# Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the Respondent in Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 425 U.S. 935

## Text

INDEX
Page
NINOS SW co nccnaninesmaccntacuutnesmgadaiine 1
MND Sonctirtactaepsacerespnchcracnmwes nae talanmommarcnes 1
RNR NORE OR RMT ON 1
ne II 2
SEI eiseesccb. anon ierenactacns ie doeni cancer aie 2
PIII rissa cents is inciaimenininena siemens D
RING conc ac eaten ceeneeoepiont ee 14
CITATIONS
Cases:
Big Rivers Electric Corporation y. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 523 F. 2d
16, petitions for a writ of certiorari
pending, Nos. 75-774 and 75-787______- 7,8
National Labor Relations Board y. Bell
Aerospace Company, 416 U.S. 267______ 10
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 489
F. 2d 390, reversed in part sub nom.
Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Comets, Bak WB Diivncininnddetecin 6-7, 8, 10
Sterra Club vy. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp.
253, affirmed sub nom. Fri vy. Sierra
Coy Ee Sls bale ctnnideaacciaice: 10
State of Texas y. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 499 F. 2d 289___......___- 7
Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, No. 74-1542, argued Jan-
RY Ri, Seika dence camuniuecnelan 6, 7

203-531—76——-1

»
Dia OR ee Baers Ere eee |

Sa

II

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Air Act, 77 Stat. 392, as amended ine
and added by the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C.

1857, et seq.:
Section 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-

STEED tniecammaatcidadaisiacceies 8
Section 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-

TA REIT soc et des ceiannineatdcbainn 9
Section 110, 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-5________ 2
Section 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-

BED sentatinin st cgeies ea neoeonaida: 9
Section 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-

PMN ID seeniratiemnccbesatinel tentsibnansitesseses 2, 6,7
Section 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.

1857¢c-5(a) (2) (B) ------ 1-2, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13
Section 110(c), 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-5(c¢)_ 3
Section 119, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)

eg Re atte ne ene TO 12
Section 119(¢)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.

(Supp. IV) 1857¢e-10(¢) (2) (B)_--- 13
Section 119(c)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C,

(Supp. IV) 1857e-10(¢) (2) (C)_--_ 13

Energy Supply and Environmental Coor-
dination Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-319, 88
ee RE ee ser 12

BO Te IOI Fon concen seen, 4

40 C.F .R. 52.1475(e) (13) _.-........._..- 4

ER Fe CLG | | a ee 4

Miscellaneous:

119 Cong. Rec. 41774-41777 (1973)___--_-- il

120 Cong. Rec. S 10409 (daily ed. June 12,

EE eencindeciatnkeanscnenniaitmnine cosine 12

es Be, aid ei ear ena ects cebiiees 2

40 Fed. Reg. 5509-5510______-___._______ 3

ee a

Ill

Miscellaneous—Continued

Page
ie ee | re keno 3, 4-5
40 Bed. Hee, 5615... 2222 ee 4
Ae i. | eee 4
i at. ARS if SC CR 4
H.R. 11450, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) ___ 11
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d
aaa ER Eg) PRE O S e ON oe ee 10
H.R. Rep. No. 93-1013, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
{> Rape eNte ae? nla pcre tee ee 11
S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-663, 93d Cong., 1st
PI ST wie iaerepicectintc ngparseiceeeikickas 11
S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(Se?) na teideeeeens onda ee 10

SS ee ON ARPT WEE REN CPR AST BS nN tA oer ome PECs 4 RG +

PELOTON LATE SEPT RT PREM ATRIA FYE eR RETIRE amie NEEREt oes: Teer mecemait. TH

POOR COPY

Su the Supreme Gourt of the Cited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-1029

KENNECOTT CoprpER CoRPORATION, PETITIONER
v.
Russett E. Trarx, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
Ja-22a) is reported at 526 F. 2d 1149.

