# Appendix — Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chicago (No. 74-1109)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1974

## Text

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APPENDIX A

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOx THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 73-1650

Tue Procrer Anp GamB_Le Company, and FMC Corporation,
Plaintiff s-A ppellees,
v.

Tue Crry or CuHIcaco,
Defendant-Appellant.

Decipep January 15, 1975

Before Swycert, Chief Judge, Farrcutp and CummMtnes,
Circuit Judges.

Swycert, Chief Judge. This appeal presents the ques-
tion of whether an ordinance of the City of Chicago that
bans the use of detergents containing phosphates is un-
constitutional on the ground that it results in an imper-
missible interference with interstate commerce. This dis-
trict court decided that the ordinance is unconstitutional.’
We disagree.

The ordinance was adopted by the City Council after
its Committee on Environmental Control had held public
meetings for three days. The measure provided that the

* Soap and Detergent Ass’n v. Chicago, 357 F.Supp. 44 (N.D.
Ill. 1973).

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sale of detergents containing any phosphorous after
June 30, 1972 constituted a criminal offense.* Most de-
tergents sold in this country contain phosphates which
are compounds containing the element phosphorous.

The present action was brought seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. Plaintiff-appellee Procter and Gamble
Company is a manufacturer of phosphate detergents.
Plaintiff-appellee FMC Corporation processes and manu-
factures sodium tripolyphosphate and other phosphate
products for use in detergents. Three other plaintiffs were
dismissed for failure to prove the jurisdictional amount
and have not appealed. The second amended complaint
alleged only a violation of the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) and the case
was tried on that issue.

A substantial amount of evidence, including exhaustive
expert scientific and technical testimony by many wit-
nesses, was presented both in court and by depositions.
As the district court observed, this evidence is much too
extensive to be set out in any detail. We think we need
present only a broad outline of the more relevant evidence.

The plaintiffs unquestionably showed that the ordinance
has had an adverse effect upon their businesses which
admittedly are national in scope. Procter and Gamble was
unable to sell any detergents in the Chicago area for five
months after June 30, 1972 and lost $4,700,000 in sales
as a result. FMC lost $500,000 worth of sales of phos-

2 Chicago, Ill., Code ech. 17, art. VII, §17-73(b) (1973) pro-
vides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to
sell, offer or expose for sale, give or furnish any synthetic
detergent or detergent containing any phosphorus, expressed
as elemental phosphorus, including synthetie detergents or de-
tergents manufactured for machine dishwashers, dairy equip-
ment, beverage equipment, food processing equipment and in-
dustrial cleaning equipment, within the City of Chicago from
and after June 30, 1972.

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phates as a result of the ordinance. Further, whereas be-
fore the ordinance Procter’s Chicago plant was able to
supply over 96 percent of the requirements for the six-
state ‘‘Chicago Plant Area,’’ after the ordinance became
effective the plant could supply only 51 percent, which
necessitated shipments to this area from other Procter
plants in Louisiana, Missouri, and Kansas. The result
was the establishment of a different and, from the com-
pany’s viewpoint, a less efficient interstate system of dis-
tribution of its products.

Evidence was also introduced concerning the warehovs-
ing practices of the retail grocery chains serving Chicago
and the surrounding area. These chains, which include
chains of independents, warehouse their products on an
area-wide basis as opposed to a city-wide basis. Goods
are purchased from the manufacturer and stored in ware-
houses for eventual distribution to the individual retail
stores. In the Chicago area, the same warehouses also
service stores in northern Illinois, northern Indiana,
southern Wisconsin, and Michigan. At the warehouses,
each product is stored in its own particular area called
a slot. There was testimony that these warehouses will not
‘double slot’’ a product and thus refused to carry both
phosphate and non-phosphate versions of the same prod-
uct. The explanation is that there is not sufficient space
in the warehouses and there would be the possibility of a
violation of the ordinance if phosphate formulas were
accidently shipped to Chicago stores. Of the seventeen
major Chicago area customers of Procter and Gamble,
fifteen chose to carry only non-phosphate detergents. The
result has been that consumers in areas of Illinois or the
other adjacent states where the sale of phosphate deter-
gents is legal can purchase only non-phosphate formulas
of the major detergents from stores which are part of
these fifteen chains. Thus, the Chicago ordinance affected
Procter and Gamble’s ability to sell its phosphate deter-
gents in other states.

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The bulk of the evidence dealt with the nature and effect
of phosphates and particularly their effect on the water
moving in the Illinois Waterway. Phosphates are not a
problem in and of themselves. They are not harmful to
most humans and are even added to water by some com-
munities for the purpose of softening. The aspect of
phosphates that causes concern is their nutritive contri-
bution to the eutrophication of rivers or lakes. Eutrophi-
eation is a process of aging, whereby a body of water
becomes over-nourished in nutrient elements such that
there occurs an extensive growth of green plants or nui-
sance algae. Nuisance algae can result in an unpleasant
ordor and a bad taste in drinking water. It is the elimi-
nation and prevention of these algae that is desirable.

Some controversy exists, however, concerning the rela-
tionship of phosphorous and eutrophication. An abundance
of phosphorous does not always result in increased eutro-
phication. It is a more complex process and its exact
nature is somewhat in dispute. Other nutrients including
nitrogen and carbon are needed for eutrophication. So
far as the nutrient aspect of eutrophication is concerned
the important inquiry centers on the idea of the ‘‘limiting
nutrient”’ or ‘‘limiting factor.’’ The ‘‘limiting nutrient’’
is that nutrient that is in the shortest supply relative to
the need for it for plant growth. It is the factor which
limits any further aquatic growth. The district court found
that phosphorous can be a ‘‘limiting factor’’ for nuisance
algae only at .02 milligrams per liter or less. There is some
evidence, however, that phosphorous is the nutrient that
is most easily controlled.

The ordinance’s most direct effect is on the Illinois
Waterway because the City’s sewage effluent flows into
it. This Waterway, which includes the Illinois River, is a
water source for some communities, but, not for Chicago.
The Waterway has a very high percentage of phosphorous.
The district court determined that before the passage of

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the ordinance the amount of phosphorous present in this
Waterway was at least twenty-five times as much as is
necessary to sustain nuisance algae. Still, there is a ques-
tion of whether there is any nuisance algae problem in
the Illinois River. Although the City introduced photo-
graphs showing the presence of such algae, the district
court concluded ‘‘that there was no significant amount
of nuisance algae in the Illinois River.’ Explanations
offered for this lack of growth included the excessive
turbidity of the river which prevents needed sunlight,
periodic flushing, and possibly some undefined trace ele-
ments which inhibit such growth. Also, the district court
found that the elimination of Chicago phosphates alone
would not result in reaching the ‘‘limiting factor’’ level,
though a 66 percent reduction did result in at least part
of the Waterway after the ordinance had been in effect.

