# Appellants Brief — Dyer v. City Council of Beloit

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385610_0252%3A03

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appellants Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1948
- **Citation:** 333 U.S. 825

## Text

ELEED THROUGH = POOR COPY

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Ocroszer Team, 1947.

No. 275

Appellant’s Brief

\ CLAUDE D. STOUT,
Milton, Wisconsin,

GEORGE 8. GEFFS,
JACOB GEFFS,
ELI BLOCK,
Janesville, Wisconsin,
Counsel for Appellant.

Midwest Law Printing Co., 340 W. Huron 8t., Chicago

SUBJECT INDEX.

Opinion of the Courts below
Statement of Jurisdiction
Statement of the case

Specification of errors

Summary of Argument

Argument

1. The requirement of the Beloit Ordinance that
the pasteurization plant must be located within six
miles of State Street and East Grand Avenue in said
city prohibits interstate commerce of pure, whole-
some and sanitary milk and is therefore unconstitu-
tional

The milk which appellant proposed to sell is pure
and sanitary and meets the requirement of the Beloit
Ordinance as to sanitation

A State cannot prohibit interstate commerce on the
ground that it is inconvenient or impractical to in-
spect the original source of the product being offered

Including a small part of Illinois within the six
mile zone does not meet the requirements of the
Interstate Commerce clause as to appellant who ob-
tains his milk beyond the six mile zone

Beloit is not free to prohibit interstate commerce
in the absence of congressional action

ii
Appellant is not responsible for Beloit’s inability
to inspect the milk being offered for sale....................

The milk that appellant offered for sale is being
adequately inspected according to current standard
and approved methods..............................

2. The provision of the Beloit Ordinance which
prohibits the sale of milk not pasteurized within the
six mile zone is arbitrary, discriminatory and in
violation of the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution

A city may not draw a line around itself and pro-
hibit the sale of milk originating beyond the line,
although it deems that it has included enough terri-
tory to supply its local needs

The six mile zone was drawn without reasonable
relation to the supposed object to he obtained by the
city ;

Courts of last resort in other states have held
such ordinances to be in violation of due process........

Conclusion _......

Appendix:
Model Milk Ordinance
Opinion of Attorney General of Michigan.................

Cases Crrep.
Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. 8. 78, 34 L. Ed. 862........

Carter v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 321 U. 8, 131,
64 S. Ct. 464

Freeman v. Hewit, .. U. S. ~.., 67 8. Ct. 274.0000.
Grant v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 263, 82 8S. W. (2d) 283...

19

19

17
16

iii
John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City of Augusta et al.,
277 U. S. 100, 48 S. Ct. 489, 72 L. Ed. 801

La Franchi v. City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal. (2d) 331,
65 P. (2d) 1301

McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 64 S. Ct.
1023

Miller v. Williams, 12 Federal Supp. 236

Prescott v. City of Borger, (Tex. App.) 158 S. W.
(2d) 578

Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 18 S. Ct.
757, 43 L. Ed. 49

Sheffield Farms Co., Inc. v. Seaman 114 N. J. L. 455,
177 A. 372

Southern Pac. Co. v. State of Arizona, 325 U. S. 761,
65 S. Ct. 1515

State ex rel. Larson v. City of Minneapolis, 190
Minn. 138, 251 N. W. 121

State of Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S., 313, 34 L. Ed.

36 Stat. 1156, 43 Stat. 937, 45 Stat. 54, 28 U. S. C. A.
344 (a) a

Texts.
22 Am. Jur. Food Sec. 16 page 817

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Ocroser Term, 1947.

No. 275

LAWRENCE DYER,

Appellant’s Brief

TT

OPINION OF THE COURTS BELOW.

The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of
Wisconsin (R. 26-30) is reported in 250 Wis. 613, 27
N. W. (2d) 733; the opinion of the Cireuit Court for
Rock County is not officially reported, but is found in
the record at pages 4-6.

2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.

(a) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
Section 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, as amended (36
Stat. 1156, 43 Stat. 937, 45 Stat. 54, 28 U. S. C. A. 344
(a) ), from a final judgment of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin entered the 10th day of June, 1947. Section
237 of the Judicial Code provides that a final judgment
or decree in a suit in the highest court of a state

‘*Where is drawn in question the validity of a
statute of any state on the ground of its being re-
pugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its
validity, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court

upon appeal.’’

There was drawn in question in this case the validity,
under Section 8 of Article 1 and the 14th Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States, of Section 8.09
(x) (2) of the Beloit City Ordinances,

A city ordinance is a statute within the meaning of
Section 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, for purpose of
appeal to this court. John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City
Council of Augusta, et al. 277 U. 8. 100, 48 8. Ct. 489,
72 L. Ed. 801,

(b) Judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of
Wisconsin was entered on June 10, 1947, (R. 26-30) and

an appeal was allowed by that court to this Court on
July 30, 1947,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The case involves the constitutionality of Section 8.09
(x) (2) of the Beloit City Ordinances, which reads:

‘*No pasteurized milk shall be sold in the City of
Beloit which shall not have been pasteurized in ap-

as lr eS eh hUue EP es aes reese! es ae eT. Fo

proved plants within six miles from the intersection
of State Street and E. Grand Ave. in the City of
Beloit.””
The parties at the beginning of the trial made the fol-
lowing stipulation of facts:

‘It Is Hereby Stipulated, in open coart, by Law-
rence Dyer, Petitioner, by McGowan, and Geffs, his
attorneys, and the defendants by C. L. Haugan,
City Attorney for the City of Beloit and Eari J.
Caskey, their attorneys; that on the 29th day of
August, 1946, the petitioner, Lawrence Dyer, made
written application to the City of Beloit for a li-
cense to distribute the milk of the Dean Milk Com-
pany in the City of Beloit, and that in so doing he
has complied with all of the terms of the City Ordi-
nance in Beloit, except in the one respect, that the
pasteurization plant of the Dean Milk Compnay is
located at Chemung, Illinois, a distance of more than
six miles from the corner of Kast Grand Avenue and
State Street in the City of Beloit; that the pasteuri-
zation plant of the Dean Milk Company, from which
the Petitioner will receive his milk for distribution
in Beloit is hetween twenty-five and thirty miles
from the point indicated by the ordinance in the City
of Beloit.

‘*It Is Also Stipulated, that in accordance with the
terms of the City Ordinance, the petitioner has filed
with the City Clerk a list of the farmers who bring
their milk to the Chemung dairy of the Dean Milk
Company and that the number of farms so named
amounts to one hundred ninety-seven; that such
farms are located in the Counties of McHenry, Boone
and Winnebago in the State of Illinois, and Wal-
worth County in the State of Wisconsin.

‘‘It Is Further Stipulated, that on the 3th day
of August, 1946, the City Council of Beloit rejected
the application of the petitioner for such milk license
upon the ground that the pasteurization plant of the
Dean Milk Company was located more than six miles

4

“It Is Further Stipulated, that it is the intention
petitioner, in the event a license is granted
to obtain milk pasteurized at the factory of
the Dean Milk Company at Chemung, Illinois, and
oe eee ee for sale in

City Beloit at retail stores,

a this 26th day of September, 1946’’ (R.
Appellant Dyer testified that the milk he proposed to
sell to retail stores in Beloit was Grade A. milk and its
composition qualifies as to the sanitary conditions and
quality required by the Beloit City Ordinance (R. 9);
that the milk is cooled to 34 degrees when it comes from
the pasteurizer and placed in paper cartons; that his
truck was insulated and in warm weather he used ice;
that when the milk arrived at Beloit, its temperature
would not be more than 42 degrees Fahrenheit; that he
had occasion to check the bacteria count on this milk
with the bacteria count of milk sold in Beloit, and in
every instance it was lower than other milk pasteurized
and sold in Beloit (R. 9-10); that this milk was sold in
the City of Chicago and suburbs; that each farm which
supplies milk to the Dean plant is inspected every week
and sometimes twice a week by the Chicago Board of
Health; that the Dean Milk Company also has its own
inspectors who inspect the source of the milk at the
farms; that the City of Chicago and its suburbs operate
under what is known as the Model Milk Ordinance for-
mulated by the Public Health Service of the United
States; (The Model Milk Ordinance is set out in the
Appendix of this brief); that the City of Chicago op-
erates under what is known as the Mayor Kelly Milk
Ordinance, which is as stringent as the Medel Milk Ordi-
nance formulated by the Public Health Service of the

United States (R. 10); that this milk is delivered to the
Dean Plant the same day it is produced and would be
delivered normally within two hours after being pas-
teurized (R. 9).

Stanley J. Goldschmidt, the City Sanitarian of Beloit,
testified that he and one assistant had charge of inspect-
ing all farms from which Grade A Milk was sold in Be-
loit; also the inspection of restaurants, clubs, taverns,
garbage collection, 1500 people engaged in handling food,
quarantine, contagious diseases, and the complaints com-
ing into the department (R. 10-11); that with his present
staff that he could not inspect the Dean Plant and 150
additional sources of milk even though the plant and
farms were located within six miles of Beloit (R. 12);
that there is more milk coming into Beloit every day
than what local people use (P, 11); that there is no ob-
jection to the quality or sanitary condition of the milk
that Mr. Dyer intends to deliver to the City of Beloit
that he knew of and that he had or one or two occasions
delivered it to the State Laboratory of Hygiene; that he
would say it was about the average of the milk sold in
Beloit, not any worse or any better (R. 12),

That his opposition to granting a license to Mr. Dyer
was based upon the proposition that the pasteurization
plant where he received his milk was located more than
six miles from State and Grand Avenue, City of Beloit
(R. 12).

That his department did not inspect dairy farms which
furnished Grade B milk to Beloit (R. 11) and that farms
furnishing Grade A milk were inspected twice a vear (TM.
12); that if this license was granted the city would have to
hire another inspector (R. 12) which would cost the city
$200.00 a month and traveling expenses (R. 13), but that

it would be hard to say whether the additional inspector
would devote his time to inspecting additional farms with-
out first lave out a program (R. 13).

The Milk Ordinance of the City of Beloit is set forth
in the Record pages 13-23. The Ordinance makes no re-
quirement in regard to the proximity of the sources of
the milk, or dairy farms, to the City of Beloit. As to
the inspection of the original sources and milk plants,
the Ordinance provides:

**(X) (6) The Health Officer or any officially ap-
pointed representative he may so designate shall in-
spect periodically or at such time as convenient or
which expediency may require, every dairy farm
producing milk and cream for consumption within
the City of Beloit and all milk plants whose milk
and cream are intended for consumption within the
City of Beloit’’ (R. 22).

**(X) (7) Samples of milk and cream from dair-
ies, milk depots, stores, cafes, soda-fountains, res-
taurants and other places where milk products are
sold shall be tested as often as the Health Officer
may require. Bacteria counts and other tests shall
be made in conformity with the standard methods
recommended by the American Public Health Asso-
ciation and the Association of Official Agricultural
Chemists. Tests may include such other chemical and
physical determinations as the Health Officer may
deem necessary for making hacterial counts and the
detection of adulteration. Notices of bacterial counts
shall be given to the producer or distributor con-
cerned as soon as made. Samples may be taken hy
the Health Officer at any time prior to the final de-
livery to consumer of any milk or milk products.
All dairies, milk plants, milk depots, stores, cafes,
restaurants, soda-fountains and other places which
shall sell or offer for sale milk or milk products in
the city of Beloit shall furnish the Health Officer,

- ,

upon his request, the names and addresses of source
from which their milk supply is obtained’’ (R. 22-
23).
The Ordinance makes the following requirement in re-
gard to the location of the pasteurization plant:

**(X) (2) No pasteurized milk shall be sold in
the City of Beloit which shall not have been pasteur-
ized in approved plants within six miles from the
intersection of State Street and E. Grand Ave., in
the City of Beloit’? (R. 22).

The trial court in its opinion stated:

‘*No objection is raised by the City as to the
Grade or quality of the milk sought to he sold, and
it is conceded that the petitioner has complied with
all of the terms of the Beloit Ordinance, except in
the one respect, that the pasteurization plant of the
Dean Milk Company is located at Chemung, Illinois, a
distance of more than six miles from the City of
Beloit, i. ¢., a distance of hetween twenty-five and
thirty-five miles from the point indicated by the Be-
loit City Ordinance”? (R. 5).

