# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Howmet Corp. v. Mercantile National Bank of Chicago

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 424 U.S. 957

## Text

Supreme Court. U. &

SOrPr., RT. U. SH D

IN THE JAN 15 1976

Supreme Court of the United States | _-
OCTOBER TERM, 1975‘. -- IR. CLERK

4

No... C5H-L OUT

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HOWMET CORPORATION, HOWMEDICA, INC., and
WAYNE PHARMACAL SUPPLY CO., INC.,
Petitioners,
Vv.

MERCANTILE NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO,
HAROLD I. SNYDER, SNYDER MANUFACTURING
CO., INCORPORATED, ZIMMER MANUFACTUR-
ING COMPANY,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

JosepH J. C. Ranauui
Counsel for all Petitioners
330 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Of Cownsel
Cuartes J. Brown
Main Street
Windham, New York 12496
Attorney for all Petitioners

Penniz & EpmMonps

330 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017
Attorneys for all Petitioners
Barrett, Barretr & MeNaany
Fort Wayne, Indiana 46802

Counsel for Petitioner Wayne Pharmacal
Supply Company, Inc.

INDEX

PAGE

SD IE A ow kx KinboachdeOebnainacedabebee ba 2
SS i ark i is 2
SEINE GIIIIEND: ckib-

MercanTILE NationaL Bank or Cuicaco, Haroip I. Sxyver,
Snyper Manvuracturinc Company, Inc., and ZIMMER
MANUFACTURING CoMPANY,

US.

Howmet Corporation, Howmenica, Inc., and WayNE
PHARMACAL Suprpiy Company, INc.

~~

This action came on for trial before the Court, Honor-
able Robert A. Grant, United States District Judge, pre-
siding, and the issues having been duly tried and a deci-
sion having been duly rendered,

It is Ordered and Adjudged that the Plaintiffs have
and recover of and from the Defendants pursuant to the
Proposed Judgment Order filed on May 13, 1974.

Dated at South Bend, Indiana, this 21st day of Novem-
ber, 1974.
Francis T. GRaANDYS
Clerk of Court

Al6

Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NortTHeErRN District oF INDIANA

SoutH Benp Division

Crvit No. 69 S 194

7s
v

MercanTILE NationaL Bank or Cuicaco, Haroip I. Snyper,
Snyper Manvuracrurine Company, Inc., and ZimMER
Manvuracrurine Company,

Plaintiffs,
v.

Howmet Corporation, Howmenica, Inc., and WayNrE
PHARMACAL Suppiy Company, INc.,
Defendants.

7‘
v

MeMORANDUM and OPINION

This is an action for damages and injunction for in-
fringement of a patent for an “evacuator”, a pump used in
surgery to remove fluid from the human body. Plaintiffs,
as patentees and licensees under United States Letters
Patent No. 3,115,138, bring this action against the defend-
ants Howmet Corporation, Howmedica, Inc., and Wayne
Pharmacal Supply Company, Inc. Plaintiffs allege that
the defendants’ infringement was willful and deliberate,
and therefore seek treble damages. The defendants in their
answer denied the charge of infringement, denied that the
patent was duly and legally issued or that it concerned an
invention, and alleged that the plaintiffs’ patent is invalid
and void.

SSM EARL FRY ST eT

oS ae

Al7
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

The patent here in suit was issued to plaintiffs on 24
December 1963. It covered a device labeled “Evacuator”,
an “invention” relating “particularly to surgical evacuators
for the removal of fluid from the human body and the like.”
This device of plaintiffs, the Hemovac, as well as defend-
ants’ device, the Porto-Vac (and the earlier Auste-Vac
model), are self-contained, independently operable evacua-
tors designed for the extraction of body fluids while the
patients who use them are ambulatory.

The defendants admit the jurisdiction of this Court; that
defendants Howmet Corporation and Wayne Pharmacal
have sold a product known as Porto-Vae within the North-
ern District of Indiana; that defendants at one time sold
a product designated Auste-Vac in the United States; and
that Howmet Corporation did engage in certain foreign
sales of a surgical evacuator (Surgivac) manufactured by
plaintiff Snyder Manufacturing Company. Thus, these
questions are not in issue here. However, defendants do
raise issues with respect to the equitable ownership, inven-
torship, validity, and enforceability of the patent.

A trial having been conducted and the issues having been
briefed by counsel, this Court, after a careful study of all
the issues involved, finds Patent No. 3,115,138 to be valid
and infringed by the defendants.

Facts:

Post-operative bleeding is one of the chief complications
which faces the plastic surgeon. Many forms of pressure
dressing have been devised in order to prevent fluid from
collecting in wounds. In the past, the evacuation of fluids
from a closed wound after surgery had been accomplished
by: (1) gravity drainage, (2) pressure dressings or com-
pression bandages, and (3) suction or negative pressure.
However, the first two methods, namely, gravity drainage
and compression bandages, involved certain inherent dis-

A18
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

advantages. On the other hand, negative pressure drain-
age has offered several advantages. Most notably, it facili-
tates the evacuation of fluids from all types of wounds and
encourages the healing or knitting of tissues.

Before plaintiffs’ device arrived on the market, continu-
ous wound suction was accomplished by power-driven
pumps, central suction systems, and the evacuated bottle.
These systems also had many disadvantages. In addition
to cost and undependability, the major disadvantage of
vacuum pumps and suction systems was that the post-
operative activity of the patient was severely restricted;
and, also, this delayed the patient’s recuperation.

The evacuated bottle permitted greater human activity
inasmuch as the patient could carry the device around
with him.

In 1959 Dr. Robert T. McElvenny and his partners, Mr.
Gregory Sullivan and Mr. Harold Snyder, set out to devise
a better apparatus for continuous wound suction. In par-
ticular, their goal was to develop a device which would
be self-actuating, which could be carried on the person of
the patient, and which could be constructed at a relatively
low cost. Dr. McElvenny discussed the subject of closed
wound suction on several occasions with a Swiss orthopedic
surgeon named Maurice Mueller. The first meeting be-
tween the two occurred in May of 1959 in Chicago. Also,
in September of that same year, Dr. McElvenny and
Gregory Sullivan visited Dr. Mueller in Switzerland.
Again, in September of 1960, Doctors McElvenny and
Mueller met at the SICOT meeting, a surgeon’s convention
in New York.

After conducting numerous experiments using plastic
bottles, McElvenny and his associates incorporated a
spring into their device to accomplish continuous wound
suction. This device evolved into, and such experimenta-
tion culminated in, the patented Hemovac.

negt enters

A19
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

Beginning in August of 1962, the defendant Howmet
Corporation, through its predecessor Austenal, became the
foreign distributor for the Hemovac (designated for
foreign sales as the Surgivac). In January of 1963,
Austenal began to consider the prospect of developing its
own wound suction pump, which was to rely on the re-
siliency of the walls of the container for its spring effect
rather than on a spring assembly itself. This decision of
Austenal to develop its own unit was not communicated
to Snyder or McElvenny. In fact, it is admitted that
while Austenal had been distributing Surgivac in Europe,
it received advertising material and marketing information
from Snyder. Also, Austenal knew that the McElvenny,
et al., patent application was pending when it was engaged
in the development of its unit.

On 24 December 1963 the McElvenny, et al., Patent No.
3,115,138 here in suit was issued by the United States
Patent Office. When this occurred, Austenal sought the
advice of its patent counsel as to whether the McElvenny
patent was valid and infringed by the Auste-Vae product
then under development. Upon counsel’s opinion to
Austenal that its product would not constitute an infringe-
ment upon the McElvenny patent, Austenal continued its
work on Auste-Vae (the equivalent of the porto-Vac)
until it appeared on the market for the first time in 1965.

