, and provisions of this contract shall have been
performed and fulfilled, by and on the part of the
party of the first part’ (Cramp Company), “said
party of the first part shall be entitled * * * te

* on the exeeu-

receive said special reserve *
tion of a release.” ete.

The failure of the delivery of the armor by the
Government within the times and in the order
required to carry on the work properly had been
fully provided for in the contract in other Ways, and
had nothing whatever to do either as consideration or
otherwise with the release whieh was required by the
contract.

Appellant contends in substance that the contract
did not obligate it to relinquish the claim in suit, or
any other claims that might acerne to it for breach of
the contract by the United States: that the eontraet
itself was not a release of such claims: and that the
acceptance by the appellant of the last payment did

not create a bar to the appellant's right of action for

16
‘
the breach committed by the United States. (Ap-
pellant’s brief, p. 12.)

The so-called breach on the part of the United
States, which consisted of its failure to deliver the
armor within the times and in the order required to
earry on the work properly, was foreseen by the
parties and fully provided for in the contract. (See
paragraph 3 of the contract, Rec., pp. 9 to 7; see also
ninth paragraph of contract, Rec., pp. and %.)

1. While the contract itself may not be a release
of such claims as those in suit, it nevertheless pro-
vided for x relesse of all claims growing out of the
contract.

The ease of Texas, cle., R. Co. v. Dashielle (198
U.S., 521), cited in appellant’s brief (pp. 17 and 18),
is not apposite. The release given in the case cited
had not been previously provided for and the char-
acter of the sane determined upon between the par-
ties. Again, a different rule of damages and of the
interpretation to be given to releases obtains i
personal injury cases. Moreover, particular injuries
being deseribed in and covered by the release, the
court held in that ease that the release given was
limited to the injuries specified alone. “This was not
the case with the release in the suit at bar,

Appellant contends that

Apart from the plain and explicit language
of the release it was clearly understood by the
parties that the claim in suit was left open and
unsettled, to be adjudicated by the tribunal
having exclusive jurisdiction of claims for un-

17

liquidated damages. That was the situation
of affairs when the first payment of $40,000
was made from the special reserve. When the
£20,000 matter was adjusted some months
later this suit had been brought and no release
Whatever beyond a voucher for the payment
was asked for or given. (Appellant's brief, )).
20.)

It is sufficient answer to this to inquire, Why should
a second release be required of the appellant when the
Government was absolved by virtue of the release
Which had already been given?

The further point is made that certain items of
uncompleted work remained at the time the release
Was given to cover the cost of which the Secretary
withheld $20,000 pending completion by the Govern-
ment at the builders’ cost. and statement is made
(appellant’s brief, p. 21) that if he had authority to
make that exception of a matter which he was author-
ized tosettle, he had also authority to make the other
exception with respect to claims that he could not
entertain and was obliged by law to leave unsettled
if the contractor refused to relinquish them.

The Secretary required the final release before he
paid any part of the special reserve, which conclu
sively shows that he did not assume to exereise ATIAY
discretionary powers except the Withholding of the
part of the money unearned by the appellant to
make the Government safe. This was a question of
pure official duty and involved no exercise of disere-
tion whatsoever. During the progress of the work

Jhon — 16

Is
-

cortain things were left to the discretion of the Secre-
tarv of the Navy, but when it came to the matter of
making the final payment, his discretionary powers
had ceased, and nothing but a ministerial funetion
remained,

The authorities cited to show the power of the
Secretary of the Navy to direct the modification of a
contract during the progress of the work have no
possible bearing on the case at bar where the Secre-
tary’s discretionary powers had ceased and only a
plain ministerial duty remained,

The ease of Weeks v. Rector ef al, Trinity Church
(56 App. Div. N. Y., 199, pp. 2) 93) is not in point.
The contract in the cxse cited provided tor the exae-
tion of x penalty in case of the contractor's default;
and in the absence of express provision the contract
by implication clearly provided for damages in erse
of the default of the other party. In the case at bar
provision was made for the exigency of the default of
the Government, and this having heen done it Is
Improper to read: into the contract additional pro-
visions not therein contained or implied. Moreover,
in the cause cited, there is nothing to show that the
contract provided for the kind of a release which was
to be given when final payment was Co he made.

