# Opposition Brief — Noel v. Chapman

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 423 U.S. 824

## Text

INDEX

Page
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Constitutional provisions, statutes and
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Appendix ................ Ldideceiriicedialihceaiiadadideenedaeesininneininmtes 12
CITATIONS
Cases:
Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 1, probable
jurisdiction noted, 416 U.S. 980 0.0... eee eeeee 8
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 .0.......cccccccceceeseeeeees 7
CE SF Ee Ws OE echdtkancattncnctctcpiviicennenits 7,10
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 ..........2.ccceceeeees 8
i Bie teh MED I FIT oc ciecccccscenssceirovversoninse 8
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 ............... 7,10
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 .0..........c0ccceceeeeees 9
Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 ..... 11
Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031, cer-
tiorart gramted, 417 U.S. DO6 ....ccrcccsccccccevscovccscoccoses 8
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 ......ccccceeccccceeseeeeeeeeeee 6
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 o....ceeecce cece ee 6,8
Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission,
PE UE UU. ccsitaanccticidetaebaiadbnnaninbedebastosighilintinnnbesiin 11

Constitution, statutes and regulation:

United States Constitution:

Article 1, Section 8, clause 4 ......... a ae tei Ae 2.9

a a ea dicecuauibuacebon 2
Act of October 3, 1965, Sec. 21(e), 79 Stat. ee Sanaa ae
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551,

et seq.:

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Miscellaneous:

H.R. 981, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) ........:::cccceeeeeeees 9

—

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 74-1257
RODOLPHE NOEL, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.

LEONARD H. CHAPMAN, COMMISSIONER OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-16a)
is reported at 508 F.2d 1023. The opinion of the district
court (Pet. App. 17a-28a) is reported at 376 F. Supp. 1095.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
January 3, 1975. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on April 3, 1975. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Aliens who are unlawfully in this country but who marry
permanent resident aliens-are eligible by statute to re-
ceive visas that will allow them to live in this country le-
gally. Another statute allows Eastern Hemisphere aliens
to receive such visas under a special preference. Western
Hemisphere aliens, however, must wait until a visa be-
comes available under the quota rules. It is the policy of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service that, in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, an illegal alien must
leave this country until a visa authorizing his return be-
comes available. The questions presented are:

1. Whether this policy denies petitioners equal pro-
tection of the laws.

2. Whether this policy is invalid because it was an-
nounced without notice and opportunity to comment.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND REGULATION INVOLVED

Article I, Section 8, clause 4 of the United States Con-
stitution provides in relevant part:

The Congress shall have Power * * * To establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization * * *.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in relevant part:

No person shall be * * * deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law * * *.

The relevant portions of the Administrative Procedure
Act are set out at Pet. 3-4.

Section 2l(e) of the Act of October 3, 1965, 79 Stat.
921, provides in relevant part with respect to immigrants
from the Western Hemisphere:

Kae dase eres ee.

3

* **the number of special immigrants [entitled
to admission for permanent residence], exlusive of
special immigrants who are immediate relatives of
United States citizens * * * shall not, [in any fiscal
year], exceed a total of 120,000.

8 U.S.C. 1254(e) provides in relevant part:

The Attorney General may, in his discretion, per-
mit any alien under deportation proceedings, other
than [enumerated classes of aliens], to depart volun-
tarily from the United States at his own expense in
lieu of deportation * * *.

8 C.F.R. 244.2 provides in relevant part:

Authority to extend the time within which to de-
part * * * is within the sole jurisdiction of the district
director.

STATEMENT

The facts are not in dispute and are set out ia the opin-
ion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 2a-4a). Petitioners
Rodolphe Noel and Antoine Petit are natives and citizens
of Haiti. Noel was admitted to this country on May 24,
1969, as a non-immigrant visitor for pleasure and was au-
thorized to stay for two months. He remained illegally be-
yond the prescribed time and was apprehended on June 15,
1972. Deportation proceedings were commenced, and at a
hearing on June 27, 1972, Noel admitted that he was de-
portable and requested the privilege of voluntary departure
in lieu of deportation. He was given until September 27,
1972, to depart voluntarily. He again failed to leave. A
warrant of deportation was issued on July 12, 1973, and
Noel was directed to report on August 21, 1973, to be de-
ported. Instead of reporting, he requested an indefinite
extension of voluntary departure while awaiting issuance
of a visa in light of his marriage, on April 13, 1973, to peti-
tioner Emiris Noel, a permanent resident alien. The New
York district director of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (the INS) denied the request.

