# Jurisdictional Statement — Doss v. Lindsley

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement
- **Published:** January 1, 1945
- **Citation:** 325 U.S. 835

## Text

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INDEX
Sussect Inpex
Page
Statement as to jurisdiction...................... 1
Statutory provisions sustaining jurisdiction _. 2
Nature of the case and rulings below.......... 2
Appendix:
Section 237(a) of the Judicial Code ........... 10
Opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Peo-
mee ¥. Teme, SEG BE, TOW... cece. = 10
TaB.Le or Cases Cirep
Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252........ 5
Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 142 Fed. (2d) 922 .................. 4
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. 8. 233... ... 5
ee 8 ee ee eer 2, 3, 6, 8
People v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 49 8. Ct. 61...... 5
Stuart v. The People, 4 1ll. 399 ................ 7
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
is oo asia ga she vive see ss ea 5
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357............... 5
Sratutes CrTep
Constitution of the United States:
yo a oxy Vans unde eos 2,4
Fourteenth Amendment ..................... 2, 4,5
Judicial Code, Section 237(a) .................... 1

—8037

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS

No. 28507

WILLIAM A. DOSS,
Petitioner,
vs.

E. E. LINDSLEY, Suenirr or Piatr County, [111no1s,
Respondent

(The Original Petition of William A. Doss of Monticello,
Illinois, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in a Certain Mat-
ter)

In Re: Petition for Leave to Appeal Said Proceedings to
the Supreme Court of the United States

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction to review the order and
judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, made and
entered in the above entitled matter on January 9th, 1945,
under Section 237 (a) of the Judicial Code because by
said order and judgment that State Court held against
this petitioner in an original petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on his contention that he was restrained of his

2

liberty by and held in the custody of the respondent in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States and the rights of
this petitioner to freedom of speech and of the press se-
cured to him by said Amendments. The order and judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of Illinois from which appeal
is now sought, the Section of the Judicial Code aforesaid
and the opinion of the Illinois Court in People v. Doss, 382
Ill. 307, are set out in an appendix to this Statement.

The application for leave to appeal is presented to the
Honorable William J. Fulton, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Illinois, on this 2nd day of April, 1945, at Syca-
more, Illinios.

The instant proceeding is a cause wherein final judg-
ment rendered by the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois
in a habeas corpus proceeding therein, that Court being
the highest court of that State of Illinois in which a decision
could be hed, draws in question the validity of an order
and judgment of the Circuit Court of Piatt County, in the
State of Illinois, sentencing this petitioner to jail and fining
him for contempt committed outside the presence of the
Court on the ground that said order and judgment are
repugnant and violative of the Constitution of the United
States and specifically the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments thereof, guaranteeing the freedoms of speech and of
press.

The instant proceeding involves a trial right privilege
and immunity specifically set up and claimed by the
petitioner under the Constitution of the United States and
the Federal Bill of Rights as hereinbefore specifically
stated.

It is alleged in the information that the petitioner was
guilty of contempt—if any contempt was committed, it was
indirect—because he delivered and caused to be delivered
in the ordinary course of the mails, copies of the Liberty

—

3

Press, a publication sponsored by this petitioner, to a Grand
Jury of Piatt County (Orig. Rec., p. 28); the contempt
was not charged on the theory that some language in the
Liberty Press was ‘‘intemperate in the extreme’’, as seems
to have been the belief of the Supreme Court of Illinois as
shown in the opinion of that Court in People v. Doss, 382
Ill. p. 307, a view probably adopted in the case in that
Court from which appeal is now sought to be prosecuted
(Orig. Rec., p. 265). That opinion is set forth in an appen-
dix hereto. The portions of the articles in the Liberty
Press selected for inclusion in the information are critical
of the State’s Attorney (Orig. Rec., p. 34) and of certain
private persons mentioned by name. They charge that
the State’s Attorney is not a truthful man and that he is
not impartial in the matter of initiating criminal prosecu-
tions. They show that a special prosecutor was named to
handle certain matters before the Grand Jury, but no at-
tack is made on him in the articles set forth in the informa-
tion. On the contrary, petitioner commended him (Orig.
Rec., p. 134). Neither is there any question raised or doubt
insinuated concerning the integrity of the Judges, and there
is no appeal to Grand Jurors to depart from their duties
as Grand Jurors.