Appellant's counsel, in an effort to distinguish be-
tween the ease of the Indiana and the one at bar,
takes the position that the court in deciding the
Indiana ease made no mistake, because in that case

the release was unconditional and given without pro-

|

1

test, whereas in the present case the appellant saved
its right of protest by virtue of the proviso which
Was Incorporated in the final release,

It the Secretary of the Navy was without JUris-
diction to entertain or pass upon claims of the char-
acter in this suit, then the release which was given in
the Jndiana ease was not sufficient to relense the
claims tn that ease. But if the Secretary did have
Jurisdiction to consider and entertain the claim in
the ladiana erase, he had qurisdiction to consider sand
settle the claims in the present suit. This court has
practically said, however, that the Secretary of the
Navy did have jurisdiction to eatertain and settle
the elaims in the Indiana ease, and a comparison of
the claims in that case with the case in suit discloses
the fact that they are identical in their nature.
Therefore the proviso does not have the effect for
Which appellant contends. Hf the Secretary of the
Navy had authority and jurisdiction in the one ease,
he had the same authority and jurisdiction in the
other ease, and this is the view held by the Court of
Claims in its opinion in the ense at bar. ‘The Seere-
tary was clothed with authority to close the contract
Ina prescribed manner. He could not make the
final payment until a full and final release of all
claims was given by the contractor, neither could
he modify or change the form of relense required
by the contract, but this does not eonfliet with the
exercise of his discretionsry powers ih respeet to
changes and modifications while the work was in

progress.

20,

Throughout the opinion of the court in the
Indiana case reference is made to expressions in the
contract as controlling rather than the language
of the release itself, and the opinion is based upon
the requirements of the contract rather than the
language and terms used in the release. The effect
of this decision is to hold that the claim in question
was liquidated in advance and that when the release
required by the contract was signed the whole
matter was closed.

The proviso does not and can not change the
situation or save any substantial rights to the
appellant which would have otherwise been for-
feited. It could not possibly add to the powers of
the Secretary of the Navy, or subtract anything
therefrom. It does not even pretend so to do.
It simply says in substance, whatever authority
inheres in the Secretary of the Navy, he exercises,
and. contra, whatever authority the Secretary of
the Navy does not possess in the premises, he does
not assume to exercise. That is all. In other
words, such claims as the Secretary of the Navy has
jurisdiction to entertain, are cov ered by the release ;
while, on the other hand, such claims as the Secre-
tary of the N avy has no jurisdiction to entertain,
are not covered thereby. This is a fair analysis of
the language of the proviso and interpretation of its
meaning. This proviso might Just as well have been
omitted.

It neither adds to nor detracts from the release
required by the contract nor from the release in the

21

form executed by appellant. The document releases
all claims arising out of the contraet, under the con-
tract and by virtue of the coutraet. “Without it
[the contract] no such elaims could have arisen,” and
the proviso is just about as effective in saving any
rights to this appellant as if it ineluded therein the
right to sue the United States for the damage done by
the earthquake to the island of Sicily.

The release called for by the seventh paragraph of
the nineteenth clause of the contract requires the re-
leasing by the party of the second part, in such form
us shall be approved by tie Secretary of the Navy,
“all claims of any kind or description under and hy
virtue of this contract.” There was nothing left to
the discretion of the Seevetary beyond the mere form
of the release. It was given on the fulfillment. of
certain stipulated conditions. Everything was to be
considered liquidated, satisfied, and elosed. and the
execution of the relense was necessary as a condition
precedent to the final payment by the Government.
Appellant was not obliged to sien the release: on the
other hand, it might have refused so to do and insti-
tuted suit to recover not only the amount of the
special reserve but all sums claimed to be due on
vecount of the Government's defaults and delays.
But having signed the release of every claim. of
Whatever kind or character, crowing out of the con-
tract or by reason of the contract, it is now precluded

from bitintaining this aetion.

+) »)

——

a

II.

