# Respondents Brief — Farver v. City of Westlake

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 420 U.S. 928

## Text

fa

Supreme Court of the United States

sy October Term, 1974
No. 74-747

y BETTY S. FARVER,

Petitioner,
vs.

CITY OF WESTLAKE,
A Respondent.

On PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To THE SUPREME CouRT OF OHIO

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT CITY OF WESTLAKE
IN OPPOSITION

- Patrick A. GAREAU
21330 Center Ridge Road
Rocky River, Ohio 44116
Telephone: (216) 333-3100
Counsel for Respondent City of
Westlake

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

*

Opinions Below
Jurisdiction ...........
Questions Presented ......
Constitutional Provision Involved
Statutes Involved
Statement of the Case
Reasons for Denying Certiorari

NIP WNW WYN

I. There has been no unconstitutional deprivation
of property without due process of law; in that
the single-family residentia! zoning of the peti-
tioner’s property, under the facts and circum-
stances presented, bears a reasonable relation-
ship to the general health, welfare and safety of
the public and is a legitimate exercise of the
police power ... 7
II. This court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
second question presented by the petitioner ........ 14
III. This court lacks jurisdiction to consider the third
question presented by the petitioner 16

Conclusion 21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed.

27 (1954) i
Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 89 S. Ct. 1162, 22

L. Ed. 2d 398 (1969) 16
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038,

35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973) 19
Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Company v. City of

Cleveland, Ohio, 235 U.S. 50, 35 S. Ct. 21, 59 L. Ed.

127 (1914) - 16
Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d

23, 309 N.E.2d 900 (1974) .......... GRADE IRS athe hs 10
Monks v. New Jersey, 398 U.S. 71, 90 S. Ct. 1563, 26

a Sy ED OED caneaicansracecinsseonisemnicedtincmnpsovucenadsenceoss 16
Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925) 9
Tacon v. Arizona, 410 US. 351, 93 S. Ct. 998, 35 L. Md.

I ch ee 15, 16, 19
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, ........ if Ae , 94
iy RI I I apc a 2 we ae 2 10, 11
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S.
365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926) ................ 8, 10, 12
Constitution and Statutes
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment ....
See ewe oa os maasbonamaniaonebbaananalabinasion 2, 14,17
Be ein SI I ED goons ntaesnebeenniins ee aos 2, 3, 14, 18

Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 2506 ......0.00020.00.0:cceee 3, 6, 20

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1974
No. 74-747

BETTY S. FARVER,
Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF WESTLAKE,
Respondent.

On PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To THE SuPREME CourRT oF OHIO

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT CITY OF WESTLAKE
IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Common Pleas in and for Cuyahoga
County rendered a memorandum opinion. The Court of
Appeals for Cuyahoga County rendered an unreported
decision. The Supreme Court of Ohio ¢ nied the peti-
tioner’s motion to assume jurisdiction. All three opinions
are properly reproduced in the petitioner’s brief in support
of her petition for*e writ of certiorai 2.4 will not be
reproduced herein.

JURISDICTION

Separate judgments of the Supreme Court of Ohio
were entered on September 20, 1974. Petitioner alleges
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1257 (3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the zoning of the petitioner’s property
bears a reasonable relation to the public health, safety,
and welfare and is a legitimate exercise of the police
power. |

2. Whether the petitioner may raise the issue of pro-
cedural due process before this court when she failed to
raise the issue in any of the proceedings in the state
courts below.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

Fourteenth Amendment Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall! abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.

-_— = & OB &

STATUTES INVOLVED

28 United States Code Section 1257 (3)

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, inay
be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: ...

(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of
a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn
in question or where the validity of a State statute
is drawn in question on the ground of its being re-
pugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or
immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Con-
stitution, treaties, or statutes of, or commission held
or authority exercised under, the United States.

Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 2506, Section 2506.01.
Appeal from decisions of any agency of any pulitical
subdivision.