The matters involved in this case and on this proposed
appeal are of a substantial nature. They raise questions
which involve (1) the right of a person to publish and cir-
culate charges against public officers concerning the man-
ner in which they perform their official duties (Orig. Rec.,
p. 136) and for the publication of which such person is ex-
pressly willing to answer fully in the Civil Courts under
the laws enforced for the protection of good character
against defamation (Orig. Rec. pp. 131, 141, 143 and
passim) and (2) whether free speech and a free press may
be intimidated or throttled through the indirect contempt
process without any findings (Orig. Rec., pp. 271-2) that

4

the exercise of these rights, in the manner charged in the
information, constituted such great and present danger to
a paramount public interest, namely, the unimpeded ad-
ministration of public justice, as te warrant and justify
restriction of such rights by fining and imprisoning the
author of the articles.

In Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board (1942), 142 Fed. (2d) 922, 928, the Cireuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit condemned the use of ‘‘in-
substantial findings of fact screening reality’’ in a con-
tempt proceeding. How much more serious it is when there
are no findings of fact in a case where, as here, freedom of
speech and of the press is sought to be controlled through
the process of indirect contempt! The petitioner objected
in the State Courts (Orig. Rec., pp. 271-2) to the omission
to make findings of fact. The effect of this omission is
obviously to make it impossible for a reviewing court to
pass upon substantial and vitally important questions of
Constitutional law involving fundamental rights of peti-
tioner under and secured by the United States Constitution,
namely, whether the writing, publication and ‘citéulation of
the Liberty Press, in the manner charged in the informa-
tion (Orig. Ree., pp. 27-42) constituted such great and
present danger to a paramount public interest, to-wit, the
administration of public justice, as to justify or warrant
restrictions upon the rights of free speech and a free press
as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States. This question
was expressly raised and overruled in the State Court
(Orig. Ree., pp. 271-2). The State Courts of Illinois may
not destroy the Constitutional Rights of this petitioner by
refusing to make findings of facts, without which the Courts
of tue United States, including the Supreme Court thereof,
may be hindered or prevented from passing upon substan-
tial and vital questions of Federal Constitutional law in-

5

volving such rights as free speech, a free press, and the
liberty of a citizen when sought to be destroyed by im-
prisonment under an order or judgment of a State Court for
indirect contempt.

The following decisions hold this Court has the jurisdic-
tion and the power on appeal from the adverse judgment of
a State Court in a habeas corpus proceeding, to correct the
order and judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois from
which the appeal here is sought; People v. Zimmerman
(1928), 278 U. S. 63, 49 S. Ct. 61; and the following de-
cisions show the power and jurisdiction in this Court to cor-
rect rulings of State Courts on the subject of free speech
and a free press and sustain the claim of the petitioner that
a substantial question is involved in this case; Whitney v.
california, 274 U. S. 357, especially concurring opinion of
Justice Brandeis; Bridges v. State of California (1941),
314 U. S. 252; Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936),
297 U. S. 233, 249; West Virginia State Board of Education
y. Barnette, 319 U. 8. 624, especially p. 630, where the Court
said with reference to the rights secured by the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as
transmitted through the Fourteenth Amendment:

‘“‘They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the
state may lawfully protect ° * * They may not be
restricted in order to protect private rights susceptible
to redress by other means.”’ (Emphasig supplied.)
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U. S. 624, 639, 641.

This petitioner urged that to punish him for publishing
or circulating the words and charges in the information for
contempt, would be an invasion of his right under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, (1) in the Liberty Press, (2), at all stages

6

of the contempt hearing before the Judge of the Circuit
Court of Piatt County (Orig. Rec. p. 12), (3) in the Su-
preme Court of Illinois in the case from the judgment in
which an appeal is sought to this Court (Orig. Ree. pp. 2-3) ;
and that in all these stages and in both the State Courts
petitioner contended in his answer to the amended informa-
tion for contempt (Orig. Rec., p. 217), in argument and in
printed briefs, that his right to speak and write his senti-
ments, as that right is guaranteed under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, was violated, infringed and abridged by the con-
tempt order of the Circuit Court of Piatt County, Illinois
(Orig. Rec. p. 217). In each and every stage in the Court
of first instance, namely the Circuit Court of Piatt County
(Orig. Rec. p. 264, par. 3), and in the Supreme Court of
Illinois (Orig. Rec., p. 278), said Courts ruled against your
petitioner upon each and all of his contentions as above
set forth.