Finally, there is the evidence concerning Lake Michigan
which is the source of Chicago’s water supply. The danger
of nuisance algae is more pronounced with regard to Lake
Michigan because it does not have the flushing quality of
a river. Moreover, the phosphorous concentration is at
about the ‘‘limiting factor’’ of .02 milligrams per liter.
But unlike some of the other communities along the lake,
Chicago’s sewage does not normally flow into the lake;
only during excessively heavy rainstorms is one of two
rivers reversed so that sewage flows into Lake Michigan.
The district court determined that such reversals occurred
only four times within a ten year period, though there
was also testimony that the frequency of such reversals is
increasing. As to the amount of phosphates entering the
lake during a year in which a back-flow resulted, the con-
clusion of the district court was that detergents contrib-
uted only 250 tons or about three percent of the total
entering the lake each year.

3357 F.Supp. at 49.

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Based on this evidence the trial court determined that
the phosphate ban was unconstitutional. It decided that
the ordinance resulted in increased costs of manufacture
and distribution and burdened interstate commerce. Once
the plaintiffs had proven this much the court held that
the City was then required to justify the ordinance by
showing some need to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare. Though it found that the ‘‘ordinance was enacted
in good faith and for laudatory objectives,’ the justifi-
cations offered for the ordinance were not sufficient to
outweigh its interference with interstate commerce. The
court held that the City did have the power to protect the
water quality for persons living downstream, but the ordi-
nance by itself would not have any beneficial effect on
the Illinois Waterway. The actual effect on Lake Michigan
was apparently considered too minimal to support the
legislation; the theory that the City could enact the ordi-
nance in order to influence other communities to stop
discharging phosphates into Lake Michigan was rejected.
Though the court conceded that such an ordinance might
be sustained in some other jurisdiction where the water
supply situation is different, it concluded that Chicago
could only enact the ordinance on a standby basis to be-
come effective only when other controls have brought the
phosphorous content of the Illinois Waterway down to
the ‘‘limiting level.’’

I

It is difficult to discern the precise test that should be
used to determine when a state or local legislative enact-
ment’s effect on an area of interstate commerce that has
not been preempted by Congressional legislation is viola-
tive of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. It is clear
that we must first decide whether there is such an effect
and what it is, for if we find no effect our inquiry need not

* 357 F.Supp. at 51.

/

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progress. However, if some effect is found then we must
proceed to consider whether the legislative body ‘‘has
acted within its province, and whether the means of regu-'
lation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought.’”
The more difficult question is whether our analysis should
encompass an additional step if the legislation is found
to be'a reasonable means of achieving a legitimate end.
The predominant test utilized by the Supreme Court ap-
pears to require that the burden imposed on interstate
commerce be balanced against the local benefit in order to
determine the ultimate question of constitutionality. See
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959),
and Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
The Court’s most recent formulation is that contained in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970):

Where the statute regulates evenhandedly ‘to effectu-

ate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects

on interstate commerce are, only incidental, it will be

upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce

ad orvaiag excessive in relation to the putative local
nefits.

There is some support, though, for the proposition that
once it is determined that the legislation is a reasonable
means of achieving a nondiscriminatory, legitimate goal
it should be deemed constitutional and any further weigh-
ing process: need not occur. One commentator has sug-
gested that this ‘‘third stage’’ balancing process is un-
desirable because it can lead to the usurpation of the
legislative role.’ Moreover, it is argued that in fact the |

°S. C.. Highway Dep’t'v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190
(1938).

* Obviously, there is some degree’ of balancing involved in the
initial determination of whether the end sought is a legitimate local
concern.

7D. ENGpAHL, ConsTITUTIONAL Power: FEDERAL AND STATE IN
A NutsHe.. (1974). Engdahl’s theory is discussed in Note, Use of

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Supreme Court has perhaps eliminated this final balanc-
ing step by its opinion in Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen ¢ Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
, Railroad Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968). Brotherhood involved
the validity of the Arkansas ‘‘full-crew’’ laws for rail-
roads. The district court had analyzed conflicting evidence
,concerning the safety value of such laws and determined
that at best they provided for a small increment in safety
not worth the cost. This was found not to ontweigh the
burden on interstate commerce. In reversing, the Supreme
Court indicated that the analysis endorsed by the lower
court was incorrect:

We think it plain that in striking down the full-
, crew laws on this basis, the District Court indulged
in a legislative judgment wholly beyond its limited
authority to review state legislation under the Com-
merce Clause.’ . '

The matter was one properly left for the legislature be-
cause the evidence: ‘‘leaves little room for doubt that
the question of safety in the circumstances of this case
is essentially a matter of public policy, and public policy
can, under our consitutional system, be fixed only by the
people acting through their elected representatives.’”

The Brotherhood case has been relied upon in cases
similar to the one at bar. In discussing the Commerce
Clause implications of an environmental statute a state
court commented :

The language of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra,
does not mechanically compel a weighing process in
every case. The language is instructive in appropriate

‘eases rather than mandatory in ali cases... . The

the Commerce Clause to Invalidate Anti-Phosphate Legislation;
Will it Work?, 45 U. Coro. L. Rev. 487 (1974).

* 393 U.S. at 136.
* 353 US. at 138.

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United States Supreme Court recognized the inappro-
priateness of a weighing process in cases of non-
comparable benefit and injury ... in Firemen v. Chi-
cago, R.I. & P. R. Co... .”

Indeed, one court confronted with a challenge to the same
type of legislation before us adopted the Brotherhood
opinion as the controlling case."

Our case, we believe, has elements that require a com-
promise between Brotherhood and Pike. Like Brotherhood
there is conflicting evidence concerning the value of this
legislation. Here the conflict relates more to the question
of whether the ordinance will result in preventing nuisance
algae, as opposed to the question of how much benefit
there is from the removal or prevention of such algae.
The latter is the type of ‘‘public policy’’ question that is
directly addressed in Brotherhood. The district court did
not and should not have evaluated the benefits te be de-
rived from the improved water quality associated with
the elimination of nuisance algae. It was proper, however,
for the court to consider the ‘‘factual’’ question of whether
the ordinance has any relationship to the elimination of
nuisance algae. The question that we are faced with is
how much weight, if any, should be accorded the legis-
lative body’s determination that the means are reasonably
related to achieving the end. In the present case we think
that it is at this point that the Pike balancing stage occurs.
The district court addressed this issue as if it was an
ordinary factual dispute over a technical matter that should
be decided without the benefit of a presumption. It is our
view, however, that if the burden on interstate commerce
is slight, and the area of legislation is one that is prop-
erly of local concern, the means chosen to accomplish

*° American Can Co. v. Ore. Liquor Control Comm’n, 517 P.2d
691, 697 (Ore. App. 1974).

Soap and Detergent Ass’n y. Clark, 330 F.Supp. 1218 (S.D.
Fla. 1971).

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this end should be deemed reasonably effective unless the
party attacking the legislation demonstrates the contrary
by clear and convincing proof.’* If it is determined that
this presumption should be applied, no further balancing
need be undertaken. The end has already been deemed
legitimate and the burden on interstate commerce slight.
If the legislation is a reasonable means to that end it is
constitutional.

