# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Gables by Sea, Inc. v. Lee

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1975
- **Citation:** 419 U.S. 1105

## Text

in the

Supreme Cours

Cniten ‘States
No. 74> 2! 28%

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,
a Florida corporation,
Petitioner,
v8.

EMMETT C. LEE, JR., Colonel, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, DISTRICT ENGINEER, DEPART-
MENT OF THE ARMY, JACKSONVILLE, FLOR-
IDA DISTRICT, ROBERT F. FROEHLKE, SECRE-
TARY OF THE ARMY, and UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MARION E. SIBLEY
and

ALLAN M. GLASER

of the law firm of

SIBLEY, GIBLIN, LEVENSON & WARD
Attorneys for Petitioners

P.O. Box 390360

Miami Beach, Florida 33139

MIAMI REVIEW — 371-4853 — 377-3721

PEL EO ELIE TL OILS EL OE RE ER

4s

ee ee

INDEX

Page

DECISIONS
I. Federal Decisions _. 2
II. State of Florida Decisions ......... 3
JURISDICTION ws 4
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 4
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND ~~?
RULE PROVISIONS INVOLVED .......... 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE = = 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......... 8
CONCLUSION oe 14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . 15

li
CITATIONS

Case Page
Board of Regents of State College v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972) 12
Chrysler Corporation v. Department of
Transportation,

472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972) 10
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814 (1971) cece sen ee 10, 11
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg,

463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ... 11
Fuentes v. Shevin,

407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972) 12, 13
Morgan v. United States,

298 U.S. 48, 56 S.Ct. 906 (1926) 12, 13
Morgan v. United States,

AUS. Lease Te (ies) —_...... 12
Perry v. Sindermann,

408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694 (1972) 12

STATUTES

Ee FE ie 4

National Environmental Protection Act, Title 42,
U.S.C. $4322, et seq. nm i Aree

III

CITATIONS (cont.)
Page
Water Quality Act, Title 33, U.S.C. §1171, et seq. ..... 4,5

Water Pollution Control Act, Title 33, U.S.C. $1341,

00S tie 4,5

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Fourteenth Amendment ....... : : e 4,5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Code of Federal Regulations,
Section 209.120(g) (1) (2) ......

Local Rule 10 of the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Florida

Local Rule 18 of the Court of Appeals for Fifth
Circuit

Rule 19(b) of Supreme Court of United States

in the
Supreme Court
of the

Gnited States

NO.

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,

a Florida corporation, Petitioner,

v8.

EMMETT C. LEE, JR., Colonel, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, DISTRICT ENGINEER, DEPART-
MENT OF THE ARMY, JACKSONVILLE, FLOR-
IDA DISTRICT, ROBERT F. FROEHLKE, SECRE-
TARY OF THE ARMY, and UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, R oie

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, GABLES BY THE SEA, INC., a Florida
corporation respectfully prays for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment and opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals, for the Fifth Circuit,
entered and rendered in the above entitled cause on July
9, 1974, to which a petition for rehearing was denied on
August 2, 1974,

2
DECISIONS BELOW

I. Federal decisions: ©:
| ‘

a. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida granting summary
judgment for the’ Respondents has not been officially
reported at this time but appears as “A” in the Appendix
‘accompanying this petition. The appellate court’s decision
was rendered without the benefit of oral argument, the
cause having been disposed of on the summary calendar.
The order of the Court of Appeals denying the petition
for rehearing appears as “B” in the Appendix.

b. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida’s order granting summary
judgment to the Respondents is not reported but appears
as “C” in the Appendix. The District Court did enter a
memorandum opinion reported at 365 F.Supp. 826. A
copy of that opinion appears as “D” in the Appendix.
The District Court’s order granting summary judgment
was entered: without Petitioner having been granted the
opportunity for oral argument in opposition ‘to the 1n0-
tion for summary judgment.

e. The District Court’s summary judgment
affirmed the decision of the United States Department
of the Army and the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers denying an extension of a permit to dredge and
fill a certain small, privately'owned area along the West-
erly shore of Biscayne Bay in Coral Gables, Florida.
That decision was rendered without the benefit of a pub-
lic hearing. A copy of that unreported decision appears

i

3

as “E” in the Appendix and a copy of the report of the
Army Corps of Ergineers upon which that decision is
based appears as “F” in the Appendix.

II. State of Florida decisions:

a. The decision of the Circuit Court of the
Second Judicial Circuit of Florida (Trial Court), not of-
ficially reported appears as “G” in the Appendix, and it
established the Petitioner’s right to dredge and fill its
property for a period of two hundred and twenty three
(223) days, which was the unexpired period of the original
permit granted by the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers, that would have remained but for the illegal, un-
warranted interference by the State of Florida.

b. The decision of the District Court of Ap-
peal of Florida, First District, 251 So.2d 880 (Fla.App.

1971), appears as “H” in the Appendix and it affirmed
the judgment of the Trial Court.

e. The Circuit Court (Trial court) rendered
a post judgment order enforcing its final judgment, said
order appears as “I” in the Appendix. The District Court
of Appeals of Florida, First District, 258 So.2d 822 (Fla.
App. 1972), quashed the appeal taken from that post
judgment order and the Supreme Court of Florida denied
certiorari. The appellate court ruling appears as “J” in
the appendix.

|

4

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked
under Title 28, U.S.C. $1254 and Rule 19(b) of the Rules
of the Supreme Court of the United States. This cause
involves vitally important questions of both Federal and
State law which have not been settled by this Supreme
Court of the United States and the decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, as
well as the administrative decision of the Department
of the Army and the United States Army Corps of En-
gineers have resulted in a drastic departure from the
accepted and usual course of due process to such an ex-
tent as to deny this Petiticner its fundamental rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

a. Whether or not a property owner can be con-
stitutionally deprived of its vested property rights by
governmental action without having been afforded a
hearing or an opportunity for a hearing?

b. Whether or not the determination of the “pub-
lic interest” involved in a proceeding pursuant to the re-
quirement of the Water Quality Act, Title 33, U.S.C.
$1171, et seq, as amended and reorganized in the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, Title 33, U.S.C. §1341,
et seq, and the National Environmental Protection Act,
Title 42 U.S.C. $4822, et seq, permits a decision based on
public clamor rather than competent, substantial evi-
dence that the requested activity will have an adverse
impact on the environment?

5

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
RULE PROVISIONS INVOLVED:

This cause involves the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States; the Water Quality
Act, Title 33, U.S.C. §1171, et seq, as amended and reor-
ganized by the Federal Pollution Control Act of October
1972, Title 33, U.S.C. $1341, et seq; the National Environ-
mental Protection Act, Title 42, U.S.C. $4321, et seq; the
Code of Federal Regulations, Section 209.120(g) (1) (2);
Local Rule 10 of the Federal District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida; and Local Rule 18 of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The pertinent parts of
the above provisions are reprinted at “K” of the
Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Gables by the Sea, Inc., purchased bay front property
located in Coral Gables, Dade County, Florida, from the
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of
Florida for residential uses and purposes. To enable de-
velopment the Trustees sold to Gables by the Sea suffi-
cient bay bottom to fill the property. Petitioner subdi-
vided its property, which was zoned for residential pur-
poses, and paid taxes on that basis. Without filling the
property, it cannot be used for any purpose.

The United States Corps of Engineers granted a
permit to complete the dredging and filling of the sub-
division which did not expire until December 31, 1968.
(A-L)' In. 1972 Petitioner applied for an extension and

'The symbol “A” will be utilized to designate pages of the ap-
pendix to this Petition.

6

renewal of that permit. (A-M) The Department of the
Army and the Corps of Engineers denied the requested
permit without granting Petitioner a hearing.

Gables by the Sea, Inc. filed its complaint in the -
United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida alleging essentially that it was denied of a
valuable property right without the benefit of procedural
due process in the form of a public hearing and without
the benefit of substantive due process in that the De-
partment of the Army and the Corps of Engineers denied
the renewal and extension of the permit on the alleged
basis that the project would be contrary to the public
interest without making a finding that the project would
cause ecological damage to that degree and extent that
would in fact make it contrary to the public interest.
The Corps of Engineers basec their denial of the re-
quested permit upon the following findings:

“Based on an evaluation of the comments by both
the developer and state and federal agencies
competent to make an evaluation of ecological
factors incident to the proposed development, it
is my conclusion that the degree of ecological
damage to ve occasioned by the project is subject
to conjecture. There will however be some irre-
versible commitment of biologically productive
areas resulting in ecological damage of one de-
gree or another. More significant however is the
lack of public acceptance of the project. Opposi-
tion to the project by virtually all governmental
agencies, citizens groups and even the Dade
County Planning Department have convinced me
that permitting of the project will not be in the

7

public interest. I therefore request authority to
deny the permit on the basis that the develop-

. ment would irretrievably commit biologically
productive lands, lacks acceptability from both
the public and private sector, and would not be
in the public interest.”

The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida entered a summary judgment in favor
of the government pursuant to its Local Rule 10(b) wich
permits the granting of judgment without the benefit of
a hearing. The trial court refused to permit Gables by
the Sea to proceed with scheduled depositions privr to the
disposition of the motion for summary judgment (A-N-68)
Petitioner would have established by those depositions that
the Corps of Engineers did not consider the relevant fac-
tors in reaching its decision.