‘pon the failure of the Government to furnish the
armor “within the dimes and in the order required
to carry on the work property,” the contractor
failed to complete and tender the yessel for trial
without (he armor, as provided for in the contract,

The contingency of the Government's taulure to
provide the armor within the times and in the order
required to carry on the work properly wis contem-
plated by the parties to the contract. Certain armor
was to be provided by the contractor tn the con-
struction of the protective deck: but bevond this the
Government was to furnish “all other armor, and
the armor bolts, to be used in the construciton of the
vessel, including such as may be required im the cou-
struction of the side and diagonal belts. turvets,
barbettes, casemates, conning towers,” efe. (btec.,
p. 6.) This was to be done. as previously stated,
“within the times aod in the order required to carry
on the work properly.” But in case of the Govern-
ment’s failure to do this, it was expressiy provided
that the contractor might complete the vessel with-
out the armor, and said vessel might be subjected to
the trial provided tor in the tenth elause of the con-
tract, and oat the time all the conditions and re-
quirements relating thereto, except as to the fitting,
fixing, placing, and securing of the armor, shall be
fulfilled, the vessel to be accepted as provided for in
the eleventh ehuuse of the contract. (Ree. p. 6.) Tt
was further provided that, if the Government: shall

not have commenced the delivery of the armor when

23

the vessel is ready for her trial, or within five mouths
alter either a preliminary or a conditional acceptance
of the vessel, the vessel shall be finally accepted sub-
ject to the conditions snd requirements of the con-
tract, and the cost of fitting. fixing, placing, and
securing the armor shill be ascertained. estimated.
and determined ly a board of naval officers “ppointed
by the Secretary of the Navy. and such cost shall be
deducted from the price of the vessel in the final
settlement under the contract.

The necessity for the cliuse in the contract for the
trial of the vessel without the armor was recoenized
by bot ty parties to the sevreement, and the inilure of
the Government to deliver the armor was sutielpated.
It was well understood that this provision wis en-
tirely for the contractor's benetit. Tt was not in the
interest of the ¢ wovernment to aecept the ship without
her armor, but the reasonableness of the provision
Was apparent in view of the facet that the armnor-plate
Industry had not far progressed in the wis ol develop-
ment and there was great uncertainty attending its
manufacture. The appellant and the naval officials
had difficulty in procuring armor in connection with
other contracts of like character, all of which empha-
sized the element of uncertainty as to the delivery of
the arinor whieh the Governrient was necessitated to
secure fron others 1 Independent contract. This
wis well known to the contractor at the time the con-
tract was signed. Therefore. the provision for the
trial of the vessel without the armor was reasonable

and entirely in the interest of appellant Upon the

24

*
failure of the Government to furnish the armor when
the ship had arrived at that degree of construction
where the armor was required, it was the privilege and
duty of appellant under the contract to tender the
vessel for trial, and upon such tender the Govern-
ment was required to subject the vessel to trial as
provided in the tenth clause of the contract.

This appellant did not do. At least there is not the
slightest claim anywhere in the record that such ten-
der was made. Had it been meade. the period of
delay would not have arisen, and it would seem that
appellant should net now be heard to claim for a
delay which was occasioned by its own negligence,

inability. or indifference to act.

Extension of the contract period,

In the ninth elnuse of the contract (Rec. pp. 9 and
10) three classes of delay are recognized and pro-
vided for therein, with diferent consequences at-
taching in the case of each: Pirst, delivs caused by
cireumstances within the contractor's control; that
is, delays for which the contractor is alone responsible
and for which penalties were imposed Second, for
delays attributable to neither party no penalties
were imposed. These deliys are described in’ the
contract aus enused “by fire or water, or by any
strike or stand-out of workmen emploved in’ the
construction of the hull, machinery, fittings, or

equipment of said vessel, or in the fitting, placing,

95

met

and securing of her armor, or by other eireum-
stances beyond the control of the party of the first
part’ (the shipbuilder). Third, for delays attribut-
able to the United States no monetary penalties
were imposed, but the contractor was entitled to a
corresponding extension of the period preseribed for
the completion of the vessel. These are the delays
described as caused “by anv net of the party of the
second part,” and as “delays which the Secretary
of the Navy shall find to be properly attributable
to the Navy Department or its authorized officers
or agents, or any or either of them, and to lave
been a delay operating lipon the final completion of
the vessel within the time specified therefor in this
contract.”