II

Having in mind the framework of our analysis, we begin
by considering what, if any, burden was imposed on inter-
state commerce by this ordinance. The first major argu-
ment raised by the plaintiffs, and apparently accepted
by the district court, is that the ordinance burdened inter-
state commerce by impairing the normal operation of
companies having interstate sales and requiring these
companies to create new, and less direct, shipping routes.
The argument is based on the fact that Procter and Gam-
ble’s plant in the Chicago area could not adequately supply
its six-state area with detergents because the plant had
to manufacture two lines of detergent products and thus
reduce its capacity. The result was that products had to
be shipped to some of these states from plants which
happened to be at different, and often further, locations.
The principal cases relied on to support this theory in-
volve interstate carriers whose ability to efficiently trans-
port other’s goods through particular states was perma-
nently impaired.** With our case, we are not confronted
with a situation in which legislation has reduced the effec-
tiveness of a means of transportation itself. In this con-
text the ordinance is not a burden on interstate commerce,

12 See also the suggestion for a somewhat different presumption
in Note, supra, n .7, at 493.

13 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) ;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).

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but is merely a ‘‘burden”’ on a company which happens
to have interstate distribution facilities. The effect of
the ordinance is that the particular interstate systems
of distribution used by Procter and Gamble and other
detergent companies before the passage of the ordinance
can no longer be used. This is because of the freely chosen
geographical locations of their various plants, not because
of the requirements of this ordinance. There is no im-
pairment of the ultimate ability to transport in interstate
commerce in the most efficient and economical manner
possible. While this factor might necessitate a change in
certain production facilities, it does not rise to the level
of an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.”

Plaintiffs also argue that the ordinance is a burden on
interstate commerce because there is a ‘*potential for
conflicting legislation.’’ Other jurisdictions, including some
within the Chicago marketing area, have enacted phos-
phate detergent legislation, and it is urged that such
local legislation might conflict with each other so as to
inhibit the uniformity necessary for the national manu-
facture and distribution of detergents. It is claimed that
Milwaukee has an ordinance that not only restricts phos-
phates, but also prohibits highly alkaline detergents which
have been used as substitutes for phosphate detergents.
But there is no evidence in the record to prove that any
phosphate substitutes used by the appellees in Chicago
violate Milwaukee’s ordinance. The Supreme Court has
indicated that in a case involving environmental legisla-
tion it is actual conflict, not potential conflict, that is rele-

* A similar conelusion was reached in the analogous case of
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Erie County, 327 N.Y.S8.2d 488, 491 (Sup.
C(t, 1971):

The primary burden which is placed upon the petitioner
Colgate involves nothing more than the changing of produc-
tion facilities at the point of origin, There is no interference
mandated by the County Law with transit across the state
lines, ...

Bitte enerencensmenenmnmnnen

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vant.* Moreover, once again the plaintiffs have drawn
the main support for their argument from the cases in-
volving interstate carriers. The importance of uniformity
‘3 not as great in the present type of case in terms of
interstate commerce. As Judge Stevens of this circuit
has stated:

[Wle think it certainly is true where you have a
carrier who necessarily goes from state to state carry-
ing the goods of third parties there is a higher inter-
est in uniformity throughout the nation, but with
respect to a commercial enterprise such as a manu-
facturer of detergents there is not the same national
interest in uniformity throughout the country.”

No burden has been shown based on this theory.

Another argument presented by plaintiffs is that the
ordinance burdens interstate commerce because it amounts
to an embargo on a safe, useful, and unique product of
commerce without any corresponding local benefit. We
find no merit to this argument. In essence, it is not a
Commerce Clause argument but one based on substantive
due process, an issue not before us. The only Commerce
Clause cases cited for this proposition involve situations
in which a state has attempted to achieve a local purpose
by discriminating against out-of-state producers or manu-
facturers.” There is no discrimination in this case. The
ordinance does not require that detergents be manufac-
tured in Chicago or Illinois and does not benefit manu-
facturers who are located there.

1° Turon Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448
(1960).

*® Soap and Detergent Ass’n v. Offutt, 3 ERC 1117, 1119 (S.D.
Ind. 1971).

17 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) ; Minnesota v. Barber,
136 U.S. 313 (1890).

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There is one theory of plaintiffs, however, in which we
find some merit. This ordinance does have an extraterri-
torial effect because of the four-state warehouse market-
ing system employed by the major wholesale purchasers
of detergents. Since a substantial number of the retail
grocery stores within a 150 mile radius of Chicago are
supplied from seventeen grocery warehouses in or near
Chicago, the refusal of these warehouses to ‘‘double slot?’
detergents means that many people outside Chicago can-
not buy phosphate detergents even though they wish to
use them. Potential purchasers in other states are pre-
vented from obtaining a detergent formula that manu-
facturers may legally sell in those states. Though the ordi-
nance may not directly dictate such a result, one effect
is that the free flow in commerce of a particular product
is disrupted. Such a disruption must be deemed a burden
on interstate commerce.

Still, there is the question of how substantial is this
burden. It is important to realize that this burden is one
that was not intended by the City Council, even though
that factor is not determinative. The effect is an incidental
one due to the nature of the grocery warehouse system
over which the City Council has no control.

Moreover, all the potential purchasers of phosphate
detergents in this area outside Chicago are not affected
by the ordinance. Other jurisdictions in the Chicago mar-
keting zone also have limitations on phosphate detergents.
Purchasers in these areas are restricted by their own
local legislation. And in the areas without such legislation
phosphate detergents assumedly will be available at those
stores which are not part of these chains. Two of the
seventeen chains chose to carry phosphate formula deter-
gents, so such products will also be available at those
stores. While there might be people who cannot buy phos-
phate detergents in their own towns, the foregoing factors
tend to lessen the burden. Indeed, there is the possibility

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that manufacturers might be able to ‘‘drop-ship”’ directly
from the plant to stores in some areas. Although this
might not be the customary or most economical procedure,
Procter and Gamble distributes its products in this man-
ner for about one percent of its total business.

We are troubled by the contention that these large ware-
houses absolutely refuse to stock two formulas of the
same detergent. Procter and Gamble and the other two
large detergent manufacturers are huge companies that
could exert at least some ‘‘leverage’’ on these warehouses.
Admittedly, there is testimony that Procter and Gamble
has tried to convince them to handle both and has had
very limited success. But we wonder whether such lever-
age would not increase when this lawsuit is not a con-
sideration. One would think that the grocery chains would
have an incentive to carry both types of detergents in
order to compete with those stores selling what Procter
and Gamble claims is the ‘‘superior’’ detergent formula.