The trial Court ruled that the six mile requirement of
the Ordinance did not deprive the appellant of his prop-
erty rights and constitutional rights without due process
of law, and was not an illegal interference with Inter-
state Commerce (R. 6).

The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of the State of Wisconsin (R. 25).

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS.

1. The Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin
erred in holding and deciding that Sec. 8.09 (X) (2) of
the Beloit City Ordinance which reads:

‘*No pasteurized milk shall be sold in the City of
Beloit which shall not have been pasteurized in ap-

8

proved plants within six miles from the intersection
of State Street and East Grand Avenue in the City
of Beloit.’’,

did not deprive appellant of his property rights without
due process of law, did not deprive appellant of his right
of contract, and did not deny to appellant the equal pro-
tection of the laws within the meaning of section 1 of
article XIV of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.

2. The Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin erred
in holding and deciding that said city ordinance as ap-
plied to appellant did not violate section 8, article I of
the Constitution of the United States, being what is com-
monly called the Interstate Commerce clause of the
United States Constitution.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

1. The requirement of the Beloit Ordinance that the
pasteurization plant must be located within six miles of
State Street and East Grand Avenue in said city prohibits
interstate commerce of pure, wholesome and sanitary
milk and is therefore unconstitutional.

It is conceded that appellant’s milk meets all the re-
quirements of the Beloit Milk Ordinance except it was
pasteurized in a plant 25 to 35 miles from Beloit. A city
or state may enact reasonable inspection laws to insure
the purity of food being offered for sale within its bound-
aries, but a city or state may not prohibit interstate com-
merce in such commodities altogether even though the
inspection is burdensome, and inspection at the origina!

Lee ee ee ee

——

9

source impossible from a practical standpoint. The con-
tention that inspection of appellant’s milk would cause
undue hardship upon the city of Beloit because the pas-
teurization plant is located 25 to 35 miles from Beloit is
without merit because the city’s chief health officer tes-
tified that his department would be unable to inspect the
additional farms and plant even if they were located
within the six mile zone, and it would be a minor matter
for the chief health officer to satisfy himself whether or
not the inspection now being made is adequate. Inspection
of appellant’s sources of milk, the milk plant and trans-
portation facilities would not be burdensome as a matter
of fact.

The fact that the six mile zone covers a small portion
of the State of Illinois does not make the Beloit Ordinance
less objectionable as to commerce originating in Illinois
more than six miles from the City of Beloit.

The City of Beloit is not at liberty to prohibit inter-
state commerce in the absence of congressional action.
The interstate commerce clause is a grant of power to
Congress to control commerce, and is a diminution pro
tanto of absolute state sovereignty over the same sub-
ject. The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to
create an area of free trade among the several states.

2. The provision of the Beloit Ordinance which pro-
hibits the sale of milk not pasteurized within the six mile
zone is arbitrary, discriminatory, and in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

A city ordinance which arbitrarily draws a line around
the city and prohibits the sale of milk pasteurized beyond
the line under any and all circumstances and conditions

—

10

is arbitrary and discriminatory. Erection of a prohib-
itive trade barrier by a city deprives those who are pre-
vented from competing in the city markets of their prop-
erty and right of contract without due process of law and
denies to them the equal protection of the law.

All courts of last resort in this country except the case
at bar has held similar ordinances in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In some of the cases the burden
of inspection was much more onerous than in the case at
bar.

Appellant should not be denied relief because he did
not offer to bear the expenses of inspection, because (1)
he was denied a license on the sole ground that the pas-
teurization plant from which he proposed to obtain milk
was located more than six miles from the City of Beloit,
(2) Appellant tendered all the license fees provided for
in the Ordinance and (3) Appellant has no control over
staffing and regulating the Health Department of the
City of Beloit.

The requirement of the Beloit Ordinance that the pas-
teurizatien plant must be located within six miles of State
Street and East Grand Avenue in said city prohibits in-
terstate commerce of pure, wholesome and sanitary milk
and is therefore unconstitutional.

The trial Court stated in its opinion:

**No objection is raised by the City as to the Grade
or quality of the milk sought to be sold, and it is
conceded that the petitioner has complied with all of
the terms of the Beloit Ordinance, except in the one
respect, that the pasteurization plant of the Dean
Milk Company is located at Chemung, Illinois, a
distance of more than six miles from the City of
Beloit; i. e., a distance of between twenty-five and
thirty-five miles from the point indicated by the
Beloit City Ordinance.’’ (R. 5).

This statement in the trial Court’s opinion under the
Wisconsin law is equivalent to the formal Finding of
Fact, Wolfrom v. Anderson, 249 Wis. 433, 25 N. W. 2d
880.

The parties stipulated in open court that the appellant
had

**Complied with all of the terms of the Citv Or-
dinance in Beloit, except in the one respect, that the
pasteurization plant of the Dean Milk Company is
located at Chemung, Illinois, a distance of more than
six miles from the corner of East Grand Avenue and
State Street in the City of Beloit’’ (R. 8).

The Beloit Ordinance makes no requirement as to the
location of the farms where the milk is produced.

12

It is true that Beloit is located on the state line be-
tween Wisconsin and Illinois and that the circle with the
six mile radius from East Grand Avenue and State Street
includes a small portion of the State of Illinois. The six
mile zone prescribed by the Beloit Ordinance prohibits
the Appellant from selling pasteurized milk within the
city for the sole reason that the milk was pasteurized
at a plant twenty-five to thirty-five miles away from
Beloit.

Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of the State
of Wisconsin held that the provision for the six mile zone
was a valid provision notwithstanding the Interstate
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. It stands as a verity
in this case that the milk which the appellant proposed
to sell is pure, wholesome, sanitary and meets all the re-
quirements prescribed by the Beloit Milk Ordinance ex-
cept that it was not pasteurized within the six mile zone.

This position when applied to the appellant is a clear
violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.

In Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. 8. 1 18 S.
Ct. 757 43 L. Ed. 49 this court held a Pennsylvania Stat-
ute was in violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause
of the Constitution which prohibited the introduction and
sale within its borders of oleomargarine. At page 12 Mr.
Justice Peckham, speaking for the majority of the Court,
stated: Ps)

‘“‘The general rule to be deduced from the deci-
sions of this court is that a lawful article of com-
merce cannot be wholly excluded from importation
into a state from another state where it was manu-
factured or grown. A state has power to regulate

13

the introduction of any article, including a food prod-
uct, so as to insure purity of the article imported,
but such police power does not include the total ex-
clusion even of an article of food.

In Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. 8S. 313, it was held
that an inspection law relating to an article of food
was not a rightful exercise of the police power of
the state if the inspection prescribed were of such a
character or if tt were burdened with such conditions
as would wholly prevent the imtroduction of the sound
article from other states. This was held in relation
to the slaughter of animals whose meat was to .be
sold as food in the state passing the so-called in-
spection law. The principle was affirmed in Brim-
mer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, and im Scott v. Donald,
165 U. S. 58, 97.

Is the rule altered in a case where the inspection
or analysis of the article to be imported is some-
what difficult and burdensome? Can the pure and
healthy food product be totally excluded on that ac-
count? No case has gone to that extent in this court.
The nearest approach to it was the case of Peirce v.
New Hampshire, 46 U. S. 5 How. 504, involving the
importation of intoxicating liquors. But in Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, the New Hampshire case was
overruled, and it was stated by the present Chief
Justice, in speaking for the court, that ‘whatever our
individual views may be as to the deleterious or dan-
gerous qualities of particular articles, we cannot hold
that any articles which Congress recognizes as sub-
jects of interstate commc¢rce are not such, or that
whatever are thus recognized can be controlled by
state laws amounting to regulations, while they re-
tain that character; although, at the same time, if
directly dangerous in themselves, the state may take
appropriate measures to guard against injury before
it obtains complete jurisdiction over them. To con-
cede to a state the power to exclude, directly or in-
directly, articles so situated, without congressional
permission, is to concede to a majority of the people
of a state, represented in the state legislature, the

14

power to regulate commercial intercourse between
the states, by determining what shall be its subjects,
when that power was distinctly granted to be ex-
ercised by the people of the United States, repre-
sented in Congress, and its possession by the latter
was considered essential to that more perfect union
which the Constitution was adopted to create.’

To the same effect, we think, is the case of Han-
mibal & St. J. Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 VW. S.
465, in which it was said that ‘whatever may be the
power of a state over commerce that is completely
internal, it can no more prohibit or regulate that
which is interstate than it can that which is with
foreign nations.’ The court, therefore, while conced-
ing the right of the state to enact reasonable inspec-
tion laws to prevent the importation of diseased cat-
tle, held the law of Missouri there under considera-
tion to be invalid, because it prohibited absolutely
the introduction of Texas cattle during the time
named in the act, even though they were perfectly
healthy and sound.

The court said that a state could not, under the
cover of exerting its police powers, substantially
prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate com-
merce. Reasonable and appropriate laws for the in-
spection of articles, including food products, were ad-
mitted to be valid, but absolute prohibition of an un-
adulterated, healthy, and pure article has never been
permitted as a remedy against the importation of
that which was adulterated and therefore unhealthy
or impure.

We do not think the fact that the article is subject
to be adulterated by dishonest persons in the course
of its manufacture, with other substances, which it
is claimed may in some instances become deleterious
to health, creates the right in any state through its
legislature to forbid the introduction of the unadul-
terated article into the state. The fact that the arti-
cle is liable to adulteration in the course of manu-
facture, and that the articles with which it may be

15

mixed may possibly and under some circumstances
be deleterious to the health of those who consume it,
is known to us by means of various references to the
subject in books and encyclopaedias, but there was
no affirmative evidence offered on the trial to prove
the fact. From these sources of information it may
be admitted that oleomargerine in the course of its
manufacture may sometimes be adulterated by dis-
honest manufacturers with articles that possibly may
become injurious to health. Conceding the fact, we
yet deny the right of a state to absolutely prohibit
the introduction within its borders of an article of
commerce which is not adulterated and which in its
pure state is healthful, simply because such an arti-
cle in the course of its manufacture may be aculter-
ated by dishonest manufacturers for purposes of
fraud or illegal gains. The bad article may be pro-
hibited, but not the pure and healthy one.

In the execution of its police powers we admit the
right of the state to enact such legislation as it may
deem proper, even in regard to articles of interstate
commerce, for the purpose of preventing fraud or
deception in the sale of any commodity and to the
extent that it may be fairly necessary to prevent
the introduction or sale of an adulterated article
within the limits of the state. But in carrying out
its purposes the state cannot absolutely prohibit the
introduction within the state of an article of com-
merce like pure oleomargarine.’’

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated in its opinion:

‘‘This ordinance does not violate the interstate
commerce clause of the United States constitution.
Milk may be furnished from farms and pasteuriza-
tion plants in the state of Illinois as well as in the
state of Wisconsin, and in fact milk is so furnished.
The production and delivery of milk are essentially
local problems with which congress has not sought
to deal, leaving the city of Beloit free to act in the
exercise of its police powers. State v. Chicago, Mil-

16

waukee d St. Paul R. Co. (1908), 136 Wis. 407, 117
N. W. 686, 19 L. R. A. (N. 8S.) 326; Wadhams Oil
Co. v. Tracy (1909), 141 Wis. 150, 123 N. W. 785.”’
(R. 29-30)

The above pronouncement is in conflict with the deci-
sions of this court upon the meaning and purpose of
the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution of
the United States. The fact that the arbitrary circle
drawn by the city of Beloit around itself includes ap-
proximately one hundred fifteen square miles of terri-
tory of the State of Illinois does not meet the constitu-
tional requirements of Commerce originating beyond the
rim of the circle. If the proposition stated by the Wis-
consin Court is allowed to stand then all interstate com-
merce in this country will soon come to an end. Any
state could effectively prohibit interstate commerce by
allowing importation within its borders of goods pro-
duced within a limited zone beyond its boundaries.