The Supreme Court of Illinois did not file an opinion in
support of or explanation of its judgment from which an
appeal is now sought to this Court and petitioner believes
that the Supreme Court of Illinois, in denying the Applica-
tion of petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus in the case
at bar, relied on its holding on the Federal questions of
Constitutional law respecting the freedoms of speech and
press, as did the State’s Attorney in his argument and mo-
tion (Orig. Rec., pp. 263, 271-2) in People v. Doss, 382 Ill.
307, where, on the questions now raised and in the same
manner, the Court said at page 315:

‘‘The constitutional guaranties invoked by defendant
were never intended to and do not sanction such conduct
as exhibited by defendant. These rights are not abso-
lute. Neither liberty of the press nor freedom of speech
have yet become license,’’

7

Stuart v. The People (1842) 4 Ill. 399, is a case remark-
ably reminiscent of Bridges v. California. In that case the

defendant was charged with contempt for publishing criti-
cal comment on the conduct of a juror while actually sitting
in a criminal case. If contempt, it was constructive or in-
direct. The language of the court is lucid, its grasp of the
fundamental principles of liberty, as we in America have
understood them, is firm, and its defense of these principles
is worthy of the best judicial traditions of our country.

Judge Breese, a great jurist in Illinois history, often com-
pared to-the famous Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts,
said:

‘Our Constitution has provided that the printing
presses shall be free to every person who may under-
take to examine the proceedings of any and every de-
partment of the Government, and he may publish the
truth, if the matter published is proper for public in-
formation, and the free communication of thoughts and
opinions is encouraged.

‘The contempt, in this case, was by a printer of a
newspaper, remarking on the conduct of an individual
juror, who, whilst he was engaged in the trial of a
capital case, and whilst separated from the public, and
in charge of the officer of the Court, was furnishing
articles for daily publication in a rival newspaper; and
in admitting a communication from a correspondent,
calculated to irritate the presiding judge of the Court,
though not reflecting upon his integrity, or in any way
impeaching his conduct. The paragraphs and com-
munication published had no tendency to obstruct the
administration of justice, nor were they thrust upon
the notice of the Court, by any act of the plaintiff in
error.

‘“‘The right to punish for contempts committed in the
presence of the Court is acknowledged by our statute;
(1) and while it affirms a principle that is inherent in
all courts of justice, to defend itself when attacked, as
the individual man has a right to do for his own preser-

vation, it may also, with great propriety, be regarded
as a limitation upon the power of the courts to punish
for any other contempts. In this power would neces-
sarily be included all acts calculated to impede, em-
barrass or obstruct the Court in the administration
of justice. Such acts would be considered as done in
the presence of the Court. So of rules entered by the
Court prohibiting the publication of the evidence or
other matters while the case is pending and undecided.
The limitation of the power to such cases only, is better
calculated to strengthen the judiciary, and fasten it in
the affections and esteem of the people, who have so
large a stake in its purity and efficiency, than the en-
larging the power to the extent claimed.

‘*An honest, independent, and intelligent court will
win its way to public confidence, in spite of newspaper
paragraphs, however pointed may be *eir wit or satire,
and its dignity will suffer less by passing them by un-
noticed, than by arraigning the perpetrators, trying
them in a summary way, and punishing them by the
judgment of the offended party.

It does not seem to me necessary, for the protection
of courts in the exercise of their legitimate powers,
that this one, so liable to abuse, should also be con-
ceded to them. It may be so frequently exercised, as to
destroy that moral influence which is their best pos-
session, until, finally, the administration of justice is
brought into disrepute. Respect to courts cannot be
compelled; it is the voluntary tribute to the public to
worth, virtue, and intelligence, and whilst they are
found upon the judgment seat, so long, and no longer,
will they retain the public confidence. o

Through oversight, doubtless, no reference is made to
this great case in The People of the State of Illinois v.
William A. Doss, (1943) 382 Ill. 307.

Prayer for Reversal

For which errors the plaintiff, William A. Doss, prays
that the said judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of

eam emaammmmaaes eres
9

Illinois, dated and entered on January 9th, 1945 in the above
entitled cause, be reversed, and a judgment rendered in
favor of the said plaintiff, and for costs.
Wiruum A. Doss,
Petitioner—Pro Se.

Ricuarp E. Westsrooks,
Attorney for Petitioner
Address: 3000 South State Street,
Chicago, Illinois.

