# Opposition Brief — Dickinson v. Porter > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385610_0368%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1949 - **Citation:** 338 U.S. 843 ## Text rilteo COPY JUL 6 1949 CHARLES ELMORE CROP SUPREME COURT OF THE unITED-STATES Cu OCTOBER TERM, 1949 No. 174 LAURA DICKINSON, Appellant, vs. C. FRED PORTER, Srare Comprro.ier or THE State oF lowa, ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA STATEMENT OPPOSING JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM Rosert L. Larson, Attorney General of lowa, Vv Dow: Hisz, First Assistant Attorney Gen- eral of lowa, Earw F. Wispom, Special Assistant Attorney Gen- eral of lowa, Bert F. Wispom, F. H. Becker, County Attorney of Dubuque County, Iowa, Counsel for Appellees. BLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY INDEX Sussect Inpex Page Statement opposing jurisdiction ............ 1-3 Motion to dismiss or affirm ....................... 75-76 TasLp or Cases CITED Aero Transit Co v. Georgia Pub. Ser. Com., 295 U. S. 285, 79 L. Ed. 1439, 55 8. Ct. 709... ... 9, 19, 22, 59 Ahrweiler v. Board, 226 Iowa 229, 283 N. W. 889 57, 61, 62 A, Magnamo Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. 8. 40, 78 L. Ed. ee We ys Mss Fos Ko wh 4 ar onew Aaa obo th 56, 59 American Sugar Ref. Co. v. State of Louisiana, 179 U. 8. 89, 45 L. Ed. 102, 218. Ct.43.. ....... 8, 18, 21, 59 Apartment Operators’ Assn. v. City, 254 N. W. 443, Be RS MY Cc oon kop WA neblawa moet 20, 37, 50, 52, 57 Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207, 90 L. ee en Ss is kp craduy ey vibAwe dee rre 57, 71 Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 254 U.S. 315... 45 Baker v. Town of West Hartford, 89 Conn. 394, 94 PS RS Pe ee ey cay rate Rae 37, 41 Bell’s Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. 8. 232, pe © & { Xs 5 eer 8, 10, 24, 25 Blume v. Crawford Co., 217 Iowa 545, 250 N. W. 733. 20, 33 Board of Supervisors v. Stewart, 30 Iowa 9, 1 Am. BR EN 2s vac risen ven sse ns bos kerceeeeeies ant 57 Booth 7. State of Indiana, 237 U. 8S. 391, 59 L. Ed. "SE" ae aie 37, 43 Boston v. Jackson, 260 U. S. 309, 67 L. Ed. 274, 43 8. See ns orca ert gar ae ne cee 75 Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 54 eo Ee EE errr ea 9 Campbell v. Olmey, 262 U. 8. 352, 67 L. Ed. 1021, 43 TE ie hs 5 punk ad an ke ule Gaia R ere us 6 Carman v. Hickman County, 215 S. W. 408........ 34 Carmichael v. So. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. 8. 495, 81 L, Ed. 1245, 57 S. Ct. 868... 9, 16, 19, 25, 37, 48, 56, 59, 69 —3702 ii INDEX Carroll v. City of Cedar Falls, 221 lowa 277, 261 BR I ee errr re 57 Chicago, R. I. d P. Ry. Co. v. Devine, 239 U. 8. 52, 60 L. Ed. 140, 36 8. Ct. 27... 75 Citizens Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322, 57 L. Ed. 1206, 33 S. Ct. 833 9, 12 Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. 8. 114, 44 L. Ed. 392, 20 S. Ct. 284...... 19, 27 Clear Lake Co-op. LSS. Assn. v. Weir, 200 lowa 1293, 206 N. W. 297.. 20, 34 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540... 26 Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. Ed. 1155, 52 S. Ct. 595. .... Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. 8S. 261, 49 L. Ed. 471, 25 S. Ct. 233... “ * Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 70 L. Ed. 969, 46 S. 0% Gi ...... ; 6,7 Dickinson vy. Porter, 35 N. W. (2d) 66, 4, 23, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 91 L. Ed. 711, 67 S. Ct. 504... 57,72 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 41 L. Ed. 388, 17S. Ct.56... 56, 66 Farwell v. Brick Mfg. Co., 97 lowa 286, 66 N. W. UT es 20, 33 Great Northern Railway Co. v. , Whitfield, 272 N. W. 787,658.D.173 ..... ...... 19, 22, 30, 50, 52 Green v. Frazier, 253 U. 8. 233, 64 L. Ed. 378, 50 S. Ct. 499 . .... 56,68 Grout v. Kendall, 195 Iowa 467, 192 N. W. 529. _. 57,63 Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U. 8. 598, 52 L. Ed. 637, 28 S. Ct. 331... 56, 66 Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. 8S. 245, 67 L. § 4 ) tS See . £3 Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 173 U.S. 592, 43 L. Ed. 823, 19 S. Ct. 553 19, 27, 37, 42 Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, 78 L. Ed. 247. ...... 19 Hill v. Rae, 158 Pac. 826,52 Mont. 378... eee ——— Snyder, 261 U. 8. 600, 67 L. Ed. 819, 43 S. See 76 BLEED THROUGH—POOR COPY INDEX jii Page Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 33 L. Ed. 1025, 10 S. Ct. 593 7 8,11 Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217, 62 L. Ed. Oe cin adibuc siusveceymeven tae rt 56, 67 King v. Mullins, 171 U. 8. 404 at 435, 436, 43 L. Ed. 314 at 226, 18 S. Ct. 925 at 987............. 37, 39 Lake Superior Consolidated lron Mines v. Lord, 271 U. 8. 577, 70 L. Ed. 1093, 46 8. Ct. 627... 19, 27 Lawrence v. State Tax Com. of Mississippi, 286 U.S. 276, 76 L. Ed. 1102, 52S. Ct.556..........- 9, 15, 19, 21 Leicht v. City of Burlington, 73 Iowa 29, 34 N. W. Y htee entre EES , 32, 37, 40, 41 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers’ Cooperative, 276 U. 8. 71, 72 L. Ed. 473, 48 8. Ct. Loftus v. Department of Agriculture, 211 Iowa 566, 232 N. W., 412, 283 U. 8S. 809, 75 L. Ed. 1427, 51 8. Byerly gees BA, Be eee Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. 8S. 32, 72 L. Ed. 770, 48 S. Ct. 423......... 37, 45, 46, 56, 57 Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U. 8. 83, 82 L. Ed. 590,60 8. Ct.406.............. 9, 17, 35, 37, 48 Michigan Central R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. 8. 245, 50 L. Ed. 744, 96 G. Ct. 450..........- eee ~ Milheim v. Moffat Tumnel Dist., 262 U. 8. 710, 67 L. Wa. 1106, 48 B. Ct. OB4....... «eee cerns 56 Miller v. Childers, 107 Okla. 57, 238 Pac. 204 . _. §0,51 Metrepolitan Cas. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L. Ed. 1070, 56 &. Ct. S8B....................--. Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165, 48 L. Ed. 133, 24 Oe ee ae ou gk aatie 4 seek ed es Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. 8. 541, 56 L, Ba 676, 9B GB. Ct. OOS... ...-. eee eee eens. 75, 76 Myers v. Board of Education, 48 Oh. App. 43, 192 OS is Se Lea cis we dab eee nee toe 50, 54 New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 Ed. 1024, 58 8. Ct.721............ 9,17 = Rn on ~ ¥ & r a iv INDEX Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 74 L. Ed. 775, ™— 508. Ct. 310... 9,14 Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. 8. 557, 43 L. Ed. 552, 19 8. Ct. 281 8,11 Puget Sound Co. v. King County, 264 U. 8. 22, 68 L. Ed. 541, 44 8. Ct. 261 9,14 Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. 8. Pee eee 17 om, A v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700, 67 Pred omy Ad v. ‘Kansas, 323 U. 8. 32, 89 L. Ed. 25, 1 4} ee 57,71 Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. 8. 114, 54 L. Ed. 688, 30 8. Ct. 496... i] State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 Pac. 771 57 Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. 8S. 137, 69 L. Ed. 884, 45 S. Ct. 425, “ALR 1454 Strickley v. "Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. 8. 527, 50 L. Ed. 581, 26 8S. ct.4 301 56, 66 Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182, 63 L. Ed. 550, 39 S. Ct. 191 ....... 6,7 Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. 8. 264, 42 L. Ed. 740, 18 S. Ct. EA Py a ae 19, 56 Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. 8. 141, 84 L. Ed. 1124, 60 S. " 19 Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Miss., 286 U. Ss. 296 at 280, 281, 76 L. Ed. 1102 at 1106, 52 S. Ct. 556 at 557; Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 at 372, 76 L. Ed. 1155 at 1167, 52 S. Ct. 595 at 602; Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169 at 176, 78 L. Ed. 247 at 952, 54S. Ct, 142 at 145; Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Com., 295 U.S. 285 at 291, 7% L. Ed. 1439 at 1444, 1445, 55 S. Ct. 709 at 711, 712; Carmichael v. So. Coal € Coke Co., 301 U. 8. 495 at 512, @1 L. Bad. 1245 at 1255, 57 8. Ct. 868 at 873, 874; Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 at 145, 147, 84 L. Ed. 1124 at 1127, 1128, 60 S. Ct. 879 at 881; Nashville, C. € St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. 8. 362 at 368, 369, 60 S, Ct. 968 at 972, 84 L. Ed. 1254 at 1257, 1258; Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U. 8. 577 at 582, 70 L. Ed. 1093 at 1101, 46 S. Ct. 627 at 629; Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261 at 274, 49 L. Ed. 471 at 476, 25S. Ct. 233 at 237; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Grower's Cooperative, 276 U.S. 71 at 89, 90 and 96, 72 L. Ed. 473 at 480 and 483, 48 S. Ct. 291 at 294 and 297 ; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 at 117, 119, and 120, ‘ 44 L. Ed. 392 at 397, 20S. Ct. 284 at 286 ; : Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264 at 978 and 280, 281, 42 L. Ed. 740 at 746, 747, 18 S. Ct. 340 at 345, 346; Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 173 U. 8. 592 at 603, 615, and 620, 621, 43 L. Ed, 823 at 827 and 832, 833, 19 S. Ct. 553 at 557, and 562, 564; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Whitfield, 272 N. W. 787 at 792, 794, 65 S. D. 173; i Hill v, Rae, 158 Pac. 826 at 828, 829, 52 Montana 378; Apartment Operators’ Ass'n v. City, 254 N. W. 443 at 444, 445, 191 Minn. 365; Leicht v. City of Burlington, 73 Iowa 29 at 30, 32, 34, N. W. 494; Farwell v. Brick Mfg. Co., 97 lowa 286 at 294, 66 N. W. 176; Clear Lake Co-op L. 8. S. Ass’n v. Weir, 200 Iowa 1293 at 1298, 206 N. W. 297 at 299; Blume v. Crawford Co., 217 Iowa 545 at 550, 551, 250 N. W. 733 at 735. Application of Cases Cited The Supreme Court of Iowa held, in the instant case, that the legislative enactment was enacted in aid of agriculture, and that the classification of ‘‘agricultural lands’’ as ‘‘ajl tracts of land of ten acres or more, and not laid off into lots of less than ten acres or divided by streets and alleys into parcels of less than ten acres lying within any school cor- poration in this state and in good faith used for agricultural or horticultural purpeses. Any land laid off or platted into lots of less than ten acres belonging to and a part of other lands of more than ten acres and in good faith used for agricultural or horticultural purposes shall be entitled to the benefit: of this chapter’’ (Italics supplied.) See Par. B, Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction (Section 426.2, Code of Iowa), at page 2) was not in violation of Section 1, | Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United | States. This question has been determined by this Court so many times that it no longer presents a substantial Federal ques- tion. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa (Filed Decem- ber 14, 1948, and reported in 35 N. W. (2d) 66 and appended DLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY 21 to Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction as Appendix «@”’) that this classification for the purposes of taxation, rtial tax exemption, or tax ‘‘eredits’’? was amply sup- ported by opinions of this Court, the Supreme Court of Iowa, and the Courts of highest jurisdiction of many states of the United States. Time will not permit treatment of all such cases. Refer- ence to all cases hereinbefore cited is respectfully requested. In American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Lowisiana, 179 U.S. 89 at 95, this Court sustained a classification of sugar refiners for the purpose of taxation into those who refined the products of their own plantations, and those who engaged in a general refining business, and at the cited page said: “The discrimination is obviously intended as an en- couragement to agriculture, and does not deny to per- sons and corporations engaged in a general refining business the equal protection of the laws.’’ (Italics supplied) This last cited case has been cited and followed many times by this Court and by the Courts of highest jurisdiction in the States of the United States. It is true that the tax there involved was a license tax, but this is immaterial. This Court, in Lawrence v. State Tar Com., 286 U. S. 276 at 280, said: “The present tax has been defined by the Supreme Court of Mississippi as an excise and not a property tax, Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34; 88 So. 4; Knox v. Gulf, M.& N. R.Co., 138 Miss. 70; 104 So. 689, but in passing on its cons(iiutionality we are concerned only with its practi“. operation, not its definition or the precise for.s of descriptive words which may be applied ‘ it. See Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. 8. 379, 387; Pacific Co. v. John- son, 285 U. 8. 480; Shaffer v. Carter, supra, pp. 54-55.”’ This Court sustained as reasonable and not arbitrary the exemption of farmers as & class from a license fee required 22 of other carriers. In Acro Mayflower Transit Co. v. Geor. gia Pub. Service Com., 295 U.S. 285 at 290, 291, this Court said: ‘*The court took notice of a common opinion, ‘well justified by the facts,’ that the farm lands of the state had been ‘accustomed to bear an undue proportion of the taxes.’ The effect of the exception would be to equalize the burden. ‘Every one knows that as a gen- eral rule a tax of this kind finally reaches the consumer of the product, or user of the service; and hence an exemption of carriers of such products is to be taken as an exemption of the products themselves, and not of the carrier.’’ The enumeration of rational bases of distinction was not put forward as exhaustive. The court expressed the belief that others could be added. We think a classification thus designed to ameliorate the lot of the producers of farm and dairy products is not an arbitrary preference within the meaning and the condemnation of the Fourteenth Amendment, The plight of the Georgia farmer has been pictured by the state court in words already quoted. To free him of fresh burdens might seem to a wise statecraft to be a means whereby to foster agriculture and promote the common good."’ The Supreme Court of South Dakota in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Whitfield, 65 S. D. 173, 254 N. W. 787 likewise took judicial notice of the fact that lands used exclusively for agricultural purposes receive less benefits from school taxes than other lands. In the cited case, the Court, 272 N. W. at 792, 793, said: ‘*We believe it true also that the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the benefit to agricultural land from school taxes is less than the benefit to other lands from the same source. See Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 20 S. Ct. 284, 44 L. Ed. 392, which held valid a statute which excepted from its operation lands used exclusively for agricultural purposes if owned by indi- BLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY —, 23 viduals, but not if owned by corporations. It is con- ceivable that the benefits from education so far as real estate is concerned, whether it be the enhanced value of that real estate due to adequate educational facilities offered or some other benefit, reflects itself less in real estate used exclusively for agricultural purposes than any other land, For example, a merchant’s business or even a railroad’s business, which is dependent some- what upon real estate in the operaticn of the business, might be quite differently affected by an adequate edu- cational system located in the community, than the business of agriculture. So far as concerns real estate, which is set apart primarily for homes or residences by being platted, obviously educational advantages reflect themselves in that real estate differently from the manner in which they reflect themselves in land used exclusively for agriculture.”’ The Supreme Court of Iowa in the instant case, 35 N. W. 9d 66 at 73 said: ‘Tt is true of course there are common characteristics between agricultural land and other realty in the mat- ter of taxation for school purposes. But we cannot say there are not characteristics which differentiate it from other realty in relation to school taxes. We are not con- vineed the legislature could not with reason conclude that agricultural land derives less benefit, in enhanced value or otherwise, from the money raised by school taxes than other real estate. City or town residence property or real estate used for business purposes may well be affected by our school system in quite a differ- ent way than land used for agricultural purposes which consists of comparatively large tracts. The legislature could reasonably have concluded that agricultural lands are taxed excessively for school purposes as compared with property devoted to other uses and that such taxes should be equalized in accordance with benefits re- ceived. * * ° Leicht v. City of Burlington, 1887, 73 Iowa 29, 31, 34 N. W. 494, 495, upheld as uniform in the constitutional ae ad EPAPER SET PCE RE TENS PONG SW RS rae ey 7 sense chapter 47, Acts 16th General Assembly (as amended section 616, Code, 1897, section 404.4, Code, 1946), which completely exempted from taxation for any municipal purpose, except road tax, lands within the extended limits of a city or town containing more than ten acres, occupied and used for agricultural pur- poses. The opinion states ‘the design of the legislature evidently was to exempt property which is used es. sentially for agricultural purposes.’ The language just quoted is repeated in Farwell y. Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co., 97 Iowa 286, 294, 295, 66 N. W. 176, 35 L. R. A. 63, apparently as stating the effect of the decision in Leicht v. Burlington, supra. 1 Cooley, 4th Ed., Section 284, page 599, says that in Iowa an exemption from city taxation of agricultural or un- platted land in a city has been upheld, citing the Leicht case.’’ 24 See Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction, Appendix *C’’, p. 8, 9. Furthermore, this fact was substantiated by proof. Ex- hibit ‘‘B’’ (certified to this Court) shows that the ratio of taxable farm property per child to taxable non-farm property per child in Iowa in 1941 in the 99 counties in Iowa was from 1.85 to 1 in Dubuque County to 8.97 in Mills County. Exhibit ‘‘C’’ shows the ratio in 97 consolids’sd schools of Iowa was from .97 to 1 in the Cotter District 0 62.80 to 1 in the Sommers District. Exhibit ‘‘D’’ shows that the ratio of taxable farm property to non-farm prop- erty in 99 city or town independent districts was from 1.17 to 1 in Ridgeway District to 68.37 to 1 in Jewell District. In other words the farm or agricultural property paid from 1.17 to 68.37 times as much school taxes per child as did the non-farm property. To say that the legislature could not under the Fourteenth Amendment equalize this school tax burden ‘‘ would render nugatory those discrimina- tions which the best interests of society require; which are necessary for the encouragement of needed and useful in- BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY _ —— 25 dustries.”” Bell’s Gap. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. at 237. This Court, in Carmichael v. Southern Coal é Coke Co., 301 U. S. at 512, said: ‘‘Reasons for the selections, if desired, readily sug- gest themselves. Where the public interest is served one business may be left untaxed and another taxed, in order to promote the one, American Sugar Refining Co. ». Louisiana, supra; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., supra; Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, supra; or to restrict or suppress the other, Magnano Co. v. Hanailton, 992 U. 8. 40; Fox v. Standard Oil Co., supra; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, supra; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304; Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, supra, 48: Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, supra. The legislature may with- hold the burden of the tax in order to foster what it con- ceives to be a beneficent enterprise. This Court has often sustained exemption for the encouragement of agriculture, American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, supra, 95; Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, supra, 291. Similarly, the legislature is free to aid a depressed industry such as shipping. The exemption of business operating for less than twenty weeks in the year may rest upon similar reasons, or upon the desire to encourage seasonal or unstable in- dustries.’’ (Italics supplied.) That property may be classified for tax purposes, taxing one class and exempting another, without violating the equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, is settled beyond peradventure of doubt by this Court in Nashwille C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, wherein at p. 368 it is said: “This Court had previously had occasion to advert to the narrow and sometimes cramping provision of these state uniformity clauses, and has left no doubt that their inflexible restrictions upon the taxing powers of the state were not to be insinuated into that meritorious _ conception of equality which alone the Equal Protection Clause was designed to assure. See Puget Sound Co, v. King County, 264 U. S. 22, 27. That the states may classify property for taxation; may set up different modes of assessment, valuation and collection; may tax some kinds of property at higher rates than others; and in making all these dif. ferentiations may treat railroads and other utilities with that separateness which their distinctive char. acteristics and functions in society make appropriate— these are among the common-places of taxation and of constitutional law.’’ * * * Since, so far as the Fed. eral Constitution is concerned, a state can put railroad property into one pigeonhole and other property into another, the only question relevant for us is whether the state has done so. If the discrimination of which the Railway complains had been formally written into the statutes of Tennessee, challenge to its constitutionality would be frivolous. If the state supreme court had construed the requirement of uniformity in the Tennes- see Constitution so as to permit recognition of these diversities, no appeal could successfully be made to the Fourteenth Amendment.”’ (Italics supplied.) 26 Referring to Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. 8. 540, this Court, in Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. 8. at 274 said: ‘Tt can scarcely be doubted that, if the Connolly case had dealt with the subject of taxation, a discriminative tax upon producers of agricultural products, either greater or less than that imposed upon other manv- facturers or producers, might have been held valid with- out denying to either party the equal protection of the laws.’’ Also referring to Connolly’s case, this Court in Tigner v. | Texas, 310 U.S, at 145, 146, said: ‘Since Connolly’s case was decided, nearly forty years ago, an impressive legislative movement bears BLEED THROU GH=POOR COPY — 27 witness to general acceptance of the view that the dif- ferences between agriculture and industry call for differentiation in the formulation of public policy. The states as well as the United States have sanctioned cooperative action by farmers; have restricted their amenability to the anti-trust laws; have relieved their organizations from taxation.”’ See also Lake Superior Con. Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U.S. 577, wherein a classification of ‘‘ore’’ lands was sustained. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Grower's Co- operative Marketing Ass’n., 276 U.S. at 96 ‘‘recognized as permissible some discrimination intended to encourage agriculture”’ citing American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisi- ana, 179 U. 8. 89, 95. In Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, this Court sus- tained a tax statute which excepted ‘‘from its operation lands used for agricultural purposes if owned by individ- uals.’’ The Court, p. 120, said: ‘In the case at bar the distinction is between tracts of agricultural lands in a certain relation to cities and lands used for other purposes in such relation. We think the distinction is justified by the principle of the cases we have cited. That principle leaves to the State the adaptation of its laws to its conditions.”’ In Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 173 U. 8. 592, this Court sustained an attack upon the city charter which exempted tracts of land of ten acres devoted to farm- ing purposes. At p. 620, 621, this Court said: “The assignments of error embrace the contention that the judgment below denies to the Bridge Company the equal protection of the laws, ‘in that its property has been subjected to taxation from which all other land not divided into lots has been exempted, although the only reason for exemption apply with much greater force to the property of the plaintiff in error than to the property which enjoys the exemption.’ 4 This contention is based upon the proviso in the city’s charter declaring that ‘no land embraced within the city limits, and outside of ten-acre lots as originally laid off, shall be assessed and taxed by the city council, unless the same is divided or laid out into lots of five acres or less, and unless all of same is actually used and devoted to farming purposes.’ Kentucky Acts 1887-88, Vol. 2, p. 991. We are of opinion that this proviso has no reference to bridges, their approaches, piers, etc., but refers only to lands capable of being cultivated or used and divided into lots upon which buildings may be erected or over which streets or other highways may be constructed, This is the better interpretation of both the old and the new charter of the city. Besides, the construction placed by the state court upon the charter of the city in respect of its power to tax the bridge property neces. sarily leads to the conclusion that the provision forbid. ding the taxation of lands not divided into lots of five acres or less does not apply to a bridge erected over the Ohio River within the city’s limits. In this view there is no basis for the suggestion of a denial of the equal protection of the laws,’ * * °, 28 The Courts of highest jurisdiction in numerous states of the United States have followed the foregoing cited cases decided by this Court. In Hill v. Rae, 52 Montana 578, 158 Pac. 826 at 828, 829, the Supreme Court of Montana said: ‘That classification is permissible, because in the essential nature of things and in any due appreciation of equality in the operation of the law it is necessary in legislation for purposes of revenue, or in the applica- tion of the police power strictly so-called, or in legisla- tion designed to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, or add to its wealth and prosper- ity, is abundantly settled by judicial decision as well as by the course of legislation. To cover the entire field of this subject is impossible within any reasonable DLEED THROUGH=—POOR COPY _ —— 29 limits. Suffice it to say that by the Supreme Court of the United States, construing this very amendment, classifications have been sustained based upon differ- ences in the amount of legacies, differences ‘petween corporations, differences between land dependent on its us for agricultural and other purposes, differences be- tween fire insurance and other insurance, differences in the character of work, differences between hiring per- sons to labor in the state and hiring persons to labor out of the state, differences between sugar refineries based entirely on whether the sugar refined was pur- chased or produced by the refiner, as well as various other differences too numerous to mention. Magoun v. Illinois T. & S. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 20 Sup. Ct. 284, 44 L. Ed. 392; Gundling v. Chieago, 177 U S. 183, 20 Sup. Ct. 633, 44 L. Ed. 725; Petit v. Minne- sota, 177 U. S. 164, 20 Sup. Ct. 666, 44 L. Ed. 716; Wil- liams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 21 Sup. Ct. 128, 45 L. Ed. 186, American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. 8. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43, 45 L. Ed. 102; and cases cited in these decisions. * * °’’ ‘In Clark v. Kansas City, supra, a state statute was under consideration which authorized certain cities to annex lands adjoining the city limits, but provided that ‘nothing in this act shall be taken or held for agricul- tural purposes when the same is not owned by any rail- road or other corporation,’ and the court upheld the distinction, declaring that it was justified by the prin- ciple of the cases cited above : : ‘That principle leaves to the state the adaptation of its laws to its conditions. The growth of cities is in- evitable, and in providing for their expansion it may be the judgment of an agricultural state that they should find a limit in the lands actually used for agriculture.’ ) ‘In American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, supra, a state statute imposing a license tax upon persons and corporations carrying on the business of refining 7 sugar and molasses, but exempting from its operation ‘planters and farmers grinding and refining their own sugar and molasses,’ was sustained with the remark that: 30 ‘The discrimination is obviously intended as an en. couragement to agriculture, and does not deny to persons and corporations engaged in a general refin. ing business the equal protection of the laws.’ ‘So, too, legislative activity having for its avowed purpose the encouragement of this or that particular industry deemed of importance to the state has been prolific of results.’’ (Italics supplied) The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Whitfield, 65 S. D. 173, 254 N. W. 787 likewise took judicial notice of the fact that lands used exclusively for agricultural purposes receive less benefits from school taxes than other land, sustained a classification of agricultural lands for tax purposes, and cited numerous eases from this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed- eral constitution. In the cited case, the Court, 272 N. W. at 792, 793, said: ‘“‘We believe it true also that the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the benefit to agricultural land from school taxes is less than the benefit to other lands from the same source. See Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 20 S. Ct. 284, 44 L. Ed. 392, which held valid a statute which excepted from its operation lands used exclusively for agricultural purposes if owned by in- dividuals, but not of owned by corporations. I? is con- cewvable that the benefits from education so far as real estate is concerned, whether it be the enhanced value of that real estate due to adquate educational facilities offered or some other benefit, reflects itself less in real estate used exclusively for agricultural purposes than any other land. For example, a merchant’s business or even a railroad’s business, which is dependent some- BLEED THROU GH=—FPOOR COPY 31 what upon real estate in the operation of the business, might be quite differently affected by an adequate edu- cational system located in the community, than the business of agriculture. So far as concerns real estate, which is set apart primarily for homes or residenced by being platted, obviously educational advantages re- flect themselves in that real estate differently from the manner in which they reflect themselves in land used exclusively for agriculture. Land used exclusively for agriculture consists of a comparatively large tract which is the whole base of the business. This is not true of land used in other businesses. It seems to us that repeatedly courts have sustained classifications founded upon reasons much more obscure than those here pre- sented. We believe it reasonable for a Legislature, in an agri- cultural state, to offer inducements to agriculture through its tax laws. Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 30 S. Ct. 496, 54 L. Ed. 688; American Sugar Refining Company v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 S. Ct. 43, 45 L. Ed. 102; Bell’s Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra. In all probability other considerations occurred to the Legislature in making the distinction, but the pos- sible considerations herein pointed out are sufficient in our opinion to prevent us from holding that there could be no possible rational basis for the legislative classi- fication. This opinion is further confirmed by a reading of the case of Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 43 S. Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237, wherein it was held that the differences between bituminous coal and anthracite , forms a just basis for their different classification under the tax laws, and the case of State Tax Board of Com’rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 S. Ct. 540, 75 L. Ed. 1248, 73 A. L. R. 1464, wherein it was held that the differences between chain store operation and the conduct of a single store was a sufficient basis for legislative classi- fication for taxation.’’ (Italics supplied) Legislature must ‘carry on’ to the point where we can say that there is satisfied the con- stitutional mandate for the maintenance of a free publie school system. The Legislature, with authority so to do, has said an 8 months annual school term is necessary. Affirming its decree, we adopt its judg- ment as our own. With the maximum levy expended, many school districts will have perhaps only a 3 months term, while others may have a 12 month school if they so desire. Without affirmative aid by the Legis- lature, the constitutional mandate for an efficient free school system will be unexecuted in those weak school districts.” And further, 238 Pace. at 207, that Court said: “The act makes the appropriation available in all school districts in the state where, under the restric- tion of the Constitution, such districts are unable to maintain the public schools for such length of terms as the Legislature, acting within its constitutional au- thority, and the exercise of sound legislative discre- tion, has declared must be provided. The classification is a reasonable one. The act applies to all then or thereafter coming within the classification, and is not violative of the section of the Constitution to which we have referred.”’ (Italics supplied) — 52 In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Whitfield, 65 S. D. 173, 272 N. W. 787 at 790, 791, the Supreme Court of South Dakotg sustained a law of that state which fixed the maximum levy on agricultural lands at 8 mills against an attack that the law constituted an arbitrary classification in violation of Section 1, 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Appellees here point out that the statute attacked in the case at bar applies to any and all school districts in the state, either now or in the future, where the millage rate for general tax purposes exceeds 15 mills. Naturally, the millage rates in school districts vary from time to time and the statute applies in any and all school districts where- in the levy exceeds 15 mills in any year. Assessment statutes may be fitted to the state’s tax sys- tem either by maximum tax levies in mills on a class of property, or by a percentage of the assessed valuation. In the laws of Minnesota, property has long been classi- fied on the basis of a percentage of actual value. This scheme of taxation was sustained against an attack that it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In Apartment Operators’ Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis, 254 N. W. at 444, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, citing many opinions of this Court, sustained the law and at the cited page said: ‘In classifying property for the purpose of taxation, the Legislature is determining a matter of state policy and is not tied down to any narrow or technical rule.”’ Dohs v. Holm, 152 Minn. 529, 189 N. W. 418, 420. Prior to the 1933 enactment here considered, real property was divided into three general classes, viz.: ‘Real estate in which iron ore is known to exist’ (the iron ore, mined or unmined, assessed at 50 per cent of its true value) ; ‘unplatted real estate’ at 33% per cent of its true value, and all other real estate at 40 DLEED THROUGH=—FPOOR COPY — 53 per cent of its true value. Mason’s Minn. St. 1927, p. 1933. Chapter 359 provides: ‘Class 3 b. All unplatted real estate, * * * which is used for the purposes of a homestead, shall consti- tute class three ‘b’ (3b) and shall be valued and as- sessed at twenty (20) per cent of the true and full value thereof. Provided, if the true and full value is in excess of the sum of $4,000.00, the amount in excess of said sum shall be valued and assessed as provided for by class three (3) hereof. (Property coming within class 3 is valued and assessed at 3344 per cent of its true value.) ‘All platted real estate * * * which is used for the purposes of a homestead, shall constitute class 3c and assessed as provided for by class four (4) hereof. (Property coming within class 4 is valued and as- sessed at 40 per cent of its true value.)’ “The classification of platted and unplatted land still remains. That classification is again divided into homestead and nonhomestead lands, the former being assessed at a lesser percentage of true value. The distinction is predicated upon the use made of the property. The other change is based upon value and gives a preference to homesteads of a value of $4,000 or less.’’ And again at p. 445 the Court said: ‘Placing homesteads in two classes on the basis of valuation was within the scope of the broad power 0” the Legislature to classify property for the purpose of taxation. Its selection of property for one classt- fication or another is binding upon the courts, ‘unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the legis- lative body acted arbitrarily and without sufficient m- formation.’ McReavy v. Holm, 166 Minn. 22, 206 N. W. 942, 944. The United States Supreme Court, in Citi- — 54 zens’ Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 33 S. Ct. 833, 836, 57 L. Ed. 1206, stated: ‘Granting the power of classi. fication, we must grant government the right to select the differences upon which the classification shall be based, and they need not be great or conspicuous, * * * The state is not bound by any rigid equality. This is the rule; its limitation is that it must not be exercised in ‘clear and hostile discriminations between particu- lar persons and classes.’ We conclude that the class- ification here considered does not come within the above quoted limitations.’’ (Italics supplied.) A classification of school districts at 15 mills was sus- tained against an attack that it was not uniform in opera- tion in Myers v. Bd. of Education, 48 Ohio App. 43, 192 N. E. 393. The statute provided that school districts wherein the millage levy for school purposes was 15 mills could participate in the state educational equalization fund by voting on additional school fund tax levy of not to exceed 3 mills. The first qualification for participation in the state fund was that the levy for school purposes must ex- ceed 15 mills in some districts and 9.5 mills in other dis- tricts. The Court held that the Act was of uniform oper- ation, and in 192 N. E. at 400, said: ‘*Under the provisions of section 5625-18a, the period the levy remains in effect is the number of years the school district may continue to participate in the equal- ization fund, which is a matter of public record and determinable from such record, and the rate of tax is fixed by definite arithmetical processes, determinable from public records, so that the rate of the tax and the period for which it is to run are both definite and certain. The act is of uniform operation throughout the state, as all school districts similarly situated were entitled to its benefits; and the tax therein provided to be levied was by uniform rule, as it was the same in every school district proceedings pursuant to the act, and the object of the tax was distinctly stated.” (Italics supplied.) BLEED THROU GH-—POOR COPY — 55 Although the question of special privileges and immuni- ties and equal protection of the laws clause of Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was not raised and decided, the question of uniformity of operation was raised and decided, and, if uniform in operation the Act could not be arbitrary, or hostile within the meaning of that amendment. These cases from state courts are not binding upon this Court and are cited merely to show that a 15 mill limita- tion, or other millage limitation, are common in school tax law legislation and that the line of demarcation at 15 mills is within legislative discretion with which the Courts will not interfere or hold in violation of Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This Court cannot say that a substantial Federal ques- tion under the Fourteenth Amendment has been raised by this 15 mill classification, and this Court should decline jurisdiction on this ground. vi Proposition The legislative enactment challenged in the case at bar was enacted for a public purpose, to-wit in aid of agricul- ture as an industry, and to encourage the reorganization of public school districts; the legislature of the State of Iowa, and the Supreme Court of Iowa have so determined ; and this Court will not hold the enactment void unless ‘‘the act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, &s, for example, the confiscation of property’’. AUTHORITIES Dickinson v. Porter, (The case at bar), 35 N.W. 24 (Iowa) 66 at 76, 78, 79, 81, Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction, Appendix ‘‘C’’, p. 15 to p. 28; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. 