We are not totally persuaded by the grocery chains’
explanation of why only one type of detergent can be
stocked. The major reason presented is lack of space.
But it would seem that the total number of boxes of de-
tergents sold would be about the same whether two formu-
lations or only one are offered. The aggregate supply of
cartons kept in the warehouse would not increase unless
it is necessary to maintain the same amount of product
in stock even though less of it is being sold. It is not
clear from the record why more actual space in the ware-
house would be necessary if the same number of cartons
is separated into two types rather than one. Possibly,
the explanation is due to the limited availability of ware-
house slots which, in at least some warehouses, are metal
racks. But again the record does not show why the slots
that are used for detergents cannot be split into two
smaller slots that could accommodate the stock necessary
for each type of detergent, assuming the total number of
boxes in stock has not changed.

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Nor can we unquestionably accept the contention that
carrying both types of detergents would result in a great
risk of accidental shipments to and sale of phosphate
detergents by stores within Chicago in violation of the
ordinance. If this were the only concern we are sure that
some procedure could be arranged to minimize this possi-
bility. For instance, the cartons that contain boxes of
phosphate could be made a different color so they would
be easily distinguishable. Certainiy under such a proce-
dure the employees of the individual stores could recog-
nize a mistake and not sell the illegal detergent.

We recognize that the Chicago ordinance combined with
the grocery warehousing practice can result in interfering
with the full distribution of phosphate detergents to areas
outside of Chicago. But many of these consumers would
probably have access to such products either at other
stores or at chain stores that might receive drop-shipments.
Our analysis has indicated that if there was sufficient
demand it might even be possible that all the large ware-
houses would carry phosphate detergents. Overall, we con-
clude that the ordinance’s effect on full access to certain
products by consumers in parts of other states can only
be classified as a slight burden on interstate commerce.

II

Having determined that the ordinance does impose some
burden on interstate commerce, we are required to con-
sider whether the interest sought to be served by the
legislation is a legitimate local concern. As with most
cases of this type, the goal of this legislation can be stated
in its ultimate terms—protection of health and welfare.
For purposes of our analysis, we believe that it would
be more useful to express the objective simply as the pre-
vention and elimination of nuisance algae. This is an en-
vironmental objective toward which local legislation may
probably be aimed. In broad terms this legislation is part

A-16

of the overall attack on the problem of water pollution.
Though there is federal intervention in this general area,
this does not prevent local attempts to deal with one
of our most immediate and difficult problems." As the
Supreme Court has said in regard to a city’s power to
enact legislation designed to curb pollution:

In the exercise of that power, the states and their
instrumentalities may act, in many areas of inter-
state commerce and maritime activities, concurrently
with the federal government.”

Indeed, Congress appears to have specifically encouraged
such local legislation.” The Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Amendments of 1972 provide:

Except as expressly provided in this chapter, noth-
ing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the
right of any State or political subdivision thereof or
interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any stand-
ard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants,
or (B) any requirements respecting control or abate-
ment of pollution.”

Moreover, as noted earlier, there are no discriminatory
aspects associated with this purpose that might invalidate
it. The objective is legitimately local and non-discrimina-
tory which means that it may properly be the end toward
which local legislation is addressed.

Finally, we see no problem in the fact that the ordi-
nance is aimed, at least in part, toward nuisance algae

18 There is no contention in this case that this particular area of
legislation has been preempted by Congressional action.

1° Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442
(1960).

2°The relevance of such Congressional encouragement has been
recognized in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 367-68 (1943).

21 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. II, 1973).

A-17

downstream from Chicago. We agree with the conclusion
of the district court that the City can be legitimately
concerned with preventing any damage to its neighbors
caused by Chicago’s actions.

IV

We are now at the stage where we must determine
whether the ordinance is a reasonable means of reaching
the end desired. We have previously concluded that the
burden on interstate commerce that results from this ordi-
nance is slight and the objective of this legislation is
legitimate. We hold that the burden is so slight compared
to the important and properly local objective that the
presumption we discussed earlier should apply. We will
accept the City Council’s determination that this phos-
phate ban is a reasonable means of achieving the elimi-
nation and prevention of nuisance algae unless we find
that the plaintiffs have presented clear and convincing
proof to the contrary.”

We discuss first the Illinois Waterway because this is
the heart of the factual controversy. An initial consider-
ation is whether there is presently a nuisance algae prob-
lem in the Illinois River. The City did introduce some
testimony and photographs indicating the existence of
excessive algae blooms in the Illinois River. But the plain-
tiffs presented credible evidence to the effect that pres-
ently there is no nuisance algae growth in the Waterway.
The district court concluded that there was no ** signifi-
cant’’ growth. We can at least assume that there is some

*2 We note that even if it is a relevant consideration at this point,
there is not a reasonable and less burdensome alternative way to
eliminate phosphates from the sewage effluent. Elimination of phos-
phates by means of sewage treatment is too costly and requires too
great a waste of chemicals to be deemed a constitutionally mandated
alternative. See generally Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951).

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nuisance algae and the possibility of more in the future,
since there was no convincing proof that such an increase
will not occur. The testimony that the excessive turbidity
and flushing quality of the river prevent algae blooms is
far from conclusive. Indeed there are apparently some
nuisance algae at present. The inhibitory factor might be
a nutrient other than phosphorous that will greatly in-
crease in concentration. The prospect for the future is
unknown.

The crux of the matter is actually the question of
whether the phosphorous level in the Waterway will ever
be relevant to the control or removal of nuisance algae.
We do not believe that the plaintiffs have met their burden
of showing convincingly that limiting the quantity of phos-
phorous can never be the key to the problem. Admittedly,
the evidence seems clear that phosphorous is not the
‘‘limiting factor’’ in the Waterway at this time. Moreover,
even with the elimination of detergent phosphates from
the Chicago sewage effluent, the phosphorous level would
not reach the limiting point. The Chicago ordinance, by
itself, would have no immediate effect on the Waterway.
This does not indicate, however, that the ordinance is
not a means of dealing with nuisance algae. The plaintiffs
introduced evidence to show that the amount of phosphor-
ous in the Illinois River could greatly increase without
increasing nuisance algae. Even if this is true, it only
proves that phosphorous is presently not the ‘‘limiting
nutrient.’’ It does not prove that phosphorous might not
be the ‘‘limiting nutrient’’ at some point in time. Indeed,
Chicago’s ordinance appears to be a significant first step
toward that goal. We do not agree with the district court
that it can only be enacted on a stand-by basis. If this
were the law, all programs aimed at eliminating phosphor-
ous from the Waterway would have to be enacted at the
same time. We can assume that other communities might
follow Chicago’s lead and prevent phosphate detergents.
Nor do we think that there was clear evidence that if all

A-19

phosphorous from detergents were eliminated there would
still be other uncontrollable sources that would keep the
level above the limiting point. There was testimony that
indicated that agricultural run-off of phosphorous can be
controlled. For Commerce Clause purposes the City Coun-
cil was justified in believing that eventually its phosphate
ban, in conjunction with other actions, would result in
eliminating and preventing nuisance algae in the Illinois
Waterway.

