# Opposition Brief — Bettis Corp. v. Charles Wheatley Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 423 U.S. 1049

## Text

Supreme Court, U. &
SUPREME COURHK WU @ DEC 10 1975

WHGHAEE-RODAR TR, CLERK

INTHE |
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-472

BETTIS CORPORATION and ST. PAUL FIRE
AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioners,

versus

CHARLES WHEATLEY COMPANY,
Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Timothy J. McNamara
DAVIDSON, MEAUX,
ONEBANE, DONOHOE,
BERNARD, TORIAN
& DIAZ
P. O. Drawer 3507
Lafayette, La. 70501
Telephone: (318) 233-2111

Attorneys for Respondent

SCOFIELDS’ QUALITY PRINTERS, P O BOX 53096. N 0. LA 70153 - 504/822 1611

eee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TATE COP THe CARE oc ccc cess cccescecens 2

ety we) Bk - | 4 y 4) RR 3

REASONS FOR REFUSING WRIT OF CER-
TIORARI

A. The exclusion provisions of Title 33

U.S.C. 905 of the L & H W Actbarthird

party claims against anemployer ......... 3
es orcs cee W NEV eh need vnsksevnesas 6

ee ek Was a ea eh ble 08s 16

i awk whee skassee es 27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..........cccccccess 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Service
Contracting, Inc., 5th Cir. (1973), 490 F.2d
ai ee ae Le Sais 4 kibe beeaves 7

American Mutual Liability Insurance Com-
pany v. Matthews, 2nd Cir. (1951), 18 F.2d
RE eS a esa ke dcb dale ke’ 7

Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v.

Erie Lackawanna Railroad Company, 92
CEE | seG Kah hence bederh beh ence aes 12,13,14

Brown v. American-HawaiianS.S. Company,

Bre Cie. CARBS), BUS Fe BGAG occ ccc ccesvecsenass 7

Cooper Stevedoring Company v. Fritz Kopke,

Inc., et al, 94 S.Ct. 2474 (1974) .............. 5,12,15

Drake v. Treadwell Const. Co., 299 F.2d 789
CEE scrap ssi sessocls Suid oande 17,18,19,21

CANT ERE PIE

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

Page
Empire Seafoods, Inc. v. Anderson, 398 F.2d
ik eek asco c eek ie be eee Cae vORR CA ees 20,21
General Electric Company v. Cuban
American Nickel Company, 396 F.2d 89, 5th
CREE Ucchus cha vdretebne hae buawed muah Sivens 8,9
Halliburton Company v. Norton Drilling
Company, 302 F.2d 431 at 434 .................. 7,8

Halycon Lines v. Haenn Ship Sealing & Refit-
ting Corporation, 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277
ERE aNaaedsnkss coun ante Wen bw has ekows 11,12,13,14

Horton & Horton, Inc. v. T/S J. E. Dyer, 428
F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den., 400 U.S.
OOS; BA .GE: QUE CHBPED oiiccnannc vducvsvnccscdvcss 13

In Re Seaboard Shipping, 449 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.

1971), cert. den. 406 U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 2039
(1972)

eceded aan/dk kd oak ae ecw W ceehewe céaews 13
Loffland Brothers Company v. Roberts, 386

ok RS Se een re eee ae 6,10
Nations v. W. W. Morris and American

Motorists Insurance Company, 483 F.2d 577

Ss I 60 ne eoanwn eden deo eU ae dawns vs 5,8
Newport Airpack, Inc. v. U.S., 419 F.2d 342 (1

SE bar cie ceed oneenksaWenaWawbine dveeee 21
Ocean Drilling & Exploration Company v.

Berry Brothers Oilfield Service, 377 F.2d

ee IE os, dns os 0 00 bes nad kee 6 dcendens. 6,7,8,10

ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

Page
Panico v. Whiting Milk Company, et al v.
United States, 335 F.Supp. 315 (U.S.D.C.,
RN UD ec on oe od ene aey REELS kk adi Ses 18

Ryan Stevedoring Company v. Pan-Atlantic
S.S. Corporation, 350 U.S. 124, 76 Supreme
RN DE 3500 5G is kde ac aheea ts ees Keke 24,26

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 9th Cir.,
(1964), 355 F.2d 379, 402-404, cert. den .... 7,18,19,21

Watz v. Zapata Offshore Company, 431 F.2d

See Se tees NE, aS sich iwiicst drat avikekeaberhes 13
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 1963,
372 U.S. 597, 83 S.Ct. 926, 10 L.Ed.2d1....... 17,18,
19,20,21,22
Wien Alaska Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 375 F.2d
ee Sg ES hahaa sxc eo b inn candevetunde ch 19,21
Statutes:
eee ns, PU IID ook ow ond cdc ek couch idacn 2
Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5
a IE (nc nncah Kea eulb chee amine uockoavs 16,18

Longshoremen’s & Harbor Workers’ Com-
pensation Act, Title 33, U.S.C., §§901 et
ROE ec eet iereeiwa na pete aw s0s Swe Cee EONS Oe ks passim

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-472

BETTIS CORPORATION and ST. PAUL FIRE
AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioners,

versus

CHARLES WHEATLEY COMPANY,
Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE HONORABLES, THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES:

For the reasons hereafter set forth, CHARLES
WHEATLEY COMPANY, third party defendant-
appellee prays that this Honorable Court refuse the
writ of certiorari sought by petitioners.