Plaintiffs formally notified defendants of infringement,
and on 21 November 1969 filed this acti a alleging in-
fringement of their patent by the present defendants.

INFRINGEMENT ISSUE:

Plaintiffs allege that Claims 3 through 14 of their patent
are infringed by the defendants’ accused device. First of
all, plaintiffs charge that claims 4, 5, and 7 through 14 are
directly infringed by defendants’ device. Secondly, plain-
tiffs contend that Claims 3 and 6 of their patent are in-

A20
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

fringed by defendants’ device under the ‘‘doctrine of
equivalents’’.

Claims 4, 5, and 7 through 14:

The thrust of plaintiffs’ argument as to these claims is
that defendants’ Porto-Vac infringes their patent because
the Porto-Vac is identical with the Bel-O-Pac, and the
Bel-O-Pac was held by this Court to infringe plaintiffs’
patent in Mercantile National Bank of Chicago v. Quest,
Inc., 303 F.Supp. 926 (N.D.Ind. 1969); aff’d 431 F.2d 261
(7th Cir. 1970). Plaintiffs maintain that their patent
claims read verbatim upon defendants’ structure and that
the similarities between plaintiffs’ Hemovae and defend-
ants’ Porto-Vae are not accidental, but rather are a re-
sult of defendants’ plan to copy their device. In rebuttal,
defendants contend that their Porto-Vac design stands
closer to that of the Barron Squeeze Bottle, a prior art
structure, than it does to Hemovac.

The first step that the Court must take in evaluating
plaintiffs’ allegations of direct infringement is to resort to
the words of the claim. As stated in Graver Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950), ‘‘If accused matter
falls clearly within the claim, infringement is made out
and that is the end of it’’.

On the basis of the evidence, this Court is of the opinion
that Claims 4, 5, and 7 through 14 of plaintiffs’ patent do,
in fact, read directly upon defendants’ Porto-Vac. In
support of this opinion, and pursuant to the test of Graver,
supra, the Court refers to the particular patent claims
involved and their application to defendants’ structure:
Claim 4 of plaintiffs’ patent, in pertinent part, states that
the patent involves a ‘‘self-contained, independently
operable, evacuator for the extraction of body fluids, for
ambulatory human use . . cymprising in combination,
a container formed of flexible material . . . having a pair
of oppositely facing end walls and a connecting side wall

A21

Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

. for movement of the end walls . . . toward each
other . . . said container being resiliently compressible
. and. . . expansible”. An examination of defend-

ants’ structure reveals that it is identical in its purpose
and structure. Claim 5 of plaintiffs’ patent calls for the
use of “flexible tubing” which has “a multiplicity of juxta-
posed openings for insertion into [a] body wound”.
Defendants’ accused structure employs the exact same use
of such flexible tubing. Patent Claim 7 calls for a ‘‘strap
fastening means” by which the container is to be secured
to the human body for purposes of ambulation. Defend-
ants’ device employs a similar fastening mechanism also
for the purpose of facilitating the ambulation of the
patient. As to Claim 8 of plaintiffs’ patent, it calls for a
“closure means” for the exhaust opening on the container.
Likewise, defendants’ Porto-Vac is equipped with a similar
device. Patent Claims 9 through 14, respectively, employ
the use of a valve plug and strap, a needle sharpened at
one end for the purpose of entering the body, and a con-
duit of flexible tubing with a Y-shaped connector for the
accommodation of different size tubing and for the inter-
fitting of single and multiple tubing “reaches”. The Court
finds that defendants’ Porto-Vac is a mirror structure of
these claims as well.

With the above observations in mind, the Court finds
merit in plaintiffs’ argument that defendants’ Porto-Vae in
the present case is identical in means, operation, and struc-
ture with the infringing Bel-O-Pac in the Quest case, supra,
and with the patented Hemovac. Therefore, we find that
Claims 4, 5, and 7 through 14 of plaintiffs’ patent are
directly infringed by defendants’ accused structure, the
Porto-Vac.

Claims 3 and 6:

As to Claims 3 and 6, plaintiffs support their charge
of infringement by invoking the “doctrine of equivalents”.

A22
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

This doctrine says, in effect, that if two devices do the
same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish
the same result, they are the same, even though they
differ in name, form, or shape. Graver, swpra, 339 U.S.
at 608. This means that a patent is infringed only if
there is substantial identity between the accused device
and the patented invention as to means, operation, and
result. Harrington Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. White, 475
F.2d 788, 796 (5th Cir. 1973). The Seventh Cireuit Court
of Appeals has accepted this principle in Hunt v. Armour
dé Co., 185 F.2d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 1950), where the Court
said:

It is well established that the test of infringement
{under the doctrine of equivalents] is whether the ac-
cused device does the same work in substantially the
same way and accomplishes the same result. See also
Quest, supra, 303 F.Supp. at 931.

Claims 3 and 6 of plaintiffs’ patent call for a ‘‘plurality
of springs’’, the compression of which creates a negative
pressure in the container for the purpose of drawing
fluids out of the body and the release of which allows for
the expansion of the container to its original size and
shape. Plaintiffs argue that a spring is anything which
recovers its original shape, Defendants, however, counter
this by maintaining that it is the lack of springs in its
device which, in fact, distinguishes their structure from
plaintiffs’ Hemovac. They argue that since their device
does not rely on separate springs as the Hemovae does,
but rather on the resiliency of the container wall instead,
their structure cannot infringe any of plaintiffs’ patent
claims.

The resolution of this question under the doctrine of
equivalents depends on whether or not the operation of
defendants’ Porto-Vac is substantially equivalent to the

A23
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

operation of plaintiffs’ Hemovac despite the fact that one
device, the Hemovac, employs springs to return the con-
tainer to its original shape after it is compressed, and
the other device, the Porto-Vac, does not. Stated another
way, does the lack of springs in the Porto-Vac distinguish
it sufficiently from the spring-operated Hemovac to cir-
cumvent the doctrine of equivalents?

This Court is of the opinion that the operation of the
accused Porto-Vac is exactly the same as the operation of
the Hemovac even though the Porto-Vac does not rely on
separate springs and that therefore the doctrine of equiva-
lents applies. Both the Hemovac and the Porto-Vac in-
volve an identical function and purpose, i.e., the removal
of body fluids from a closed wound after surgery. They
both do this work in substantially the same way and ac-
complish substantially the same result. It is inconsequen-
tial, in the Court’s view, that one device employs springs
and the other does not when, as here, the same result is
accomplished in substantially the same way. It is the
‘«spring effect’’ in both devices which accomplishes wound
suction, and that is the important factor. Therefore, the
Court holds the Claims 3 and 6 of plaintiffs’ patent, under
the present facts and circumstances, are indeed infringed
by defendants’ Porto-Vac.