As to delays attributable to neither perty. while
the contreetor might suffer serious loss. it could
Claim nothing from the Government on that eecount,
and the provision that no deduetion should be made
from the contraet: price on aceount of such delays
gave the contractor all the relief whieh it could
fairly ask.

For delays attributable to the Government there
could be no deduetions from the contract price, and
this even thoueh it had not been se stated in the
contract. The reason and justice of this are obvious:
hence the provision for an extension of time Wiis
not necessary to protect the contractor aw@ninst
deductions on seeount of delay. and the only possible
object was to relieve the Government from pecuniary

liability for such delays.

26

The provisions of paragraph 3 relate to the Gov-
ernment’s default in the delivery of armor, whereas
the provisions of paragraph 9 of the contract cover
all manner of delays which the Secretary of the Navy
shall find chargeable to the Government. ‘Phe con-
ditions and ciretnistances which surrounded the
contract were as well understood by the contractor
as by the Govermuent. The contractor well knew
that the Government had no armor-plate plant of its
own and had to obtain the same from outside parties,
and that the question of armor plate at that thiae was
avery uncertain quantity. It entered into the con-
tract fully informed and advised and it ean not now
claim that the contract clause providing for an ex-
tension had any other, different, or larger effect: than
that stated therein. In other words, the contractor
understood that in case of default on the part of
the Government in the delivery of the armor no
penalties could be claimed against the Government,
but that an extension of the contract period would
result, if requested; otherwise, the ship might be
tendered and subjected to her trial and delivered
without her armor, as provided for in the third para-
graph of the contract.

It is submitted that where the contract provides a
method to be pursued by either party in case of the
other’s default, that that method is an exclusive one,
and the court will not add thereto or take therefrom.
Had the contract been silent upon this point and

failed to provide for such contingency there would

yt

seen to be some basis for the appellant's contention
and for the recovery praved for.

As it is, the contractor, liaving invoked this pro-
vision of the contract and obtained the extension
sought, thereby relieved itself from lissboility for dedue-
tions from the contract price due to its failure to de-
liver the vessel within the original contreet period.

Appiving the principle of the well-known maxim,
CL pre SSiO WiHLUS OSL erclusio aller ius, the contractor is

concluded by the terms of the contract itself. Tf sueh

condition was unsatisfactory to the contractor it
should have refused to execute the contraet. As
before sugeested, this was not the firsi contract eon-
taining similar provisions entered into between the
parties for the construction of a battle ships no duress,
fraud, or concealment entered into the negotiations:
bot) parties were fully empowered to contract: both
were fully conversant with sll the details of the con-
tract in question; and every known contingency was
provided for therein, or intended to be provided for
therein, nid particularh deluvs attributable to the
Government. Clearly the contracter having exe-
euted the contract is bound by its terms and ean not
add thereto clauses not contained therein, or escape
the conseqneneces of clauses embraced therein. ‘The
courts taay not resd into coutriets new provisions,
especially when the contract itself clearly provides
for the contingeney afterwards complained of,

The case of Haydurille Mining and Manufacturing
Co. ve. Art Tnstitute (39 Fed. Rep., IS’) ts om point,

This was an aetion to reeover fer extra work and

28

also for damage due to the delay of other contractors.

The contract was for fireproofing work done on a

building, work which would necessarily be delayed
if the building was not ready for the fireproofing at
the proper time. ‘Phe contract contained this pro-
vision :

Should delay be caused by other contractors
to the positive hindrance of the contractor
hereto, a just and proper amount of extra
time shall be stlowed by the architeet, pro-
vided it shall have given written notice to
said arehiteet of sueh hindrance or delay.

In delivering its opinion in the ease the court said:

Taking this clause of the contract and the
specifications together, [ construe them to
mean this: That, if the plaintiff was delayed
by renson of the tardiness or want of dispatch
on the part of the contractors doing other
classes of work upon the building, it should be
entitled to such further time for the comple-
tion of the work as the architects would allow
him (sic.), but J} do not see that there ts any
provision that it is entitled to peCUunhary
damages by reason of said delay. Evidently
the parties anticipated that this contractor,
doing only a part of the work, and that which
was largely dependent upon the completion of
other classes of work by other contractors,
must nwait the movements of those other con-
tractors, and it seems to me that the stipula-
tion for further time to complete the work in
case of delay by other contractors implies
that there is to be no pecuniary compensation
for such delay.

