# Appendix — Allied Pilots Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Board

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_0370%3A4

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 420 U.S. 972

## Text

DEC

5

xe 74-70 g
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,

Petitioner,
v.

CIvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent,

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al.,

we #Y-710

Alk LINE DISPATCHERS’ ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.

CIvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent,
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al.,
Intervenors.

APPENDIX TO PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

———————

ConHEN, Weiss AND SIMON
605 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10016

O'’Donocuvue & O'DONOGHUE _
1912 Sunderland Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Attorneys for Petitioner
Air Line Pilots Association,
International

Hicusaw & MAHONEY
1015 Eighteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorneys for Petitioners

6 1974

11 Dm ATRIA SOT ARNO POR
:
INDEX ;
4
Sei E
PAGE Fi
Opinion of the Court of Appeals ............ iv j
Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, j
Order E-13899, 29 CAB 168 (1959) é
Opinion of the Board ................. 6a 3
#s
Opinion of Member Minetti, Dissenting .. 16a E
Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, é
Supplemental Opinion and Order on Recon-
sideration, Order E-14563, 30 CAB 90 (1959)
ee 35a
Opinion of Member Minetti Dissenting .. 38a
Order Instituting Investigation,
Order E-15413, 31 CAB 977 (1960) ...... 4la
Mutual Aid Pact Investigation, #
Order E-21044, 40 CAB 559 (1964)
Opinion of the Board .................. 44a

Opinion of Vice Chairman Murphy, Con-
curring and Dissenting .............. 49a

Opinion of Member Minetti, Dissenting .. 49a
Initial Decision of Examiner S. Thomas

NS le MS Cia Ga ga ps 844 bow 2-6 53a
Mutual Aid Pact of 1958 ............... 53a
Mutual Aid Pact as Amended through De-

NE Es das 6 ack dae we ec dances 122a

Mutual Aid Pact Incorporating Supple-
mental Payments Amendment, dated De-
CO ly BE 6k oe ba ects eaaaeces 123a

ii
PAGE

F. Mutual Aid Agreement Between American and
Mohawk Airlines,

Order E-24213,—CAB 209 (1966)
Opinion of the Board ................. 130a
Opinion of Member Gillilland, Dissenting . 132a

G. Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement (Rerewal),
Order Instituting Investigation, Order E-
26000, November 17, 1967 .............. 134a
H. Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement (Renewal),

Order Denying Leave to Intervene and Defer-
ring Kequest to Remand, Order 70-1-100,
Sammary BO, TOTO ous cen ccscesssscccenss 138a

I. Airlines Mutual Aid Pact,

Order 70-7-114 (July 28, 1970)
Opinion of the Board .................. 148a
Opinion of Chairman Browne, Concurring 158a
Opinion of Members Minetti and Murphy,

RII nao s.c cas nsawsdcassnseees 159a
Ynitial Decision of Examiner Arthur S.
PU: CUD 444460 xe canevacdoens 162a

J. Airlines Mutual Aid Pact—Order Granting in
Part Petition for Reconsideration and Remand-
ing for Further Hearing,

Order 70-11-110 (November 23, 1970) .... 22la

K. Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement,

Order 73-2-110 (February 27, 1973)
Opinion of the Board .................. 226a

iii
PAGE
Opinion of Members Minetti and Murphy,

Concurring and Dissenting ........... 255a
Initial Decision of Examiner Arthur S.

Present (1972) ..... Pe ey ey ee ee 27la
Mutual Aid Pact of October 31, 1969 .... 314a
Mutual Aid Pact Amendment of December

a eee _ EERE ears 322a

L. Pertinent Sections of:
Railway Labor Act, as Amended, 45 U.S.C.
§ 152, First, Seventh, Ninth
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as Amended,
49 U.S.C. § 1302, § 1871, $ 1882, § 1384
Sherman Act, Sec. 1, 15 U.S.C. $1
Clayton Act, Sec. 6, 15 U.S.C. $17 ...... 33la

APPENDIX A

Decision of United States Court of Appeals
502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir., August 8, 1974)

A hon etn tel bY

ae a

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 73-1214

AR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL,
PETITIONER

v.

CIvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ET AL
ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION & AIRCRAFT
MECHANICS FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION
FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC.
HUGHES AIR CORPORATION d/b/a HUGHES AIRWEST
NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES, INC.
OZARK AIR LINES, INC.
PIEDMONT AVIATION, I}.
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, INC.

. — Sin ss SNF HENRY IPT PR, CRT
ERNE EI PGE POAT LEO AE LUT EI ORT LEZEN NNT TN ELE I

IF A REIT IDD AE it LEB ELIT POR AL AV TOCA

Vv
No. 73-1229

Al LINE DISPATCHERS’ ASSOCIATION, ET AL,
PETITIONERS

Vv.

Civi. AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
BRANIFF AIRWAYS, INC.
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.
EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.
NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.
UNITED AIR LINES, INC.

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
WESTERN AIR LINES, INC.

ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND THE AIRCRAFT
MECHANICS FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION
FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC.

HuGnes AIR CORPORATION d/b,a HUGHES AIRWEST
NortTH CENTRAL AIRLINES, INC.
PIEDMONT AVIATION, INC.

“. TEXAS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, INC.

Petitions For Review of an Order of the
Civil Aeronautics Board

Decided August 8, 1974

Robert S. Savelson, of the bar of the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of

vi

court, with whom Donald J. Capuano was on the brief,
for petitioner in No. 73-1214. Patrick C. O’Donoghue
and Martin F. O’Donoghue, Jr., alse entered appearances
for petitioner in No. 78-1214.

William G. Mahoney, for petitioners in No. 73-1229.

Mariin C. Seham, of the bar of the Supreme Court of
the United States, pro hac vice, by special leave of court
for intervenor, Allied Piiots Association and Aircraft
Mechanies Benevolent Association. Richard Hibey and
James P. Davenport, entered appearances for intervenors
Allied Pilots Association and Aircraft Mechanics Benevo-
lent Association.

Glen M. Bendixsen, Attorney, Civil Aeronautics Board
for respondent. Richard Littell, General Counsel, Civil
Aeronautics Board, O. D. Ozment, Deputy General Coun-
sel, Robert L. Toomey, Acting Associate General Counsel,
Litigation and Research, Civil Aeronautics Board and
Robert B. Nicholson, Attorney, Department of Justice,
were on the brief, for respondent. R. Tenny Johnson,
General Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board, at the time the
record was filed and Warren L. Sharfman, Associate
General Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board, at the time
the record was filed, also entered appearances for re-
spondent. Howard E. Shapiro, Attorney, Department of
Justice also entered an appearance for respondent.

Charles A. Miller with whom Robert N. Saylor and
Eugene D. Guiland were on the brief, for i1.tervenors
trunkline carriers.

Raymond J. Rasenberger and James L. Devali were
on the brief for intervenors, Frontier Airlines. Inc., et al.

Before: BAZELON, Chief Judge and MACKINNON, Cir-
cuit Judge and CHRISTENSEN,” United Stotes
Semor District Judge for the District of Utah

* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).

Pin en

_ Co CRETE BIT OL LB Bate Se ee eee
OA IGS OA PPL LI III LL OOS CAS LP OVO Re J Lae Os ee a 2 were 2 “

vii

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge BAZELON.

BAZELON, Chief Judge: Petitioners, who are various
groups of airline employees, challenge the CAB’s ap-
proval of the airlines’ Mutual Aid Pact, as amended.
They contend that the Pact, as approved, vielates the
national laber policy, the Railway Labor Act (RLA}
and the antitrust laws; and that there is no substantial
evidence to support the CAB'’s finding that the Pact is
not adverse to the public interest.

1.

Created in 1958 by six airlines, the Mutual Aid Pact
represented a joint effort to soften the impact of strikes
against individual companies. At its inception, the Pact
provided only for “windfall payments.” A strikebound
company received payments from other Pact members
equal to their inerease in revenues resulting from the
strike minus their added operating expenses in servicing
the new business. The Paci. was soon amended to pro-
vide for “supplemental payments.” This feature enabled
a carrier member to receive 25°. of its normal air trans-
port operating expenses for operations shut down by the
strike. A 1969 amendment to the Pact raised that figure
te 50°, during the first fourteen days of the strike.
dropping by stages to 35°) after a strike period of four
weeks or longer. The additional payments over windfall
to meet this allotment were to be contributed by each
member in the proportion which its air transport oper-
ating revenues bore to the total revenue for all members.
Individual earrier liability for supplemental payments
Was limited at first to one-half of one percent of the
carrier's intake for the prior year. That limitation was
upped in 1969 to one percent by agreement of the Pact
members.

Both the increase ip supplemental payments rates and
the higher ceiling on individual earrier liability were

Beer SDC a OU eg GT a

aad ee ee ee
AVANCE ON MI RR Ry SAIS LACM LEENA, LTO RR LOEEOE A AAD

viii

approved in the Board's 1973 order,’ which followed an
initial decision by the Administrative Law Judge refus-
ing to allow the escalations.: These elements of the
amended Pact are the primary focus of the unions’ at-
tack on the Board's action. Petitioners also contest the
CAB’s consent to a 1971 amendment to the Puct author-
izing the participation of local service carriers.

Il.

The Supreme Court has recognized the responsibility
of transportation agencies like the CAB to make deci-
sions consistent with national labor policy. Burlington
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 173. This
responsibility was explicitly recognized in the Board's
opinion and is not a matter of dispute on appeal. What
is in dispute is the substance of national labor policy
relevant to this case.

The national labor policy rests on the principle that
parties should be free to marshall the economic resources
at their disposal in the resolution of a labor dispute,
consistent with the specific rights and prohibitions es-
tablished by the labor statutes. It is not generally given
to government agencies to “regulate what economic
weapons a party might summon to its aid.”* And this
principle, of course, underlies the RLA, which is made
applicable to air carriers by 45 U.S.C. §181 and by
section 401(k) (4) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
$1871(k) (4). That Act does establish certain proce-
dures that must be followed in the direct bargaining

‘CAR Order 73-2-110, Feb. 27, 1973, Joint App. 268a.
: Initial Decision of Examiner Arthur S. Present, Joint
App. 271a.

> NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490
(1960).

a, ee

ENO TE OPM TOLL RIP ASABE LLP NIN ONE BE Te REELS BE AER 8

DREN “eT ART. Bey

Peer ea seeueree: PEF RAINE

ix

process, but once these procedures are exhausted with-
out a settlement, either side is free to resort to economic
self-help in an attempt to force a settlement most favor-
able to it.’

This is not to suggest that warfare between unions
and the airlines may rage uninhibited under the RLA.
Like other substantive labor legislation, the RLA_ im-
poses a duty on both employers and employees to bar-
vain in good faith, and it recogrizes the right of em-
vlovers to organize without employer interference. But
in this case the CAB specifically noted that “the record
is replete with evidence of the earnest and consistent
vood faith efforts of [the Mutual Aid Pact Members!
to find a resolution to their strikes throughout the course
of difficult labor negotiations.” ~ The Board also points
‘to evidence refuting any notion that the Pact functions
as an employer device to control the formation of bar-
raining units."

The permissibility of the Mutual Aid Pact under the
RLA is supported by Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319
Red 366 (2d Cir. cert. denied, 375 U.S. 8380 11963).
The case involved a union attack on a strike insurance
plan in the railroad industry. a device whose similarity
to the Mutual Aid Pact in the airlines industry was

‘See 4 ULS.C. $$ 154-68, 183-85.

Seco Brotherhood of RR. Trainmen v. Jaeksonville Termi-
nal Co, 394 US. 3869, 378-79.

om U.S.C. § 152 First.
f/., § 152 Fourth.
Opinion of the CAB, Feb. 27, 1973, Joint App. 240a-41a.

One instence of an alleged RLA violation by an airline is
noted, but it was not shown to have any connection to carrier
membership in the Pact. /d., Joint App. 241a.

“See ia., Joint App. 240a n.14.

Pe

x

specifically noted in the Second Circuit’s opinion. In up-
holding the plan, the court began with the principle set
out above and found further support for its result in
section 20 of the Clayton Act’ and section 4 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act,” which sanction the payment of
benefits to parties engaged in a labor dispute. Petition-
ers’ efforts to undermine the rationale of the Kennedy
decision are unconvincing.’ We find the Board’s ap-
proval of the Pact, us amended, fully consistent with the
national labor policy and the RLA.

1099 U.S.C. § 52.
1129 U.S.C. § 104.

is Petitioners’ argument is based in part on a later holding
of the Second Circuit, NLRB v. A. & P. Stores Tuc., 340 F.2d
690, that a lockout by employers who were not in the same
bargaining unit as the company being struck was violative
of the National Labor Relations Act. Petitioners urge that this
case implies that multiemployer aid is impermissible except
in the context of multiemployer bargaining units, which pres-
ently do not exist in the airlines industry. A. & P. is easily
distinguished from Kennedy in that the court’s result in
A. & P. turned on a finding that the lockout violated section
8(a) (1) of the NLRA as a device to force the unions to accept
multiemployer bargaining units. As we have noted, text ac-
companying note 9 supra, the Pact does not appear to have
such coercive tendencies.