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

These proceedings were instituted by the wife and
child of Murray White, an employee of Charles
Wheatley Co., (Wheatley) who was killed due to an
explosion on a fixed platform in the Gulf of Mexico
upon which he was working. In suing Bettis
Corporation, the plaintiff alleged that the explosion
resulted from a defect in an “actuator” manufactured
by Bettis Corporation, which constituted acomponent
part of what is known as a “Wheatley Univalve
Launch Package”, an apparatus designed to clean
moisture from within natural gas transmission lines
connecting offshore drilling platforms. This
particular launch package, which was assembled by
Wheatley. was sold to Texas Eastern Transmission
Corporation (Texas Eastern) and was installed on its
offshore fixed platform. White's widow and child are
presently collecting compensation benefits to which
they were and are entitled under the provisions of the
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act, Title 33, U.S.C. Sections 901 et seq. (L & H W Act)
from appellee herein, Wheatley. They also instituted
an action in tort for damages against Texas Eastern
and the Bettis Corporation, the latter party having
manufactured the allegedly defective actuator valve
incorporated in the launch system.

Bettis and its insurer, St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Company, filed third-party complaints
against Wheatley, seeking indemnity or contribution
in tort in the event that they should be held liable to
White's survivors on the principal demand. The trial
court, however, entered a Rule 54 (B) FRCP Order

DELLS OAM oS RRA ON I LEELG LG BREE BIGOT A

3

granting Wheatley’s motion to dismiss the third-party
complaint from which dismissal] Bettis and its insurer
appealed to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the third-party complaint, prompting
Bettis and its insurer to make application to this
Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari.

QUESTION PRESENTED

The only issue presented by this application is
whether the third party claims for tort indemnifica-
tion or contribution brought by appellants should be
barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the
L &H W Act.

REASONS FOR REFUSING WRIT OF CERTIORARI

A. The exclusion provisions of Title 33
U.S.C. 905 of the L & H W Act bar third
party claims against an employer.

In constructing an argument in opposition to the
application for writs of certiorari, the writer begins
with the exclusionary provisions of the L & H W Act.
Title 33 Section 905 contained (prior to the 1972
amendment) the following pertinent language.

“The liability of an employer prescribed in
Section 904 of this Title shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such
employer to the employee, his legal repre-
sentative, husband or wife, parents, de-
pendents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise

4

entitled to recover damages from such
employer at law or in admiralty on account of
such injury or death .. .” (Due to the time at
which this death occurred, the 1972 amend-
ments are not applicable to this case.
However, this particular provision was not
amended or changed by the 1972 Legisla-
tion.)

The language ‘and anyone otherwise entitled to re-
cover damages from such employer at law or in
admiralty on account of such injury or death” is
without doubt sufficient to cover claims brought by
third party tort feasors such as Bettis which arise out
of the death or injury of the employee. The immunity
provided for in Title 33 U.S.C. Section 905, cannot be
limited to actions brought by employees, their legal
representatives, relatives, dependents and survivors,
etc., without rendering the clause just quoted
purposeless. To read the statute so narrowly would
impute to Congress an intent to write into it a
meaningless provision which would operate as mere
surplusage. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that all provisions of a statute are pre-
sumed to have a purpose and when the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous its provisions
should be given effect. It is respectfully submitted that
the exclusionary provisions of the L & H W Act con-
strued together clearly mean what their language
unambiguously and unequivocally suggests — that
an employer is to be wrapped with complete immunity
from any and all actions arising out of or in any
manner connected with the death of his employee,
whether they be instituted by the employee, his

RAE ise Begin RCT Te TR REN ae ee

5

representatives, relatives, survivors, etc., or by third-
party claimants seeking indemnification or contribu-
tion in tort.

The obvious intent of the L & H W Act is to provide
the injured employee (or his survivors in case of
death) with a remedy against hisemployer regardless
of where the fault for his injuries lies. In return for
giving up the right to resist recovery by its employee
for job-related injuries, the employer is vested with
immunity from all actions brought by the employee.
his survivor, dependents, legal representatives. etc.,
or by third parties which arise out of or are related to
the job injury. See, Cooper Stevedoring Company v.
Fritz Kopke, Inc., et al, 94 S. Ct. 2474 (1974); see. also,
Nations v. W. W. Morris and American Motorists
Insurance Company, 483 F. 2d 577 (1973), cert. den. To
permit complete or partial reimbursement of third
party tort feasors at the expense of employers who are
also bound to make compensation payments to their
injured employees would subvert the exclusiveness of
remedy provisions of the L& HW Act. Such an
employer would be in the untenable position of having
to pay not only the compensation claims of his
employee, but the claims for reimbursement by third
party tort feasors. The aims of the act designed and im-
plemented to limit the liability of the employer for
work-related injuries sustained by his employees to
the payment of compensation benefits would be in-
directly circumvented by third-party claimants seek-
ing tort indemnification or contribution.

