# Petition for Rehearing — Diamond v. Bland

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Rehearing
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 419 U.S. 885

## Text

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— OFC 2 1974

Supreme Court of the Unite States

October Term, 1974

No. 74-97

ROGER JON DIAMOND; WILLIAM DUXLER;
and PEOPLE'S LOBBY, INC.,

Petitioners,
vs.

FRANK BLAND, Sheriff of San Bernardino
County; LOUIS J. FORTUNA, Chief of Police
of City of San Bernardino; LOWELL E.

LATHROP, District Attorney of San
Bernardino County; JAMES LAMBERT;
C.H. BARRET: AL C. BALLARD, Mayor

of City of San Bernardino; and
HOMART DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari To The
Supreme Court of the State of California

PETITION FOR REHEARING

ROGER JON DIAMOND
Attorney at Law

15415 Sunset Boulevard
Pacific Palisades
California 90272

(213) 454-1351

Attorney for Petitioners.

PEOPLE’S LOBBY PRESS. LOS ANGELES

ethhen

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1974

No. 74-97

ROGER JON DIAMOND; WILLIAM DUXLER;
and PEOPLE'S LOBBY, INC.,

Petitioners,
US.

FRANK BLAND, Sheriff of San Bernardino
County; LOUIS J. FORTUNA, Chief of Police
of City of San Bernardino; LOWELL E.
LATHROP, District Attorney of San
Bernardino County; JAMES LAMBERT;
C.H. BARRET: AL C. BALLARD, Mayor
of City of San Bernardino; and
HOMART DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Petitioners herein respectfully
move this Court for an order (1) vacat-
ing its order of October 15, 1974 deny-
ing the petition for writ of certiorari
in this case, Mr. Justice Douglas and
Mr. Justice Stewart being of the opinion
that the petition should be granted, and
(2) granting the petition. On October 3l,

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1974 Mr. Justice Brennan extended the
time in which to file a petition for
rehearing to and including December 9,
1974.

Rehearing is sought because of the
following intervening circumstances:

1. Amendments to the California
Constitution effective November 6,
1974;

2. Amendments to the California
Government Code effective January 7,
1975;

3. Comments of Chief Justice Warren
Burger reported on October 15, 1974

If rehearing is granted and certiorari
is granted, this Court should resolve the
constitutional issues presented in the
petition for certiorari in light of the
enumerated intervening circumstances. At
a minimum, this Court should grant cer-
tiorari, summarily vacate the judgment
of the California Supreme Court, and
remand the case to that court for recon-
sideration of its four-to-three decision
in light of the substantial intervening
circumstances which have occurred at the
state level.

I. AMENDMENTS TO CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION

On November 5, 1974 the California
electorate voted to amend the California
Constitution, and the amendments became
effective on November 6, 1974. Article
I, Sections 9 and 10 (the free speech
and petition provisions of the California
Constitution, Pet.App. A., pp. A2-A3)

etm ccensne

were repealed.

Justice Mosk, writing for the three
dissenters on the California Supreme
Court, based his decision partly on
Article I, Section 9 of the California
Constitution (Pet.App. O, p. Al1l4).

Although Sections 9 and 10 were
repealed by the California electorate,
substantially similar provisions were
added to the California Constitution.
Article I, Section 2 now provides as
follows:

"Every person may freely speak,
write and publish his or her senti-
ments on all subjects, being respon-
sible for the abuse of this right.

A law may not restrain or abridge
liberty of speech or press."

Article I, Section 3 now provides as
follows:

"The people have the right to
instruct their representatives,
petition government for redress
of grievances, and assemble freely
to consult for the common good.”

It should be noted that the new "peti-
tion clause" is broader than the old
(Article I, Section 10) because the right
to petition has been extended from the
right to petition the "Legislature" to
the right to petition "government."

More important than the changes noted
above is the addition of Article I,
Section 24 to the California Constitution:

"Rights guaranteed by this

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Constitution are not dependent on
those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution.