Willful and Wanton:

Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ infringement of their
patent was willful and deliberate, and that they are there-
fore entitled to multiple damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 284. In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite defend-
ants’ failure to inform plaintiffs of defendants’ decision
to develop their own device while defendant was still the
foreign distributor of plaintiffs’ product. Further, plain-
tiffs argue that defendants’ conduct in this regard should,
in any event, have ceased after defendants became aware

~ i RRS AP GILL AOL ABLATED EIEIO LEER IE AE DIY eb ARIS ANG ME REARAL SS ES RR OT GN EIR LAREN ELE LANL CEPTS IE BE IME LIF IS EE ete

A24
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

of the Court’s decision in Quest, supra. The evidence
shows, however, that the defendants, before marketing
their structure, sought the advice of patent counsel as to
the possibility of their device infringing upon plaintiffs’
device. It was the opinion of defendants’ counsel that the
claims of plaintiffs’ patent would not be infringed by any
wound suction pump that relied upon the resiliency of its
side walls for a spring effect rather than upon separate
internal springs. In view of this opinion of counsel, de-
fendants continued their developmental work on Auste-Vac
until it appeared on the market in 1965. In light of this
fact, it appears to the Court that the defendants had a
bona fide and reasonable belief that their structure would
not infringe plaintiffs’ patent. Therefore, this Court finds
that plaintiffs have not met the burden of showing that
defendants’ conduct was willful and wanton which is re-
quired for the recovery of multiple damages. Anderson
Company v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 265 F.2d 755, 763 (7th
Cir. 1959) ; Artmoor Co. v. Dayless Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 1, 5
(7th Cir, 1953); Quest, supra, 303 F.Supp. at 931.

Vauipiry IssvE:

In their answer and supplemental answer, defendants
have denied infringement and have raised affirmative de-
fenses of the invalidity and unenforceability of plaintiffs’
patent. In particular, defendants make the following al-
legations: (1) that plaintiffs’ patent is invalid because of
prior art, anticipation, and for obviousness; (2) that the
inventors did not themselves invent the subject matter
patented; and (3) that the patent is unenforceable because
of plaintiffs’ fraud and unclean hands in procuring it.

Initially, the Court notes that it is a well settled prin-
ciple that the granting of a patent by the United States
Patent Office carries with it a strong presumption that the
patent so issued is valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282; General Foods

ppaearn SO SOR PET sew FRIDLEY Py DPR 8 we RNS

Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

Corporation v. Perk Foods Co., 419 F.2d 944, 947 (7th
Cir. 1969). It is also free from dispute that a party who
alleges the invalidity of a patent or of certain claims
within the patent has a “heavy burden” of establishing
such invalidity by “clear and convincing’’ evidence. King-
Seeley Thermos Co. v. Tastee Freez Industries, Inc., 357
F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 1966). The defendants have prof-
fered several arguments which they maintain satisfy their
burden on the issues of invalidity and unenforceability.

Prior Art, Anticipation, and Obviousness:

The first argument that defendants propound is that
plaintiffs’ patent is invalid because the basic concept of
the Hemovac was anticipated and obvious with reference
to the prior art. In particular, defendants refer to the
Barron Squeeze Bottle and the Barron Article of 10 Sep-
tember 1959. It is contended by defendants that plaintiffs’
patent reads directly on the Barron Article as does the
basic concept of the invention; that plaintiffs’ device is
the same as the Barron Bottle; and that plaintiffs’ device
was fully anticipated by Dr. John Barron, an English
plastic surgeon. Further, defendants maintain that plain-
tiffs must demonstrate that they worked on the develop-
ment of their patented device with a diligence from the
date of the Barron Article to the eventual first date of
construction and use.

The Court has carefully and attentively examined the
testimony relating to the Barron Bottle and its relevance,
if any, to the Hemovae and concludes that there is no rea-
sonable interpretation of the two structures which would
make the Barron Bottle an anticipation of plaintiffs’ de-
vice. In this regard, the Court takes particular note of the
fact that plaintiffs in their experimentation phase re-
jected the use of plastic bottles which had many of the
same physical, operative, and structural characteristics as

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A26
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

the Barron Squeeze Bottle. As a matter of fact, the Court
is inclined to see the Hemovac as a definite improvement
upon the prior art. See Quest, supra, 303 F.Supp. at 932.
Therefore, the Court finds that defendants’ argument of
anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) is without merit in
light of the present facts and circumstances.

Moreover, taking into account the many significant dif-
ferences between the Barron Bottle and the patented
Hemovace, we find that the patent is not invalid under 35
U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness. This Court perceives that the
patented subject matter as a whole would not be obvious
at the time of invention to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which the subject matter pertains. Another
permissible consideration which the Court deems worthy
of merit in regard to the claim of obviousness is the fact
that plaintiffs’ Hemovac has made great strides in the
furtherance of medical science to the general benefit of
mankind. See generally Graham vy. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).

Finally, as to the Barron Article, the medical literature
upon which defendants rely as being prior art, the Court
notes that the technique, method, or procedure of closed
wound suction had been known to the medical profession
for years. Quest, supra, 303 F.Supp. at 932. As stated in
that opinion, however, at page 933:

This fact ... does not affect the validity of the patent
in suit, for the invention covered by the patent does
not claim the technique or method of closed wound
suction .... The patent we are concerned with con-
tains apparatus, not method claims.

In the case at bar, as in Quest, supra, plaintiffs’ patent
concerns apparatus and not method claims, and therefore
the Barron Article does not affect its validity. In any
event, this Court is satisfied that the plaintiffs have demon-
strated the required “reasonable diligence” in developing

A eee
an

A27
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

their device from 12 August 1959 until its eventual reduc-
tion into practice. See Texas Co. v. Globe Ou & Refining
Co., 112 F.Supp. 455, 482 (N.D.Ill. 1953). The testimony
has shown that subsequent to August of 1959 until Hem-
ovac was commercially produced, there was no time that
the inventors stopped working (Snyder Tr. 198-200).

Inventorship:

The defendants next assert that plaintiffs’ patent should
be declared invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) because they
allege that Dr. Mueller originated the idea of a separate
spring in a resilient wound suction pump, and Dr. McEl-
venny appropriated that idea from him. Therefore, the
contention is that the patentees are not the original or true
inventors of the patented article.

The Court notes with regard to this issue that there is
substantial conflict of testimony in the record and in the
briefs as submitted by counsel. Defendants question the
honesty and integrity of Dr. McElvenny, particularly in his
dealings with Dr. Mueller, and emphasize the falsity of
Dr. McElvenny’s oath to the Patent Office. Also, defend-
ants strongly urge that the evidence shows that Dr. Mueller
made significant contributions to the design of Hemovac.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, deny any questionable con-
duct on the part of Dr. McElvenny in his association with
Dr. Mueller, and emphatically state that although Dr.
McElvenny may have obtained the impetus for his work
from Dr. Mueller, he did not wrongfully misappropriate
the idea of Hemovae from Dr. Mueller. Furthermore,
plaintiffs contend that Dr. McElvenny never obtained any
specific structure or apparatus from Dr. Mueller in relation
to Hemovac.

The Court perceives in resolving the question of inven-
torship that it must rely exclusively upon the testimony
as it appears in the record and the statements made in the

pSaeiees LOLLER SSIES BEG PLES EAL LITLE OEE EPA ofA IB IE IE LINE

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A28
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

numerous depositions. Admittedly, the evidence on this
issue is conflicting. However, the granting of letters patent
raises a prime facie presumption not only that the patent
itself is valid, but that the named persons are inventors
of the patented device as well, and the burden is on the
defendant to show otherwise by “strong, clear, and convinc-
ing evidence”. 35 U.S.C. § 282; Porter-Cable Machine Co.
v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 274 F.Supp. 905, 913 (D.C.
Md. 1967) ; aff’d 402 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1968); Ever-Wear,
Inc. v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 427 F.2d 373, 375 (7th Cir.
1970) ; Dart Industries, Inc. v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours &
Co., 348 F.Supp. 1338, 1355 (N.D.Ill. 1972). The question
for the Court to determine, then, is whether defendants
have, in fact, satisfied their burden of proof with respect
to the inventorship of Hemovac.