Every final order, adjudication, or decision of any
officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, de-
partment or other division of any political subdivision
of the state may be reviewed by the common pleas court
of the county in which the principal office of the political
subdivision is located, as provided in sections 2505.01 to
2505.45, inclusive, of the Revised Code, and as such pro-
cedure is modified by sections 2506.01 to 2506.04, inclusive,
of the Revised Code.

The appeal provided in sections 2506.01 to 2506.04,
inclusive, of the Revised Code is in addition to any other
remedy of appeal provided by law.

A “final order, adjudication, or decision” does not
include any order from which an appeal is granted by
ruie, ordinance, or statute to a higher administrative au-
thority and a right to a hearing on such appeal is provided;
any order which doves not constitute a determination of
the rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships
of a specifiea person; nor any order issued preliminary
to or as a result of a criminal proceeding.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Since the facts of this case are such an integral part
of the petitioner’s complaint before this court, we feel it
is necessary to set them out more fully than the summary
treatment contained in the petitioner’s statement of the
case.

On May 2, 1968, John A. Thomson, a realtor, on behalf
of Mrs. Betty S. Farver (hereinafte: referred to as the
petitioner). submitted to the Council of the City of West-
lake a letter requesting that the subject property be re-
zoned from single-family to multi-family use. On May
16, 1968, the Council referred this request to the Planning
Commission for recommendation. No action was taken
on this request at the time because during that period
the Planning Commission and the Council were devising
a new Comprehensive Zoning Code and Zoning Map. On
January 6, 1970, a second request was made on behalf
of the petitioner to rezone the property. On January
15, 1970, the Council referred the matter to the Planning
and Zoning Committee of Council. Thereafter, Ordinance
No. 1970-56 was drafted and piaced on the Council agenda.
The Planning and Zoning Committee recommended that
the ordinance be further considered by Council, and the

ordinance was placed on Council’s agenda for its regular
meeting of October 1, 1970. A public hearing was ad-
vertised and held as provided by the Charter of the
City of Westlake, and was conducted on the evening of
February 4, 1971. The Ordinance, No. 1970-56, was voted
on that night by Council and unanimously defeated.

Thereafter, the petitioner appealed this decision of
the Council to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court,
Case No. 891890. The case was heard on May 24, 1972.
The Court granted the City of Westlake’s motion for an
order dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction. The
petitioner then appealed this decision to the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals, Case No. 32029. On March
8, 1973, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming
the decision of the Court of Common Pleas.

While the action appealing the Council’s refusal to
rezone was being heard, the petitioner filed another action
for a declaratory judgment. The answer of the respondent
City of Westlake alleged that the petitioner failed to ex-
haust her administrative remedies. Therefore, on August
8, 1972, the petitioner requested that the Westlake Director
of Inspections issue a building permit to her for the con-
struction of multi-family buildings. The Director denied
the application since the property was not zoned for her
proposed use. The petitioner then appealed the Director’s
refusal to the Zoning Bosra of Appeals of the City of
Westlake. The matter was heard before the Zoning Board
of Appeals afier advertisir g for a public hearing on the
request on August 29, 1972. After presentation of all
the testimony and the exhibits, the Zoning Board of Ap-
peals denied the petitioner’s request.

After the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals
was sent to the petitioner, an appeal was perfected to
the Common Pleas Court under the Administrative Appel-

late Act, Chapter 2506 of the Ohio Revised Code. A com-
plete record of the testimeny and exhibits taken by the
Zoning Board of Appeals was submitted to the Court of
Common Pleas pursuant to law. Counsel for the petitioner
submitted the following Assignments of Error as the basis
of her appeal to the Common Pleas Court:

1. The decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals is
arbitrary, capricious, unconstitutional, and void.

2. The decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals is
contrary to law.

3. The decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals is
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

After reviewing the record of the Zoning Board of Appeals
and the additional testimony introduced at trial, the court
found in favor of the respondent City and denied the
petitioner’s request.