This declaration of rights may
not be construed to impair or deny
others retained by the people."

The addition to the California Consti-
tution of this amendment is a significant
intervening circumstance. It goes to the
heart of the dispute between Justice
Burke's four-justice majority opinion
and Justice Mosk's three-justice dissent-
ing opinion. Justice Mosk concluded that
petitioners’ rights were protected by the
California Constitution, which afforded
petitioners greater rights than they
possessed under the federal constitution.
Justice Burke did state that the question
was being left open (Pet.App. O, p. 104)
because, in his view, Lloyd v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972), is based on the
property right of the shopping center,
not the absence of a First Amendment
right in the leaflet distributor. As
noted in the petition for certiorari,
there is great uncertainty in the lower
courts and among the legal commentators
as to the precise meaning of Lloyd v.
Tanner. Pet. pp. 36-37.

This constitutional change alone
requires, at a minimum, this Court to
vacate summarily the judgment below and
remand with directions to the California
Supreme Court to reconsider its opinion
in light of the change. Parenthetically,
it should be noted that Justice Burke
retired from the California Supreme Court
on November 20, 1974, leaving a three-to-
three split on the issue. Perhaps the

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vote of his replacement will make the
difference (just as the loss of the late
Justice Raymond E. Peters from the first
six-to-one Diamond v. Bland majority
apparently led to the second four-to-
three reversal (Justice Clark, Peters'
replacement, voted to overrule the prior
decision)). (Mr. Justice Marshall dis-
senting in Lloyd v. Tannexr, 407 U.S. 551,
584 (1972), recognized the effect of the
composition of a court upon the decision
it renders.) (It also perhaps should be
noted that Secretary of State Edmund G.
Brown, Jr., who filed an amicus curiae
brief in support of petitioners in the
California Supreme Court (Pet.App. M,
pp. A91-A98) was elected Governor of
California on November 5, 1974. Governor-
elect Brown, in view of the denial of
certiorari, cannot determine whether to
seek 2 statute specifically authorizing
the utilization of shopping centers for
the circulation of initiative petitions.
It is not clear whether such a statute
would be constitutional. The present
opinion of the California Supreme Court
indicates that in its view this Court
would strike it down. Yet this Court has
not spoken. The California Legislature
will not enact a law the California
Supreme Court believes would be invalid.
Petitioners cannot enact such a statute
by an initiative petition without access
to shopping centers.)

II. LIMITATION ON EXPENDITURES;
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE

Another significant intervening circum-
stance is the addition of Sections 85200
and 85201 to the California Government

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Code regarding the limitation on expendi-
tures which may be incurred in the circu-
lation of statewide initiative petitions.
These sections will become effective on
January 7, 1975. They provide as
follows:

"85200. No person shall incur
any expenditure in furtherance of
a circulation or qualification of
a statewide petition without the
express or implied authorization
of the proponent. For purposes
of this article, 'expenditure' does
not include:

(a) Unreimbursed expenses incur-
red by a circulator incidental to
his circulation of the petition;

(b) Expenditures for advertis-
ing or speech regarding the measure
unless the advertising or speech is
directly incidental to circulation
of the petition.

"85201. Not more than twenty-
five cents ($0.25) multiplied by
the number of signatures required
for qualification, adjusted for
cost of living changes, shall be
spent in furtherance of the circu-
lation or qualification of a state-
wide petition."

