# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — CIRRAMI V. UNITED STATES (No. 74-1066)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1974

## Text

SUPREME COURT, U. & Supreme

i
IN THE '

Supreme Cowt of the Uniten States

Ocroser Term, 1974

No. 74-1066

SALVATORE CIRAMI, and JAMES CIRAMI,
Petitioners,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Wacman, Cannon & Musorr, P.C.
136 East 57th Street
New York, N. Y. 10022

and

Luioyp A. Hate
36 West 44th Street
New York, N. Y. 10036
(212) 972-0170

Cownsel for Petitioners

Adame Press Corp. 139 Cedar Street, N. ¥-—Beakman 3-1050-51

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TORRENT aE EI

es

SLATE AY ig EEO REP ELE A PERE SOE SE.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Orrnion BeLow

JURISDICTION

Questions PRESENTED

ConsTITUTIONAL Provisions INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Reasons ror GRANTING THE Writ

1. Defendants may not be convicted on charges
not brought by the Grand Jury

2. The alleged false statements were not crim-
inal, the prosecution was arbitrary and threat-
ens all other innocent taxpayers and filers ....

ConcLusiIon

APPENDIX:

A—Opinion of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit

B—Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Cireuit, Affirming Judgment

C—Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Denying Motion for
Extension of Time

Cases Cited

Benderoff v. United States, 398 F. 2d 132 (8th Cir.
1968)

Chilhowee Mills, Ine. v. C.LR., 152 F. 2d 137 (D. C.
Cir. 1945)

12

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FTN cine Mat ga

rte Ye

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
Genevieve B. Walker, 4 T.C. 630 (1966) 13
Germantown Trust Co. v. C.LR., 309 U. S. 304 (1940) 18
Paritem Singh Poonian v. United States, 294 F, 2d

74 (9th Cir. 1961) 11,12
Russel v. United States, 369 U. S. 749 (1964)... 5)
Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S. 130 (195°). 14
Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 350 (1965)... 8
Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492 (19438)... 12,14
Stirone v. United States, 361 U. S. 212 (1960)_........ 8,10

Stockstrom v. C.I.R., 190 F. 2d 283 (D. C. Cir. 1951) 13
United States v. Barash, 365 F. 2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966) 14
United States v. Casale Car Leasing Inc., 385 F. 2d

707 (2d Cir. 1967) 14
United States v. Fischetti, 450 F. 2d 34 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. den. 405 U. S. 1016 12
United States v. Wilkins, 385 F. 2d 465 (4th Cir.
1967) 8
United States v. Williams, 412 F. 2d 625 (3rd Cir.
1969) 12
Venus v. United States, 368 U. S. 345 (1961)_..... 13
Ward v. United States, 344 U. S. 924 (1953) 0... 13

United States Constitution Cited
Fifth Amendment 2, 3,11

Statutes Cited
18 U.S.C.:

See. 1001 12

; TABLE OF CONTENTS iii
| PAGE

26 U.S.C.:
See. 7201 1, 3, 14
See. -7206(2) 1, 2, 5, 12, 14

28 US.C.:
See. 1254(1) 2

Regulation Cited
Treasury Regulations:

See. 31.6011(a)-5

14

EWI LD IRONS

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\

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1974

No.

\

SALVATORE CIRAMI, and JAMES CIRAMI,

Petitioners,

Us.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

ee

\ i.
—>—

\

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioners, Salvatore and James Cirami, hereby peti-
tion this Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, affirming, January 24, 1975,
petitioners’ conviction under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206(2) in
the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York. 4 '
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FLARED NIIP LIN OTE VALI TL TF, PANG NETO ET EN CL OAD

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A DPE BL ERIE NALA PD

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APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit

Unirep States Court or APPEALS
For THE Seconp Circuit
No. 1179—September Term, 1973
Argued July 16, 1974—Decided January 24, 1975

Docket No. 74-1492

y™
~~

Unirep States oF AMERICA,
Appellee,

—against—

SatvaTore Cirami and James CrraM1,

Appellants.

?

Before:

Muuucan and Winter,®* Circuit Judges, and Newman,°*
District Judge.