Petitioner prosecuted an appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The appeal was
placed on the summary calendar pursuant to Local Rule
18 of the Fifth Circuit and Petitioner was thereby denied
the opportunity to present oral argument. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the summary judgment entered by the
District Court. Thus, based on the false premise that due
precess and the ends of justice consist of a clear calendar
and administrative efficiency, the Petitioner has been
through the entire Federal administrative hierarchy, the
Federal trial court level and now through the Federal
appellate court level without the benefit of any hearing
whatsoever and without its attorneys being permitted to
make a single appearance at any hearing in any court
recom. The cumulative result is that Petitioner has been
deprived of a substantial property right without the bene-

8

fit of substantive or procedural due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

It appears from the decisions of the Courts below,
concerning judicial review of a denial of a requested
dredge and fill permit, that as a matter of policy the
Fifth Circuit will not inquire into procedural or substan-
tive matters regarding decisions by the Army Corps of
Engineers. The Fifth Circuit equates the “public interest”
with a determination of whether the vocal members of the
public are opposed to a project rather than objective find-
ings based on competent evidence.

Undoubtedly, as a direct result of the failure to afford
Petitioner a hearing, the denial of the requested dredge and
fill permit was not based upon the prescribed legislative
standards contained in the Water Quality Act, Title 33
U.S.C. $1171, et seq, as amended and reorganized in the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Title 33 U-S.C.
§1341, et seq, the National Environmental Protection
Act, Title 42, U.S.C. §4322, et seq, and the applicable pro-
visions of the Code of Federal Regulations, all of which
provide that the denial of a dredge and fill permit must
be based on findings that the activity if permitted would
cause such extensive damage as to be contrary to the pub-
lic interest because of its adverse effect on the environ-
ment. A minor impact on the ervironment will not, under
the applicable law, justify the denial of a permit. The
determination of the “public interest” is not a matter of
taking a popularity poll, but rather a determination based
upon competent, substantial evidence that the requested

9

activity will cause such extensive damage as to have an
adverse impact on the environment.

The above quoted findings of the District Engineer
established that there would be no substantial damage or
injury to the ecology or to biologically productive areas.
Such a finding requires the issuance of the requested per-
mit. The permit was not issued because tie District En-
gineer found “more significant however, is the lack of
public acceptance of the project.” It is respectfully sub-
mitted that “public acceptance” and “contrary to pub-
lic interest” are two entirely different concepts. The lat-
ter is based on objective standards; whereas, the former
contemplates a popularity contest and relegates a property
owner’s right to the whim of public clamor.”

The decisions below are tainted by the denial of pro-
cedural due process resulting from the cumulative effect of
the failure of the United States Army Corps of Engineers
to afford the Petitioner a public hearing contrary to its own
regulations; the granting by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida of a summary
final judgment in favor of the Respondents pursuant to its
Local Rule 10(b), which permits the granting of-a sum-
mary judgment without the benefit of a hearing before the
Court; the District Court’s further action in not permitting
Petitioner to proceed with scheduled depositions prior to the
disposition of the motion for summary judgment contrary
to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that depositions will be considered by the Court
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment; and by
the effect of Local Rule 18 of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit which permitted this cause to be placed

23 Andersons American Law of Zoning, §15.27, page 155-156.

BF OEE OTTER

10

on the summary calendar and thereby deprived Petitioner
of the opportunity to present oral argument.

Title 33, U.S.C. §1344 became effective on October
18, 1972, and provided for permits for dredging and filling
after notice and opportunity for public hearing. This
Statute was in effect prior to November 22, 1972, when
Colonel Lee, the District Engineer, prepared his report on
the Petitioner’s application recommending denial of the
permit and prior to January 18, 1973, when final action
was taken denying the permit. Yet, despite this legisla-
tive mandate requiring a hearing, none was held.

Compounding the denial of procedural due process, the
District Court refused to allow Petitioner the right to
take depositions of the administrative officials participat-
ing in the proceeding which resulted in the denial of the
requested permit. It was an absolute necessity for the trial
court to determine whether the United States Army Corps
of Engineers based its decision denying the requested per-
mit on the relevant factors. Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814 (1971);
Chrysler Co~poration v. Department of Transportation,
472 F.2d 65y (6th Cir. 1972). Depositions were essential
for a determination of whether or not the administ:‘ative
bureaucracy of the Corps of Engineers had based their
decision upon consideration of the relevant factors. The
purpose of taking the scheduled depositions was to estab-
lish that the administrative officials and agencies that
submitted written reports had no factual predicate, either
by inspection or otherwise, for their reports, and that
these reports were forwarded automatically without re-
gard or relationship to the true relevant facts concerning
the effect, if any, on the environment by the granting
of the requested permit. It was these unsupported reports

11

that gave rise to the objectiuns relied on by the District
Engineer in making his findings. The scheduled discov-
ery was prohibited, but if permitted, would have revealed
the arbitrary and capricious nature of the decision of the
Corps of Engineers because of the lack of any evidence
to support the decision. In fact, the District Engineer,
Col. Lee, found “that the.degree of ecological damage to
be occasioned by the project is subject to conjecture.”
The United States Supreme Court held in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra, that the
administrative officials who participated in an adminis-
trative decision, even in the absence of de novo review,
may be required to give testimony in order to afford
adequate judicial review in the United States District
Court. See also Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In the in-
stant cause the trial court held and the Court of Appeals
affirmed that no discovery would be permitted because
Petitioner was bound by the administrative record and
any discovery would be irrelevant. The effect of such a
ruling was to prevent judicial review and an examination
of whether or not the administrative hierarchy considered
the relevant factors and statutory standards.

The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of
Florida held that if the filling and dredging would injure
the environment to such an extent as to adversely affect
the public interest, then the State of Florida could exer-
cise the power of eminent domain and take the property
by paying the owner just compensation. Government can
not, after selling submerged land to private owners for
valuable consideration, deny the right to use that land in
the only way in which private ownership can have any
value. By denying the permit the Corps of Engineers

12

deprived the Petitioner of a valuable property right, that
is, the use of the property. In rendering such a decision it
was essential that Petitioner be afforded a full and open
hearing and a fair opportunity to meet the issues and be
heard before the Corps issued its final command.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently
held that a party who has been deprived of property by
administrative action is entitled to procedural due process
in the form of notice and an opportunity to be heard. This
protection found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution has been read broadly by this
Court to include protection of any significant property
interest. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 48, 56 S.Ct. 906
(1926); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773
(1938); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 598, 92 S.Ct. 2694
(1972); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972) and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
USS. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972); The United States Supreme
Court in Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent.R.Co., 305 U.S. 177,
59 S.Ct. 160 (1938), held that the statutory requirement
that a determination by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission as to whether or not an electric railway was
subject to the Railway Labor Act could only be made after
a hearing and that the reference to “hearing” intended a
proceeding in which evidence is received and weighed
along with argument. The Court described in that case the
phrase “hearing” as follows:

‘. . - The Commission must determine ‘after
hearing’. The requirement of a ‘hearing’ has
obvious reference ‘to the tradition of judicial
proceedings in which evidence is received and
weighed by the trier of facts.’ The ‘hearing’ is

13

‘the hearing of evidence and argument’. Morgan
v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480, 56 S.Ct. 906
911, 80 L.Ed. 1288. And the manifest purpose in
requiring a hearing is to comply with the re-
quirements of due process upon which the parties
affected by the determination of an administra-
tive body are entitled to insist. ...” (at page 163)

In the Fuentes v. Shevin case, supra, this Court held
that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment in-
cludes the right and opportunity to be heard at a mean-
ingful time and in a meaningful manner by a person who
held less than absolute ownership in a physical object. This
protection applies equally to a person with the right to
dredge and fill nis property which is useless unless he can
do so.

It is indeed unfortunate that the recent enforcement
of the admirable goal of protection of the environment
for the present and future has resulted in administrative
agencies riding roughshod over private property owners
without affording them due process of law. It must be
remembered that private property owners are persons
within the protection of the Constituticn and their rights
can only be encroached upon by governmental interfer-
ence if they are afforded the full protection of the Con-
stitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. To do less would
simply mean that the judicial, executive and legislative
branches of the United States government have decided
that the ends justify the means and the individual liber-
ties preserved and protected by the United States Con-
stitution have been eroded and undermined in the over
zealous pursuit of an otherwise worthwhile object. The
environment can and must be protected but due Process
of Law can not be allowed to fall in the path of that goal.

Sarr ce

14
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that this Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted, |

- MARION E. SIBLEY
and
ALLAN M. GLASER
of the law firm of
SIBLEY, GIBLIN, LEVENSON
& WARD
Attorneys for Petitioners
605 Lincoln Road, Suite 707
P.O. Box 390360
Miami Beach, Florida 33139

By: /s/ Marion E. Sibley
MARION E. SIBLEY

By: /s/ Allan M. Glaser

ALLAN M. GLASER

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing “Reply Brief of Appellant” was mailed
to EDWARD J. SHAWAKER, attorney for Appellees,
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, and to
PAUL & THOMSON, attorneys for Intervenors, 1300
First National Bank Building, Miami, Florida 33131,
this ___. day of September, 1974.

/s/ Allan M. Glaser

a ti

tee oe

et
oe

SIAR Y
BUPREME COURT, U. &

No. 74-28 7

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,
a Florida corporation,

Petitioner,

EMMETT C. LEE, JR., Colonel, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, DISTRICT ENGINEER, DEPART-
MENT OF THE ARMY, JACKSONVILLE, FLOR-
IDA DISTRICT, ROBERT F. FROEHLKE, SECRE-

TARY OF THE ARMY, and UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Appendix
Designation Page
A Decision of the United States Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit —.-_»_-____ 1

B Order denying petition for rehearing of
the United States Court of re Fifth
Circuit — ii a 2

C Order Granting Summary Final Judgment
for Defendant entered by the United States
District Court for the Southern District
ef Tee a ES 3

D Memorandum Opinion entered by the
United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida... =~ 5

E_ Final decision of the Corps of Engineers 17
ee a eee 19
G Final Judgment of the Circuit Court of the

Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon
County, Florida 24

H Decision of the District Court of —
First District of Florida - Phe 38

I Final Judgment entered by the Circuit
Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and
for Leon County, Florida. =. == = 46

I

INDEX TO APPENDIX (cont.