In passing the L & H W Act, Congress recognized
the tremendous burden of employers who in the course
of their large scale operations are often subjected to

TSE TN ee

6

claims for job-related injuries brought by employees.
Accordingly, Congress enacted the exclusionary
provisions referred to in order to lighten this burden.
It is respectfully submitted that to permit recovery on
the part of third party plaintiffs herein against the
employer would thwart the intent of Congress by
allowing circumvention of the exclusionary
provisions of the L & H W Act which provisions are
grounded on considerations of sound policy.

B. Jurisprudence.

The jurisprudence is well-settled that inasmuch as
the L & H W Act immunizes employers from any tort
liability in connection with the injuries or deaths of
their employees then ipso facto employers cannot be
held liable to third party claimants on the basis of any
negligence on their part which may have contributed
to the death of the employee. See, Loffland Brothers
Company v. Roberts, 386 F. 2d 540; Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Company v. Berry Brothers Oilfield
Service, 377 F. 2d 511 (ODECO).

In fact the Fifth Circuit in deciding the instant case
against third party claimants relied expressly upon
the ODECO case. In ODECO, employees of Berry
Brothers injured while performing repairs on an off-
shore drilling platform owned by ODECO, filed
actions in tort against ODECO alleging the latter's
failure to furnish a safe place to work as causative of
their injuries. At the same time the injured employees
received L & H W compensation benefits from Berry
Brothers to which they were entitled. ODECO third
partied Berry Brothers, the employer of the injured
employees. The Fifth Circuit, affirmed the trial court's

7

dismissal of the third party complaints. The court
there said,

“It is thus apparent that the Act's exclusive lia-
bility provision effectively abrogates any
independent tort liability of the employer to
its employees, thereby eliminating any basis
which may have existed for indemnification
on a tort theory. Thus while the employer may
continue, even in spite of the exclusive lia-
bility provision of the act, to remain liable for
indemnity on the basis of an express or im-
plied contractual obligation, in the absence of
such obligation, as here, there simply exists
no underlying tort liability upon which to base
a Claim for indemnity against the employer.”
(Citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 9th
Cir., (1964), 355 F. 2d 379, 402-404, cert. den.:
Halliburton Company v. Norton Drilling
Company, 302 F.2d 431 at 434; Brown v.
American-Hawaiian S. S. Company, 3rd Cir.
(1954), 211 F. 2d 1618; American Mutual Lia-
bility Insurance Company v. Matthews, 2nd
Cir. (1951), 18 F. 2d 322, 323-336). 377 F. 2d at
514-515.

The Fifth Circuit in the instant case was also im-
pressed with a more recent statement of the foregoing
rule announced in ODECO set forth in Aetna Casualty
& Surety Company v. Service Contracting, Inc., 5th
Cir. (1973), 490 F. 2d 299. There the Court said that
having paid workmen’s compensation to the
employee in accordance with the exclusive liability
provisions of the L & H W Act, Service Contracting

ao SERENE HG ‘

was not subject to any independent tort liability to its
employees. Without this underlying tort liability,
Service Contracting could not have been liable for in-
demnification in the absence of a written contract.
(Citing ODECO, and General Electric Company v.
Cuban American Nickel Company, 396 F. 2d 89, 5th
Cir. (1968) and Halliburton supra.

The breadth of the immunity afforded employers by
the exclusionary provisions of the L & H W Act was
recently recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Nations v.
W. W. Morris and American Motorists Insurance
Company, supra. In that case the plaintiff alleged that
he was entitled to a remedy in tort against his co-
employee whose negligence wes alleged to have
caused him injury while he was working on an oil
drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico. Although the
case involved a claim by one employee against
another, the court made the following pronounce-
ment which is applicable to the instant case.

“Sections 905 A [Section 905 A is the same as
Section 905 before the 1972 amendments. The
exclusive remedy provisions before and after
the amendments to the act are the same] and
933 (I) of the L & H completely obliterates the
rights of common, civil or maritime law
against employer and fellow employee.
Congress in its unlimited power has deter-
mined that the relationship gives rise only to
compensation liabilities. The nature of the
obligation is that there is no — the word is no
— obligation.”

3

“Here there is no gap — not even a tiny one.
L&H is complete and self-sufficient. It
affords specific rights by imposing specific
responsibilities. In return for sometimes
awesome obligations it extends to the
employer and fellow employees an absolute
civil immunity.” (Emphasis added.)

