# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 424 U.S. 934

## Text

Prratuma Partners, a California limited part-
nership, and Wuaiam Lawrence,
Petitioners,

V8.

Tae Crry or Peracvma, a California Charter City, Hen
Potnam, Roszat A. Brunnes, Joun W. Cavanacn,
Roserr E. Day, James L. Hanserson, Feep

MaLooLo A, SAR
James L, BrYERs,

900 College Avenue,
Santa Rose, California 95404,

Counsel for Petitioners,

PAWEL AE? ‘ PURE ARIE + ee

Page
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Constitutional provisions involved ..............0.00e ee eee 3
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Reasons for gramting the WHEE 2.0... cesses csceccenccccs 10

1. The decision of the court of appeals denying peti-
tioners standing to assert the interests of prospective
residents of Petaluma creates a confusing and unnec-
essary test for derivative standing and conflicts with
decisions of this court and other courts of appeals ... 10

2. The decision of the court of appeals to review an
admittedly exclusionary land-use ordinance only for
a “rational basis,” and not on some higher and stricter
standard, conflicts with decisions of this court and
courts of last resort in the several states ........... 15

3. In a metropolitan housing market, exclusionary meas-
ures taken by one city increase burdens on other
cities, frustrate efforts to find housing, and cause a
decline in the quality of the region’s housing. No met-
ropolitan city may legislate for “the general welfare”
without considering the impact of its land-use laws
a Bi OI 5s i Es Sn Ree ha SiR ee a Ss 21

Ci ao card CREE N UE Oe Pi OV ERA Ran Wa ER ea cha peeks 28

id

RETR ee

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) ...17, 18, 23
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765

EE Sane eUEVECING Gs dat REEOO GCA CHEKM ek us cand ancee 18, 23
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 .......... cece ween 12, 16
Berenson v. Town of New Castle, ........ OMe & iti

rs ZBL AL LA NM WHS een,

38

The Council made specific findings with respect to
housing patterns and availability in Petaluma, in-
cluding the following: That from 1960-1970 hous-
ing had been in almost unvarying 6000 square-foot
lots laid out in regular grid patterns; that there was
a density of approximately 4.5 housing units per acre
in the sing'> femily home areas; that during 1960-
1970, 88 per cent of housing permits issued were for
single-family detached homes; that in 1970, 83 per
cent of Petaluma’s housing was single family dwell-
ings; that the bulk of recent development (largely
single family homes) occurred on the eastern portion
of the City, causing a large deficiency in moderately
priced multi-family and apartment units on the east
side.

To correct the imbalance between single-family and
multi-family dwellings, curb the sprawl of the City
on the east, and retard the accelerating growth of the
City, the Council in 1972 adopted several resolutions,
which collectively are called the “Petaluma Plan”
(the Plan).

The Plan, on its face limited to a five-year period
(1972-1977).' fixes a housing development growth rate

*

1The district court found that although the Plan is ostensibly
limited to a five-year period, official attempts have been made to
perpetuate the Plan beyond 1977. Such attempts include the urban
extension line (see text infra) and the agreement to purchase from
the Sonoma County Water Agency only 9.8 million gallons of water
per day through the year 1990. This flow is sufficient to support
a population of 55,000. If the City were to grow at a rate of about
500 housing units per year (approximately three persons per unit),
the City would reach a population of 55,000 about the year 1990.
The 55,000 figure was mentioned by City officials as the projected
optimal (and maximum) size of Petaluma. See, e.g., R.T. at 135-43,
145-46. -

PRAT PT DEERE ISPS on ART * i8 2 te. LER STR PRLS Sek F s C8

39

not to exceed 500 dwelling units per year.? Each
dwelling unit represents approximately three people.
The 500 unit figure is somewhat misleading, however,
because it applies only to housing units (hereinafter
referred to as “development-units”) that are part of
projects involving five units or more. Thus, the 500
unit figure does not reflect any housing and popula-
tion growth due to construction of single family
homes or even four-unit apartment buildings not part
of any larger project.

The Plan also positions a 200 foot wide “green-
belt” around the City,’ to serve as a boundary for
urban expansion for at least five years, and with
respect to the east and north sides of the City, for
perhaps ten to fifteen years. One of the most innova-
tive features of the Plan is the Residential Devel-
opment Control System which provides procedures
and criteria for the award of the annual 500 devel-
opment-unit permits. At the heart of the allocation
procedure is an intricate point system, whereby a
builder accumulates points for conformity by his
projects with the City’s general plan and environ-
mental design plans, for good architectural design,
and for providing low and moderate income dwelling
units and various recreational facilities. The Plan
further directs that allocations of building permits

2The allotment for each year is not an inflexible limitation. The
Plan does provide for a 10 percent variance (50 units) below or
above the 500 unit annual figure, but the expectation of the Council
is that not more than 2500 units will be constructed during the
five-year period.