Appendix
Designation

J Decision on Motion to quash appeal entered
sts oa aa pelmaieara

L

First District

Pertinent Text of Statutes and Rules
a) Title 33, U.S.C., § 1171(b) (4)
b) Title 33, U.S.C, $1344
c) Title 42, U.S.C., § 4321

d) Code of Federal Regulations,
§ 209.120(g) (1) and (2) —.

e) Local Rule 10, United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Pewee £2

f) Local Rule 18, United States Court of
Appeals, Fifth District _

Original permit

Application for Extension filed in 1972 __
Order Quashing Notices to Take Deposi-
tions and Staying Discovery entered by

the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida...» a

Page

- & 8

57

57

75

tae?

A-A

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

EMMETT C. LEE. Jr., Colonel, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 74-1028
Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.

July 9, 1974.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida; William O. Mehrtens, Judge.

Before GEWIN, GODBOLD and CLARK, Circuit
Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this case, Gables by the Sea, Inc., seeks reversal of
the district court’s order granting summary judgment to
the appellees. After giving full consideration to the briefs,
trial record, and the district court opinion, 365 F.Supp.
826, we discern no valid basis for reversal under the facts
disclosed by the record in this case. Moreover, our recent
opinion in Di Vosta Rentals, Inc. v. Lee, 488 F.2d 674
(5th Cir. 1973), demonstrates to us that appellant’s con-
tentions are without merit. Accordingiy, the judgment of
the district court is affirmed.

*Rule 18, Sth Cir. See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty
Co. of New York et al., Sth Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part 1.

as

2
A-B
[TITLE OMITTED]
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
(Filed August 2, 1974)

Before GEWIN, GODBOLD and CLARK, Circuit
Judges.

PER CURIAM:
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing

filed in the above entitled and numbered cause be and the
same is hereby denied.

3
A-C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 73-752-Civ-WM

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,

a Florida corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EMMETT C. LEE, JR., etc., et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY FINAL
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT

This cause came on to be heard upon the motion of
the defendants for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule
56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and counsel having
submitted memoranda of law in support of their respec-
tive positions, and the Court having considered the rec-
ord, most particularly the administrative record filed by
defendants in support of their motion for summary judg-
ment, and the Court being otherwise duly advised in the
premises, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

1. That the motion of the defendants for summary
judgment be, and the same is, hereby granted.

ee eS eo tn ie ee ee kc as ee eae eee

4

2. That the plaintiff shall take nothing by this ac-
tion and summary final judgment is hereby entered in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, and
the defendants shall go hence without day .

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers at Miami, Dade
County, Florida, this 23rd day of October, 1973.

/s/ W. O. Mehrtens

UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE

cc: Marion E. Sibley, Esq.
United States Attorney (Reynolds)
James R. Walpole, Esq.

5
A-D
[TITLE OMITTED]
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This suit, brought against the United States and cer-
tain named individuals is, in essence, a challenge of the
administrative determination made by the Corps of Engi-
neers to deny the plaintiffs application for a “dredge and
fill permit” pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 403. A brief account
of the facts alleged in the Complaint will precede a dis-
cussion of the legal issues.

In 1956 the Corps of Engineers issued a dredge and
fill permit to Gables Venetian Waterway, Inc., predeces-
sor in title to plaintiff in the instant action. The permit
authorized dredging and filling operations on the western
shore of Biscayne Bay, a navigable water of the United
States. By its terms, the permit had an expiration date of
December 31, 1959. Several revisions in the application
were made and extensions of the permit granted from
1959 through 1965. In the fall of 1965 plaintiff again
requested an extension of the permit, in order to complete
the work, to December 31, 1968. The Corps granted this
extension. No further requests were made for [310] ex-
tensions prior to the expiration date and plaintiff's permit
expired December 31, 1968.

Approximately four years later’ on July 28, 1972, a
representative of Gables submitted a permit application

‘Apparently after the Corps granted the permit extension to De-
cember 31, 1968, Gables was involved in a series of litigation in the
Florida state courts involving the issuance of certain State permits and
certification. The State court litigation has no effect on the instant case.

6

to the Corps seeking to conduct dredge and fill activities
in the same vicinity of the prior dredge and fill opera-
tions. Pursuant to its standard procedures, the Corps
issued a public notice of the application. The Corps then
received over 500 comments, including reports from State
and Federal agencies, in opposition to the proposed proj-
ect. In response to such adverse comments, Gables submit-
ted a technical report to the Corps attempting to show
that the permit should be issued. On January 18, 1973,
the Corps denied the application.

Shortly thereafter Gables filed the instant case seek-
ing to have the Corps issue the permit. The Government
filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. A motion to
intervene on behalf of the defendants was filed by the
Tropical Audubon Society, Inc., the National Audubon
Society, Inc. and the Florida Audubon Society. This Court
denied the motion to intervene. The Government then filed
a motion for summary judgment upon which I will now
rule.

[311] SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The procedural aspect of the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment should be considered before reaching
the substantive issues presented in such motion.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a
judgment should be rendered if the pleadings and other
papers filed show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), F.R.C.P. See
Natural Screen Service v. Poster Exchange, 305 F.2d 647
(C.A. 5, 1962). Defendants have filed a motion for sum-

7

mary judgment and have attached to it the entire admin-
istrative record (in excess of 600 pages) upon which the
Corps of Engineers based its decision to deny the plain-
tiff’s permit along with two affidavits indicating that the
Corps’ decision was based on the record. Defendants take
the position that there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact other than those established in the pleadings and
the attached papers. This Court has carefully reviewed the
papers filed in the case and, in spite of the plaintiff's
opposition, is persuaded that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact in the instant case. I now turn to the
question of whether the defendants are entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.

DECISION OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS

The Complaint, after describing various State court
proceedings which involved the plaintiff, alleges that the
defendants did not conduct an adversary hearing and
“that there was no substantial evidence to support the
judgment of [312] the district engineer in denying plain-
tiff’s application for an extension of its permit, and said
judgment is arbitrary, capricious and without sufficient
support in the record before the District Engineer.” (Com-
plaint, paragraph 12) These items will be discussed indi-
vidually in determining whether or not defendants are
entitled to summary judgment.

1. Adversary Hearing. Plaintiff takes the position
that it is entitled to an adversary hearing prior to a deter-
mination by the Corps on its permit application. if for no
other reason than for the Corps to consider the issue of
the “public interest” of the project. Defendants on the
other hand argue that the plaintiff may have requested,

8

and had the opportunity for, a public hearing but this
opportunity was waived since no hearing was ever re-
quested. The question this Court must decide is whether
the plaintiff is entitled as a matter of right to a public
hearing. In making this determination I look first to the
statute which authorizes the defendants to issue permits
for dredge and fill activities—Section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 403. This section makes it unlaw-
ful to, inter alia, excavate, fill or alter the course, condi-
tion or capacity of the channel of any navigable water
“unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of
Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army
prior to beginning the same.” 333 U.S.C. 403.? The statute
then clearly provides the Secretary of the Army with [313]
the authority to issue permits to conduct dredge and fill
operations but it nowhere provides that any type of hear-
ing must be held prior to the issuance of such permits.
In examining the issue of whether or not this Act requires
a hearing, the Court in Sisselman v. Smith, 432 F. aa 750,
754 (C.A. 3, 1970), found:

“The Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act
of 1899 . . . may be searched in vain for any
language indicating the need for an adversary
hearing before the authority contained therein -
may be exercised. . . .”

The Rivers and Harbors Act nowhere requires that a
hearing be held prior to the issuance of a permit. Further,
the issuance or denial of such is not contingent on adver-
sary proceedings, although such proceedings are clearly

Section 12 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 406, provides for criminal pen-
alties up to $2500 for each violation and for the removal of any unlaw-
ful structures.

9

' not prohibited by the Act. In examining the regulations
of the Corps of Engineers I find that the applicant is
provided with an adequate opportunity to present any
information or evidence upon which it wishes to support
the application or to rebut objections to the application.
See 33 C.F.R. §202.120(f). In the instant case the plain-
tiff never requested the Corps to conduct a hearing. While
the Corps was considering its application, plaintiff sub-
mitted a technical report rebutting certain of the adverse
comments and reports submitted to the Corps. The plain-
tiff was free to request a hearing at that point or to pre-
sent the Corps with any further information or reports
that it felt appropriate. I find that since the plaintiff had
its opportunity to request a hearing and elected not to do
so, it may not challenge denial of the permit on the basis
that it did not receive a hearing.

[314] 2. Scope of Review. In order to determine
whether or not the decision of the Corps of Engineers to
deny the permit was proper, it is first necessary to estab-
lish the proper scope of judicial review. Plaintiff has
sought to conduct extensive discovery procedures, presum-
ably to determine whether the Corps properly denied the
application. Defendants have opposed the discovery proce-
dures on the basis that this action is a challenge, pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.,701 et seq.,
to a final agency decision of the Corps and as such should
be reviewed only on the administrative record. I find the —
position of the defendants to be proper.

The plaintiff seeks to review a final administrative
decision of the Corps of Engineers; the Complaint alleges
jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. It is
well established that the extent of judicial review of an

10

administrative decision is determined by the statute upon
which the decision is based. In the absence of statutory
authorization, review of an administrative decision is
based upon the administrative record of the particular
agency., This was recently affirmed by the Supreme
_ Court in Camp v. Pitts, _— US. ——, 98 S.Ct. 1241,
1244 (1978) :

_ “The appropriate standard for review was ac-

cordingly whether the comptroller’s adjudication

was ‘arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discre-

tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,’

_as specified in 5 U.S.C. §706(2) (A).”