* of the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, sitting
by designation.

** of the United States District Court, District of Connecticut,
sitting by designation.

[la]

WS et bP DTA SW ne

2a
Appendix A

Appeal by Salvatore and James Cirami from convic-
tion for attempted evasion of taxes and aiding in the prep-
aration of false information returns, after trial before a
jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, Mark A. Constantino, District
Judge.

Affirmed.

Robert E. Scher, New York, New York (Raphacls,
Searles, Vischi, Scher, Glover & D’Elia, on the brief),
for Appellants.

Richard B. Buhrman, Attorney, Tax Division, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Scott P.
Crampton, Assistant Attorney General, Ernest J.
Brown, Crombie J.D. Garrett, Attorneys, Tax Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.,
and Edward J. Boyd, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York, on the brief), for Appellee.

Newman, District Judge:

Salvatore and James Cirami appeal from multi-count
convictions for revenue law violations. The appellants
are principal officers of Air Package Distribution Service
Ltd. (hereinafter “the corporation”), a trucking company
that provides pickup and delivery service to airlines. The
corporation sought to classify its truck drivers as inde-
pendent contractors, rather than employees, thereby at-
tempting to evade its obligation for paying taxes im-
posed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (sevial
security) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.

3a
Appendix A

A nineteen-count indictment charged the Ciramis with
three sets of violations. Counts 1 through 14 alleged that
they attempted to evade social security taxes due for four-
teen calendar quarters in 1967 through 1970 by filing false
and fraudulent employer’s quarterly tax returns understat-
ing the amount of taxable wages paid, in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7201 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Counts 15 through 17
alleged similar violations with respect to attempted eva-
sion of federal employment taxes for the years 1967, 1968,
and 1969. Counts 18 and 19 alleged that the appellants, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), aided and assisted in
the preparation of false United States Information Re-
turns (forms 1099) for the years 1968 and 1969, which
stated that the recipients of payments from the corpo-
ration were independent contractors rather than em-
ployees. After a trial before Judge Mark A. Costantino
and a jury, appellants were convicted en eighteen of the
nineteen counts, Count 16 having been dismissed. Appel-
lants were sentenced to pay fines on each of the eighteen
counts resulting in conviction, and were also placed on
probation.

Appellants’ attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence is
without merit, and no useful purpose would be served
by detailing the circumstances from which the jury was
ebundantly justified in concluding, under unchallenged and
proper instructions, that the truck drivers were regular
employees of the corporation and that both appellants wil-
fully participated in the attempt to evade corporate taxes
by filing false returns that concealed the employee status
of the drivers.

The principal issue on appeal arises because of a mis-
take made by the Government in drafting for the Grand
Jury’s consideration the first seventeen counts of the in-

SRS OE ee oe

ODS tee PRIDE A EN SS

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4a
Appendix A

dictment. Count 1, set out in full in the margin,’ was
drafted in an effort to follow the standard form for al-
leging attempted evasion of corporate taxes by responsible
corporate officials. The manner of attempted evasion was
alleged to be the filing by the appellants of false employer's
quarterly returns. The falsity was alleged by comparing
the wages reported to have been paid some employees
and the tuxes due thereon with the higher amount of
wages actually paid to all employees and the correspond-
ing higher amount of taxes due thereon. The mistake
occurred when it was alleged that the higher amount of
taxes was owed by the appellants, rather than by the

“That during the period from January 1, 1967 to July 31,
1971, inclusive in the Eastern District of New York, the defend-
ants Salvatore Cirami and James Cirami who were the President
and Treasurer and Vice President and Secretary respectively of
Air Package Distribution Service Ltd., a corporation, with its
principal place of business in Queens County, New York, did
wilfully attempt to evade and defeat a large part of the federal
income taxes withheld from wages and Federal Insurance Con-
tributions Act taxes due and owing to the United States of
America for the quarter ending March 31, 1967, by preparing and
causing to be prepared and thereafter filing and causing to be
filed with the Internal Revenue Service Center, Andover, Massa-
chusetts, a false and fraudulent employer’s quarterly tax return,
wherein it was stated that the total taxable wages paid employees
for the said quarter was the sum of $13,320.82 and that the total
amount of tax withheld and Federal Insurance Contributions Act
taxes due thereon was the sum of $1,172.23, whereas, as the
defendants then and there well knew, the total taxable wages paid
employees for said quarter was the sum of $39,401.82 upon which
wages the defendants owed to the United States of America fed-
eral income taxes withheld from wages and Federal Insurance
Contributions Act taxes due in the total amount of $3,467.36.