8At some points this urban extension line is about .25 mile
beyond the present City limits.

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are to be divided as evenly as feasible between the
west and east sections of the City and between single-
family dwellings and multiple residential units (in-
cluding rental units),* that the sections of the City
closest to the center are to be developed first in order
to cause ‘‘infilling” of vacant area, and that 8 to 12
per cent of the housing units approved be for low and
moderate income persons.

In a provision of the Plan, intended to maintain
the close-in rural space outside and surrounding
Petaluma, the City solicited Sonoma County to estab-
lish stringent subdivision and appropriate acreage
parcel controls for the areas outside the urban exten-
sion line of the City and to limit severly further resi-
dential infiling.

Purpose of the Plan

The purpose of the Plan is much disputed in this
case. According to general statements in the Plan
itself, the Plan was devised to ensure that ‘‘develop-
ment in the next five years, will take place in a rea-
sonable, orderly, attractive manner, rather than in a
completely haphazard and unattractive manner.” The
controversial 500 unit limitation on residential devel-
opment-units was adopted by the City “[i]n order
to protect its small town character and surrounding

4By providing for the increase of multi-family dwellings (in-
eluding townhouses as well as rental apartments), the Plan allows
increased density. Whereas, during the years just preceding the
Plan, housing density was about 4.5 units per acre, under the
Plan single-family housing will consist of not only low (4.5 units
per acre) but also medium density (4.5 to 10 units per acre).
And multi-family housing, to comprise about half of the housing
under the Plan, will be built at a density of 10 or more units

per acre.

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41

open space.” The other features of the Plan were
designed to encourage an east-west balance in devel-
opment, to provide for variety in densities and build-
ing types and wide ranges in prices and rents, to
ensure infilling of close-in vacant areas, and to pre-
vent the sprawl of the City to the east and north.
The Builders Association of Sonoma County (the
Association) argues and the district court found,
however, that the Plan was primarily enacted “to
limit Petaluma’s demographic and market growth in
housing and in the immigration of new residents.”
375 F.Supp. 574, 576.

Market Demand and Effect of the Plan

In 1970 and 1971, housing permits were allotted at
the rate of 1000 annually, and there was no indica-
tion that without some governmental control on
growth consumer demand would subside or even re-
main at the 1000 unit per year level. Thus, if Peta-
luma had imposed a flat 500-unit limitation on all
residential housing the effect of the Plan would
clearly be to retard to a substantial degree the nat-
ural growth rate of the City. Petaluma, however, did
not apply the 500-unit limitation across the board.
but instead exempted all projects of four units or
less. Because appellees failed to introduce any evi-
dence whatsoever as to the number of exemnt units

5After the appellees initiated this suit, the City attempted to
show that the Plan was implemented to prevent the over-taxing of
available water and sewage facilities. We find it unnecessary, how-
ever, to consider the claim that sewage and water problems justified
implementation of the Plan.

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expected to be built during the five-year period, the
effect of the 500 development-unit limitation on the
natural growth in housing is uncertain. For purposes
of this decision, however, we will assume that the 500
development-unit growth rate is in fact below the
reasonably anticipated market demand for such units
and that absent the Petaluma Plan, the City would
grow at a faster rate.

According to undisputed expert testimony at trial,
if the Plan (limiting housing starts to approximately
6 per cent of existing housing stock each year) were
to be adopted by municipalities throughout the
region, the impact on the housing market would be
substantial. For the decade 1970 to 1980, the short-
fall in needed housing in the region would be about
105,000 units (or 25 per cent of the units needed).
Further, the aggregate effect of a proliferation of the
Plan throughout the San Francisco region would be
a decline in regional housing stock quality, a loss of
the mobility of current and prospective residents and
a deterioration in the quality and choice of housing
available to income earners with real incomes of
$14,000 per vear or less. If, however, the Plan were
considered by itself and with respect to Petaluma
only, there is no evidence to suggest that there would
he a deterioration in the quality and choice of hous-
ing available there to persons in the lower and mid-
dle income brackets. Actually, the Plan inereases the
availability of multi-family units (owner-ocenpied °
and rental units) and low-income units which were
rarely constructed in the pre-Plan days.