In support of their position that Dr. McElvenny was not
the true inventor of Hemovac, defendants rely on the testi-
mony of Dr. Michael P. Mandarino (Tr. 1033), Mr. John
Markham Ahern (Tr. 1241), and Mr. Jerome Joss (Tr.
1215-1216), which, taken together, indicates that on several
occasions Dr. McElvenny allegedly admitted that he had
gotten the idea of Hemovac from Dr. Mueller. Defendants
also refer the Court to the testimony of Mr. George Baxter
(Tr. 1139) who indicated that he was skeptical of Dr.
McElvenny’s veracity. Contrasted with the above, how-
ever, is the letter of Mr. John Chalakani, (PX-19-G, page
2), in which he wrote that it was Dr. Robert T. McElvenny
who had developed the Surgivac evacuator, and the inter-
office memorandum of Mr. John H. Bregert (PX-19-K) in
which he wrote that the Snyder Hemovac was the “brain
child” of Dr. McElvenny.

Plaintiffs in their Post-Trial Brief in Reply on the
Issue of Validity (pp. 45-48) attempt to discredit the tes-
timony of Dr. Mandarino in that they allege that he is
interested in an outcome of this litigation that is adverse
to plaintiffs because, among other things, he was elected

SLL IIE ELON PETS BP POET LN ER ART OSS

Horie

A29
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

to the Board of Directors of the reactivated Richey Com-
pany, the company which defendants claim is entitled to
the assignment of Gregory Sullivan’s one-third title inter-
est in the patent that is the subject matter of this law
suit. Further, in their brief, plaintiffs question the valid-
ity of George Baxter’s testimony by pointing out that such
testimony was based solely on certain statements that
were made to him by Dr. Mueller and upon that alone, and
not upon any other information communicated to him.
After careful consideration of the conflicting evidence
above, and after examination of the pertinent correspond-
ence in relation to the issue of the inventorship of the
Hemovae, this Court finds, on the weight of the credible
evidence, that defendants have not produced the “strong,
clear, and convincing evidence” that is required to over-
come the presumption that the patentees were the true
inventors of the subject matter of the patent. See Porter-
Cable, supra. Although the Court notes, in all candor, that
the issue is not clear, the fact that defendants have not
met their burden is, in the opinion of the Court, fatal to
their claim of the invalidity of plaintiffs’ patent under

35 U.S.C. § 102(f).

Equity/Unclean Hands:

Defendants contend, finally, that plaintiffs’ patent is
unenforceable because of plaintiffs’ fraud and misconduct,
particularly with reference to Dr. McElvenny’s alleged
inequitable misappropriation of Gregory Sullivan’s one-
third title interest in the patent from the Richey Manu-
facturing Company before the company went bankrupt.
The conflict centers around the fact that much of Sulli-
van’s work on the evacuator was allegedly done during
the period of his employment at Richey and at Richey’s
considerable expense. Defendants argue that since it was
one of Gregory Sullivan’s duties while an employee of the

A30
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

Richey Company to “dream up new surgical equipment
for the medical field” (Sullivan Tr. 854), he had the con-
sequent duty and obligation to assign his one-third title
interest in the resulting invention to his employer. The
failure to do so, defendants maintain, has done violence
to the basic equitable principles that underlie the entire
patent system and makes plaintiffs guilty of unclean
hands.

In addition, it is argued by defendants that Dr. Mce-
Elvenny consciously misled and deceived Mr. Alfred H.
Greening, the Richey Company’s bankruptcy trustee, as
to the value and probable commercial success of the evacu-
ator, thus influencing him to abandon the evacuator as a
Richey Company asset. Such concealment and deception,
defendants maintain, is further evidence that the patent
in suit springs from a history of inequity and unclean
hands and amply demonstrates that patentees have acted
in so reprehensible a fashion as to deny them the equi-
table remedies they are seeking from this Court.

The plaintiffs rebut the defendants’ equity defenses by
maintaining, first of all, that Gregory Sullivan was under
no duty or obligation to assign his interest to the Richey
Company. In support of this, plaintiffs allege that there
was no fraud perpetrated on Richey because the Richey
Company Board of Directors was fully informed that
Sullivan was, in fact, one of the inventors of the patent
in suit. Furthermore, it is argued that since Sullivan was
not expressly required by the employment contract to
assign any invention that he might make while on the job
to his employer, he was not impliedly required to do so.

With respect to the bankruptcy trustee, plaintiffs con-
tend that Mr. Greening was not misled by Dr. McElvenny,
but it was his own lack of dilegence in acquiring informa-
tion about the evacuator from McElvenny and other pos-
sible sources which resulted in his abandoning the evacua-

soma

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Teh OTS EEL MIE BOLI F LEE TENT LERNER ENE EE GSE IES RSE ENS ELIE PSB DOR TD OIE

A31
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

tor as an asset of the Richey Company. Plaintiffs main-
tain that no fraud whatsoever was involved in the Mc-
Elvenny/Greening relationship and that, therefore, there
was no misconduct on the part of Dr. McElvenny which
could possibly give rise to defendants’ argument of unclean
hands.

Finally, plaintiffs make the argument that, in any event,
defendants cannot properly inject themselves into a private
controversy relating to the matter of private title which
exists between plaintiffs and the bankruptcy trustee or
between plaintiffs and the reactivated Richey Company.
Therefore, plaintiffs conclude that defendants cannot rely
on the alleged rights of either of those liti,.nts to further
their own cause whether the defense is viewed as alleged
lack of title or alleged unenforceability because of unclean
hands,

The basic equitable principle underlying the United
States patent system as set down by the Supreme Court
is that patent monopolies must spring from backgrounds
free from fraud or other inequitable conduct. Precision
Co. v. Automotive Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). It has
long been recognized that any patent obtained through
fraud and dishonest dealings is unenforceable in a court
of equity. Seismograph Service Corp. v. Offshore Raydist,
135 F.Supp. 342, 354 (E.D.La. 1955). However, equity is
always reluctant to work a forfeiture of the patentee’s
property in the absence of unconscionable or morally
reprehensible conduct. A patent will not be rendered un-
enforceable in equity against an alleged infringer absent
fraudulent, intentional, and willful conduct on the part of
the patentee or his assignee. Tractor Supply Co. v. Inter-
national Harvester Company, 155 U.S.P.Q. 420, 433 (N.D.
Til. 1967). In the case at bar, defendants have alleged
that the patent in suit was procured by fraud and numer-
ous dishonest dealings. Once again, of course, defendants

aon |

A32
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

have the burden of proving that the patentees acted fradu-
lently by clear and convincing evidence in order to over-
come the patent’s presumed validity. Monsanto Company
v. Rohm & Haas Company, footnote 14, 456 F.2d 592, 601
(3rd Cir. 1972); United States v. Marifarms, Inc., 345
F.Supp. 858, 862 (D.C.Del. 1972).

Turning immediately to the question of Gregory Sul-
livan’s alleged obligation to assign his title interest in
the patent to the Richey Company, the Court notes that
it has been said that courts are reluctant to imply or infer
an agreement by an employee to assign his patent to his
employer due to the particular nature of the act of in-
vention in the absence of an express agreement to assign.
However, one who is employed to make an invention and
who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing
that task is bound to assign to his employer any patent
obtained. This applies though, only if the employee’s in-
vention is the precise subject of the contract of employ-
ment, and he has produced only that which he was em-
ployed to invent. United States v. Dubilier Condenser
Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187-188 (1933) ; Standard Parts Co. v.
Peck, 264 U.S. 52, 59 (1924). No assignment of the patent
to the employer is required in a situation where an em-
ployee, who is not assigned the specific task of inventing,
makes an invention, even though the invention relates to
the employee’s field of employment and the employer’s
time and resources are utilized in making the invention.
This is especially so where the employee, on his own time
and outside of his regular working hours, engages in ac-
tivities to refine and improve his device. Melin v. United
States, 478 F.2d 1210, 1213 (Ct.Cl. 1973).