JURISDICTION

The judzment of the court of appeals was entered

on November 28, 1975. The petition for a writ of

certiorari was filed on January 20, 1976. The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency correctly interpreted Section

(1)

PLEASE LAGGED. LILLE LOLI! LILES SMO ME SIRI IEG ROR EOE MI LEE OPT

* aay

2

119(a)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-
5(a)(2)(B), to require that state implementation
plans, designed to meet national ambient air quality
standards, must use continuous emission reduction
techniques to the extent available and may not rely
on intermittent or supplemental emission control
measures on a permanent basis.

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 110 of the Clean Air Act, as added by the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1680, 42
U.S.C. 1857c¢—5, is set out in pertinent part at Pet. 2-3.

STATEMENT

The Clean Air Act, 77 Stat. 392, as amended, 42
U.S.C. 1857, et seq., requires the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate na-
tional primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards that will protect the public from known
or anticipated adverse effects of various air pollutants.
Each State is primarily responsible for assuring the
quality of the air within its territory and must devise
a state implementation plan designed, at a minimum,
to implement, maintain and enforce the national
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards.

Under Section 110(a)(2) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
1857¢—5(a) (2), the Administrator is required to ap-
prove a state implementation plan if he determines.
inter alia, that “it imeludes emission limitations,
schedules, and timetables for compliance with such
limitations * * *” (Section 110(a) (2)(B), 42 U.S.C.
1857¢-5(a)(2)(B)).

ERC Ops RE eye en RET mp Cee ince i VL HUDLE I SCA BOTY ANE RE Hape SL PORE IRE OG

POOR COPY

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3

The Administrator previously had approved those
provisions of Nevada’s plan relating to control stra-
tegy except those involving control of sulfur oxide
emissions from petitioner’s McGill smelter, the only
major source of such emissions in the Nevada Intra-
state Air Quality Control Region (Pet. App. 3a). On
June 14, 1974, the State of Nevada submitted amend-
ments to its plan that would have required application
of constant emission control technology to reduce sul-
fur oxide emissions from the smelter by 60 percent
of the sulfur contained in the unprocessed ore. In
order fully to meet all ambient air quality standards,
the amendments envisioned the use of a new 750-foot
tall smokestack and also would have required use of
“supplementary”’’ or ‘‘intermittent’’ control systems
designed to control emissions further by curtailing or
discontinuing production on days when meteorological
conditions were conducive to ground level concentra-
tions in excess of the ambient air quality standards.
40 Fed. Reg. 5509-5510. The Nevada amendments
would have permitted use of these supplementary con-
trol systems on a permanent basis and did not require
application of additional direct emission controls as
they became available. 40 Fed. Reg. 5510.

On February 6, 1975, after public hearings, the
Administrator disapproved Nevada’s amendments and
promulgated substitute sulfur oxide emission hmnita-
tions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-5(c). 40 Fed Reg.
5508, et sey. The Administrator determined that an 86
percent reduction in sulfur oxide emissions was neces-
sary to meet the ambient air quality standards (Pet.
App. 6a), but recognized that attainment of that emis-
sion level could not reasonably be achieved at present

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BLEED THROUGH

SATAN OASIS or |

4

using only constant emission reduction controls, The
PA Adiinistrator’s regulations therefore provided
that, as a temporary measure, petitioner may install
certain already ordered constant emission reduction
technology that would produce the 60 percent redue-
tion contemplated by the Nevada amendments, and
must employ such additional and supplementary con-
trol measures or other dispersion techniques as may be
necessary to meet the air quality standards, 40 CLELR.
O21ATH(e) (7): 40 Red. Reg. 5515. The Administrator
determined, however, that the permanent use of such
techniques could not be justified.' He therefore directed
petitioner to carry on or support a research and devel-
opment program directed at attaining compliance with
those standards solely through constant emission re-
duction techniques, and to adopt improved technology
as it becomes available for use. 40 CPLR. 52.1475(e)
» (15); 40 Ped. Reg. 5516, 5517. As stated in the
siiililla to the regulations (40 Fed. Ree. 5510);
EPA will approve such measures as intermit-
tent production curtailment and use of dispersion
techniques, incliding tall stacks, as an addition
to available constant control measures, until such
time as the treatment of weak gas streams can be
accomplished through reasonable retrofit control
techniques, Evaluation of the availabiniy of con-
stant control techniques whieh may be developed
in the future will be made using the same criteria
‘In its Memorandum in Support of Petitioner, the Staie of
Nevada overlooks the Administrator's distinction between the
temporary and permanent use of supplementary control techni-
ques. It erroneously contends that “[t]he only material difference

between the [f}ederal plan and the Nevada plan” is the require
Ment that petitioner condnet a research program (Nev, Mom. 2).

