# Brief for the United States — Breen v. United States (Nos. 74-1085, 74-11143)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the United States
- **Published:** January 1, 1974

## Text

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CITATIONS
Cases:

Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687------

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149_-.---.----
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60_---- Bow
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391-----

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222... -. -. -... 12,13

Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477... -- -- -- -- --
Lutwa’: v. United States, 344 U.S. 604-_- -- --
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759--- - - --
Oregon v. Hass, No. 73-1452, decided March 19,
SR a sinus wheaed wb ae ah Riles deb enn bowen
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343_-- -- --
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203_--- -- --
United States v. DeCoster, 487 F. 2d 1197--_- -
United States v. Fanning, 477 ¥. 2d 465,
certiorari denied, 414 U.S. 1006__--- -. -- --
United States v. Fench, 470 F. 2h 1234,
certiorari denied sub. nom. Blackwell v.
United States, 410 U.S. 909.---.-.-------
United States v. Gant, 487 I’. 2d 30, certiorari
a: A el en ka neers)
United States v. Geaney, 417 F. 2d 1116,
certiorari denied sub nom. Lynch v. United
A Be. Bae Se nk oie dccscenends

(1)
575-667—75-——1

18
15
15

12
19
19
14

19

13

13

bee

Cases—Continued Page
United States v. Gonzalez, 491 F. 2d 1202----- 13
United States v. Grant, 489 F, 2d 27. -. -- -- -- 14
United States v. Graves, 428 F. 2d 196 certiorari

denied, 400 U.S. 960. .... .. -- -- -------- 19
United States v. Insana, 423 F. 2d 11665, -

certiorari denied, 400 U.S. 841--.-- -- -- -- -- 10
United States v. Miramon, 470 F. 2d 1362,

certiorari denied, 411 U.S. 934.-.-------- 14

United States v. Perez, 491 F. 2d 167, certiorari
denied sub nom. Lombera v. United States,
October 15, 1974 (No. 73-6784) - --------- 12-13

United States v. Polizzi, 500 F. 2d 856, certi-
orari denied, January 20, 1975 (No. 74-

OBB) .....222-22-2--220----------------- 16
United States v. Robinson, 502 F’. 2d 894-.. -. -- 14
United States v. Santana, 503 F. 2d 710, certi-

orari denied, December 9, 1974 (No. 74-

$311) ERT Ei 15, 16
United States v. Thornton, 498 F. 2d 749... -- 16, 17
United States ex rel. Walker v. Henderson, 492

F. 2d 1311, certiorari denied, 417 U.S. 972_. 14
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62_------- 12,13

Statutes and rule:

21 U.S.C. (1964 ed.) 173... .. -- -- -- -. -- -: -- 3

oo WAC. (1006 of.) 174... .. .. -. .. -. -.---- 3

. Oa) od) eee 3

1 U.BC. B4l(a)(1). .- -- -- -- -- --+- -- -+ --+- 3

21 U.S.C. eS re igen eben 3

21 U.S.C. 951(a)(1)- - ake ne iu token ee 3

21 U.S.C. 952. . case 3

Rule 801(d)(1), ‘Federal Rules ‘of “Evidence
(effective date, July 1, 1975).......-...-- 10

Miscellaneous:

III Wigmore, Evidence, § 841(2), pp. 489-493

(Chadbourn rev.) - -------------- -- ------ 18

Gu the Supreme Court of the Cnited States

OctoBER TERM, 1974

No. 74-1085
THomMas MATTEO, PETITIONER

v.
UNITED STaTES OF AMERICA

No. 74-1143
JOHN INDIVIGLIO, PETITIONER

Vv.
Unitep STaTES OF AMERICA

No. 74-6161
FRANK BREEN, PETITIONER

Vv.
UnITEeD STATES OF AMERICA

ON PRTITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The court of appeals affirmed without opinion.
(1)

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2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (No. 74-1085,
Pet. App., pp. 36-37) was entered on February 11,
1975. The petitions for writs of certiorari in Nos. 74-
1085 and 74-1143 were filed on February 28, 1975, and
the petition in 74-6161 was filed on March 10, 1975.’
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioner in No. 74-1085 presents the following
questions:

1. Whether the grand jury testimony of a recalei-
trant government witness was properly ‘admitted for
impeachment purposes.