The unions also resort to Brotherhood of Railway &
Steamship Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Y., 384 U.S. 238
(1966), which held that during a strike period 2 railroad
could make some alterations in its contracts with the unions
without submitting these alterations to the lengthy negotia-
ions procedures required by the Act. The unions attempt
to read into this case a principle limiting the use of em-
ployer self-help whose effect is to prolong strikes. In fact, the
decision vindicates the right of self-help in the face of the
technical requirements of the Act by allowing the employer
to make adjustments necessary for continued operations dur-
ing the strike subject only to approval by the district court.

xi
III.

There is no indication either in the initial opinion of
the Administrative Law Judge or in the CAB’s opinion
that the unions presented their antitrust objections to
the Pact in the proceedings before the agency. As a
‘echnical matter, therefore, we are precluded from con-
sidering the antitrust attack absent any reasonable
grounds for failure to pursue that attack before the
CAB." As a practical matter, we cannot exercise an
appellate function in the review of administrative mat-
ters unless the problems have been fully aired and fo-
cused in the proceedings below. The Federal Aviation
Act (FAAs specifically exempts agreements approved
by the CAB from the operation of the antitrust laws."
The initial forum in which to raise antitrust objections
remains the ageney which is charged with the primary
determination of the public interest.’

IV.

In passing on agreements among air carriers under
49 U.S.C. $ 1382, the CAB is required to disapprove any

49 US.C. § 1486(e) provides:
No objection to an order of the Board .. . shall be con-
sidered by the court unless such objection shall have been
urged before the Board ... or if it was not so urged,
untoss there were reasonable grounds for failure to do so.

19 US.C. § 1384.

In prior rulings, the CAB has dealt with antitrust ob-
yeetions to the Puet. See. ¢.g., Opinion of the CAB, July 10,
M64, Joint App. 44a, 66a-67a. It concluded that the Pact
“has not operated in restraint of trade or lessened competition
between air carriers... .” However, we do not consider
these prior rulings, or the findings which they contain, to be
proper subjects of review at this juncture. See 49 USC.
“1I860a) Oprecliding appeals from orders of the CAB after
‘ days of decision except by leave of court on a showing of
soneonable grounds for failure to file in timely fashion).

xii

agreements which it finds to be “adverse to the public
interest.” The courts may not overturn the CAB’s find-
ings of fact unless they are unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record.” Nor may they upset the final
judgments of the CAB unless they fall outside a zone of
reasonableness.’” It is urged, however, that because the
CAB lacks expertise in labor matters, its decisions im-
pinging on the activities of unions in the airlines indus-
try are to be accorded less weight than these standards
imply, although petitioners fail even to articulate an al-
ternative standard.”

The CAB is not a labor board, of course, as it is first
to concede. Yet we have already concluded that its
decision in this case is consistent with national labor
policy, such as it may be discerned. Beyond that, a
proper evaluation of the Pact’s effect on the unions and
their members necessarily involves a firm grasp of in-
dustry practices under the agreement, and the CAB’s
grasp has reason to be firm. Against a background
k 1owledge of the industry’s economic structure, the CAB
has monitored the Pact since its inception sixteen years
ago and has the benefit of three full evidentiary hear-
ings conducted on the Pact in 1962, 1966 and 1970.**

16 49 U.S.C. § 1486(e): “The findings of fact by the Board
_.., if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”

17 See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 98 U.S. App.
D.C. 348, 354, 235 F.2d 845, 851 (1956).

‘‘ Brief for Petitioner Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’! at 8-9.
' Brief for Respondent CAB at 16.

2° Cf. National Aviation Trades Ass’n v. CAB, 136 US.
App. D.C. 367, 372, 420 F.2d 209, 214 (1969) (endorsing
CAB’s competence to make findings reievant to antitrust
factors despite its lack of expertise as such in the antitrust
field).

xiii

Despite the CAB’s experience with the Pact, we would
net affirm, of course, if issues of employee welfare had
been ignored or slighted. This court has previously
pointed out “the Board’s duty to consider the welfare of
carrier employees under the public interest standard
when it approves agreements under Section 412.”*' But
in a finding that the unions do not dispute, the Board
in this ease declared

that the employees retain substantial and effective
bargaining power regardless of the Mutual Aid
Agreement. Thus, the record shows that air carrier
wages ... are higher than, and. . . have increased
faster than, wages in other industries, including
other transportation industries.**

We do not think the Board need have gone further in
this respect.

In assessing the net impact of the Pact and its new
amendments, the CAB also took into account, inter alia:
the industry’s vulnerability to strikes; the tendency of
the Pact, as amended, to promote or prolong strikes;
and the impact which the agreement has on the viability
of marginal companies. Since the basis of the CAB’s
findings on each of these points is vigorously attacked
by the unions, we will review in some detail the evi-
dence on which the Board bases its findings.

The Board found that the air transport industry “suf-
fers a greater impact by strike than do other industries,
and is therefore more vulnerable to strike|s| .. . than
are other industries.” The unions claim that this finding
is based on a misreading of the testimony of Dr. Herbert
R. Northrup of the Wharton School of the University

“Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. CAB, 154 U.S. App. D.C.
316, BZ, ATS F.2d 900, 905 (1973).

Opinion of the CAR, Feb. 27, 1973, Joint App. Z34da-35a.

xiv

of Pennsylvania.*’ On our reading of the statement, Dr.
Northrup seems quite explicit that airlines—like other
service industries in which the ability to stockpile is
limited—are particularly vulnerable to strikes and fur-
thermore that they are more vulnerable to strikes than
other transportation industries with a higher percentage
of freight traffic, which can be stored pending settle-
ment.:* In defending the peculiar suitability of the Mu-
tual Aid Pact for the airlines industry, the Board did
not purport to find that air carriers were more sensi-
tive to work stoppages than all other transport industries;
nor was such a finding necessary.

The tyro remaining findings of the Board which come
under special fire are: (1) that the Pact, as amended.
is not likely to have a serious impact on the willing-
ness of companies to sustain or prolong strikes; (2) that
the payments required by the Act do not and are not
likely to affect the viability of small or economically
marginal airlines. These findings are defensive in na-
ture. They are central to the Board’s answer to al-
legations that the Pact poses risks to the stability and
smooth operation of the airlines system which out-
weigh the benefits on which we have touched. If either
finding were unsupported, we would have difficulty in
countenancing the Board’s decision. But we do not so
conclude.

Although the CAB followed the Administrative Law
Judge’s view that “the record does not establish that
any carrier has incurred or prolonged a strike because
of the increased level of mutual aid,” ** it differed from
his as-essment of a substantial danger that the amended

*’ Trunkline Carrier Exhibit No. 80.
‘Id. 11-42.

Initial Decision of Examiner Arthur S. Present, Joint
App. 301a.

REMPCERG NAT MENT LAE DIRIY EN OP RI eCSTIETEN

APE ATP OTR EA LIT BE FI

ear cia ine

Reaver RPE MAL AED

XV

Pact would result in significantly longer and more fre-
quent work stoppages. In concluding that this risk was
not substantial, the Board noted the relative infrequency
with whieh negotiations in the airlines industry have
erupted into strikes in recent years. The statistics cited
cover the period from 1968-1971, during at least part of
which the new amendments were actually in effect.”

The CAB’s finding on the prolongation issue is further
supported by the Board's determination that significant
financial pressures to settle remain on the airlines despite
their participation in the Pact. The unions point out
that in 1970 some airlines actually experienced operating
profits during periods of strike when supplemental pay-
nents under the Pact were taken into account. But the
Bourd reasonably believed that in assessing the dynamics
of the companies’ position during strikes, operating prof-
its should be compared to “normal profits” for a similar
period—profits which the company would have enjoyed
‘¢ it had not sustained a strike. Similarly, it included
in its model “post-strike losses.” These take in the cost
of resuming operations, losses attributable to the ab-
sence of advance bookings and “the long-term loss of
traffie attributable to the loss of carrier identity in the

9 27

market .... ”

Clearly “normal profits” and “nost-strike losses” are
based to some degree, as petitioners assert, on “specula-
tion and hypotheeation,” * but the absence of certainty
does not preclude the Board from making a considered

“}ronieally, the unions cite the same statistics in their
altempts to refute the CAN’s findings on the strike prolonga-
tion issue. Brief of Petitioner Air Line Dispatchers’ Ass’n at
10. This would seem to ignore that the Pact was in effect
during the entire period covered by the figures.

Opinion of the CAL, Feb. 27, 1973, Joint App. 236a.
-s Brief of Petitioner Air Line Dispatchers’ Ass'n at 30.

xvi

judgment on the best information available. One could
wish that the Board had addressed itself to the meth-
odological problems inherent in estimating these loss fac-
tors: it simply stated that it considered the companies’
figures to have been “reasonadly estimated’ and adopted
them as its own. Yet the unions do not point to evi-
dence that the companies reached their estimates by mis-
guided or meritricious methods. And the CAB did seek
to control the risk of error by limiting its approval of
the agreement to a period of five years. Thus, if the
CAB’s “hypotheeatiuns” prove wrong, they may be cor-
rected.

The Board also found that the Pact offers no significant
threat to the financial stability of its members. Although
the Administrative Law Judge reached a different as-
These methodological problems do receive extensive treat-
ment by company experts cn the record. See Trunkline Car-
rier Exhibit Nos. 50-52. Presumably these discussions pro-
vided the basis of the CAB’s acceptance of the estimates.

“|nitin! Decision of Examiner Arthur S. Present, Joint
App. 301a.

‘ Opinion of the CAB, Feb. 27, 1973, Joint App. 243a-44a.

aaentes

Basses ee

xvii

from strikes or threats of strike.* This line of justi-
fication also supports the Board’s approval of the 1971
amendment allowing local service carriers to join the
act, for these carriers, as a group, are likely to be less
stable, and therefore more vulnerable to strikes than
trunkline carriers.

Of course, the ceiling imposed by the Pact provides
some safeguard against oppvessive payrhents. And al-
though liability for windfall payments may bring a car-
riers total obligation to more than one percent of its
operating revenues, the Board argues correctly that the
windfall paynients represent no added burden to the
company which must pay them, because they represent
only profits which the company could not have expected
to enjoy absent the strike suffered by its competitor.

We conclude that the findings on which the Board
rests its decision are adequately supported and that the
result reached is «a reasonable one.

V.

We have earefully considered the unions’ remaining
econtentions."' We believe that only one warrants dis-
cussion. The unions say the CAB erred in failing to
adopt a condition that would have precluded considera-
tion of amounts paid out under the Pact as expenses for
the purpose of establishing rates. As the CAB recog-
nized," the petitioners are seeking to pursue this issue
in the wrong procedural context. The authority of the
Board to review and prescribe air carrier rates is ex-

Id.. Joint App. 245a.

These include a claim of bias on the part of CAB, which
we deem without substantial foundation.

“The CAR refused to take evidence on this point. Brief
of Petitioner Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l at 72.

xviii

ercised in distinct proceedings under the FAA.’ Jf
the unions feel that the rates charged by the airlines
are unreasonable because they include allowances for pay-
ments under the Pact, they may institute proceedings
before the CAB under 42 U.S.C. § 1482(d). Petitioners
suggest that their objection would be “buried” in a rate-
making proceeding.” If this should happen, and if the

unions are so advised, they may seek judicial review.”

Affirmed.

33 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d).
‘’ See Brief of Petitioner Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l at 72.
* See 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a).

APPENDIX B

Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact
Order E-13899 (1959)

Opinion of the Board
Opinion of Member Minetti, dissenting

one ad BC Hr

Docket 9977
(E-18899)

SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT

Decided May 20, 1959

On the basis of the record before the Board and after giving due consideration
to the standards contained in the Federal Aviation Act and the Railway
Labor Act, basic agreement between American Airlines, Inc.. Capital Air-
lines, Inc., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
Trans World Airlines, Ine., and United Air Lines, Inc., relating to mutual
assistance in the event of strikes, not found to be adverse to the public in-
terest or in violation of the Act and, accordingly, approved subject to con-
ditions.

In the absence of an affirmative showing io the record. the Beard is unable to
conclude that the agreement violates the Railway Labor Act: that the acree-
men’, threatens, by an azzravation of labor disputes, to hinder promotion of
a eiable and efficient air transportation system ; that the agreement. modified
by deletion of the provision relating to reuting of trathe by a struck carrier,
will substantially lessen competition between carriers: thar the agreement is
too vague for approval or that the parties thereto have failed to comply with
the filing requirements imposed by the Beard’s orders: that subsidy mail-pay
considerations require disapproval of the agreement; or that the agreement
would inject the Board into the controversial area of labor relations and
impose such a complex administrative burden on the Lourd as to render ite
approval adverse to the public interest.