“In applying that standard the focal point for
judicial review should be the administrative rec-
ord already in existence, not some new record
‘made initially in the reviewing court.”

2 2 *

“The validity of the comptroller’s action must,
therefore, stand or fall on the propriety of that
finding, judged, of course, by the appropriate
standard of review.”

[315] The Supreme Court also dealt with this issue in
_ Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
420 (1971): ,

“Thus it is necessary to, remand this case to

. the district court for plenary review of the Secre-

tary’s decision. That review is to be based on the

full administrative record that was before the
Secretary at the time he made his decision.”

a

Judicial review, then, must be centered’ around the
contents of the administrative record. Information extra-
neous to the record should not be considered in the review
procedure. If the agency action is found to be improper,
the matter would be remanded to the agency; it would be
improper to conduct de novo proceedings in the form of a
trial by the district court to consider extra-record infor-
mation.

I find that the scope of review in the instant case is
limited to the administrative record upon which the Corps
of Engineers made its decision.

3. Arbitrary, Capricious, and Abuse of Discretion
Or Not in Accordance with Law.

Plaintiff urges that the denial of its permit by the
Corps was arbitrary and capricious and further alleges
that the District Engineer found that the project would
cause no harmful effect to the navigable waters of Bis-
cayne Bay. (Complaint, paragraph 13) Defendants on the
other hand deny such allegations and assert that the deci-
sion of the Corps was proper and that the [316] admin-
istrative record supports this position. The record contains
over 500 adverse comments on the project including those
from the United States Environmental Protection Agency,
the Department of Interior, the Metropolitan Dade County
Planning Department, the Florida Audubon Society and
the National Audubon Society as well as reports from the
Department of Interior, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and
Wildlife and the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish

'The Court may also consider the inherent expertise of the agency
making the decision. City of Chicago v. F.P.C., 458 F.2d 731, 746
(C.A. D.C. 1971).

12

Commission. Hundreds of interested citizens, including at
least one United States Senator and two Congressmen,
submitted comments opposing the project. Less than five
comments were received in favor of the project. Also in-
cluded in the record is a twenty-six page technical report
submitted by the plaintiff which discusses and rebuts cer-
tain of the adverse comments. The Department of Interior,
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, in its report to
the Corps, stated:

“The project, as proposed, will result in a sig-
nificant destruction in degradation of the marine
resources of South Biscayne Bay. Approximately
128 acres red mangroves and 50 acres of open
shallow water will be lost as the result of the
proposed filling. In addition, 240 aercs of bay
bottom will be altered or disturberi as t™. result
of the proposed dredging op-ration. Areas previ-
ously dredged in accordance with the original
permit are over 10 feet deep, receive little or no
light penetration, contair lwrge deposits of silt,
and have not revegetated. It is obvious that re-
vegetation cannot be anticipated in the proposed
dredge area.”

The Florida Fresh Water and Fish Commision stated in
its report to the Corps:

[317] “The proposed project’s finger fill system
will contribute to increased urban runoff which
in conjunction with the excessively deep canals
will contribute to eutrophication of adjacent
waters. ...”

13

“This project will completely obliterate or de-
grade more than three hundred and fifty acres
of biologically productive submerged land and
title swamp, thus eliminating a significant por-
tion of the Biscayne Bay ecosystem, its food
webs and wildlife habitat. . . .”

The Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary
stated in its letter to the Corps:

“ The dredging proposed would permanently
disrupt these [complex and valuable biological}
communities in both the area to be filled and
the area dredged to obtain the fill material. Per-
haps of greater importance would be the damage
caused by siltation and turbidity resulting from
the dreging operation. . . .”

In order to upset the final agency decision, there must
be a clear showing that such decision was improper. The
burden of proving that the action was improper is on the
party challenging the decision. It is well settled that there
is a definite presumption of regularity in favor of the
administrative decision. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279
(1965); Chaney v. United States, 406 F.2d 809 (C.A. 5,
1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 867. In reviewing this action
this Court may determine only whether the agency acted
properly and it must not “substitute its judgment for
that of the agency.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 301 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). After reviewing the
administrative record, which I find adequate for the pur-
poses of judicial review, this Court is of the opinion and
finds that the Corps’ decision was proper, was not arbi-
trary, capricious, was not an abuse of discretion and in

14

accordance with law. I find [318] that the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors; that
there was no “clear error of judgment”, Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971);
and that the Corps’ action in denying the permit was a
“reasoned decision’, International Harvester v. Ruckels-
haus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (C.A. D.C. 1973). See also Essex
Chemical Corporation et al. v. Ruckelshaus, No. 72-1079,
C.A. D.C., decided September 10, 1973, slip opinion pages
12, 18, 19 and 25.

4. Sufficiency of Fact Finding. Plaintiff contends
that the decision of the Corps is not supported by the
record. This is, in effect, an attack on the sufficiency of
the fact finding procedures of the administrative agency.
However, nowhere does the plaintiff clearly establish any
defect in the procedures or the establishment of the admin-
istrative record. The procedures of the Corps of giving
public notice of the permit application, accepting written
comments, providing the applicant with copies of comments
and by allowing the applicant to rebut comments, are not
on their face inadequate procedures in the administrative
process. In the instant case these procedures, as evidenced
by the record, were properly and adequately carried out
by the Corps.

Plaintiff also contends that there “was no substantial
evidence” to support the decision of the Corps of Engi-
neers. This argument is not relevant to the Corps’ fact
finding procedures since the substantial evidence test need
only be utilized in an [319] adjudicatory or formal rule

*Plaintiff does assert that no adversary hearing was conducted,
but it never asserts that this resulted in faulty fact finding by the
Corps.

— ———

15

making procedure. It is not involved in the type of decision
making process involved in the instant case. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414, 417
(1971); Camp v. Pitts, __ US. —_. %8 S.Ct. 1241
(1973) ; Delaware Citizens for Clear Air, Inc. v. Ruckels-
haus, 480 F.2d 972 (C.A. 3, 1973).

I find the Corps’ fact finding procedures to be ade-
quate, based upon substantial evidence, and that they were
adequately carried out in the instant situation.

CONCLUSION

Having considered the pleadings and papers, includ-
ing the administrative record, in this matter, I find that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the
defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law. The administrative determination of the Corps of
Engineers in denying the plaintiff's application for a per-
mit pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 403 is upheld and the relief
sought by the plaintiff is denied.

DONE and ORDERED at Miami, Florida, this 15th
day of October, 1973.

/s/ W. O. Mehrtens
United States District Judge

{320] copies to:

Robert W. Rust, U.S. Attorney
By: Robert Reynolds, Asst. U.S. Attorney
300 Ainsley Bldg., Miami, Fla. 33132

16

James R. Walpole, Attorney, Dept. of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Ward
By: Marion E. Sibley, Esq.

P.O. Box 360

Miami Beach, Fla. 33139

Stuart Simon, Esq.,

Metropolitan Dade County Attorney
1626 Dade County Courthouse,
Miami, Fla. 33130

Paul & Thomson

By: Parker D. Thomson, Esq.
1300 First National Bank Bldg.,
Miami, Fla. 33131

17

A-E
[65]
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Jacksonville District, Corps of Engineers
P. O. Box 4970
Jacksonville, Florida 32201
SAJSC Permits (56-188) 18 January 1973

Mr. Edmund Friedman
Connell Associates, Inc.
P. O. Box 677

Miami, Florida 33135

Dear Mr. Friedman:

This is in reference to your letter of 28 July 1972 sub-
mitting an application in behalf of Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc.,
to modify and extend a Department of the Army permit
originally issued 18 June 1956 to dredge and fill in certain
areas along the westerly shore of Biscayne Bay at Coral
Gables, Florida.

Your application was given careful and thorough consider-
ation by all levels of the Department of the Army prior to
final action in the matter.

The final findings and conclusions of the Army, based on
all available evidence, are that issuance of the requested
permit:

1. Is not believed to be consistent with current public
interest in the preservation of man’s natural environment
as enunciated in Public Law 91-190,

18

2. Would destroy a biologically productive area in
Biscayne Bay, and

3. Is opposed by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and
Wildlife of the Department of the Interior, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the State of Florida Game and
Fresh Water Fish Commission and Department of Natural
Resources, the Dade County Planning Department, and
was the subject of over 500 letters of opposition from the
general public.

In view of the above, we have concluded that the proposed
work would not be in the public interest and regret that
we must inform you that the request for modification and
extension to Department of the Army permit 56-188 is
hereby denied.

BY AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY:

s/ EMMETT C. LEE, JR.

Colonel, Corps of Engineers
District Engineer

19

A-F
[19]
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Jacksonville District, Corps of Engineers
P. O. Box 4970
Jacksonville, Florida 32201
SAJSC Permits (56-188) 22 November 1972

SUBJECT: Report on Application to Modify Depart-
ment of the Army Permit to Dredge and Fill
in Biscayne Bay

THRU: Division Engineer, South Atlantic
ATTN: SADKO

TO: HQDA (DAEN-CWO-N)
WASH DC 20314

1. Name of applicant: Gables By the Sea, Inc., c/o
Connell Associates, Inc., P.O. Box 677, Miami, Florida
33135.

2. Location of work: westerly shore of Lower Bis-
cayne Bay, south of the mouth of Snapper Creek Canal
and north of Shoal Point, Sections 17 and 18, Township
55 S., Range 41 E., City of Coral Gables, Dade County,
Florida.