Although it is impossible to prove a negative, name-
ly that no law exists to support any such claim for
indemnity upon the employer who is otherwise
clothed by the immunity provisions of the L& H W
Act, still we do have some additional guides in the
jurisprudence of a positive nature in the Fifth Circuit
decision of General Electric Company v. Cuban-
American Nickel Company, 396 F. 2d 89 (C.A. 5, 1968).
In that case, one Salvadore Locicero, an employee of
GE, sued the Cuban-American Nickel Company for
personal injuries arising out of an industrial accident
at the company’s metal recovery plant in Port Nickel,
Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. Locicero, at the time
of the accident, was working as an electrician for GE
and a member of its repair crew. He was dispatched to
the switching station at Port Nickel to repair certain
equipment GE had warranted. Cuban-American was
in possession and control of the plant and, of course,
the switching station, and had an electrical engineer
and several electricians in its employ. On the day in
question the repair party was admitted to the
premises at Port Nickel and escorted to the switching
station by the Cuban-American employee charged
with responsibility for the station. The employee un-

Pa a =

10

locked the gate to the fence surrounding the station
and unlocked the door to the building containing the
electrical equipment to be repaired, gave the repair
party a diagram of the wiring of the station, and as-
sured the repair party that it could safely work on the
equipment because the station had been de-energized.
Unfortunately for Mr. Locicero, it was not. He
thereupon brought a negligence action against
Cuban-American and Cuban-American in turn third-
partied GE, the manufacturer of the equipment andthe
direct employer of Mr. Locicero. Note here that Cuban-
American was the vendee of GE with all of the usual
warranties of implied fitness of the product flowing
from GE to Cuban-American. The Court found that the
plaintiff Locicero was not negligent, that Cuban-
American was negligent but that its negligence was
passive while GE’s negligence was active so that
accordingly the District Court entered judgment for
complete indemnity in favor of the vendee, Cuban-
American against the manufacturer and vendor, GE.
GE appealed contending that the exclusive remedy
provision of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation
Act completely precluded either indemnity in tort or
indemnity based on the breach of an implied contrac-
tual obligation. In an extensive and lengthy opinion
reviewing not only the Louisiana authorities inter-
preting the immunity provision of the Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation Act, but also maritime
authorities on the efficacy of the immunity afforded by
the L& HW Act to employers offshore (such as
ODECO and Loffland Brothers cases cited supra), the
Fifth Circuit concluded abso’utely and unequivocal-
ly that the Lower Court was w1 ong in granting indem-
nity in favor of Cuban-American and against GE in

NER ONIN eSMDEHLORANcaTeRRET INTE N onrtm 9 rn rormery ene?

11

spite of the fact that Cuban-American was GE's
vendee for whom GE was performing services under
contract at the time Locicero, GE's employee, was in-
jured.

To this point, the writer has relied exclusively on
Circuit Court of Appeals decisions to buttress the
argument that the application should be denied. It is
suggested, however, that there is a line of cases deal-
ing with the availability of the remedy of contribution
in non-collision maritime cases decided by this
Honorable Court which supports the contentions of
appellee herein. These cases imply that the exclusion
provisions of the L & H W Act are broad enough to
eliminate the third party claims filed herein.

In Halycon Lines v. Haenn Ship Sealing & Refitting
Corporation, 342 U.S. 282, 72 S. Ct. 277 (1952) a ship
repairman employed by Haenn sued Halycon for in-
juries incurred while he was repairing Halycon’s
ship, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness.
Because the plaintiff was eligible for compensation
benefits under the L& HW Act, he had no action
against his employer, Haenn. However, Halycon
brought a third party action against Haenn, the
employer, alleging that it was entitled to contribu-
tion, alleging in effect that the employer was along
with it a joint tort feasor. As of 1952 the rule allowing
contribution among joint tort feasors in collision
maritime cases had not been extended tonon-collision
maritime cases. This Honorable Court, with Justice
Black speaking for the majority, refrained from allow-
ing contribution, citing numerous factors. The opin-
ion did indicate that the majority was influenced by

12

the fact that Congress had “made fault unimportant in
determining the employer's responsibility to his
employee” and ‘made further inroads on traditional]
court law by abolition of the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk and by creation ofa
Statutory schedule of compensation.” 72 S. Ct. 277 at
280.

In a per curiam opinion rendered in Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Company v. Erie Lackawanna Rail-
road Company, 92S. Ct. 1550 (1 972), thiscourtheldina
non-collision admiralty case that the District Court
had properly dismissed a third party tort feasor’s
claim for contribution against an injured brakeman’s
employer. In so holding this Honorable Court relied
upon its decision in Halycon.

In Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. v. Fritz
Kopke, Inc., et al, 1974 AMC 537, this Honorable Court
granted writs for the purpose of extinguishing the
confusion then existing as to whether there was con-
tribution in non-collision admiralty cases and in do-
ing so made some statements which are particularly
applicable to the case sub judice.

In that case, the plaintiff, a longshoreman employed
by Mid-Gulf Stevedores, was injured while loading
Cargo in a vessel owned and operated by Fritz Kopke
under a time charter to Alcoa Steamship Company.
The ship had been initially loaded with crates of cargo
by employees of another Stevedore, Cooper Stevedor-
ing Company, in Mobile, Alabama. The ship sailed to
Houston where the plaintiff was injured when load-
ing cargo on top ofthe crates. The plaintiff sued Kopke

13

and Alcoa (the vessel) to recover damages for his in-
juries. The vessel third partied Cooper seeking con-
tribution. The trial court, after finding that the vessel
was unseaworthy and that Cooper's employees had
negligently stowed the crates, divided the damages
between them and in effect granted the vessel's claim
for contribution.