The Seventh Cireuit Court of Appeals has held that
where a person was employed as an “idea man” to devise
new uses for paperboard or paperstock, and in a situation
where he was authorized to patent at his employer’s ex-
pense any inventions and improvements he might make in

BP A AB UCL OP IAT) OP

A33
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

the paperboard field, any inventions made and patents ac-
quired by him relating to paperboard during his term of
employment belonged to his employer, and he was required
to assign any such inventions and patents thereon to his
employer. Belanger v. Alton Box Board Co., 180 F.2d 87,
88 (7th Cir. 1950). On the other hand, if the employment
is general, and it covers a field of labor and effort in the
performance of which an employee conceives an invention
for which he obtains a patent, the contract is not so broadly
construed as to require a assignment of the patent.
Dubilier, supra, 289 U.S. at 187; Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119
U.S. 226 (1886); Dalzell v. Dweber Manufacturing Co., 149
U.S. 315 (1893).

It cannot be questioned, in determining whether Gregory
Sullivan was obligated to assign his interest in the patent
to the Richey Company, that the terms and conditions of
his employment and the understanding of those terms and
conditions by the parties are of utmost importance. Since
there is not a plethora of testimony as to this issue in the
record, however, the determination becomes primarily a
matter of law.

This Court, in evaluating the above and other legal
precedents with respect to the assignment issue, notes that
there is a common element present. That is, in order for
an employee’s invention to be assignable to his employer,
the employee must be employed to develop a “specific”
process or product for his employer. Muenzer v. W. F. &
John Barnes Co., 133 N.E.2d 312, 318-319 (1956). The
employee must be employed to accomplish a “specific” task,
or to solve a “specific” problem within the scope of his gen-
eral employment. Dubilier, supra, 289 U.S. at 187;
Belanger, supra, 180 F.2d at 93; United States v. Hough-
ton, 20 F.2d 434, 437 (D.C.Md. 1927); aff’d 23 F.2d 386
(4th Cir. 1928). Furthermore, the employee must be en-
gaged to devote his time to developing a (meaning specific)
device. Lion Mfg. Corporation v. Chicago Flexible Shaft

OLLIE LIE IOLA ESO GIIU LIE EAE SE ELIF LIAO II EO

A34
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

Co., 106 F.2d 930, 933-934 (7th Cir. 1939). Again, the em-
ployee must be hired to invent the “precise subject” of
the contract of empioyment; namely, to produce that “spe-
cific thing” which he was employed to invent. Standard
Parts, swpra, 264 U.S. at 59. Stated otherwise, it appears
to still be the rule that a contract of general employment to
develop ideas in a certain field will not serve to expand
the terms of the employment contract so as to make a
specific invention developed by an employee assignable to
his employer unless, of course, the terms of the employment
contract expressly so provide, Dubilier, supra, 289 U.S. at
187-188, and such is the clear and unambiguous intention
of the parties to the contract. Standard Parts, supra, 264
USS. at 53.

With the above in mind, although Richey’s employment
of Gregory Sullivan to “dream up new surgical equipment
for the medical field” relates to inventing in the broad
sense, the Court sees such employment as being general in
nature. The employment was not for the stated purpose of
developing a “specific” or “particular” product within the
medical field, or to do a task in relation to a certain device,
as was the case in all of the above-cited authorities.
Gregory Sullivan was not under a contract to make a “par-
ticular” invention or solve a “particular” problem for the
Richey Company. His prescribed duty was merely to use
his inventive or creative ability generally within the vast
boundaries of the entire medical field in relation to the de-
velopment of surgical equipment. In this regard, the Court
notes that there was testimony to the effect that Gregory
Sullivan did not understand at any time that he was ob-
ligated in any way to assign inventions to the Richey Com-
pany. (Snyder Tr. 148.) Thus, even though Sullivan’s
employment by Richey related generally to invention in
the medical field, the evidence indicates that it was not the
intention of the parties that Sullivan should assign any in-
ventions or patents to Richey during his term of employ-

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eid ter wy) wee ~ wate Wo a - worn “ tam aol os Pe A, PA OG Mtn dh 9% Pw FE LE AR oe AE 7

A35

Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

ment. In fact, not until after the contract was entered
into and, in particular, not until the prosecution of this law
suit, did the question even arise as to the assignment of
any patentable inventions that Sullivan might have made
while an employee of the Richey Company. See generally
Standard Parts, supra, 264 U.S. at 53. Furthermore, the
evidence is clouded as to whether Sullivan’s work in de-
veloping the patent was entirely at Richey’s expense and
whether Sullivan actually used Richey’s facilities and
equipment. Most notable here is the testimony to the ef-
fect that Sullivan did his development work “in his work
shop... in town” (Compare Tr. 1510), and that he worked
nights “at home” testing materials for Dr. McElvenny
(Snyder Tr. 1801). In such circumstances, the Court holds
that it is less compelling to require that any resulting in-
vention and patent thereon be assigned to the employer. t
Melin, supra, 478 F.2d at 1213. 3

Accordingly, this Court finds that since the employment
agreement then existing between Sullivan and Richey was
a general agreement to develop ideas in the medical field,
and more importantly, since the parties did not appear to
expressly or clearly contemplate the assignment of any
patentable invention that Gregory Sullivan might obtain
from his performing the work for which he was employed,
and since there is evidence that Gregory Sullivan did some
developmental work on his own time using his own labora-
tory facilities and equipment, he was not, under the circum-
stances, required to assign his one-third interest in the
patent to the Richey Manufacturing Company as claimed
by defendants. If the Richey Company had any interest at
all in any product that Sullivan might develop, that in-
terest, according to the intention of the parties, was a
right to distribute the product (PX-18-0), thus leaving the
manufacturing rights to the Snyder Manufacturing Com-
pany (Snyder Tr. 144), and preserving the title interest in
Gregory Sullivan.

PRE

FLAS he CRN a

PELE NP POMEL LO a antes tae de at a eh ee ne a cn

A36
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

Therefore, the Court now holds that defendants’ equity
defense based on Gregory Sullivan’s failure to assign his
patent interest to the Richey Company must fail because,
taking into account Sullivan’s understanding that he was
not obligated to assign any invention or patent thereon
along with the other circumstances of his employment
heretofore discussed, defendants have neglected to show
by the necessary clear and convincing evidence that his con-
duct ascended to that level of unconscionability or bad faith
which is required in equity to render the patent in suit
unenforceable.