3. Estate and other primary authority: The appli-
cant has necessary estate rights.

4. Character of proposed work: It is proposed to
dredge approximately 1,300,000 cubic yards of material

20

from Lower Biscayne Bay to a depth of -13.0 mean sea
level (approximately 55 acres) and upland canals. Ma-
terial would consist of some sand, mud, and oolitic lime-
stone. Retaining mounds would be constructed to inclose
and contain the dredged materials. Weirs would be used
at the easterly edge of the proposed fill. See report sub-
mitted by Dr. Howard J. Teas which gives in detail the
proposed work and his opinion of the effect of the work
on the environment (Incl 11).

5. Views of local and State authority: The State
Department of Pollution Control issued a letter of certi-
fication on 15 May 1972 as a result of a court order but
stated that they had not reviewed and analyzed the proj-
ect, and consequently did not know whether or not there
would be reasonable assurance that the project would not
violate applicable water quality standards of the State
of Florida. The Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund withheld comment on the Corps’ public notice
since they were [20] under a court order to grant a State
permit. See letter dated 12 September 1972 (Incl 7). The
Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission of the State of
Florida objected to the proposed work in letter dated 18
September 1972 (Incl 7). By letter of 22 September 1972
Metropolitan Dade County requested the permit be denied
(Inel 8).

6. Date for sending information to other interested
parties and summary of objections offered: A public no-
tice was issued 17 August 1972 (see Inclosures 2 and 3).
Approximately 515 objections were received. This oppo-
sition is discussed in a subsequent paragraph and reflected
in Inclosure 9. Two letters in favor of the project were
received (Incl 10).

21

7. Views of District Engineer concerning probable
effect on:

a. Navigation: There would be no unreasonable ob-
struction to navigation.

b. Harbor lines: Not applicable.
ce. Flood heights and drift: Not applicable.
d. Beach erosion and accretion : Not applicable.

e. Fish and wildlife: The U.S. Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and Wildlife recommended the permit be denied.
The work was also opposed by Florida State Game and
Fresh Water Fish Commission and the State Department
of Natural Resources.

f. Pollution: Similarly, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency in letter dated 12 October 1972 recommended
the permit be denied. As previously stated, the State De-
partment of Pollution Control issued letter of certifica-
tion as a result of a court order.

g. Esthetics: During the period of construction, the
proposed work would be esthetically objectionable but upon
completion should present an attractive waterfront devel-
opment.

h. Ecology: The opposition of the Federal and State
agencies and the general public is based, to a large extent,
on the loss of an ecologically valuable area.

i. Oceanography: Not applicable.

22

j. Public Interest: The reaction of the public notice
makes it clear that granting the permit would not be con-
sistent with the public interest.

[21] 8. Other pertinent remarks:

a. On 18 June 1956, the District Engineer issued a
Department of the Army permit to the applicant to dredge
and fill, the dredged material to be contained by adequate
dikes, modified and extended 5 December 1957, extended
4 December 1959, revised 6 July 1960 and extended 12
November 1965. No protests were received. The present
application is to revive, modify and extend this permit.
(See Inclosure 1).

b. The application has been the subject of wide-
spread public interest. Over 515 responses were received
to our public notice of which all but two were in opposi-
tion. See Inclosure 9 as a representative sample of this
opposition; the remaining are in our files as a matter of
record but are not transmitted because of the great bulk
involved.

ce. There were many requests received for a public
hearing, including requests from Senator Chiles and Con-
gressmen Pepper and Fascell. However, it was my con-
clusion that a hearing would only serve to further delay
a final decision as it was felt that sufficient response
was received on the public notice to adequately reflect the
public interest in the proposal.

d. The Fish and Wildlife Service and EPA recom-
mended that the permit be denied. (See Inclosures 5
and 6).

-e. The recognized conservation groups are also unan-
imously opposed to the work as proposed. (Included in In-
closure 9).

f. Inclosure 12 was received from the applicant in
_ response to objections made by Environmental Protection
Agency, Department of the Interior, Metropolitan Dade
County and: Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish” Com-,
mission.

9. Conclusions and recommendations: Based on an
evaluation of the comments by both the developer and state
and. federal agencies competent to make an evaluation of
ecological factors incident to the proposed development,
it is my conclusion that the degree of ecological damage to
be occasioned by the project is subject to conjecture. There
will however be some irreversible commitment of biologi-
cally productive areas resulting in ecological damage of
one degree or another. More significant however is the
lack of public acceptance of the project. Opposition to the
project by virtually all governmental agencies, citizens
groups and even the Dade County Planning Department
have convinced me that permitting of the project will not
bein the public interest. I therefore request authority to
deny the permit on the basis that the development would
irretrievably commit biologically productive lands, lacks
acceptability from both the public and private sector, and
would not be in the public interest.

/s/ Emmett C. Lee, Jr.

EMMETT C. LEE, JR.
Colonel, Corps of Engineers
District Engineer

* * *

24

A-G
(17)
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR
LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA

CIVIL ACTION NO. 69-984 |

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,
a Florida corporation,

ms Plaintiff,

vs.

CLAUDE P . KIRK, JR., Governor of the State of Flor-
ida; TOM ADAMS, Secretary of State of the State
of Florida; EARL FAIRCLOTH, Attorney General
of the State of Florida; FRED O. DICKINSON, JR.,
Comptroller of the State of Florida; BROWARD
WILLIAMS, Treasurer of the State of Florida;
FLOYD T. CHRISTIAN, Superintendent of Public
Instruction of the State of Florida; DOYLE CON-
NER, Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of

. Florida, and their successors in office, as the BOARD
OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVE-
MENT TRUST FUND OF THE STATE OF
FLORIDA,

, Defendants.

FINAL JUDGMENT

'

The ‘issues between the parties require the deter-
mination of the rights of plaintiff to dredge fill material
from the public waters of Biscayne Bay and use it to fill

25

certain bottoms owned by plaintiff. The facts are rather
involved and can best be evaluated if stated chronologi-
cally. Plaintiff is the successor in title to other parties
with respect to some of the rights now asserted but, for
the purpose of simplicity, the word ‘plaintiff’ will be used
to describe both plaintiff and its predecessors in title.

On January 6, 1936, plaintiff acquired by purchase
from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund a
substantial tract of bottoms in Biscayne Bay and within
the City of Coral Gables. This tract extended seaward to
the then established bulkhead line.

[18] Some time after the purchase of these bottoms,
the bulkhead line was reestablished some distance sea-
ward from its previous location.

In 1956 plaintiff began to seek the necessary permits
to dredge from the adjacent public bottoms and fill its
land. Under date of May 17, 1956, the Trustees agreed
to the issuance by the U.S. Corps of Engineers of a per-
mit for this dredging. Everyone concerned seems to have
regarded this as, at least, a license to plaintiff to remove
the fill from the public bottoms.

During 1957 plaintiff sought to acquire by purchase
from the Trustees a parcel of bottoms consisting of the
area between the bulkhead line as it had previously
existed and the new bulkhead line which had been estab-
lished somewhat seaward from the old line.

In the course of these negotiations several letters
were written on behalf of the Trustees which are perti-
nent to the present inquiry.

26

On March 5, 1957, W. Turner Wallis, engineer for the
Trustees wrote:

“The present policy of the Trustees, applica-
ble to Dade and Palm Beach Counties, is limited
to arrangements under which material may be
used by the upland owner for filling the adjoin-
ing submerged land. The application to purchase
the desired quantity of material should be ac-
companied by a suitable map showing both the
area to be filled and the area and depth limits
of proposed excavation.

“Upon payment of the appraised value for the
filled area (prior to filling) and the completion
of such work, the Trustees will issue a disclaimer
of title.”

Plaintiff filed a formal application with the Trustees,
accompanied by a map which indicated the bottoms to be
acquired, [19] the areas to be filled and areas from which
the proposed fill was to be dredged. This map clearly in-
dicates that the area to be filled embraced the parcel pre-
viously acquired and the proposed new acquisition.

Under date of September 6, 1957, Van H. Ferguson,
Director, wrote:

“The grant of the deeds to the submerged
lands includes approval for dredging the area in-
dicated for this purpose on the map which ac-
companied the applications.”

Other correspondence is of similar tenor.

wooo eee or

port en

ISAO TET:

27

Under date of September 25, 1957, in the light of this
background plaintiff purchased and paid for the second
parcel of bottoms — that lying between the old and the
new bulkhead lines.

Plaintiff asserts the right to dredge from public bot-
toms to fill its now privately-owned submerged land on
two theories: (1) the right to the unexpired portion of a
dredging permit which, it alleges, defendants illegally re-
voked, and (2) a legal right to a new permit.

Without discussing all the voluminous documents
filed before the Court or the transcript of testimony, it
is sufficient at this time to point out the following:

It is alleged by the plaintiff and admitted by the de-
fendant that prior to October 18, 1965 the City of Coral
Gables approved a fill permit to plaintiff and on No-
vember 2, 1965 this permit was formally approved by the
Trustees. It is also admitted that this permit was ex-
tended until December 31, 1968. See Paragraph VIII of
Complaint and Page 2 of Answer.

The extension of the fill permit took the form of an
approval by the Trustees of an extension of a permit
issued [20] by the Corps of Engineers.

The defendants now argue that this was not a valid
extension because it was for a period longer than two
years and they say the Trustees are bound by the require-
ment of Section 253.124, Florida Statutes (as it then
existed) that no construction permit shal] be issued un-
less the proposed work is to be completed within two
years next after the date of the issuance of such permit.

Laying aside the question of the possible estoppel of the
Trustees to now assert their own wrong in approving a
three-year extension of plaintiff's dredging rights, it is
apparent that the statute places no limit upon the length
of an extension of a dredging permit. It provides “Such
time may be extended for good cause, upon showing that
all due effort and diligence toward completion of said
work have been made.” In the absence of proof to the
contrary the Court must assume that the necessary show-
ing was made or this permit would not have been ex-
tended.