LAC TAT IRE ALY ate SNE REE ALI LR OGY LINEN BERL LSLEU DRI LLE A) SALLE SEES ILE ENTE SRP

4

Petitioner Antoine Petit was admitted to the country on
August 4, 1970, as a visitor for pleasure for two months.
He did not depart as required and obtained employment in
violation of his non-immigrant status. He was apprehended
on June 7, 1973. He, too, conceded deportability and re-
quested voluntary departure. He was given until July 8,
1973, to depart. On June 26, 1973, he married petitioner
Yanick Petit, who had entered the United States a week
earlier as a permanent resident immigrant. He then re-
quested an extension of voluntary departure until a visa
became available. The district director denied the request
and required him to leave the country by July 27, 1973. He
did not leave, and on August 6, 1973, a warrant of de-
portation was issued.

On August 24, 1973, petitioners brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy
of INS declining to permit aliens to remain in this country
pending the issuance of a visa was unconstitutional. They
also sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit INS from
deporting any of them. The district court denied the motion
for a preliminary injunction (Pet. App. 17a-28a), and the
court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. la-16a).' The court
considered and rejected the claims made here.

ARGUMENT

| Aliens, from whatever country of origin, who are
the parents, children or spouses of American citizens may
enter this country without prior labor certification or nu-
merical limitation. 8 U.S.C. 1151(a), (b) and 1182(a)(14).
Similarly, aliens who are the parents, children or spouses

'Petitioners appealed from an order denying a preliminary injunc-
tion. The court of appeals concluded, however, that the district court’s
decision on the underlying legal and constitutional issues was final.
It therefore treated petitioners’ claims on the merits.

5

of resident aliens, and who are not from the Western Hemis-
phere, are exempt from the labor certification require-
ment (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(14)) and, although they are sub-
ject to a quota limit of 170,000, they receive a special right
of preference over others seeking a visa within that yearly
quota limit (8 U.S.C. 1153(a)). As a result, they receive
visas very quickly. On the other hand, Western Hemisphere
aliens (such as petitioners) who are the immediate rela-
tives of permanent resident aliens, although exempt from
prior labor certification, are subject to the yearly numeri-
cal limit of 120,000 visas for permanent residence and en-
joy no right of preference over others seeking visas within
the same limit. Act of October 3, 1965, Sec. 21(e), 79 Stat.
921. We have been informed by INS that the current wait-
ing period for the issuance of visas to persons in this cate-
gory is approximately two years.

Since 1940 the Attorney General has had statutory dis-
cretion to permit the voluntary departure of deportable
aliens (8 U.S.C. 1254(e)). The authority to grant this
privilege and to set the date for departure has been dele-
gated to district directors (8 C.F.R. 244.2). The national
policy of INS has been that.deportable Western Hemis-
phere aliens must leave and wait abroad until they become
eligible for visas, even though married to a permanent
resident alien. The New York district, departing from this
rule, had in the past routinely granted “extended volun-
tary departure” pending availability of a visa.

The New York district’s practice reverted to the norm
in the summer of 1972 when INS informed all district
directors, including the New York district director, that as
of July 31, 1972, Western Hemisphere aliens should be
granted extended voluntary departure only if compelling
circumstances warranted the privilege.

6

This statement of policy was prompted by a letter to the
Commissioner of INS from Congressman Rodino, Chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee, advising the Com-
missioner that evidence before the Subcommittee on
Immigration and Nationality indicated that the employ-
ment of illegal aliens in this country was unfavorably in-
fluencing the domestic job market, and that routinely per-
mitting deportable aliens to remain in the country pending
issuance of visas was not justifiable.2 On April 10, 1973,
again in response to a letter from Congressman Rodino
(Pet. App. 29a-30a), the INS provided that aliens present in
the United States and who had acquired the requisite family
status on or before April 10, 1973, would be allowed to
remain pending visa issuance in accordance with the earlier
New York practice. On the other hand, the policy was not
to be applied prospectively so as to act “as an invitation to
aliens to thereafter enter this country, acquire the speci-
fied relationship, and remain unlawfully” (Exh. K, p. 2,
Letter of Acting INS Commissioner Greene). Petitioners’
marriages took place on April 13, 1973, and June 26, 1973.

- 2. Petitioners’ primary contention (Pet. 10) is that the
policy requiring aliens from the Western Hemisphere who
are illegally in this country to depart until visas become
available to them cannot withstand the “close judicial
scrutiny” to which classifications based on alienage are
subject (Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634), and violates
the “fundamental right” of the family to remain intact
(Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645). These arguments are
insubstantial.

2This letter is reprinted as an Appendix, infra.

7

The power of Congress to fix, and of the executive to
enforce, “the conditions under which aliens are to be per-
mitted to enter and remain in this country” is plenary
(Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616; Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522, 531), so much so that this power is “largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589. Yet here, the source of
petitioners’ complaint lies with acts of Congress. Congress
determined that aliens married to citizens are entitled to a
preference; Congress decided that Eastern Hemisphere
aliens married to permanent resident aliens are entitled to
a preference; Congress decided that Western Hemisphere
aliens married to permanent resident aliens are not en-
titled to a preference. We do not think it open to doubt
that Congress has the power to make such decisions.