10

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

(1) Seetion 237 (a) of the Judicial Code of the United

States:

‘*Sec. 237. (a) A final judgment or decree in any suit
in the highest court of a State in which a decision in
the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the
validity of a treaty or statute of the United States, and
the decision is against its validity; or where is drawn
in question the validity of a statute of any State, on
the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision
is in favor of its validity, may be reviewed by the Su-
preme Court upon a writ of error. The writ shall have
the same effect as if the judgment or decree had been
rendered or passed in a court of the United States.
The Supreme Court may reverse, modify, or affirm the
judgment or decree of such State court, and may, in its
discretion, award execution or remand the cause to the
court from which it was removed by the writ.’’

(2) The order and judgment of the Supreme Court of

Illinois appears on page 278 of the original record, as
follows:

‘‘The motion by petitioner for leave to file petition
for habeas corpus is unnecessary; petition is treated
as a petition for habeas corpus and petition denied.’’

(3) Opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois in People

v. Doss, 382 Ill. 307:

‘‘Mr. Justice Wilson delivered the opinion of the
court:

‘“‘The defendant, William A. Doss, was adjudged
guilty of criminal contempt by the circuit court of Piatt
county and fined $2000 and sentenced to imprisonment
in jail for a period of three months, the sentence to not
run concurrently with any other sentence. He prose-
cutes a direct appeal on the ground, among others,
that the order of conviction infringes the constitutional

11

guaranties of liberty of the press and freedom of
speech.

‘*An information was filed January 15, 1942. The
amended information, filed May 9, 1942, charged the
defendant with delivering or causing to be delivered
a copy of each of five issues of Tue Liserty Press, pub-
lished by him, to the foreman and a majority of the
members of the Piatt county grand jury then in session
investigating alleged violations by defendant of the
criminal libel law which had previously appeared in
his paper. It was also alleged that some of the issues
of the paper were sent by mail to several of the mem-
bers of the grand jury. The five issues of defendant’s
publication appear in the amended information. No
useful purpose can be served by narrating, in detail,
the voluminous contents of the issues of Tur Liserty
Press sent by defendant to the grand jury. It suffices
to observe that the language of the excerpts is intem-
perate in the extreme, and consists largely of accusa-
tions against the members of the bar of Piatt County,
attacks against the State’s Attorney of the county,
and, also, the special State’s Attorney who was ap-
pointed special prosecutor to act with reference to the
questions concerning the alleged violations of the
criminal libel law by defendant, and of repeated efforts
to dissuade the grand jury from returning indictments
against him. Those portions of the five issues made a
part of the amended information abound in vilifying
and vituperative statements concerning the objects of
defendant’s spleen. The articles urge the grand jurors
to not follow the advice and recommendations of the
prosecutors and, instead, to be guided by the advice of
the defendant. Defendant’s motion to strike the in-
formation was overruled. Thereafter, he answered,
admitting that he published the five issues of Tue
Liserty Press in question, and delivered or caused to
be delivered a copy of each of them to the foreman and
the majority of the members of the grand jury, and
that he mailed copies to other members of the grand
jury, but denied that they constituted contempt of
court, or that they were intended to wrongfully in-

12

fluence the grand jury in the performance of its duty,

**In the meantime, on February 10, 1942, defendant
applied for a change of venue from Judge W. S. Bod-
man, presiding judge of the circuit court of Piatt
county. His application was granted, and, on Febru-
ary 10, he filed a petition for change of venue from
Judge F. B. Leonard, another of the judges of the
circuit court. No formal order was entered with re-
spect to this second petition. It was, however, in effect,
acted upon and allowed by Judge C. Y. Miller, the third
of the judges of the circuit court, on March 6 in a
written statement in which he stated that he would not
try the contempt charge, and that the three judges had
decided that the administration of justice would be
best served by asking the Supreme Court to assign a
trial judge to the county. March 11, 1942, on motion
of the three judges of the sixth judicial circuit, this
court ordered that Judge James V. Bartley, one of the
circuit judges of the twelfth judicial circuit, be as-
signed to preside in the cireuit court of Piatt county,
at such times and for such period as may be necessary
to dispose of the matters pending against William A.
Doss. May 19, 1941, defendant filed a petition for
change of venue from Judge Bartley. This petition
was denied.