Likewise, the Court finds that defendants have not met
their burden of proving that Dr. McElvenny fradulently
misled and deceived Mr. Greening, the Richey bankruptcy
trustee, with respect to the abandonment of the evacuator.
In the Court’s opinion, because of the sketchy testimony
in the record, defendants have not shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence that Dr. McElvenny acted in so repre-
hensible a fashion as to warrant a determination that the
patent in suit be declared unenforceable. It may well be
true that not enough information about the evacuator was
communicated to Greening by McElvenny. But this, in
itself, is not sufficient, in the opinion of this Court, to sus-
tain defendants’ allegation of fraudulent concealment
especially where Greening had the opportunity to obtain
more information regarding the ‘‘hemotoma pump”’ from
other easily accessible sources, and more importantly,
where the record does not clearly disclose whether
McElvenny’s conduct in this regard was intentionally and
willfully designed to deceive Mr. Greening. The record is
not entirely clear, moreover, whether the ‘‘hemotoma
pump’’ which McElvenny mentioned to Greening in
September of 1960 was a prototype model which had, in
fact, been abandoned or whether it was the device that was
to become a highly successful commercial reality. It

AOR GL ASAT A CEILS IP EPI GE. hah ALES EME LBA Bk PIRSA BAG, LB ERI DE OIE. ILE AA BIE liediid

A37
Memorandum and Opinion of the District Court.

should not be forgotten in this regard that plaintiffs did
experiment with and disregard many prototype devices
before the Hemovac evolved into its final form. It is
quite likely that Dr. McElvenny was referring to one of
these earlier prototype models when he mentioned the
abandonment of the hemotoma pump to Mr. Greening.
The evidence is just not all that clear. Finally, if the only
interest which Richey had in the patented article was a
shop-right as contended by plaintiffs, then that interest
would not qualify as an asset of the Company to be
scheduled by the bankruptcy trustee since such an interest
does not involve a conveyance of title. Dubilier, supra, 289
U.S. at 188-189.

In conclusion and with regard to the awarding of at-
torney fees, the Court notes that such an award may be
made to the prevailing party in a so-called ‘‘exceptional
case’’. 35 U.S.C. § 285. An exceptional case is one which
contemplates such unfair and reckless conduct on the part
of the losing party as to make it unconscionable for the
prevailing party to sustain the expense of counsel. Q-
Panel Company v. Newfield, 482 F.2d 210, 211 (10th Cir.
1973). The Court observes, however, that the present case
is not an appropriate one in which to award attorney fees
to either party, and therefore holds accordingly.

Counsel for the plaintiffs are hereby invited to submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in con-
formity with this opinion.

Rosert A. GRANT
District Judge

Enter: March 15, 1974

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A38

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact,
Proposed Conclusions of Law,
and Proposed Judgment Order.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For THE NorTHERN District oF INDIANA
Soutn Benp Drvision

Civil Action
No. 69 S 194

+—
. 2

MercANTILE NationaL Bank or Cuicaco, Harotp I. Snyper,
Snyper Manuracrurine Company, Ino., Zimmer Manv-
FACTURING COMPANY,

Plaintiffs,

Vs.

Howmet Corporation, Howmenica, Inc., and WayNnr
PHarmacaL Supp.ty Company, Inc.,
Defendants.

y%
a4

Proposep Finpincs or Fact
The Parties

1. Plaintiff Mercantile National Bank of Chicago is
trustee of Robert T. McElvenny deceased, one of the
patentees named in United States Letters Patent No.
3,115,138, the patent in suit, and is a co-owner of the legal
title to said patent. During his lifetime, Robert T.
McElvenny became assignee of the interest of Gregory B.
Sullivan, another of the patentees, now also deceased.

2. Plaintiff Harold I. Snyder is a citizen of the United
States and a resident of Dover, Ohio, is another patentee

A39

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

named in United States Letters Patent No. 3,115,138, and
is a co-owner of the legal title to said patent.

3. Plaintiff Snyder Manufacturing Co., Inc., is a cor-
poration organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Ohio, has its offices and principal place of busi-
ness at New Philadelphia, Ohio, and is the exclusive licen-
see under United States Letters Patent No. 3,115,138.

4. Plaintiff Zimmer Manufacturing Co. is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Indiana, has its offices and principal place of business at
Warsaw, Indiana, and has exclusive sales rights to devices
as set forth and claimed in United States Letters Patent
No. 3,115,138 by virtue of a grant from Snyder Manufac-
turing Co., Inc.

5. Defendant Howmet Corporation (successor) is a cor-
poration organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Delaware and has its principal office and place
of business at New York, New York. Defendant How-
medica, Inc., is a corporation of the State of Delaware;
and Defendants Howmet Corporation (successor) and
Howmedieca, Inc., were substituted for Howmet Corpora-
tion (original).

6. Defendant Wayne Pharmacal Supply Co., Inc., is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Indiana and has a regular and established office
and place of business at South Bend, Indiana, within this
District and Division.

7. United States Letters Patent No. 3,115,138 duly and
legally issued on December 24, 1963; and Plaintiffs are
entitled to bring this action for its infringement.

SSP TARLETON ARSENE LIOR T Bi NOLIN IIE! LIE L IER Mo RF

A40

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

8. Plaintiff Snyder Manufacturing Co., Inc., manufac-
tures and Plaintiff Zimmer Manufacturing Co. sells a
surgical evacuator, embodying the invention of United
States Letters Patent No. 3,115,138, under the trademark
“Hemovac”; and the proper statutory patent notice has
been placed on the surgical evacuators so manufactured
and sold.

9. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of Plaintiff’s [sic] Complaint. Venue in
this judicial District and Division is proper.

10. The patent in suit has been before this Court pre-
viously in Mercantile National Bank of Chicago, et al. v.
Quest, Inc., et al., 303 F. Supp. 926 (N. D. Ind., 1969) ;
aff’d. 431 F. 2d 261 (7th Cir., 1970).

Background of the Invention

11. Closed wound suction is a surgical technique in
which negative pressure (suction) is applied to a surgical
wound that has been closed to the atmosphere by such
means as sutures. A hollow tube is used as the suction
connection communicating from the wound to a vaccum
source. Closed wound suction has important advantages
over other wound drainage techniques, such as gravity
drainage and pressure dressings (compression bandages).

12. Before the invention of the patent in suit, closed
wound suction was practiced by means of (1) an electric
or other power-driven vacuum pump, (2) a central suc-
tion system, or (3) an evacuated bottle. Each of these
systems has disadvantages. Absent portability in the suc-
tion device, the physical activity of the patient is re-

be

A41

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

stricted and post-operative exercise, ambulation and
rehabilitation are delayed.

13. In 1959, Plaintiffs’ decedent, Dr. Robert T. Me-
Elvenny, an orthopedic surgeon, took up the challenge of
providing a continuously operable, self-acting, closed
wound suction device for ambulatory human use, and
worked on this project with Mr. Gregory Sullivan and
with Mr. Harold I. Snyder. At that time, there were no
known closed wound suction devices which were reliable,
and at the same time self-contained, portable and both
independently and continuously operable.

14. Dr. McElvenny discussed the subject of closed
wound suction on several occasions with a Swiss ortho-
pedic surgeon named Maurice Mueller. The first meeting
between the two occurred in May of 1959 in Chicago while
Dr. Mueller was touring the United States. During his
stay in the United States in the late spring of 1959, Dr.
Mueller did not discuss the subject of closed wound suc-
tion with anyone until after he visited Dr. McElvenny.
In September of that same year, Dr. McElvenny and
Gregory Sullivan visited Dr. Mueller in Switzerland.

15. After conducting numerous experiments using plas-
tic squeeze bottles, Dr. McElvenny and his coinventors
incorporated a spving into their device to accomplish con-
tinuous wound suction. This device evolved into, and such
experimentation culminated in, the patented “Hemovac”
unit.

Infringement

16. Claims 4, 5 and 7 through 14 inclusive of Plaintiffs’
patent in suit read directly and verbatim on the Defend-
ants’ accused “Porto-Vac” units.

A42

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

17. Claim 4 of the patent in suit states that the essence
of the patented device is a “self-contained, independently
operable evacuator for the extraction of body fluids, for
ambulatory human use . . . comprising in combination, a
container formed of flexible material . . . having a pair of
oppositely facing end walls and a connecting side wall. . .
for movement of the end walls . . . toward each other...
said container being resiliently compressible ...and.. .
expansible”. Defendants’ accused devices are identical in
their purpose and structure.