9. Whether a testifying defendant’s out-of-court
admission, made while in custody in the absence of
Miranda warnings, was properly used for impeach-
ment purposes upon cross-examination.

3 Whether the government’s rebuttal evidence
against petitioner Matteo was properly admitted.

4. Whether petitioner Matteo was denied the
effective assistance of counsel.

Petitioners in Nos. 74-1143 and 74-6161 present the
following questions: |

5, Whether there was sufficient evidence of partici-
pation in the conspiracy by petitioners Indiviglio and
Breen.

1 The petition in No, 74-1143 was originally filed in typescript
on February 28, 1975, and it was returned to counsel on that

date. Printed copies were filed on March -10, 1975, and the case
was then docketed as of the earlier date.

3

6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
rereading the government’s final argument to the jury.

Petitioner in No. 74-6161 additionally presents the
following questions:

7. Whether an out-of-court admission, made by peti-
tioner Breen while intoxicated, was admissible in
evidence.

8. Whether certain grand jury testimony and other
sealed reports should have been furnished to petitioner
Breen.

STATEMENT

Following two separate jury trials in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, petitioners were convicted of conspiring to im-
port and distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
(1964 ed.) 173 and 174 (for transactions occurring
prior to May 1, 1971), and 21 U.S.C. 812, 841(a) (1),
841(b)(1)(A), 951(a) (1), and 952 (for transactions
occurring after May 1, 1971).’ Petitioners received the
following sentences: Matteo, ten years’ imprisonment
and a special parole term of five years; Indiviglio,
twelve years’ imprisonment and a special parole term
of five years; Breen, seven and one-half years’ impris-
onment and a special parole term of five years.

2 Petitioners were charged in a single-count indictment with
conspiring with unindicted co-conspirators Frank Aguiar and
James McCormack. Petitioner Indiviglio’s case was severed prior
to the first trial. Petitioner Breen’s case was severed during
the first trial. Accordingly, petitioner Matteo was tried alone and
convicted on June 14, 1974. Subsequently, petitioners Indiviglio
and Breen were tried together and convicted on August 16,
1974.

4

Briefly . summarized, the overlapping evidence
adduced at the two trials revealed the existence of a
conspiracy pursuant to which large quantities of
heroin were imported from France and distributed to
buyers in the United States. Although membership in
the conspiracy changed from time to time, the core
membership and the purpose of the conspiracy
remained intact. Petitioner Indiviglio’s role in the
conspiracy was that of the main importer of heroin
from French sources; petitioners Matteo and Breen
functioned as major distributors of heroin within the
United States.

A. THE TRIAL OF PETITIONER MATTEO

In the summer of 1968, Frank Aguiar, the govern-
ment’s principal witness, was in the business of selling
heroin. His source of supply was Tyler Somas.
Unhappy with the quality of heroin that he was
receiving, Aguiar met with Somas and petitioner
Matteo. At that time, Matteo promised Aguiar that he
would receive better heroin in the future. Thereafter,
Aguiar continued to receive small amounts of heroin
from Somas (Tr. I, 134-137).°

In the fall of 1969, Aguiar again met with petitioner
Matteo, who was accompanied by petitioner Breen.
Matteo asked Aguiar how much money he had made
from his narcotics dealings since their first mecting.
Aguiar stated that he had made approximately $67,000.

2“Tp, I” refers to the transcript of petitioner Matteo’s trial ;

“Tr, II” refers to the transcript of the trial of petitioners
Indiviglio and Breen.