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43

Court Proceedings

‘wo landowners (the Landowners) and the Associ-
ation instituted this suit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and its
officers and council members, claiming that the Peta-
luma Plan was unconstitutional. The district court
ruled that certain aspects of the Plan unconstitution-
ally denied the right to travel in so far as they tended
‘“‘to limit the natural population of the area.” 375
F.Supp. 574, 588, The court enjoined the City and its
agents from implementing the unconstitutional ele-
ments of the Plan, but the order was stayed by Jus-
tice Douglas pending this appeal.

Jurisdiction

The City, on two wholly separate grounds, chal-
lenges the power of the district court to hear the suit
below. The City contends that a court has no jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
entertain a suit against members of a city council.
Relying on City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973), which held that a city is not a “person” under
§ 1983, the City argues that its councilmen, similarly,
are not “persons.” This court, however, has recently
faced the very issue raised by the City and has held
that a city official is a “person” within the meaning
of §1983 and that a district court has jurisdiction
under 28 1.8.C. § 1343 over an action to enjoin him
from enforcing an unconstitutional statute. Ybarra v.
City of the Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250,
953 (9th Cir. 1974).

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44

The district court had jurisdiction not only under
§ 1343 but also under the general federal question
statute, 28 U.S.C. 1331. It does not appear to a legal
certainty that the amount in controversy is less than
$10,000. See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red
Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938).

Standing

The City also challenges the standing of the Associ-
ation and the Landowners to maintain the suit. The
standing requirement raises the threshhold question in
every federal case whether plaintiff has made out a
“case or controversy” between himself and the defend-
ant within the meaning of Article III of the Constitu-
tion. In order to satisfy the constitutional require-
ment that courts decide only cases or controversies
and to ensure the requisite concreteness of facts and
adverseness of parties, plaintiff must show that he has
a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,”
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), or that he
has suffered “some threatened or actual injury result-
ing from the putatively illegal action.” Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). Further, the
plaintiff must satisfy the additional court-imposed
standing requirement that the “interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” As-
sociation of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Ine. v. Camp, 297 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). A corollary
to the “zone of interest” requirement. is the well-
recognized general rule that ‘‘even when the plaintiff

45

has alleged injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or con-
troversy’ requirement, . . . the plaintiff must assert
his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his
claim to relief on the Jegal rights or interests of third
parties.” Warth v. Seldin, ........... EI AOb dasionn UE abas , slip
op. at 8 (1975); accord, United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249, 256 (1953).

Appellees casily satisfy the “injury in fact” stand-
ing requirement. The Association alleges it has suf-
fered in its own right monetary damages due to lost
revenues, Sonoma County builders contribute dues
to the Association in a sum proportionate to the
amount of business the builders do in the area. Thus,
in a very real sense a restriction on building in Pet-
aluma causes economic injury to the Association.®

The two Landowners also have already suffered or
are threatened with a direct injury. It is their posi-
tion that the Petaluma Plan operated, of itself, to
adversely affect the value and marketabilty of their
land for residential uses, and such an allegation is
sufficient to show that they have a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy. See Golden v.
Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y. 2d
359, 365-66, 285 N.F. 2d 291, 294, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138,
142, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).

*Even assuming arquendo that the Association i’self has not
suffered a direct injury, it nonetheless has standing to represent
the interests of its own members, most if not all of whom have
suffered or are threatened with a direet injury. See Warth v.
Seldin, U.S. at , slip op. at 20; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 734-41 (1972).

46

Although appellees have suffered or are threatened
with direct personal injury, the “zone of interest” re-
quirement poses a huge stumbling block to their at-
tempt to show standing. The primary federal claim
upon which this suit is based—the right to travel or
migrate—is a claim asserted not on the appellees’
own behalf, but on behalf of a group of unknown
third parties allegedly excluded from living in Petal-
uma. Although individual builders, the Association,
and the Landowners are admittedly adversely affected
by the Petaluma Plan, their economic interests are
undisputedly outside the zone of interest to be pro-
tected by any purported constitutional right to travel.
Accordingly, appellees’ right to travel claim “falls
squarely within the prudential standing rule that nor-
mally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal
interests of others in order to obtain relief from in-
jury to themselves.” Warth v. Seldin, U.S. at. ........ .
slip op. at 18. ;