Throughout the litigation in the
instant case there has been no limit on
the amount of money which could be spent
to circulate and qualify a statewide
initiative petition for the ballot. The
absence of any restriction on the expen-
diture of funds to collect signatures

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on petitions is inextricably related
to the major premise of the majority
a of the California Supreme Court,
-€., that there are effective, altern-
fites methods cf gathering signatures on
petitions. As Secretary of State Edmund
G. Brown, Jr., pointed out in his amicus
brief, many California initiative
petitions qualified for the ballot
because of the financial resources of the
proponents of the measures. If cost is
not a factor, promoters of initiative
petitions might be able to pay persons
to go door-to-door in the communities and
gather signatures in this time consuming
and expensive fashion. Thus, with no
financial limitation, effective, alter-
native means of circulating initiative
petitions may exist (which petitioners
do not concede). However, the limitation
on expenditures for qualifying initiative
petitions will force all proponents to
seek locations where numerous signatures
can be gathered with little expense, such
as shopping centers. Secretary of State
Brown noted in his amicus brief the
relationship between the availability of
alternatives and the cost of qualifying
initiative petitions. Indeed, he anti-
cipated the enactment of financial
limitations. Govehor-elect Brown stated
in his brief,

"Finally, proposals to limit
circulation expenditures or to
prohibit payment to circulators
are pending before the Legisla-
ture. If any of these proposals
are enacted and if the opinion of
the District Court of Appeals (sic)
is affirmed, the result could well

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be to make the qualification of
an initiative petition a practical
impossibility under any circum-
stances.” Pet.App. M, pp. A96-A97.

In view of the new financial restric-
tions on expenditures to qualify initia-
tive petitions for the ballot and the
significance to the majority of the
California Supreme Court of the avail-
ability of alternative (but obviously
more expensive) methods of petition
circulation, at a minimum this Court
should vacate the judgment of the
California Supreme Court and remand to
that court for the purpose of permitting
it to reconsider its opinion.

III. COMMENTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Statements made by the Chief Justice
were published in the Los Angeles Daily
Journal on October 15, 1974, the same
day certiorari was denied. The Chief
Justice announced his concern about the
increasing workload of the Court. A
copy of the article is included as an
appendix to this petition.

The action of the Court in denying
certiorari can only lead to an increase
in litigation, both state and federal,
with the resulting continued and in-
creased burden on this Court which the
Chief Justice apparently would like to
see lessened. By denying certiorari in
this case, which involves the right of
the initiative guaranteed by the consti-
tutions of twenty-one states, this Court
has necessarily made it much more diffi-
cult, indeed impossible in most cases,
for citizens of these states to partici-

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pate in that form of the legislative
precess known as the initiative. With-
out shopping center access, citizens
simply cannot gather enough signatures

in the time allotted to qualify a measure
for the ballot.

Often, the subject of a citizen
initiative drive is the same as a lawsuit.
The instant case is an excellent example.
It involves an attempt to enact anti-
pollution legislation by the initiative
process.

When the legislative system fails
(initiative or representation), persons
turn to the judiciary. Thus, the battle-
ground for clean air shifted to the
judiciary. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. ’

ve iu 3 City of Chicago
v. General Motors Corporation, 467 F.2d
1262 (7th Cir. 1972); Diamond v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal.App.3d 374, 97
Cal.Rptr. 639, 47 A.L.R. 3d 759, 3 E.R.C.
1227 (1971). Some air pollution cases
have reached this Court on appeal, e.g.,
City of New York v. United States, 397
U.S. 248 (1970), and some have been
brought as original proceedings, e.g.,

Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406
U.S. 109 (1972).

Numerous other social problems which
are brought to the judiciary could be
solved by the legislative process. By
limiting the legislative process, this
Court forces frustrated citizens to turn
to the courts for help. The Chief Justice
has previously stated his preference for
legislative solutions to social problems.
See United States v. Richardson, U.S.

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, 41 L.Ed 2d 678, 689-690 (1974) and
Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the
War, U.S. __, 41 L.Ed 2d 706, 716-
722 (1974).