The second proposition of the Wisconsin Court that the
city of Beloit is free to act in the absence of action by
Congress is also in conflict with the decisions of this
Court. This court stated in Freeman v. Hewit, ..U, 8...
67 S. Ct. 274, 276:

*‘Our starting point is clear. In two recent cases
we applied the principle that the Commerce Clause
was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact
laws for the protection and encouragement of com-
merce among the States, but by its own force created
an area of trade free from interference by the States.
In short, the Commerce Clause even without imple-
menting legislation by Congress is a limitation upon
the power of the States. Southern Pacific Co, v. Ari-
zona, 325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515 89 L. Ed. 1915;
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. .., 66 S. Ct. 1050,
In so deciding we reaffirmed, upon fullest consider-
ation, the course of adjudication unbroken through
the Nation’s history. This limitation on State power,

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

17

as the Morgan case so well illustrates, does not
merely forbid a State to single out interstate corm-
merce for hostile action. A State is also precluded
from taking any action which may fairly be deemed
to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade
between States. It is immaterial that local commerce
is subjected to a similar encumbrance. It may com-
mend itself to a State to encourage a pastoral in-
stead of an industrial society. That is its concern
and its privilege. But to compare a State’s treat-
ment of its local trade with the exertion of its au-
thority against commerce in the national domain
is to compare incomparables.

These principles of limitation on State power ap-
ply to all State policy no matter what State interest
gives rise to its legislation. A burden on interstate
commerce is none the lighter and no less objectionable
because it is imposed hy a State under the taxing
power rather than under manifestations of police
power in the conventional sense.’ (Ttalies ours.)

In Carter v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 321 U. 8. 131,

64 S. Ct. 464 at page 137 of U. S. Rep. and 468 of S. Ct.
Rep. :

“That clause remains in the Constitution as a
grant of power to Congress to control commerce and
as a diminution pro tanto of absolute state sover-
eignty over the same subject.”’

In Southern Pac. Co. v. State of Arizona, 325 U. 8.

761, 769, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 1520, this Court stated:

‘*For a hundred years it has been accepted con-
stitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, with-
out the aid of congressional legislation, thus affords
some protection from state legislation inimical to
the national commerce, and that in such cases, where
Congress has not acted, this Court and not the state
legislature, is under the commerce clause the final
arbiter of the competing demands of state and na-
tional interests.”’

18

In McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. 8. 327, 330,
64 5S. Ct. 1023, 1026 this Court stated:

‘The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was
to create an area of free trade among the several
States.”’

The case of Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. 8. 78, 34 L. Fd.
852 held unconstitutional the statute of the State of Vir-
ginia which provided for inspection of meat that was
transported more than one hundred miles after slaughter
and for an inspection fee of one cent a pound. Rebman
was convicted for the sale of meat from animals slaughi-
tered in [linois. The United States Supreme Court held
the Virginia statute unconstitutional. The Court stated:

**Is the Statute now before us liable to the objec-
tion that, by its necessary operation, it interferes
with the enjoyment of rights granted or secured by
the Constitution? This question admits of but one an-
swer. The Statute is, in effect, a prohibition upon
the sale in Virginia, of beef, veal or mutton, although
entirely wholesome, if from animals slaughtered one
hundred miles or over from the place of sale. We
say prohibition, because the owner of such meats can-
not sell them in Virginia until they are inspected
there; and being required to pay the heavy charge of
one cent per pound to the inspector, as his compensa-
tion, he cannot compete, upon equal terms, in the
markets of that Commonwealth, with those in the
same business, whose meats, of like kind, from ani-
mals slaughtered within less than one hundred miles
from the place of sale, are not subjected to inspec-
tion at all. Whether there shall be inspection or not,
and whether the seller shall compensate the inspec-
tor or not, is thus made to depend entirely upon the
place where the animals, from which the heef, veal
or mutton is taken, were slaughtered. Undoubtedly,
a State may establish regulations for the protection
of its people against the sale of unwholesome meats,
provided such regulations do not conflict with the

ELFEN THO MICHWM —. PHOODES CoOPry

19

powers conferred by the Constitution upon Congress,
or infringe rights granted or secured by that instru-
ment. But it may not, under the guise of exerting
its police powers, or of enacting Inspection Laws,
make discriminations against the products and in-
dustries of some of the States in favor of the prod-
ucts and industries of its own or of other States. The
owner of the meats here in question, although they
were from animals slaughtered in Illinois, had the
right, under the Constitution, to compete in the mar-
kets of Virginia upon terms of equality with the
owners of like meats, from animals slaughtered in
Virginia or elsewhere within one hundred miles from
the place of sale. Any local regulation which, in
terms or by its necessary operation, denies this
equality in the markets of a State, is, when applied
to the people and products or industries of other
States, a direct burden upon commerce among the
States, and therefore void.’’

The right of the City of Beloit to inspect appellant’s
milk before sale is not involved in this case. The provision

of the Ordinance in question simply prohibits the sale of
the milk altogether.

Beloit may regulate the introduction of a food product
in such way as to insure its purity, but such power does
not include the total exclusion of an article of food. 22
Am. Jur. Food Sec. 16 page 817.

The defense in this action consisted chiefly of the prop-
osition that it was too expensive and inconvenient for the
City of Beloit to inspect the additional sources of milk
and the pasteurization plant from which the appellant
would obtain the milk he proposed to sell. There is no
objection to the purity, wholesomeness or sanitation of
the milk which the appellant proposed to sell in Beloit.
The objection is that the City of Beloit does not want to
ineur the inconvenience and expense necessary to satisfy
itself that this milk does comply with the requirements
of its Ordinance.

20

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated in its opinion:

‘‘The city of Beloit has two employees in this de-
partment, the city sanitarian and an assistant, and
proof was offered that to assume the inspection of
the additional plant and farms it would require the
employment of another employee at a cost of $2,400
per year, and if other likewise distant plants were
included it would cost much more. Convenience and
efficiency are self-evident.’’ (R. 28-29)

The record, however, shows that the city sanitarian and
one assistant inspect the Grade A farms furnishing milk
to Beloit about twice a year; that they inspect also 38
restaurants, 16 soda fountains, 18 light lunch establ'sh-
ments, 20 confectionery stores, 81 grocery and meat mar-
kets, 8 bakeries 53 taverns and clubs, 8 dairies and also
supervise the collection of garbage from about 8,500
households, inspect 1,500 people engaged in handling food
and also handle the daily complaints and the quarrantine
of contagious diseases. In their spare time they look
after the correspondence that comes into the office.

The city sanitarian also testified that if additional
farms and pasteurization plants from which the appellant
proposed to obtain his milk were all located within the
six mile zone that he and his assistant would not have
time to inspect them; an additional inspector would cost
the City of Beloit about $200.00 per month plus travelling
expenses and that, ‘‘it would be hard to say whether his
work would be devoted to inspecting additional farms
without first laying out a program.’’ (R. 12-13)

The record shows that the farms and plant from which
the appellant would obtain his milk were inspected by
cities in Illinois obtaining milk from the Dean Milk Com-
pany and by the inspectors of the Dean Milk Company it-
self twice a week. The farms within the six mile zone
furnishing Grade A milk are inspected only twice a year

BLEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

21

by th City of Beloit and those furnishing Grade B milk
are not inspected at all.

Section 11 of the Model Milk Ordinance and Code, re-
commended by the United States Public Health Service
and prepared by direction of the Surgeon General of the
United States provides:

**Sec. 11. Milk and milk products from points
beyond the limits of routine inspection—Milk and
milk products from points beyond the limits of rou-
tine inspection of the city of may not be sold
in the city of , or its police jurisdiction, unless
produced and/or pasteurized under provisions equi-
valent to the requirements of this ordinance: Pro-
vided, That the health officer shall satisfy himself
that the health officer having jurisdiction over the
production and processing is properly enforcing such
provisions.’

The provision of the Model Milk Code is perfectly rea-
sonable and is an adequate safeguard to insure the purity
and sanitation of the milk—in fact, the Beloit Milk
Ordinance, Sec. (X) (6) authorizes a similar procedure.
This section provides:

**(6) The Health Officer or any officially appointed
representative he may so designate shall inspect
periodically or at such time as convenient or which
expediency may require, every dairy farm producing
milk and cream for consumption within the city of
Beloit and all milk plants whose milk and cream are
intended for consumption within the city of Beloit.’’

Section (X) (7) of the Beloit Milk Ordinance author-
izes the health officer to examine samples of the milk and
to make all of the tests recommended by the American
Public Health Association and Association of Official
Agricultural Chemists to determine the purity and sani-
tation of the milk.

22

The milk which the appellant proposed to furnish is
regularly inspected twice a week both as to the sources of
the milk and pasteurization plant and the means of trans-
portation by cities with ordinances just as exacting and
stringent as the Beloit City Ordinance. The city sani-
tarian of Beloit, with little expense and inconvenience,
could easily determine whether or not this inspection was
being made in the proper manner and whether or not the
requirements of the Ordinances of the Illinois cities were
being met.

The location of the pasteurization plant 25 or 35 miles
from the City of Beloit in this day of modern roads and
automobiles presents no great inconvenience. As to the
inspection of the additional farms the Beloit City Or-
dinance prescribes no limitation as to the location of the
farms; the six mile limit applies only to the pasteuriza-
tion plant.

In view of the frank admission of the city sanitarian
that he would be unable to inspect the additional farms
and the pasteurization plant even if they were located
within the six mile limit destroys the excuse that the
appellant should be barred from engaging in Interstate
Commerce because of the inconvenience and expense in
determining whether or not his product is pure, whole-
some and sanitary.

The same excuse that the city of Beloit makes was
made by the State of Minnesota and denied by this Court
in the case of State of Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S.
313, 34 L. Ed. 455. That case involved the sale of fresh
meat. It is common knowledge that fresh meat is subject
to contamination to an equal extent as milk. The Minne-
sota statute prohibited the sale of fresh meat in Minne-
sota unless the animal had been inspected in Minnesota
before slaughter. Barber was convicted of selling meat

ELEED THROUGH ~— POOR COPY

23

in Minnesota which had been slaughtered in Illinois. The
State of Minnesota argued that it could not determine
whether or not the animal was healthy by merely inspect-
ing the meat when it was offered for sale. The State of
Minnesota contended that it could only be determined
whether or not the anima] was healthy by inspecting the
animal before slaughter. It also contended that it had a
right to have this fact determined by its own inspectors
and that it was too inconvenient and expensive ior its
inspectors to go to [llinois and other states and inspect
the animal before slaughter. This contention was rejected
by the United States Supreme Court and this Court
stated at page 458:

‘*On the contrary, the enactment of a similar
statute by each one of the States composing the
Union would result in the destruction of commerce
among the several States, so far as such commerce
is involved in the transportation from one part of
the country to another of animal meats designed
for human food, and entirely free from disease.
* * * When to this is added the fact that the Statute,
by its necessary operation, prohibits the sale, in
the State, of fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork,
from animals that may have been inspected carefully
and thoroughly in the State where they were slaugh-
tered, and before they were slaughtered, no doubt
can remain as to its effect upon commerce among
the several States. Jt will not do to say—certainly
no judicial tribunal can, with propriety, assume—that
the people of Minnesota may not, with due regard
to their health, rely wpon inspections in other States
of animals there slaughtered for purposes of human
food. Tf the object of the Statute had been to deny
altogether to the citizens of other States the privi-
lege of selling, within the limits of Minnesota, for
human food, any fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or
pork, from animals slaughtered outside of that State,
and to compel the people of Minnesota, wishing to
buy such meats, either to purchase those taken from

24

animals inspected and slaughtered in the State, or
to incur the cost of purchasing them, when desired
for their own domestic use, at points beyond the
State, that object is attained by the Act in question.
Our duty to maintain the Constitution will not permit
us to shut our eyes to these obvious and necessary
results of the Minnesota Statute. If this legislation
does not make such discrimination against the prod-
ucts and business of other States in favor of the
products and business of Minnesota, as interferes
with and burdens commerce among the several States,
it would be difficult to enact legislation that would
have that result.’’