On May 21, 1968 the Trustees adopted a resolution
prohibiting any person from thereafter dredging pur-
suant to any pre-existing permit unless dredging opera-
tions had already commenced. Plaintiff respected this
resolution and, not having begun dredging, did not there-
after attempt to dredge under its permit.

As regards this permit the Court holds:

1. The right of plaintiff under the circum-
stances of this case to dredge fill material for
public bottoms to fill the submerged land pur-
chased from the Trustees was an incident to the
purchase of submerged land and became a vested
right.

2. This right did not extend in perpetuam
and would be lost if not exercised within a rea-
sonable time.

3. A reasonable time does not extend beyond
the expiration date of the last extension granted
by the Trustees.

29

[21] 4. The granting of dredge and fill per-
mits by the Trustees served to perpetuate the
rights of plaintiff for the life of such permits.

5. The action of the Trustees in attempting
to abrogate an extension of a fill permit pre-
viously granted was without lawful authority,
and void.

6. Plaintiff should not be penalized for obey-
ing the demands of the highest officers of the
State and respecting the order not to dredge.

7. Plaintiff is entitled to dredge from the
designated areas under the terms and conditions
of its permit in effect on May 21, 1968 for a
number of days after this judgment becomes
final, and the time for appeal expires, equal to
the number of days from the adoption of the
above-described resolution of the Trustees to
December 31, 1968.

After the Trustees had attempted to abrogate the
then current permit plaintiff applied to the City Com-
mission of Coral Gables for a new permit. A hearing
was had and this permit was granted by the City Com-
missioners. It was then transmitted to the Trustees for
their approval. After several rather stormy sessions the
Trustees disapproved the permit.

As regards this action of the Trustees, plaintiff raises
three questions. It contends: (1) the Trustees were limited
to “formal” approval of the permit granted by the City,
and since the permit was in proper form and had been

30

issued after all statutory formalities had been observed,
the Trustees had no discretion and should have approved
the permit; (2) that the Trustees acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in disapproving the action of the City of
Coral Gables in approving the permit, and (3) that the
Trustees illegally and in violation of plaintiff’s rights re-
ceived additional evidence at a subsequent meeting when
plaintiff was not represented after the taking of evidence
had been closed. These contentions require separate con-
sideration.

Prior to the Legislative session of 1967, the statutes
vested in local officials the power to determine discre-
tionary [22] matters relating to the issuance of dredge
and fill permits. The power of the Trustees was limited
to formal approval — that is, approval of the procedure
followed in the issuance of the permits. Chapter 253,
Florida Statutes, 1965. Trustees v. Venetian Isles Develop-
ment Corp., 166 So.2d 765. Burns v. Wiseheart, 205 So.2d
708.

Chapter 253 was amended in 1967. This amendment
purports to vest broad powers in the Trustees to disap-
prove permits authorized by cities and counties. Plaintiff
contends that the amendment is invalid because it provides
that “The Trustees shall consider any other factors af-
fecting the public interest”. This language, plaintiff
argues, is so broad as to constitute a delegation of legis-
lative powers to the Trustees in violation of the well-
established rule which requires reasonable guidelines
regulating the exercise of discretion by executive officers
in matters affecting the rights of the people. If the
quoted language were all the change in the law, this argu-
ment would require most careful consideration. However,

TO A

31

Section 253.124(2) as it stands after the 1967 amendment,
provides for the granting of fill permits by local officers
only after the consideration of specifically enumerated
matters and then provides that the Trustees shall have
power to “approve, reject or issue” the permit.

The most casual reading of the matters required to
be considered reveals that they include things of general
public interest to the people of the State, as well as the
local interests of the inhabitants of the cities and counties
in which the proposed dredging and filling will occur. It
would be an undue restriction of the plain language of the
statute to hold that the Trustees, in approving or rejecting
an application, should not exercise their independent judg-
ment in regard to the [23] enumerated matters required
to be considered.! The Trustees do not sit merely as an
appellate tribunal to review the action of the local au-
thorities. They exercise for the general public of the State
the same original powers which local authorities exercise
with respect to local interests.

Even should it be determined that the sentence “The
Trustees shall also consider any other factors affecting
the public intent” is invalid, that would not affect the
remainder of the amendatory statute and the authority of
the Trustees to exercise independent judgment in regard
to the matters specifically enumerated in the statute would
remain.

It is next contended that the Trustees acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously in refusing to approve the dredge
and fill permit authorized by the City of Coral Gables.

1Jt would appear that the amendment of the statute was for the

purpose of changing the law announced in the Venetian Isles and
Wiseheart cases.

32

In support of this position, plaintiff relies largely
upon the case of Zabel v. Pinellas County Water and
Navigation Control Authority, 171 So.2d 376.

A dredge and fill permit contemplates two things —
the taking of fill material from one place and depositing
that fill material in another. As applied to the situation
presently before the Court, the rights of the plaintiff are
entirely different with respect to the two operations. The
place from which the material is sought to be dredged is
public property held by the Trustees for the benefit of the
public. On the other hand the place where the plaintiff
desires to deposit this fill material is private property
owned by plaintiff by purchase from the Trustees. To
the extent, if any, that action of the Trustees in refusing
the requested permit is [24] motivated by a desire to pre-
vent the reasonable development by filling of plaintiff's
privately owned bottoms the action of the Trustees is arbi-
trary, capricious and without sufficient support in the
record before the Trustees or the record before this Court.
See Zabel v. Pinellas County Water and Navigation Con-
trol Authority, 171 So. 2d 376. DiVosta Rentals, Inc. v.
Kirk, Leon County No. 69-1219.

: As regards the removal of fill from public bottoms
for the purpose of filling these privately owned bottoms
an entirely different situation is presented.

‘As has been heretofore observed, the plaintiff has
acquired a right to fill its land by dredging from public
bottoms as an incident to its original purchase. But the
right to dredge from public bottoms was not included in
the deed or conveyed by express grant. It was in the na-
ture of an implied agreement on the part of the Trustees

33

as an incident to the purchase by plaintiff, enforceable
more by equitable estoppel than the protection of any
title acquired by any conveyance by the Trustees of an
interest in the public bottoms from which the fill was to
be removed. It would be quite unreasonable to infer from
the circumstances of the conveyance to plaintiff that it
was not the intention of the parties that plaintiff would
have the right to dredge for public bottoms for the pur-
pose of filling those submerged lands. It would be equally
unreasonable to infer from these circumstances any in-
tent that this right to dredge was intended to exist for all
time to come. The only logical conclusion is that the right
to dredge should exist for a reasonable time. Plaintiff
has lost by inaction any legal right to a permit to dredge
from public bottoms to fill the land in question, arising
from or as an incident to its purchase of the [25] bottoms
it now desires to fill beyond the time agreed to by the
Trustees.

The present granting of any dredge permit authoriz-
ing plaintiff to obtain material from public bottoms to
fill its submerged land would be a matter of grace on the
part of the public. However, statutes may be enacted
which permit citizens to qualify for public grants and
when the terms of a valid statute are fully met, it is the
legal duty of public officials to execute such grants. If
plaintiff has fully met the requirements of a valid statute
or if the Trustees, in denying it a permit, have not ac-
corded plaintiff all its legal rights, it is the duty of the
Court to grant appropriate relief.

In this case the Court finds that the Trustees con-
sidered plaintiff’s application for a dredge and fill permit
after affording plaintiff a hearing, and upon the basis

34

of the evidence before them denied this permit. To the
extent that this decision constituted a denial of the right
of plaintiff to fill submerged land owned by it, the action
of the Trustees was not justified by the evidence before
them and was legally arbitrary and capricious. To the
extent that this decision of the Trustees constituted a
denial of a permit authorizing plaintiff to dredge material
from public bottoms for the purpose of filling its privately
owned submerged land the action of the Trustees was
within the scope of their statutory powers. Since the per-
mit applied for was for both dredging and filling it was
lawfully denied in that form. It would be the legal duty of
the Trustees to issue a permit to plaintiff to fill its sub-
merged land by the use of suitable material from other
sources.

If such filling would injure the aquatic life of the
vicinity to such an extent as to adversely affect the public
[26] interest, the State has the power of eminent domain
to take, for just compensation, the plaintiff’s property.
But the State cannot, after selling submerged land to
private owners, deny such owners the right to use those
lands in the only way in which private ownership can
be of any value.

Finally, plaintiff complains that the Trustees denied
it due process of law by taking evidence at a meeting of
the Trustees at which plaintiff was not represented. The
record shows that, acting rather informally, the Trustees
had received evidence and argument for and against the
granting of the permit and on July 29, 1969 took the mat-
ter “under advisement.”

35

On August 5th a representative of the Trustees wrote
plaintiff’s attorney:

“This will acknowledge receipt of depositions,
documents and other exhibits submitted to the
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund in regular meeting on July 29, 1969.

“For your information we enclose an unofficial
copy of the Trustees’ minutes relative to your
appearance before the Board.

“After the Trustees have had an opportunity to
properly review your exhibits, we shall be pleased
to hear from you as to what date you may desire
this matter to be placed before the Trustees for
consideration.”

Plaintiff’s attorney replied:

“With reference to your letter of August 5,
1969, please be advised that the evidence in this
matter has been submitted to-the Board at a
regular meeting held on July 29, 1969 and the
Board is now considering the case.

“We have no objections to the Board voting on
this matter at its meeting on August 19, 1969.

“Please advise us of the result of such vote.”

The representative of the Trustees then wrote plain-
tiff’s attorney:

36

{27] “Your letter of August 7 indicating that you
would have no objection to this matter coming
before the Trustees on August 19, 1969, is hereby
acknowledged.

“We will advise the Attorney General of your
position and will await his directive.”