5

Matteo was puzzled at this response because he had
received only $2,000 from Somas. Matteo said that he
would get to the bottom of the matter of payments
and also indicated that thereafter Aguiar would be
dealing directly with him and Breen (Tr. I, 141-143).
In November 1969, petitioners Matteo and Breen went
to Aguiar’s apartment and asked to borrow $16,000
in order to finance a heroin business dealing in larger
quantities. They offered Aguiar a partnership in
exchange for a loan. Aguiar stated, however, that he
would lend the money only if they agreed to furnish
him with uncut heroin at cost (Tr. I, 147-150, 353-
354). A few days later, Aguiar gave $16,000 to Matteo
and Breen (Tr. I, 150).

Several days later, Matteo and Breen brought a
kilogram of heroin to Aguiar’s apartment, where it
was divided into eight packages. Thereafter, Matteo
and Breen took the heroin and left (Tr. I, 150-151,
355-356). A few days later, Breen returned to
Aguiar’s apartment and asked Aguiar to store the
packages of heroin. Subsequently, either Matteo or
Breen picked up the heroin (Tr. I, 152-154).

Throughout 1970, Aguiar purchased progressively
larger quantities of heroin from Matteo; in the latter
part of the year, he was purchasing three kilograms
at a time (Tr. I, 158-159). Between November 1970
and January 1971, Aguiar and Matteo conducted their
heroin dealings as partners; they earned $170,000 in
profits during those months. Following dissolution of
that partnership, Matteo continued to supply heroin
to Aguiar (Tr. I, 161-163).

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6

Aguiar made increasingly larger purchases, cul-
minating in a series of ten-kilogram transactions (Tr.
I, 163-164). In September 1972, Aguiar arranged to
buy another ten kilograms of heroin through Matteo,
for a total price of $270,000. Matteo was to make the
purchase by using $190,000 of his own money (repre-
senting a debt that he owned Aguiar) and additional
monies to be supplied by Aguiar. Aguiar was to de-
liver $60,000 in cash to Matteo in advance and an addi-
tional $20,000 when the narcotics were received.
Aguiar delivered the $60,000 (Tr. I, 172-174) ; how-
ever, the following day, Matteo was found shot (not
fatally) in the home of petitioner Indivigilo (Tr. I,
520-521). The police also found an attache case near
Matteo’s body, containing $350,000 in cash (Tr. I, 524).

B. THE TRIAL OF PETITIONERS INDIVIGLIO AND BREEN

Tn the spring of 1968, Matteo approached Somas to

-arrange a business deal whereby Somas would manage

Matteo’s heroin business (Tr. II, 26). At that time,
Matteo was living in an apartment building owned by
petitioner Indiviglio, the basement of which contained
a laboratory (Tr. II, 27-28). On one oceasion, Matteo
and Somas picked up some dark brown heroin samples
that had been left in the laboratory and delivered them
to James McCormack, who tested the samples (Tr. I,
29, 31, 35-36). MeCormack told Aguiar that he was
dealing in heroin supplied by Indiviglio (Tr. IT, 236),
and he explained that the heroin was brown because it
had been damaged in shipment and then treated by
Indiviglio (Tr. IT, 238).

7

Matteo instructed Somas to provide petitioner Indi-
viglio with any funds he might need in order to travel
to France to arrange a source of heroin (Tr. II, 37-38,
40). Thereafter, Matteo, Somas, and Indiviglio held a
meeting during which Indiviglio said that he was plan-
ning a trip to Europe (Tr. II, 41-42). Several months
later, Indiviglio asked Somas for $5,000 for a trip;
however, Somas was only able to give him $3,000 ( Tr.
Il, 43-44). Upon his return, Indiviglio said that some-
ove in Newburgh, New York, had “taken his connec-
tion away”. Indiviglio stated that a letter relating to a
shipment was being sent to the person in Newburgh
and asked Somas to go to Newburgh and steal the let-
ter (Tr. II, 4445).