There are several exceptions to this general rule,
but plaintiffs do not fall within any of them. Con-
gress may grant standing by statute to persons who
might otherwise lack standing, td., but here no stat-
ute expressly or by clear implication grants to per-
sons in appellees’ position a right of action based on
third parties’ right to travel. On several occasions,
the Sunreme Court has granted standing to persons
whom a criminal statute directly affected to challenge
the statute on the ground that if enforced it would
infringe the rights of third parties. F’.q., Doe ». Bol-
ton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973): Griswold v. Con-
nectient, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). No comparison,

47

however, may be iairly drawn between appellees and
the doctors facing criminal sanctions in Bolton and
Griswold. Nor do appellees allege that the Petaluma
Plan precludes or otherwise adversely affects a rela-
tionship existing between them and the persons whose
rights allegedly have been violated. Cf. NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958). The only con-
nection between any of the appellees and any of the
persons who purportedly are excluded from Petal-
uma is the possibility that but for the Plan they
would be parties to a purchase-sale agreement.’ There
exists no special, on-going relationship between appel-
lees and those whose rights allegedly are violated
which militates in favor of granting standing. Cf.
NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 458-60; Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925) ;
Washington Utilities &} Transportation Commission
y. FCC, —. Pe Gn ees (9th Cir. 1975); Akron
Board of Education v. State Board of Education of
Ohio, 490 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974). Nor have the Association and the
Landowners shown that their prosecution of the suit
is necessary to ensure protection of the rights asserted.
Cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237
(1969) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 459; Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. at 257. Assuming arguendo that
the constitutional right to travel applies to this case,

7The Association does not allege that a contractual or other
relationship proteeted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982 actually
exists between its members and any particular person excluded
from residence in the town, or that any such relationship was either
punished or disrupted by the City. Compare Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) with Warth v. Seldin, .....
Ue. % ...... n.22, slip op. at 23 n.22.

— |

those individuals whose mobility is impaired may
bring suit on their own behalf and on behalf of those
similarly situated. Although Warth v. Seldin denied
standing to a group of low-income and minority-
group plaintiffs challenging exclusionary zoning prac-
tices, the case is no bar to a suit against the City
brought by a proper group of plaintiffs. The Court
in Warth v. Seldin left open the federal court doors
for plaintiffs who have some interest in a particular
housing project and who, but for the restrictive zon-
ing ordinances, would be able to reside in the com-
munity.

Although we conclude that appellees lack standing
to assert the rights of third parties, they nonetheless
have standing to maintain claims based on violations
of rights personal to them. Accordingly, appellees
have standing to challenge the Petaluma Plan on the
grounds asserted in their complaint that the Plan is
arbitrary and thus violative of their due process
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. and
that the Plan poses an unreasonable burden on inter-
state commerce. See Steel Hill Development, Inc. v.
Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir.
1972): Sisters of Providence of St. Maru of the
Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 400
(N.D. Til. 1971). The fact that one of the Landown-
er’s property lies wholly outside the present City
houndaries and that the other’s pronerty lies mostly
outside the houndaries is no har to their challenging
the Citv’s Plan which has a direct, intended and im-
mediate effect on the property. See Scott vr. City of

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49

Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 548-49, 492 P.2d 1137,
1141-42, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749-50 (1972).

Other Challenges to the Plan

Although the district court rested its decision
solely on the right to travel claim,* all the facts and
legal conclusions necessary to resolve appellees’ other
claims are part of the record. ‘Thus, in order to pro-
mote judicial economy, we now dispose of the other
challenges to the Plan.* See Blaney v. Florida Na-
tional Bank at Orlando, 357 B.2d 27, 28 (5th Cir.
1966) ; Necchi v. Neccht Sewing Machine Sales Corp.,
348 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 19165), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 909 (1966).

Substantive Due .Process

Appellees claim that the Plam is arbitrary and un-
reasonable and, thus, violative: of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amemdment. According to

8Since the court struck down the Pan on the right to travel
ground, the court believed it unnecessary to consider plaintiffs’
contentions that the Plan was invalid wnder the commerce clause
and under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 375 F. Supp. at 586.