Cooper appealed, alleging that the District Court
had erred in permitting contribution in a non-collision
maritime case. The Fifth Circuit rejected the latter
argument holding that the apparent prohibition
against contribution in non-collision maritime cases
announced in Halycon and Atlantic Coast Line, ap-
plied only where the joint tort feasor against whom
contribution is sought is immune from tort liability by
statute. The Fifth Circuit cited Horton & Horton, Inc. v.
T/S J. E. Dyer, 428 F. 2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den.,
400 U.S. 993, 91 S. Ct. 461, (1971); Watz v. Zapata Off-
shore Company, 431 F. 2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970); In Re Sea-
board Shipping, 449 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1971); cert. den.,
406 U.S. 949, 92 S. Ct. 2039, (1972) ). The court added.

“Sessions [the injured employee], in addition
to suing the vessel, could have proceeded
directly against Cooper Stevedoring [third
party defendant] as Cooper was not his
employer, and therefore, not shielded by the
limited liability of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers’ Act." 479 F. 2d 1041 at 1042.

The obvious inference from this latter statement is
that the L & H W Act confers statutory immunity on
employers against claims for contribution and indem-

14

nification (indemnification being “only an extreme
form of contribution” as recognized by the admission
of counsel for Bettis and its insurer, in his rebutta]
brief filed with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
page 1.).

On certiorari this Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit. In
permitting contribution against Cooper Stevedoring
Company this Court distinguished the Halycon and
Atlantic cases on the ground that they involved third
party actions against employers who were immune
from direct action by their employees under the
L & H W Act. With reference to the Halycon case in
particular, the court said,

“The Court [in Halycon]. . took cognizance of
the apparent trade-off in the Act between the
employer's limitation of liability and the
abrogation, in favor of the employee, of
common-law doctrines of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. (Citations
omitted) Confronted with the possibility that
any workable rule of contribution might be
inconsistent with the balance Struck by Con-
gress in the Harbor Workers’ Act between the
interests of carriers, employers, employees
and their respective insurers, we refrained
from allowing contribution in the circum-
stances of that case.”

“These factors underlying our decision in
Halycon still have much force. Indeed. the
1972 amendments to the Harbor Workers’ Act
re-emphasized Congress’ determination that

SRLS Bg BS ng es eo ee

15

as between an employer and its injured
employee, the right to compensation under the
Act should be the employee's exclusive
remedy. But whatever weight these factors
were properly accorded in the factual circum-
stances presented in Halycon, they have no
application here. Unlike the injured worker in
Halycon, Sessions was not an employee of
Cooper and could have proceeded against the
vessel or Cooper or both of them to recover full
damages for his injury. Had Sessions done so,
either or both of the defendants could have
been held responsible for all or part of the
damages. Since Sessions could have elected to
make Cooper bear its share of the damages
caused by its negligence, we see no reason
why the Vessel should not be accorded the
same right. On the facts of this case. then, no
countervailing considerations detract from
the well-established maritime rule allowing
contribution between joint tort feasors.” 94
S. Ct. 2174 at 2178. (Emphasis added)

Without belaboring the point it is sufficient to con-
clude that this Honorable Court recognized in Cooper
Stevedoring that the legislation, the jurisprudence
and “countervailing” considerations of sound policy
indicate that the exclusive remedy provisions of the
L & H W Act clearly immunize employers from all ac-
tions in tort stemming from job related in juries, (fatal
or non-fatal) sustained by their employees, regardless
of whether the actions are instituted directly against
the employer by the employee or whether they are pur-
sued indirectly by third party claimants such as

—— ee od

16

appellants. It is respectfully submitted that a denial of

appellants’ application for writs of certiorari is dic-
tated.

REBUTTAL

In his petition for a writ of certiorari, counsel for
appellants cites what he considers to be “important”
reasons for the granting of the writ.

The appellants’ argument is by analogy. They com-
pare the “exclusivity provisions” of the L & H W Act
to similar almost identical provisions contained in the
Federal Employees Compensation Act (5 U.S.C. Sec.
8116 (C) (FECA), while ignoring the disanalogous
character of the employment of tax-paying citizens in
government service as opposed tothe private sectorof -
the economy. Appellants urge that inasmuch as the
exclusivity provisions of each act have for all prac-
tical purposes the same verbiage and that the purpose
of both federal compensation acts is the same — to
“give speedy and certain relief to injured workmen or
their dependents in the case of death —” that the two
respective provisions should be accorded identical
constructions or interpretations. Additionally they
cite the conflict in authority among the federal cir-
Cuits with regard to whether the United States Govern-
ment (the employer under the FECA) can be subjected
to third party claims for indemnification despite the
existence of the provision of that Act barring direct ac-
tions by its employees. Appellants apparently
assume that by resolving this conflict among the cir-

cuits concerning the breadth of the exclusive remedy
provisions of the FECA in favor of recovery by tort

Pega ae OPN REI PR FN Rt Fg NS

17
feasors of indemnity or contribution in tort from the
federal] fisc, this Honorable Court can at the same time
work a “reasonable” construction of the exclusivity
provisions of the L& HW Act which would allow
recovery on the third party demands against appellee.