In early 1969, Somas began purchasing small
amounts of heroin from petitioner Breen (Tr. II,
49-50). Somas was in turn supplying heroin to Aguiar.
After Aguiar complained to petitioner Matteo about
the quality of heroin that he was receiving from
Somas, Breen undertook to supply Aguiar directly
and did so on two oecasions (Tr. I], 241-244).

In the fall of 1969, Aguiar agreed to lend Matteo
and Breen $16,000 to be used in their heroin dealings,
provided that he be given an option to purchase uncut
heroin at cost (Tr. II, 247-248). Soon thereafter,
Matteo and Breen brought a kilogram of heroin to
Aguiar’s apartment to be divided into 4-kilogram
packages (Tr. I1, 88, 249-250). A few days later Breen
returned to the apartment and asked Aguiar to store
three packages of heroin, which Breen and Mattes
subsequently picked up (Tr. TT, 250-251, 254).

|
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8

In 1970, Breen told Aguiar that he and Matteo were
no longer in partnership (Tr. II, 255). Nonetheless,
Breen continued to supply heroin to Somas on at least
seven occasions, the last of which involved delivery of
one pound of heroin (Tr. LI, 167-168, 173-179).

During this time, petitioner Indiviglio told Somas’s
wife that he had made ‘millions’? in the narcotics
business by importing foreign cars containing caches
of heroin (Tr. II, 180-181. 183-184, 219-220).

In September 1972, Matteo was found in I ndiviglio’s
home. He had been shot five times in the back but was
still alive. Next te Matteo was an attache case con-
taining $350,050 in cash (Tr. II, 364, 369). Police
officers also found laboratory equipment used in the
processing of heroin (Tr. IT, 382-384).

ARGUMENT

1. James McCormack, an unindicted co-conspirator,
was called as a government witness. After testifying
that he knew petitioner Matteo and had met with him
in 1967 or 1968 (‘Tr. I, 460-463), McCormack claimed
that he was unable to remember any events that would
incriminate Matteo.’ Thereafter, the government was
permitted to use MeCormack’s detailed gr and jury
testimony in an attempt to refresh his memory and, in
the alternative, for the purpose of impeachment (Tr.

‘ Before he testified, MeCormack was examined by the court.
MeCormack claimed at that time that he could not recall his
dealings with Matteo. The court then }» ‘1d MeCormack in con-
tempt (Tr. T. 440), ruling that he was willfully refusing to
answer questions (Tr. 1, 457-438, 444).

I, 468-497).’ For the most part, McCormack testified
that he could not recall whether or not he had given
the testimony set forth in the grand jury record.
Petitioner Matteo incorrectly contends (Pet. 15-24)
that the trial court erred in allowing the government
to use MeCormack’s grand jury testimony for im-
peachment purposes. A court may properly admit a
witness’s prior statement as impeachment evidence if
it is inconsistent with his testimony at trial. Grune-
wald vy. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 418. In this case,
it was clear that McCormack was merely feigning a
faulty memory in order to protect Matteo. As the
trial judge observed (Tr. I, 514):
Not once did [McCormack] complain of be-
ing sick while he was under cross examination.
On cross examination he answered every ques-
tion asked by [petitioner's trial counsel}. He
remembered matters that occurred at a tine
earlier to [sic] the time he appeared before the
Grand Jury.
He was quite articulate in describing the pro-
grams that he received in State custody.

It is clear to me that this witness never

intended to testify directly or give testimony
that was required of him; that he answered

* Petitioner Matteo mistakenly intimates that the grand jury
testimony was introduced as substantive evidence. Following the
objection of petitioner's trial counsel (Tr. I. 539-540), the court
stated: “[T]o the extent that [McCormak] refused to admit
any of the statements, I would say that it is not admissible
under the substantive crime” (Tr. I, 541). Thereafter, the court's
jury instruction on prior inconsistent statements limited their
consideration to “judging the credibility of the witness” (Tr. I,
742-743).

TRAN

10

questions that inculpated himself, but refused
to answer questions that inculpated [petitioner |
Accordingly, the court was well within its discretion
in allowing the use of McCormack’s prior inconsistent
grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes.