In violation of Section 7201, Internal Revenue Code; 26 United
States Code, Section 7201; 18 United States Code, Section 2.”

LNCS

5a
Appendix A

corporation. After alleging the correct amount of wages
to be $39,401.82, Count 1 continued: “upon which wages
the defendants owed to the United States of America fed-
eral incomes taxes withheld from wages and Federal In-
surance Contributions Act taxes due in the total amount
of $3,467.36.” The deletion of the quoted words, and of
corresponding language from Counts 2 through 17, upon
motion by the Government after it had rested, is chal-
lenged by appellants as a denial of their Fifth Amend-
ment right to trial upon an indictment of a grand jury.

Ever since the Supreme Court announced in Ex parte
Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887), that an indictment cannot be
amended except by resubmission to a grand jury, the law
has been in a “confused state,” United States v. Edwards,
465 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1972), as to whether any al-
iteration is permissible and if so, how any appropriate
changes may properly be made. While a “no amendment”
rule has been stated, e.g., Dodge v. United States, 258 F.
300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 660 (1919), changes of
various sorts have in fact been approve, e.g., United
States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972). See cases collected in Heis-
ler v. United States, 394 F.2d 692, 695-96, nn. 2-6 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968). The Supreme
Court has stated that a “useless averment” of an indict-
ment may be ignored, Ford vy. United States, 273 U.S.
993, 602 (1927), and courts have regularly permitted jur-
ies to disregard as surplusage language in an indictment
not essential to the allegations of the offense charged. See,
e.g., United States vy. Archer, 455 F.2d 193 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972); United States v. Cola-
surdo, supra.

RB I ERIE EET

6a
Appendix A

Despite this modern line of cases, uncertainty has per-
sisted as to the propriety of withdrawing indictment lan-
guage from a trial jury’s consideration because Bain,
which “has never been disapproved,” Stirone v. United
States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960), itself involved the with-
drawal from the jury's consideration of language not es-
sential to the offense charged. Bain, an officer of a bank-
ing association, was charged with making a false report
with intent to deceive the Coimptroller of the Currency
and the agent appointed to examine the affairs of the
association. The trial court eliminated the reference to
the Comptroller of the Currency. The Supreme Court re-
versed even though the balance of the indictment ade-
quately stated an offense. The Court was concerned that
the grand jury might have indicted only because the
Comptroller of the Currency had been deceived. 121 U.S.
at 10. Implicit in this holding is the view that the Fifth
Amendment protects a defendant from being tried on
minimally sufficient allegations of an offense unless a
grand jury has made the prior determination that it con-
siders those allegations sufficient to warrant the exercise
of its prosecuting discretion. See Gaither v. United
States, 413 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

This Court has viewed Bain as holding that some dele-
tions of unnecssary language may work an impermissible
“fundamental change” in the charge set forth in an in-
dictment, even though a legally sufficient allegation re-
mains. See United States v. Colasurdo, supra, 453 F.2d
at 590. That type of change, involving the disregard of
language that might well have had a significant bearing
on the grand jury’s decision to indict, may still violate
the Pain rule. Even this interpretation of Pain may have
been eroded by the Supreme Court's opinion in Stirone vy.

7a
Appendix A

United States, supra, which interpreted Bain as standing
for “the rule that a court cannot permit a defendant to
be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment
against him.” 361 U.S. at 217. This view appears to
express concern only with the addition of charging lan-
guage, rather than its deletion.