Where Congress has been silent on the matter of private efforts by employers
to induce acceptance by unions of recommendations of emergency boards
established by the I’resident of the United States under section 10 of the Rail-
way Labor Act, the Board will not usurp the congressional prerogative by
embroidering additional prohibitions on the fabric of that Act.

Provision in agreement, not essential to basic plan, which requires struck car-
rier to route traflic to other sicnatories, unduly restrains competition among
air carriers, docs not serve the interests of the traveling public, and must be
deleted as a condition to approval of the agreement.

Approval of agreement shall in the public interest be conditioned npon deiction
of objectionable clause relating to routing of traffic, preservation of richts
and obligations under Railway Labor Act, continuation of recnlar reports,
and reservation of question concerning reasonableness of financial provisions
of agreement for future ratemaking or other regulators purposes under the
Act.

AYPPRARANCTS ‘

Gun Farmer, Howard C, Westwood, David C. Acheson, and Jerome Ackerman
ou behalf of American Airlines, Inz., ct al.

Samuel E. Gates on behalf of American Airlines, Inc.
Charics H. Murchison, Robert B. Hankins, Macon M. Arthur, and James JT.

Bastian on behalf of Capital Airlines, Inc.
W. Glen Harlan, FE. Smuthe Gamorctt, William R. Howard, and William B.
Bell, Jr., on behalf of Kastern Air Lines, tne.
John C. Pirie on behalf of Pan American World Airways, Ine.
Carl S. Rowe and Arthur Wischart on behalf of Trans World Airlines, Inc.
H. Templcton Brown on behalf of United Air Lines, Inc.

168 Vol. 29, No. 14

PRN CEN NRA om LES Wis EL DE

SIX-CAPRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 169

Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., James L. Highsaw, Jr., Plato
Papps, and [var I’cteraon on behalf of International Association of Machini-t-,
and the Brotherhood of Rallway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Mandler;, Ix-
press and Station Employees.

F. Harold Bennett and Wanriee WT. Schy on behal€ of Air Line Pilots Assocla-
tion, Internatlonal, and Air Line Ageuts Association, International.

John FF. O'Donnell ou behalf of Transport Workers Union of Amerien, AFL-
clo.

George R. Petty, Jr., on behalf of Flight Engineers International Association,
AFL-C10.

Orinion
By tur Boarp:

This proceeding involves an agreement between six certificated
carriers? for mutual assistance in the event of certain strikes.* The
carriers seek approval of the agreement under section 412 of the Act

On December 4, 1958, the Board ordered * oral argument on the
question of approval or disapproval of the agreement. AIL inter-
ested parties and government agencies were invited to participate in
the hearing. Statements of position have been filed by the carriers?
unions,’ six supplemental air carriers,’ and one municipal chamber
of commerce. Responses to Board inquiries have been reecived from
various government agencies.” The carriers and unions ' have fur-
ther expressed their views during oral argument, and the matter now
stands submitted for decision.

tAmeriean Alriines, Inc., Capita! Alrlines, Ine., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Pan American
World Airways, Ine., Trans World Airlines, lne., and United Air Lines, Ine. These
carriers shall be referred to simply as “the carriers,” or by their commonly knows
abbreviatet names.

3A copy of the agreement is attached hereto as appendix A.

3 Federal Aviation Act sec, 412 provides:

“See. 412. (a) Every air carrier shail file with the Board a true copy, or. if oral,

a true and complete memorandum, of every contract or agreement (whether enforceable
by provisions for liquidated damages, pensities, bonds, or otherwise) affecting air trans-
portation and in force on the effective dite of this section or bereatter entered tnta,
or any meditieation or cancellation thereot, between such air carrier and any other air
earcier, foreigo air carrier, or other carrier for pooling or apportioning —-er losses,
trate, service, or equipment, of relating to the establishment of transportation rates,
fares, charges, or classilientions, or for preserving and improving safety, coenemns and
efficiency of operation, or tor controlling, regulating, preventing, or otherwise eliminating
Gestructise, oppressive, or wasteful competition. or for regulating stops, schedules, aud
ebaracter of service, or for uther ee working arrangements.

° ° ° ° ° °

“(b) The Board shall by order deaneneee any such contract or agreement, whether or
not previously approved by it. that it tinds to be adverse to the public interest. or in
violation of this Act. and shall by order approve ans suck contract of agreement. or
ans modification or cancellation thereof, that It does not tind to be adverse to the public
interest, or in violation of this Act: except that the Board may not approve any con-
tract or agreement hetween an ale carrier not directly engaged in the operation of air-
craft in nit transportation and a common carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce
Act, as amended. governing the compensation to be received by such common cartier
for transportation ne rviees performed by it.”

4Order BK baton. os eA tet

ovae carriers filed a joint brief, TWA and Capital also filed supplemental metmo-
randume.

6 Internattonal Associntion of Machinists, ond the Brotherhood of Railway and Steam-
abip Clerks, Freteht Ulandlers, Dxpress and Station Employees (jointly): Air Line
Agents Association, Internationa®: smd Air Line Pilots Association. International.

TAN American Airwaves, Ine., Air Corso Express, Ine. dba. Columbia Airlines, Seur-
dough Air Transport, Sontheorn Atr Trans cort, Ine. Standard Airways, and United States
Oversens Airlines, Ine. cjetotis arin di-approevald.

8 Louisville (Kyo) Chamber of Commerce Caurging appreval.

PS Department of Commerce. Depertment of Justices, Department of Labor, National
Labor Relations Beard. and Natvenal Sfecdiation Board. ‘The responses of these agencies
are eet forth In appendix Bo to this opr,

WM International As-octation of Machinists; Rrotherhood of Rallwas and Steamship
Clerks, Preticht ye Iixpress amt Station Limndoyeea: Ate Line Pilota Association,
International; Ale Line Agents Association, International: Transport Workers of Aimer-
ten, AFL CIOS and Plight Engineers’ International Assoctation, AFL-CIO, These unions
abail be referred to herein as “the unlons,”” or by their commonly known alphabetical
abbreviations.

29 C.A.B.—168
598690—62——--13

6a

4 r vee SO er AR a I PS 2 aE ES eet Oe LSP a, a EBON dA ei
x

170 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS

After careful scrutiny of the record before it. the Board has deter-
mined to approve the agreement since, subject to conditions," the
basic agreement cannot be found to be adverse to the public interest
or in violation of the Act. Certain conditions required by the public
interest will be included in the order of approval.

I

The agreement, which became etlective October 20, 1958, and is to
expire 1 year later, provides for mutual assistance in the event any
party’s flight operations are shut down by rexson of (1) a strike
called to enforce union demands in excess of or opposed to the recom-
mendations of a Presidential Emergency Board appointed under
section 10 of the Railway Labor Act; or (2) a strike called before
exhaustion of the pre-strike procedures of that Act: or (3) a strike
which is “otherwise unlawful.” The operating parties will pay to
the strike-bound signatory carrier their “increased revenues attrib-
utable to the strike * * *: Jess applicable added direct expenses.”
In return, the struck carrier “will make every reasonable effort * * *
to provide the public with information concerning all air services
rendered by the other parties, and to direct to them as much of the
traflie normally carried by the party sutlering such a strike as pos-
i olen

IT

In determining whether to approve the agreement. we are governed
by section [12 of the Act. which provides that we siiail approve any
agreement not found to be adverse to the public interest '* or in vio-
lation of the Act. Since both the Federal Aviation Aet and the
Railway Labor Act provide that every air carrier, and its emplovees,
must comply with the applicable provisions of the latter statute?3
our measurement of the agreement against the standards contained
in section 412 begins with the inquiry whether the agreement vio-
lates the Railway Labor Act.

11 As noted hereinafter, the conditions include deletion of clause 2 of the agreement,
@ severable provision which is not essential to adininiscration of the agreement but which
is objectionable to the interests of the public.

12 Qur purview of the “public interesc” is framed by sec. 102, which provides :

“See. 102. In the exercise and performance of its powers aud duties under this Act,
the Board shall consider the following, emeng other thines, as being in the public inter-
est, and in accerdance with the public convenience ated necessity :

(a) The enceuragement and development of ano arr-tranmspertition system properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the Loretza aivd elemestic conumerce of the
United States. of the Posial Service, and of the nationad defense :

(bp The rezulativa of air transportation te sueh iMmanner os te recognize and preserve
the inherent adsonteces ef ossuie the biche.t decree of safety ia. aml foster sound
economic conditions in, such tranmspertation, aud to improve the relations beiween, and
Coordingte transportation by. air carriers :

(c) ‘The promotion et adequate, economical, and efficient service by ale carriers at
reasonable charzes, witheut unjust diservninations, undue preferenees of advantages, or
unfair or destructive competitive practices ;

(d) Competition to the extent mecessary to assure the sound development of an air-
transportation system properly adapted te the needs ef the ferenzu and domestic com-
merce of the United States, of the Uostal Servier, and of the national defense ;

(e) The promotion of safery in nar eon

(f) The promotion. encouragement, and deve nr ef civil aeronautics *

3 Section JOLEKI C4) Of our Act makes comp swith tithe TL ef the Railway Labor
Act a condition upon the holdings of a eertitieate ot publie “Hence ad fteeessitv by
any air carrier, Section Lol of the Railway Laber Net exte s Visi
title To of that Aet (except see. 3) te “cover every commen earrier by sir engaged iv
Interstate or foreign commerce, and every earrier by air transperting mail for or under
contract with the United States Government, and every air pilet or other person who
performs any werk as an employee or subordinate oflicial of sueh earrier or carriers,
Rubject to its or their continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner of rendl-
tion of his service.”

29 C.A.B.—168
Ta

ot

Digrtione:

a ee i oa

IX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 171

The unions oppose approval of the agreement on the ground that
the agreement wil! violate the Railway Labor Act in several respects.
First, it is contended that “the agreement portends a repudiation of
the requirement that collective bargaining be in good faith.” We
cannot agree. Clearly, such a result is not dietated by the terms of
the agreement, which do vot impinge upon the carrier” responsibilt-
ties “to exert every reasonable effort te make * * * agreements — * *
and to settle all disputes.” Vhe sc:eement. although increasing
management's abilities to withstand the economic impact of strikes
in the same manner that union strike benefits cushion the econonie
effect on cmployees, does not purport to affect the carriers’ duties
under the Railway Labor Act to bargain in earnest. Nothing pre-
sented by the parties shows that the operation of the agreement wiih,
in fact, induce the carriers to cisregard the obligations imposed by
law. Neither matters of record nor fair inferences to be drawn
therefrom justify a finding that the agreement will constitute an
impedunent to lend fide collective bargaining.

Similarly. we cannot conelnde that the operation of the agreement
will interfere with Cie prompt sett'oment of disputes. Our view is
confirmed by the chrenicle Gf recent events. ‘Thus, although the
agreement was operative during a period of nvvor strikes, the reeord
is devoid of any showing that the duration of any dispute was pro-
longed as a result of the mutual aid provided thereunder. Indeed,
counsel for the wnious diseiaimed any evidence to this effect when
questioned at oral argument.

Moreover, experience derived from the recent strikes -neeests that
there will necessarily be present potent factors preciuding carrier
complacency around the bargaining table. Strikes compensable un-
der the agreement wil continue to eause stgnificant losses of rev-
enue!® For example, even after Capital received mivitial aid) pay-
ments of S2.247.972 for October and November 195% that ecarrter’s
net operating revenue for the 2 months in which the strike tock
place was S1587,979 less than the carrier would have earned by its
own forecast. And, as to expenses, it is noteworthy that payments
under the agreement do not reeoup a struck carrier's fixed costs, or
its extraordinary sirike expenses. We are satistied that the prospect
of major Josses of revenue and continning fixed expenses, with pes-
sible permanent diversion of traffic to competing carriers, will serve
aS a genuine carrier incentive to avoid strikes by bargaining in good
faith. Accordingly, we reject the wuon contention to the contrary.

MAmonz the bargaining duties of carriers are those set forth In sec. 2, first, of the
Rallwas Laber Act, whieh provides:

“Et shall be the duty of al) eorcters, their aleers, aventt, and employees to exert
every reasonable esert te teshe aod maintain oerectiaents coneertiung rates of pay. rules,
and working condit ons, ated te settle all disputes, whether aristag out of the opplieation
of euch agrecment. Or othe owl. an order te avoid any interruption to Commerce of to
the operation of any carrier growin: out of ans dispute between tie Cartier and the
employees thereof"

13 Kallway Labor Act, sec. 2, first. quoted nete Tt. supra.

Bee A ostdiewtatttat teeeileee OP the te cetene stitet hd tave been certvedd from fight
vperations by the struck carrier Weil mot be teenuped by operation of the agreement.
Fiest, net all tratlic let by the struct carrier wal be dovertesl to parttes te the agree
ment; Henelgnatory earriers, ex eourse, Wilh Dot pesos Cheat “exeess nese dee to the
atrike, This loss of revenne will be imerecsed by the condition attieled (oe oar order
which prohibits routtus of tratie by streeb eurrier te other sesnatery earriers.
Seeondly, the struck coctier cai expect mo reterm with fe peet to iocht« over segments
not serviced by any party to the agreement. Finally. it is possible that the grounding
of an airline will teedluce no portion of Its potential trite not to travel bs air, thos
depriving oll alr carriers, Including the struck carrier, of “excess income.”