The INS policy of which petitioners complain is a policy
putting aliens who are illegally in this country on a footing
similar to that of aliens who have not yet arrived; that is,
the INS requires aliens to live up to the limitations on the
visas by which they initially entered this country and to
leave when their permitted stay has expired. As the court
of appeals observed (Pet. App. 13a):

* * * ranting the relief sought would place Noel
and Petit in a position of precedence over those West-
ern Hemisphere aliens who have made application for
visas in regular course and who are awaiting their
turn for admission. There is no reason to prefer those
who have flouted the immigration laws, which per-
mitted their entry for a limited time and purpose,
over those who have steadfastly and patiently fol-
lowed legal procedures.

Petitioners have demanded, in effect, that the INS
administratively provide the immigration preference
that Congress has withheld. The INS has declined to pro-
vide such a preference to deportable aliens in petitioners’

8

position and has required such aliens io await their turn in
order of preference before they can take up legitimate
residence in this country. Nothing in the Constitution
precludes the INS from implementing the statutes in this
manner.

Petitioners argue that the INS policy is unconstitutional
because alienage is a “suspect” classification. But this
argument fails to take account of the nature of the policy
under attack. The cases cited by petitioners* deal with
discrimination against aliens lawfully admitted for per-

31t is, therefore, not necessary to explore petitioners’ contention
that the INS policy is irrational and not supported by compelling in-
terests. The government argued in the district court and the court of
appeals that the policy requiring deportable aliens to leave the country
until they could obtain a visa was justified by the exigencies of the
domestic labor market; the courts below agreed (See Pet. App. 12a).
But the more fundamental justification for the INS policy is that it
simply implements the policy of Congress; petitioners are complain-
ing that the INS must advance some compelling interest not to relieve
them of burdens placed upon them by Congress. We submit that an
administrative agency is not required to provide reasons, compelling
or otherwise, for declining to provide discretionary relief from con-
gressional policy. Aine

_ 4Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365; Sugarman v. Dougall, supra;
and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, upon which petitioners rely in de-
manding close judicial scrutiny of INS’ policy, involved state classi-
fications based on alienage. But federal power to act in respect to
aliens is plenary, and the proposition that alienage is a “suspect”
category as to federal legislative or executive action is inaccurate.

Nor do Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (C.A. 9), cer-
tiorari granted, 417 U.S. 944, restored to the calendar for reargument,
March 3, 1975, and Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. | (S.D. Fla.),
probable jurisdiction noted, 416 U.S. 980, restored to the calendar for
reargument, March 3, 1975, support petitioners’ claim. We believe that
those cases were incorrectly decided. Whether or not they were cor-
rectly decided, however, they go no further, as the court of appeals
noted (Pet. App. 8a, n. 3), “than to declare that the federal and state
governments cannot treat aliens legally residing in this country dif-
ferently from citizens with regard to certain rights or privileges.”
Neither case can be controlling in regard to the power of the executive
branch to deal—even at the cost of hardship to lawful residents—with
aliens who are by their own admissions deportable.

9

manent residence; here, by contrast, there is discrimination
among groups of individuals, a// of whom are aliens. The
policy differentiates among aliens, but does not discrim-
inate against them. Congress’ power to decide which
aliens shall enter or remain in the country, individually and
as groups, is undisputed and has been reaffirmed recently
by this Court. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753. Peti-
tioners, far from being lawfully admitted permanent resi-
dents, are by their own concessions deportable; they can
hardly complain that Congress has used alienage as a
category in carrying out its powers under Article I, Section
8, clause 4 of the Constitution to establish rules for the ad-
mission and exclusion of aliens to this country.‘

Nor are petitioners correct in arguing (Pet. 10) that the
INS has burdened the “fundamental right” of marriage.
Neither INS nor Congress has imposed burdens upon mar-
riage. The government has said no more than that aliens
unlawfully within the country—whether married or not—
are subject to deportation. Congress and the INS have de-
clined to allow marriage to produce a benefit unavailable
to unmarried aliens unlawfully within the country. The
Constitution does not demand that marriage be the source
of preferential treatment.®

‘Petitioners refer (Pet. 7) to H.R. 981, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973),
which would have granted preferences in the award of immigrant visas
to immediate family members of both citizens and lawful resident
aliens, and would thus eliminate the long wait for immigrant visas by
Western Hemisphere aliens. No corresponding bill was introduced in
the Senate in the 93d Congress, nor has any been introduced in the
Senate in the 94th Congress.

*Indeed, marriage is a source of preferential treatment for peti-
tioners because Western Hemisphere aliens married to permanent
resident aliens are exempt from the labor certification requirements.
Petitioners’ complaint is that Congress and the INS did not provide
the additional benefit of preference within the quota (or even exemp-
tion from the quota).