18. Patent Claim 5 calls for the use of “flexible tubing”
which has “a multiplicity of juxtaposed openings for inser-
tion into [a] body wound”. Defendants’ accused struc-
tures employ the exact same use of flexible tubing.

19. Patent Claim 7 calls for a “strap fastening means”
by which the container is to be secured to the human body
for purposes of ambulation. Defendants’ devices employ
a similar fastening mechanism for the like purpose of facil-
itating the ambulation of the patient.

20. Patent Claim 8 calls for a “closure means” for the
exhaust opening on the container. Defendants’ “Porto-
Vac” units are equipped with a like device.

21. Patent Claims 9 through 14, respectively, recite the
use of a valve plug and strap, a needle sharpened at one
end for the purpose of entering the body, and a conduit
of flexible tubing with a Y-shaped connector for the accom-
modation of different size tubing and for the interfitting of
single and multiple tubing “reaches”. Defendants’ “Porto-
Vac” devices present a mirror structure of these claims.

A43

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

22. Defendants’ “Porto-Vac” devices are identical in
means, operation, and structure with the infringing “Bel-O-
Pak” units in the Quest case supra, and with the patented
“Hemovac” evacuator.

23. Claims 3 and 6 are infringed by the accused devices,
under the doctrine of equivalents, because the accused de-
vices include therein the equivalent of a spring as required
by these latter claims. It is the “spring effect” in the ac
cused devices and in the patented device which accom-
plishes wound suction, and that is the important factor.

24. While Defendants’ accused “Porto-Vac” devices dif-
fer somewhat in form from the device shown in the draw-
ings of the patent in suit, the accused devices do the same
work and accomplish the same result in substantially the
same way as the device disclosed and claimed in the patent
and there is a real identity of means, operation, structure
and result.

25. Defendants’ accused “Auste-Vac” units are the full
equivalents of Defendants’ “Porto-Vac” devices insofar as
concerns infringement of Claims 3 through 14 of the patent
in suit.

26. Defendants’ accused “Porto-Vac” and “Auste-Vac”
devices are unlike the prior art Barron Squeeze Bottle.
The end walls of the Barron Squeeze Bottle are not ar-

ranged for movement toward each other to effect resilient
compression of the container.

Willful and Wanton

27. Beginning in August of 1962, Defendant Howmet
Corporation, through its predecessor Austenal, became the

PALIN LOD NR AOS NM AONE LOLA ILE PME DEOL EDA NAN AGG BOWL AAI

POLAR a EN. Ay

A44

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

foreign distributor for the “Hemovac” device (designated
“Surgivac” for foreign sales). In January of 1963, Aus-
tenal began to consider the prospect of developing its own
wound suction pump, which was to rely on the resiliency of
the walls of the container for its spring effect rather than
on a spring assembly. This decision of Austenal to de-
velop its own unit was not communicated to Plaintiff Sny-
der or to Dr. McElvenny. Furthermore, while Austcaal
was distributing “Surgivac” units in Europe, it received
advertising material and marketing information from
Plaintiff Snyder Manufacturing Company. Also, Austenal
knew that the McElvenny et al patent application was pend-
ing when it was engaged in the development of its units.

28. On December 24, 1963, the McElvenny et al Patent
No. 3,115,138 here in suit was issued by the United States
Patent Office. When this occurred, Austenal sought the
advice of its patent counsel as to whether the McElvenny
et al patent was valid and infringed by the ‘‘Auste-Vac”’
product then under development. Upon counsel’s opinion
to Austenal that its product would not constitute an in-
fringement upon the McElvenny et al patent, Austenal
continued its work on “Auste-Vac” until it appeared on
the market for the first time in 1965.

29. Plaintiffs formally notified Defendants of infringe-
ment on November 21, 1969, by filing this action for in-
fringement of their patent.

30. Because Defendants had a reasonable belief that
their structure would not infringe Plaintiffs’ patent,
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that
Defendants’ conduct was willful and wanton which is re-
quired for the recovery of multiple damages.

er

_

A45

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

Prior Art, Anticipation, and Obviousness

31. A British surgeon, John Barron, used a plastic
squeeze bottle for closed wound suction in England and
wrote an article about his work in a periodical which was
published September 10, 1959.

32. Plaintiffs’ patentees, in their experimentation
phase, rejected the use of plastic squeeze bottles which
had many of the same physical, operative and structural
characteristics and deficiencies as the Barron Squeeze
Bottle. Plaintiffs’ patented device is a definite improve-
ment upon and advancement over the Barron Squeeze
Bottle. The Barron Squeeze Bottle work did not antici-
pate the invention of the patent in suit.

33. The differences between the claimed subject matter
and the prior art Barron Squeeze Bottle would not have

been obvious to a personal of ordinary skill in the art of

medical appliances in the period of 1959-60 when the in-
vention covered by U. S. Patent No. 3,115,138 was made.

34. The invention disclosed and claimed in Patent No.
3,115,138 made a valuable contribution to medical science
and to the benefit of mankind in that it provided the first
self-contained, reliable, continuously acting, lightweight,
surgical evacuator device that could be economically
manufactured and presterilized; and thus, it put the tech-
nique of closed wound suction into general use.

35. The patient in suit does not claim the technique or
method of closed wound suction but rather relates to appa-
ratus. The Barron Article does not affect its validity.

36. Plaintiffs’ patentees conceived the invention of the
patent in suit at least as early as August 12, 1959, and

By Ot a aie oi

TR aC eRe IO

EIEIO LEA NIL EE ELE OTL NEE ROE RE IMATE

A46

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

were thereafter reasonably diligent in developing it until
its eventual reduction to practice. From August 1959 until
the patented “Hemovac” device was commercially pro-
duced, there was no time that the inventors stopped work-
ing.

37. The prior patents relied on by Defendants were
either considered by the Patent Office or were no better
than the patents which were considered by the Patent
Office. None renders obvious the invention of the patent
in suit.

38. The testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert witness was more
persuasive and provides more than a preponderance of
the evidence on each of the issues. Defendants’ live expert
testimony about the prior art and its applicability to the
validity of Plaintiffs’ patent claims was the result of hind-
sight observation and speculation, and is not convincing.
Inventorship

39. The patentees named in U. S. Patent No. 3,115,138
are the true, original inventors of the invention described
and claimed therein. Patentee Dr. Robert McElvenny did
not derive his contributions to the invention from Dr.
Mueller or from any one else.

40. The most that can be said for Defendants’ Mueller
defense is that Patentee McElvenny may have been in-
spired in the ‘‘Hemovac” development work by his con-
tacts with Dr. Mueller.

41. There is confusion and contradiction in the deposi-
tion testimony regarding possible admissions by Dr. Mc-
Elvenny to the effect that he had gotten the idea of
“Hemovac” from Dr. Mueller. Contemporaneous writings

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A47

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

by Defendants’ employees Begert and Chalakani, who
were well acquainted with both Dr. Mueller and Dr. Mc-
Elvenny, on the other hand, clearly attribute the
“Hemovae’ to Dr. McElvenny. The Court resolves the
conflicting evidence in favor of Plaintiffs.

Title and Enforceability

42. Patentee Gregory Sullivan was an employee of the
Richey Manufacturing Company during the development
of the patented ‘‘Hemovac’’ wound exacuator. He was
under an oral contract of general employment without any
intent or understanding, express or implied, that he was
obligated in any way to assign inventions or patents to
‘the Richey company. He was not employed to develop or
invent a specific or particular product in the medical field.