As the Second Cireuit held in the similar case of
United States v. Insana, 423 F, 2d 1165, 1170 (C.A. 2),
certiorari denied, 400 U.S. 841: °

Where * * * a recalcitrant witness who has
testified to one or more relevant facts indicates
by his conduct that the reason for his failure to
continue to so testify is not a lack of memory
but a desire “‘not to hurt anyone,” then the
court has discretionary latitude in the search
for truth, to admit a prior sworn statement
* * * (T]he trial judge’s hands should [not]
be tied where a witness does not deny making
the statements nor the truth thereof but merely

em
°

falsifies a lack of memory

“In Jnsana, the witness responded “If he says I said it, I guess
I did: and “I don’t remember”; and “If he has it on the record
I guess I must have”; and finally, “I don’t recall” (423 F. 2d
at 1168). In the instant trial, MeCorinack’s responses included,
“J :ecall the conversation, but not that question and not that
answer” (Tr. 1, 470): “That sounds familiar. 1 am not posi-
tive’ (Tr. I, 471); “It may be down there, but I don’t remem-
ber those questions at all” (Tr. 1, 476); “At the moment I can't
think at all” (Tr. I, 484): and “I am not sure at this time” (Tr.
I, 487). ;

? The court in /nsana held that such statements were admnis-
sible as substantive evidence. See also ( ‘alifornia v. Green, 399
U.S. 149: Rule 801(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
(effective date. July 1, 1975). A fortiori, the district court
here had discretion to admit MeCormack’s prior statements for
impeachment purposes.

FOOT

i

—7

11

2. Following his arrest, petitioner Matteo made in-
culpatory statements to a government agent, At a pre-
trial hearing, these statements were suppressed on the
eround that they had been made in the absence of
Miranda warnings. The statements were, however, used
for impeachment during the course of the cross-
examination of Matteo. Petitioner Matteo claims (Pet.
24-27) that that use was improper. © | '

‘At trial, Matteo testified in his own behalf. He ad-
mitted that he was involved in illegal gambling opera-
tions but denied that he had been trafficking in nar-
cotics (Tr. 1, 575-578). On cross-exunination, Matteo
again ‘denied involvement in the drug trade, stating
that he had never purchased ov sold heroin at any time
(Tr. I, 593). Although Matteo admitted knowing of
petitioner Indiviglio’s involvement in the narcotics

trade, he said that this knowledge came from a single’

conversation in which Indiviglio had acknowledged
that he was once involved with narcoties (Tr. I, 605-
606). Thereafter, the trial court allowed Matteo to be

cross-examined concernins the inclupatory statements °

that he made while in custody (Tr. 1, 612-615):

Q. In that conversation, do yor recall that
Agent Schnepper said to you that he was aware
that you had done [five] to [ten] kilograms of
heroin at a time but wanted to, know what Indi-
viglifo] was doing, and that you responded that
Indiviglifo] was doing 30 to 40 kilograms at a
time. Do you recall that conversation ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that what you said?

A. Yes, that’s right.

TAD EONS DESPRE RIES |

‘ 12
Q. Did you also state that Indviglifo] had
lost his European connection a while ago, be-
eause the connection had gotten jammed up
with the police in France?

| A. Right.

Petitioner voluntarily elected to take the stand in
his own defense and was, therefore, properly subjected
to “the traditional truth-testing devices of the adver-
sary process.” Harris V. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225.
The impeachment, use of his’ prior admission was
proper. Oregon V. Huss, No. 73-1452, decided March
19, 1975; Harris v. New York, supra. See also Walder
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62.