-

0
as were used in developing these regulations.
Namely, [supplementary control systems] will
continue to be allowed where permanent produc-
tion curtailment, shutdown or delays in attain-
ment of national standards are the only other
alternatives.

Petitioner filed a timely petition for review of the
Adiministrator’s actions in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The State of Nevada
intervened in support of petitioner, The court held
that Section 110(a)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act
requires the use of corstant emission reduction tech-
nology and that the Administrator therefore had
properly rejected that portion of the Nevada plan that
would have permitted the permanent use of internit-
tent controls, The court concluded that the Adminis-
trator acted within the scope of his authority “in re-
fusing toe accept intermittent controls as adequate
colupliance with the statute” (Pet. App. ba).

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends (Pet. 10-12) that the Adminis-
trator’s disapproval of that portion of the Nevada im-
plementation plan allowing permanent use — of
supplementary control measures exceeded his au-
thority under the Clean Air Act. It argues that in
iaplementing its “preferred strategy” of constant
eniussion reductions for attaining and maintaining
winbient air standards, EPA derogated from the power
of the States to formulate emission control strategies,
in violation of the statutory division of pollution con-
trol responsibilities between the federal and_ state
governments, However, EPA's adoption of this strat-

202-521 -- 76-——-2

6

egy was not a discretionary act but a mandatory re-
sponse to the manifest congressional intention that
ambient air standards be met whenever possible by
continuous emission control limitations.’ Its rejection
of the Nevada amendments was in strict compliance
with its assigned role under the Clean Air Act. The
decision of the court of appeals therefore is correct,
and it does not conflict with any decision of this Court
or any court of appeals.’

1. Section 110(a)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. 1857¢-5() (2) (B), requires that every state
implementation plan include

emission Hmitations, schedules, and timetables
for compliance with such limitations, and such
other measures as may be necessary to insure
attainment and maintenance of sueh primary or
secondary standard, including, but not limited
to, land-use and transportation controls.
Every court that has considered this language las
construed it to require the use of all available meas-
ures for contintteus limitation of emissions, See Na-
fural Resourecs Defouse Council, Tne. ve Ruviven-

> Thus, the State of Nevada incorrectly asserts (Nev. Mem. 3)
that the Adininistrater’s sole justification for requiring continu-
ous elission limitations was their “convemlence and ease of en-
forcement”. This argument is also implicit in petitioner's refer-
ences to the Adniiistrator’s “preferred strategy” (see Pet. 2.5),

In Jovian Bheetric Coon, Buvivoniwental Protection Aqeuey.
No. T4-15i2. argued January 21, 1976. we contended that upon
judicial review of the Administrator’s approval of a state imple-
mentation phin under the Clear Air Act, the court may not con-
sider claims that compliance is economically or technological
infeasible: As we argued in that ease, there is noe requirement in
Section 110(a)(2) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857-5 (a) (2). that in
deciding whether to approve a state-submitted implementation

—

et

7

mental Protection Agency, 489 F. 2d 390, 106-409
(CLA. 5), reversed in part on other grounds sub nom,
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 4221 US.
60; State of Teras vy. Environmental Protection
Ayency, 499 BF. 2d 289, 311-313 (CLA. 5): Big Rivers
Electric Corporation Vv. Environmental Protection
Agency, 523 F. 2d 16 (CLA. 6), petitions for a writ of
certiorari pending, Nos. 75-774 and 75-787.