29 C.A.B.—168

8a

172 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS

Second, the unions contend that “the agreement violates the duties
of air carriers under the Railway Labor Act by bringing into the
dispute carriers not parties thereto.” In this regard it is argued
that the financial * provisions of the agreement will nopert the
signatory carriers info the “shadowy background” of disputes, atd-
ing the actual parties to seek the bargain desired by the other car-
riers. We do not agree. Even assuming that the Railway Labor
Act precludes group bargaining without union consent, the agree-
ment would not violate that Aet unless it burdened the negotiating
carrier with representation of positions net its own!’ "Phis, how-
ever, the agreement does not do: The carrier involved in the dispute
may bargain without reference to the views or policies of other
parties to the agreement: if struck, it is entitled to financial aid with-
out regard to the popularity of its bargaining posture among the
other parties. It may well be, of course, that carriers have and
under the agreement increasingly will consult with each other con-
cerning labor questions of common concern, Such a practice, how-
ever, would not necessarily entail any sacrifice of each carrier's com-
plete and exclusive control over its collective bargaining.””

The third manner in which it is contended that the agreement
violates the Railway Labor Act relates to its coverage of strikes
which have been called “for reasons which incinde the enforcement
of demands in excess of or opposed to the recommendations of a
board established by the President of the United States under
section 10 of the Railway Labor Act.” The uniens urge that the
agreement is antipothetic to both the letter and spirit of thac Act
by attempting to force unions to accept emergeucy board recom-
mendations.

The union position is that the carriers may not by mutual eco-
nomic aid seek to induce acceptance of board recommendations,
which are not made mandatory by the Railway Labor Aet. Such
concerted carrier action is asserted to be opposed to the congressional
contemplation that emergency board recommendations be free of
compulsion. ‘To the contrary, the carriers urge that the refusal of
Congress te compel acceptance by governmental sanction did not
operate to prohibit private parties from attempting to induce com-
pliance by the ciash of comparative economic bargaining strength.

The Railway Labor Act is silent on the matter of private efforts
to compel acceptance by unions of the recommendations of emergency
boards. Nothing in the legisiative history called to our attention
indicates that Congress intended to forbid a mutual ail pact among
employers for that purpose. The Board will not neurp the co.-
gressional prerogative by embroidering additional prohibitions on
the fabric of the Railway Labor Act. As we have said before —*°

17The union Interpretation of the Railway Iabor Act te exclude from disputes car-
flers not parties thereto rests upon see. 2. sewond, of that Act, which provides:

“ALL disputes between a carrier or enrriers and its or their employers shall be con-
sidered, and, if possible, decided. with all expedition, in coaference between representa-
tives designated and authorized -o toe confer, respectively, by the carrier or carriers and
by the employees thereof interested in the dispute.”

ICS ANulines Negutistiey Cortese Se 1 ob C1947. where we allewed 1S car-
tiers to set up an orcanization te act as exclusive bargaining representative of each
carrier, althouch we did not purport to pass upon its propriety as a representative in
avy particular necotiation.

19 We express no view whether carrier consultation, which is not shown In the record,
would be a dv The
union arguments to the contrary have been carefully weighed and
found wanting. First, since the carriers’ duties to exert every rea-
sonable effort to achieve prompt and orderly settlement of disputes
reinains unaffected, we cannot agree that the agreement will destroy
effective collective bargaining under the Railway Labor Act. Sec-
ondly, we cannot accept the bare, unsupported contention that the
agreement will result in an expansion of the area of labor disputes
and industrywide strikes. The record before us does not support
the inference that the existence of the agreement would persuade
unions, as a matter of strategy or of retaliation,*® to strike against
carriers With whom they have no uncompromisable dispute. The
mere augury of industrywide strikes, incorrectly predicted under
similar circumstances once before,’ is insuflicient to warrant a con-
clusion that the agreement will destroy workable labor relations in
the industry.**
IV

In weighing the objections made to the traffic-routing provision of
the agreement, we must recognize that our order of approval would
grant immunity from the antitrust laws.2? We have therefore scru-
tinized the agreement to insure that the conduct thus legalized does
not inhibit competition to any significant extent or. if it does, that
the restraint is necessary to serve the purposes of the regulatory
statute.*°

After consideration of the contentions of the parties. we have
concluded that the clause relating to diversion of traflic by the
struck carrier! is adverse to the public interest. First. the von-
certed eifort to shuttle traflie among a restricted group of carriers
is repugnant to established antitrust principles and should not re-
ceive our approval unless required by a serions transportation need,
or in order to secure important public benetits.** Since the record
fails to show any sound public justification for the restrictive pro-
vision, we cannot allow it to stand. Secondly, we are convinced

25 Should subsequent events, including the operation of the agreement, lead to a dif-
ferent conclusion, we would act to preserve the minimum stability in air transportation
required by the public interest.

% Coun-el for JAM-EKC. at oral arzument, disavowed any intent on the part of his
clients to stave retaliatory strikes.

— IAM and ALDPA briefs in Airlines Negotiating Conference Agreements, docket

2 The petition of ALAA. dated Feb. 9, 1959, requests exemption of ALAA from the
application of the agreement on the grounds that the earrer allecations of imbalance
do not relate to ALAA. Viewing the petition as. in part, an anteipaters petition Lor
reconsideration and, in part. a repiy brief fer w hich request for leave to file was dermis ad
at oral arzument, we shall grant the carriers’ metions fo distarss, Order K-s22en,
Mar. 18, 1095S: rule 31 of the Rules of Dractier in Leonemie Proceedings. In adlditien,
we note thet the specitte findinzs and substantiating evidentiary hearing requested) by
ALAA are rendered unnecessary by the rationale of our decision, Sines we do net
approve the agreement tn order to redress an alleged preponderance of lober power, the
failure of ALAA to achieve cquivalent barzatning strength would not entitle it to an
exemetion from the application of the agrectnent.

7 Vederal Aviation Aet, sec. 414.

M Poderal Aviation Act. see. 102(d), See Local Cartage Aagrcement Case, Th CARB.
850 (in): Air Freight Tariff Aareement Case, 14 CLA.B. 42-4 (151): Air Cargo, Ine,
Agreement, Petitions, © CAT des cloasd.

3°2. The party suffering such a strike will make every reasonable effort, with its
emmoyees still on duty, to provide the pablie with information concerning ai) air sery-
fees rendered by the other parties. and to direet fo them as much of the tratie normally
carried by the party suffering such a strike as possible, all as the best interests of the
members of the public may require.”

92 Sve Local Cartage Agrecment Case, supra; North Atlontic Tourist Commission Caac,
16 C.A.B, 225 (1952).

29 C.A.R.—168
lla

er

, rae eee

Pia Nall ea eek

FNL LATE OCI ERE ON RET

“

PITPRRE NT ANY

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ae

Beer:

ONE Re AO EDM 2 He

oo eM PS SALTER OCA ELAS. TF

SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 175

that the public interest is not served if the traveling public, unaware
of alternative air services which might be preferable, is advised
according to carrier obligation rather than passenger convenience.*?

Recognizing that the provision is not crucial to the purpose of the
agreement, we believe sound regulatory practice dictates conditioning
our order of approval upon the deletion of the provision from the
agreement3* We shall require the filing of an amendment to the
agreement to conform it to the requirements of the public interest.**

If the agreement is so moditied, the questions posed by the Depart-
ment of Justice concerning restraint of trade may be answered
favorably to the agreement. First, we are satisfied that the agree-
ment springs from business requirements and not from any intent
to monopolize. Secondly, we do not believe that the operation of
the modified agreement during the limited period of a strike would
seriously affect competition between air carrier parties to the agree-
ment nnd other carriers. The condition we have imposed will pre-
vent a lessening of competition between air carriers. while surface
carriers cannot be deprived of traffic which has already expressed
a preference for air service.

Similarly, we cannot conclude that the financial assistance provi-
sions of the agreement will substantially lessen competition within
the air transportation industry. The commercial advantages of
building goodwill and permanently capturing diverted traflic miti-
gate against any dampening of competition between operating
signatory carriers. y

The unions have urged disapproval on several grounds relating to
the completeness of the agrecnient and to the contracting parties’
responses to our orders. First, the unions contend that the agree-

° , » , ° van :
ment is too ambiguous for approval. We disagree. The carriers
were required to file the agreement under section 412(a), whether or
not it was legally enforceable“ Similarly, the Board is required by
section 412(b) to approve or to disapprove the agreement unless it
is so vague that the Board cannet intelligently determine whether

33 We are aware that several carriers have made the routing obligations more palatable
bs Saying special stress on the provi.o “all as the best interests of the members of the
poblic may require.” Copital, for example. “in ceneral” prefers signatories only where
schedules are “equally d:

el

other reasons,® then, the Railway Labor Act is an employee-protec-
tion statute as well as an overall plan for labor peace. Since both
objectives are designed to be realized through genuine, good-faith
caiheative bargaining. ‘the emasculation of the bargaining process
inherent in this agreement is adverse to the objectives of the Rail-
way Labor Act.

To insure the attainment of its objectives, the Railway Labor Act
commands the parties to major disputes to take the following pre-

gnceieit kN ae AeA

‘ liminary steps, without which no agreement could be reached, and
: freezes the use of economic weapons during those steps? First, the
2 Railway Labor Act requires direct bargaining between the parties
4 in a good-faith effort to adjust their differences. Second. when
: bilateral efforts to reach agreement have failed, on request of
J either party or on proffer of services by the National Media-
a tion Board, the National Mediation Board will

act as mediator,
or counselor, to both parties to the dispuie. Third, in the

% event of continued failure by the parties to reach agreement
3, after mediation, the National “Mediation Board must make every
; effort to induce the parties to submit their controversies to tinal and
binding arbitration. Finally, where either of the parties declines to
arbitrate and the National Mediation Board is of the judgment that
an unadjusted dispute threatens “substantially to interrupt inter-
State conmierce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the
country of essential transportation service.” * the National Mediation
Board must notify the President, who in his discretion may create
in Emergency Board to investigate and report on the facts of the
dispute. .
hxamination of this agreement reveals it to be contrary to the
collective bargaining objectives of the Railway Labor Act in two
fundamental respects. One, it imposes compulsory multiemployer
bargaining without employee consent. Two, it substitutes reliance
4 on economic force for the good-faith bargining required by the
Railway Labor Act.

MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING

Whether the majerity considers multiemployer bargaining desir-
} able or undesirable, its review of this Agreement is circumscribed
: by the prohibition of the Railway Labor Act against the imposition
: of multiemployer bargaining on unwilling employees. This the Na-
tional Mediation Board has fonnd.! Moreover, the language of the

‘ statute permits no other reasonable construction and the statutory
| prohibition has been recognized by airline spokesmen.

@ While the Ratlway Taber Act prohibits unfair
Parable restraints are

‘
labor practices by employers, na com-
4 duttes in the Railway 1

Imposed on employee aetivicy The only stzniticant employee

ather Net apple eaaally to emplovers,

TFrom the time of the notice of intended change in agreements which acts the Rail-

way Labor Act’a machinery in motion, no chavge may be made in statue qo With respect

to rates of pas. rules, of Werking conditions for ¢1) 10 dige after negotiations hare

A collapsed and the serviers of the National Mediation Roard have not been utilized:
(2) for 20 daga after notification by the National Mediation Board. if ite services have

been utilired. that it« ineliatory efforts have fettea: of (3) im the event of establish-

ment of an Largrerecy Steard. for 30 days after the teport to the l’resident.

* Sec. 10. Ratlway bor Act. i
foeth Amnial Report. pre do

*Nothonal Mevibe tien Tecore
fe Ree statements of Mero Theron then Genetal Counsel for the Ale Transport Ax DER A i A ALR ELEA LO E
pen A PPA EPS Sen oo - ” “ - cow =
“es

SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 183

subsequent to the effective date of this agreement and prior to the
date on which it was filed with the Board, requires an examination.
From the context of statements made by the president of Capital to
us on October 21, 1958, it is reasonable to assume that the ultimatum
was issued on behalf of other airlines as well and in reliance on the
economic strength furnished by this agreement. If, because of
this agreement, the hostile attitude displayed by the parties at the
time of the Cepital ultimatum (:n attitude in sharp contrast to the
forebearance and absence of bitterness noted in Emergency Board
Report No, 122),)° will continue in the future, the purposes of the
Railway Labor Act will be entirely frustrated.