A decision in favor of petitioners
would result in a reduction in the work-
load of this court, and the workload of
the judiciary in general. The more
Opportunities citizens have to partici-
pate in the legislative process, the less
will be the demands they place on the
judiciary. Obvious also is the fact that
the availability of the initiative pro-
cess reduces the likelihood that frus-
trated citizens will resort to socially
Se methods to accomplish their
goals.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, as
well as those contained °. the petition
for writ of certiorari, petitione:s pray
that this Court grant rehearing of the
order of denial, vacate that order, grant
the petition and either hear this case on
its merits or summarily vacate the judg-
ment below and remand to the California
Supreme Court for reconsideration of its
opinion in light of the intervening cir-
cumstances enumerated herein. On a

1. A statute adopted by the initia-
tive process may lead to judicial
action if it is unconstitutional. This
is true of any statute. An initiative
statute was declared violative of the
state and federal constitutions by the
California Supreme Court in Weaver v.
Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235 (1966).

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previous occasion in this case the Chief
Justice and Justice Blackmun voted to
grant certiorari and also voted to grant
a rehearing, Homart Development Co. v.
Diamond, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); 405 U.S.
981 (1972). Now Justices Douglas and
een favor the granting of certiorari.
Petitioners respectfully urge this

Honorable Court to grant the rehearing
requested.

Respectfully submitted,

ye Cid

ROGER JON DIAMOND
15415 Sunset Boulevard
Pacific Palisades
California 90272

(213) 454-1351

Attorney for Petitioners.

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

As counsel for Petitioners, I hereby
certify that this petition for rehearing
is presented in good faith and not for
delay and is restricted to the grounds
specified in Rule 58(2) of this Court.

rege. Jn amend
ROGERGON DIAMOND

Counsel for Petitioners

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APPENDIX A

Los Angeles Daily Journal, Oct. 15, 1974

Burger Complains
Of High Caseload

Supreme Court to Begin Hearing
Record Number of Appeals Today

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The
Court its
of hearing orai in its

Warren E. Burger 5 the
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urger has frequently com-
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decisions included such
issues as school %
obscenity rulings and cases
involving other forms of free

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TERR: BLE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roger Jon Diamond, declare as
follows: I am an attorney at law duly
admitted to practice before the Supreme
Court of the United States, and I am
the attorney for petitioners.

On 1/279 Fé 1974, pursuant to

Rule 33 of the Supreme Court Rules, I
caused the within Petition for Rehearing
to be served on all respondents, the
California Supreme Court, the California
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, the San Bernardino County
Superior Court, and on California Secre-
tary of State Edmund G. Brown, Jr., amicus
curiae in the California Supreme Court,
and the American Civil Liberties Union

of Southern California, amicus curiae

in the California Supreme Court, by plac-
ing three copies thereof enclosed in a
sealed envelope with first class postage
thereon fully prepaid, in the United
States mail at Los Angeles, California,
addressed as follows:

Court of Appeal

Fourth Appellate District
640 State Building

303 West Third Street

San Bernardino, Calif. 92401

V. Dennis Wardle, Clerk

San Bernardino Superior Court
351 North Arrowhead Avenue
San Bernardino, Calif. 92401

Lonergan, Jordan, Gresham
& Varner
Allen B. Gresham, Esq.
398 West Fourth Street
San Bernardino, Calif. 92401

Lederer, Fox and Grove
Lawrence M. Cohen, Esq.
233 South Wacker, Suite 7916
Chicago, Illinois 60606

A. L. Wirin

Fred Okrand

John D. O'Loughlin

Jill Jakes

323 West Fifth Street

Los Angeles, California 90013

Ralph H. Prince, City Attorney
300 North "D" Street
San Bernardino, Calif. 92418

Paul A. Grube, Jr.

Deputy County Counsel

157 West Fifth Street

San Bernardino, Calif. 92401

Daniel H. Lowenstein, Esq.
111 Capitol Mall
Sacramento, Calif. 95814

California Supreme Court
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, Calif. 94102

I further certify that all parties
required to be served have been served.

Kege, Ton Damad

Jon Diamond

15415 Sunset Boulevard
Pacific Palisades
California 90272

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