29

The only points of difference between the case
cited and the case at bar are that in the former there
were no penalties for delay by the contractor, and the
extension of time was to be in ease of delay by other
contractors, but these differences, however, do not
affect the principle involved in the two cases, which
is the same.

The fact that in the Haydnville Company's case
the time was to be extended on account of delays
caused by other contractors docs not impair the value
of that case as a preeedent. The point decided was
that where a contract provides that in the event of
delays caused by other contractors the time is to be
extended the owner is not liable for damages enused
by such delays; and it inevitably follows from the
same reasoning that where a contract provides that
in the event of delays caused by the owner or his
agents the time is to be extended he is not liable for
damages caused by such delays. The two cases are
as analogous as two cases may well be, and the prin-
ciple enunciated by the court is applicable here.

The ease of Richard v. Clark (SS N.Y. Supp., 242)
bears a still closer resemblance to the case at bar than
that last cited in that delays for whieh the owner
Was responsible were provided for. The contract
read:

Should the contractor be obstructed or de-
laved in the prosecution or completion of his
work by the act, negleet, delay, or default of
the owner or the architect, or of any other
contractor employed by the owner upon the

30

work, or by any damage which may happen
by fire, lightning, earthquake, or evelone, or
by the abandonment of the work by the em-
ployee through no fault of the contractor, then
the time herein fixed for the completion of
the work shall be extended for a period equiva-
lent to the time Jost by reason of any or all
of the causes afores:id.

The architect was responsible for the delay, and
the court below eave judgment in favor of the con-
tractor for the damazes due to such delay. The
Supreme Court of New York, however, reversed the
judgment and in the opinion rendered (p. 244 Supra)
Say :

Nor am | satisfied that any damages in the
ease are recoverable cither for a delay or for
extra work. ‘The claim for delay was neces-
sarily based upon the failure of defendant's
architects to furnish the detail plans in time,
as to which the contract provided that if the
contractor “be delayed in the prosecution or
completion of his work by the act, neglect,
delay, or default of the owner or the archi-
tect.” ete., “then the time herein fixed for the
completion of the work shall be extended for
a period equivalent to the time lost by reason
of any or all the causes aforesaid.” The con-
tract therefore explicitly contemplated a sit-
uation such as here has arisen, and the inten-
tion of the parties, as evidenced by the agree-
ment, evidently was that the time clause af-
fected the plaintiff alone, and that he might
be absolved therefrom to the extent and in
the manner provided in the contract.

3]

The decision in the case cited would have been
the same had the delay been eaused by the owner
instead of the architect, so that the ease fits the case
at bar like a death mask.

It will thus be seen that the contingeney of delay,
both in the delivering of the armor and in sil other
matters, Was amply provided for in the contraet. In
case the armor should not be delivered when called

he contractor and needed in the work. the

for by t
option was his to finish the ship and deliver her
Without her armor, and in case of any other delay,
or in case of delay in delivering the armor, the eon-
tractor was to have the right of sa extension of his
contract without incurring any penalties: so that
the provisions of the contract being tree from: any
possible ambiguity do not call for interpretation. by
the court, and, as explained above, being entirely
reasonable and conseionable, do not call for refor-
mation.

Presumably the contract Savs What io riesus and
means What it savs; otherwise it would not have been
reduced to writing. “The text of the same is its own
best interpreter. Nothing is tobe found in the lan-
guage of the contract, and it is submitted that noth-
ing is fairly deducible therefrom, giving the contractor
damages for the Government's delays or defaults. 1
is only by a forced construction of its provisions and
by supplying clauses not contained therein thet any
Justifieation of the appellant's position is possible.