After this appeal from the Board of Zoning Appeals
was concluded by the trial court, the action for the declara-
tory judgment was then heard by the same court (Case
No. 907,277). The same and sole issue was again tried;
namely, that the zoning on the part of the City was un-
reasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and a denial of the peti-
tioner’s constitutional rights. All of the testimony and
exhibits presented to the Board of Zoning Appeals was
again admitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties.
At the request of the court, the parties agreed to proffer
to the court, by written instrument, the testimony of any
additional witnesses to be called in the declaratory judg-
ment action.

This case came on for final hearing on February 22,
1973. T'pon consideration, the court again found against
the petitioner.

~]

The petitioner then apnealed this decision to the Court
of Appeals, Case No. 32695, as well as the decision of
the Common Pleas Court involving the appeal from the
Zoning Board of Appeals, Appellate Case No. 32694. The
motion by petitioner to consolidate the appeals was over-
ruled. The cases were heard and argued together. The
Court of Appeals reviewed an extensive record encom-
passing all the testimony and exhibits presented before
the Zoning Board and Common Pleas Court.

The Appellate Court succinctly summed up the testi-
mony in its journal entry, set out ‘n Appendix B of the
petitioner’s request for a writ of certiorari and does not
demand repetition here. In both cases the court affirmed
the decision of the Common Pleas Court and denied the
petitioner her requested relief.

The petitioner then moved the Supreme Court of Ohio
to assume jurisdiction over both cases. Both motions were
denied on September 20, 1974.

REASONS FOR DENYING CERTIORARI

I. THERE HAS BEEN NO UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW; IN THAT THE SINGLE-
FAMILY RESIDENTIAL ZONING OF THE PE-
TITIONER’S PROPERTY, UNDER THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED, BEARS
A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE GEN.
ERAL HEALTH, WELFARE, AND SAFETY OF
THE PUBLIC AND IS A LEGITIMATE EXER.
_CISE OF THE POLICE POWER.

A starting point for a discussion of the legal principles
for the creation and challenge of zoning ordinances is

this court’s landrnark decision in the Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Compony, 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114,
71 L. Ed. 303 (1926). With this decision the concept of
comprehensive zoning legislation for a community achieved
permanent acceptance throughout our country. This court
established the general guideline or test by which a court
may review the validiiy of a zoning ordinance:

“The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws
and regulations, must find their justification in some
aspect of the police power, asserted for the public
welfare. The line which in this field separates the
legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power
is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with
circumstances and conditions. A regulatory zoning
ordinance, which would be clearly valid as applied
to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as applied
to rural communities. In solving doubts, the maximum
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which lies at
the foundation of so much of the common law of
nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew.
And the law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted,
not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful
aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the
scope of the power. Thus the question whether the
power exists to forbid the erection of a building of
a particular kind or for a particular use, like the
question whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is
to be determined not by an abstract consideration
of the building or of the thing considered apart, but
by considering it in connection with the circumstances
and the locality. Sturgis v. Bridgeman, L.R. 11 Ch.
852, 865. A nuisance may be merely a right thing
in the wrong place—like a pig in the parlor instead
of the barnyard. If the validity of the legislative

classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable.
the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294. (Emphasis
added) 272 U.S. 365, 387.

The Supreme Court of the State of Ohio preceded
this court by one vear in promulgating the same guideline
for Ohio courts in Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149
N.E. 30 (1925). In this case the court held:

“Laws enacted in the proper exercise of the police
power which are reasonably necessary for the preser-
vation of the public health, safety and morals, even
though they result in the impairment of the full use
of property by the owner thereof, do not constitute
a ‘taking of private property’ within the meaning of
the constitutional requirements as to making compen-
sation for the taking of property for public use and
as to the deprivation of property without due process
of law.” 112 Ohio St. 628

The court amplified this principle of law beginning at
page 638:

“As a preface to our discussion of this question we
must remind ourselves that the test is not whether
this court sitt® g as a city council, would have enacted
the ordinance challenged. The members of this court
may or may not conceive that such an ordinance is
wisely calculated to preserve the public health, morals
or safety. If the ordinance discloses no purpose to
prevent some public evil or to fill some public need,
and has no real or substantial relation to public health,
morals, and safety, it must be held void. When, how-
ever, legislation does have a real and substantial rela-
tion to the prevention of conditions detrimental to
the public health, morals, or safety, no matter how