Thus it is apparently the contention of the
appellants that the court should adopt an interpreta-
tion similar to that given by some courts to the FECA.
which is however, a different statute passed under a
different act with different purposes. Although both
acts are in essence federal compensation acts, the
L & H W Act covers private employers in private in-
dustry while the FECA applies solely to the United
States Government as employer. Further, it is sub-
mitted that the cases principally relied upon by the
appellants in interpreting the FECA exclusivity
provisions can be readily distinguished.

Specifically, Bettis, the manufacturer and its in-
surer, rely upon the Drake and Weyerhaeuser cases
(amply briefed and cited in appellants’ application for
writs), as the principal cases which indicate that ac-
tions for indemnification in tort are not barred by the
exclusivity provisions of the FECA. However. aclose
analysis of these two cases will reveal. we submit. that
actually there is no conflict between these two
decisions interpreting the exclusive remedy provi-
sion under the FECA and the decisions already noted
interpreting the exclusive remedy provision of the
L&HW Act, for, factually, there is no similarity
between the indemnitor and indemnitee in those cases
with the relationship between Bettis and Wheatley in
this case. What distinguishes Drake and
Weyerhaeuser from this case is that there is no
independent legal relationship between Bettis and
Wheatley the breach of which would serve to form an

18
independent cause of action between the two whereas
in both the Drake and Weyerhaeuser cases there was
such an independent relationship. This was noted in
the case of Panico v. Whiting Milk Company, et al v.
United States, 335 F. Supp. 315 (U.S. D.C., Mass. 1971)
which it is submitted represents a correct interpreta-

tion and application of the Drake and Weyerhaeuser
cases.

Panico involved an action for injuries received by
the driver of one mail truck in an accident in
Massachusetts involving two mail trucks and a milk
truck owned by the defendant milk company and op-
erated by the defendant driver who in turn filed a third
party complaint against the United States as the
employer of the driver of the other mail truck for tort
indemnity and contribution. The District Court held
that the United States, by paying compensation bene-
fits to the original plaintiff, the mail truck driver who
was injured by the joint actions of the milk truck
driver and the other mail truck driver, was clothed
with immunity under 5 U.S.C.A. Section 8116 (C), the
exclusive remedy provision of the FECA Act. Hence
the third party action against the United States was
dismissed. In so holding, the Court stated:

“There are two grounds for the court's order of
dismissal of the third-party action. The firstis
that allowance of the third-party claim would
avoid the exclusiveness of plaintiff Panico’s
remedy under 7 (b) of the Federal Employees
Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. 8116 (c). This isa
question as to which there has been aconflict
of authority among the Courts of Appeals for
various circuits. See, e.g., United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Wiener, 9 Cir., 1964, 335 F. 2d 379, 402-

19

404. and Wallenius Bremen G. m.b.H. v. Unit-
ed States, 4 Cir., 1969, 409 F. 2d 994, Murray v.
United States, 1968, 132 U.S.App. D.C. 91, 405
F. 2d 1361. There appears to be little dispute
that the government is not liable for contribu-
tion because payment of compensation
benefits to a federal employee extinguishes
the government’s liability to him; and accord-
ingly the motion to dismiss is allowed without
further discussion as to counts 2 and 4. The
division of authority relates to the third-party
plaintiffs’ claims under counts 1 and 3 for in-
demnity. We believe that the decisions of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Unit-
ed Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, Supra, and Wien
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 9 Cir.,
1967, 375 F. 2d 736, state the better rule.

The Supreme Court decisions on which the
third-party plaintiffs rely, Weyerhaeuser S.S.
Co. v. United States, 1963, 372 U.S. 597, 83S. Ct.
926, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1, and Treadwell Const. Co. v.
United States, 1963, 372 U.S. 772, 83 S. Ct. 1102,
10 L. Ed. 2d 136, reversing Drake v. Treadwel]
Const. Co., 3rd Cir., 1962, 299 F. 2d 789, are dis-
tinguishable. Both cases involved tort feasors
who were related to each other independently
of the accident causing personal injuries, in
the Weyerhauser case by the historic admiral-
ty rule of divided damages and in the
Treadwell case by the contract between the
company and the United States for the
manufacture of a steel expansion tank.”