If nothing had been said concerning a breach of the

contract on the part of the Government and no pro-

32

vision had been made therefor, the case would be on a
different footing; bat this very circumstance having
been contemplated by the parties and having been
covered by the contract in the first place, so that the
contractor might complete and deliver the vessel with-
out the armor, or. in the second place, that he might
apply for and obtain an extension of the contract
period, no shred of a ease is left for reeovery in dam-
ages on account of he Government's default.

It has been announced by this tribunal repeat-
edly and with emphasis that the courts will not
assume to make a contract for the parties which
they did not choose to make for themselves. ‘This
has not been more tersely stated than in the opin-
ion of the court in the esse of Vorgan County Vv.
Allen (103 U.S. 515). as delivered by Mr. Justice
Harlan:

We ean only say, What ean not be too often
repeated, that hard cases can not he per-
mitted to make bad law.

In the case of Hudson Canal Co. v. Penna, Coal
Co. (S Wall., 276), the court held:

A covenant ean not be implied in the ab-
sence of language tending to a eonelusion that
the covenant sought to be set up was in-
tended. The facet that the nonimplication of
it makes a contract, in consequence of events
happening subsequent to its being made, quite
unilateral to its advantages, is not a sufficient
ground to imply a covenant which would tend
to balance advantages thus preponderating.

In other words, it was held in that case that

courts may not incorporate into a sealed instru-

ment any covenant for the expression of which
language is entirely wanting in the instrument and
which can not be legally iniplied from any other
covenant therein, although the contraet as ex-
pressed may seem to be mueh in favor of one party,
and the ODMSSION of a covenunt Was clenrly OVCCH=
sioned by mistake.
The court further saic
Courts of daw enn ret INCOPporst te Te
sealed instrument what the parties left out of
it, even thoueh the OL MISSION Was Oo cosioned hy
the clearest mistake: nor ean they reject what
the parties Inserted, tiless it be repuchant to
some other part of the tastrument
In Garinsel vo Kranl (22 Wall. 308) it was held

threat
The court ¢an not import words into 2 con
traet whe would Miike af rigteriadh lif-

ferent ina vitil particular from: what it is.

sented

A court of law ean not neorpornte
Instrument that whieh is omitted. even hy mistake,
hor can anything be rejected unless clearly repug-
hant. (Robbins \ Rollins, ee { PUR ne OF iy Bs ee Culliford
Vv. Gonillo, 128 UL. 158.)

The court is nota liberty either to disreenrd
words usec hy he parties or te insert words Which
the parties have not made use of. (Marrison y.
Fortlage, WL US, 68.)

The courts Ingv not take a contract for the
parties, Their funetion and them tity CON-
sist stiiply in entoreing one setoally made,
(Imperial Mire ine. Co. v. Coox County, 1]

‘]. @.. 12.)

ol

Where the language of a contract is clear and
explicit there is no call for construction. (Calderon
v. Allas Steamship Co., V70 UL 8., 280.)

In the latter case the court in its opinion, (ator alia,

states as follows:

Parties ave presimned to know the force and
effect of the language in which they have
chosen to embody their contract, and to re-
fuse to vive effect to such language might re-
sult in artfully misleading others who have
relied on the words being used in their ordinary
sense. In construing contracts words are to
receive their plain and literal meaning. even
though the intention of the party drawing the
contract may have been different from that
expressed. (Citing Clark on Contracts, p.
OB.)

Cases almost without number might be cited both
in the federal and state courts holding that contracts
ure to be construed according to the intention of the
parties as expressed therein, and that the courts will
disregard the motives, the purposes, or the expecta-
tions of a party thereto if these are not in harmony
with the plain import of the words used.

54 Texas, 605.

Clark v. Lillie, 3A Nt. AOS.

Noyes v. Nichols, 28 Vt., 159.

Conn v. Lewss, 15 Ky... 66.

Hildreth v. Forrest, 27 WKy., 217.

Shultz v. Johnson, AN Wy. 497.

Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Portsmouth Co..
16N. EL, 249.

oe

the appellant's principal contention is that “The
Government broke the contract and in consequence
of that the claimant suffered damave. and is entitled
to recover an amount equal to that damage.” ( Ap-
pellant’s brief, p. 26.)