3. During his testimony, petitioner Matteo generally
denied trafficking in narcotics (Tr. 1, 576-578, 593)
and specifically denied meeting anyone at the Club
International for the purpose of arranging a purchase
of narcotics (Tr. I, 613). In rebuttal, the government
offered testimony that showed that Matteo had traded
in drugs (Tr. I, 630), that a meeting between a nar-
cotics dealer and Matteo had been arranged at the
— latter’s request (Tr. I, 630-631), that Matteo was in-
troduced to the narcotics dealer at the Club Inter-
national (Tr. 1, 631), and that Matteo effected a large
purchase of narcotics several days later (Tr. 1, 631-
632).

Petitioner Matteo’ claims (Pet. 28-31) that this
rebuttal testimony ‘was improperly received. But as
petitioner concedes (Pet. 29), the admissibility of
rebuttal evidence is within the broad discretion of the
trial court, and its determination will not be reversed
unless that discretion has been abused. See, ¢.g.,

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13

United States v. Perez, 491 F. 2d 167, 173 (C.A. 9),
October 15, 1974 (No. 73-6784) ; United States v.
Fenech, 470 F. 2d 1234 (C.A.D.C.), certiorari denied
sub nom. Blackwell vy. United States, 410 U.S. 909.
That discretion was not abused here. Matteo had flatly
denied ever dealing in narcotics; in the circumstances of
this case it was well within the court’s discretion to
allow the government to impeach Matteo’s credibility
by introducing evidence that contradicted his testi-
mony. Harris v. New York, supra; Walder v. United
States, supra. See, also, United States v. Gonzalez,
491 F. 2d 1202, 1204 (C.A. 5); United States v. Gant,
487 F. 2d 30, 33 (C.A. 10), certiorari denied, 416
US 941; United States v. Fench, supra.

4. Petitioner Matteo further argues (Pet. 31-34)
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his trial attorney failed to object to the admis-
sion of certain evidence that Matteo characterizes as
irrelevant and prejudicial. Specifically, he points to
the use for impeachment purposes of McCormack’s
grand jury testimony and his own admissions to Agent
Schnepper and to the introduction of evidence about
his near-fatal shooting. But as we have shown above,
the impeaching evidence was properly admitted. And
the evidence of the circumstances surrounding Mat-
teo’s shooting was relevant and admissible. The dis-
covery of narcotics paraphernalia and a large amount
of cash in co-conspirator Indiviglio’s home, at the
time of Matteo’s shooting in that home, tended to
corroborate Aguiar’s testimony that, on the day before
the shooting, he had given Matteo $60,000 for the

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14

purchase of a large quantity of heroin, Any objection
to the introduction of that evidence presumably would
have been unavailing.

The tactical and strategie decisions made by an
attorney during the course of a trial are not ordi-
narily subject to scrutiny on review. See, e.g., United
States ce vel. Walker v. Henderson, 492 F, 2d 13811
(C.A, 2), certiorari denied, 417 U.S. 972; United
States v. Grant, 489 F. 2d 27 (C.A. 8). However, under
any applicable standard of appellate review, the record
supports the conclusion that petitioner Matteo was,
in fact, afforded adequate assistance of counsel. Com-
pare United Slates V. Robinson, 502 F. 2d 894, 896
(CLA, 7), Cuited States ox rel. Walker, v. Henderson,
supra, and United Slates Vv. Miramon, 470 F. 2d 1362
(CLA. 9), certiorari denied, 411 U.S. 934 (ineffective
representation consists of conduct that shocks the
eonseience of the court and makes the proceedings a
faree and mockery of justice) with United States v.
DeCoster, AST F.2d 1197, 1202 (C.A.D.C.) (defendant
entitled te “the reasonably competent assistance of an
attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advo-

cate”).

torney conducted an extensive cross-
examinationeabebhiaewgovernnent’s witnesses, presented
a plausible theory of defense in his opening statement, ,
explored that defense through Matteo’s own testimony,
and summarized the evidence and his theory during
final arguments. The record fails to disclose (and peti-
tioner Matteo does not allege) any potentially exon-
erating defenses that were not considered by defense
counsel or any exculpatory evidence that was not

SO NN ce IF AEE MR

15

introduced. Throughout the trial, defense counsel
rendered the reasonably effective assistance demanded
of an attorney of ordinary skill and training in erim-
inal law. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 739,
770-771; Beasley v. United States, 491 F. 2d 687, 696
(C.A. 6).