°In discussing whether the Plan, althtonugh a burden on the right
to travel, was justified by a compellimg state interest, the court
serutinized the Plan’s purpose. According to the court, the preserva-
tion of the City’s small town characterr and the slowing down of
the rate of growth by limiting the ntaumber of new homeowners
were not within the public welfare. 3755 F. Supp. at 586. Thus, in
light of this finding, it would be a wasttefy] exercise to remand the
ease for consideration of the substantijye due process issue. The
court has already made clear its conclusion that the avowed pur-

poses of the plan do not amount to leegitimate governmental in-
terests.

ay

PARTIE YO” F

30

appellees, the Plan is nothing more than an exclu-
slonary zoning device,’ designed solely to insulate
Petaluma from the urban complex in which it finds
itself. The Association and the Landowners reject,
as falling outside the scope of any legtimate govern-
mental interest, the City’s avowed purposes in imple-
menting the Plan—the preservation of Petaluma’s
small town character and the avoidance of the social
and evironmental problems caused by an uncontrolled
growth rate.

In attacking the validity of the Plan, appellees
rely heavily on the district court’s finding that the
express purpose and the actual effect of the Plan is
to exclude substantial numbers of people who would
otherwise elect to move to the City. 375 F. Supp. at
581. The existence of an exclusionary purpose and
effect reflects, however, only one side of the zoning

10Exelusionary zoning” is a phrase popularly used to describe
suburban zoning regulations which have the effect, if not also the
purpose, of preventing the migration of low and middle-income
persons. Since a large percentage of racial minorities fall within
the low and middle income brackets, exclusionary zoning regula-
tions may also effectively wall out racial minorities. See generally
Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zon-
ing: Death Knell for Home Rule? 1969 U. Tol. L. Rev. 65 (1969) ;
Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination
of the Current Controversy, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 1111 (1972); David-
off & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land
Use Controls, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 509 (1971) ; Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 Harv. Li. Rev. 1645 (1971).

Most court challenges to and comment upon so-called exclusionary
zoning focus on such traditional zoning devices as height limita-
tions, minimum square footage and minimum lot size requirements,
and the prohibition of multi-family dwellings or mobile homes. The
Petaluma Plan is unique in that although it assertedly slows the
growth rate it replaces the past pattern of single-family detached
homes with an assortment of housing units, varying in price and
design.

POOR COP"

;OPY

51

regulation. Practically all zoning restrictions have
as a purpose and effect the exclusion of some activ-
ity or type of structure or a certain density of inhab-
itants. And in reviewing the reasonableness of a zon-
ing ordinance, our inquiry does not terminate with
a finding that it is for an exclusionary purpose.'! We
must determine further whether the exclusion hears
any rational relationship to a legitimate state inter-
est. If it does not, then the zoning regulation is in-
valid. If, on the other hand, a legitimate state inter-
est is furthered by the zoning regulation, we must
defer to the legislative act. Being neither a super
legislature nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal
court is without authority to weigh and reappraise the
factors considered or ignored by the legislative body
in passing the challenged zoning regulation.’? The
reasonableness, not the wisdom, of the Petaluma Plan
is at issue in this suit.

It is well settled that zoning regulations “must find

their justification in some aspect of the police power,
asserted for the public welfare.” Village of Euclid v.

11Our inquiry here is not unlike that involved in a case alleging
denial of equal protection of the laws. The mere showing of some
discrimination by the state is not sufficient to prove an invasion of
one’s constitutional rights. Most legislation to some extent dis-
criminates between various classes of persons, business enterprises,
or other entities. However, absent a suspect classification or invasion
of fundamental rights, equal protection rights are violated only
where the classification does not bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest. See Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos
Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974).

12 Appellees’ brief is unnecessarily oversize (125 pages) mainly
beeause it is rife with quotations from writers on regional planning,
economie regulation and sociological policies and themes. These
types of considerations are more appropriate for legislative bodies
than for courts.

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PDE LADO the AR IE | 8 ta

52

Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). The
concept of the public welfare, however, is not limited
to the regulation of noxious activities or dangerous
structures. As the Court stated in Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954):
The concept of the public welfare is brioad and
inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.
It is within the power of the legislature tto deter-
mine that the community should be beauitiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
(citations omitted). Accord, Village of Belle ‘Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6, 9 (1974).

In determining whether the City’s interest in pre-
serving its small town character and in avoiding
uncontrolled and rapid growth falls within the broad
concept of “public welfare”, we are considerably as-
sisted by two recent cases. Belle Terre, supra, and
Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d
250 (9th Cir. 1974), each of which upheld as not
unreasonable a zoning regulation much more restric-
tive than the Petaluma Plan, are dispositive of the
due process issue in this case.