The effectiveness of the legislation is also shown, to
some extent, by the evidence concerning Lake Michigan.”
There is. no question that both eutrophication and phos-
phorous are serious problems in regard to Lake Michigan.
Though Chicago might contribute relatively little phos-
phorous to the lake, the phosphorous level is at such a
precarious point that even this minimal amount takes on
added importance. Further, contrary to the district courts
view, we find that Chicago has a legitimate interest in
banning phosphate detergents as an example for other
communities presently releasing their sewage into Lake
Michigan. Chicago is attempting to convince these com:
munities to control their phosphate discharge into the lake.
Chicago could reasonably decide that t would be aided in
this endeavor if it could show these other jurisdictions
that Chicago is willing to endure whatever hardships may
be associated with the loss of phosphate detergents. Given
the other aspects of the legislation that support its pre-
sumption of effectiveness, we need not reach the question
of whether this hortatory element by itself could support

* The City has argued in its brief that the ordinance also helps
Lake Michigan because it has the result of preventing other areas
from receiving phosphate detergents too, and thus these areas are
forced to control their discharge of phosphorous into the Lake. We
totally reject the contention that the effectiveness of the ordinance
ean be supported on the basis of this extraterritorial coercion. We
do not believe that the City Council considered this possibility and
we in no way rest our decision on this argument.

A-20

the conclusion that the ordinance provides a means suffi-
ciently effective to be declared constitutional. Based on all
the evidence the presumption afforded the City Council’s
judgment has not been overcome.

This case has presented a very difficult iilibleiiSiitas
problem. On the basis of the above analysis we have re-
solved the question in favor of the constitutionality of the
ordinance. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court
is reversed. .

B-1
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DISTRICT

Tue Soar ann Derercent Association, THe Procrer anp
GamsLe Company, FMC Corporation, Monsanto
Company, and Amway ‘Corporation, Plaintiff s,,

v.

| Tue Crry or Curcago, Defendant.

DECISION and ORDER

This case came on for trial on a declaratory action
brought by an association and four of its members en-
gaged in manufacturing detergents and phosphates. Plain-
tiffs seek to set aside an ordinance of the City of Chicago
which since June 30, 1972 has made it a criminal offense
to sell detergents containing phosphorus within the City.
Phosphorus is the element from which phosphates are
made and phosphates are a principal ingredient of most
detergents. Hence detergent products sold in Chicago must
now be made with substitutes for phosphates.

Plaintiffs Soap and Detergent Association, Monsanto
Company and Amway Corporation have failed to prove
the jurisdictional amount required by 28 U.S.C. § 1351,
and their complaints will be dismissed. The remaining
plaintiffs, The Procter and Gamble Company, a detergent
manufacturer, and FMC Corporation, a phosphate manu-
facturer, have proved that well in excess of $10,000 is
involved in their cases, and diversity is not contested.

/

B-2

The ordinance in question was adopted by the City
Council on October 14, 1970 upon the recommendation of
its Committee on Environmental Control which had held
public hearings on the matter for three days. The Com-
mittee did not make a written report and the City Council
made no findings or declarations of policy; so the specific
bases for the ordinance became known only in the course
of this litigation. The court ruled at the close of the plain-
tiffs’ case that ii had produced sufficient evidence to re-
quire the City to justify the ordinance.

We now find and conclude thgt the City failed to sustain
this burden, under the particular facts and circumstances
of this case, and that the two remaining plaintiffs are en-
titled to the declaratory and injunctive relief prayed for.
The evidence is largely technical and too voluminous to
_ summarize in detail, but the court finds the following con-
trolling facts have been proved.

' The ordinance provides in pertinent part as follows:

§17-7.3(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm,
or corporation to sell, offer or expose for sale, give
or furnish any synthetic detergent or detergent con-
taining any phosphorus, expressed as elemental phos-
phorus, including synthetic detergents or detergents
manufactured for machine dishwashers, dairy equip-
ment, beverage equipment, food processing equipment
and industrial cleaning equipment,, within the City
of Chicago from and after June 30, 1972.

§17-7.4 Penalties. Any person found guilty of vio-
lating, disobeying, omitting, neglecting, or refusing
to comply with, or resisting or opposing the enforce-
ment of any of the provisions of ‘this Article VII, ...
‘upon conviction thereof’ shall be punished by a fine
of not less than one hundred dollars ($100.) nor more
than $300.00 for the first offense, and not less than
$300.00 nor more than $500.00 for the second and each
subsequent offense, in any 180-day period, or shall be
punishable as a misdemeanor by incarceration in the
county jail for a term not to exceed six months under
procedures set forth in Section 1-2-1.1 of the Illinois

/

B-3

Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. nn ggy
as amended, or by both fine and imprisonment.

separate and distinct offense shall be regarded ag
committed each day on which such person shall con-
tinue or permit any such violation, or failure to com-
ply is permitted to exist after notification thereof.

Similar ordinances have been adopted by various juris-
dictions, state and local, in widely separated areas of the
United States. As of September 1972, four small munici-
palities neighboring Chicago, and-also the unincorporated
area of Lake County, Illinois prohibit the sale of deter-
gents containing any phosphorous. Other neighboring
jurisdictions, including the states of Indiana and Michi-
gan, limit the phosphorus content to 8.7 %o. Several mu-
nicipalities have repealed or delayed the effective date of
their ordinances, and most of the other municipalities sur-
rounding Chicago have no restrictions on the sale or use
of phosphate detergents.

Nationwide, a patchwork pattern of ordinances and laws
has grown up over the past three years ranging from com-
plete prohibition of phosphate detergents in Dade County,
Florida, Erie County (Buffalo), New York, and two addi-
tional states outside of the Mid-West, an 8.7% limitation
in many other localities, and no controls elsewhere. These
laws and ordinances have become too numerous and diverse
to summarize beyond the date of the stipulation of the
parties dated September 26, 1972. The task of complying
with and contesting this rash of legislation has required
considerable attention of the industry, one corporate offi-
cial testifying that he spends a day a week on the problem.
Members of the industry or its association have spent
several millions of dollars to develop a substitute for
phosphate in detergents, but none of these efforts have
yet been successful. Consequently, in many areas plaintiffs
have replaced all or most of the phosphorus content of
detergents with soda ash, a less effective and cheaper
component.

B-4

Plaintiffs contend that detergents containing phosphorus
are a useful and harmless product and that the City’s
ordinance unreasonably and unjustifiably interferes with
their normal distribution and sale of these products in
interstate commerce. The original complaints also alleged
unconstitutional discrimination and a violation of the
plaintiffs’ right to due process, among other things, but
on October 30, 1972 they filed a Second Amended Com-
plaint which was limited to an alleged violation of the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States
(Article I, Section 8, Clause 3). Plaintiffs seek a declara-
tion that the ordinance is unconstitutional and to enjoin
its enforcement.