Plaintiff’s attorney selected a date for the Trustees
to act on this application. In doing so he had no authority
to limit the scope of the action of the Trustees to simply
voting to approve or disapprove the permit. He had no
right to assume that the Trustees would not at that time
reopen the taking of evidence. While it would have been
a courtesy to plaintiff’s attorney to inform him in ad-
vance that more evidence would be offered, failure to
give such notice does not deny due process of law. Plain-
tiff was on notice that the Trustees would take action on
the application on a date chosen by plaintiff’s attorney.
That is sufficient.

It is therefore, ADJUDGED:

1. The plaintiff has the lawful right to dredge ma-
terial from the areas indicated on the application for a
dredge and fill permit and to use such material to fill
its privately owned submerged land indicated on such
application for a period of time consisting of 223 days
beginning on the day this judgment becomes final by the
expiration of the time of appeal, or the filing of the man-
date of an Appellate Court affirming this Judgment,
whichever is the later date.

37

2. Plaintiff has not shown a legal right to a permit »
to dredge from public bottoms in excess of the rights out-
lined in paragraph 1 supra. {faa

8, Upon proper application it would be the legal
duty of the Trustees to grant plaintiff a permit to fill
its privately owned’ submerged ‘land, purchased from the
Trustees, by use of materials from other sources.

DONE at Tallahassee, Florida, this’ 10 day of Sep-
tember, A.D. 1970.

/s/ Hugh M. Taylor

!

38
\ A- H
[41] |
| | IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

1

JULY TERM, A.D. 1971.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES |
TO FILE REHEARING PETITION AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

' CASE NO, 0-167.

‘CLAUDE R. KIRK, JR., Governor of the
State of Florida, et al.,
Appellants,
VS.

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,
‘a Florida corporation,
: Appellee.
Opinion filed August 31, 1971.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
‘Hugh M. Taylor, Judge.

Philip S. Bennett and Herbert D. Sikes, for Appellants.

Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Ward; and Gerald T. Wether-
ington, for Appellee. |

JOHNSON, J.

39

This is an appeal by the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund of a judgment rendered by the
Circuit Court of Leon County, Florida, on the 10th day
of September, 1970, in a cause brought by the Appellee,
Gables By The Sea, Inc., a Florida corporation, against
the Trustees. The judgment of the lower court adjudicated
that Gables By The Sea was entitled to dredge from a
certain designated area in Biscayne Bay to procure mate-
rial to fill the corporation’s swamp and overflow land it
had purchased from the Trustees.

142] The crux of the complaint filed by the plaintiff-
appellee herein, was to obtain quashal of an order or
ruling of the Trustees of the Improvement Trust Fund
and a declaratory decree.

At the time the corporation entered into negotiations
with the Trustees for the purchase of the land in question,
it was agreed that the Trustees would agree to sell the
fill material required and that the payment would be made
for the material on the basis of appraised price of the land
to be filled; and that the purchase price of $480.00 per
acre (plus the advertising costs) will in addition to paying
for the acquisition of the bay bottom land, also include »
the necessary fill from the bay bottom in front of the
property in sufficient quantity to fill the acquired land
to grade. Thereafter the corporation paid for the land,
which included the appraised value of the fill material.

The trial court held an extended hearing and there-
after entered its final judgment, in which the judge cited
some ten pages of findings and reasons upon which to
premise his judgment. The adjudicative portion of the
Order was as follows:

tne erence cena Beene SET SCN TROPA NOT,

40
“It is, therefore, ADJUDGED:

“1. The plaintiff has the lawful right to
dredge material from the areas indicated on the
application for a dredge and fill permit and to
use such material to fill its privately owned sub-
merged land indicated on such application for a
period of time consisting of 223 days beginning
on the day this judgment becomes final by the
expiration of the time of appeal, or the filing of
the mandate of an Appellate Court affirming
this judgment, whichever is the later date.

“2. Plaintiff has not shown a legal right to a
permit to dredge from public bottoms in excess
of the rights outlined in paragraph 1 supra.

“3. Upon proper application it would be the
legal duty of the Trustees to grant plaintiff a
permit to fill its privately owned submerged land,
purchased from the Trustees, by use of materials
from other sources.”

Prior to oral argument of this cause before this Court,
the [43] Appellee filed a motion to correct the judgment,
as follows:

“Under the terms and provisions of the final
judgment rendered by the lower court in this
cause the appellee (plaintiff) was adjudged to
have ‘the lawful right to dredge material from
the areas indicated on the appllication for a
dredge and fill permit and to use such material
to fill its privately owned submerged land indi-

41

cated on such application for a period of time
consisting of 223 days beginning on the day this
judgment becomes final by the expiration of the
time of appeal, or the filing of the mandate of

“Final hearing in the court below occurred on
March 3, 1970. At the time of submission of said
cause to the lower court, a permit to dredge the
area referred to in said judgment was awarded
by the United States Department of the Army,
Corps of Engineers, as @ matter of course upon
the receipt of an approval of such dredging by
the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.
At that time the Corps of Engineers granted such
permit to dredge as a mere formality when it
appeared that such dredging would not interfere
with navigation. As shown by the record in this
cause the Corps had determi that the dredg-
ing of the area described in the judgment would
not interfere with navigation and it had granted
a permit to dredge, which permit is dated the
12th day of November, 1965, but which has now
expired. (See Exhibit LL).

“After the submission of this cause to the
lower court, and on April 3, 1970, the United
States Congress passed Public Law 91-224, Sec-
tion 1171 of which prohibited the United States
Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers
from granting a permit to dredge unless and
until the Department of Air and Water Pollu-
tion Control of the State of Florida issued a cer-

42

tificate authorizing said dredging. A true copy of
said Act is hereto attached, marked Exhibit A,
and made a part hereof. The refusal of the
State to issue said certificate requires the United
States Department of Army Corps of Engineers
to decline the issuance of a dredging permit.

“After the passage of the Public Law 91-224,
the State of Florida, Department of Air and
Water Pollution Control issued its notice and its
certification information, a true copy of which
is hereto attached and marked Exhibit B and
made a part hereof which outlines the conditions
and the requirements imposed upon the Appel-
lee in order to procure a certification, which is
essential before the Corps of Engineers will ac-
cept an application for the issuance of a dredg-

ing permit

“The acts and conduct of the State and Fed-
eral Governments which occurred subsequent to
the submission of this cause on final hearing to
the lower court will deprive the Appellee of the
benefit of the judgment rendered by the lower
court in which it was intended that the Appellee
would receive [44] 223 clear days within which
to accomplish the dredging authorized by said
judgment for the reason that the procedures re-
quired of the Appellee in order to procure certif-
ication from the State and a Federal permit wiil
consume a major portion, if not all, of said 223
days, if the running of said days commences from
the day of the final determination of this cause
in the Courts of Florida The appellee cannot

43

make application for its permit to the Corps of
Engineers until a favorable and final determina
tion of this litigation has occurred

“Thus, subsequent to the rendition of the judg-
ment the procedures adopted both by the Fed-
eral and State Governments in connection with
the issuance of a permit by the United States
Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers,
has been radically changed and the time required
to acquire a permit has been lengthened to the
point where the State and Federal authorities
can through the natural delays provided by their
present procedure, require of the appellee more
than 223 days to acquire the Corps of Engineers’
permit This would defeat the judgment of the
lower court and deny to the appellee the rights
assured to it by the said judgment

“Wherefore, in the event the District Court of
Appeal of Florida, 1st District, affirms the judg-
ment of the lower court, the appellee respect-
fully moves that the mandate issued upon such
affirmance provide that the 223 day period ac-
corded to the appellee as its period to dredge, as
set forth in the judgment, shall begin to run on
the day of the issuance of the permit by the
United States Department of Army, Corps of
Engineers and not on the day the judgment
becomes final. See $59.34, F.S.”

Therefore, in order not to defeat the judgment of
the lower court and thereby deny the rights of the appl-

44

lee assured by the said judgment, this Court does hereby
grant the motion of appellee and does extend the 223 day
period accorded the appellee in the lower court’s judg-
ment as hereinafter provided.

Upon the call of this cause for oral argument, the
Appellants announced that they wished to withdraw their
appeal, and admitted in open court that the Appellee’s
motion had merit and that it would be unjust to cause
the Appellee to lose the benefit of the judgment it recov-
ered resulting from delays created by the enactment of
the Federal law and by the action of the Department of
Air and Water Pollution Control. The Appellants, how-
ever, urged that this matter should be considered and the
motion granted by the trial [45] court rather than this
Court. The Appellants sought to reserve the right to ap-
peal from the lower court’s order granting the Appellee’s
motion. There is no dispute about the matters set forth
in the motion and it is not only within the power of this
Court to assure to the Appellee the benefits of the fruitful
judgment it has obtained, but it is this Court’s duty to do
so and avoid endless, fruitless litigation. From an exam-
ination of this directive covering the certification infor-
mation required by the Department of Air and Water
Pollution Control, it appears that the exact information
required for certification has already been furnished to
other departments of the state, including Appellants. The
very issues suggested by the required application were
actually the issues tried in the lower court and found in
favor of the Appellee. It would be grossly unfair and con-
trary to the long recognized legal concept of terminating
litigation and avoiding a multiplicity of legal action to
now either expect or require the Appellee to start anew
in the administrative departments of Government after it

SRE QaS NAGE STRODE Ak BBC:

45

has successfully established its position to a final conclu-
sion in the Courts.

