# Memorandum — Houston Endowment, Inc. v. Dunlop

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Memorandum
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 423 U.S. 893

## Text

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-176
HouUSTON ENDOWMENT, INC., PETITIONER
v.

JOHN T. DUNLOP, SECRETARY OF LABOR

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION

Petitioner contends (1) that the equal pay pro-
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as added,
77 Stat. 56, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1), are inapplicable,
since the work performed by its male and female
employees was not shown to be substantially identi-
cal; (2) that it was denied due process because the
district court’s injunction was overly broad; and (3)
that it was denied due process because the district
court ruled against it from the bench.

(1)

2

This action was brought by the Secretary of Labor
in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, to enjoin petitioner from violat-
ing the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, supra.

The evidence showed that petitioner owned, op-
erated and managed several office buildings in Hous-
ton, Texas (A. 2).* It employed a number of male
and female custodial employees to clean offices, rest-
rooms, corridors and stairwells of the buildings in
the evenings. The female custodial employees had
responsibility for either cleaning or vacuuming and
cleaning. Those who only vacuumed were assigned
six floors of a particular office building; they were
required to carry vacuums from floor to floor (A.
51).

Those who cleaned and vacuumed ordinarily were
assigned two floors (Tr. 29). They were required
to vacuum all rugs and spot clean them by hand
(A. 34, 35), to dry mop all tiled floors (A. 76, 172),
to empty trash cans into a bag attached to a large
wheeled supply cart which they pushed from office
to office (A. 38, 39, 78), and to spot clean walls,
polish doorknobs and desks, dust venetian blinds and
clean women’s lavatories on each of the assigned
floors (A. 73, 76, 164, 172).

The male custodians also had responsibility for
vacuuming and cleaning (A. 55, 156; Tr. 243-245,
262-263). Some of them were assigned to vacuum

1“A.” refers to the joint appendix of the parties in the court
of appeals. “Tr.” refers to the trial transcript.

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3

only; others to clean and disinfect the men’s lava-
tories (A. 67, 133; Tr. 77, 389) ; the rest of the male
custodians were assigned to clean, scrub and wax
tiled floors with the use of adaptable motor-driven
machines (Pet. App. C-3).

The female custodial employees were paid $0.10
per hour less than the male custodial employees
(Pet. App. C-4).

The district court found that the men and women
performed janitorial work which, although not iden-
tical, was so “substantially similar’ as to meet the
Act’s “equal work” concept (Pet. App. C-6; A. 20);
that use of the machines by some of the male cus-
todial employees required no greater skill, responsi-
bility or effort than that required of female cus-
todial employees in performing their duties (ibid.) ;
and that petitioner had not offered “any objective
evidence that the duties performed by men as a class
required greater effort over a significant period of
time than that performed by women as a class so
as to justify any wage differential” (7ibid.). The
court concluded that petitioner therefore violated the
equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (Pet. App. C-7). It enjoined petitioner from
committing further violations and, pursuant to the
Act, awarded restitution to certain of the female cus-
todial employees (Pet. App. D-1—D-6). The court of
appeals affirmed per curiam (Pet. App. A-1).

1. a. Petitioner contends (Pet. 10) that the equal
pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act are
inapplicable to the instant case, since the district

4

court did not find that the work performed by male
and female custodial employees was “substantially
identical.” It is well established, however, that the
test for determining whether the Act’s “equal work”
concept is applicable is whether the jobs are closely
1 lated and job performance requires “equal skill,
effort, and responsibility” and “similar working con-
ditions” (29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1)). See also Corning
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 198-200.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, no court that has
considered the issue has required that the work to
which male and female employees are assigned must
be substantially identical before the equal pay provi-
sions are applicable. See Brennan v. City Stores,
Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238, n. 8 (C.A. 5); Hodgson v.
Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 493 (C.A. 4);
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (C.A.
3), certiorari denied, 398 U.S. 905; Hodgson v. Mil-
ler Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 227 (C.A. 7).

In the instant case, although male and female
custodial employees were assigned to different duties,
their duties were closely related and there is ample
evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion
that their work required equal skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility, and was performed under similar work-
ing conditions. The evidence showed that both sexes
were responsible for cleaning and vacuuming—tasks
which required the same kind and amount of physical
exertion, which were equally routinized, and which
required no particular skills.

b. Petitioner also contends (Pet. 7-9) that the Act
does not permit a court to look behind an employer’s

5

job classifications if there is a reasonable basis for
them. In the instant case, however, there was no
finding that petitioner’s classifications were “reason-
able” or based upon any factors other than the sex
of the employees.* Once the Secretary has demon-
strated that the work being performed by male and
female employees is substantially equal in skill, effort
and responsibility, the burden then shifts to the em-
ployer to show some factor other than sex which
justifies the salary disparity. Corning Glass Works
v. Brennan, supra, 417 U.S. at 204. Petitioner
failed to meet this burden.

2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 13-18) that it was
denied due process because the district court’s in-
junction was not limited to the establishments and
employees involved in the litigation. It is well estab-
lished, however, that an injunction “should operate
as an effective deterrent to a repetition of the unlaw-
ful conduct” (United States v. Crescent Amusement
Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186; McComb v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192-193). A company-wide
decree is particularly appropriate where, as here, the
violations are shown to be the result of company
policy and are found at several separate establish-
ments controlled by the employer (Pet. App. C-1—
C-2). See, e.g., Brennan v. J. M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d
443 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 419 U.S. 881; Tobin
v. Frost-Arnett Co., 13 WH Cases 566, 34 CCH Lab.

2 Although the compliance officer stated that there was a
“reasonable basis” to “argue” that the jobs were not equal
(Pet. 7-8), the Secretary of Labor made no such determination.

6

Cas. § 71,220 (%.D. Tenn.), affirmed, 264 F.2d 246
(C.A. 6); Chambers Construction Co. v. Mitchell, 233
F.2d 717, 725 (C.A. 8); J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 380 F.2d 292 (C.A. 2),
certiorari denied, 389 U.S. 1005; National Labor
Relations Board v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
408 F.2d 374 (C.A. 5).

The injunction gave petitioner adequate notice of
the practices from which it was required to refrain:
providing unequal pay to male and female employees
whose work requires substantially equal skill, effort,
and responsibility. Contrary to petitioner’s asser-
tion, the injunction does not expose it to the “risk”
of contempt if it incorrectly evaluates job categories
not at issue in the instant case; petitioner will “still
be able to raise questions of law and of good faith
as freely as in the original suit for an injunction”
(Mitchell v. Pidcock, 299 F.2d 281, 287 (C.A. 5)).

3. Petitioner further contends (Pet. 18-19) that
it was denied due process because the district court
ruled against it from the bench at the conclusion of
the evidence. Petitioner assumes that the court’s
ruling had been reduced to writing prior to the time
when petitioner offered the testimony of two wit-
nesses. But the record does not support this assump-
tion; it is just as likely that the court was speaking
extemporaneously or from notes taken during the
presentation of petitioner’s case. Thus there is no
reason to suppose that the district court did not ac-
cord full and fair consideration to petitioner’s evi-
dence.

7

For the foregoing reasons, it is therefore respect-
fully submitted that the petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari should be denied.

ROBERT H. BoRK,
Solicitor General.
WILLIAM J. KILBERG,
Solicitor of Labor,

CARIN ANN CLAUSS,
Associate Solicitor,

SYLVIA S. ELLISON,
MELANIE FRANCO NUSSDORF,
Attorneys,
Department of Labor.

SEPTEMBER 1975.

% ov. s. sovarnmenr printine orrice; 1975 593127 36

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_1359%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