The City contends that the ordinance is justified to pro-
tect the Illinois Waterway into which the Metropolitan
Sanitary District discharges the City’s sewage effluent
and also to protect the City’s water supply which comes
from Lake Michigan. It contends that phosphates unduly
accelerate the natural eutrophication of both of these
bodies of water and would be unreasonably expensive to
remove by sewage treatment. Since detergents contribute
approximately 50% of the phosphates in Chicago’s sewage
effluent, it asserts that it has the power and the right to
prohibit the introduction of this element into the system,
despite any interference that this may have on interstate
commerce. In short the City argues that the benefits result-
ing from the ordinance outweigh any disadvantage to the
plaintiffs or their customers, including housewives and
businesses using detergents. It is worth noting that none
of these groups nor any of the communities which depend
on the two bodies of water have sought to intervene in
this case.

The City does not contend that it has the right to pro-
hibit the sale of safe and useful products within its con-
fines, and plaintiffs do not contend that they have the
right to distribute and sell a product in interstate com-

B-5

merce which damages the public’s water. The principal
issues therefore are whether the ordinance does interfere
with the free flow of interstate commerce and, if so, whether
this is justified by the benefits realized by the ordinance.
The parties have offered their evidence in a commendably
thorough and forthright manner, so that the court has
been greatly assisted in deciding this case on a much
more complete record than was presented to the Commit-
tee on Environmental Control of the Chicago City Council.

There can be no doubt that local governments have the
right to enact laws for the protection of the public, even
to the extent of regulating or excluding certain undesir-
able activities from interstate commerce. For example, the
State of Florida can forbid the interstate shipment of
inedible or immature citrus fruit. in order to protect its
industry’s reputation. Sligh v. Kirkwood, Sheriff of Orange
County, Florida, 237 U.S. 52 (1915). Trucks over a certain
size and weight were held to be properly excluded by one
state in order to protect its highways. South Carolina
Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177
(1939). A smoke ordinance of the City of Detroit was
justified as a health measure even though it burdened
interstate navigation. Huron Portland Cement Company v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). In these and similar
cases the local interests protected by the laws in question
were found to justify the reasonable exercise of local police
powers.

On the other hand, the State of Illinois cannot require
interstate trucks to use specially designed mudguards when
this is not reasonably necessary for the protection of its
citizens. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
Arizona cannot require its melons to be packaged within
the state if this is primarily for the purpose of creating
a local enterprise. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970). And the State of New York, in order to protect
local economic interests, cannot refuse to issue a permit

B-6

for a plant to produce milk in New York to be shipped to
Boston. H. P. Hood é Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
In all of the foregoing cases, the state and local laws were
held to be an impermissible interference with interstate
commerce because they were not shown to be sufficiently
necessary for the health, safety or welfare of the local
citizenry.

Modern-day detergents were developed and patented
after World War II by chemists who discovered that phos-
phates when combined with other materials would clean
better than soap, particularly in hard water. Detergents
contributed to the development of the automatic washing
machines and dishwashers, and the two complementary
lines of products flourished. Detergents soon outstripped
soap in volume and now contribute gross sales exceeding
$2,000,000,000 a year to the economy.

The evidence is clear that a detergent made with phos-
phate is a more effective cleaning agent than non-phosphate
detergents when used with Chicago’s water and is not at
all harmful to the persons using it or wearing clothes or
eating from utensils washed in it. In the form of phos-
phates, phosphorus constituted 12.3% of Procter and
Gamble’s leading detergent, Tide, and up to 25% of some
phosphate detergents, before the ordinance required a
reformulation. Phosphorus is a natural and benign element
appearing to a greater or lesser extent in all living or-
ganisms, including the human body.

Besides establishing beyond question that phosphate de-
tergents are not only safe but also beneficial to the users,
plaintiffs also proved that the prohibition of the sale of
these products in the City of Chicago seriously disrupted
the flow of interstate commerce. The normal distribution
system which developed for detergents is area-wide, not
city-wide. They are manufactured in plants located in
various cities in the Mid-West and then sold to major chain
stores and similar distributors. In the Chicago area these

B-7

purchasers store their products in warehouses and dis-
tribute them when needed to retail stores throughout
Northern Illinois and Indiana, and Southern Wisconsin
and Michigan. The proprietors of these warehouses, who
are customers of the plaintiff manufacturer, have ada-
mantly refused to carry two or three formulations for each
of the 275 varieties of detergents because this would double
or triple the number of ‘slots’? which would be required.
Furthermore they refuse to incur the risk of becoming
exposed to heavy fines by mistakenly delivering detergents
with phosphates to stores in Chicago. The undisputed evi-
dence is that 15 of the 17 major customers of Procter and
Gamble servicing Chicago and environs chose to carry only
non-phosphate detergents after June 30, 1972 and the two
which carry two formulations sell and distribute primarily
outside of the City.

The result is that the plaintiffs’ normal manufacturing
and distribution processes had to be drastically revised
because of the Chicago ordinance, Some of the plants which
had manufactured only one detergent formulation now
must be scheduled to manufacture two; other plants have
been devoted to manufacturing non-phosphate detergents
which had previously manufactured for a much larger area.
This requires obtaining raw materials from different
sources, shutting down the plants more frequently for
cleaning and change-over operations, changing shipping
patterns to accommodate the Chicago market, and many
other uneconomical makeshifts. The plaintiff Procter and
Gamble Company estimates that its shipping costs for raw
materials and finished products have been increased
$2,500,000 a year due to the changed production arrange-
ments required for the Chicago area. It did not sell any
detergents in the Chicago area for five months after
June 30, 1972 because it did not make a satisfactory non-
phosphate detergent, thereby losing approximately $4,-
700,000 in sales. It has completely withdrawn a tablet
detergent from the Chicago market because of inability

BS

to formulate it effectively without phosphate. Plaintiff
FMC Corporation has lost sales of phosphates amounting
to about $500,000 a year to its customers selling in the
Chicago area.

The court does not consider relevant whether it is more
profitable to manufacture the non-phosphate detergents;
the question is whether the plaintiffs have the right to
sell and ship a harmless product in interstate commerce.
The evidence of increased costs of manufacture and dis-
tribution, however, is relevant to show a burden on inter-
state commerce. It then becomes the task of the defendant
City to justify its ordinance by showing at least some
need to protect the public health, safety or welfare. This
need is not measurable in dollars and cents but can be
weighed equitably against the plaintiffs’ right to free trade.
E.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, supra.

The City’s justifications for the ordinance were of an
indirect nature, to the effect that excessive phosphates in
sewage cause undesirable changes in the Illinois Waterway
and in Lake Michigan. All of Chicago’s sewage is collected
and treated by the Metropolitan Sanitary District, an in-
dependent governmental entity. Most of this effluent is
then channelled into the Sanitary and Ship Canal which
enters the Des Plaines River at Lockport and then becomes
the Illinois River. Only a very small amount of phosphates
are removed by the Metropolitan Sanitary District and
none is removed intentionally except at one plant. Another
plant is under construction which will remove phosphate
from effluent discharged into the Fox River and thence
into the Illinois. Phosphates will be removed by that plant
in order to comply with the proposed regulation of the
Illinois Pollution Control Board, but the Metropolitan
Sanitary District has officially opposed any requirement
that it remove phosphates from sewage. Nor is there any
limit set by the Illinois Pollution Control Board on the
amount of phosphate which can be discharged into the
Illinois River.