10

unwise the measure itself seems to individual judges,
it is not for the judicial tribunals to nullify it upon
constitutional grounds. (Citations Omitted). The
courts in such cases have no right to determine
whether the measures questioned are wise or the best
that might have been adopted. The courts cannot
hold such laws invalid upon the mere ground of in-
expediency. In other words, the question of the rea-
sonableness of this ordinance is one, in the first in-
stance, for the determination of the council which
enacted it.” ( Emphasis added).

This “reasonable relation” standard stiil remains the
test applied by the courts of the State of Ohio. Cf., Mobil
Oil Corp. v. City of Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23, 309
N.E.2d 900 (1974).

This court, itself, was recently faced with a set of
circumstances similar to the case at bar. The case of
the Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974),
involved a zoning ordinance restricting the respondent's
land use to one-family dweiiings thereby excluding the
proposed multi-family use. This court sustained the valid-
ity of the ordinance holding that it was an example of
economic and social legislation with respect to which the
legislature has drawn lines in the exercise of its discretion.
The decision reaffirmed the tesi originally established by
this court in the Euclid case: that is, whether the ordinance
is reasonable, not arbitrary and bears a rational relation-
ship to a state objective. In its opinion discussing the
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance, this court quoted
its earlier decision in Bermen v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75
S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954):

“We do not sit to determine whether a particular hous-
ing project is or is not desirable. The concept of
the public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . The values

1]

it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”
94S. Ct. 1536, 1539.

Specifically considering the zoning ordinance before
the court, namely, an ordinance excluding multiple dwell-
ings, this court stated:

“The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses and
the like present urban problems. More people occupy
a given space; more cars rather continuously pass by;
more cars are parked; noise travels with crowds.

A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and
motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in
a land use project addressed to family iieeds. This
goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker,
supra. The police power is no‘ confined to elimination
of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample
to lay out zones where family values, youth values,
and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and clear air
make the area a sanctuary for people.” 94 S. Ct.
1536, 1541.

The case at bar involves the petitioner’s proposed use
of multi-family dwellings in a single-family use district
thereby creating all the same problems of noise, cars, and
overcrowding which this court referred to in Belle Terre,
supra. The evidence introduced into the record before
the trial court and later considered by the Court of Ap-
peals ¢-monstrated that the present single-family zoning
bears a reasonable relationship to the general health, wel-
fare, and safety of the community and is neither arbitrary

12

nor capricious. The expert testimony proved that it is
economically feasible to develop the petitioner’s property
under the present single-family zoning. Indeed, the record
showed that the best utilization of the petitioner’s property
—considering the Guide Plan and adjacent development—
is for single family use. In this regard it must be noted
that the petitioner’s property was zoned in conformity
with the comprehensive guide plan. In the Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Cumpany, supra, this court ex-
pounded upon the merits of comprehensive zoning with
special emphasis on apartment development:

“The matter of zoning has received much attention
at the hands of commissions and experts, and the
results of their investigations have been set forth in
comprehensive reports. These reports, which bear
every evidence of painstaking consideraticn, concur
in the view that the segregation of residential, busi-
ness, and industrial buildings will make it easier to
provide fire apparatus suitable for the character and
intensity of the development in each section; that it
will increase the safety and security of home life;
greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially to
children, by reducing the traffic and resulting con-
fusion in residential sections; decresse noise and other
conditions which produce or intensify nervous disor-
ders; preserve a more favorable environment in which
to rear children, etc. With particular reference to
apartment houses, it is pointed out that the develop-
ment of detached house sections is greatly retarded
by the coming of apartment houses, which has some-
times resulted in destroying the entire section for pri-
vate house purposes; that in such sections very often
the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed
in order to take advantage of the open spaces and

13

attractive surroundings created by the residential char-
acter of the district. Moreover, the coming of one
apartment house is followed by others, interfering by
their height and bulk with the free circulation of
air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which other-
wise would fall upon the smeller homes, and bringing
as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing
noises incident to increased traffic and business, and
the occupation, by means of moving and parked auto-
mobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus detract-
ing from their safety and depriving children of the
privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed
by those in more favored localities—until, finally, the
residential character of the neighborhood and its desir-
ability as a place of detached residences are utterly
destroyed. Under these circumstances apartment
houses, which in a different environment would be
not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable,
come very near to being nuisances.” 272 U.S. 365,
394.