In Tratn vy. National Resources Defense Council,
supra, 421 U.S. at 78, this Court stated that state im-
plementation plans to attain and maintain national
ambient air standards

must include “emission Jimitations,” which are
regulations of the composition of substances
eniutted into the ambient air from such sourees
as power plants, service stations, and the like.
They are specifie rules to which operators of
pollution sources are subject, and which if en-

plan, the Administrator must consider whether compliance with
the emission limitations therein is feasible. Accordingly, so long
as the plan is sufficient to achieve ambient air standards wo ve-
quires continnous emission limitations, it must be approved,

If. however, a state plan appears facially inadequate in that i
could be construed to permit: intermittent emission Tinitations,
the Administrator must review it to determine whether the inter
mittent controls are justified. Only if the demonstration of ade
quoey Which must aecompany the submission of each dmaplementa-
tion plan shows that constant emission controls are unavatlable
will tae Administrator approve a plan that permits ue of disper
sion technology suel. as tatermittent controls. Thus. the Adriins
trator does not review the feasibility of compliance with a state-
submitted plan where itis adequate on its facecas in Vaden Blee-
fetes Imit will concider feasibility only in determining whether
special eirenmstances justify approving an apparently deficient
plan that fails to inelude constant emission lindtations neee sary
to obtain approval under Section 110(a) (2), resorting instead to
dispersion techniques,

is a

forced should result in ambient air which meets

the national standards [emphasis supplied].

As had the Sixth Circuit in Big Rivers, supra, the
court below correctly interpreted this statement to
mean that “emission limitations” do not include regu-
lations that merely regulate the time during which
pollutants may be dispersed into the atmosphere or the
altitude of the smokestack through which they are
dispersed, which are the effects of intermittent or
supplemental control systems (Pet. App. lWa-l2a).
2. ‘Phe purpose of the Clean Air Act further eoi-
linus that Congress intended to require that state im-
plementation plans require continuous — emission
controls if available. National primary ambient air
quality standards are those “requisite to protect the
publie health,” 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-4(b) (1): national
secondary ambient air quality: standards are. those

‘To be sures the Court in Zr held that “so long as the na-
tional standards are being attained and maintained. there is no
basis in the present Clean Air Act for forcing further techno-
logical developments” (4d. at 91). But the Court was referring
to modification of source-by-source emission limitations fixed by
the State, which the Administrater must approve so long as the
state plan as a whole provides for a mix of emission limitations
from all sources sufficient to meet national air quality standards :
if these limitations are suflicient, the Administrator may not raise
the limitation on a particular source to force technological im-
provement as to that source, The Court did not thereby preclude
the Adiministrator from withholding his approval of state imple-
mencation plans that did not employ “emission limitations” or
that could Le construed to permit intermittent emission controls
when continuous controls were available, Nor did it prevent the
Adiainistrator from seeking to force sufficient development of
technology so that ambient air standards may be met solely
through emission limitation controls, rather than by supple-
reentary techniques (Pet. App. Dla-l2a n. 22).

9

“requisite to protect the public welfare from any
known or anticipated adverse effects associated with
the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air,”
42 U.S.C. 1857¢-4(b) (2). State implementation plans
must provide for attainment and “maintenance” of
these standards, 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-5(a) (1). Internit-
tent controls, however, do not provide a sufficient
enarantee that national primary and secondary am-
bient air quality standards will be maintained. As the
court below stated (Pet. App. lla-12a):
Intermittent control systems (such as those re-
stricting production, or utilizing less pollut-
ing fuels, during periods of adverse weather)
do limit the amount of pollutant emitted while
such controls are being applied. However, the
reliability and enforceability of such controls
is questionable; they may not be implemented
when they are in fact needed. Moreover, there
is no assurance that temporary reductions im
emissions resulting from such controls will not
be balanced, or even exceeded, by an increase im
the amount of pollutant emitted when weather
conditions improve and production is increased
to make up for prior losses, or more polluting
fuels are again used. Thus, intermittent con-
trols, like tall stacks, may only disperse the
pollutant rather than reduce it. Tall smoke-
stacks disperse a pollutant through ereater
quantities of air: intermittent control systems
disperse a pollutant through longer periods of
time. Neither assures: a_ reduction in the
quantity of the pollutant eventually emitted.
Under section [110(a)(2)(B)], EPA may re-
quire that assurance [footnote omitted].