5. Petitioner Indiviglio contends (Pet. 49, 7-8)
that there was insufficient non-hearsay evidence to
establish his participation in the conspiracy.’ We
disagree. The direct evidence showed that petitioner
Matteo lived in an apartment building owned by
Indiviglio and that he picked up samples of heroin
from a laboratory located in that building ; that Matteo
and Somas had paid for Indiviglio’s trip to France
out of their narcotics earnings; that following Indi-
viglio’s trip to France he reported to Somas that
someone in Newburgh, New York, had taken away his
connection, and Somas was sent to steal a letter relat-
ing to this lost connection; and that a large quantity
of laboratory equipment suitable for processing heroin
was found in Indiviglio’s home. Moreover, Fay Somas
testified to a conversation with Indiviglio during which
the latter stated that he had made ‘‘millions’’ by
importing heroin secreted in foreign ears.” Accord-

‘ Petitioner Breen also incorporates this contention in his peti-
tion. but there was ample direct evidence of Breen’s involvement
in narcotics transactions to warrant the admission against him
of the declarations of co-conspirators. See Glasser v. United
States. 315 U.S. 60, 80; United States v. Santana, 503 F, 2d 710
(C.A. 2), certiorari denied, December 9, 1974 (No. 74-5311).

* That testimony was of course admissible against the declar-
ant, Indiviglio, as an admission without regard to the admissi-
hility of the declarations of his co-conspirators. Cf. Lutwak v.
United States, 344 U.S. 604, 618.

16

ingly, MeCormack’s declaration to Aguiar that Indi-
viglio supplied heroin to him was properly considered
by the jury. United States v. Santana, supra; United
States v. Geaney, 417 F. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.A. 2), cer-
tiorari denied sub nom. Lynch v. United States, 397
U.S. 1028.

6. Petitioners Indiviglio and Breen contend (No.
74-1143, Pet. 5-7; No. 74-6161, Pet. 15) that the trial
court erred in allowing a portion of the government’s
summation to be read to the jury. It is well recognized,
however, that the trial court has wide discretion in
evaluating the consequences of reading portions of the
transcript to the jury.” See, e.g., United States v.
Thornton, 498 F. 2d 749, 753 (C.A.D.C.). Although
petitioners allege that prejudice resulted, neither they
nor the record substantiates that claim.

During its deliberations, the jury requested that the
government’s summation be read to them. Prior to the
reading of the requested transcript the court admon-
ished (Tr. II, 865):

- Now, again understand that summation is not
testimony. It’s just the argument of counsel and
don’t lose sight of the other summations by the
other lawyers * * *.

Thereafter, the court reporter read back a portion of
the government’s summation. After the jury was satis-
fied that they had heard enough of the summation, the
court again instructed (Tr. II, 868):

1° The court’s discretion is not limited to the reading of evi-
dentiary portions of the transcript. See, ¢.g., United States v.

Polizzi, 500 F. 2d 856, 876 (C.A. 9), certiorari denied, Janu-
ary 20, 1975 (No. 74-322).

7% OE Lg OE AAP IEL ELENA A TOOL AE

17

The portion of the summation was a discussion
by Mr. Weintraub of the evidence. Of course,
that isn’t evidence, it’s only what he says, what
he finds from the evidence.