In the lower courts, the case of Muller v. Williams, 12
Federal Supp. 236 held unconstitutional a regulation of
the Health Commissioner of Baltimore City which pro-
hibited the use or sale of cream for the manufacture of
ice cream produced by dairies situated more than fifty
miles from the City limits. The plaintiff, a citizen of
Pennsylvania, with principal place of business at Phila-
dephia, sought an injunction against the regulation. The
City defended upon the ground that ‘‘there are more
than 4,000 dairy farms within the 50 mile limit from
Baltimore and the number of available inspectors is, as
a matter of reasonable expense, necessarily limited. With
regard to distantly located dairy plants, for instance
those in Wisconsin, it is said to be impossible to make
such frequent inspections and to carry on such educa-
tional work as is possible within a limited distance from
Baltimore City.’’ Judge Chestnut held the regulation to
be in conflict with both the Due Process and Interstate
Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. In his opinion,
he stated:

‘‘In my opinion the regulation is invalid, when
attacked as unreasonable. by a directly interested
party producing milk within the State of Maryland
(in the absence of a state statute) outside the zone

BLEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

25

or from the point of view of being a direct burden
upon interstate commerce. From the latter aspect,
the applicable principles of constitutional law are
now well settled. Freedom of commerce between
the states is the rule and not the exception. Under
the Constitution it may be regulated by Congress but
unless otherwise specifically so regulated, the states
may exercise their police power by statute and may
authorize their municipal corporations to do so by
ordinances, provided the latter are reasonably
adapted to the legitimate end of protecting the
health, morals and welfare of the community. But
when local regulations under the guise of police
power are not reasonably adapted to accomplish
these legitimate ends and constitute a direct burden
upon interstate commerce, they must fall, 12 C. J.
52, 60, 81. The principle here involved has been
very recently applied by the Supreme Court of the
United States to interstate shipments of milk in the
ease of Baldwin, Commissioner v. Seelig, 294 U. S.
511, 55 S. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 1032. There a statute
of New York which required a minimum price to
be paid producers of milk within the State and
further provided that no milk from other states
should be sold in New York unless the same minimum
prices were paid to producers in foreign states, was
held unconstitutional as applied to interstate ship-
ments of milk from Vermont, when sold in the
original package, whether in the cans in which
transported or as milk bottled therefrom. Said Mr.
Justice Cardozo (294 U. S. 511, pages 521, 522, 55
S. Ct. 497, 499, 79 L. Ed. 1032):

‘New York is equally without power to prohibit
the introduction within her territory of milk of whole-
some quality acquired in Vermont, whether at high
prices or at low ones. * * * Such a power, if ex-
erted, will set a barrier to traffic hetween one state
and another as effective as if customs duties, equal
to the price differential, iad been laid upon the thing
transported. Imposts or duties upon commerce with
other countries are placed, by an express prohibi-

26

tion of the Constitution, beyond the power of a state,
‘*except what may be absolutely necessary for exe-
euting its inspection Laws.’’ Constitution, art 1,
$10, cl. 2; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19
L. Ed. 382. Imposts and duties upon interstate com-
merce are placed beyond the power of a state, with-
out the mention of an exception, by the provision
committing commerce of that order to the power of
the Congress. Constitution, Art. 1 48, cl. 3. ‘‘It is
the established doctrine of this court that a state
may not, in any form or under any guise, directly
burden the prosecution of interstate business.’’* * *
Nice distinctions have been made at times between
direct and indirect burdens. They are irrelevant
when the avowed purpose of the obstruction, as well
as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate
the consequences of competition between the states.
Such an obstruction is direct by the very terms of
the hypothesis. We are reminded in the opinion
below that a chief occasion of the commerce clauses
was ‘‘the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the
States, taking form in customs barriers and other
economic retaliation.’’ ’

“Tf the principle of this regulation is once es-
tablished as to milk it could seemingly be extended
to other food products such as vegetables, fruits and
meats, which are likewise subject, although perhaps
in less stringent degree, to food inspection and ex-
clusion laws, but only when reasonable. * * * The
result might well be that Baltimore would be made
an isolated sanitary area for much of its food sup-
ply, although it is certainly not intended to suggest
that such an unreasonable extension of the prin-
ciple is at all likely to be proposed by our very
efficient Health Commissioner. The principle, how-
ever, is one that runs directly counter to the consti-
tutional freedom of the interstate commerce.’’

* * -_ * .

‘*The real objection of the Health Department to
the foreign cream is based on the alleged impractica-

BLEED THROUGH ~ POOR COPY

27

bility of adequate and effective supervision by its
own representatives of the dairy farms which pro-
duce the milk supply from remotely situated foreign
dairy plants. This of itself is not a sufficient basis
for excluding the cream although very probably it
would support regulations of a somewhat different
nature than those applicable to the local supply
which would afford every reasonable assurance to
the Health Commissioner for the protection of the
health of the community.’’

It is submitted that the provision of the Beloit Ordi-
nance which requires milk to be pasteurized within the
six mile zone is in violation of the Interstate Commerce
Clause of the Constitution of the United States.

II.

The provision of the Beloit Ordinance which prohibits
the sale of milk not pasteurized within the six mile zone
is arbitrary, discriminatory and in violation of the 14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The philosophy of the opinion of both the trial and
Supreme Court of Wisconsin was that the City of Beloit
could make arrangements to inspect enough of the sur-
rounding territory to supply it with milk and prohibit
entry of milk originating beyond the artificial line pre-
scribed by the Ordinance. This philosophy is set forth
in the following quotation from the opinion of the Snu-
preme Court of the State of Wisconsin:

**It cannot be said that the city, in adopting the
section in dispute, arbitrarily acted on the question
of convenience, efficiency, and cost of inspection,
unless we adopt the rule in the case of Meridian v.
Sippy, 54 Cal. App. (2d) 214, 128 Pac. (2d) 884,
where the court said that milk production is a legiti-
mate business and so long as persons engaged in the

28

business put out a clean, pure and wholesome product
it should be permitted to flow freely on the markets,
unburdened by duplication of imspection and pro-
hibitive trade barriers, which rule we do not adopt.
(Italies ours).

**Counsel for appellant relies on State ex rel. Lar-
son v. City of Minneapolis, supra, and La Francei v.
City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal. (2d) 331, 65 Pace. (2d)
1301. In each instance the city passed an ordinance
restricting the sale of milk in their respective cities
to that pasteurized in plants located within the city
limits of the particular city. No consideration was
given to the area necessary to furnish the milk, and
the plants near the cities in question were arbi-
trarily prohibited from selling milk in the city. No
inspection of the farms producing the milk was pro-
vided for in the ordinances, making the facts entirely
different from those under consideration. Every
ordinance must stand or fall upon its own merits.
It is either reasonable or arbitrary in accordance
with the facts and purposes it is intended to serve,
if within the police powers of the municipality adopt-
ing it. The area necessary to be included in the ordi-
nance could well depend upon the population to be
served, the amount of milk produced, and the loca-
tion of the pasteurization plants with reference to
the population to be served. A reasonable exercise
of police power is not a trade barrier, and contract
rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the federal constitution do not have a superior

right to the right of a municipality to reasonably
protect the health of its citizens.’’ (Italics ours)
(R. 29).

The six mile zone was drawn without reasonable rela-
tion to the supposed object to be obtained by the city.
The chief health officer of the city testified that with his
present staff they would be unable to inspect the milk
plant and the additional farms from which the appellant
proposed to obtain his milk even though the plant and
farms were located within the six mile zone.

BLEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

29

This means that the city arbitrarily limited the busi-
ness to those who were already engaged in the business
and prohibited newcomers from competing for the busi-
ness.

Under the doctrine above announced by the Supreme
Court of the State of Wisconsin every city and village
could build a trade barrier around itself and include so
much of the surrounding territory as the city deemed
necessary to serve the population and to suit its own
convenience as to inspection. This doctrine is not con-
fined merely to milk, other articles of food such as meat,
bakery goods, fruits and vegetables are subject to being
inspected. Any article of food which the city has a right
to inspect to determine its fitness for human consump-
tion could be excluded from Interstate Commerce if it
originated or was produced beyond the artificial line
which the city saw fit to draw around itself.

Every decision of the Courts of last resort in this
country has held such requirements to be in violation
of due process of law-excepting the decision here under
review.

State ex rel. Larson v. City of Minneapolis 190 Minn.
138, 251 N. W. 121 was a mandamus to compel the re-
spondents to issue to relator a license to sell pasteurized
milk and its products within the City of Minneapolis.

The question presented involved the constitutionality
of a city ordinance which made it unlawful to sell pas-
teurized milk in Minneapolis unless it was pasteurized
in plants located within the city limits.

Petitioner’s plant was located 30 miles beyond the city —
limits.

The trial court found that the inspection necessary to
safeguard the public health:

30

‘*is attended with substantial public expense, which
is greater or less according to the distance to be
traveled by the inspectors for the purpose of mak-
ing such inspection”’
and that this ordinance was reasonable in that respect.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the trial court
and stated in the opinion:

“‘The issue, then, is limited to the question of
whether or not provision by the city for adequate
inspection of relator’s pasteurization plant, trans-
portation facilities, etc., is so expensive and incon-
venient to the city as to justify prohibition by it of
relator’s established business unless he moves his
pasteurization plant into the city.’’

‘“‘If the inspection fee is deemed insufficient, there
appears to be no good reason why such insufficiency
can not be remedied in a manner that would impose
no unjust hardship on any one concerned. There is
nothing in the record to show what, if any, incon-
venience the city may be put to that would justify
such a harsh requirement as provided by the ordi-
nance. We are obliged to hold that the ordinance,
in so far as it prohibits the sale of pasteurized
milk or its products in the city of Minneapolis, unless
the same shall have been pasteurized in a pasteuriza-
tion plant located within the city limits, violated
relator’s constitutional rights of property and con-
tract. The restriction contained therein goes ‘beyond
the reasonable demands of the occasion,’ and is not
adaptable to the end sought.’’

In the Larson case Ninety-seven per cent (97%) of
the milk and Ninety-nine and one-tenth per cent (99.1%)
of the cream consumed in the city were pasteurized in
plants located within the city limits; the city ‘had three
milk inspectors, one inspected raw milk and two pas-
teurized milk. One of the latter spent one-half of his
time on plants located outside of the city. Notwithstand-
ing these facts the Minnesota court stated:

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

31

‘“‘The restriction contained therein goes ‘beyond
the reasonable demands of the occasion,’ and is not
adaptable to the end sought.’’

The trial court in the case at bar stated in its opinion:

‘“‘The petitioner herein has made no offer to as-
sume or repay the additional expense necessary to
have such additional inspections made.’’ (R. 6).

The answer to that proposition is that the Beloit City
Ordinance makes no provision for payment of any of the
expenses of inspection, and the appellant has no control
over the staffing and regulating of the Health Depart-
ment of the City of Beloit.

The same argument was made in the Larson case and
that was answered by the Supreme Court of Minnesota:

“If the inspection fee is deemed insufficient, there
appears to be no good reason why such insufficiency
ean not be remedied in a manner that would impose
no unjust hardship on any one concerned.’’

Furthermore, the objection made by the trial court
is not apropos to the case at bar because the license was
refused to the appellant on the sole ground that the
pasteurization: plant from which he proposed to obtain
his milk was not located within the six mile zone.

Sheffield Farms Co., Inc. v. Seaman, 114 N. J. L. 455,
177 A. 372 was a proceeding in certiorari to review the
action of the Health Department of the City of Perth
Amboy, N. J. in refusing to grant petitioner a permit to
sell and distribute its milk in Perth Amboy.

The Health Department refused the permit because it
did not have sufficient personnel or funds to inspect peti-
tioner’s milk. The Department was already inspecting
21 duly licensed distributors, 350 licensed retailers and
2,000 separate sources of milk.

32

The city had an adequate supply of milk and the price
was fixed by the State Milk Control Board.

The Supreme Court set the refusal aside, stating:

‘It is next urged that the refusal was based on
a sound discretion lodged in those possessing the
power to grant the permit. This is not so. There is
no such discretion in the granting power in the
premises. Moreover, even if such an unreasonable,
arbitrary, and capricious discretion were delegated
or vested in the granting power it would be illegal.

‘*It is further contended for the respondents that
the permit was refused in order to conserve public
health and safety, and that the city is without funds
to inspect and supervise the sources of prosecutor’s
supply of milk.