In the majority’s view there is no evidence whatsoever that any
work stoppage was prolonged because of this mutual aid agreement
or the attitudes engen? ved by it.2 The majority also points to
the ultimate settlement of the dispute between Capital and_ the
Machinists on terms favorable to the employees as evidence of the
innocuousness of the agreement and its inability to enable carriers
to hold out longer? The latter argument, of course, seems some-
what inconsistent with the former. But whether or not the agree-
ment prolonged the Capital strike, and it appears that it did, the
Railway Labor Act is concerned with prevention of work stoppages,
and not with the settlement of disputes on terms particularly favor-
able to either side. In fact, one of the basie difliculties with this
agreement, as with the earlier Airlines’ Negotiating Committee
acreement, is the tendency to make belligerents of negotiators. The
almost inevitable result of the hostile attitudes produced by such
agreements is the ultimate concession by one party, after a work
stoppage, to terms highly favorable to the other party.

The Railway Labor Act. in contrast, contemplates the complete
aveidence of work stoppages through mutual agreement. rather than
the ultimate surrender of one side to the other. It is noteworthy
that, while the carrier parties to the negotiations reported in Emer-
gency Board No, 122 were preparing for all-out contlict, the Ma-
chinists and United sat down, in an atmosphere of mutual contidence
and trust, and worked out an agreement satisfactory to both sides '
without a work roy mg and the consequent public inconvenience.
Similar preparation for peace might have avoided the Capital work
stoppage as well.

FFEFECT ON THE DUTY TO NEGOTIATE

On its face, it is evident that reliance by the carriers on their
combined economic power to enforce Emergency Board recommenda-
tions, instead of the good faith bargaining required by the Railway
Labor Act, will violate that statute.

As previously indicated, negotiations in good faith are essential
to the success of the statutory plan. In the language of a recent

_———

a Lrepertigs of Board conference with President Baker, Oct. 21, 1958, pp. 13, 14,
20.

15 Report No. 122, p. 178.
“ALijerity opinten, poov7d
Majortt,s opinion. po ti mete 21

18 Oral argument transcript, pp. 127-129.
29 C_A.R.—I168

15

20a

gaat tees

184 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS

decision,’ “Such compliance (with the mandatory bargaining pro-
visions of the Railway Labor Act) cannet be merely perfunctory.
‘Good faith exhaustion of the possibility of agreement is required to
fulfill it’” [Emphasis added; footnote omitted. ]

The National Mediation Board. in the past, has deplored the lack
of maturity in air transport employer-cmployee relations, as evi-
denced by the frequent failure of the parties to resolve issues in
good-faith negotiations prior to mediation.“ Yet, in the negotis-
tions current at the time of execution of the agreement before us, no
carrier2! with the exception of Eastern,?? made any counteroffer
until after the Emergency Board proceeding"? Despite the absence
of early good-faith bargaining. a fact which was noted with concern
by the Emergency Poard?* the carrier parties to this agreement
characterized all requests made by labor, as well as those yet to be
made, as “extreme and unreasonable.” Whether the earriers had
agreed to make no counteroffers, as was suggested in oral argument.?®
and whether any such pact laid the foundation for the instrument
now before the Board, is impossible to determine from the meager
information currently available to us. It is clear that any aggra-
yation of the present tendency to defer genuine collective bargaining
until a work stoppage is imminent wili seriously impair the col-
lective-bargaining process.

It is clear, too, that this agreement will produce that result. since
the incentives offered by the agreement do not become operative until
the preliminary steps required by the Railway Labor Act have been
exhausted, procedurally (though not substantively), and unti! an
Emergency Board has issued recommendations. The purpose of the
agreement is to provide the combined economic power to enforce
settlement of labor disputes on whatever terms an Emergency Board
may recommend. The agreement thus aims at perpetuation of the
tendency to defer bargaining until the issuance of an Temergency
Board report. since its only effect on present bargaining practices
is to make them more attractive.

This increased use of Emergency Board recommendations as a
earrier’s first counteroffer is an unequivocal violation of the bargain-
ing mandate of the Railway Labor Act, since the statute requires
good-faith bargaining before the creation of an Emergency Board.
No carrier can know, during the negotiating period which precedes
the establishment of an Emergency Board, what recommendations
an Emergency Board will make or even if the creation of an Emer-

eee a ne eee

ane ‘ican Airlinca, Inc. ¥. Air Line Pilota Aas sciation, 43 L.R.R.M. 2402 (Dec. 12,
? .
195770 na tration of the Raflway Labor Act by tbe National Mediation Board, 1934-

ahd, °

21 The negotin. ‘ons concerned involved 6 atrlines and the International Association of
Machinists. ‘Vheoe of the alrimes, Capital, Eastern, and TWA, are parties to the acree-
ment nuder discussion. Of the 6. only Capital suffered a work stoppage, Acreement
has now been reached by International Association of Machinists on the one h ind and
each of the G6 airlines on the other. The terms of the agreement are, of course, unknown
to thiy Bonrd. The reasons whe National, Northeast, and Northwest have declined to
become particw to this mutzct ald agreement have not been furnixbed to the Boar.

2) Eastern offered sulocaet. “ay dess than the amount recommended by the Emergency
Board: oral argument tron crip. p. 127.

23 Oral argument transcript, pp. 1206-127.

24Sce Emeigency Board Leport Ne. 122, p. 9: “We reeret and deplore the fact that
there was net more effective bargaining on wages prior to the creation of this Board.”

2 Oral argument transcript, pp. 126-127.

29 0.A.B.—168

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SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 185

gency Buard will be recommended. As a practical matter then, the
carrier cannot freely bargain in good faith if it intends to rely on
Emergency Board recommendations, since it would thereby risi
offering its employees more than the Emergency Board will ulti-
mately recommend. The absence ef good-faith bargaining during
this period, hewever, is in tlat violation of the Railway Labor Act.
The result is well described in language of the Netional Labor
Relations Board which has said: “Where negotiation is not entered
into in good faith, where there is no real give and take, there is no
collective bargaining.” 78

The majority argues that, since the mutual aid agreement does
not entirely insulace a struck carrier egainst loss, ample incentive
will remain for each carrier to bargain freely and earnestly during
the periods designed for that purpose. The reasoning wanld be
more impressive were it not for the fact that the carriers, heretofore.
have been reluctant to engage in genuine bargaining until the elev-
enth hour. Since contemplation of unrecompensed total loss, in the
event of shut down, did not deter the carriers from engaging in such
poor bargaining practices in the past, the financial security offered
by this mutual aid agreement can only reduce the incentive to
bargain.

To evaluate the full impact of this agreement on future collective
bargaining, it is imperative that we know all the circumstances
under which it will be eifective. Obviously, if the carriers ean
invoke this agrecement during any strike, the threat to the continued
existence of genuine collective bargaining in the air transport in-
dustry will be considerably heightened.

Looking at the precise terms of this agreement, we find it opera-

tive in the event of a strike: (1) called for reasons “which include
the enforcement of demands in excess of or opposed to the recom-
mendations of a board established by the President of the United
States under section 10 of the Railway Labor Act and applicable to
such party” [emphasis addea]; (2) “ealled before the employees on
strike shall have exhe isted the procedures of the Railway Labor
Act,” or (3) “which is otherwise unlawful.”
* The judicial remedies which the carriers gratuitously commend
fo the unions in the event that carrier practices exceed the scope of
this agreement are available also to the carriers in the event of
strikes called for reasons outlined in (2) and (3) above. We have
been furnished with no reason 47 for believing that these judicial
remedies, if adequate for the employees, will not be adequate to pro-
tect the carriers against unlawful employee activity. If the rem-
edies are inadequate, the cure lies in corrective legisiaiion and not
in the vigilante activity inherent in the agreement.

BWritten Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining; N.L.RB. Bulletin No. 4.
November 1959, p. 12

77 Transcript, pp. 95, 96. One possible explanation appears in the uncompleted oral
argument discussion of the American strike and its relationship to thit agreement: a
perhaps unintended implication exists there that unlawful strikes are these which have
net been judielally dectared to be Liwful Anether explanation may le In the Possi-
bility that a determination of ith ealtty by an atrline of airlines. under this agreement,
docs not, Whe a judtletal determination, have for its purpose the presention of strikes
but the ultimate settlement of strikes on preconceived terms.

29 C.A.R.—168
698090—62——_14

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186 — CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS

As urgently as the actual operation of provisions (2) and (3)
above need evidentiary explanation, the most objectionable is pro-
yision (1) which relates to Emergency Hoard recommendations.
For the effect of the word “jnclude” in (1) is to make the agreement
operative in any strike affecting any of the carricr parties. It may
be invoked 1n a.d of an employer whether or not (a) the employer
has exhausted the remedies of the Railway Labor Act; (b) an }mer-
gency Board has been established; or (c) the employer will himself
accept the Emergency Board recommendations. This mutual aid
agreement, then, in threatening economic warfare unless employees
accept any and all Emergency Board findings, amends the Railway
Labor Act’s statutory plan in a manner which, from an employers

oint of view, is just as effective as the elimination of the statute.
his agreement has from an employer viewpoint all of the advan-

tages of compulsor arbitration with none of its disadvantages;
while TDmergency Board recommendations will in contemplation
he economically binding on employees, the carriers under the terms
of the agreement will be under no compulsion to accept them.*®

While it might be argued, for example, that the absence of pay-
ments to American, for the period of its strike, proves that the
agreement will not be operative in any and all circumstances, this
argument in my © inion is unpersnasive. As hereinabove indicated,
under the Jetter of the agreement, the right to payments is not con-
fned to circumstances specifically enumerated. Moreover, it is
highly probable that if American is to continue a party to the agree-
ment, it will be paid subsequent to the issuance of this opinion. In
any event, since the threat of this agreement hung over the recent
negotiations between A merican and its employees, the agreement was
operative whether or not American will be paid.

The naked question presented then is whether this Board will
approve the agreement even if operative in any strike. no mafter
how it ig motivated, or whenever It occurs. The majority, in point-
ing to the legal remedies which were available to unions prior to
the entry of this order2® answers the question in the affirmative.
It is difficult to understand, however, how remedies which are in-
adequate for carrier purposes will suffice to safeguard the interest
of employees, let alone the public, in the event of carrier activities
which violate the Railway Taber Act. Aside from the differences
in the nature of judicial relief which must be obtained, employees
vis-a-vis employers. in the event of violation of the Railway Labor
Act the employees, because of the majority's approval of this

ee

28 Acceptance of all Fmereency Yoard recommendations would be the near equivalent
of arrecing to compulsory arbitration, a process to which the carriers as a whole do
not appcar to be attracted, See American Aviation, Feb. 23, 1959. Pp. Hy i

“Constructive dl-cuxsions, but littl: ehanee of aetion, seems te sam up Labor Secre-
tary Mitchell's recent alrline labor meeting. Management asked amendments to Railway
Labor Act—seeret ballot tn strike votes, ban on jnrisdictional strikes, time limit on
length of mediation, no eevondary boyeorts, Airline Jabor leaders want no chances.
Rome carriers favor commul-ors arbitration, bat materity oppese it, as de unions. Con-
gressional action on amendments je very unlikely thie secre. ‘Mrlines give bigher priority
io working out some form_of group bargaining with unions.”

24 Moteritw opmion. p. 172

3° The carriers’ remedy in the event of {allure to negotiate in cond faith ts infunetion.
(American Airlines, Ine. ¥. Air Line Vilote Asanciation, supra.) smplosees, on the other
hand, must obtain a decree compelling specific formance of the carriers’ statutory
obligations. (Virginian Ky. v. Federation, 400 U.S. 515 (1937).)

29 €.A.B.—168

23a

| Beare Teeter PAR

SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 187

agreement, may well be required to pursue their remedies with this
Board before judicial relief is granted? If so, at least some ques-
tion arises as to whether the majority’s action has immunized car-
rier activity under the agreement from immediate or ultimate redress
by the employees under the Railway Labor Act, prior to specific
Board disapproval.

Whatever the employees’ remedies may be, we cannot approve this
agreement as not in violation of the Federal Aviation Act. the
Railway Labor Act, or the public interest in either, if it permits,
encourages, or results in carrier activities which violate either stat-
ute. Under our authority, it is not enough to say that the employees
have ample remedies in the event of unlawful carrier activity. We
are without power to approve any agreement between carriers which
has resulted or will result in unlawful activity. In the absence of
information responsive to the many questions arising under this
egreement, we must disapprove it.

“SANCE FOR THE GOOSE”

Neither the carriers nor the majority concede that a transportation
necessity must be established before this agreement can be approved.
T, on the other hand, do not concede that there can be a transporta-
tion justification for an agreement which is so clearly repugnant
to the purposes of the Railway Labor Act.

This issue needn't be resolved in view of the antitrust law implica-
tions inherent in the agreement, implications which have always, in
this Board's view, required allirmative justification.2? Such questions
are always present where competitors agree to share excess earnings.
Sharing profits with a competitor, like playing marbles “for fun”
rather than “for keeps,” is entirely inconsistent with the concept
of vigorous competition between rivals. The carriers have beon cer-
tificated to compete with, not subsidize each other. Air carrier sub-
sidy. if necessary, will be granted by the Government as provide:
by Congress in section 406 of the Act.