The disregarded portions of the indictment in this case
were plainly surplusage. The manner of an attempted
evasion of income taxes has been deemed not essential
to a valid indictment. Hayes vy. United States, 407 F.2d
189 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 395 U.S. 972 (1969);
Heasley v. United States, 218 F.2d 86 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955). Here, the manner of at-
tempted evasion—filing false returns—was adequately
stated even after the deletion, the omitted words econ-
cerning only the correct amount of taxes due. Nor do
we think there is any substantial likelihood that the grand
jury would have failed to indict the appellants for their
actions in wilfully filing false returns even if the grand
jurors had understood that the taxes were due from the
corporation and not from the appellants.

Appellants further contend that the deletions that oc-
curred here caused them prejudice beeause of the man-
ner in which they chose to defend. At trial the LR.S.
special agent acknowledged, on cross-examination, that no
notice had been given the corporation of its obligation
to pay social security taxes for its employees, nor had
any assessment been made of taxes due. Of course, no
notice or assessment was necessary prior to a prosecu-
tion for attempted evasion. Ford vy. United States, 233
F.2d 56 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
In any event neither the cross-examination of the spe-

ae

ee St pe eee

8a
Appendix A

cial agent, nor any other evidence developed at the trial,
sought to place the obligation to pay taxes upon the
appellants or to shift it to the corporation, where it be-
longed. The jury’s attention was simply never directed
to the question of who was liable for payment of taxes,
an issue of no relevance in this attempted evasion case.
This case is thus totally unlike United States vy. Wolfson,
437 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1970), where substantial evidence
was submitted to the jury in support of allegations sub-
sequently withdrawn from the jury’s consideration. The
deletion here caused no prejudice.*

? Appellants allege one particular respect in which they were
prejudiced by the deletion, or, more precisely, by the prosecutor’s
failure to respect the deletion. The summation includes the fol-
lowing :

“Evidence in this case, I submit, points very strongly to
that Mr. Cirami was a man of expediency. In this case, he
saved approximately $34,000 by this scheme.

Mr. Hollman: I object to that.

Mr. Myerson: That is the amount in the indictment.

The Court: No, sustained.

Mr. Myerson: I submit, ladies and gentlemen, if you
find Mr. Cirami did that, it will add up to the approximate
figure of $34,000.

Mr. Hollman: I object to that.

The Court: Sustained.

Mr. Myerson: You can add it up, ladies and gentlemen.”

Plainly, it was improper for the prosecutor to argue to the jury
the total amount of taxes saved, when there was no evidence to
support these figures, and when the allegations of the indictment,
upon which he sought to rely, had been stricken from the indict-
ment at his request. It is also inexcusable for him to have per-
sisted in this improper argument after objection to it had twice
béen sustained.

. (Footnote continued on following page)

9a
Appendix A

One further aspect of the alteration of the indictment
warrants additional comment, the manner of accomplish-
ing the deletion. The Ninth Circuit has pointed out the
anomaly of permitting trial judges to instruct juries to
disregard certain portions of an indictment, yet prohibit-
ing a physical correction of the indictment papers to
reflect the deletion. Heisler vy. United States, supra. Yet
convictions have been overturned where language, con-
ceded to be surplusage, had been crossed out on the face
of the indictment. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States,
12 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1926).°

In United States v. Wolfson, supra, this Court econ-
sidered deletion of indictment language accomplished by
covering the words to be omitted with opaque paper on
which was written, “This portion of indictment stricken
as a matter of law; it is not to be considered by the
jury.” 437 F.2d at 868. The decision did not question
this physical alteration of the indictment, though con-
victions were reversed because of the prejudicial effect
of the evidence admitted in support of the deleted alle-
gations.

(Footnote continucd from preceding page)

Under all the circumstances, however, no prejudice resulted.
The prosecutor was referring to Salvatore Cirami, president of
the corporation, who had acknowledged that the corporation was
“his own company.” It was proper to argue, as bearing on motive,
that the principal officer of his own corporation stood to gain
money by attempting to evade corporate taxes. The improper
reference to the amount of taxes does not warrant reversal.