10

Moreover, since the use of dispersion techniques
merely regulates the timing or altitude, but not the
quantity, of pollutants discharged into the atmosphere
(Pet. App. lla-1l2a), it is at odds with the policy of
nondegradation in the Clean Air Act.’ As the court of
appeals stated in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Tne. ve Environmental Protection Agency, supra, 489
I*. 2d at 408-409:

Dispersion * * * techniques operate by keeping
pollutants out of areas of Jigh pollutant con-
centration, and dispersing them to lower con-
centration areas; their objective is to reduce
concentrations in high-concentration areas. In-
evitably, however, the pollutants emitted into
the atmosphere must end up somewhere; and
the atmosphere at their destination, wherever
that may be, will be degraded, in violation of
the congressional policy. The only techniques
fully capable of guaranteeing non-degradation
are [continuous] emission limitation — tech-
niques.°

3. “[SJubsequent legislation declaring the intent of
an earlier statute is entitled to significant weight,’
National Labor Relations Board vy. Bell) Acrospace
Company, 416 U.S. 267, 275, and the legislative his-

* This policy requires that areas of clean air, where air quality
indices are above the levels set by the national ambient air quality
standards, must not be degraded, even though degradation will
not reduce the quality of the air below levels specified by the
standards. See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st C One 2d Sess. 2 (1970):
IT.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1,205 vane Nierra
CVuh ve Reuckelshaus. DAL EF. Supp. 253, 255 (1D. D.C.). atlirmed
suh nom. Brive Sierra Club Al2 US 5 AL,

* The court classified both tall stacks and intermittent controls
as dispersion techniques (47. at 594 n. 2).

11

tory of subsequent amendments to the Clean Air Act
shows that Congress intended that state implementa-
tion plans should require the use of continuous enis-
sion controls when available (see Pet. App. P3a-22a).

Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1974, in
response to the 1973 oil embargo and energy crisis. As
it passed the House of Representatives, the 1973
predecessor to the 1974 amendment, which subse-
quently was vetoed, permitted the permanent use of
intermittent controls at certain emission sources.’ The
Conference Committee eliminated this provision and
in its draft permitted intermittent controls only upon
pollution sources that converted to coal, and then only
as a temporary relief measure under specified
conditions.”

In March 1974, the Administrator transmitted a
new proposed bill to the House which, in pertinent
part, Was the same in substance as the statute even-
tually adopted. The Administrator also transmitted
another proposal, which he did not support, that
would have amended Section T857e-5(a)(2)(B) to
provide that nothing in that section was to be con-
strued “ ‘to preclude use of * * * intermittent control
measures.” 7?" 'Phe Administrator stated that this pro-
posed amendment, which was intended * ‘to allow the
use of intermittent control strategies as a permanent

"Murphy Amendments to TLR. P50. Section 201, 83d Cong.
Ist Sess, (19793): 119 Cong. Rec. 41775-41777 (1973).

*s. Conf. Rep. No. 95-663, 95d Cong... Ist Sess. 83-84 (1975).

* Letter dated March 22. 1974. from Russell BE. Prain, Adiain-
istrator of EPA. to Hon, Carl TP. Albert, Speaker of the House of

Representatives, attached to TLR. Rep. No. 93-1013, 98d Cong.
Zab Sess, (L974). (See Pet. App. 1a—19a.)

12

method for achieving compliance with stationary
source emission standards’, would “‘signifieantly
weaken the Clean Air Act.’ *’ The Administrator re-
affirmed the contrary position taken by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, stating, “*[a]s in the past,
EPA will contend that the intermittent controls
‘an be used only as an expedient, temporary control
measure.” (See Pet. App. 18a.)

