# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Tillem v. New Jersey

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_0566%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 419 U.S. 900

## Text

| | MICHAEL RODAK, JR..CLeR

IN THE ne

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1974

No. 74-60 a

La
a

GERALD TILLEM,
Petitioner,

Vs.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent.

¢?

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY,
APPELLATE DIVISION

Rosert A. Coocan,
Counsel for Petitioner,
Crystal Brook Professional Building,
State Highway 35,
Eatontown, New Jersey 07712

Adams Press Corp., 11 Commerce Street, Newark, N. J.—Market 3-8611-12

rs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion BELow

JURISDICTION

Qurstions PRESENTED

CoNSTITUTIONAL Provisions INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Reasons FoR GRANTING THE WRIT

ConcLusion

APPENDIX:

A—Order of Supreme Court of New Jersey Deny-
ing Petition for Certification

B—Opinion of the Appellate Division of the Su-
perior Court of New Jersey

Cases Cited
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385
(1926)

Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399 (1966) ~...........
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939) —.W0....
State v. Smith, 46 N. J. 510 (1966)

United States Constitution Cited
Fourteenth Amendment ...

PAGE

Ny oo WwW WS WS WO F

lo, a; eo? ee 2

2,5

Ee tL

iakhralvScacall PASSA Dine nian ces

sets SS eedatial

3
3
2
4
=
é
$
4
2
:
’
;

li TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statutes Cited
Anti Gangster Law

N.J.S. 2A :119-1

N.J.S. 2A:119A-3

28 U.S.C., Section 1257 (3)

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octroser Term, 1974

No.

ys
>

GERALD TILLEM,
Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent.

*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY,
APPELLATE DIVISION

Gerald Tillem, your Petitioner, prays that a Writ of
Certiorari issue to review the order of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey entered in the above-entitled cause on June
18, 1974.

Opinion Below

The order of the Supreme Court of New Jersey deny-
ing a Petition for Certification to the Appellate Division,
Superior Court of New Jersey was entered herein with-
out opinion on June 18, 1974. It has not yet been offi-

hat

cially reported and is reprinted at p. la of the Appendix
hereto.

The opinion of the Appellate Division, Superior Court
of New Jersey per the Honorable Joseph Halpern, P.J.
A.D., entered herein on March 29, 1974, is reported at 1
to 7 N. J. Super. 421, 317 A. 2d 738 (App. Div. 1974). It
is reprinted at p. 2a to 12a of the Appendix hereto.

Jurisdiction

1. The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
was entered on June 18, 1974 and is final by its terms.

2. No application for rehearing or for an extension of
time within which to petition for certiorari has been ap-
plied for, granted or denied.

3. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C., Section 1257 (3).

Questions Presented

1. Is N.J.S. 2A:119A-3, which makes any person who
engages in the business of making loans or forbearances
at a rate exceeding 50% per annum a criminal, repugnant
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
by reason of its vagueness and uncertainty?

Constitutional Provisions Involved

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States: “... No State shall... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

”

3

Statement of Case

This is an appeal in a criminal case from a judgment
of conviction on a single count of “being in the business
of making loans or forbearances in excess of 50% per
annum” contrary to the provisions of N.J.S. 2A :119A-3.
N.J.S. 2A:119A-3 reads as follows:

Any person who engages in the business of mak-
ing loans or forbearances prohibited by section 1 of
this act, or who conspires so to do, shall be guilty
of a high misdemeanor and shall be punished by a
fine of not more than $10,000.00, or by imprison-
ment for not more than 25 years, or both. N.J.S.
2A :119A-3.

Originally the defendant was charged in an eight count
New Jersey State Grand Jury indictment. The first
count charged him with willfully, knowingly and unlaw-
fully engaging in the business of making loans and for-
bearances at a rate of interest exceeding 50% per annum
between February of 1970 and July 12, 1972, in violation
of N.J.S. 2A:119A-3, as set forth in toto aforesaid. Counts
Two through Kight charged the defendant with seven sub-
stantive loans in excess of 50% per annum in violation of
N.J.S. 2A:119-1. N.J.S. 2A:119-1 reads as follows:

Any person who, not being authorized or per-
mitted by law so to do, charges, takes or receives
any money, property or other thing of value as in-
terest on the loan or forbearances of any money
or other property at a rate exceeding 50% per an-
num, or the equivalent rate for a longer or shorter
period, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or
by imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.
N.J.S. 2A:119-1.