The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the distinction
made by the Court in Panico is a valid one and that its

20

interpretation of the significance of the Weyerhaeuser
case is correct. The correctness of the distinction made
in Panico was recognized in Empire Seafoods, Inc. v.
Anderson, 398 F. 2d 204 (1968), a case involving the
question of divided damages between a ship owner
who struck a bridge and the contractor building the
bridge. The contractor pointed to the exclusive
remedy provision provided in the Florida Workmen's
Compensation Act and the exclusive remedy provi-
sion provided for in the L & H W Act, Section 905(a)
and took the position that it could not be burdened with
a liability for injuries sustained by its employees in
addition to the liability imposed upon it by the Com-
pensation Act by using the divided damage rule in-
asmuch as to do so would be to permit something to be
done indirectly which could not be done directly,
citing any number of longshoremen and tortfeasor
cases where the employer escaped liability to a third
party for injuries to an employee by virtue of the ex-
clusive remedy provision where the party claiming
either contribution or indemnity in tort did not have
the benefit of a divided damages rule. In disposing of
this contention the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that this was a case which required the applica-
tion of a divided damage rule inasmuch as it was a
collision between a vessel and a bridge under con-
struction, citing the Weyerhaeuser case. It then stated:

“The longshoremen and joint tortfeasor
cases relied upon by Cleary are not helpful
because the legal relationships of the parties
in those cases and the relationship in the case
sub judice, involving a maritime collision
between a vessel and a bridge, are not com-
parable and cannot be analogized.”

- ie fn) ee p> er: 2° sbhte us
1 kr a eee IRA BE on = Besta. +

21

By the same token, if longshoremen and joint
tortfeasor cases and cases for indemnity in tortcannot
be analogized to a maritime collision case in which
the divided damages rule is applicable, then logically
maritime collision cases are not analogous and com-
parable to platform accident cases on the outer con-
tinental shelf involving the application of Louisiana
surrogate law.

It is submitted that such decisions as United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379 (9 C.C.A., 1964);
Wien Alaska Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 375 F. 2d 736 (9
C.C.A., 1967) and Newport Airpack, Inc. v. U.S., 419
F. 2d 342 (1 C.C.A., 1969) represent a true and correct
interpretation of the significance of the Weyerhaeuser
and Drake decisions and their significance regarding
the exclusive remedy provision in the FECA Act.
These cases clearly demonstrate that those few cases
so heavily relied upon by Bettis herein resulted from
an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the
Weyerhaeuser and Drake cases, an interpretation at
variance with the Fifth Circuit's understanding and
interpretation of the effect of the Weyerhaeuser and
Drake cases, as exemplified by its comments on that
jurisprudence in the Empire Seafoods case just dis-
cussed. For example, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener,
cited supra, involved 31 cases arising out of a mid-air
collision between a commercial airliner and a United
States Air Force jet fighter. The crew of the airliner
was found to be negligent as well as the pilot of the jet
fighter. The question then became whether the airline
was entitled to indemnity from the United States with
regard to the deaths of government employees aboard
the airliner at the time of the mid-air collision. The
District Court denied either contribution or tort in-

OTE Ba

22

demnity because of the exclusive remedy provision of
the FECA Act which clothed the United States with im-
munity from tort liability with respect to these deceas-
ed employees or their heirs. The airline appealed the
denial of its claim for tort indemnity or contribution
against the United States with respect to the nine
government employee cases, contending that the
Weyerhaeuser case demanded a different decision, one
which would permit the airline to obtain tort in-
demnity from the United States in spite of the ex-
clusive remedy provision of the FECA Act. In over-
ruling that contention and affirming the District
Court's action, the Court of Appeal, Ninth Circuit,
made a penetrating analysis of Weyerhaeuser and its
effect and compared and contrasted the decisions un-
der the L & H W Act. It stated:

“The Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 83 S. Ct. 926, 20
L.Ed.2d 1 (1963), held that the express
provisions of the statute do not qualify the his-
toric admiralty rule of divided damages in
mutual fault collision. The admiralty rule of
divided damages is to be distinguished from
the rule of indemnity urged upon us by United
since under admiralty law there arises from a
collision involving mutual fault the right to
apportionment of all damages resulting there-
from, including personal injuries, cargo dam-
age, and damage to the ships. The divided
damage rule is based upon the duty which
each shipowner owes the other to navigate
safely irrespective of any duty to the person
injured. On the other hand neither contribu-
tion nor indemnity may be awarded without
the support of liability on the part of the in-

23

demnitor to the person injured. The courts
have consistently held that in the absence of
an express or implied contract of indemnity or
in the absence of the indemnitor'’s liability to
the injured party, there can be no recovery for
indemnity. Christie v. Powder Power Tool
Corp., 124 F. Supp. 693 (D.D.C. 1954); Terminal
R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. United States, 182 F. 2d
149 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. den. 340, 825, 71S. Ct.
60, 95 L. Ed. 606; Slattery v. Marra Bros., supra;
Lo Bue v. United States, 188 F. 2d 800 (2d Cir.
1951); Drumgoole v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co., 170 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Va. 1959).

As pointed out in the Weyerhaeuser opinion
372 U.S. 602, 83S. Ct. 926, the exclusive liabili-
ty provision of the Federal Employees’ Com-
pensation Act is indistinguishable from Sec-
tion 5 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Worker's Act, 33 U.S.C. 905. In construing this
statute the courts have held that an employer
may be liable for indemnity to another on the
basis of an express or implied contract of in-
demnity but that in the absence of a contrac-
tual duty, the exclusive liability provision
removed the underlying liability necessary
for indemnity. American Mutual Liability In-
surance Co. v. Matthews, 182 F. 2d 322 (2nd Cir.
1951); Lo Bue v. United States, supra; Crawford
v. Pope & Talbot, 206 F. 2d 784 (3rd Cir. 1953):
Brown v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211
F. 2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1954). The courts said in
Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, supra, 206 F. 2d at
792:

“Authority is lacking ‘for saying that
differences in the degrees of fault (active or

24

passive negligence) between two
tortfeasors will without more strip one of
them, if he is an employer. of the protection
of a compensation act; and we are ata loss to
see any tenable principle which can support
such a result.’ Slattery v. Marra Bros., 2Cir.,
1951, 186 F. 2d 134, 139.”