‘*Here, again, the argument finds no support in
the record of the stipulated facts. Respondents con-
cede that they have no knowledge respecting the
quality of prosecutor’s milk and milk products, or
the sanitary condition under which its milk is pro-
duced, handled, or marketed. It clearly could not,
therefore, form a judgment of refusal to grant the
permit on unknown or undetermined facts. Nor does
the mere lack of funds to investigate the facts justify
the refusal. The Legislature has provided for such
a contingency. See section 10, chapter 131, P. L.
1932, p. 222, at p. 235 N. J. St. Annual 1932, p. 81-
162A (10).

**Tt will serve no useful purpose to answer or
further discuss the purported reason argued upon
which the refusal is sought to be justified. Suffice
it to say that the meager facts, relevant as to the
occasion and history of the refusal, lead us to the
conclusion that they are without substance. They are
excuses rather than legal reasons. The city just
took the position that it had enough milk dealers
and that it had the situation ‘well in hand.’ Such
a position is unreasonable; it is arbitrary, capricious,
and discriminatory. It unlawfully curtails prose-

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

33

cutor’s common-law right to engage in a lawful busi-
ness, notwithstanding that it has fully complied with
the requirements of the state and city. This the city
cannot lawfully do.

‘‘The refusal is set aside, with costs.’’

LaFranchi v. City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal. (2d) 331,
6& P. (2d) 1301, was an action for declaratory relief.
The ordinance prohibited sale of milk within Santa Rosa
that was pasteurized outside of the city limits. The Su-
preme Court of California reversed the lower court and
held the ordinance unconstitutional. After reviewing the
eases from other jurisdictions the Supreme Court stated
(page 1304):

‘** * * In other words, it has been held quite
generally that the city limits as the boundary line
outside of which plants may not be located if the
milk is to be sold within the city do not aave a rea-
sonable relationship to a proper legislative object
and gnm ordinances fixing such a boundary are
invalid.

**In line with the authorities from other jurisdic-
tions from which we have quoted are those from our
own courts declaring that ordinances designed for
the purpose of erecting tariff barriers are void.

* @ @))

Meridian v. Sippy, 54 Cal. App. (2d) 214, 128 P. (2d)
884, held invalid an ordinance of the City of Stockton.
The effect of the ordinance was to prevent milk from
being brought beyond the boundaries of San Joaquin
County and sold in Stockton. The upper court held that
the ordine:. > violated both the California Statute and
Constitutic.., at page 886, the court stated:

**If the position of respondent is sound, it may
lead to dire results. It would be possible for every

city in the State of California to erect prohibitive
trade barriers around the boundary of the county

34

of its locale; not only milk, but many other food
products designed for human consumption could be
barred in this same manner. The free flow of goods
from one community to another is conducive to the
general prosperity and economic welfare of the state
and nation. Furthermore, milk production is a legi-
timate business; millions of dollars in this state are
invested in this industry, and so long as the per-
sons engaged in this business put out a clean, pure
and wholesome product, a way should be found to
allow their products to flow freely in the market,
unburdened by duplication of inspection and pro-
hibitive trade barriers, and if the present law on our
statute books can be given a reasonable construction
which will bring about this result, it should be given
such construction.’’

At page 888:

‘*Any ordinance or statute which prevents any
person from engaging in a lawful business cannot
be upheld unless protection of life, health or prop-
erty makes it reasonably necessary. Such is not the
case The contention of respondent if approved
might ult in the erection of trade barriers that
would affect the economic prosperity of the whole
state.’’

Grant v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 267, 82 S. W. (2d) 283,
held invalid an ordinance of Louisville which prohibited
the sale of milk from plants located outside of Louis-
ville and not engaged in business when the ordinance
was enacted. Plaintiff built his plant after the ordinance
was enacted and outside of Louisville. Plaintiff sought
to sell Grade A raw milk in Louisville. The court held
the ordinance unreasonable and unconstitutional. At page
285 the court stated:

‘“‘The general. rule as to the regulations in the
sale of ordinary articles of commerce, such as milk,
is only that they must be reasonable to be valid.’’

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

35

‘‘Loaf Baking Co. v. Pace (Tex. Civ. App.), 19 S.
W. (2d) 459; City of Des Moines v. Fowler (lowa),
255 N. W. 880; Whitney v. Watson, et al., 85 N. H.
238, 157 A. 78, 86. In the last mentioned case, the
principles applicable to regulation of the sale of
milk were thus stated: ‘Dairy products are normally
legitimate subjects of commerce, interference with
which is justifiable only so far as the protection
of the public health requires. To that extent the
Legislature may regulate and limit their sales. Be-
yond this, the marketing of such products is a mat-
ter of right. It is in the interest of the purchasing
public as well as of the producer that a license be
granted the latter when he has fulfilled the legisla-
tive requirements.’’

Prescott v. City of Borger (Tex. App.) 158 8S. W.
(2d) 578, involved an ordinance of the City of Borger.
The ordinance prohibited sale of milk not pasteurized
within the county. Plaintiff’s plant was 60 miles away
and in another county. The Court held the ordinance

was in conflict with both the Texas Statute and Consti-
tution.

The attorney-General of Michigan on November 6,
1946, ruled that a milk ordinance prescribing a 30 mile
limit for the City of Midland, Michigan, was invalid
and in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. We have
set this opinion out in full in the appendix of this brief.

We submit that the provision of the Beloit Milk Ordi-
nance prohibiting the sale of the milk within the city
which is pasteurized in plants located outside the six
mile zone is in violation of the Interstate Commerce
Clause of the United States and that it deprives the ap-
pellant of his property rights and the right to contract
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States; that the said provision is
arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory and that the

36

judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Wis-
consin should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Ciaupe D. Srovrt,

Milton, Wisconsin,
Attorney for Appellant.

Grorce S. Gerrs,

Jacos Gerrs,

Eu Brock,

of McGowan, Geffs, Geffs & Block,
Janesville, Wisconsin,
Of Counsel.

PLEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

PUBLIC HEALTH BULLETIN.
No. 220
(1939 Edition)

UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE MILK
ORDINANCE

(This unabridged form of the ordinance should be
adopted only where the short enabling form in part I
is not considered legal.)

An ordinance defining ‘‘milk’’ and certain ‘‘milk prod-
ucts,’’ ‘‘milk producer,’’ ‘‘pastewrization,’’ etc., prohibit-
ing the sale of adulterated and misbranded milk and milk
products, requiring permits for the sale of milk and milk
products, regulating the inspection of dairy farms and
milk plants, the examination, grading, labeling, placard-
ing, pasteurization, regrading, distribution, and sale of
milk and milk products, providing for the publishing of
milk grades, the construction of future dairies and milk
plants, the enforcement of this ordinance, and the fixing
of penalties.

Be it ordained by the of the city
of as follows:

Secrion 1. Definitions —The following definitions shall
apply in the interpretation and the enforcement of this
ordinance :

A. Milk.—Milk is hereby defined to be the lacteal secre-
tion obtained by the complete milking of one or more

38

healthy cows, excluding that obtained within 15 days
before and 5 days after calving, or such longer period
as may be necessary to render the milk practically colo-
strum free; which contains not less than 8 percent of
milk solids not fat, and not less than 3% percent of milk
fat.

B. Milk fat or butter fat—Milk fat or butter fat is the
fat of milk.

C. Cream and sour cream.—Cream is a portion of
milk which contains less than 18 percent milk fat. Sour
cream is cream the acidity of which is more than 0.20
pereent, expressed as lactie acid.

D. Skimmed milk.—Skimmed milk is milk from which
a sufficient portion of milk fat has been removed to re-
duce its milk-fat percentage to less than 3% percent.

E. Milk or skimmed-milk beverage—A milk beverage

or a skimmed-milk beverage is a food compound or con-
fection consisting of milk or skimmed milk, as the case
may be, to which has been added a sirup or flavor con-
sisting of wholesome ingredients.

F. Buttermilk.—Buttermilk is a product resulting from
the churning of milk or cream, or from the souring or
treatment by a lactic acid or other culture of milk,
skimmed milk, reconstituted skimmed milk, evaporated
or condensed milk or skimmed milk, or milk or skimmed-
milk powder. It contains not less than 8 percent of milk
solids not fat.

G. Vitamin D milk.—Vitamin D milk is milk the vita-
min D content of which has been increased by a method
and in an amount approved by the health officer.

H. Reconstituted or recombined milk and cream.—Re-
constituted or recombined milk is a product resulting

ELEED THROUGH ~— POOR COPY

39

from the recombining of milk constituents with water,
and which complies with the standards for milk fat and
solids not fat of milk as defined herein. Reconstituted
or recombined cream is a product resulting from the
combination of dried cream, butter, or butter fat with
cream, milk, skimmed milk, or water.

I. Goat milk.—Goat milk is the lacteal secretion, free
from colostrum, obtained by the complete milking of
healthy goats, and shall comply with all the requirements
of this ordinance. The word ‘‘cows’’ shall be interpreted
to include goats.

J. Homogenized milk—Homogenized milk is milk
which has been treated in such manner as to insure
break-up of the fat globules to such an extent that after
48 hours storage no visible cream separation occurs on
the milk and the fat percentage of the top 100 ec.
of milk in a quart bottle, or of proportionate volumes
in containers of other sizes, does not differ by more than
5 percent of itself from the fat percentage of the re-
maining milk as determined after thorough mixing.

K. Milk products.—Milk products shall be taken to
mean and include cream, sour cream, homogenized milk,
goat milk, vitamin D milk, buttermilk, skimmed milk,
reconstituted or recombined milk and cream, milk bev-
erages, skimmed-milk beverages, and any other product
made by the addition of any substance to milk or any
of these products and used for similar purposes and
designated as a milk product by the health officer.

L. Pasteurization.—The terms ‘‘pasteurization,’’ ‘‘pas-
teurized,’’ and similar terms shall be taken to refer to
the process of heating every particle of milk or milk
products to at least 143° F., and holding at such tem-

40

perature for at least 30 minutes, or to at least 160° F.,
and holding at such temperature for at least 15 seconds,
in approved and properly operated equipment: Provided,
That nothing contained in this definition shall be con-
strued as disbarring any other process which has been
demonstrated to be equally efficient and is approved by
the State health authority.

M. Adulterated milk and milk products —Any milk
or milk product which contains any unwholesome sub-
stance, or which if defined in this ordinance does not
conform with its definition, or which carries a grade
label unless such grade label has been awarded by the
health officer and not revoked, shall be deemed adul-
terated and misbranded.

N. Milk producer.—A milk producer is any person who
owns or controls one or more cows a part or all of the
milk or milk products from which is sold or offered for

sale.

O. Milk distributor —A milk distributor is any person
who offers for sale or sells to another any milk or milk
products for human consumption as such.

P. Dairy or dairy farm.—A dairy or dairy farm is
any place or premises where one or more cows are kept,
a part or all of the milk or milk products from which
is sold or offered for sale.

Q. Milk plant.—A milk plant is any place or premises
or establishment where milk or milk products are col-
lected, handled, processed, stored, bottled, pasteurized,
or prepared for distribution.

R. Health officer—The term ‘‘health officer’’ shall
mean the health authority of the city of......... pecctiliened , or his
authorized representative.

ELEED THROUGH ~— POOR COPY

41

S. Average bacterial plate count, direct microscopic
count, reduction time, and cooling temperature.—Average
bacterial plate count and average direct microscopic
count shall be taken to mean the logarithmic average,
and average reduction time and average cooling tem-
perature shal] be taken to mean the arithmetic average,
of the respective results of the last four consecutive
samples, taken upon separate days, irrespective of the
date of grading or regrading.

T. Grading period——The grading period shall be such
period of time as the health officer may designate within
which grades shall be determined for all milk and milk
products, provided that the grading period shall in no
case exceed 6 months.

U. Person.—The word ‘‘person’’ as used in this ordi-

nance shall mean ‘‘person, firm, corporation, or associa-
tion.”’

_ V. And/or.—Where the term ‘‘and/or’’ is used ‘‘and’’
shall apply where possible, otherwise ‘‘or’’ shall apply.