NT TUES SW

4

Prior to the commencement of the trial the defendant,
through his counsel, moved to dismiss the First Count
which charged him with being in the business of making
loans at a rate of interest exceeding 50% per annum on
the ground that the Statute was unconstituticnal because
of its vagueness (T 3, 17 through 23).* This motion was
denied by the trial judge (T 3, 24 to T 4,18). The case
then proceeded to trial and the defendant was convicted
on all counts. The defendant was sentenced on the “do-
ing business” count to a term in the New Jersey State
Prison of not less than ten nor more than fifteen years,
and on each of the seven substantive counts to a term in
the New Jersey State Prison of not less than two nor
more than three years. The sentence on the substantive
counts were to be consecutive to each other and conseecu-
tive to the sentence on the “doing business” count. De-
fendant appealed.

At the Appellate level the defendant again raised the
constitutionality of the “doing business” statute hecause
of its vagueness, but his challenge was rebuffed. How-
ever, the intermediate Appellate Court accepted the de-
fendant’s argument that the seven substantive counts
“merged” in the “doing business” count and reversed the
convictions for the seven substantive loans. Nevertheless,
the defendant was still exposed to a minimum of ten years
and a maximum of fifteen years on the “doing business”
count.

Defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of N.J.S.
2A :119A-3 was raised and argued at Point I in defend-
ant’s brief in the Appellate Division, Superior Court of
New Jersey, and was disposed of adversely as to defend-

* The reference “T” refers to the Transcript of the trial herein.

5

ant by that Court (5a). The issue was further raised as
Point I in the Petition for Certification filed by defend-
ant in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which was de-
nied on June 18, 1974 (la). Therefore, defendant’s posi-
tion has been preserved throughout the appellate process
leading to this petition.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

1. Certiorari should be granted to permit this Court to
decide the issue of the constitutionality vel non of New
Jersey’s loan-sharking statute because of the extremely
severe penalty provisions attached to its trespass and the
genuine likelihood that it will be utilized more frequently
in future state court prosecutions.

N.J.S. 2A:119A-3 says:

Any person who engages in the business of making
loans or forbearances prohibited by section 1 of this
act (N.J.S. 2A:119A-1) shall be guilty of a high
misedemanor and shall be punished by a fine of not
more than $10,000.00, or by imprisonment for not
more than 25 years, or both.

In its applicable part, section 1 (N.J.S. 2A:119A-
1) reads as follows:

Any person who... receives any money as interest
on a loan or forbearance of any money .. . at a rate
exceeding 50% per annum, .. . is guilty of a mis-
demeanor...

It is and has been the defendant’s position that the
“being in the business of making usurious loans” statute
is so vague as to be constitutionally infirm under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is es-

(pene: Hie

tablished that a law fails to meet the requirements of the
Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that
it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it pro-
hibits. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399 (1966). Put
another way, no one may be required at peril of life, lib-
erty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes. A statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law. Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385 (1926). This concept has been recognized
by the highest court of New Jersey. State v. Smith, 46
N. J. 510 (1966).

Exactly what does “engaging in the business of making
usurious loans” mean? The Act contains no definition of
“engaging in the business” nor does it set forth any stand-
ard by which it could be determined that one was engag-
ing in the business of making loans. Certainly one of the
basic purposes of the Due Process Clause has always been
to protect a person against having the Government im-
pose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid
laws of the land. Implicit in this constitutional safeguard
is the premise that the law must be one that carries an
understandable meaning with legal standards that courts
must enforce. In the statute subject to attack at bar,
there is no attempt made by the legislature to define or
set standards on “engaging in the business of making
loans”. These words are subject to numerous and varied
interpretations. In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939), another New Jersey statute—the Anti Gangster
Law—was challenged constitutionally on the grounds of
vagueness and was struck down by the United States Su-
preme Court. Concededly, no two statutes are alike as to
wording or purpose, but a close comparison of the New

7

Jersey “loansharking” act with the Anti-Gangster Law
shows that the former does not even contain either a defi-
nition or standards which the latter did and the latter
(even with some attempt at definition) was struck down.
The vice of N.J.S. 2A:119A-3 is that it leaves open the
widest possible inquiry as to meaning of terms, the scope
of which no one can foresee and the result of which no
one can foreshadow or adequately guard against.

By exercising jurisdiction herein, this Court cannot only
correct the injustice visited upon the defendant, but can
also alert law-enforcement personnel that whereas clearly
defined penal statutes will be upheld those statutes which
attempt to punish without precision will fall.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and based on the fore-
going authorities, Petitioner respectfully requests this
Court to grant the Petition for Certification to the
Appellate Division, Superior Court of New Jersey.