B-9

Phosphate in water is not itself a pollutant. Some com-
munities add it to water in the purification process for
the purpose of softening. Excessive phosphates in the
sewage effluent, however, can cause nuisance algae to
flourish, resulting in a deterioration of the fish species,
an unpleasant odor from decaying algae, and a bad taste
in the water when used for drinking. The long-range effect
of nuisance algae is to accelerate natural eutrophication
and, by over-abundance; to ultimately destroy the value
of a body of water. This has happened in parts of Lake
Erie.

The weight of the evidence showed that there was no
significant amount of nuisance algae in the Illinois River
before the ordinance was passed and consequently that
the ordinance was not required for this objective. Neither
the State of Illinois nor the Federal government nor any
municipality or person along these rivers requested this
ordinance or testified in its support before the City Coun-
cil’s Committee or in this court. In fact scientists of the
State of Illinois and Missouri testified in the case at bar
that nuisance algae was no problem in the Illinois and
Mississippi Rivers, and no evidence was offered of algae
in the waterways above the Illinois River.

The reason for the lack of nuisance algae in the Illinois
and Mississippi Rivers is apparently attributable to such
causes as excessive turbidity, the periodic flushing of the
river by high water, and the presence of some undefined
trace elements which inhibit the growth of algae. More
to the point, however, is the fact that the Illinois and
Mississippi Rivers are so overloaded with phosphates that
the removal of phosphates from detergents can have no
effect on their plant or fish life. These rivers carry a
higher percentage of phosphates than any other river in
the United States, contributed by leaves and other natural
sources, agricultural fertilizers, industrial effluent, human
wastes and detergents. As a result the Illinois River at

B-10

Peoria contains at least 25 times as much phosphate as is
necessary to sustain nuisance algae, of which the Chicago
detergents contributed approximately 25%. The maximum
or ‘‘limiting’’ amount of phosphate which nuisance algae
can use is about .02 milligrams per liter; any amount above
this is surplus, having no effect on the growth of algae.

According to intensive samplings made by the Illinois
State Water Survey, the Illinois River at Peoria before
the Chicago ordinance became effective contained a mini-
mum of .5 milligrams of phosphate per liter and averaged
1.5 milligrams. After the ordinance went into effect, the
lowest phosphate count was .025 milligrams per liter and
the average was .5, still far above the limiting factor for
nuisance algae. Although these measurements were taken
some miles downstream from Lockport, the witness ex-
pressed the scientific opinion that 75 to 80% of Chicago’s
phosphates continue in the stream down to Peoria and
that the loss is more than regained by contributions added
by industry, sewage and other factors below Lockport.
Nonetheless he testified that there was no nuisance algae
in the Illinois River and that phosphates did not damage
or threaten its water. Even the defendant’s witnesses ad-
mitted that phosphates are not a limiting factor for nui-
sance algae at any place down to and including the Gulf
of Mexico, before or after the ordinance.

After the ordinance had been in effect for four months,
one of the plaintiffs’ witnesses took a quantity of water
from the Illinois River at two spots downstream from
Lockport and grew algae in it under laboratory conditions.
He found that the re-introduction of phosphates had no
discernible effect on the growth of algae in this particular
water but that the addition of nitrogen did. He concluded
that the elimination of phosphates from detergents had had
no effect on the growth of algae and was not justified for
this objective.

B-11

By the time of trial, the Chicago ordinance had been in
effect for almost six months, and an earlier provision of
the ordinance, reducing phosphorus in many detergents to
8.7%, had been in effect since February 1, 1971. The plain-

February 1, 1971, but it offered no evidence of anv change

nance had no effect.

The City of Chicago introduced a series of aerial photo-
graphs into evidence which purported to show algae growth

River where tributaries containing nuisance algae flowed
into the Illinois. The photographs therefore were not of
sufficient weight to establish a justification for the ordi-
nance.

the obligation, to prevent its activities from damaging its
neighbors. Cf. Sligh v. Kirkwood, Sheriff of Orange County,

Florida, 237 U.S. 52 at p. 60 (1915). Just as Chicago is
not privileged to dump raw sewage into the Illinois River,
so likewise it cannot lawfully dump other pollutants into

B-12

the waterways or air. This is not a jurisdictional problem,
it is a question of controlling nuisances, and the City un-
doubtedly has the power to do this.

On the other hand, the City cannot interfere with inter-
state commerce merely for hortatory purposes, to influence
other cities to refrain from discharging phosphates into
Lake Michigan. The concentration of phosphates in the
Lake is far lower than in the Illinois River, approximately
at the limiting amount of .02 milligrams per liter, and the
danger of nuisance algae is therefore much more real. The
Lake does not have the turbidity or flushiug antidotes
found in the rivers, and the excessive discharge of phos-
phates into the Lake can actually cause the bad results
which the City contends have occurred in the Illinois
Waterway.

The City has not shown that any appreciable amount of
sewage from Chicago gets into Lake Michigan, however.
The only places where Chicago sewage is known to enter
the Lake on occasion is from the Chicago River and the
Calumet River. Both of these rivers now flow away from
the Lake, and their reversal into the Lake is controlled by
locks. During excessively heavy rainstorms these two
rivers can be allowed to flow into the Lake as a safety
valve to relieve over-loading of the Metropolitan Sanitary
District facilities. However, this has only occurred from
the Chicago River on two occasions in the last ten years
and on two other occasions from the Calumet River during
the same decade. The amount of discharge into the Lake
is not accurately measured, but it has been relatively min-
imal, usually much less than 200,000,000 cubic feet on each
oceasion. The back-flow contains only about 45% of raw
sewage and a proportionately smaller amount of phos-
phate. The amount of phosphate actually discharged into
the Lake by these occasional back-flows is not contained
in any measurements made by the City or by the Metro-
politan Sanitary District, but we conclude from the evi-

B-13

dence that in the years of serious back-flows, detergents
contribute not more than 250 tons of the 15,000,000 pounds
of phosphates dumped into the Lake each year, approxi-
mately 3%. Thus this secondary justification for the or-
dinance is found to be insufficient.