Seo. 2. The sale of adulterated milk, or ungraded milk
or milk products prohibited—No person shall within the
I i ccageleates , or its police jurisdiction, produce,
sell, offer, or expose for sale, or have in possession
with intent to sell, any milk or milk product which is
adulterated, misbranded, or ungraded. It shall be un-
lawful for any person, elsewhere than in a private home,
to have in possession any adulterated; misbranded, or
ungraded milk or milk product.

Sec. 3. Permits—It shall be unlawful for any person
to bring into or receive into the city of —........... + or its
police jurisdiction, for sale, or to sell, or offer for sale
therein, or to have in storage where milk or milk prod-
ucts are sold or served, any milk or milk product defined

42

in this ordinance, who does not possess a permit from
the health officer of the city of ................. =

Only a person who complies with the requirements of
this ordinance shall be entitled to receive and retain
such a permit.

Such a permit may be suspended by the health officer,
or revoked after an opportunity for a hearing by the
health officer, upon the violation by the holder of any
of the terms of this ordinance.

Sec. 4. Labeling and placarding.—All bottles, cans,
packages, and other containers enclosing milk or any
milk product defined in this ordinance shall be plainly
labeled or marked with (1) the name of the contents as
given in the definitions in this ordinance; (2) the grade
of the contents; (3) the word ‘‘pasteurized’’ only if the
contents have been pasteurized; (4) the word ‘‘raw”’
only if the contents are raw; (5) the phrase ‘‘for pas-
teurization’’ if the contents are to be pasteurized; (6)
the name of the producer if the contents are raw, and
the name of the plant at which the contents were pas-
teurized, if the contents are pasteurized; and (7) in the
case of Vitamin D milk, the designation ‘‘Vitamin D
Milk’’ and the source of the vitamin D. The label or
mark shall be in letters of a size, kind, and color ap-
proved by the health officer and shall contain no marks
or words which are misleading.

Every restaurant, cafe, soda fountain, or other estab-
lishment serving milk or milk products shall display at
all times, in a place designated by the health officer, a
notice approved by the health officer, stating the lowest
grade of milk and/or milk products served.‘
in which only grade A milk or only certified
grade A pasteurized are permitted to be sold may

ry and
delete this paragraph and nevertheless be recognized as having adopted
ordinance.

BLEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

43

Sec. 5. Inspection of dairy farms and milk plants for
the purpose of grading or regrading.—At least once dur-
ing each grading period the health officer shall inspect
all dairy farms and al] milk plants whose milk or milk
products are intended for consumption within the city of
SS , or its police jurisdiction. In case the health
officer discovers the violation of any item of sanitation,
he shall make a second inspection after a lapse of such
time as he deems necessary for the defect to be reme-
died, but not before the lapse of 3 days; and the second
inspection shall be used in determining the grade of milk
and/or milk products. Any violation of the same item of
this ordinance on two consecutive inspections shall call
for immediate degrading.

One copy of the inspection report shall be posted by
the health officer in a conspicuous place upon an inside
wall of one of the dairy farm or milk plant buildings, and

said inspection report shall not be defaced or removed by
any person except the health officer. Another copy of
the inspection report shall be filed with the records of
the health department.

Sec. 6. The examination of milk and milk products.—
During each grading period at least four samples of milk
and cream from each dairy farm and each milk plant
shal] be taken on separate days and examined by the
health officer. Samples of other milk products may be
taken and examined by the health officer as often as he
deems necessary. Samples of milk and milk products
from stores, cafes, soda fountains, restaurants, and
other places where milk or milk products are sold shall
be examined as often as the health officer may require.
Bacterial plate counts and direct microscopic counts shall
be made in conformity with the latest standard methods
recommended by the American Public Health Associ-

44

ation.” Examinations may include such other chemical
and physical determinations as the health officer may
deem necessary for the detection of adulteration, these
examinations to be made in accordance with the latest
standard methods of the American Public Health Associ-
ation and the Association of Official Agricultural Chem-
ists." Samples may be taken by the health officer at
any time prior to the final delivery of the milk or milk
products. All proprietors of stores, cafes, restaurants,
soda fountains, and other similar places shall furnish
the health officer, upon his request, with the names of all
distributors from whom their milk and milk products
are obtained. Bio-assays of the vitamin D content of
vitamin D milk shall be made when required by the
health officer in a laboratory approved by him for such
examinations.

Whenever the average bacterial count, the average
reduction time, or the average cooling temperature falls
beyond the limit for the grade then held, the health of-
ficer shall send written notice thereof to the person con-
cerned, and shall take an additional sample, but not
before the lapse of 3 days, for determining a new average
in accordance with section 1 (S). Violation of the grade
requirement by the new average or by any subsequent
average during the remainder of the current grading
period shall call for immediate degrading or suspension

S Municipalities in which the adoption of legislation by reference
is not considered legal may substitute the following wording: “* * *
in conformity with the regulations of the health officer (or board of

speci may be treated in the same manner, such as
the requirements the Association of Medical Milk Com-
missions under the definition of certified milk-raw, uirements

modified accredited areas in item ir, and the U. S. Public Health
Service milk code in section 154.

BLEED THROUGH ~ POOR COPY

45

of the permit, unless the last individual result is within
the grade limit.

Seo. 7. The grading of milk and milk products.—At
least once every 6 months the health officer shall an-
nounce the grades of all milk and milk products deliv-
ered by all producers or distributors and ultimately
consumed within the city of ~................ , or its police
jurisdiction. Said grades shall be based upon the follow-
ing standards, the grading of milk products being iden-
tical with the grading of milk except that the bacterial
standards shall be doubled in the case of cream, and
omitted in the case of sour cream and buttermilk. Vita-
man D milk shall be only of grade A or grade B pas-
teurized, certified, or grade A raw quality.

Certified milk-raw.—Certified milk-raw is raw milk
which conforms with the requirements of the American
Association of Medical Milk Commissions‘ in force at
the time of production and is produced under the super-
vision of a medical milk commission and of the State
board of health or of the city or county health officer

Grade A raw milk.—Grade A raw milk is raw milk the
average bacterial plate count of which as determined
under sections 1 (S) and 6 of this ordinance does not
exceed 50,000 per cubic centimeter, or the average direct
microscopic count of which does not exceed 50,000 per
cubic centimeter if clumps are counted or 200,000 per
cubic centimeter if individual organisms are counted, or
the average reduction time of which is not less than 8
hours: Provided, That if it is to be pasteurized the
corresponding limits shall be 200,000 per cubie centi-
meter, 200,000 per cubic centimeter, 800,000 per cubic

* See footnote 5, p. 7.

46

centimeter, and 6 hours, respectively; and which is pro-
duced upon dairy farms conforming with all of the fol-
lowing items of sanitation.

Irem lr. Cows, tuberculosis and other diseases.—Ex.-
cept as provided hereinafter, a taberculin test of all
herds and additions thereto shall be made before any
milk therefrom is sold, and at least once every 12 months
tnereafter, by a licensed veterinarian approved by the
State livestock sanitary authority. Said tests shall be
made and reactors disposed of in accordance with the
requirements approved by the United States Department
of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry,* for accred-
ited herds. A certificate signed by the veterinarian or
attested to by the health officer and filed with the health
officer shall be evidence of the above test: Provided, That
in modified accredited counties in which the modified
accredited area plan is applied to the dairy herds the
modified accredited area system approved by the United
States Bureau of Animal Industry‘ shall be accepted
in lieu of annual testing.

Within ........... " years after the adoption of this ordi-
nance all milk and milk products consumed raw shall
be from herds or additions thereto which have been
found free from Bang’s disease, as shown by blood serum
tests for agglutinins against Brucella abortus made in a
laboratory approved by the health officer. All such herds
shall be retested at least every 12 months and all reac-
tors removed from the herd. A certificate identifying
each animal by number, and signed by the laboratory
making the test, shall be evidence of the above test.

Cows which show an extensive or entire induration of
one or more quarters of the udder upon physical exami-

* See footnote 5, p. 7.

* The number should be inserted when the ordinance is adopted. It

should not exceed 6 if the community wishes to be recognized
Se having odopted thie ordinance.

BLEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

47

nation, whether secreting abnormal milk or not, shall
be permanently excluded from the milking herd. Cows
giving bloody, stringy, or otherwise abnormal milk, but
with only slight induration of the udder, shall be ex-
duded from the herd until re-examination shows that
the milk has become normal.

For other diseases such tests and examinations as the
health officer may require shall be made at intervals
and by methods prescribed by him, and any diseased
animals or reactors shall be disposed of as he may
require.

Irem 2r. Dairy barn, lighting—A dairy or milking
barn shall be required and in such sections thereof
where cows are milked windows shall be provided and
kept clean and so arranged as to insure adequate light
properly distributed, and when necessary shall be pro-
vided with adequate supplementary artificial light.

Irem 3r. Dairy barn, air space and ventilation—Such
sections of all dairy barns where cows are kept or milked
shall be well ventilated and shall be so arranged as to
avoid overcrowding.

Irem 4r. Dairy barn, floors—-The floors and gutters
of such parts of all dairy barns in which cows are milked
shall be constructed of concrete or other approved im-
pervious and easily cleaned material, provided that if
the milk is to be pasteurized tight wood may be used,
shall be graded to drain properly, and shall be kept
clean and in good repair. No horses, pigs, fowl, calves,
ete., shall be permitted in parts of the barn used for
milking.

Trem 5r. Dairy barn, walls and ceilings.—The walls
and ceilings of all dairy barns shall be whitewashed once

48 .

each year or painted once every 2 years, or oftener, if
necessary, or finished in an approved manner, and shall
be kept clean and in good repair. In case there is a
second story above that part of the barn in which
cows are milked the ceiling shall be tight. If the feed
room adjoins the milking space, it shall be separated
therefrom by a dust-tight partition and door. No feed
shall be stored in the milking portion of the barn.

Irem 6r. Dairy barn, cowyard.—All cowyards shall be
graded and drained as well as practicable and kept clean.

Irem 7r. Manure disposal.—All manure shall be re-
moved and stored or disposed of in such manner as best
to prevent the breeding of flies therein or the access
of cows to piles thereof.

Irem 8r. Milk house or room, construction—There
shall be provided a milk house or milk room in which
the cooling, handling, and storing of milk and milk prod-
ucts and the washing, bactericidal treatment, and storing
of milk containers and utensils shall be done. (a) The
milk house or room shall be provided with a tight floor
constructed of concrete or other impervious material,
in good repair, and graded to provide proper drainage.
(b) It shall have walls and ceilings of such construction
as to permit easy cleaning, and shall be well painted or
finished in an approved manner. (c) It shall be well
lighted and ventilated. (d) It shall have all openings
effectively screened including outward-opening, self-clos-
ing doors, unless other effective means are provided to
prevent the entrance of flies. (e) It shall be used for
no other purposes than those specified above except as
may be approved by the health officer; shall not open
dizectly into a stable or into any room used for domestic

_——

1476740—40—-_2

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

49

purposes; shall, unless the milk is to be pasteurized,
have water piped into it; shall be provided with ade-
quate facilities for the heating of water for the cleaning
of utensils; shall be equipped with two-compartment sta-
tionary wash and rinse vats, except that in the case of
retail raw milk, if chlorine is employed as the principal
bactericidal treatment, the three-compartment type must
be used; and shall, unless the milk is to be pasteurized,
be partitioned to separate the handling of milk and the
storage of cleansed utensils from the cleaning and other
operations, which shall be so located and conducted as
to prevent any contamination of the milk or of cleaned
equipment.

Irem 9r. Milk house or room, cleanliness and flies.—
The floors, walls, ceilings, and equipment of the milk
house or room shall be kept clean at all times. All means
necessary for the elimination of flies shall be used.

Item 10r. Toilet—Every dairy farm shall be provided
with one or more sanitary toilets conveniently located
and properly constrneted, operated, and maintained, so
that the waste is inaccessible to flies and does not pollute
the surface soil or contaminate any water supply.

Irem llr. Water supply.—The water supply for the
milk room and dairy barn shall be properly located,
constructed, and operated, and shall be easily accessible,
adequate, and of a safe sanitary quality.