Respectfully submitted,

Rosert A. Coocan
Counsel for Petitioner
Crystal Brook Professional Building
State Highway 35
Eatontown, New Jersey 07724

Sattnc, Moore, O’Mara & Coocan
Attorneys for Petitioner

[Appenpices Fotitow]

APPENDIX A

Order of Supreme Court of New Jersey Denying
Petition for Certification

SupremME Court cor NEw JERSEY
C-666 SrepremBer Term 1973

La
_—

State or New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Vs.

GeraLp TILLEM,

Defendant-Petitioner.

?

To Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification having been submitted to
this Court, and the Court having considered the same,

It is hereupon Orperep that the petition for certification
is denied, with costs.

Wrrness, the Honorable Richard J. Hughes, Chief Jus-
tice, at Trenton, this 18th day of June, 1974.

Frorence R. PEsKoE
Clerk
Filed

Jun 18 1974

FLoreNcE R. PEsSKOE
Clerk

POF SI LE ED

2a

APPENDIX B

Opinion of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court
of New Jersey

Superior Court or New JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION

A-2895-72

Strate oF New JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

GeraLD TILLEM,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued February 20, 1974—Decided Mar 29 ’74
Before Judges Ha-trern, Marruews and BiscHorr.
On appeal from Monmouth County Court.

Mr. Robert A. Coogan argued the cause for appellant
(Messrs. Saling, Moore, O’Mara & Coogan, attorneys).

Mr. Michael A. Graham, Deputy Attorney General, ar-
gued the cause for respondent (Mr. William F. Hy-
land, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney;
Mr. George F. Kugler, Jr., former Attorney General
of New Jersey, and Michael A. Graham, of counsel
and on the brief).

3a
Appendix B

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Havpern, P.J.A.D.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of en-
gaging in the business of “loan sharking” in violation of
N.J.S.A. 2A: 119A-3. He was also convicted, at the same
trial, on seven counts of “loan sharking” representing
seven illegal loans made to four different individuals over
a two and one-half year period, wherein the annual rate of
interest charged was between 200 and 300%, in violation
of N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1. He was sentenced on the latter
seven charges to consecutive 2-3 year State Prison terms,
and on the former charge to a State Prison term of 10-15
years, to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed
on the seven charges. In all, he was given State Prison
sentences totalling 24-36 years.

Before considering the issues raised on this appeal, we
pause to point out that defendant neither testified nor
called any witnesses in his defense; and we find the un-
contradicted proofs of the State amply supported the
convictions.

I
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-3

Defendant argues that N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-3 is unconsti-
tutional because of vagueness, in that “* * * it does not
spell out the degree or details of ‘engaging in the busi-
ness’ of making loans.” The statute provides:

94:119A-3. Busrxess oF Makinc Pronwisitep Loans
or ForEBEARANCES; PENALTY

Any person who engages in the business of mak-
ing loans or forebearances prohibited by section 1

4a
~ Appendix B

of this act, or who conspires so to do, shall be
guilty of a high misdemeanor and shall be pun-
-ished by a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or by
imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or both.

The contention is without merit. Reading, as we must,
N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1 through 2A:119A-4 as a whole statu-
tory scheme to prevent and punish the crime of loan
sharking, we are satisfied that men of common intelli-
gence do not have to guess at the legislative meaning or
differ as*to the application of the term “engages in the
business of making [illegal] loans.” State v. Joas, 34
N. J. 179, 185 (1961). The four sections of the loan
sharking statutes must be considered as a homogeneous
and consistent whole giving effect to all their provisions.
State v. Green, 62 N. J. 547, 554-555 (1973). Giving the
statutory words their common, ordinary, common-sense
construction, they can be defined as meaning one who
carries on an enterprise, a business or a profession for
profit or improvement over a period of time, as distin-
guished from one who commits or occasionally partici-
pates in a single act or transaction. See Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary, 1969, p. 751; Black’s Law
Dictionary, (4 ed. 1951), p. 622; 58 C.I.S., Money Lend-
ers, §1, pp. 852-853 (1948); Fleckenstein Brothers’ Com-
pany v. Fleckenstein, 66 N. J. Hq. 252, 256-257 (Ch. 1904).

The trial judge in clear and plain language defined
the term to the jury thusly:

Now, what does the statute mean by someone
who engages in the business of making loans?
What do we mean by business? Well, business as
used in the statute pertains in a very broad sense
to all gainful activity. A business could be called

5a
Appendiz B

occupation or work of some sort in which a per-
son is engaged on a regular basis.