Counsel for the appellant in referrine to paragraph
3 of the contract SiLV :

Certain contingencies provided seainst in
the latter part of this parscraph, and which,
had they arisen, might have modified the
Obligations of both partics. did not arise. so
we can tenore them.

The tact is that these so-called “certain contingen-
cies” did arise and have modified the oblivations ot
both parties. It is specifically stated in said para-
graph 3 that in case of the Government's failtire so
to do the contractor might complete the vessel, with-
out her armor, and tender her for trial in such ceondi-
tion, and in ease of further failure of ine Government
to deliver said armor within five months after cither
a preliminary or conditiona! acceptance of the vessel
said vessel should be finally secepted by the Govern-
ment. Therefore the paragraph of the contract pro-
viding for the delivery of the armor makes provision
also for the default of the Government in this respect
and gives the vessel company the right to complete
the vessel without her armor and tender her to the
Government.

Furthermore, under paragraph 9 in ease of the

Government's default the appellant might apply for

36
and secure an extension’ of the contract period cor-
responding with the time of the delay. |

Appellant further says in this connection that

It was the builder's right and obviously it
was for the best interests of the United states,
as well as its own, to proceed with the work
as best it could, complete it, and sue for dam-
veges caused by the breach,

It is true, as stated, that the builder had the right
to proceed with the work and complete the vessel,
notwithstanding the Government’s breach; but pro-
vision having been made for the breach in lieu of
damages the contractor can not recover diumages
caused by the breach.

In this view the authorities cited by appellant (ap-
pellant’s brief, p. 26) are not in point. Quotation is
made from Hudson on Building Contract (1, pp.
303-1907) to the effect that

If the prevention does not go to the root
of the whole contract, but merely delays the
performance, the contractor does not waive
his right to recover damages merely by pro-
ceeding with the work.

As previously explained, the contractor in this
ease waives its right to recover the damage in the
contract itself (not throug): any performance of the
contract on appellant's part). Certainly it estops
itself from the recovery of daiage when it accepts the
final payment and signs the release provided for by

the contract.

37

The Government contends that upon its failure to
furnish the armor plate as agreed an application
might be made by the contractor for an extension
corresponding to the time of delay, and that the ex-
tended contract. period thereby becomes the real
contract period; therefore there was no such delay
as made the Government responsible to the ceon-
tractor tn damages.

This contention is characterized by appellant's
counsel as “pure sophistry,” and appellant says
(p. 27 of its brief) that the Government might liave
deferred ordering the armor for vears or forever, and
if the Secretary kept on extending the Cramp com-
pany’s building period the Government could have
left the vessel on appellant's hands indefinitely and
still have remained blameless,

It would seem that this argument is without force
in view of the fact that appellant under its contract
could tender the vessel without the armor. Again,
it must be remembered that the Government at the
time of entering into the contract for building this
ship was in need of battle ships in view of the war
with Spain, which was then imminent. In addition
to this, the Government had a large sum of money
wlready invested in this particular vessel, all of which
contradicts the idea that the Government would
indefinitely continue to extend the building period.

Appellant says (p. 82):

if Was competent to provide, as the contraet
did, that no damages should be imposed for

35

delay occasioned without fault of the builder
and beyond its control, whether the Govern-
ment or some other ageney were responsible.
It was reasonable to discriminate, as the con-
tract did, between delays due to the Govern-
ment’s fault and delays arising without fault
of the Government or builder.

As previously explained, these contracts were un-
questionably drawn with the idea in mind of pro-
tecting the Government against damages due to its
failure to secure and deliver the armor “within the
times and in the order to carry on the work prop-
erly.”

The case of Stubbings Co. v. Exposition Co. (ALO TL.
App.. 210; appellant's brief, p. 33) is somewhat similar
to the case at bar. However, it differs in this respect,
that in the ease cited the contract provided for the
filing of claims for delays not attributable to the
contractor, and stated when the same would be made
and how they should be made. In other words, in
that case damages were specifically provided for,
thus clearly distinguishing it from the ease at bar.

In the ease of Nelson v. Pickwick Co. (30 Tl. App.,
333, cited in appellant's brief, pp. 34 to 36, inclusive)
there are also points of similarity presented to the
‘ase at bar. However, in that case there were other
contractors on other parts of the work, and the con-
tract provided that the appellant should cooperate
with the contractors on other parts of the work and
arrange matters so that none of the cooperating con-
tractors should be delayed.