In Belle Terre the Supreme Court rejected numer-
ous challenges’* to a village’s restricting land! use to

13The plaintiffs in Belle Terre claimed inter alia that the
ordinance interferred with a person’s right to travel and right to
migrate to and settle within a state.

The Supreme Court held that since the ordinance was mot aimed
at transients, there was no infringement of anyone’s right’ to travel.
416 U.S. at 7. Although due to appellees’ lack of standing -we do not
reach today the right to travel issue, we note that the Petaluma
Plan is not aimed at transients, nor does it penalize those who have

OR OG FEE ILI LO OBOE AE

53

one-family’* dwellings excluding lodging houses,
boarding houses, fraternity houses or multiple-dwell-
ing houses. By absolutely prohibiting the construc-
tion of or conversion of a building to other than
single-family dwelling, the village ensured that it
would never grow, if at all, much larger than its
population of 700 living in 220 residences. Nonethe-
less, the Court found that the prohibition of board-
ing houses and other multi-family dwellings was rea-
sonable and within the public welfare because such
dwellings present urban problems, such as the occu-
pation of a given space by more people, the increase
in traffic and parked cars and the noise that comes
with increased crowds. According to the Court,

A quiet place where yards are wide, people few,
and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate
guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs. This goal is a permissible one
within Berman v. Parker, supra. The police
power is not confined to elimination of filth,
stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people.

416 U.S. at 9. While dissenting from the majority
opinion in Belle Terre on the ground that the regula-

recently exercised their right to travel. See CEEED v. California
Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 332-34 (1974); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
342 (1972).

14The word “family” as used in the ordinance meant one or more
persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living together as
a single housekeeping unit. Two or fewer persons living together,
though not related by blood, adoption or marriage were considered
a “family”. 416 U.S. at 2.

SPREE DIS ER IN ee |

54

tion unreasonably burdened the exercise of First

Amendment associational rights, Mr. Justice Mar-

shall concurred in the Court’s express holding that a

local entity’s zoning power is extremely broad:
[LJocal zoning authorities may properly act in
furtherance of the objectives asserted to be
served by the ordinance at issue here: restricting
uncontrolled growth, solving traffic problems,
keeping rental costs at a reasonable level, and
making the community attractive to families.
The police power which provides the justifica-
tion for zoning is not narrowly confined. And, it
is appropriate that we afford zoning authorities
considerable latitude in choosing the means by
which to implement such purposes.

416 U.S. at 13-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (empha-

sis added) (citations omitted).

Following the Belle Terre decision, this court in
Los Altos Hills had an opportunity to review a zon-
ing ordinance providing that a housing lot shall con-
tain not less than one acre and that no lot shall be
occupied by more than one primary dwelling unit.
The ordinance as a practical matter prevented poor
people from living in Los Altos Hills and restricted
the density, and thus the population, of the town. This
court, nonetheless, found that the ordinance was ra-
tionally related to a legitimate governmental interest
—the preservation of the town’s rural environment—
and, thus, did not violate the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 503 F.2d at 254.

Both the Belle Terre ordinance and the Los Altos
Hills regulation had the purpose and effect of per-

55

manently restricting growth; nonetheless, the court
in each case upheld the particular law before it on
the ground that the regulation served a legitimate
governmental interest falling within the concept of the
public welfare: the preservation of quiet family
neighborhoods (Belle Terre) and the preservation of
a rural environment (Los Altos Hills). Even less
restrictive or exclusionary than the above zoning
ordinances is the Petaluma Plan which, unlike those
ordinances, does not freeze the population at present
or near-present levels.’* Further, unlike the Los Altos
Hills ordinance and the various zoning regulations
struck down by state courts in recent years, the
Petaluma Plan does not have the undesirable effect
of walling out any particular income class nor any
racial minority group.’®

15[nder the Petaluma Plan, the population is expected to increase
at the rate of about 1500 persons annually. This rate approxi-
mates the rate of growth in the 1960’s and represents about a 6
percent inerease per year over the present population.

16Although appellees have attempted to align their business in-
terests in attacking the Plan with legitimate housing needs of the
urban poor and racial minorities, the Association has not alleged
nor ean it allege, based on the record in this case, that the Plan
has the purpose and effect of excluding poor persons and racial
minorities. Cf. Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E. 2d 390 (1959). Contrary to the
picture painted by appellees, the Petaluma Plan is “inclusionary”
to the extent that it offers new opportunities, previously unavail-
able, to minorities and low and moderate-income persons. Under the
pre-Plan system single family, middle-income housing dominated
the Petaluma market, and as a result low and moderate income
persons were unable to secure housing in the area. The Plan
radically changes the previous building pattern and requires that
housing permits be evenly divided between single family and multi-
family units and that approximately eight to twelve per cent of
the units be constructed specifically for low and moderate income
persons.