‘*Defendant contends that the denial by Judge Bart-
ley of the petition for change of venue constitutes
reversible error. The contempt charged against de-
fendant was a constructive criminal contempt com-
mitted out of the presence of the court, one which par-
takes of a criminal nature. Section 26 of the Venue
Act provides that no more than one change of venue
shall be granted to a defendant. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,
chap. 145, par. 26.) The right to a change of venue is
statutory, and the applicant must bring himself within
the statutory requirements. (People v. Toughy, 361
Ill. 332; Hutson v. Wood, 263 id. 376.) Defendant was
granted a change of venue from Judge Bodman and
was, for all practical purposes, granted a second
change of venue from Judge Leonard. His complaint
is that his third request was refused. For the ade-

13

quate reason that under section 26 of the Venue Act
he was entitled to only one change of venue, there was
no error in the denial of the petition by Judge Bartley.
Defendant argues, however, that the amended infor-
mation, filed May 9, 1942, constitutes a new cause of
action, and that, hence, the previous changes of venue
cannot be considered. No authority is cited, and we
have been unable to find any, for this novel proposition.
It is elementary that the filing of an amended informa-
tion or an amended complaint does not necessarily
constitute a new cause of action. Moreover, defendant
is not in a position to contend that the amended in-
formation presented a new cause of action against him
since he has failed to include the original information
in either the record or his abstract. Upon the record
thus made, there is no possible way of determining
whether the amended information did, as asserted,
constitute a new cause of action.

‘‘Apart from the fact that defendant has failed to
satisfy procedural requisites with respect to his con-
tention concerning change of venue and that substan-
tive grounds adequately support the denial of his third
petitioner, there is respectable authority for the
proposition that statutory provisions relative to change
of venue do not apply to proceedings to punish con-
tempts, unless such proceedings are expressly included,
eo nomine, in the statute. (Rapalje on Contempts, p.
110; State of Oklahoma ex rel. Short v. Owens, 125
Okla. 66; VanDyke v. Superior Court, 24 Ariz. 508;
Tucker v. State, 35 Wyo. 430.) The reason assigned
for inapplicability of change of venue statutes to con-
tempt proceedings is that a contempt is neither civil
nor criminal in fact, but sui generis.

‘‘Defendant claims that he was entitled to a trial by
jury, as requested. In a case, as here, where a con-
tempt proceeding is instituted to maintain the court’s
authority and to uphold the administration of justice,
and where the acts charged were not committed in the
presence of the court, a sworn answer denying the
alleged wrongful acts is conclusive, extrinsic evidence
may not be received to impeach it, and the defendant

14

is entitled to his discharge. (People v. Whitlow, 357
Il]. 34; People v. McDonald, 314 id. 548; People v. Sey-
mour, 272 id. 295.) If the answer is false, the remedy
is by indictment for perjury. (People v. McLaughlin,
334 Ill. 354.) On the other hand, if the answer admits
the material facts charged to be true and the facts con-
stitute a contempt of court, punishment is imposed.
(People v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524; People v. Seymour,
supra.) In either event, the offender is tried solely
upon his answer. It follows, necessarily, that the
defendant is not entitled to a trial by jury because no
issue of fact is or can be formed by a jury to try.
People v. Seymour, supra; O’Brien v. People, 216
Ill. 354.

‘‘The gist of several errors relied upon by defendant
for a reversal is to the effect that the amended informa-
tion should have been stricken on his motion. It is now
definitely settled in Illinois that written communica-
tions to members of a grand jury while in session, con-
taining malicious accusations against private citizens
and public officials, including the State’s Attorney, and
couched in such language that they can serve no useful
purpose but show only personal enmity, constitute con-
tempt of court as an unauthorized interference with the
administration of justice, even though the letters do not
refer to cases pending before the grand jury. (People
v. Parker, supra.) The amended information satisfies
the requirements of the law as a pleading, and it
affirmatively appears from the information that de-
fendant sent copies of five different issues of his paper
to members of the grand jury while in session, with
respect to matters pending before the grand jury di-
rectly affecting defendant himself. The motion to
strike was properly overruled.

‘*In an analogous case, Commonwealth v. McNary,
246 Mass. 46, the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts, in deciding, as a matter of law, that the
sending of a letter by one under investigation to mem-
bers of the grand jary, in view of attending circum-
stances, could have been found to be a contempt of
court, observed; ‘The court has the power and is

15

charged with the duty of punishing for contempt any
one whose conduct interferes with or has a tendency to
obstruct the grand jury. Such conduct is as much con-
tempt, and punishable as such as that which interferes
with or has a tendency to obstruct the administration of
justice in the courts in another form or manner. It may
be as necessary to put forth the power of the court to
protect itself against contempts committed against this
instrumentality of justice as against others. It is a
contempt of the court of which the grand jury is a part
to obstruct its normal and legal functions.’