39

The court says (p. 334):

These portions of the specifications were in
print, and it isa reasonable inference that con-
tractors for other branches of the work were
bound by like provisions.

This differentiates the case cited from the ease at
bar, and, furthermore, it appeared in evidence that
a promise was made by the general agent of the up-
pellees having authority, to the appellant, when but a
small part of the work was done and extra pay Was
claimed as a condition for going on with it, that the
company would pay the additional cost eaxused by
such delay.

It is impossible to determine how much influence
the promise to pay for the extra time by the appellee
at the time the delay occurred may have had upon
the mind of the court in arriving at its conclusion.

Moreover, in the case cited, the court held that

The provision for the extra time was for the
avoidance of the penalty the appellant would
incur if he did not complete his contract on
time.

In the present cease the contract expressly pro-
vided that there should be no deductions for the
delay due to circumstances beyond the contractor's
control, so it is certain that the provision for exten-
sion Was not for avoidance of penalty the contractor
would incur if he failed to complete the work on time.

This clearly distinguishes the cases.

40

There would seein io be a somewhat close resem-
blance between the case of Del Genovese v. Third Ave.
Ry. Co. (13 N. Y. App., 412), cited in appellant’s
brief (p. 37), and the ease at bar, although it is not
clear that the two contracts are alike in all essential
respects. Certainly in the contract construed by
the court in the ease cited it is not shown that there
was any method provided for the contractor to fin-
ish the work despite the interruption of the other
party or of other contractors. This is a vital variance
between the two cases.

Taking into consideration the provisions of the con-
tract in suit, which differ in many material respects
from those contained in the cases cited by appellant
in its brief, it is submitted that there is nothing
which successfully controverts the position taken
by the Government with respect to the contract
herein. The rule of this case is laid down by Har-
mon in his work on contracts (p. S08, sec. 390), to
the effect that where parties enter into engagements
with express stipulations, if is to be presumed that
they have expressed all the conditions by which
they intend to be bound unless an intention to the
contrary appears, and that where an agreement
has been reduced to writing the parties will not be
permitted to deny that they intended to make the
stipulations contained in the instrument.

The eases of [Higgins v. Kagleton (34 N. Y. Supp.,
995) and .Aspen v. Austen (5 Q. B. D., 671) are in

point with the principle for which we contend,

4]

holding, as appears in the opinion of the court in the
last-mentioned case, that--

Where parties have entered into written
engagements with express stipulations, it is
manifestly not desirable to extend by any
implication. The presumption is that, hav-
ing expressed some, they have expressed all
the conditions by which they intend to be
bound under that instrument.

The contract for the building of this vessel pro-
vided that “ when the conditions, covenants, snd pro-
visions of the contract are performed and fulfilled on
the part of the party of the first part, then said party
is entitled to receive the reserve or surplus of said
reserve retained by the Government,” on certain con-
ditions, namely, “the execution of a final release to
the party of the second part in such form as shall be
approved by the Secretary of the Navy, of all claims
of any kind or description under or by virtue of this
contract.” (Ree., p. 14.)

The release required by the contract was executed
by appellant, wherein it “does hereby, for itself and
its successors and assigns and. its legal representa-
tives, remise, release, and forever discharge the
United States of and from all and all manner of debts.
dues, sum and sums of money, accounts, reckonings,
claims, and demands whatsoever in daw and— in
equity, for or by reason of or on account of the con-
struction of said vessel under the contract aforesaid,

excepting the sum of twenty thousand dollars,

42
withheld by the Secretary of the Navy as above set
forth.” (Ree., pp. 27, 28.)

Every claim by this release on account of or grow-
ing out of the construction of the vessel in question,
whether that claim be legal or equitable, was released
by the execution of this instrument.

We respectfully submit that the Court of Claims
was right in dismissing the petition, and we ask that
its judgment be affirmed.

JOHN Q. THOMPSON,
Assistant Attorney-General.
FRANKLIN W. COLLINs,
Altorney.

O

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386001_0068%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