In spite of the need for justification, no transportation necessity
has been established. The carriers assert that since unions provide
economic assistance to each other during strikes or lockouts, the
maxim “sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander” provides the
equity for comparable mutual aid among carriers. But we have no
evidence of assistance given by other unions to the Machinists in the
strike against which this agreement was first directed. The only
assistance to the Machinists in the Capital strike was the payment
of $10 per week out of their own strike fund.4? That assistance
neither furnishes the economic strength to prolong a strike nor jus-
tifies the et bags of huge sums to a struck carrier to enable it to
resist employee requests. ‘To state the proposition is to reject it.

oy

Si Cf. Krotherhood of Railway, ctc. v. Railroad Retire. Bd., 239 F. 24 37 (1956).

S27. Majeritv opinion, p. 145; see also Isbrandtern vy. United States, 211 FL 2d 51,
ST (D.C. Cir. 10%4):

“e © © the agency entrusted with the duty to protect the public Interest (must)
scrutinize the agre ment to moke sure that the conduct thus legalized does not invade
the probiblitions of the antitrust laws anv more than te necessary to serve the purposes
of the regulatory atatute.” (Emphasis supp licd.)

83 Oral argument tranecript, p. 142.

2? C.A.B.---108

24a

188 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS

“rE RECORD”

The majority blindly denies that the foregoing clear indications of
violation of the Railway Labor Act unequivocally establish the
agreement's illegality. Accordingly, the majority is forced to recon-
cile its grant of approval with discharge of its statutory investiga-
tive duties by a three-step reasoning process. First in its “pains-
taking review” 4 tie majority leans heavily on the failure of “the
record” to provide unequivocal evidence of illegality. Second, the
majority states that the Board must approve agreements under sec-
tion 412 of the Act. in the absence of facts which affirmatively and
unequivocally establish the agreement as in violation of the Act.
Third. in recognition of the factual deficiencies of “the record,” the
majority imposed various conditions to its approval of the
agreement.

Plainly, there is no “record” in this proceeding, nor can the tran-
script of oral argument be reasonably so designated. Oral argu-
ments neither resolve. nor are they designed to resolve. factual ques-
tions. Since the majority argues that this agreement musf be ap-
proved in the absence of facts which affirmatively and unequivocally
establish its illegality a refusal by the majority to provide an
opportunity for evidentiary development of those facts is inde-
fensible. Further, no one can argue that action on the agreement
could not await more precise administrative fact-finding processes
since section 412 agreements do not require approval prior to
effectuation.

To assert that we must immediately approve agreements between
carriers in the absence of affirmative facts clearly establishing ille-
gality not only rules out the evidentiary process for section 412
agreements, but conflict=, as well, with past attitudes toward the
review of those agreements. We have repeatedly asserted that
“Where an agreement has * * * elements which are plainly re-
pugnant to established antitrust principles. approval should not be
granted unless there is a clear showing that the agreement is required
by @ serious transportation need, or in order to secure important
public benefits.” 35 [Italie supplied.] I can see no reason for main-
taining that a clear showing of illegality must "2 made by opponents
of an agreement in one instance, and a clear showing of necessity
must he made by proponents in another. If the difference is the
immunization from the sanctions of other statutes which may be
given by our approval, it must be recoenized that Board approval here
grants antitrust Jaw immunity. It must be recognized, too, that
while we have no power to grant Railway Labor Act immunity. the
possibility that this Board may have exclusive primary jurisdiction
over future allegations of Railway Labor Act violations because of
this agreement may produce the same result.¢ Plainly, regardless
of the burden of proof. the fact of the matter is that we cannot

1s Malority opinion, p. 176-177.

3 Local Cartage Aarcement Caer, 15 CNT S50, 853 (1952).

% See Brotherhood of Railway, etc. v. Railroad Retire. Bd., supra.

29 C.A.B.—168

2 ERS OE Pree: ——

SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 189
~w
approve any agreement, unless we are completely satisfied with its
legality.

‘he majority's imposition of various conditions to its approval
in no way substitutes for that satisfaction. On the contrary, the
very necessity for imposition of conditions speaks cloquently for
the majority's dissatisfaction with the agreement as written and
with the majority's lack of knowledge of the carriers’ past and
future operat.on thereunder. Astonishingly, in one of its conditions,
the majority has stated that its approval shall not affect the rights
of management or labor under the Railway Labor Act. The major-
ity is required to decide, however, whether the agreement has oper-
ated or will operate in violation of the Railway Labor Act. If the
agreement jias had or will have that effect, it clearly affects the
rights of employees adversely under that statute. The majority,
then. has approved the agreement as not in violation of the Railway
Labor Act, while, at the same time. denying that past or future
violations of the Railway Labor Act have received or will receive
the majority's blessing. If this approach is correct, then any section
432 agreenient may be iaechanicaliy approved by substituting for
factual analysis an admonition net to break the law. 1 cannot be.
lieve that Congress intended that we employ any such mechanical
nto or that our concept of admini-trative machinery take such a
iteral turn.

An unwillingness to hear evidence before rendering a decision is
more consistent with Jaissez-fa‘re concepts than with regulatory
responsibility. As a regulatory body, it is our duty to be fully
informed before dediding matters so clothed with the public interest.

We cannot approve agreements such as the one before this Board
by pleading the absence of facts when the facts are available. Here.
in spite of a prima facie indication that the agreement is repugnant
to the purposes of the Railway Labor Act. the majority has granted
its approval. not on an insuflicient record. but in the total absence
of any evidentiary record. In addition, this deficiency is aggravated
by the fact that burean counsel. nermally the sole spokesman for the
public interest, has nether participated in oral argument nor filed
a statement of position.

From all of the foregoing, I conclude that this mutual aid agree-
ment must be disapproved as adverse to the public interest. The
agreement strikes at the heart of the poliey of the Railway Labor
Act. a statute which embodies the wisdom acquired through years of
trial and error in labor Jegislation. The public interest inherent in
unintermmpted air transportation is not served by permitting manage-
ment to pit itself openly and adamantly against good-faith bargain-
ines with its emplovees, Air transportation will continue to progress
only in an atmosphere of mutual management-labor respect and co-
operation. It will not do sa by permitting air carriers, in a private
agreement, to rewrite the Railway Labor Act by silencing the em-
ployee’s voice in the determination of his wages and conditions of
employment.

29 A B.--168

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190 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS

Arrenpix A

Aonerment dated as of October 20, 1958 hetween Awerican Airlines, Inc.,
Capital Airlines, Inc, Fastern A‘r Lines, Inc., Pan American World Airways,
Ine., Trans World Airlines, Inc., aud United Air Lines, Inc.

Witn resets :

Whereas, the parties are common carriers holding certificates of public
convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter
7 = providing for the transportation by air of persons, property and
mall; an

Witenras, the mutual interests of the parties call for the taking of all proper
apd lawful mensurea to bring about sound and rensonable economic conditions
that will be of benefit to the alr transport industry and to the public; and

Wrea&ras, the parties and other airlines are facing or faced with the threat
of extreme oud unreasonable demands made by representatives of certain of
the classes and croafis of their empioyees, as exemplified by the current dispute
between certain of the parties and their maintenance and related employees,
represented for the purpose of collective bargaining by the International Asso-
ciation of Machinists, AFL/CIO (hereinafter enlled 1AM), © controversy in
which TAM has rejected and shown an utter Afsregard for the recommenda-
tions of the Emergency Board 122 appointed by the President of the United
Hintes to investigute suid dispute and has struck Capital Airlines and threat-

--... eued to strike other carriers for their insistence upon substantial compliance

= eticrre-tosme of said recommendations, which action of the IAM tends to
undermine tlie infuance. position and Integrity of such Roard and is destructive
of the collective bargaining process; and

Wuerras, it is in the public interest and the interest of the parties hereto
that the recommendations of such Presidential Emerzeucy Bonrd crented under
the provistons of the Railway Labor Act be respected by the employers aad
employees whose dispute was heard by the Roard ;

Now, Trenton, the parties bereby agree:

1. In the event any party suffers a strike, resulting in the shutdown of its
flight operations, which has been enlled for reasons which include the enforce-
mont of demands in excese of or opposed to the reconmendations of a heard
established by the President of the United States under section 10 of the Rail-
way Labor Act and applicable to such party: or which has been called before
the employees on strike shall have exhausted the procedures of the Railway
Labor Act or Which {s otherwise unlawful; then, in such event. ench party
will poy over to the party snffering the strike an nmount equal to its incrensed
revenucs nttributable to the strike duriog the term thereof, less applicable
added Mirect expenses. T’ayinents shall be mate monthly within 10 days after
the close ef each enleidor month or at such more frequent intervals as may be
agreed to by the partics.

2 ‘The purty suffering such a strike will make every rensonable effort, with
ite employees still on duty, to provide the publie with information concerning
all alr services rendered by the other purties, and to direct to them as much
of the traMe normally carried by the party suffering such a strike ne possible,
all ax the best laterests of the members of the public may require.

3. Any other alr enrrier hoiding a certifiente of public convenience and neces-
sity fesued by the CAL may become a party to this agreement by signing
counterpart coples thereof, forwarding coples to each of the other parties and
te the CAB for Ming.

4. This agreement shall become effective Immediately and shall be filed with
the CAL. If thie agreement shall be disapproved by the CAB, it shnll terminate
forthwith to the extent disapproved, and payments made hereunder, to the ex-
tent that they are affected by the terms of such disapproval, shall become and
be treated as an obligation te and owing from the party suffering the strike to
the paving party. This agreement shall continue in effect for a period of one
year from the date hereof.

29 C.A.B.—168

27a

, . . ae ee ae
Aine ONG MP ty a it 7 . -

SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 191

In Wirness Wientor, the parties have signed this agreement as of the date
first above written.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
By /s/ C. BR. SMITI
President
CAPITAL AIRLINES, INC.
By /s/ David If. Baker
Drosident
EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.
By /s/ Eddie Rickenbacker
Chairman of the Board
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.
By _/s/ wuan T. Trippe
resident
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
By /s/ Charles §. Thomas
President
UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
By /s/ C.F. McErlean
Vice-President—Assistant to
President
STATE OF VIRGINIA }
COUNTY OF ARLINGTON }

Haves Preven, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is Secretary of
Capital Airlines, Ine.: that he has read and is familiar with the contents of
the attached agreement dated as of October 20, 1958S, between American Air-
lines, Ine., Capital Airlines, Ine. Fastern Air Dines, Ine., Pan American World
Airways, Ine, Trans World Airlines, Ine., and United Air Lines, Ine. : and that
the attached agreement is a true and complete copy of the original agreement
executed by the parties

RS. ¢

/s/ Hayes Dever
(NOTARIZED)
Arrenpix B

DEPARTMENT or ComMERCT
Washington, D.C., January 14, 1959.
Ilon. Javrs Ro Dereer,
Chairman, Civil Acronautics Roard, Washington, D.C.

Dran Me. Citatesan: You asked our views in connection with the Board's
consideration of the agreement by six certificated air carriers for matual as-
sistance in the event of strike. Mach of these carriers has underisken, in the
event of a strike occurring under certain conditions, to pay to any participating
earricr forced te suspend ti ht operations, any net gain realized as a result of
such shuftdewn from operations over reutes over which it is competitive with
the struck carrier. These parments are to be made only if the strike was
called to enforce demands in ecoutliet with recommendations made by a Presi-
dential board appointed under Section 10 of the Railway Laber Act, or if the
strike was called before the procedures of the Railway Labor Act had been
exbausted, or if the strike is untaw ful.

Since the agreement afleets matters within the purview of Section 412(a)
of the Civil Aeronantics Net of 15s now the Federal Aviation Act ef 1958),
the Beourd has aeeepted it} for filinz and has commenced proceedings under
Section UHC) of the Net to determine if it shonkd be approved or disapproved.
Tn this respeet the Dourd must determine whether the agreement is adverse
te the public interest

We believe this acreement is consistent with the publie interest and that it
should be approved by the Civil Aeronamties Boure.

Pouring the past two deendes, air transportation has evolved from a mode of
transport utilized by the venturesome few into an economic necessity. More
fod mere, our Nation's commerce has come to depend upon and require the
Uniniorrnpted and ecomemie services of our air earriers. This depemlence

vee AH. 168

_——

192 CIVIL AERONAUTICS aie REPORTS

upon air transportation and the need, in the public interest, for adequate, safe
and continuous service has been recognized by Congress in the statutory scheme
which has been adopted for the regulation of this industry. Air carriers may
not operate routes unless authorized to do so by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Once such authority has been granted, safe and \adequate service must be pro-
vided without interruption unless the carrier is agthorized by the Loard to sus-
pend such operations. Air carriers must comply Wwith the requirements of the
Railway Labor Act iu the conduct of their laboer\ relations, or face the possi-
bility of loss of their nuttwrity to operate. fn \addition to this, the added
costs which may be assumed by air carriers as 4 result of bargaining with
their employees cannot be automatically passed on to the public in the form of
higher rates. Under the law, the Civil Aeronautics Board has the final word
on the rates which air carriers may charge. In short, certificated air carriers
have very little choice- they must provide service, they must operate at fares
consistent with determinations of the Board and they must abide by the re-
quirements of the Railway Labor Act.