‘*Defendant complains that the court erred in declin-
ing to permit him to produce witnesses, including two
members of the grand jury, upon the hearing of the
contempt proceedings. In a contempt alleged to have
been committed beyond the presence of the court, no
evidence other than defendant’s sworn answer can be
heard and considered by the court in the determination
of his guilty or the enormity of the offense. (People v.
Severinghaus, 313 Ill. 456.) In short, error would have
been committed had the court allowed witnesses to
testify in this action.

‘*Defendant contends that the court erroneously ad-
judged him guilty of contempt. It is established that
when communications to a grand jury having a tendency
to directly impede, embarrass or obstruct it in the dis-
charge of any of its duties remaining to be discharged
after the publications were made, such publications con-
stitute contempt. (People v. Parker, supra.) It is
manifest that defendant was seeking, by all means at
his command, to influence the grand jury in its delibera-
tions concerning the criminal charges under investiga-
tion with respect to the alleged criminally libelous arti-
cles published by him in The Liberty Press. His para-
mount purpose was to influence the grand jury to not
indict himself. The publications go further and indi-
rectly, if not directly, urge that several members of the
bar of Piatt county, including the State’s Attorney, be
indicted. In addition, he repeatedly professed in-
nocence of any criminal charges, told the grand jurors

16

that the State’s Attorney was not correctly advising
them concerning the law, and arrogated himself the
duty of instructing the grand jury as to the law. De-
fendant’s actions were highly contumacious, as he well
knew. More than five years ago he had been charged
with circularizing the grand jury by mail regarding a
matter to come to it. He admitted mailing the articles
in question to each grand juror prior to the meeting of
the grand jury. Particularly pertinent is our observa-
of his guilt or the enormity of the offense. (People v.
tion made at the time of defendant’s disbarment (In re
Doss, 367 Ill. 570): ‘The publication of the newspaper
articles, regardless of when they appeared, and
especially the circularization of the grand jury are
especially to be condemned. The invariable effect of
this sort of propaganda is to create disrespect for the
courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute
with the public.’

‘*Defendant argues, bowever, that his efforts neither
influenced nor appreciably affected the actions of the
grand jury. The success or failure of an attempt to
influence the jury is not the test of liability, since no
one can know what, if any, effect it had. (12 American
Jurisprudence, Contempt, sec. 37.) Defendant’s con-
tention does not, however, square with his argument, as
he states in his brief that the actions of the State’s At-
torney and Special State’s Attorney ‘undoubtedly did
unlawfully so interfere with the grand jury’s actions
and deliberations that it netted them, according to the
record, four indictments, although I admit they had de-
manded more indictments.’ We do not deem it ma-
terial whether defendant’s actions actually influenced
the grand jury. That he intended the five issues of The
Liberty Press to influence the grand jury is beyond
doubt. They reflect a coolly calculated tendency to
directly impede, influence, embarrass and obstruct the
grand jury in the discharge of its duties. The constitu-
tional guaranties invoked by defendant were never in-
ténded to and do not sanction such conduct as exhibited
by defendant. These rights are not absolute. Neither

17

liberty of the press nor freedom of speech have yet be-
come license.

‘‘Finally, defendant complains that the punishment
imposed was too severe. A disavowal, or denial under
oath, of intent to insult the court or to s!ander or deter
the grand jury in its duty, should be considered by the
court in mitigation of the offense but it cannot be con-
sidered as a complete justification. (People v. Parker,
supra; People v. Severinghaus, supra.) By his own ad-
mission, defendant published and circulated copies of
The Liberty Press ‘by the thousands’ in Piatt county,
thereby indicating he was well able to pay the fine. De-
fendant was for approximately thirty years a member
of the bar of this State and during this period he oceu-
pied positions of public honor and responsibility as
county judge and State’s Attorney of Piatt county. As
an active practitioner, as a former jurist and a former
prosecutor, he was particularly well qualified to know
the effect likely to be produced upon the grand jury by
the articles written and published by him in The Liberty
Press. These circumstances, together with the admoni-
tion of this court in 1937 render his conduet in forward-
ing the papers to the grand jurors inexcusable.

‘‘The order of the circuit court is affirmed.

Order affirmed.’’

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385610_0142%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.