8. 112 at 157 to 161; 41 L. Ed. 388, 389; 17 S. Ct. 56 at 62 to 64; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264 at 278, 279, 42 L. Ed 740 at 746, 18 S. Ct. 345; Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. 8S. 527 at 530, 531, 50 L. Ed. 581 at 583, 26 S. Ct. 301 at 302, 303 ; Hairston v. Danville € Western Ry., 208 U. 8S. 598 at 606, 607, 52 L. Ed. 637 at 641, 642, 28 S. Ct. 331 at 334, 335; Union Lime Co. v. C. d N.W. Ry. Co., 233 U. 8. 211 at 218, 58 L. Ed. 924 at 928, 34 S. Ct. 522 at 524; Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. 8. 217 at 221, 222, 62 L. Ed. 252 at 255; Green v. Frazier, 253 U. 8S. 233 at 239, 240, 64 L. Ed. 878 at 881, 882, 40 S. Ct. 499 at 501; Rindge v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U. 8S. 700 at 705, 706, 67 L. Ed. 1186 at 1192, 1193; Mitheim v. Moffat Tunnel Dist., 262 U. S. 710 at 717, 67 L. Ed. 1194 at 1199, 43 S. Ct. 694 at 696; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. 8. 32 at 40, 72 L. Ed. 770 at 775, 48 S. Ct. 423 at 426; Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U. 8S. 36 at 41, 42, 77 L. Ed. 1015 at 1021, 1022, 53 S. Ct. 431 at 433; A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. 8. 40 at 43, 44, 78 L. Ed. 1109 at 1113, 1114, 54 §. Ct. 599; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. 8. 495 at 514, 515, 81 L. Ed. 1245 at 1256, 57 S. Ct. 868 at 874, 875; BLEED THROUGH—POOR COPY — 57 Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas, 323 U. 8. 32 at 35, 89 L. Ed. 95 at 28 65 S. Ct. 9 at 10; Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207 at 214, 215, 90 L. Ed. 6 at 153, 14, 66 S. Ct. 62 at 65; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. 8. 1 at 6, 7, 91 L. Ed. 711 at 718, 719, 67 S. Ct. 504 at 506, 507; Board of Supervisors v. Stewart, 30 Iowe 9 at 22, 29, 1 Am. Rep. 238; Grout v. Kendall, 195 lowa 467 at 477, 478, 192 N.W. 529 at 533; Carroll v. City of Cedar Falls, 221 Iowa 277 at 282, 292, 261 N.W. 652 at 655, 660; Ahrweiler v. Board, 226 lowa 229 at 233, 236, 283 N.W. 889 at 891, 892; Apartment Operators’ Assn. V. City of Minneapolis, 195 Minn. 365, 254 N.W. at 443, 444, 445; State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 Pace. 771, 777, 782. Application of Cases Cited The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the opinion in the case at bar, 35 N.W. 2d 66 at 76, held that the legislative enact- ment for the purpose of benefiting agriculture, lowa’s basic industry, and to encourage the reorganization of school districts to improve the state’s educational system, both of which are universally held to be for the general welfare and therefore each is for a ‘‘ public’ purpose. These holdings are assigned as error in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8, p. 2, 3, Appellant’s Assignment of Errors. The Supreme Court of Iowa in the case at bar, 35 N.W. 2d at 76; Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction, p. 15, 17, said ‘As stated in Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U.S. 122, 124, 125, 41 S. Ct. 43, 44, 65 L. Ed. 170, 175: ‘Any classification is permissible which has a reasonable relation to some permitted end of government action. : | * * * It is enough, for instance, if the classification is reasonably founded in ‘the purposes and policy of taxation’. (Citations.)’ The power of state legislature to adjust their tax laws in order to encourage an industry or undertaki deemed vital to the welfare of the state or in further. ance of some related principle of public policy has frequently been upheld. The governor of the state in commenting upon the report of the school code commission said in his mes- sage to the legislature that enacted this law, ‘We all know that agriculture is Iowa’s basic resource. Upon its prosperity depends the prosperity of our great number of small businesses and communities.’ It was most effectively demonstrated during the depression of the early nineteen thirties that the well-being of the state as a whole is directly dependent upon the welfare of agriculture. The prosperity of our basic industry was no less vital when this act was passed nor is it less vital now when many other countries look to us for food and agriculture must supply their needs. Our state constitution contains the express mandate, ‘The General Assembly shall encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.’ Art. IX. 2d div., see. 3. We have frequently referred to agriculture as the basic industry in this state. See for example Blume v. Crawford County, 217 Iowa 545, 550, 551, 250 N.W. 733, 92 A.L.R. 757; Clear Lake Co-op. Live Stock Shippers’ Ass’n. v. Weir, supra, 200 Towa 1293, 1298, 206 N.W. 297. The Blume case (217 Iowa 545, 250 N.W. 735) upholds a law directing county boards of supervisors to appropriate funds raised by taxation to county farm bureaus under certain conditions and says a statute in aid of agriculture ‘is not repugnant to any constitutional provision.’ The plain inference from the opinion is that what benefits agriculture benefits the state as a whole. Other decisions generally like the Blume case appear in Annotation, 92 A.L.R. 768, 770. BLEED THROU GH=—POOR COPY __— 59 Pertinent here is this language from Carman v. Hick- man County, 185 Ky. 630, 215 8.W. 408, 411: ‘* * © it is a matter of common knowledge, of which everybody must take notice, that in the agricultural interests of the state lie its chief source of wealth, and that the prosperity of the state springing from this source contributes to the growth and importance of every other industry in the state, as well as to the comfort and happiness of the whole people; * * °’. It is not debatable that it is part of the public policy of this state, evidenced by our constitution and numer- ous statutes, to encourage agriculture. It seems equally plain the encouragement of our basic industry serves the public interest. We are not convinced the legisla- ture might not fairly conclude this law in its practical operation will both benefit and encourage agriculture.”’ (Italics supplied.) To sustain this holding the Court cited (See 35 N.W. 9d at 77) from the opinions of this Court the following cases: Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 57 S. Ct. 868, 872, 81 L. Ed. 1245, 1253, 1255, 109 A. L. R. 1327, 1333, 1335; Aero-Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm. 295 U. 8. 285, 291, 55 S. Ct. 709, 711, 79 L. Ed. 1439, 1444; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. 8. 89, 95, 21 S. Ct. 43, 46, 45 L. Ed. 102, 105; A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 48 S. Ct. 423, 72 L. Ed. 770. The Court also cited cases from many state jurisdictions. With reference to the furtherance of the reorganization eee eet — of school districts to improve the state’s educational 8ys- tem, the Court, 35 N.W. 2d at 78, said: ‘*Since we have upheld the classification” of lands used for agricultural purposes upon the reasons stated in Division IIL and this Division IV, it is unnecessary to consider whether, as suggested by the legislative commission that recommended the passage of the act and as argued by defendants, the classification might also be sustained as in furtherance of the reorganization of school districts in order to improve our educational system. We may observe, however, this might well have been one of the considerations that occurred to the legislature in making the classification and we cannot say such conclusion could not be reached in good faith. The test of reasonableness of a classification is good faith of the legislature in making it.’’ (Italics supplied) 60 The operation of the Act is simple. Sections 426.6, et seq., Code of Iowa, 1946, p. 2 of Appellant’s quotation of the statutes attacked, provide that the county auditor (who makes up the tax lists in Iowa) lists by school districts all the tracts of lands entitled to credit under the Act together with the taxable value, as shown by the assessment rolls returned to him by the assessors of the county. He then determines from this value and the budget of the school district filed with him the millage rate in each school dis- trict for general school purposes. If the millage rate is in excess of 15 mills he computes the amount of credit each and all the tracts are entitled to, by multiplying the taxable value thereof by the millage rate in excess of 15 mills. He totals the amounts for all school districts in his county and forwards the total for his county to the state comptroller. The state comptroller then totals the amount of credits for all counties of the state and apportions the funds appropri- ated and in his hands to the several counties in the state, and forwards state warrants to the county auditors of the several counties of the state. Upon receiving the warrants, BLEED THROU GH-—POOR COPY — 61 the county auditor determines the amount of credit to be credited to each tract of agricultural lands and enters that amount on the tax list. He then delivers the tax lists (show- ing the credit to each tract of agricultural land) and the state comptroller’s warrant representing the total credits to the agricultural land in his county to the county treasurer who credits each school district with the total amount of the tax credits credited on lands in the district, and enters the amount credited to each tract of land in the county upon the tax receipt for the land. The Court, 35 N.W. 2nd at 81 pointed out that this proce- dure is modeled after the Homestead Tax Credit Act, Chap- ter 425, Code of lowa, 1946 enacted in 1937. The Court said: ‘The law in question seems directly analogous to the Homestead Tax Credit Act, Ch. 425, Code, 1946. It is plainly patterned after the homestead law. The public policy served by the former is the encouragement of the industry on which the prosperity of the state largely depends. The public policy served by the other, as stated in Ahrweiler v. Board, 226 Iowa, 229, 233, 236, 283, N.W. 889, is the encouragement of home owner- ship. Perhaps the ownership of homes is more bene- ficial to the state than the welfare of agriculture. If 80, the distinction is largely of degree and not of kind.”’ (Italies supplied) In the case of Ahrweiler v. Board, 226 lowa 229, 233, 236; 283 N.W. 889, 891, 892, the Supreme Court of Iowa said: “Thus it appears that the legislature, realizing the social and material benefits to the public at large from the ownership of homesteads by the people, sought to encourage and increase such ownership and occupation. The method adopted was to grant to each homestead a credit against the real estate taxes for each year the property constituted a homestead.’’ 1: The Court in the cited case, 283 N.W. at 892 said: 62 ‘The tax credit is not a credit to the owner, but to the homestead, although this results in benefit to the owner and cash refunds were allowed taxpayers who had paid such taxes prior to the allowance of the credit. That the credit is to the property, as distinguished from the owner, is evident from various provisions of the act. The credit (or refund) is given against the tax on the homestead and the taxpayer makes claim therefor as owner of the homestead. ‘The Homestead Exemption Law was not adopted upon the premise that a homestead credit was a gift or bonus with no consideration requirements in re- turn. The principle behind the act was benefit to be returned to the state and its people by homestead own ership. As consideration for exemption it might be said that the homestead earns its credit each year of its existence. Consequently, it should not be entitled to credit for any other year. The credit against the 1936 tax may be explained and justified upon the theory that it was morally due for service already rendered.” (Italics supplied) The Court in the case at bar, 35 N.W. 2d 81, also said: ‘**Again, from 1 Cooley, 4th Ed., section 175, page 384: ‘In case of doubt, courts are largely influenced by the public policy of the state, in determining whether taxation is for a public purpose.’ See also 61 CJ, Taxation, section 20. As previously indicated, there can be no question it is part of the public policy of this state to encourage agriculture. And the furtherance of the reorganization of school districts in order to improve our educational system would be as plainly part of our public policy. As hereinafter pointed out, it has been the policy of the legislature from its inception to grant numerous tax exemptions.’’ (Italics supplied) BLEED THROUGH—POOR COPY The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the state’s early history (1870) sustained a tax levied to aid in the construction of railroads as a tax for a public purpose. See 30 Iowa 9, I Am. Rep. 238. That Court also sustained an appropri- ation through a bond issue for the payment of a bonus to soldiers, sailors and marines for service in World War I as being for a public purpose. In Grout v. Kendall, 195 Iowa 467, 477, 478; 192 N.W. 529 at 533, that Court said: ‘‘Whether a particular purpose is a public purpose, and whether it has the sanction of a moral obligation of the state, are questions which have never been defi- nitely answered or defined. It has been quite uniformly held by the courts that the determination of such ques- tions inheres largely in the legislative power. Within the zone of doubt that is a moral obligation of the state, and that is a public purpose, which the Legislature deems to be such.”’ The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the case at bar, construed the legislative enactment to place a ceiling of 15 mills upon agricultural lands in tracts of 10 acres or more, and by ap- propriation from funds in the state treasury reimburses the districts wherein the ceiling applies. In the opinion, 35 N.W. 2d at 79, Appellant’s Statement as to Jurisdiction, Appendix **C,”’ p. 22, the Iowa Court said: ‘‘In reality, however, the law separately classifies only lands used for agricultural purposes and those not so used and then subelassifies agricultural lands into tracts containing ten acres or more and those not that large (section 424.2) for the purpose of applying a dif- ferent tax burden to the lands thus classified in order to apportion the taxes to the actual benefits received, to encourage agriculture and, the legislature may also have felt, to further the reorganization school districts so as to improve our educational system. A ceiling of 15 mills for school taxes is placed upon agricultural tracts of ten acres or more and the state, | 64 to the amount of $500,000, reimburses the districts jp which the ceiling is applied. The South Dakota law, upheld in Great Northern R. Co. v. Whitfield, supra, 65 8.D. 173, 272 N.W. 787, 111 A.L.R. 1475, fixes eight mills as the ceiling for school taxes on agricultural lands.”’ The 52nd session of the lowa General Assembly created a Military Service Tax Credit Fund, (Ch. 231, Laws of 52nd G.A.). For more than fifty years, the State of lowa has granted exemption in a limited amount to persons for mili- tary service in the various wars engaged in by the United States and that exemption has now been extended to per- sons for military service in so-called World War II. The legislative enactment last above referred to made an ap- propriation to reimburse local taxing bodies for the reve- nue lost on an analogous basis to the agricultural land credit act cli#!lenged in the case at bar. The Court in the case at bar, 35 N.W. 2d at 79, 80, Ap- pellant’s Appendix, p. 23, 24, with reference to the appro- priation feature of the challenged enactment, said: ‘*Since, as we have held, this act is a valid taxing measure is not rendered invalid by the appropriation provision. The public policy in furtherance of which the classification is made for the purpose of applying a different tax burden or a partial tax exemption, if the law be considered a partial tax exemption measure, is sufficient to support the appropriation. An act can- not be said to be for a private purpose where ‘some principle of public policy’ underlies its passage, Whether an appropriation connected with a taxing statute is for a public purpose depends upon whether the remainder of the statute is for such purpose. See 1 Cooley, 4th Ed., section 177. Without the appropriation made by the act the loss of revenue to the school districts by the imposition of the ceiling of 15 mills would fall wpon other property BLEED THROU GH=-POOR COPY — 65 owners in the districts. Under the law as written, how- ever, such loss is borne by the state up to the amount appropriated. The money is taken from one public fund and put into another. That the appropriation feature of the act does not render it invalid in the respect claimed see State ex rel. Board v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 P. 771, 777, 782, which sustains a law that exempts from taxation prop- erty to ‘he amount of $2000 of certain war veterans and provides for reimbursement by a state appropri- ation to each county in the amount of county tax on the exempted property. The court holds it a valid tax exemption statute because the legislature might have found it served a public purpose as an incitement to patriotism and encouragement to defend the country in future conflicts and the validity of the law is not aff ected by the appropriation measure. This from the opinion is pertinent here: ‘A lawful exemption from taxation cannot, we think, be regarded as a gift or donation to or in aid of the individual * * * in whose favor the exemption is de- clared. * * * Indeed, we do not think the statute makes a gift to the exemption claimant even indirectly. The state may be regarded as the sole actor. It exempts the property declared to be exempt, and stands the loss not only of the state tax which would otherwise be col- lected, but the county tax as well. The money appro- priated is public money, whether in the state or county treasury, and by the statute is taken out of one publie pocket or fund and put into another.’ *’ (Italics supplied) For more than 50 years, this Court hes held that where the legislatures and the courts of a state has construed a legislative enactment to be a part of the public policy of the state and to be enacted for a public purpose, this Court will treat such determination ‘‘with very great respect and * * * regard the decisions as embodying the delib- — * erate judgment and matured thought of the courts of that state on this question.’’ See Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. at 160, 161 where this Court said that the rule applies to ‘‘the exercise of the right of emi. nent domain or by that of taxation.’’ In Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. 8. at 530, this Court, speaking to the same subject of ‘‘ publie pur. pose,’’ said: ‘*In view of the decision of the state court we assume that the condemnation was authorized by the state laws, subject only to the question whether those laws as con- strued are consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. Some objections to this view were mentioned, but they are not open. If the statutes are constitutional as con- strued, we follow the construction of the state court.” In Hairston v. Danville d Western Ry. Co., 208 U. §. 