In the course of presenting the Conference Report
on the 1974 amendment to the Senate, Senator Muskie,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Environmental
Pollution and manager of the bill in the Senate,
stated (120 Cong. Ree. S. 10409 (daily ed. June 12,
1974)):

** * TNJo one should view limited application
of enforceable strategies related to this legisla-
tion as a precedent for future legislation or as
a reinterpretation of the requirements of the
existing law which bar the application of in-
termittent control strategies as a substitute for
emission limitations.

When finally enacted, the Energy Supply and
Knvironmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. LL.
95-319, 88 Stat. 246, added a new Section 119 to the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. EV) 1857¢-L0, which
permits certain power plants and other large emission
sources that convert from burning oil or natural gas
to burning coal to obtain temporary relief from air
pollution control requirements and thereby to use in-
termittent controls temporarily if certain specified
conditions are met. One of the conditions is that the
souree in question must enter into binding contracts
to acquire cither a long-term supply of low-sulphor

13

coal or a “continuous emission reduction system.”
Whichever alternative is chosen, the arrangement
must achieve the necessary degree of emission reduc-
tion not later than December 31, 1978. Use of inter-
mittent controls after that date is not permitted. See
Sections 119(¢)(2)(B) and (C), 42 U.S.C. (Supp.
IV) 1857¢-10(¢) (2) (B) and (C).

Since the purpose of this legislation was to encour-
age certain power plants to convert from oil or gas to
coal and to provide relief to those plants that switched
to coal because of the oil supply interruption, it is in-
conceivable that Congress intended to impose on such
sources a greater burden than if they had not con-
verted, Accordingly, Congress must have assumed that
intermittent controls were not permitted prior to the
1974 amendment.”

0 On March 18, 1976. the Ilouse Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce ordered that IT.R. 10498, a bill further amend-
ing the Clean Air Act, be reported favorably to the House. Section
103(a) of that proposed bill would add a new Section 12i(a) to
the Clean Air Act which would define the term “means of emission
limitation” for purposes of that Section as “a system of continuous
emission reduction (including the use of specific technology or
fuels with specified pollution characteristics) * * *.° A comparable
provision, defining “emission limitation” as a requirement limit-
ing the emission of air pollutants on a continuous basis. is included
as Section 33(i) of a similar bill to amend the Clean Air Act cur-
rently pending before the Senate Committee on Public Works. If
adopted, these bills would remove any residual ambiguity in the
expression of the congressional intention that state implementation
plans must require the use of continuous emission limitations when
available.

Moreover, Section 5(b) of the Senate biH weuld amend
Section 110(a)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act to provide that the
Administrator mist approve a state submitted implementation
plan if, among other requirements, “it includes emission limita-
tions, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limita-

ore 1

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Bock Rh ah EY

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14
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is respectfully submitted
that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.
Rosert H. Bork,
Solicitor General.
pT TP 4 ep
Perer R. Tart,
Assistant Attorney General,
Jacques LB. GELIN,
EpwWarb J. SHAWAKER,
CuarLes W. SHIPLEY,
Attorneys.

Marcu 1976.
tions, and, in addition, as may be necessary, (i) to assure attain-
ment and maintenance of such primary or secondary standard,
such other measures, including, but not limited to * * * enforceable
supplemental emission reduction strategies for existing nonferrous
smelters * * *,”

Section 121(c) (3) (A) of the House bill would provide that the
owner of an existing nonferrous smelter may receive up to two
five-year extensions of the date f- > eempliance with any require-
ment of a state implementation pla. © :on a demonstration that it
is necessary to use other measures, presumably including dispersion
techniqnes, to attain and maintain national ambient air quality
standards if the Administrator has determined that no “means of
emission limitation” (as that term is defined above) necessary for
compliance with such requirement is reasonably available,

Thus, both houses of Congress have recognized that before non-
ferrous smelters may, for an extended period of time, rely upon
supplemental control techniques to comply with state implementa-
tion plans, the present Clean Air Act must be amended. Further-
more, the pendency of these amendments demonstrates that
Congress is aware of the problems of the smelter industry and is
considering whether special treatment is appropriate, If the Act is
duly amended along the lines suggested by the proposed legisla-
tion, the question presented in this case may be of no prospective
significance,

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_2147%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.