Irem 12r. Utensils, construction—All multi-use con-
tainers or other utensils used in the handling, storage,
or transportation of milk or milk products must be
made of smooth nonabsorbent material and of such con-
struction as to be easily cleaned, and must be in good
repair. Joints and seams shall be soldered flush. Woven
wire cloth shall not be used for straining milk. All milk

50

pails shall be of a small-mouth design approved by the
health officer. The manufacture, packing, transportation,
and handling of single-device containers and container
eaps and covers shall be conducted in a sanitary manner.

Irem 13r. Utensils, cleaning.—All multi-use containers,
equipment, and other utensils used in the handling, stor-
age, or transportation of milk and milk products must
be thoroughly cleaned after each usage.

Irem 14r. Utensils, bactericidal treatment.—All multi-
use containers, equipment, and other utensils used in
the handling, storage, or transportation of milk or milk
products shall between each usage be subjected to an
approved bactericidal process with steam, hot water,
chlorine, or hot air.

Irem 15r. Utensils, storage——All containers and other
utensils used in the handling, storage, or transportation

of milk or milk products shall be stored so as not to
become contaminated before being used.

Irem 16r. Utensils, handling.—After bactericidal treat-
ment no container or other milk or milk product utensil
shall be handled in such manner as to permit any part
of any person or his clothing to come in contact with
any surface with which milk or milk products ome in
contact.

Irem 17r. Milking, udders and teats, abnormal milk.—
The udders and teats of all milking cows shall be clean
and rinsed with a bactericidal solution at the time of
milking. Abnormal milk shall be kept out of the milk
supply and shall be so handled and disposed of as to
preclude the infection of the cows and the contamination
of milk utensils.

————— a ee ee ee ee ee ee te

51

Irem 18r. Milking, flanks.—The flanks, bellies, and tails
of all milking cows shall be free from visible dirt at
the time of milking.

Irem 19r. Milkers’ hands.—Milkers’ hands shall be
clean, rinsed with a bactericidal solution, and dried with
a clean towel immediately before milking and follow-
ing any interruption in the milking operation. Wet-
hand milking is prohibited. Convenient facilities shall
be provided for the washing of milkers’ hands.

Irem 20r. Clean clothing—Milkers and milk handlers
shall wear clean outer garments while milking or handl-
ing milk, milk products, containers, utensils, or equip-
ment.

Irem 2ir. Milk stools——Milk stools shall be kept clean.

Irem 22r. Removal of milk.—Each pail of milk shall
be removed immediately to the milk house or straining

room. No milk shall be strained or poured in the dairy
barn.

Irem 23r. Cooling —Milk must be cooled immediately
after completion of milking to 50° F. or less, and main-
tained at that average temperature, as defined in section
1 (S), until delivery. If milk is delivered to a milk plant
or receiving station for pasteurization or separation, it
must be delivered within 2 hours after completion of
milking or cooled to 70° F. or less and maintained at
that average temperature until delivered.

Irem 24r. Bottling and capping.—Milk and milk prod-
ucts shall be bottled from a container with a readily
cleanable valve, or by means of an approved bottling
machine. Bottles shall be capped by machine. Caps or
cap stock shall be purchased in sanitary containers and
kept therein in a clean dry place until used.

52

Irem 25r. Personnel, health—The health officer or a
physician authorized by him shall examine and take a
careful morbidity history of every person connected with
a retail raw dairy, or about to be employed, whose work
brings him in contact with the production, handling,
storage, or transportation of milk, milk products, con-
tainers, or equipment. If such examination or history
suggests that such person may be a carrier of or in-
fected with the organisms of typhoid or paratyphoid
fever or any other communicable diseases likely to be
transmitted through milk, he shall secure appropriate
specimens of body discharges and cause them to be exam-
ined in a laboratory approved by him or by the State
health authorities for such examinations, and if the re-
sults justify such person shall be barred from such
employment.

Such persons shall furnish such information, submit to
such physical examinations, and submit such laboratory
specimens as the health officer may require for the pur-
pose of determining freedom from infection.

Irem 26r. Miscellaneous.—All vehicles used for the
transportation of milk or milk products shall be so con-
structed and operated as to protect their contents from
the sun and from contamination. All vehicles used for the
transportation of milk or milk products in their final deliv-
ery containers shall be constructed with permanent tops
and with permanent or roll-down sides and back, provided
that openings of the size necessary to pass the delivery
man may be permitted in the sides or back for loading
and unloading purposes. Al] vehicles shall be kept clean,
and no substance capable of contaminating milk or milk
products shall be transported with milk or milk prod-
ucts in such manner as to permit contamination. All
vehicles used for the distribution of milk or milk prod-

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

53

ucts shall have the name of the distributor prominently
displayed.

The immediate surroundings of the dairy shall be kept
in a neat, clean condition.

Grade B raw milk—Grade B raw milk is raw milk
which violates the bacterial standard and/or the abortion
testing requirement for grade A raw milk, but which con-
forms with all other requirements for grade A raw milk,
and has an average bacterial plate count not exceeding
1,000,000 per cubic centimeter, or an average direct
microscopic count not exceeding 1,000,000 per cubic centi-
meter if clumps are counted or 4,000,000 per cubic centi-
meter if individual organisms are counted, or an average
reduction time of not less than 31% hours, as determined
under sections 1 (S) and 6.

Grade C raw milk.—Grade C raw milk is raw milk
which violates any of the requirements for grade B raw

milk.

Certified milk-pasteurized.—Certified milk-pasteurized
is certified milk-raw which has been pasteurized, cooled,
and bottled in a milk plant conforming with the require-
ments for grade A pasteurized milk.

Grade A pasteurized milk.—Grade A pasteurized milk
is grade A raw milk, with such exceptions as are indi-
eated if the milk is to be pasteurized, which has been pas-
teurized, cooled, and bottled in a milk plant conforming
with all of the following items of sanitation and the
average bacterial plate count of which at no time after
pasteurization and until delivery exceeds 30,000 per
cubic centimeter, as determined under sections 1 (S)
and 6.

The grading of a pasteurized milk supply shall include
the inspection of receiving and collecting stations with

54

respect to items 1p to 15p, inclusive, and 17p, 19p, 22p,
and 23p, except that the partitioning requirement of item
5p shall not apply.

Irsm 1p. Floors.—The floors of all rooms in which
milk or milk products are handled or stored or in which
milk utensils are washed shall be constructed of concrete
or other equally impervious and easily cleaned material
and shall be smooth, properly drained, provided with
trapped drains, and kept clean.

Irem 2p. Walls and ceilings.—Walls and ceilings of
rooms in which milk or milk products are handled or
stored or in which milk utensils are washed shall have
a smooth, washable, light-colored surface and shall be
kept clean.

Irem 3p. Doors and windows.—Unless other effective
means are provided to prevent the access of flies, all
openings into the outer air shall be effectively screened
and doors shal] be self-closing.

Irem 4p. Lighting and ventilation—All rooms shall
be well lighted and ventilated.

Item 5p. Miscellaneous protection from contamination.
—The various milk-plant operations shall be so located
and conducted as to prevent any contamination of the milk
or of the cleaned equipment. Al] means necessary fer the
elimination of flies shal] be used. There shall be separate
rooms for (a) the pasteurizing, processing, cooling, and
bottling operations, and (b) the washing and bacteri-
cida] treatment of containers. Cans of raw milk shall
not be unloaded directly into the pasteurizing room. Pas-
teurized milk or milk products shall not be permitted to
come in contact with equipment with which unpasteurized
milk or milk products have been in contact, unless such

55

equipment has first been thoroughly cleaned and sub-
jected to bactericidal] treatment. Rooms in which milk,
milk products, cleaned utensils, or containers are handled
or stored shall not open directly into any stable or living
quarters. The pasteurization plant shall be used for no
other purposes than the processing of milk and milk
products and the operations incident thereto, except as
may be approved by the health officer.

Irem 6p. Toilet facilities—Every milk plant shall be |
provided with toilet facilities conforming with the ordi-
nances of the city of -.................. . Toilet rooms shall not
open directly into any room in which milk, milk products,
equipment, or containers are handled or stored. The
doors of all toilet rooms shall be self-closing. Toilet
rooms shall be kept in a clean condition, in good repair,
and well ventilated. In case privies or earth closets are
permitted and used, they shall be separate from the build-
ing, and shall be of a sanitary type constructed and
operated in conformity with the requirements of item
10r, grade A raw milk.

Irem 7p. Water supply—The water supply shall be
easily accessible, adequate, and of a safe, sanitary quality.

Irem 8p. Hand-washing facilities—Convenient hand-
washing facilities shall be provided, including warm run-
ning water, soap, and approved sanitary towels. The use
of a common towel is prohibited.

Irem 9p. Sanitary piping.—All piping used to conduct
milk or milk products shall be ‘‘sanitary milk piping’’
of a type which can be easily cleaned with a brush.
Pasteurized milk and milk products shall be conducted
from one piece of equipment to another only through san-
itary milk piping.

56

Irem 10p. Construction and repair of containers and
equipment.—All multi-use containers and equipment with
which milk or milk products come in contact shall be
constructed in such manner as to be easily cleaned and
shall be kept in good repair. The manufacture, packing,
transportation, and handling of single-service containers
and container caps and covers shall be conducted in a
sanitary manner.

Item 1lp. Disposal of wastes.—All wastes shall be
properly disposed of.

Irem 12p. Cleaning and bactericidal treatment of con-
tainers and equipment.—All milk and milk products con-
tainers and equipment, except single-service containers,
shall be thoroughly cleaned after each usage. All con-
tainers shall be subjected to an approved bactericidal
process after each cleaning and all equipment immedi-
ately before each usage. When empty and before being
returned to a producer by a milk plant each container
shall be effectively cleaned and subjected to bactericidal
treatment.

Irem 13p. Storage of containers and equipment.—After
bactericidal treatment all bottles, cans, and other multi-
use milk or milk-products containers and equipment shall
be stored in such manner as to be protected from con-
tamination.

Irem 14p. Handling of containers and equipment.—
Between bactericidal treatment and usage, and during
usage, containers and equipment shal] not be handled or
operated in such manner as to permit contamination of
the milk.

Irem 15p. Storage of caps, parchment paper, and sin-
gle-service containers.—Milk-bottle caps or cap stock,
parchment paper for milk cans, and single-service con-

BLEED THROUGH ~— POOR COPY

57

tainers shall be purchased and stored only in sanitary
tubes and cartons, respectively, and shall be kept therein
in a clean dry place.

Irem 16p. Pasteurization.—Pasteurization shall be per-
formed as described in section 1 (L) of this ordinance.

Irem 17p. Cooling.—All milk and milk products re-
ceived for pasteurization shall immediately be cooled in
approved equipment to 50° F. or less and maintained at
that temperature until pasteurized, unless they are to
be pasteurized within 2 hours after receipt; and all
pasteurized milk and milk products shal] be immediately
cooled in approved equipment to an average tempera-
ture of 50° F. or less, as defined in section 1 (8S), and
maintained thereat until delivery.

Irem 18p. Bottling.—Bottling of milk and milk prod-
ucts shall be done at the place of pasteurization in ap-
proved mechanical equipment.

Irem 19p. Overflow milk.—Overflow milk or milk
products shall not be sold for human consumption.

Item 20p. Capping.—Capping of milk and milk prod-
ucts shall be done by approved mechanical equipment.
Hand capping is prohibited. The cap or cover shall cover
the pouring lip to at least its largest diameter.

Irem 2ip. Personnel, health—The health officer or a
physician authorized by him shall examine and take a
eareful morbidity history of every person connected with
a pasteurization plant, or about to be employed, whose
work brings him in contact with the production, handling,
storage, or transportation of milk, milk products, con-
tainers, or equipment. It such examination or history
suggests that such person may be a carrier of or infected
with the organisms of typhoid or paratyphoid fever or

58

any other communicable diseases likely to be transmitted
through milk, he shall secure appropriate specimens of
body discharges and cause them to be examined in a
laboratory approved by him or by the State health an-
thorities for such examinations, and if the results justify
such person shall be barred from such employment.

Such persons shall furnish such information, submit to
such physical examinations, and submit such laboratory
specimens as the health officer may require for the pur-
pose of determining freedom from infection.

Irem 22p. Personnel, cleanliness.—All persons coming
in contact with milk, milk products, containers, or equip-
ment shall wear clean outer garments and shall keep
their hands clean at all times while thus engaged.