Appellants contend on Page ’7 of their petition that in
Ryan Stevedoring Company v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Cor-
poration, 350 U.S. 124, 76 Supreme Court 232, 1956,
“[T]his Court held that were the injuries to the
longshore-employee occurred through the fault of the
employer, the third party ship owner has a right to
receive full reimbursement from the stevedoring
employer. regardless of the existence of the “ex-
clusive liability” provision of the L& HW Act.”
Appellants took several statements from the text of
the Ryan opinion, setting them forth in support of
their averment that the exclusive remedy provisions
of the L & H W Act apply only to the “employee, and
those claiming under or through him.” They neglect-
ed, however, to quote the fullowing statements from
the opinion rendered therein. Thus it was also said by
this court:

“The Act[L & H W Act] nowhere expressly ex-
cludes or limits a shipowner’s right, as a third
person, to insure itself against such a lia-
bility either by a bond of indemnity, or the con-
tractors own agreement to save the ship-
owner harmless. Petitioner's agreement in the
instant case amounts to the latter, for, as will
be shown, it is a contractual undertaking to

25

stow the cargo “with reasonable safety” and
thus to save the shipowner harmless from
petitioners’ failure to do so.

“In the face of a formal bond of indemnity this
statute clearly does not cut off a shipowner's
right to recover from a bonding company the
reimbursement that the indemnitor, for good
consideration, has expressly contracted to
pay. Such a liability springs from an indepen-

dent contractual right. Itis not an actionbyor .

on behalf of the employee and it is not one to
recover damages, ‘‘on account of” an
employee's “injury or death”. Itisasimple ac-
tion to recover under a voluntary and self-
sufficient contract, a sum measured by
foreseeable damages occasioned to the
shipowner by the injury or death of a
longshoreman on a ship.

‘While the Compensation Act protects a
Stevedoring Contractor from actions brought
against it by its employees on account of a
contractor's tortious conduct causing injury
to the employee, the contractor has no logical
ground for relief from the full consequences of
its independent contractual obligation, volun-
tarily assumed to the shipowner, to load the
cargo properly.

“The shipowner’s action here is not founded
upon a tort or upon any duty which the
Stevedoring Contracting was to its employee.
The third party complaint is groumded upon

ALT Ty SMR

26

the contractors breach of its purely consen-
sual obligation owing to the shipowner to
stow the cargo in a reasonably safe manner.
Accordingly the shipowner’s action for in-
demnity on that basis is not barred by the
Compensation Act.”

Thus. it is clear that the basis for the Court's deci-
sion in Ryan is that there was an independent contrac-
tual undertaking running from the contractor to the
shipowner, which provided the basis for the ship-
owner's action by indemnity against the contractor.
The implication from this case is that in the absence of
such a contractual or consensual undertaking, the
shipowner’s claim for indemnity against the
contractor-employer would have been barred by vir-
tue of the provisions of the L & H W Act. The Ryan
case, in fact, stands for the proposition that in order for
there to be a right of indemnity or contribution in favor
of the third parties, there must be an independent con-
tractual right exercised against the employer in such
cases. In the instant case, there is no such contractual
relationship between Bettis, the manufacturer of the
allegedly faulty actuator, and Wheatley, the
assembler of the launch system which incorporated
the actuator. There is no warranty or contractual
undertaking running from Wheatley to Bettis. If any-
thing there is an implied contractual warranty of fit-
ness of the actuator running from Bettis, which manu-
factured the actuator which was installed in the
Wheatley Launch System, in favor of Wheatley, its
vendee!

Peak UA a sh Vi i ie Le oy oe ae

27

CONCLUSION

As this court recognized just last year in the Cooper
Stevedoring case, Congress in 1972 re-emphasized its
determination to further limit the employer's liability
to third parties while at the same time increasing his
already substantial burdens and obligations for
benefits to his employees under the L & H W Act. It is
most respectfully urged and contended that to grant
the relief petitioned for herein by Bettis Corporation
and its insurer would only serve to thwart the
acknowledged policy of the Congress of the United
States in this respect.

Respectfully submitted,

Timothy J. McNamara,
DAVIDSON, MEAUX,
ONEBANE & DONOHOE
P. O. Drawer 3507
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501

TIMOTHY J. MCNAMARA
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing brief has been
served upon opposing counsel of record by placing the
same properly addressed in the United States Mail
with adequate postage affixed thereto this ____ day of
December, 1975.

TIMOTHY J. MCNAMARA

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_1662%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