598 at 606, 607, speaking to the same subject, said: “‘The rule of state decision is clearly established and we have no occasion here to consider the varying reasons which have influenced its adoption. But when we come to inquire what are public uses for which the right of compulsory taking may be employed, and what are private uses for which the right is forbidden we find no agreement, either in reasoning or conclusion. The one and only principle in which all courts seem to agree is that the nature of the uses, whether public or private, is ultimately a judicial question. The deter- mination of this question by the courts has been in- fluenced in the different States by considerations touch- ing the resources, the capacity of the soil, the relative importance of industries to the general public welfare, and the long-established methods and habits of the people. In all these respects conditions vary so much in the States and Territories of the Union that differ- ent results might well be expected. * * * The pro- priety of keeping in view by this court, while enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, the diversity of local eon- BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY — 67 ditions and of regarding with great respect the judg- ments of the state courts upon what should be deemed publie uses in that State, is expressed, justified, and acted upon in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, ub. sup., Clark v. Wells, ub. sup. and Strickley v. High- land Boy Mining Co., ub. sup. What was said in these eases need not be repeated here. No case is recalled where this court has condemned as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment a taking upheld by the state court as a taking for public uses im conformity with its laws.’’ (Italics supplied.) In Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217, this Court ap- plied this rule to municipal taxation to establish and main- tain a municipa! wood, coal and fuel yard in the City of Portland, Maine. This Court, 245 U.S. at 221, said: ‘The act in question has the sanction of the legis- lative branch of the state government, the body pri- marily invested with authority to determine what laws are required in the public interest. That the purpose is a public one has been determined upon full consid- eration by the Supreme J udicial Court of the State upon the authority of a previous decision of that Court. Laughlin v. City of Portland, 111 Maine, 486. The attitude of this court towards state legislation purporting to be passed in the public interest, and so declared to be by the decision of the court of last resort of the State passing the act, has often been declared. While the ultimate authority to determine the validity of legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment is rested in this court, local conditions are of such vary- ing character that what is or is not a public use in a particular State is manifestly a matter respecting which local authority, legislative and judicial, has peculiar facilities for securing accurate information. In that view the judgment of the highest court of the State upon what should be deemed a public use in a particular State is entitled to the highest respect.’’ With reference to the application of the rule on publie purpose to the taxing power, this Court, in Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. at 239, 240, said: ‘*The taxing power of the States is primarily vested in their legislatures, deriving their authority from the people. When a state legislature acts within the scope of its authority it is responsible to the people, and their right to change the agents to whom they have entrusted the power is ordinarily deemed a sufficient check upon its abuse. When the constituted authority of the State undertakes to exert the taxing power, and the question of the validity of its action is brought before this court, every presumption in its favor is indulged, and only clear and demonstrated usurpation of power will au- thorize judicial interference with legislative action. In the present instance under the authority of the constitution and laws prevailing in North Dakota the people, the legislature, and the highest court of the State have declared the purpose for which these sev- eral acts were passed to be of a public nature, and within the taxing authority of the State. With this united action of people, legislature and court, we are not at liberty to interfere unless it is clear beyond rea- sonable controversy that rights secured by the Federal Constitution have been violated. What is a public pur- pose has given rise to no little judicial consideration. Courts, as a rule, have attempted no judicial definition of a ‘public’, as distinguished from a ‘private’ pur- pose, but have left each case to be determined by its own peculiar circumstances. Gray, Limitations of Tax- ing Power, sec. 176, ‘Necessity alone is net the test by which the limits of State authority in this direction are to be defined, but a wise statesmanship must look be- yond the expenditures which are absolutely needful to the continued existence of organized government, and embrace others which may tend to make that govern- ment subserve the general well-being of society, and advance the present and prospective happiness and prosperity of the people.’ Cooley, Justice, in People v. Salem, 20 Michigan, 452. Questions of policy are not submitted to judicial determination, and the courts have no general authority of supervision over the exer- BLEED THROUGH=—POOR COPY — cise of discretion which under our system is reposed in the people or other departments of government.”’ Williams v. Mayor etc. of Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, con- strued a statute of the State of Maryland exempting a single railroad which was insolvent. The Circuit Court of Appeals held the statute in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution on the grounds that it granted special privilege to a single railroad. This Court reversed the Cireuit Court of Appeals and in the opinion, 289 U. S. at 42, said: ‘‘Tt is not the function of a court to determine whether the public policy that finds expression in legislation of this order is well or ill conceived. Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 696, 609; Missouri Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. 8. 267; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. 8. 374, 388, 389. The judicial function is exhausted with the discovery that the relation between means and end is not wholly vain and fanciful, an illusory pretense. Within the field where men of reason may reasonably differ, the legislature must haveits way. Otis v. Parker, supra. Nor in marking out that field will a court be forgetful of presumptions that help to fix the boun- daries. ‘As underlying questions of fact may eondi- tion the constitutionality of legislation of this charac- ter, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.’ ”’ (Italics supplied.) In Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. Ss. 495, this Court construed the Alabama Unemployment Com- pensation Act as levying a tax for a public purpose. In the opinion, 301 U. S. at 514, 515, the Court said: “The states, by their constitutions and laws, may set their own limits upon their spending power, see Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; ef. Parkers- burg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. 8. 1, but the requirements of due process leave free scope for the exercise of a wide legislative discretion in determining what expenditures will serve the public interest. — 70 This Court has long and consistently recognized that the public purposes of a state, for which it may raise funds by taxation, embrace expenditures for its gen- eral welfare. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v, Bradley, supra, 161; Green v. Frazier, supra, 240, 241. The existence of local conditions, which, because of their nature and extent, are of concern to the public as a whole, the modes of advancing the public interest by correcting them or avoiding their consequences, are peculiarly within the knowledge of the legislature, and to it, and not to the courts, is committed the duty and responsibility of making choice of the possible methods. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, supra, 160; Jones v. Portland, supra, 221, 224, 225; Green v. Frazier, supra, 239, 240. As with expendi- tures for the general welfare of the United States, United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 67; Helvering v. Davis, post, p. 619, whether the present expenditure services a public purpose is a practical question ad- dressed to the law-making department, and it would require a plain case of departure from every public purpose which could reasonably be conceived to justify the intervention of a court.’’ (Italics supplied.) Certainly, it is clear at first giance that legislative enact- ments to aid and encourage agriculture, and to promote the reorganization of school districts are a part of the public policy of the State of Iowa. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Iuwa, 35 N. W. 2d at 76, the Constitution of Iowa contains the express mandate that ‘‘The General Assembly shall encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improve- ment. Art. IX, 2d div., see. 3.” There is, in fact, a com- pact with the Government of the United States to do that very thing. Can this Court say that a law enacted for the very pur- poses of that mandate from the people of Iowa and that com- pact with the Federal Government was not enacted for a public purpose as a part of the public policy of the State of Iowa in the face of the determination of the legislature and BLEED THROU GH—POOR COPY — 71 every Court of Lowa, including the Court of highest resort that the statute was enacted as a part of the public policy of the State of Iowa ‘‘to encourage agriculture’ and ‘‘the furtherance of the reorganization of school districts in order to improve our educational system’’? See 35 N. W. 2d at 81. ” Contatale, at ‘‘first blush” it is apparent that the legis- lative enactment challenged in the case at bar is a valid exercise of legislative power, and no substantial Federal question is raised under Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas, 323 U. S. 32, this Court sustained a statute of the State of Kansas prohibiting the sale of ‘filled milk’’. In the opinion, 323 U.S. at 34, 35, this Court said : ‘Apparently the objection under the equal protec- tion clause is that the Kansas statute permits the sale of skimmed milk which has less calories and fewer vitamins than petitioners’ compound and yet forbids the sale of the compound despite its higher nutritive value. Such an objection is governed by the same standards of legislation as objections under the due process clause. It is a matter of classification and the power of the legislature to classify is as broad as its power to prohibit. A violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in either case would depend upon whether there is any rational basis for the action of the legis- lature.”’ In Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. 8S. 207 this Court sustained a law of North Dakota which excepted from compulsory sale lands acquired, lands owned by corpora- tions whose business was dealing in farm lands and lands belonging to certain cooperative corporations. In sustain- ing the classifications, this Court, 326 U.S. at 214, 215, said: ‘The North Dakota Legislature may have thought that its policy with reference to corporate-owned agri- emmy cultural lands would be advanced by permitting corpo- rations engaged in the business of dealing in farm lands to acquire and sell without restriction lands forced upon the market by the statute. It could have t that its policy would be in part defeated by withholding authority from farm cooperatives to acquire and use farm lands for agricultural purposes. Cf. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533, 562-564. Statutory discrimination between classes which are in fact different must be presumed to be relevant to a per- missible legislative purpose, and will not be deemed to be a denial of equal protection if any state of facts could be conceived which would support it. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. 8. 342, 357 ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509, and cases cited.” (Italics supplied.) In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. 8. 1, this Court sustained a law of New Jersey which provided for paying costs of transporting pupils to school, including those who attend parochial or church schools, and to reimburse parents for transportation costs paid. This law was attacked on the grounds that it appropriated tax funds to private pur- poses in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the opinion, 330 U. S. 1 at 6, 7, this Court said: ‘*The fact that a state law, passed to satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal desires of the indi- viduals most directly affected is certainly an inadequate reason for us to say that a legislature has erroneously appraised the public need. It is true that this Court has, in rare instances, struck down state statutes on the ground that the purpose for which tax-raised funds were to be expended was not a public one. Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. 8S. 487; Thompson v. Con solidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. 8S. 55. But the Court has also pointed out that this far-reaching au- thority must be exercised with the most extreme caution. Green v. Frazier, 253 U. 8. 233, 240. Otherwise, a state’s 72 DLEED THROUGH—POOR COPY 73 power to legislate for the public welfare might be seri- ously curtailed, a power which is a primary reason for the existence of states. Changing local conditions create new local problems which may lead a state’s people and its local authorities to believe that laws authorizing new types of public services are necessary to promote the general well-being of the people. The Fourteenth Amendment did not strip the states of their power to meet problems previously left for individual solution. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. 8. 97, 103- 104; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. 8. 27, 31-32; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. 8. 112, 157-158. It is much too late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no public purpose. Cochran v. Louisi- ana State Board of Education, 281 U. 8. 370; Holmes, J., in Interstate Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87. See opinion of Cooley, J., in Stuart v. School District No. 1 of Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69 (1874). The same thing is no less true of legislation to reimburse needy parents, or all parents, for payment of the fares of their children so that they can ride in pubiic busses to and from schools rather than run the risk of traffic and other hazards incident to walking or ‘hitchhiking.’ See Barbier v. Connolly, swpra, at 31. See also cases collected 63 A. L. R. 413; 118 A. L. R. 806. Nor does it follow that a law has a private rather than a public purpose because it provides that tax-raised funds will be paid to reim- burse individuals on account of money spent by them in a way which furthers a public program. See Car- michael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 518. Subsidies and loans to individuals such as farmers and home-owners, and to privately owned transportation systems, as well as many other kinds of businesses, have been commoaplace practices in our state and national history.’’ (Italics supplied) It is perfectly clear, at first blush, that the classifications in the legislative enactment attacked in the case at bar are in no way in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that the act was enacted in aid of agriculture (since it applies to all agricultural and horticultural land in the state except Be —- tracts of less than 10 acres); that the classification at 10 acres is within legislative discretion; that the act was en. acted for a ‘‘publie purpose’’ as a part of the ‘‘ public policy of the state’’ to encourage reorganization of school dis- tricts; that it has been so construed by the Court of highest jurisdiction in the State of Iowa as well as by the lower Court; that under the decisions of this Court these deter- minations are entitled to great respect by reason of local conditions, and the public policy of the State; that there is no substantial Federal question raised under Section 1, 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution; and that this Court should decline jurisdiction in this case. 74 Wuenrerore, Appellees pray that an order be entered by this Court sustaining their Resistance to the Jurisdiction in this cause, and for their costs. Rosert L. Larson, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, lowa; Dow Hiss, First Assistant Attorney General of lowa, Des Moines, Iowa; Eart F. Wisvom, Special Assistant Attorney General of Iowa; 1114 Register & Tribune Building, Des Moines, Iowa; Bert F. Wispom, 1.14 Register & Tribune Building, Des Moines, Iowa; F. H. Becker, County Attorney of Dubuque County, Dubuque, Iowa, Cownsel for Appellees. PLEED THROUGH-—POOR COPY — APPELLEES’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM Come now all of the Appellees, by Robert L. Larson, At- torney General of lowa, Don Hise, First Assistant Attorney General of Iowa, Earl F. Wisdom, Special Assistant Attor- ney General of lowa, Bert F. Wisdom, and F. H. Becker, County Attorney of Dubuque County, Iowa, their counsel, and respectfully move this Court to dismiss the appeal taken herein by Laura Dickinson, or affirm the decision and judg- ment of the Supreme Court of Iowa rendered and filed herein and as grounds therefor states: 75 (1) That the appeal is taken for the purpose of delay only; (2) That the cause shows upon its face that no substantial Federal question is presented for review under Section One, Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; (3) That, although the record in said cause may show that this Court has technical jurisdiction, it is manifest that the questions upon which the appeal is taken and the errors cited by said Appellant are so unsubstantial that further argument is unnecessary. Avrnorrries ty Support or Motion Rule 7, U. 8S. Supreme Court Rules; Rule 12, Par. 3, U.S. Supreme Court Rules; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541 at 544, 56 L. Ed. 875 at 878, 32 Sup. Ct. 606 at 608; Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Devine, 239 U. 8. 52 at 54, 60 L. Ed. 140 at 142, 36 Sup. Ct. 27 at 28; Boston v. Jackson, 260 U.S. 309 at 314, 67 L. Ed. 274 at 282, 43 Sup. Ct. 129 at 131; — 76 Hoages v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600 at 601, 67 L. Ed. 819 at 821, 43 Sup. Ct. 435 at 436. In Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541, at 544, this Court said: ‘*Defendant in error moves to affirm the judgment under subdivision 5 of Rule 6. The motion we think should prevail, since the questions urged upon our attention as a basis for a reversal of the judgment have been so plainly foreclosed by decisions of this court as to make further argument unnecessary.’’ This is the universal rule in this Court. In further support of the Motion, see Authorities cited under Proposition II to Proposition VI, inclusive, of Appel- lees’ ‘‘ Brief in Suport of Resistance to Appellant’s State- ment of Jurisdiction.”’ The cases cited and quoted in Proposition II to Proposi- tion VI, inclusive, of Appellees’ ‘‘ Resistance to Appellant’s Statement of Jurisdiction’’ show conclusively that the clas- sifications made by the legislative enactment challenged herein are reasonable and proper and within public policy of the State of Iowa throughout its history. Said citations from the opinions of this Court show conclusively that the errors upon which Appellant bases her claim for reversal have been so plainly foreclosed by the decisions of this Court as to make further argument unnecessary. DPLEED THROUGH=—POOR COPY a 77 Wuererore, Appellees pray that the appeal herein be dis- missed; or in the alternative, that the decision and judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa be affirmed. . Rosert L. Larson, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, lowa; Dow Hise, First Assistant Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa; Eaart F. Wispom, Special Assistant Attorney General of lowa, 1114 Register & Tribune Building, Des Moines, lowa; Bert F. Wispom, 1114 Register & Tribune Building, Des Moines, Iowa; F. H. Becker, County Attorney of Dubuque County, Dubuque, Iowa, Counsel for Appellees. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385610_0368%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.