Pistia si PEER NG SER FO AINA LUS? LIM SOE SARA IER EER IPE LE MOEN R(T IS EARNERS HE DIRS HEE: OT BIE RRS

10

3. Petitioners contend that the INS policy is invalid
because it was announced without use of the notice and
comment rulemaking provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553. Even if Section 553 is
applicable to INS,’ Section 701(a)(2) of the Act exempts
from judicial review agency action that is committed to
agency discretion by law. Here, 8 U.S.C. 1254(e) explicitly
commits to the discretion of the Attorney General the au-
thority to grant voluntary departure. While, as the court
of appeals noted (Pet. App. 13a-14a), the district courts
have jurisdiction to review exercises of INS discretion to de-
termine Mhether they are arbitrary or capricious, the
basis of that jurisdiction is contained in the Immigration
Act (8 U.S.C. 1329), not in the Administrative Procedure
Act.

At all events, Section 553(b)(3)(A) of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act exempts “general statements of policy”
from the notice requirements of Section 553. Both lower
courts correctly held that the July 31, 1972, policy and the
April 10, 1973, modification are within the statutory ex-
ception for general policy statements. The court of ap-
peals reasoned (Pet. App. 15a):

In the first place, the regulation governing the issue
of extensions of time to depart which is here rele-
vant explicitly provides that the “[aJuthority to ex-
tend the time within which to depart... is within .
the sole jurisdiction of the district director.” 8 C.F.R.
§244.2. The “instructions” complained of in this case
do not purport to amend the published regulation or

7Section 553 does not apply “to the extent that there is involved
***a4 military or foreign affairs function of the United States”
(5 U.S.C. 55aX(1)). As this Court has repeatedly observed, federal
“[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain
here are peculiarly concerned with the practical conduct of govern-
ment” (Galvan v. Press, supra, 347 U.S. at 531), for such policies are
“vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in
regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government” (Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, supra, 342 U.S. at 588-589).

11

to oust the District Director of his “sole” discretion.
In fact, the District Director of New York was the
only INS officer who “routinely” extended the stay in
the case of an alien married to a resident alien; the
practice in the rest of the country was otherwise. We
construe the instruction to be simply a statement by
the agency of its general policy as a guideiine for the
District Directors. * * * One scholar has suggested
that “[iJt may be that ‘general statements of policy’
are rules directed primarily at the staff of an agency
describing how it will conduct agency discretionary
functions, while other rules are directed primarily at
the public in an effort to impose obligations on them.”
Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Partici-
pation in the Making of Interpretative Rules and Gen-
eral Statements of Policy under the APA, 23 Admin.
L. Rev. 101, 115 (1970-71).

Finally, as both courts below found, the change in policy
affected no “existing rights and obligations” of peti-
tioners and therefore was not open to challenge by them.
Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (C.A.
2); Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission, 412 F.2d
740, 744 (C.A. 3). Petitioners’ claim that they had “pre-
existing expectations which were extinguished by admin-
istrative fiat” (Pet. 16) rings hollow in light of the fact that
they were not married at the time either of the policy
change or of its subsequent limited relaxation.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

RoBERT H. Bork,
Solicitor General.

JOHN C. KEENEY,
Acting Assistant Attorney General.

SHIRLEY BAccus-LOBEL,
MICHAEL W. FARRELL,
Attorneys.

JUNE 1975. DOJ-1975-06

12

APPENDIX

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

June 27, 1972

Honorable Raymond F. Farrell, Commissioner
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Department of Justice

119 D Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20536

Dear Mr. Commissioner:

Hearings conducted by this Subcommittee over the past
year in the field of immigration law enforcement have
pointed up the unfavorable influence which employment
by illegal aliens is having on the domestic job market.
This is, of course, particularly evident in those areas of
the United States having a high rate of unemployment
among Americans.

With this in mind, the Subcommittee believes that the
Service practice of routinely permitting alien professionals
and certain natives of the Western Hemisphere to remain
in the United States until their visa priority dates are
reached is no longer justifiable. These non-resident aliens
and their dependents are competing for jobs when un-
employed residents of the United States, and their numbers
should not be allowed to increase further. The Subcom-
mittee therefore recommends that this practice be ter-
minated immediately, but that those aliens who have al-
ready been granted permission to remain pending visa
availability be allowed to stay if they maintain the quali-
fications on which the privilege was given originally. —

13

The Subcommittee is of the opinion that existing provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, particularly sec-
tion 101(a) 15) H)(i), are sufficient to provide for the ad-
mission of professionals to the United States to fill those
positions which cannot be filled by United States resi-
dents.

Kindest regards.
Sincerely,

Peter W. Rodino, Jr.
Chairman

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_1041%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