If a person engages in a certain type of transac-
tion once and that’s all, you certainly wouldn’t con-
sider that person to be in the business. If, how-
ever, that type of conduct is repeated to the ex-
tent that there is a certain regularity to that type
of conduct, then it could be inferred properly that
that person was in that business. It’s in that sense
that we use the term business that I have just read
to you.

We need hardly labor the point any further since we are
satisfied the statute informs those concerned what is pro-
scribed and, therefore, is not void for vagueness.

II
ScCIENTER AND CRIMINAL INTENT

Defendant contends the trial judge erred in refusing to
charge the jury that scienter and criminal intent were
essential elements of N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1 and 3 which the
State had to prove in order to convict him. We disagree.

Whether a statute provides criminal sanctions for pro-
scribed conduct, without proving criminal intent, is a
matter of statutory construction. There are areas where
the evil or danger sought to be prevented is so great
that the Legislature may, as a matter of public policy, de-
clare an act unlawful without proof of a wrongful intent.
State v. Hatch, 64 N. J. 179 (1973); Morss v. Forbes, 24
N. J. 341, 358 (1957). We believe the Legislature felt
Joan sharking is of that invidious caliber. We would
have to be very naive to believe that one who loans

ad ey at

Tie ius edie del

et Lada,

Bis SABLA RE ECE

PDO GE Ma den

6a
Appendix B

money to individuals at annual interest rates in excess
of the lawful rates (here it was 200-300%) does not know
he is violating the law.

It
Prosecutor’s SUMMATION

Defendant argues the prosecutor’s comments in sum-
mation deprived him of a fair trial. The comments com-
plained of consisted of a reference to defendant, by way
of sarcasm, as a “giant angel”; likened defendant to
Shakespear’s Shylock in exacting a “pound of flesh”; and
in referring to a specific loan made by defendant, said
the borrower had “his guts torn out.” These were strong
comments, but in the light of the evidence, defense coun-
sel’s summation, and the nature of the charges and
proofs, they were justifiably made and can hardly b»
deemed sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a_reversai.
United States v. La Sorsa, 480 F. 2d 522, 526 (2 Cir.
1973), cert. den. 38 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1973); State v. Knight,
63 N. J. 187, 193-194 (1973); State v. Wilson, 57 N. J.
39, 50 (1970). In any event, the trial judge instructed
the jury that its verdict must be based on the evidence.
See United States v. Ramos, 268 F. 2d 878, 880 (2 Cir.
1959). If error existed, it was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in view of the overwhelming evidence of
defendant's guilt. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371
(1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969);
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), reh. den.
386 U. S. 987 (1967).

AL SEP PY MILI
: Fi
2

7a :
Appendix B
IV
MERGER

Defendant contends the seven individual charges for
loan sharking merged in the greater offense of engaging
in the business of loan sharking. We agree.

The legislative intent must be garnered from the loan
sharking statute considered in their context as a whole.
This is particularly true since they were passed at the
same time to effectuate a given result or to overcome a
certain evil. N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1 proscribes the making
of loans in the amount of $1,000, or more, at a rate in
excess of the annual or equivalent legal rate of interest
but not in excess of 50% per year, and designates such
offenses as misdemeanors. It then provides that any
person who makes a loan at an annual or equivalent legal
rate of interest in excess of 50% per year, regardless
of the amount or duration of the loan, is guilty of a high
misdemeanor.*

N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-2 makes it a high misdemeanor, pun-
ishable by imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or
a fine not greater than $10,000, or both, for any person to
use or threaten to use force in connection with a loan
made in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1. Here the Legis-
lature obviously intended to severely punish loan sharkers,
or their agents, who commit or threaten to commit vio-
lence upon borrowers of the proscribed illegal loans.

*It was under this latter provision that the seven counts were
premised since the annual or equivalent rate of interest allegedly
charged exceeded 50%.

8a
Appendix B

N.J.S.A. 2A :119A-3, as previously set forth herein, seeks
to reach those who engage in the business of loan shark-
ing, as distinguished from those involved in an isolated
transaction. And, here again, the Legislature considered
the business of loan sharking a menace and detriment to
the public welfare, and prescribed the severe penalties for
violators of imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or
a fine not greater than $10,000, or both.

N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-4, not applicable here, made it mis-
demanor punishable by a maximum of three years im-
prisonment, or a fine not greater than $25,000, or both, for
any person who knowingly possesses, maintains or has
control over anything used to record the proscribed loan
sharking transactions.