An extensive amount of testimony was received and
considered in this case. The testimony proved to the satis-
faction of the Zoning Board of Appeals, the trial court,
and Appellate Court, and the Supreme Court of the State,
that the zoning of the petitioner’s property bears a reason-
able relationship to the general health, welfare, and safety
of the community. To allow the petitioner to increase
her financial gain by building apartments in a single-
family zone, under the facts and circumstances presented
in the record, would undermine the whole purpose of
comprehensive zoning and much worse, endanger the wel-
fare of the community as a whole.

14

II. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CON-
SIDER THE SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED
BY THE PETITIONER.

The petitioner claims that this court has jurisdiction
to consider the questions she presents by virtue of Title
28, United States Code Section 1257 (3). This section
reads as follows:

“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had,
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:

(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of
a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn
in question or where the validity of a State statute
is drawn in question on the ground of its being repug-
nant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United
States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity
is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes of, or commission held or author-
ity exercised under, the United States.”

The second question presented to this court by the
petitioner reads as follows:

“Whether or not the guarantees of procedural due
process were afforded in the Petitions in the State
Court and whether or not in so doing it failed to
follow its own law.”

This question contains only one allegation of a fed-
erally-protected right; that is, whether or not the fail-
ure of the trial court to make findings of fact and con-
clusions of law denied the petitioner Due Process of law
as that term is used in the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States.

15

In the case of Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 93 S.
Ct. 998, 35 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1973), this court construed Title
28, United States Code Section 1257 (3). The case in-
volved the constitutional limits on the authority of the
State of Arizona to try in absentia a person who volun-
tarily left the State and was unable to return, for fi-
nancial reasons. Upon reviewing the record it ap-
peared that the constitutional questions were not raised
by the petitioner below nor passed upon by the Arizona
Supren:e Court. This court held that it could not de-
cide issues raised for the first time at this level in the
judicial proceedings. More specifically this court held
that where an issue presented in a petition for cer-
tiorari was not raised below nor passed upoen by the
State’s highest court, and where the only issue actually
litigated does not alone justify exercise of certiorari juris-
diction, the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as im-
providently granted.

The record in the case at bar shows that the ques-
tion on this issue raised by the petitioner before the
Ohio State Supreme Court was as follows:

“Where, upon seasonal request, a court fails to enter its
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the error is
prejudicial and the offended party is entitled to a re-
versal as a matter of law.”

This proposition of law and the petitioner’s suppori-
ing argument in her memorandum in support of jurisdic-
tion before the Ohio State Supreme Court raises no claim
of any infringement of a federally-protected right. The
proposition of law presented to the State court questioned
whether the trial court properly complied with the State
law and local rules as to the making of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The proposition of law is also ad-
dressed to the proper remedy if the Supreme Court found

16

that the trial court did not conform to the rules of the State.
It must be noted that the petitioner never raised the issue
of procedural due process or even intimated to the court
that such an issue existed. Since the issue of procedural
due process was never presented to the Ohio State Supreme
Court, the court never rendered a decision on it.

This court has explicitly stated on numerous occasions
that it will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction any petition for
a writ of certiorari if the federal question to be argued was
not raised, preserved, or passed on in the state court but
simply raised here for the first time on review of a state
court decision. Tacon v. Arizona, supra; Monks v. New
Jersey, 398 U.S. 71, 90 S. Ct. 1568, 26 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1970);
Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 89 S. Ct. 1162, 22 L.
Ed. 2d 398 (1969).