43. Gregory Sullivan did developmental work on the
‘“‘Hemovac’’ evacuator on his own time using his own
facilities.

44. Gregory Sullivan was under no contractual duty,
express or implied, to assign his interest in the patent in
suit to the Richey Manufacturing Company. Neither were
the other inventors.

45. It was the intention of the parties that the Richey
Manufacturing Company was to have a right to distribute
the ‘‘“Hemovac” wound evacuator or “hematoma pump”
This right was not an asset of the company, and scheduling
of it in the bankruptcy of the company was not required.

46. The information transmitted by Dr. McElvenny to
the bankruptcy trustee Greening was not incomplete so as
to amount to fraudulent concealment, especially since

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A48

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

Greening had ample opportunities to obtain information
from other easily accessible sources.

47. The Defendants have not met their burden of proof
on the issues of unenforceability.

48. However, this is not an “exceptional case” so as to
require the award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs.

Proposep Conc.usions oF Law

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and over
the subject matter of this suit. Venue is properly laid in
this District and Division.

2. Plaintiffs have title to United States Letters Patent
No. 3,115,138 and are the owners of all rights thereunder,
including the rights to sue for writ of injunction and to
recover damages for past infringement.

3. Plaintiffs have maintained their burden of proving
the essential facts alleged in the Complaint. The De-
fendants have not maintained their burden of proving the
essential facts of any of their affirmative defenses. The
law is with the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants on
each of the issues raised by the Complaint and by Defend-
ants’ affirmative defenses.

4. A United States Letters Patent regularly issued, is
presumed to be valid; and the named patentees are pre-
sumed to be the inventors of the patented device.

5. A party who alleges the invalidity of a patent has a
heavy burden of establishing such invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence.

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A49

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

6. Claims 3 through 14 of Plaintiffs’ United States
Letters Patent No. 3,115,138 are good and valid in law.

7. The prior art relied upon by the Defendants, includ-
ing the Barron Squeeze Bottle, does not constitute an
anticipation of Plaintiffs’ patent claims under 35 U.S.C.
102.

8. The prior art relied upon by the Defendants, includ-
ing the Barron Squeeze Bottle, does not render Plaintiffs’
claims invalid for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103.

9. The patentees of U. S. Patent No. 3,115,138 were
reasonably diligent in developing their device from August
12, 1959, until its eventual reduction to practice.

10. Claims 4, 5 and 7 through 14 in suit are infringed
by Defendants’ accused structures, and are directly read-
able thereon.

11. Claims 3 and 6 in suit are infringed by the Defend-
ants’ accused structures under the doctrine of equivalents.

12. The function and purpose of the patented and
accused devices are identical, and equivalent, doing the
same work in substantially the same way to accomplish
substantially the same result.

13. The burden is ou the Defendants to show by strong,
clear and convincing evidence that the named patentees
are not the true inventors of the patented device.

14. A patent will not be rendered unenforceable in
equity against an alleged infringer absent fraudulent,
intentional and willful conduct by the patentee or his
assignee.

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A50

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

15. In order to overcome the patent’s presumed valid-
ity, Defendants have the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the patentees acted fraudulently.

16. An employee is not obligated to assign his inven-
tions to his employer unless the terms of the employment
contract expressly so provide or unless he was hired
specifically to invent a particular device.

17. A ‘shop right” will not be implied where an em-
ployee engages in activities to refine or improve his device
on his own time and outside of his regular working hours.

18. A “shop right” is non-transferable and is not a
property interest subject to a conveyance.

19. Plaintiff’s patent in suit is free of fraud and is en-
foreeable by them against Defendants.

20. Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction restraining
Defendants against further infringement of United States
Letters Patent No. 3,115,138 as to Claims 3-14 inclusive.

21. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages for
Defendants’ infringement of United States Letters Patent
No. 3,115,138, together with interest and costs. Plaintiffs
are entitled to an accounting by this Court to determine
these amounts, and the cause should be continued as to the
accounting issues pursuant to Rule 42 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.

22. The Court finds against the Plaintiffs on the issue
of treble damages for willful infringement, under 35 U.S.C.
284.

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A51

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

23. The Defendants’ affirmative defenses are without
merit.

24. Every finding of fact deemed a conclusion of law
is hereby adopted as a conclusion of law.

ProposeD JUDGMENT ORDER

This cause having come on to be heard on Plaintiffs’
Complaint, and on Defendants’ Answer, and the Court
having heard the testimony of the witnesses for the re-
spective parties in open court and having examined the
depositions made of record, the exhibits received in evi-
dence, and the briefs of the respective parties, and the
Court having filed its Memorandum of Decision on March
15, 1974, and on this day the Court’s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law within the meaning of Rule 52 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Ir IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject matter of this action.

2. Venue is properly laid in this District and Division.

3. Plaintiffs Mercantile National Bank of Chicago and
Harold I. Snyder are the owners of United States Letters
Patent No. 3,115,138 and all rights thereunder, including
the right to sue for a writ of injunction and to recover
damages for past infringement; and Plaintiff Snyder
Manufacturing Company, Inc., is the exclusive licensee
under said patent.

4. Judgment on the Complaint is entered for the Plain-
tiffs.

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A52

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

5. United States Letters Patent No. 3,115,138 as to
Claims 3 through 14 inclusive, is in all respects valid and
subsisting in law.

6. Defendants have infringed Claims 3 through 14 of
Plaintiffs’ patent by making and selling closed wound suc-
tion devices embodying the inventions of said claims.

7. Ten days after entry of this Judgment Order, a Writ
of Perpetual Injunction shall issue out of and under the
seal of this Court directed to the Defendants, and to each
of their officers, agents, employees, servants, and attor-
neys, and to all persons under their control or in privity
with them, permanently restraining them, and each of
them, from directly or indirectly making, using or selling,
causing to be made, used or sold or offering to make, use
or sell clored wound suction devices embodying the inven-
tions of any of the Claims 3 through 14 of the United
States Letters Patent No. 3,115,138 and from infringing
upon, inducing or contributing to the infringement of any
of said claims during the term of said patent.

8. An accounting shall be made and rendered as to the
extent of the manufacture and sale of infringing devices
by the Defendants, and as to the amount of damages suf-
fered by the Plaintiffs by reason of the Defendants’ in-
fringement of Claims 3 through 14 of United States
Letters Patent No. 3,115,138.

9. The said Defendants and their officers, directors,
attorneys, servants, agents, workmen and employees are
hereby directed and required to attend before this Court,
or a Special Master appointed by the Court, from time to
time as required and to produce such relevant devices,

A53

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed
Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Judgment Order.

objects, books, documents and papers as requested and to
submit to examination, oral or otherwise.

10. The Plaintiffs shall recover their damages, together
with interest, and costs, as determined by the Court with
respect to the issues raised by the Defendants’ challenge
to the validity of Claims 3 through 14 of United States
Letters Patent No. 3,115,138 and by the Defendants’ in-
fringement of said claims.

Respectfully submitted,

Ricwarp R. TREXLER
Richard R. Trexler

Joun S. Fosse
John S. Fosse

Ouson, TREXLER, WOLTERS,
BusHNELL & Fosse, Lip.
141 West Jackson Boulevard

Chicago, Illinois 60604
Telephone: (312) 427-8082

Of Counsel:

Robert L. Rasor, Esq.

Rasor, Harris, Garrard & Lemon
210 North Buffalo Street
Warsaw, Indiana 46480

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Statute Involved
35 U.S.C. § 103

Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102
of this title, if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which
the invention was made.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_1886%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