In contrast with this, the freedom of organizations representing air carrier.
employees to take action to enforce their demands is virtually unlimited. The
initiative in determining whether or not to use economic compulsion to enforce
demands and the extent and duration of such compulsion rests with the em-
ployees and their organizations and not with the air carriers. Neither Civil
Aeronautics Board nor the Nat‘onal Mediation Board nor any other agency of
the Government has authority to elreumscribe the freedom of action which
air carrier employees hove in dealing with their employers. It is in this
posture therefore that sur carriers and their employees sit down to bargain.
The carriers cannot curtail or suspend thelr operations as a means of enfore-
ing their demands, The carriers cannot refuse to follow the procedures pro-
vided by the Railway Labor Act. The carriers cannot act in any manner not
in aceord with requirements provided by law. Any action along these lines
could result in proceedings by the Civil Aeronautics Board to deprive the car-
rier of its right to operate in air transportation.

Carrier emplosees can suspend operations by striking. They can refuse to
follow the procedures provided by the Railway Labor Act. Their right to
strike Is specifically guaranteed by law and there is no legal penalty to consider
for their failure to follow procedures promulgated to assure peace and sta-
bility in labor-management relations.

The ultimate procedure provided by the Railway Labor Act is the appeint-
ment by the Vresident of, and consideration of the dispute by, a Board em-
powered to make recommendations. It is true that neither party is bond to
accept these recommendations. It does net follow from this, however, that ft
is to be expected that either party should freely disrezard these recommenda-
tions and seek to compel the other party to de likewise. The weapon which
the employees have to compel such disrezard is the strike. When this weapon
is used against one of a number of corapeting air carriers, a legical extension
is the fact that the operating carriers reap economic benetit from the struck
earricr’s enforced suspension of flicht operations.

In the agreement which is before the Board, the parties undertake not to
retain such benefit but ra.her te restore the net cain realized to the earrier
whose employees have struck. Is this adverse to the public interest? Consid-
ered in the licht of the conditions which must be met beford print nnuder
the agreement are to be made, we believe the answer to this question must be
no.

The purposes soucht to be served by the acreement—to disceurace rejection
of recommendations made by disiuterested Boards appointed br the Presijent
awl encourage compliance with procedures provided by Congress to effect neace
and stability in air carrier Libers+nanacement dealings—these objectives ecan-
not be held to be adverse to the public interest. Neither can reasonable steps
taken to further such objectives be ansthing but consistent with the public
Interest.

Certainly this agreement does not deny to the emploree organizations their
richt to strike. It dees seck to deny to them the involuntary aid of compet-
ing air eurriers in the furtherance of strike objectives which are contrary to
the spirit amd letter of statutes designed to protect the public interest in unin-
terrupted air transportation service.

The effect of the acreement is to strengthen the ability of the parties to insist
upon complinnee by the tnuion with lawful procedures and the acc*ptance of

29 C.A.B.—'‘6S
29a

ee eee

ee ee er

Brana SrA relia 88 a el WTI HET EB

nl

SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 193

recommendations of disinterested public boards convened pursuant to pro-
cedures provided by Congress. As matters now stand, a Union which refuses
to accept the recommendations of such a Board may strike to require acceptance
of its demands. The carrier has the choice of acceding to the union demand>
or having to shut down and see its business and its customers foreed to use
the services of @ competitor. The competitor has no choice but to coutinue to
operate with the usually predictable certainty that it will be next. Its con-
tinued operations, therefore, become part of a persuasive force to require ac-
ceptance of union demands in excess of impartial recommendations. The even-
tual cost of thix must necessarily fali upon the public. If a carrier should
choose nevertheless to hold out, we have a ionz drawn out shutdewn with the
public again having te bear the eventual burder both in terms of inconvenience
and fiuanetal cost. Thix is na regulated industry. The certificated carriers
must operate and they cannot continue to operate if they lose money. Losses
must be made up either in hizher fares or goverumeut subsidy. The thrust of
the agreement before the Benrd is net to enforce unrensonable demands which
manatgement might seek It is to give a hich decree of acceptability to reeom-
mendations and procedures provided by law on the part of both management
and labor, We think these objectives will serve the public interest in assuring
genuine collective barzaining and avoiding resorts to force’ as a means of
settling disputes.

None of the carriers party to this agreement are receiving subsidy aid from
the Government. Nevertheless, the question has been raised that the agree-
nent poses the possibility that the Government may have to underwrite costs
arixing as a result of this ondertahing. This. it is argued, would be adverse to
the publie interest. We think this issue to be irrelevant to the question of the
validity of this acreetsent. We eannct predict what will actually happen but
the following are sume of the possibilities. First, none of the parties may,
during the effective period of this agreement, require subsidy. Second, the
effect of the agreetnent could be to help a earrier, which micht otherwise
require subsidy oveid that need. Finally, even if a carrier should have to apply
for subsidy mail pay during the period of this agreement, that need more than
likely would rest upen factors other than the need to meet payments made
pursuant te this agreement. In any event the proper fime to determine the
extent te which these costs may be considered for subsidy mail pay purposes
would be in a mail rate proceeding-——1f such a proceeding should be required
fn the case of a party to this acreement.

In the present proceeding it is neither contemplated nor likely that the
payments made by any of the carriers will have to be underwritten by the
Govermecnt. What is mere important from the standpoint of public interest
Is thet if air carrier ermoleyces are free to pursue demands in excess of the
recommendations ef disinterested Presidential Boards and air carriers have no
choice but te accete te such demands, then the increased costs which wenld
result moy eventually have to be borne either by the users of air transperta-
thon in the form of bicher fares or by the publie at lnrge in bearing the eost
of inerensed subsidy aid) Here asain the weight of public interest is on the
side of permitting aetien taken for the purpose of encouraging acceptance of
recommendations and campliznce with procedures provided by law. This is the
purpose seucht by the air carrier's agreement.

We believe the acreeteent is consistent with the public interest. it will nat
interfere with effective and lawful eslective bargaining and it will help to
assure adequate, ecomemie and uninterrupted air service necessary to the
commerce of the United States,

Sincerely yours,
(S) F. H. Mueller,
FREDERICK H. MuUrryer,
Undcr Scerctarnu.

DEPARTMENT OF JI'STICE
Washington, December 80, 19358.
Hien. Jaurs R. Dierrer,

Chairman, Civil Acronautics Board, Washinoton 25, D.C.

My Dyan Me Cistesax: Your letter to the Attorney General, dated Decem-
ber 8, 1958, refers te “an agreement for mutual assistance in the event of a
strike’ which “ the “windfall” agreement as amended by
the Mareh 7, 1960, amendment, increased to « 10-carrier-party
“windfall” agreement with expanded strike coverage, and (3)
the “supplemental payments agreement,” an amendment dated
Marcel, 22, 1962, retroactively effective December 31, 1961, sub-

+) Ne tional and Continental had withdrawp tom the Pact effective Dee. 31, 1061. See

4 Seeat =
“ os 4 dally beasts determined by Ite average dally air treneport operating
Pak the overaties shut down (CAB accounts 5100-7000) fora period of 12 months
fiamed'ately prior to the month the strike begins.
# C.A.B.—559

6la

a 0 at ee =

——_

MUTUAL AID PACT INVESTIGATION TY

calendar year. The roportionate liability for supplemental pay-
ments is established by the iatio of its air transport operating
revenues for the previous enlendar year to the tota air transport
operating revenues of the nonstruck carriers for the same period.
The liability of a carver to make supplemental payments is exclu-
sive of its liability to wake “wind fall” payments. Kedist ribution
of the supplemental payments jx provided for in the event that there
are inulliple strikes during any calendar year which would result
jn reqitirements in execs of the total liability. in this event. ihe
supplemental payments are recomputed so as to provide each of the
struck carriers with an equal percentage of the standard amount,
except that a etruck carrier may retain its “windfall” receipts.*®
A F rtm, jacking in previous agreements. rovides for final
and binding arbitration of a dispute among the carrier parties
regarding the right to recetve or make payments under the agree-

The “supplemental payments agreement” also extends the prior
coverage of the Pact to shutdown of flight operations caused by
a strike which occurs after a Presidential Emergency Hsoard has
been appointed but fails to make’ specific recommendations on the
merits of the dispute and the st rack carrier has acted in compliance
with the Railway Labor Act.“ Thus. the coverage of the Pact has
been broadened to apply to all shutdowns due to strikes against a
Pact member, except in instances in which the Pact member has
acted illegally or has refused to accept demands equal to or less
than these recommended by a Presidential Emergency Board.

Adherence to the iaset. former]; open to any air carrier holding
a certificate of public convenience and necessity, 15 restricted to a
trunk air carrier? A trunk air carrier not a party prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1962. may adhere either on 6 months’ notice or immediately,
in which event it would be obligated to make all payments for
which it would have been liable if a party since January 1, 1962,
subject to the correlative right to offset: payments which it would
have received. but not greater than its liability. A member of the
Pact prior to January 1. 1962, which withdraws. may adhere only
by complying with the provisions requiring retroactive obligation.*?

The agreement i- effective from year to year but any party may
withdraw from the Pact as of December 31 of any calendar year in

accordance with the written notice provisions of the prior agree-

ments. Iowever, if a carrier has received supplemental paynients
in exeess of such payments made by it since January 1, 1962, it
remains obligated to make the paymenis required by the agreement
to the extent of such exces> for a period of 12 months after with-
drawal.

—— Recently, the Board took juris-
diction over a complaint filed pursuant to sections 410(k) (4) and
1002(a) of the Act, alleging, inter alia, violations by an air carrier
(not. a party to the Pact) of the Act and tide IT of the Railway
Labor Act. Although complaints of Railway Labor Act violations
against air carriers have been tiled as far back as 16, this is the first
complaint on which the Board has reached a decision on the merits.’
In this proceeding. docketed as a petition for enforcement? the
Board found the carrier to have failed to bargain in good faith with
the representatives of its employees as reanired by section 2. First. of
the Railway Labor Act, and that continued refusal of the air carrier
to comply with its obligation under the Railway Labor Act to
bargain in good faith, would subject its certificate to suspension or
revocation pursuant to section 401(g) of the Act. In reviewing the
basis for the Board's jurisdiction, it stated:

While the exact role the Board is to play In the enforcement of oblica-

tions placed on cir carriers by the Railway Labor Act is unsettled “—and

13 Sce order of investigation F-15413. The ceurt as recently a2 1960 also recognized
that “the Board's experience and expertise t- with transportation not labor relation. preb-
lems.” Outland v. CA. BL, 284 Fd 224 (DC. Cir. 1960) ;

74 Cf. United States Vv. Lowden, 808 US 225 (1989).

15 Bg., United-Weetern, Acquisition Air Carrier Property, 11 CAR. 701 (1950).

70 f3-9., United-Capital Merger Case, on CABS 7, SL2-841 (1961) (eases cited).

WE g., Capital-Nutional Interchange, OC AB. Sal (1949).

Western Air Lines ¥. Civil Acronantics Koard, 194 FB. 2d 211 69th Cir, 1952); Nene v
Civil Acronruties Board, 204 BL 2b 265 eld Cir Vode | Danielson Vo Civil Aeromaalies
Board, 204 BF. 2d 266 (2d Cir, 1952): Outland v. C. A. B., 284 FP. 2d 224 (D.C. Cir. log:

79 Seo pote Bl, infra

80 ‘The examiner takes nettles that there are presently pending before the Roard two eon
plaints involving alle red Violations ef the Railwae Labor Act, stemming out of the recent
controversy between the tlicht engineers and carriers signatary to the Paet--PEIA, FAL
Chapt. v. BAL, docket Dieon Cpetitien fer Enroreement nled Jan 22, W850: and a eon
Plaint presently not docke ted as a petition for enterecment tiled dam. & Wan. cdocket
14273) wherein a croun of individnal members and former members of the TAM have filed
a jetnt complaint against Northwest.

mM) Adeline Dilute v. Soutiorn Amiwaue, Unforcement, supra, Members Girneys and Gills!
land diccenting, also EOYSTS7. Ane. 27. tees. and Eore162. Tan 3, 1988, ay A. 40%
wherein the Bonrd exeretsed Ets jurisdiction coneurrentiv with the conrt under the RIA
making findings of fact and Jaw at variones with these of a ULS. dtstriet court judge, sitttns
at Nashville, ‘tenn, ino a preceeding between the same parties and bearing on the same
fublect matter, Petittan for review of the Bourd's ordor is pending, aub nom, Southern Piiote
Aasoriation y.C. 4. B., 823 BF. 2d 288 (D.C, Cir. 1963).