The petitioner in the case at bar did not raise, nor did
the Ohio State Supreme Court nor any of the lower state
courts adjudicate, such an alleged constitutional infringe-
ment. In order to bring the case at bar into this court,
the petitioner is attempting to enlarge upon the conten-
tions made and passed upon by the state courts by adding
a new assignment of error. This court has made it clear
that such attempts will not be tolerated. Cleveland and
Pittsburgh Railroad Company v. City of Cleveland, Ohio,
235 U.S. 50, 35S. Ct. 21, 59 L. Ed. 127 (1914).

Ilr. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CON-
SIDER THE THIRD QUESTION PRESENTED
BY THE PETITIONER.

The third question presented in this petition for a writ
of certiorari is as follows:

“Whether or not a municipality in a zoning matter,
wherein a property owner is compelled to exhaust her

17

administrative remedy, may refuse to act from May
2, 1968 till February 4, 1971 wherein three (3) times
during that period its Planning Commission has rec-
ommended action favorably to the Petitioner.”

This question fails to set out the federally-protected
right of which the petitioner feels she is being denied. By
the way her question is presented, we are led to believe
that her complaint is addressed to the time lag between
May 2, 1868 and February 4, 1971. Since the petitioner
cites only the Fourteenth Amendment in her petition, it
seems that sne is alleging that this time lag sormehow de-
nied her due process of law.

“is she did in question two, the petitioner is again
attempting to raise an issue here which she did not present
to the state courts. An analysis of the petitioner’s prop-
ositions of law before the Ohic State Supreme Court shows
that the petitioner raised the issue of substantive due pro-
cess but never presented any question as to procedural due
process. The proposition of law raised by the petitioner
before the Ohio State Supreme Court reads as follows:

“Where a property owner requests rezoning on May 2,
1968 with no final action by the Council until February
4, 1971; Where the Planning Commission of that Coun-
cil on three separate occasions recommends that the
premises be re-zoned as requested; where within that
period, land immediately adjacent to the subject prem-
ises is re-zoned for multi-family use up to, but not be-
yond, the irregular property line of the owner, with
no street, highway or other natural boundary excluding
the exact houndary of the owner's property; where
the subject premises are in part covered by a fireline
easement from a United States Government nike site:
where the premises are surrounded by commercial
propertv apartments, greenhouses and nursery prop-

18

erty, a church and parking area, a convent and, in
particular, a trailer park for mobile homes; where
there have been no new housing starts of even mod-
estly priced residential property in over fifteen years;
where the plan proposed by the City for single family
residential use would leave 28% of the land unavailable
for that use: where at a cost of $75,000 per residence,
the single family property is priced out of the market;
where for multi-family use it would have a value of
$620,000 and where there is no evidence presented to
show that multi-family use would in any way offend
against the public health, safety, welfare or morals,
the reft.sal of the City Council to re-zone and or grant
a bui'ding permit is arbitrary, capricious, unconstitu-
tion] and void.”

If not made clear by this pioposition of law that the
petit.oner presented only the issue of substantive due pro-
cess to the court, it is made clear by the argument of the
petiticner in her memorandum in support of jurisdiction
before the Ohio State Supreme Court. The petitioner
stated in her memorandum that:

“The sole and only issue before the Court in regulating
the use of land is a constitutional issue. Control rests
upon the police power of the State. Otherwise, the
deprivation is confiscation with compensation. With-
out justification on the grounds of public health, wel-
fare, safety and morals, control cannot be justified or
sustained. Any violation is contrary to the Vth and
XIVth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States of America and of Article 1, Section 19 of tne
Constitution of the State of Ohio.” (Emphasis added).

Again, the petitioner never raised the question of pro-
cedural due process before the Supreme Court of the State
of Ohio. The question cannot now be raised for the first

19

time on a writ of certiorari before this court. Tacon v.
Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 93 S. Ct. 998, 35 L. Ed. 2d 346
(1973).