We believe that the Chicago detergent ordinance was
enacted in good faith and for laudatory objectives, and
that a legislative enactment should not be interfered with
by the courts unless clearly required. Nevertheless we find
and conclude that Section 17-7.3(b) of the Chicago ordi-
nance, prohibiting the sale of detergents containing any
phosphorus, constitutes an unjustified interference with
interstate commerce and therefore violates Article I, See-
tion 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution. This
does not necessarily mean that similar ordinances in other
jurisdictions cannot be sustained, where the effects of dis-
charging phosphates into the public water supply may
outweigh the interference with interstate commerce. It is
also possible that area-wide legislation or regulation may
reduce the phosphate contributions into the Illinois Water-
way to a ievel where detergents should be controlled simi-
larly with other sources of phosphates, but this is not con-
templated even under the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act until July 1, 1977 at the earliest. (P.L. 92-500,
Section 301(b)). Until plenary jurisdictions take action to
control all phosphates down to the limiting level so that
phosphates from detergents then might have some effect
on the Illinois Waterway, the City of Chicago should adopt
no more than a stand-by ordinance, to become effective
if and when this level is approached,

If Section 17-7.3(b) of the Municipal Code prohibiting
the sale of detergents containing any phosphorus is strick-
en, then Section 17-7.3(a) which limits sales of detergents
to those containing less than 8.7% phosphorus would
remain, theoretically. However, it is apparent that even
this lesser restriction has insufficient legal justification and

B-14

would have substantially the same effect on interstate
commerce as does the total ban. Furthermore the intent
of the City Council seems to have been to supersede the
8.7% requirement by the total ban, thus terminating the
former requirement by June 30, 1972. Thus Section 17-
7.3(a) also fails, both as a matter of statutory construction
and as a matter of constitutional law, and with these two
sections void, the entire ordinance, including the labelling °
and enforcement provisions, are of no effect.

The court reserved ruling on some of the documents
offered during trial and in depositions. The objections to
plaintiffs’ exhibits 13 and 14 are sustained. The objections
to defendant’s exhibits 6, 39, 42, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55
are sustained. The objections to defendant’s exhibits 26,
27, 28 and 29 are overruled. 28 U.S.C. § 1733.

Plaintiffs are ordered to submit a final judgment order,
agreed to in form, in accordance with the foregoing find-
ings and conclusions to be presented in open court on
March 9, 1973 at 10 a.m. At that time the parties may
bring up any other matters which they consider necessary
for the final disposition of this case.

C-1

APPENDIX C

STATUTES INVOLVED |
City of Chicago Gude 17-7.1—7.4 (1973)

Section 17-7.1. Definitions. (a) The term ‘*synthetic de-
tergent’’ or “‘detergent’’ means any cleaning compound
which is available for household use, laundry use, other
personal uses or industrial use, which is composed of or-
ganic and inorganic compounds, including soaps, water
softeners, surface active agents, dispersing agents, foam-
ing agents, buffering agents, builders, fillers, dyes, en-
zymes and fabric softeners, whether in the form of crystals,
powders, flakes, bars, liquids, sprays, or any other form.

(b) The term ‘polyphosphate builder’? or « phos-
‘phorus’ means a water softening and soil suspending agent
made from condensed phosphates, including pyrophos-
phates, triphosphates, tripolyphosphates, metaphosphates
and glassy phosphates, used as a detergent ingredient, but
shall not include “‘polyphosphate builders’’ or ‘*phos-
phorus’’ which is essential for medical, scientific or special
engineering use under such conditions and regulations as
may be prescribed, after hearing, by the Commissioner of
Environmental Control.

(c) The term “‘recommended use level?’ means the
amount of synthetic detergent or detérgent which the man-
ufacturer thereof recommends for use per wash load, at
which level said synthetic detergent or detergent will ef-
fectively perform its intended function.

(d) The term ‘‘machine dishwasher’’ means equipment
manufactured for the purpose of cleaning dishes, glass-
ware and other utensils involved in food preparation, con-
sumption or use, using a combination of water agitation
and high temperatures,

(e) The terms ‘dairy equipment,’’ “beverage equip-
ment’’ and ‘‘food processing equipment’? mean that equip-

C2

ment used in the production of milk and dairy products,
foods and beverages, including the processing, prepara-
tion or packaging thereof for consumption.

_ (f) The term ‘¢industrial cleaning equipment’’ means
machinery and cther tools used in cleaning processes dur-
ing the course’ of industrial manufacturing, production and
assembly.

Section 17-7.2. Labeling. It shall be unlawful for any
person, firm or corporation to sell, offer or expose for sale,
give’ or furnish any synthetic detergent or detergent,
whether in the form of crystals, powders, flakes, bars,
liquid, sprays, or any other form, in the City of Chicago
from and after February 1, 1971, unless the container,
wrapper or other packaging thereof shall be clearly labeled
with respect to its polyphosphate builder or phosphorus
ingredient content clearly and legibly set forth thereon in
terms of percentage of phosphorus by weight, expressed
as elemental phosphorus per container, wrapper or other
packaging thereof, as well as grams of phosphorus, ex-
pressed as elemental phosphorus, per recommended use
level.

Section 17-7.3. Limitations. (a) It shall be unlawful for
any person, firm or corporation to sell, offer or expose for
sale, give or furnish any synthetic detergent or detergent
containing more than eight and seven/tenths percent
(8.7%) of phosphorus by weight, expressed as elemental
phosphorus, within the City of Chicago from and after
February 1, 1971. It shall also be unlawful for any person,
: firm ‘or corporation to sell, offer or expose for sale, give or
furnish any synthetic detergent or detergent which requires
a recommended use level of said synthetic detergent or de-
tergent which contains more than seven grams (7 gms.) of
phosphoras by weight éxpressed as elemental phosphorus,
within the City of Chicago from and after February 1,
1971. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this

C-3

Section 17-7.3(a), synthetic detergents or detergents man-
ufactured for use in machine dishwashers, dairy equip-
ment, beverage equipment, food processing equipment and
industrial cleaning equipment shall not be subject to the
limitations herein set forth, but are hereby made expressly
subject to the provisions of Section 17-7.3(b).

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corpo-
ration to sell, offer or expose for sale, give or furnish any
synthetic detergent or detergent containing any phos-
phorus, expressed as elemental phosphorus, including syn-
thetic detergents or ietergents manufactured for machine
dishwashers, dairy equipment, beverage equipment, food
processing equipment and industrial cleaning equipment,
within the City of Chicago from and after June 30, 1972.

(c) The concentration of phosphorus by weight, ex-
pressed as elemental phosphorus in any synthetic deter-
gent or detergent shall be determined by the current ap-
plicable method prescribed by the American Society for
Testing and Materials (A.S.T.M.).

Section 17-7.4. Penalties. Any person found guilty of
violating, disobeying, omitting, neglecting, or refusing to
comply with, or resisting or opposing the enforcement of
any of the provisions of this Article VII, except when
otherwise specifically provided, upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
dollars ($100.) nor more than $300.00 for the first offense,
and not less than $300.00 nor more than $500.00 for the
second and each subsequent offense, in any 180-day period,
or shall be punishable as a misdemeanor by incarceration
in the county jail for a term not to exceed six months
under procedures set forth in Section 1-2-1.1 of the Illinois
Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 1-2-1.1)
as amended, or by both fine and imprisonment. A separate
and distinct offense shall be regarded as committed each
day on which such person shall continue or permit any

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such violation, or failure to comply is permitted to exist
after notification thereof.
Article L section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States.
Section 8. The Congress shall have Power

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_0851%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