It is apparent that the jury’s verdicts resulted from
a careful evaluation of the evidence. At the same
time that the jury requested the reading of the sum-
mation, it also asked to see Exhibit 47 (a shipping
notice) (Tr. II, 359, 857). Thereafter, the jury asked
to examine Exhibit 52, consisting of several documents
found in petitioner Indiviglio’s home (Tr. II, 446, 667)
and all of the letters from ‘‘Bob” that were found in
Indiviglio’s home (Tr. II, 867). The jury then re-
quested Exhibit 46, a photograph of the money found
near Matteo’s body following his shooting (Tr. II, 359,
869). Finally, it requested and heard Aguiar’s testi-
mony on direct examination, on cross-examination by
Indiviglio’s counsel, on redirect examination, and on
recross-examination by Indiviglio’s counsel (Tr. I,
870-872). Certainly in these circumstances the reading
of a portion of the government’s summation, which the
jury used, at most, as a guide to the evidence, did not
cause substantial prejudice or constitute reversible
error. Cf. United States v. Thornton, supra.

7. Petitioner Breen contends (Pet. 9-14) that cer-
tain admissions to his friend, James Schmidt, were im-
properly admitted at trial because he had been intoxi-
cated at the time he made them.” The criterion for the

1 Schmidt was a police officer, but petitioner Breen concedes
(Pet. 10) that his statements were not the result of a custodial
interrogation.

SAT PPT OS oo

18

admissibility of confessons or admissions made while
in a state of self-induced intoxication is simply that of
trustworthiness. See III Wigmore, Evidence, § 841
(2), pp. 489-493 (Chadbourn rev.). There was ample
evidence here that Breen was not so intoxicated that
his admissions were inherently untrustworthy.
Breen had placed a telephone call to a Long Tsland
bar where Schmidt’s in-laws worked. Breen explained
that he was in a downtown Manhattan bar and needed
a ride to Long Island because the train was not run-
ning at that hour of the night (Tr. II, 424, 429-430,
460, 542). Breen gave Schmidt detailed directions on
how to reach the Manhattan bar; thereafter, Schmidt
drove to meet Breen (Tr. II, 430-431). Upon reaching
the bar, Schmidt played a game of pool with Breen
(Tr. II, 427) and also engaged in a discussion over
drinks. It was during this time that Breen made the
inculpatory statements. Subsequently, Schmidt drove
Breen back to Long Island. Schmidt characterized
Breen’s conversations that night as both coherent and
responsive (‘I'r. II, 462-463). Schmidt’s characteriza-
tion was corroborated in part by Breen, who was able
to reconstruct the events of the night in question (Tr.
IT, 529-532, 540-543), admitted that he remembered
the happenings of that night ‘fairly well” (Tr. 3a
542), and conceded that he could hold his liquor
‘fairly well’? (Tr. II, 541). Accordingly, there, was
ample basis for the trial court’s conclusion that
Breen’s statements were sufficiently trustworthy to be
admissible. Cf. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477.

“~~ ee.)

19

8. Finally, petitioner Breen urges (Pet. 14-15) that
this Court further review certain sealed grand jury
transcripts and investigative reports to determine
whether all material relating to the testimony of the
government’s witnesses was produced. However, a
criminal defendant is not entitled to the production of
statements of witnesses “which do not relate to the
subject matter of their testimony” (Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 258) or to investigative reports
that are “the product of the investigator’s selections,
interpretations, and interpolations” (Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343, 350) and were not the
subject of testimony at trial.

The trial court conducted an in camera inspection of
the material here in question, and it was then sealed
and forwarded to the court of appeals for an ‘‘appro-
priately limited review.” Palermo v. United States,
supra, 360 U.S. at 353. Petitioner Breen neither dem-
onstrates a “particularized need” for the material nor
does he show that the determinations of the courts
below were clearly erroneous. Further review by this
Court is unwarranted. See United States v. Fanning,
477 F. 2d 45, 49 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 414 U.S.
1006; United States v. Graves, 428 F. 2d 196, 200
(C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 400 U.S. 960.

20
CONCLUSION

The petitions for writs of certiorari should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted.
Rosert H. Bork,
Solicitor General.
JoHN C. KEENEY,
Acting Assistant Attorney General.
JEROME M. Fert,

Rosert J. ERICKSON,
Attorneys.

May 1975.

G.6. GOVERNMEET PRINTING OFFICE: 1978

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_0817%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