Viewing these statutes as indicated, we are satisfied that
one is not guilty of engaging in the business of loan
sharking unless it is shown that various loans are made
as part of a continuing criminal impulse, namely, to en-
gage in the business of loan sharking. Here, the proofs
were not controverted that defendant made at least seven
loans proscribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1 to four different
individuals over a period of two and one-half years. This
was the kind of illegal business the Legislature sought to
prevent. For an incisive discussion of the evils of loan
sharking, see “Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities and New
York’s Usury Statute”, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 167 (1966).

The seven separate illegal loans were constituent ele-
ments of the greater offense of engaging in the business
of loan sharking and, therefore, merged in the conviction
of the greater offense. They cannot be fractionalized ae-
cording to its component parts. State v. Riley, 28 N. J.
188, 195 (1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 313 (1959);
State v. Mowser, 92 N. J. L. 474 (KE. & A. 1919); Note,
Twice In Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262, 318-319 (1965). See
also Final Report New Jersey Penal Code, §2C:1-6 and
Commentary.

~—>

PTY OES SS RRS olen ee

9a
Appendix B

In enacting N.J.S.A. 2A :119A-3 the Legislature intended
to punish a course of conduct (engaging in the business
of loan sharking), therefore, all violations that spring
from that singleness of thought and deed, are but one of-
fense. United States v. Universal C.1.T. Credit Corp., 344
U.S. 218 (1952). See also State v. Di Rienzo, 53 N. J. 360
(1969) ; State v. Mills, 51 N. J. 277, 289 (1968), cert. den.
393 U.S. 832 (1968). This principle was enunicated by
Otto Kirchheimer in “The Act, The Offense and Double
Jeopardy”, 58 Yale L. J. 518, 522 (1949):

The unifying element in the cases where ‘con-
sumption’ or ‘subsidiarity’ may be called into play
exists in the perpetrator’s own mind and in his ulti-
mate goal. Whatever appears to him as the princi-
pal object of his criminal endeavors becomes the
main object of the law’s protection. All other stages
or aspects of his action, be they antecedent, simul-
taneous, or posterior, would assume independent
significance only if their perpetration would en-
danger a different social interest; otherwise, they
merge in the offense category protecting the inter-
est towards which the main attention of the perpe-
trator is directed (emphasis added).

If the Legislature had intended to make individual loan
sharking acts separate offenses it would have so provided.
Having failed to do so, it is reasonably inferable that the
individual offenses merged in the greater offense because
without proof of the individual offenses the crime of en-
gaging in the business of loan sharking could not be
proven. The “rule of lenity” which has been often applied
in construing legislation should be utilized to prevent mul-
tiple convictions where none was intended. See Heflin v.

S| —_—

10a
Appendix B

United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Ladner v. United
States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349
U.S. 81 (1955); 8 Moore, Federal Practice, §8.07(2), 1973,
pp. 8-60 to 8-61. The philosophy behind the rule was ex-
pressed by Justice Frankfurter thusly:

It is not to be denied that argumentative skill,
as was shown at the Bar, could persuasively and
not unreasonably reach either of the conflicting con-
structions. About only one aspect of the problem
; can one be dogmatic. When Congress has the will
q it has no difficulty in expressing it—when it has the
will, that is, of defining what it desires to make the
unit of prosecution and, more particularly, to make
each stick in a faggot a single criminal unit. When
; Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imput-
5 ing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity
‘ should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this not
out of any sentimental consideration, or for want
of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in pro-
scribing evil or antisocial conduct. It may fairly
} be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve
f doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against
3 the imposition of a harsher punishment. This in no
’ wise implies that language used in criminal statutes
should not be read with the saving grace of common
y sense with which other enactments, not east in tech-
y nical language, are to be read. Nor does it assume
; that offenders against the law carefully read the
penal code before they embark on crime. It merely

means that if Congress does not fix the punishment
for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity,
4 doubt will be resolved against turning a single trans-
a action into multiple offenses, when we have no more

lla
Appendix B

to go on than the present case furnishes. (Bell v.
United States, 349 U.S. supra, at 83-84).

In view of the nature of the crime here involved, we
find no abuse of the trial judge’s sentencing discretion on
the first count.

Having decided that the seven lesser included offenses
(counts 2-8 in the indictment) merged in the greater of-
fense (count 1 of the indictment), we ceverse the con-
victions on the seven individual counts for loan sharking,
and vacate the sentences imposed thereon. We affirm the
conviction for unlawfully engaging in the business of loan

sharking.

SRLS AS he

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_0566%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.