3 The manner of altering the face of the indictment in Stewart
is explained in Stewart v. District Court, 16 F.2d 863 (9th Cir.
1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 755 (1927).

i

SOLEIL PAL IAL LL TEES Ee

10a
Appendix A

In the instant case, we are neither asked to decide,
nor do we express, any view as to whether the jury is
to inspect an indictment in any or all criminal prose-
cutions. But, if a jury is permitted to see the individual
indictment, and if any language of that indictment is
surplusage or other matter that a jury may properly be
instructed to disregard, we think the preferable course
is to prepare a retyped “clean” version of the indict-
ment, omitting the language to be disregarded without
any indication of its omission. If the language is not
to be considered by the jury, it is surely better to re-
move it from their scrutiny, rather than rely on instruc-
tions. Crossing out or covering the deleted words only
serves to arouse the jury’s curiosity and stimulate un-
warranted speculation as to the full scope of the original
allegations. Of course, in situations where the original
indictment has been read to the jury or where a dele-
tion leaves the remaining langiage awkward or unclear,
a trial judge may, especially if the defendant prefers,
permit the jury to see the original indictment and deal
with the deletion in the court’s instructions.

In this case, the deletion was accomplished by placing
brackets on the face of the indictment around the words
to be deleted. However, it appears that the indictment,
thus marked, was never submitted to the jury. Appar-
ently, it is not the routine practice in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York to submit indictments to the trial jury,
and the jury in this case made no request to see the
indictment. In his charge, Judge Costantino simply read
to the jury Counts 1, 15, and 17, which were illustrative
of the three sets of offenses charged, and in doing so,
omitted the language that he had ordered stricken. Thus,
the jury received an entirely adequate statement of the

ene ae,

lla
Appendiz A

offenses alleged, and their attention was never directed
to the fact that the improper allegation concerning taxes
owed by the appellants had been originally included in
the indictment and thereafter deleted. Since the jury
never saw the indictment, the absence of a clean, retyped
indictment is of no consequence.

The judgments of conviction are affirmed.

j

Bren SN

12a

APPENDIX B

Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Affirming Judgment

74-1492

Unitep Srates Court or APPEALS
For tHe Seconp Circuit

At a stated Term of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the United States Courthouse in the City of
New York, on the twenty-fourth day of Jan-
uary, one thousand nine hundred and sev-
enty-five.

Present:

Hion. Harrison L. WintTER
Hon. Wituiam H. Mvtuican
Circuit Judges
Hon. Jon O. NewMan
District Judge

Unirep Srates or AMERICA,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,

Vv.

Satvatore Cram & James Crrami,

Defendants-Appellants.

a

t " eee. |

13a
Appendix B

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
record from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the judgments of said Dis-
‘ trict Court be and they hereby are affirmed in accordance
with the opinion of this court with costs to be taxed
against the appellants.

A. Dante Fvsaro,
Clerk
By Vincent A. Carin,

Chief Deputy Clerk

A true copy

A. Danret Fusaro
Clerk
by: Vincent A. Cariin
Vincent A. Carlin,
Chief Deputy Clerk

lia

_ APPENDIX C

Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Denying Motion
for Extension of Time

74-1492

: A 22 .

‘ | Unitep States Court oF APPEALS

| For THE Seconp’ Circuir
4 ‘ '

2 At a stated Term of. the United States Court
4 of Appeals, in and for the Second Cireuit,
j held at the United States Courthouse in the
zs City of New York, on the 19th day of Feb-
4 ruary, one thousand nine hundred and sevy-
; enty-five.

i ‘

i Unitep States or AMERICA,

j Plaintiff-Appellee,
g | Vv.

| | Sarvatore Crami & James Cram,

; Defendants-A ppellants.

It is hereby ordered that the motion made herein by
_ counsel for the appellant by notice of motion dated Feb-

ane’ agh eR”

lia
Appendix C

ruary 7, 1975 to extend the time to file a petition for
rehearing and rehearing en banc to and including seven
days after the grant of this motion or for a stay of man-
date pending application to the Supreme Court of the
United States for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure be
and it hereby is denied.

Harrison L. Winter (MDD)
Harrison L. Winter

Writui1m H. Mvuiuican
William H. Mulligan

Jon O. Newman (MDD)
Jon O. Newman
Circuit Judges

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_0718%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