Irem 23p. Miscellaneous.—All vehicles used for the
transportation of milk or milk products shall be so con-
structed and operated as to protect their contents from
the sun and from contamination. All vehicles used for
the transportation of milk or milk products in their final
delivery containers shall be constructed with permanent
tops and with permanent or roll-down sides and back,
provided that openings of the size necessary to pass the
delivery man may be permitted in the sides or back for
loading and unloading purposes. All vehicles shall be
kept clean, and no substance capable of contaminating
milk or milk products shall be transported with milk or
milk products in such manner as to permit contamination.
All vehicles used for the distribution of milk or milk
products shall have the name of the distributor promi-
nently displayed.

The immediate surroundings of the milk plant shall be
kept in a neat, clean condition.

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

59

Grade B pasteurized milk.—Grade B pasteurized milk
is pasteurized milk which violates the bacterial standard
for Grade A pasteurized milk and/or the provision of
lip-cover caps of item 20p and/or the requirement that
grade A raw milk be used, but which conforms with all
other requirements for grade A pasteurized milk, has
been made from raw milk of not less than grade B qual-
ity, and has an average bacterial plate count after pas-
teurization and before delivery not exceeding 50,000 per
eubie centimeter, as determined under sections 1 (8S)
and 6.

Grade C pasteurized milk—Grade C pasteurized milk
is pasteurized milk which violates any of the requirements
for grade B pasteurized milk.

Seo. 8. Grades of milk and milk products which may
be sold.—From and after 2 months from the date on
which this ordinance takes eifect no milk or milk products
shall be sold to the final wonsumer or to restaurants,
soda fountains, grocery stores, or similar estabiishments
0 .: Previaed, That when any milk
distributor fails to qualify for one of the above grades
the health officer is authorized to revoke his permit,’ or
in lieu thereof to degrade his product and permit its sale
during a temporary period not exceeding 30 days or in
emergencies such longer period as he may deem neces-
sary.

Src. 9. Supplementary grading prescribed and regrad-
ing authorized.—If, at any time between the regular an-
nouncernents of the grades of milk or milk products, a
lower grade shal] become justified, in accordance with
sections 5, 6, and 7 of this ordinance, the health officer
shall immediately lower the grade of such milk or milk

* See footnote 2, p. 2.
*See footnote 2, p. 2.

60

products, and shall enforce proper labeling and placard-
ing thereof.

Any producer or distributor of milk or milk products
the grade of which has been lowered by the health officer,
and who is properly labeling his milk and milk products,
may at any time make application for the regrading of
his product.

Upon receipt of a satisfactory application, in case the
lowered grade is the result of an excessive average bac-
terial plate count, direct microscopic count, reduction
time, or cooling temperature, the health officer shall take
further samples of the applicant’s output, at a rate of
not more than two samples per week. The health officer
shall regrade the milk or milk products upward whenever
the average of the last four sample results indicates the
necessary quality, but not before the lapse of 2 weeks
from the date of degrading.

In case the lowered grade of the applicant’s product
is due to a violation of an item of the specifications pre-
scribed in section 7, other than average bacterial plate
count, direct microscopic count, reduction time, or cooling
temperature, the said application must be accompanied
by a statement signed by the applicant to the effect that
the violated item of the specifications has been conformed
with. Within 1 week of the receipt of such an application
and statement the health officer shall make a reinspection
of the applicant’s establishment, and thereafter as many
additional reinspections as he may deem necessary to
assure himself that the applicant is again complying with
the higher grade requirements, and, in case the findings
justify, shall regrade the milk or milk products upward,
but not before the lapse of 2 weeks from the date of

degrading.

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

61

Sec. 10. Transferring or dipping milk; delivery contain-
ers; handling of more than one grade; delivery of milk
at quarantined residences.—Except as permitted in this
section, no milk producer or distributor shell transfer
milk or milk products from one container to another on
the street, or in any vehicle or store, or in any place
except a bottling or milk room specially used for that
purpose. The sale of dip milk is hereby prohibited.

All pasteurized milk and milk products shall be placed
in their final delivery contain’ rs in the plant in which
they are pasteurized, and all raw milk and milk products
sold for consumption in the raw state shall be placed in
their final delivery containers at the farm at which they
are produced. Milk and imilk products sold in the dis-
tributor’s containers in quantities less than 1 gallon shall
be delivered in standard milk bottles or in single-service
containers. It shall be unlawful for hotels, soda foun-
tains, restaurants, groceries, and similar establishments
to sell or serve any milk or milk product except in the
original container in which it was received from the dis-
tributor or from a bulk contsiner equipped with an ap-
proved dispensing device: /’r. vided, That this require-
ment shall not apply to cream ecunsumed on the prem-
ises, which may he served from the original bottle or
from a dispenser approved for euch service.

It shal] be unlawful for any hotel, soda fountain, res-
taurant, grocery, or similar establishment to sell or serve
any milk or milk products whic) have not been main-
tained, while in its possession, at a temperature of 50°
F. or less.

No milk or milk products shall be permitted to come
in contact with equipment with which a lower grade of
milk or milk products has bees in contact unless such
equipment has first been thoroughly cleaned and sub-
jected to bactericidal treatment.

62

Bottled milk or milk products, if stored in water, shall
be so stored that the tops of the bottles will not be
submerged.

It shall be the duty of all persons to whom milk or
milk products are delivered to clean thoroughly the con-
tainers in which such milk or milk products are delivered
before retarning such containers. Apparatus, containers,
equipment, and utensils used in the handling, storage,
processing, or transporting of milk or milk products shall
not be used for any other purpose without the permission
of the health officer.

The delivery of milk or milk products to and the col-
lection of milk or milk products containers from residences
in which cases of communicable disease transmissible
through milk supplies exist shall be subject to the special
requirements of the health officer.

Seo. 11. Milk and milk products from points beyond

the limits of routine inspection.—Milk and milk products
from points beyond the limits of routine inspection of
the city of may not be sold in
the city of , or its police jurisdic-
tion, unless produced and/or pasteurized under provi-
sions equivalent to the requirements of this ordinance:
Provided, That the health officer shall satisfy himself
that the health officer having jurisdiction over the pro-
duction and processing is properly enforcing such pro-
visions.

Sec. 12. Future dairies and milk plants.—All dairies
and milk plants from which milk or milk products are
supplied to the city of ...Whieh are here-
after constructed, reconstructed, or extensively altered
shall conform in their construction to the requirements
of this ordinance for grade A dairy farms producing

BLEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

63

milk for consumption in the raw state, or for grade A
pasteurization plants, respectively: Provided, That the
requirement of a two-room milk house shall be waived
in the case of dairies the milk from which is to be pas-
teurized. Properly prepared plans for all dairies and
‘milk plants which are hereafter constructed, recon-
structed, or extensively altered shall be submitted to the
health officer for approval before work is begun. In the
ease of milk plants signed approval shall he obtained
from the health officer and/or the State health depart-
ment.

Src. 13. Notification of disease.—Notice shall be sent
to the health officer immediately by any producer or dis-
tributor of milk or milk products upon whose dairy farm
or in whose milk plant any infectious, contagious, or com-
municable disease occurs.

Sec. 14. Procedure when infection suspected—When
suspicion arises as to the possibility of transmission of
infection from any person concerned with the handling
of milk or milk products, the health officer is authorized
to require any or all of the following measures: (1) The
immediate exclusion of that person from milk handling,
(2) the immediate exclusion of the milk supply concerned
from distribution and use, (3) adequate medical and bac-
teriological examination of the person, of his associates,
and of his and their body discharges.

Sec. 15. Enforcement interpretation—This ordinance
shall be enforced by the health officer in accordance with
the interpretations thereof contained in the 1939 edition
of the United States Public Health Service Milk Code,
a certified copy of which shall be on file in the city
elerk’s office.””

%” See footnote 6, p. 7.

64

Sec. 16. Penalty—Any person who shall violate any
provision of this ordinance shall be fined not more than
at the discretion of the court. Each
and every violation of the provisions of this ordinance
shall constitute a separate offense.

Seo. 17. Repeal and date of effect—All ordinances and
parts of ordinances in conflict with this ordinance are
hereby repealed; and this ordinance shall be in full force
and effect immediately upon its adoption and its publi-
cation, as provided by law.

Seo. 18. Unconstitutionality clause-—Should any sec-
tion, paragraph, sentence, clause, or phrase of this or-
dinance be declared unconstitutional or invalid for any
reason, the remainder of said ordinance shall not be af-
fected thereby.

Opinion of Attorney General of Michigan.
ORDINANCES.
(Milk)

A city ordinance providing that no license shall be
granted to a milk producer whose dairy farm is more
than thirty miles from the city and whose plant is located
outside of the city, is violative of the constitutional rights
of property and contract of a dealer whose plant is
located outside the city. It is further discriminatory, and
therefore invalid.

ELEED THROUGH ~ POOR COPY

65

0-5105 November 6, 1946

William DeKleine, M. D., Commissioner
Michigan Department of Health

Dewitt Road

Lansing 4, Michigan

Dear Dr. DeKleine:

We understand from your inquiry relative to the Michi-
gan Model Milk Ordinance that the city of Midland
adopted such ordinance and is now considering amending
the ordinance by inserting a section to read as follows:

**No license required by this section shall be granted
except upon certification by the Health Officer, and
no license shall be granted to a producer whose
dairy farm is more than thirty miles from the city
unless, in the opinion of the Health Officer, an emer-
gency exists which necessitates a greater milk-shed
area, or to a processer, bottler or distributor, not
now engaged in said business, whose plant is located
outside of the city.’’

You state that the city attorney of Midland does not
feel inclined to approve this proposed section and that
he will not do so without the recommendation of your
department. You therefore question as to the advisability
of making such a recommendation.

It is my opinion that such a provision in the ordinance,
as is presented, would be discriminatory, violative of the
constitutional rights of property and contract, and un-
enforceable.

While our Michigan Supreme Court has not passed
precisely on this particular question, in the case of Cook
Coffee Co. v. Flushing, 267 Mich. 131, it was said by the
court:

‘It has been

prohibition and invalid.’’ (Citing Brooks v. Mangan,
86 Mich. 576; City of Saginaw v. Saginaw Circuit
Judge, 106 Mich. 32; and Goldstein v. City of Ham-
tramck, 227 Mich. 263.)

Tt has likewise been held in many jurisdictions that
a classification in an ordinance based on location of its
place of business is void. In the case of Miller v. Wil-
liams, 12 Fed. Supp. 236, a regulation of a city health
commissioner similar to the ordinance under considera-
tion was before the court. This regulation had been made
under a city ordinance which ordinance had been upheld
by the courts, and provided, among other things, that
persons dealing in milk and cream in Baltimore City
must obtain permits from the health commissioner. In
this case, it was held that a regulation of a city health
commission, prohibiting the sale of cream in the city for
use in the manufacture of ice cream unless produced
within a fifty mile radius of the city, was invalid as to
shipper from another state as a direct burden on inter-
state commerce. The court further said in connection
with this regulation:

‘‘In my opinion the regulation is invalid, when
attacked as unreasonable by a directly interested
party producing milk within the state of Maryland
(in the absence of a state statute) outside the zone
or from fhe point of view of being a direct burden
upon interstate commerce.”’

Your further #t -ntion is called to the case of Grant
v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 267, where the court held that the
refusal to grant a permit for the sale of milk within
the city, solely upon the ground that the applicant had
constructed his miik plant since the ordinance had been

rrrcrren '’worvinwu. DomAampD “nov

67

passed and had not located it within the city where it
would be more accessible for easy and frequent inspec-
tion, was held to be discriminatory, and therefore invalid.
In the case of Ex. Rel. Larsen v. Minneapolis, 190 Minn.
138, it was held that a provision in the city ordinance
which prohibits the sale of pasteurized milk or its prod-
ucts within the city, unless the milk has been pasteurized
in a plant located within the city limits, violates the con-
stitutional rights of property and contract of a dealer
whose plant is located outside the city.

Very truly yours,

Foss O. Exprep,
Attorney General.

By John A. Bradshaw,
Deputy Attorney General.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385610_0252%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.