Even assuming that the question of procedural due
process had been properly raised before the state court,
the petitioner's allegations of a denial of due process have
no basis in fact. This court has held that the concept
of procedural due process can only be judged on the par-
ticular facts of each case. Cf.. Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 US. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973).
The facts in the case at bar show that on May 2, 1968,
John A. Thomson, a realtor, on behalf of the petitioner,
submitted to the Council of the City of Westlake a letter
requesting that the subject property be rezoned from
single-family to multi-family use. On May 16, 1968, the
Council referred this request to the Planning Commission
for recommendation. No action was taken on this request
at the time because during this period, the Planning Com-
mission and the Council were devising a new compre-
hensive zoning code and zoning map encompassing the
entire city. On January 6, 1970, a second request was
made on behalf of the petitioner to rezone the property.
On January 15, 1970, the Council referred the matter to
the Planning and Zoning Committee of Council. There-
after, Ordinance No. 1970-56 was drafted and placed on
the Council agenda. The Planning and Zoning Committee
recommended that the ordinance be further considered
by Council, and the ordinance was placed on Council's
agenda for its regular meeting of October 1, 1970. A
public hearing was advertised and held as provided by
the Charter of the Citv of Westlake, and was conducted
on the evening of February 4, 1971. The ordinance was
voted on that night by Council and inanimously defeated.
If there was any delay in the consideration of the peti-
tioner’s request for rezoning, it was caused by the fact

20

that at that time the City was revamping the entire zoning
scheme of the municipality, and the Council thought it
more expedient to consider the petitioner’s property in
the context of the entire plan rather than as an isolated
parcel.

In the petition for a writ of certiorari before this
court, the petitioner complains that she was “locked in”
and denied the right to proceed under the requirement
that she first exhaust her administrative remedies. This
is simply not true. The facts show that the petitioner
was not “'ocked in” to any administrative system but
rather locke herself in by pursuing a single remedy where
alternative semedies were available. The petitioner was
content with requesting Council to rezcae her property
and then waiting for Council’s decision which would be
made along with the revamping of the entire zoning scheme
of the City. The petitioner knew that the consideration
by Council of the zoning for the entire City would not
be an overnight affair, but rather would take much study
and painstaking deliberation. If the petitioner felt that
the delay in time would cause her some type of hardship,
she could have sought an immediate adjudication of her
rights as to this property. The zoning ordinances of the
City of Westlake provided for a hearing before the Zoning
Board of Appeals for any property owner who felt that
the present zoning of his parcel caused some type of un-
usual hardship. Codified Ordinances of Westlake, Chapter
1215. The State Code, Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506,
then provided for a court review of any order meade by
this administrative body. In fact, the petitioner did take
advantage of this remedy but not until August 8, 1972.
There was also another remedy available to the petitioner.
She could have brought a declaratory judgment action
directly before the Common Pleas Court as early as May
2, 1968.

21

The fact is that the petitioner was quite content to
await the decision of Council when it considered her re-
quest for a rezoning along with its study of the zoning
scheme for the entire city. The petitioner cannot now
assert a denial of due process because of a delay which
was self-imposed.

CONCLUSION

The respondent believes, as to the first question raised
by the petitioner in her petition for a writ of certiorari,
that there is no substance in fact to her allegations of
a deprivation of propert,, without due process of law.
The evidence introduced before ‘ne Zoning Board of Ap-
peals of the City of Westlake, the trial court, and con-
sidered by the Court of Appeuls and the Supreme Court
of Ohio, proved to the satisfaction of all four bodies that
the zoning of the petitioner's property was reasonably
related to the public healtl:, safety, and welfare and within
the police powers of the respondent-City. The respondent
believes that the secead and third questions presented
by the petitioner ars improperly before this court since
they were never raised in the courts below. For this
reason, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider them here
for the first time.

For all the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully
requests that the petition for writ of certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Patrick A. GAREAU
21330 Center Ridge Road
Rocky River, Ohio 44116
Telephone: (216) 333-3100
Counsel for Respondent City of
Westlake

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385608_0058%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