40 U.A.B.—559

70a

SPSHEY

586 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS

(he legislitive history of Section 401(k) Is of little or no help--we agree

wiih the Examiner's conclusion that the Bourd must proceed on the prem.

ise that it was the Intent of Congress that the Board tn appropriate cases

is the foruin to hear and determine complaints alleging violation of such

obligations by air carriers. [Footnote omitted]

Although it appears that the Board is being drawn deeper into
Inbor-management relations, this involvement is not attributable,
vtiher direcily or indirectiy, to the iniinence of the Pact.

SUMMARIES OF POSITIONS AND ARGUMENTS

vane briefs end reply briefs filed with the examiner narrow con-
serabiv the issues remaining for decision. The interested parties
sad the Burean were unrestricted in the lengths of briefs or replies
ond have comprehensively discussed the salient facts and the appli-
cihle legal questions arising out of the agreements. At the risk of
over simplification and inadvertent misrepresentation, inherent in
“unaarization, the positions and the major arguments of the »arties.

‘nolized in the briefs, will be outlined.

RUREAU POSITION AND ARGUMENT

Yhe Bureau takes the general position that the Pact, as amended,
sith the exception of the supplemental payments provision [clause
‘()) of the amendment of March 22, 1962, should be approved for
' pectod of 3 years, subject to a limitation of “windfall” payments
‘onuse 1(A)] to a struck carrier to an amount not to exceed its
actust operating expenses incurred during the strike period, less any
exrned revenues. The rationale of the Bureau's position is given in
ic brief as follows:

Carriers should be permitted to attempt to Improve their collective
vargaining ability unless such efforts are adverse to the public interest

r clearly tend toward vielation of the Railway Labor Act. The evidence

adduced of operations under the Pact since its inception in 1938 is, In

ovr judgment, inconclusive. Because of the many ad hoe facters involved
ta the Tabor disputes which have vecurred since then, it is net possible to
pinpoint the effeets of the Pact on the stability of air transportation,

Under these circumstances, we find no compelling reason to depart radi-

sally from the Board's action In approving the original Pact.

Tt recommends a continnation of the reporting provisions now re-
juured by the Boare’s order of approval; i... monthly statements of
financial transactions by Pact members, and, in addition, to “assure
restriction ef the amount of Pact payments,” a requirement that a
‘ice carrier must within 40 days after a strike period, report the
vevennes earned and received, the actual operating expenses, total

pevses Incurred, and depreciation and amortization, all in terms of
(‘ts functional accounts. In order to make the filing of required
reports “self-iamplementing,” it is recommended that the filing of
reports he made “a condition precedent to the receipt or retention of
pavments.”

fie Bureau finds that the record indicates a need for a uniform
“hod “for determining the revenues attributable to strikes and
; 40 C.A.B.—559

Tila

OB ATT R DE RENT ML tet OT See LVR BE IMER

MUTUAL AID PACT INVESTIGATION 587

the applicable added direct expenses incurred by nonstruck carriers.”
As reasoned by the Bureau:

To the extent that there are areas of disagreement among the carriers,
the possibility is created of conscious or inadvertent manipulation of
revenues, expenses, and payments. This possibility is inconsistent with
the concept of a definable limit on windfall receipts and Board review ot
that Hmit.

Claiming that a uniform method is feasible, the Bireat recommends,
asa condition te the approval of the aereement, that (he Pact sens
bers agree fo and subnut a provision for a uniform method of eal
cwating “windfall” payments within a period 6f 30 days thereafter.
Although the supplemental payments provision should be disap-
proved and “windfall” limited, the Bureau does not recommend that
the disapproval of the Board should have retroactive application.
lt interprets the terms of the agreement to require repayments only
“to the extent that they are ailected by the terms of such approval”
and that, therefore, the Board by making its approval prospective,
can determine the repayments necessary to effect equity and justice
between the parties.

The Bureau's argunents supporting its position are summarized
in its brief and, in the interest of accuracy, will be quoted verbatim:

The Bureau's chief objection to the Pact as presently written is that it
obligates carriers who may not compete with a struck airline and whe
way have no direct interest in its liber problems to make substantial
payments to the struck carrier even though the paying carrier receives ho
direct benefits from its payments or from the strike. Payments out of
revenues realized as a result of the strike---the so-called “windfall pay-
ments"—do not suffer from this vice, since such sums are payable only to
the extent that additioaal revenue is earned. The Bureau believes that
the supplemental payments provision presents too great a danger of im-
plementation in a fastich repugnant to the pubhe interest.

Supplemental payients taust be made regardiess of the paying car-
rier’s profit position, As a result of the unqualified obligation to stand
ready to pay over up te the limit of liability based on past earnings, the
viability of a paying member can be seriously and adversely atrected.
This being true, sound management principles would net appear to nliow
a carrier to place itself in such a position without its having, and exer-
cising, the right to participate in the negotiating policy Ciscussions lead-
Ing up to another carrier's decision to take a strike, However, the record
in this proceeding does not indicate that there has been participation

PALL LI ETI ONIN LT ED MLO IL tee ee ee

among Pact members (1 consultations on the advisability of another's i
accepting a strike (nor is there evidence tiat such consultations are con- A
templated). We do not think it would be fn the public interest for the FS
Board to approve a carrier's management, in effect, delegating to anetler =
the right to commit the former to substantial and onereus obligatiers, a
especially when this must be dene without policy guidance, consultation, a
or review. 4

Nor could the carriers revise their agreement to provide for such guid- $
ance. consultation, or review; fer te do so, in the absence of a concur-: &
rence therein by the Inber erzinization invelved, would tend te bring b
about the substance of ronitiempleyver or industrywide bargaining. Both La

the National Mediation Board and the Civil Aeronautics Board have held
that, while the Railway Laber Aet does net expressly preclude’ such bar-
gaining, the bargaining unit must be arreed to by beth management and
Inbor. And, even without prier consultation among paying carriers, the
supplemental payments provision logically leads the Pact members into a
position of multiemployer or indysirywide bargaining, whether or not
employee groups agree, This tendency results from the fact that a car-

40 C.A.B.—-559
248 S883-—68-—-39

é
Pe
&
:
:

72a

5S8 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS

rier which Is facing the prospect of making substantial out-of-pocket con-
tributions will very naturally expect the recipient to maintain bargaining
positions consistent with {ts own views 4

Morvover, the fact that carriers are able to tap the economic resources
of others In the industry to withstand the impact of strike losses will,
over the long run, encourage labor organizations to plan their labor nezo-
ifations tn euch a way as to equalize their relative economic position.
The most obvious possibility is sunultaneous strikes against: several oc
all of the Pact members. In this sense, then, the Pact tends to force
indor organizations Inie MUiGt BaTgAlning i viclaticn of the Railway
Labor Act.

Further, and entirely apart from possible Railway Labor Act violations,
the supplemental payments provisien appears to be inimical to the public
Interest Ju the possibility that it holds ferth of ionger and more wide-
spread strikes. In attenipting to place themselves in an improved bar-
gatning position, the Pact members could) have chosen any benetits level
af supplemental payments, nnd se, the level which they did choose must
be one which they feit would reasonabiy achieve their objectives. Oie
objective is, of course, to enliance the ability to withstand strikes. The in-
creased Pact benetits, through supplemental payments, will, we believe,
enable a carrier to do xo for a longer period than it could under the pure
“windfall” theery. In such circumstances, the Pact creates the real pos-
sibility of countermeasures by the union which might result in prolonged
or industry wide strikes. In the absence of any clear advantage to the
publfe Interest in the agreement, the public should nor be forced to assume
such risks.

Qn the other hand, we do not believe that the carriers should be pre-
eluded from all cforts to improve their pesition to withstand a strike.
rhus, we think that the tnducement te vioition of the Railway Labor
Act Is reduced substantially when the obligation to pay funds to a struck
carrier ts related to “windfall” receipts of a competitor. This conclu-
sion woud be further strencthened if the plan were so conditioned as
tu assure thet the payments to the struck carrier would not exceed the
difference between the actual operating expenses incurred during a strike
an? any earned revenues. At the same time, where strikes do occur. the
limited payments would avert possible financial disaster te a carrier and
attendant violence to the scheme of national air transportation. We.
therefore, urge that such a limitation be imposed as a condition to ap-
rreval of the Pact. In this connection, another condition should require
a struck crrrier, for all periods of partial or complete shutdown, te report
promptly to the Board its actual revenues earned and actual expenses
incurred, by CAB functional accounts.

Because of the difficulttes which might result from distortion ef prin-
ciples under which payments are computed, the Bureau believes it essen-
tal thet payments be determined according to a fair. precise, and uniform
method. This can be accomplished by requiring the Pact members to
arrive at uniformity in the formulas for computing net added revenues
which each has thus far individually determined, by setting up continued
adherence to periodic reporting requirements as a condition precedent to
receipt of payments under the Pact. and by requiring more detailed re-
porting by struck carriers. The record at hearing shows that notwith-
standing individually differing fiscal treatments among the carriers, there
{is no reason why a uniform method for determining added net revenues
caanot be devised.

Conditional approval fer 3 years ts urged because on the basis of the
record as it exists. a trial period, at the end of which the Board may
review the Pact, is necessary.

As neted above, the Bureau proposes that its position be adopted prosper-
tively, so that carriers will not be required to repay sums already due

141f the oblectionable teadencles taward prestrike consultation and forced indnstre-
wide barenining pesitions did net come to fruition during the enrrent Eastern Air
Linece «trike, this dees not prove that the Rurean’s coneeen is miseliced The initt
ating enuse of that dispute wae the crew complement issne, ae to whieh the attitude
of sll Pact members hae evoleed to a substontioliv taenticsl position. Accordingly.
enecific coneultations wonld not hare been necessary since It fe obvions that all of
the members were in substantial agreement with Eastern’s original stand on that issne

410 C.AB—19

73a

MUTUAL Aib PACT INVESTIGATION 589

which would not be payable were our position adopted, The principal
effect of this recommend:tion is te alew Pastern te keep approXiinately
$10 rillilon In supplemental payments whteh it has received as a result
of the 1962 FETA strike This recommenchition is based on the wording
of the Pact Itself as it reflects the carriers’ torent, the fact that return of
this money might undustty enrich Pact members other than Tastern, spe-
cin) cireumstances attending tho fastern strike, and the Hagnclal impact
ae Eastern of telng forced te returth this large sum,

UNION PARTIES’ POSTYION AND ARGUMENT

The union parties take the position that the concept of mutual
assistance among the air carriers in the air transportation industry
is adverse to the public interest standards of section 102 of the Act
and, therefore, the mutnal aid agreement should be disapproved in
itsentirety. They have denounced any prior contention that the Pact
violated the Railway Labor Act, the antitrust laws, or the Act.
Their objection to the Pact is confined to the direct assertion that the
Pact does not serve the public interest. hindering the attainment of
the objectives set forth in section 102 of the Act by (1) aggravating
labor disputes, and rather than contributing to the “stability and
efficiency in air transportation that freedom from industrial strife
will provide,” has caused a deterioration of labor-management rela-
tions in the air transportation industry: and (2) defeating the major
purposes of the Railway Labor Act.

It is asserted generally that the Pact has been “detrimental to good
labor relations” in the industry, creating a spirit of hostility, iis-
trust, and a hardening of attitudes, and having “a tendency to
destroy the effectiveness of eeliective bargaining” which is dependent
ye soe an atmosphere of good labor-management relations. Instead
of operating as a defense of the carriers against mutual assistance
among unions, it has produced an opposite eifect. resulting in an
nimosphere of mutual combat which has culminated in a substantial
increase in the number of strikes. both legal and illegal, accompanied
by an increase in duration and severity.

While not contending shat the Pact violates the Railway Labor Act
by contravening spectiic commands or prohibition thereof, it is urged
as not in the public interest because contrary to the spirit and stated
purposes of the Railway Labor Act. It defeats two of its maier
objectives, that of avoiding interruptions to commerce or to the
operation of an air carrier engaged therein, and that of providing
for the prompt and orderiy settlement of disputes concerning rates
of pay, rules. or working conditions. It is contrary to the spirit of
the Railway Labor Act in its long-term purpose which is alleged to
be the forcing of joint bargaining on the unions in violation of sec-
tion 2, First, of the Railway Labor Aet and under the inthience of
the Pact, the carriers, in fact. had violated the duty imposed by the
Railway Labor Act to bargain in good faith. F

Tho union parties agree with the Bureau that the carriers. as pro

nents of the agreements, have the burden of showing aflirmative
justification in the public interest for the Pact and allege that thev
have failed to sustain this burden. They deny vigorously that the
carriers have proved any imbalance in the bargaining position of the
unions over that of the carriers, and claim no disparity in economic

40 C.A.B.—5t9 .

74a

(peers gerrescorer naoremarnonenees Meus ERR

|

PER AOMARTAEY

| ae

ER crise a ee

See ee ee ee oes .
Bawa: Ne. AA Pat shiot RY ata ig

590 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS

power, in fact, exists. In support, they show that financial resources
of air transport unio

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_0370%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