In stark contrast, each of the exclusionary zoning regulations
invalidated by state courts in recent years impeded the ability of

cece |

we rey Te - ¥ nie LD Ae TNO. deta Mel HBT oes 8 sth LSS I ae tte 2 fw Be Ra SPR rel Stara de

Although we assume that some persons desirous of
living in Petaluma will be excluded under the hous-
ing permit limitation and that, thus, the Plan may
frustrate some legitimate regional housing needs, the
Plan is not arbitrary or unreasonable. We agree with
appellees that unlike the situation in the past most
municipalities today are neither isolated nor wholly
independent from neighboring municipalities and
that, consequently, unilateral land use decisions by
one local entity affect the needs and resources of an
entire region. See, c.g., Golden v. Planning Board of
Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) ;
National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Note, Phased Zoning: Reg-
ulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Develop-
ment, 26 Stan. L. Rey. 585, 605 (1974). It does not
necessarily follow, however, that the due process
rights of builders and landowners are violated merely
heeause a loeal entity exercises in its own self-inter-
est the nolice power lawfully delegated to it hy the

(4 aere minimum lot); Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax
County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (rezoning
to minimum two acre lots with the effect of keeping poor in another
section of municipality).

’ ae beets Cates Ba RNC

OLN OE ILL DIOL IES ON LR Oe

57

state. See Belle Terre, supra; Los Altos Hills, supra.
If the present system of delegated zoning power does
not effectively serve the state interest in furthering
the general welfare of the region or entire state, it
is the state legislature’s and not the federal courts’
role to intervene and adjust the system. As stated
supra, the federal court is not a super zoning board
and should not be called on to mark the point at
which legitimate local interests in promoting the wel-
fare of the community are outweighed by legitimate
regional interests. See Note, supra, at 608-11.

We conclude therefore that under Belle Terre and
Los Altos Hills the concept of the public welfare is
sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma’s desire to pre-
serve its small town character, its open spaces and
low density of population, and to grow at an orderly
and deliberate pace.’

170ur decision upholding the Plan as not in violation of the
appellees’ due process rights should not be read as a permanent
endorsement of the Plan. In a few years the City itseif for good
reason may abandon the Plan or the state may decide to alter its
laws delegating its zoning power to the local authorities; or to meet
legitimate regional needs, regional zoning authorities may be es-
tablished. See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code §§ 66600 et seg. (San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission) ; Cal Gov. Code
§§ 66801, 67000 et seq. (Tahoe Regional Planning Agency) ; Public
Resources Code §§ 27000 et seq. (California Coastal Zone Conser-
vation Commission). To be sure, housing needs in metropolitan
areas like the San Francisco Bay Area are pressing and the needs
are not being met by present methods of supplying housing. How-
ever, the federal court is not the proper forum for resolving these
problems. The controversy stirred up by the present litigation, as
indicated by the number and variety of amici on each side, and
the complex economic, political and social factors involved in this
case are compelling evidence that resolution of the important
housing and environmental issues raised here is exclusively the
domain of the legislature.

Sa en at

PvEiE SARL 6.8 AL ALLELES POR BEE Ee EN AI OTD TM

58

Commerce Clause

The district court found that housing in Petaluma
and the surrounding areas is produced substantially
through goods and services in interstate commerce
and that curtailment of residential growth in Peta-
luma will cause serious dislocation to commerce. 375
F. Supp. at 577, 579. Our ruling today, however, that
the Petaluma Plan represents a reasonable and
legitimate exercise of the police power obviates the
necessity of remanding the case for consideration of
appellees’ claim that the Plan nanan d burdens
interstate commerce.

It is well settled that a state regulation validly
based on the police power does not impermissibly
burden interstate commerce where the regulation nei-
ther discriminates against interstate commerce nor
operates to disrupt its required tniformity. Huron
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 441, 448 (1960). As
stated by the Supreme Court almost 25 years ago:

When there is a reasonable basis for legislation
to protect the social, as distinguished from the
economic, welfare of a community, it is not for
this Court because of the Commerce Clause to
deny the exercise locally of the sovereign power
of the [state].

Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641 (1951). It is
wholly beyond a court’s limited authority under the
Commerce Clause to review state legislation by bal-
ancing reasonable social welfare legislation against
its incidental burden on commerce. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock

59

Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 393 U.S. 129, 136
(1968).

Consequently, since the local regulation here is
rationally related to the social and environmental
welfare of the community and does not discriminate
against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its
required uniformity, appellees’ claim that the Plan
unreasonably burdens commerce must fail.*

Reversed.

18Qur decision today conforms with others which have upheld
reasonable state environmental legislation despite some burden
incidentally placed on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Huron Cement
Co. v. Detroit, supra (air pollution statute) ; Procter & Gamble
Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ........
U.S. .... (1975) (ban on phosphate detergents); American Can
Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 15 Or. App. 618, 517
P.2d 691 (1973) (ban on non-returnable beverage containers).

pyre & moangrrdy

ee ee ery

a ae ons . ; <> sc anne ieee

60

Appendix C

United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit

No. 74-2100

Construction Industry Association of |
Sonoma County, a nonprofit corpora-
tion, et al.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,
Vs.
The City of Petaluma, a California

charter city,
Defendants-A ppellants.

:

[Filed Oct. 2, 1975]

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California

ORDER

Before: Barnes and Cuow, Circuit Judges, and East,*
District Judge,

The panel as constituted in the above case has voted
to deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the
suggestion for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion
for rehearing en bane and no judge of the court has
voted to grant rehearing en banc. F.R.App.P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied and the sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane is rejected.

*Hon. William G. East, Senior United States District Judge,
District of Oregon, sitting by designation,

61

Appendix D

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

Case No. C-73-663-LHB

Construction Industry Association of ’
Sonoma County, a nonprofit corpora-
tion, et al.,

Plaintiff,
Vs.

The City of Petaluma, a California
charter city,
Defendant. |

NOTICE OF SPREADING OF MANDATE

To:

Arata, Misuraca, Clement & Haley
717 College Avenue
Santa Rosa, CA 95402

Joseph H. Henderson

1200 College Avenue

Santa Rosa, CA 95402

Edouard E. Robert

133% Kentucky Street

Petaluma, CA 94952

Sturgis, Deu-Dulk Douglas & Anderson
1322 Webster Street

Oakland, CA 94612

ie eR a ee hk eee |

62

Notice is hereby given that the Mandate of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to this Court
was spread on the minutes of this Court on October
14, 1975.

( ) Affirming

(X) Reversing

( ) Reversing and Remanding (with instructions)

Dated: October 15, 1975.

Clerk of Court
/s/ Theodore H. Kast
by: Theodore H. Kast
Deputy Clerk.

RAE ELI EEO LON EEN OP SN III NE

63

Appendix E

United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit

No. 74-2100 DC# C 73-663-LHB

Construction Industry Association of )
Sonoma County, a nonprofit corpora-
tion, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Vs.

The City of Petaluma, a California
charter city,

Defendants. |

[Filed Oct. 14, 1975]

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California

JUDGMENT

This Cause came on to be heard on the Transcript
of the Record from tlie United States District Court
for the Northern District of Californ.. and was duly

submitted.

On Consideration Whereof, It is now here ordered
and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of the
said District Court in this Cause be, and hereby is

REVERSED.

SPR AEN OE OO TA SEN SC AINE ONL AS CD ot Ltn ORE

64

With costs in this Court in favor of the Appellant
and against Appellee in the amount of $1,325.44.

Printing Appellant’s briefs $1,260.44
Docket fee 50.00
Clerk’s fee 1500

$1,325.44

Filed and entered August 13, 1975.
A True Copy
Attest Oct. 9, 1975

Emil E. Melfi, Jr.,
Clerk

J. N. Iway,
Deputy.

Pa ARNE Seg OIE Re QL IPR tes TN eee

65

Appendix F

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE I

Section 8. The Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. ...

ARTICLE IIT

Section 1. The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ;
—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls ;—to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction ;—to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party ;—to Controversies be-
tween two or more States ;—between a State and Citi-
zens of another State;—bhetween Citizens of different
states,—between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between
» State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects. ...

Pee eS SE

22 OG SE POI SALIENCE LEV OI GL BOSD GOODS IT! ELIS GES

PILE LER ELOY OGY IL BM IER A IEP

——e——— SST on he

PEAR WAA CR Ae

66

AMENDMENT IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.

AMENDMENT X

The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction there-
of, are citizens of the United States and the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_1930%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