The judgment for the Appellee was rendered on Sep-
tember 10, 1970. The Appellants waited until July 14,
1971, after the call of the case on oral argument, to an-
nounce the withdrawal of this appeal. During this period
of time the Appellee has been denied the use of his prop-
erty, as ordered by the lower court. The Appellants frank-
ly stated orally before the Court that they could give no
assurance that they would not appeal an order rendered
by the lower court upon said motion, even though they
conceded it was meritorious. We think under these circum-
stances that we are required to bring this case to a final
termination. It is, [46] therefore, ordered that the judg-
ment in the lower court be amended so that the same shall
read, as amended, that the Appellee shall have the lawful
right to dredge material from the areas indicated on the
application for a dredge and fill| permit and to use such
material to fill its privately owned submerged land indi-
cated on such application for a period of time consisting
of 223 days, beginning either on the day after the Army
Corps of Engineers issues its final permit permitting the
appellee to dredge and fill as aforesaid, or beginning on
the first day after there are no legal impediments to the
appellee commencing its filling operation. In all other re-
spects the final judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed and motion to correct judgment granted.

CARROLL, DONALD, Acting Chief Judge, and RAWLS,
J., CONCUR.

A-I

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDI-
CIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY,
FLORIDA. CASE NO. 69-984

GABLES-BY-THE-SEA, INC., a
Florida corporation,

\
2
REUBIN O’D. ASKEW, Governor of the State of Florida;
DOROTHY W. GLISSON, Secretary of State; ROB-
ERT L. SHEVIN, Attorney General; FRED 0. DICK-
INSON, JR., Comptroller; THOMAS D. O’MALLEY,
Treasurer; DOYLE ‘CONNER, Commissioner of
Agriculture; RALPH M. TURLINGTON, Commis-
missioner of Education; as Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida,
and JOEL KUPERBERG, Executive Director, Board
of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund;
Defendants.

Plaintiff,
vs.

~

FINAL JUDGMENT

This cause came on for hearing before the Court on
February 11 on the Motion of the Defendants to Discharge
the Rule Nisi entered in this cause January 21, 1972 and
directed to the Board of Air and Water Pollution Control,
and argument of counsel for the respective parties having
been heard and the Court being advised of its opinion in
the premises, it is thereupon

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

47

1. The rule nisi is issued to the defendants directing
them to show cause why the defendants should not approve
the permit referred to in the Final Judgment of this
Court rendered September 10, 1970 and affirmed and
corrected on appeal by the First District Court of Appeals
in Kirk, et al v. Gables By the Sea, Inc., 251 So.2d 880.

2. It appears to the Court that this case involved
pure questions of law and that final judgment may be
rendered herein on the questions of law which have been
raised by [55] mentioned rule nisi and the Motion to
Discharge same. The facts and issues have been fully dis-
cussed and set forth in the Final Judgment of this Court
above mentioned and in the opinion of the First District
Court of Appeals above cited.

3. The Court is of the view that the opinion and
judgment of the First District Court of Appeals, above
cited, has fully considered and disposed of the conten-
tions between the plaintiff and the defendant, even
though the defendant Board was not a party to proceed-
ings prior to the issuance of the rule nisi by this Court.
In the last analysis the issues involved are between the
plaintiff on the one hand and the State of Florida, acting
through its agencies, on the other. Though the Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Fund and the Board of Air
and Water Pollution Control and the Department of Air
and Water Pollution Control are separate and distinct
agencies of the State, they are nevertheless mere agencies
of the State and the question before this Court is not
whether the actions of one may be the actions of another
but whether or not the State is bound by the results of
litigation involving one of such agencies.

48

4. The First District Court of Appeals had before
it the very circumstances concerning the effect of the Act
of Congress passed as Public Law 91-224, Section 1171
and the certificate required of the Department of Air and
Water Pollution Control. The following portions of said
opinion appear to be dispositive of the problem before this
Court:

“From an examination of this directive covering
the certification information required by the De-
partment of Air and Water Pollution Control, it
appears that the exact information required for
certification has already been furnished to other
departments of the state, including Appellants.
The very issues suggested by the required appli-
cation were actually the [56] issues tried in the
lower court and found in favor of the Appellee.
It would be grossly unfair and contrary to the
long recognized legal concept of terminating liti-
gation and avoiding a multiplicity of legal action
to now either expect or require the Appellee to
start anew in the administrative departments of
Government after it has successfully established
its position to a final conclusion in the Courts.

The judgment for the Appellee was rendered
on September 10, 1970. The Appellants waited
until July 11, 1971, after the call of the case on
oral argument, to announce the withdrawal of
this appeal. During this period of time the Ap-
pellee has been denied the use of his property, as
ordered by the lower court. The Appellants frank-
ly stated orally before the Court that they could
give no assurance that they would not appeal an

49

order rendered by the lower court upon said mo-
tion, even though they conceded it was merito-
rious. We think under these circumstance. that
we are required to bring this case to a final
termination.”

Accordingly, it’s the judgment of this Court that the Plain-
tiff has completed all procedures required by law to entitle
him to certification on behalf of the State of Florida that
the derdge permits be issued and that it be given the full
benefit that the judgment of this Court has approved and
corrected by the opinion and decision of the First District
Court of Appeals.

6. Deeming the defendants will discharge their legal
duties, as authoritatively adjudicated by courts of com-
petent jurisdiction, this Court will withhold the issuance
of any coercive writ unless same shall become necessary to
give effect to rights herein adjudged, jurisdiction being
reserved for such purpose.

6. In all other respects this judgment may be deemed
final in the dispositions of the questions of fact and law
arising in this cause. :

ORDERED and ADJUDGED in Chambers at Talla-
hassee, Florida this 16th day of February, A.D., 1972.

50

[57]
A-J

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1972.
CASE NO. 0-167.

REUBIN O0’DONOVAN ASKEW, Governor of the
State of Florida, etc., et al.,

Appellants,
vs.

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,
a Florida corporation,

Appellee.
Opinion filed March 16, 1972.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Hugh M. Taylor, Judge.

Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General ; and Howell L. Fergu-
son, Assistant Attorney General; and Philip S. Ben-
nett and Herbert D. Sikes, for Appellants.

Gerald H. Wetherington; and Marion E. Sibley, of Sibley,
Giblin, Levenson & Ward, for Appellee.

' 51
ON MOTION TO QUASH APPEAL
PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-appellee has filed its motion to dismiss an |
appeal taken by the appellants or to peremptorily affirm
the judgment of the lower court, which this Court treats
as a motion to quash the appeal.

It appears to this Court that all issues involved in this
cause were adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff in this
Court’s prior mandate filed August 31, 1971, which af-
firmed the judgment of the trial court. Said mandate’ en-
compassed all the affected agencies of the State of Florida.
Pursuant to said mandate, the trial court issued a rule nisi
directed to the Board of Air and Water [58] Pollution Con-
trol of the Department of Air and Water Pollution Control
requiring it to show cause why it should not approve the
permit referred to in'the trial court’s final judgment and
the mandate of this Court affirming said judgment. The
appellant moved to discharge said rule nisi, and the trial
court entered final judgment ordering that the dredge per-
mits be issued. It is from this judgment that appellanis
now appeal. As

It is the conclusion of this Court that the appeal herein
is dilatory in nature, is sought by appellants for the sole
purpose of further frustrating and delaying compliance
with the mandate of this Court and the final judgment of
the trial court, is frivolous, and not taken in good faith.
This Court does hereby conclude that the final judgment
entered by the trial court is an appropriate order rendered
in strict compliance with the mandate of this Court.

52

The motion of appellee to quash the appeal is granted
and upon the going down of our mandate, the trial court
is directed to institute such proceedings and to take such
coercive action in the premises as is deemed necessary and
advisable to secure full compliance with its order of Feb-
ruary 16, 1972. In view of the inordinate delays already
incurred in connection with the final disposition of this

litigation, no petition for rehearing on this judgment will
be entertained.

‘

CARROLL, DONALD, Acting Chief Judge, RAWLS and
JOHNSON, JJ., CONCUR.

5 i A-Ka

Titie 33, U.S.C. $1171 (B) (4)
(4) Prior, to the initial operation of any federally
_ licensed or permitted facility or activity which may result
in any discharge into the navigable waters of the United
States and with respect to which a certification has been
obtained pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection,
which facility or activity is not subject to a Federa] op-
erating license. or permit, the license or permittee shall
provide an opportunity for such certifying State or, if
appropriate, the interstate agency or, the Secretary to
review the manner in which the facility or activity shall be
operated or conducted for the purposes of assuring that
applicable water quality standards will not be violated.
Upon notification by the certifying State or, if appropriate,
‘ the interstate agency or the Secretary that the operation
of any such federally licensed or permitted facility or ac-
tivity will violate applicable water quality standards, such
Federal agency may, afer public hearing, suspend such

‘ \

53

license or permit. If such license or permit is suspended,
it shall remain suspended until notification is received from
the certifying State, agency, or Secretary, as the case may
be, that there is reasonable assurance that such facility or
activity will not violate applicable water quality standards.

A-Kb
Title 33, U.S.C. $1344
$1344, Permits for dredged or fill material

(a) The Secretary of the Army, acting through the
Chief of Engineers, may issue permits, after notice and
opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at spe-
cified disposal sites.

(b) Subject to subsection (c) of this section, each
such disposal site shall be specified for each such permit
by the Secretary of the Army (1) through the application
of guidelines developed by the Administrator, in conjunc-
tion with the Secretary of the Army, which guidelines
shall be based upon criteria comparable to the criteria
applicable to the territorial seas, the contiguous zone, and
the ocean under sec'‘on 1348(c) of this title, and (2) in
any case where such guidelines under clause (1) alone
would prohibit the specifications of a site, through the
application additionally of the economic impact of the site
on navigation and anchorage.

(ce) The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the
specification (including the withdrawal of specification)
of any defined area as a disposal site, and he is author-

54

ized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for
specification (including the withdrawal of specification)
as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice
and opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge
of such materials into such area will have an unaccept-
able adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish
beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding
areas), wildlife,¥er recreational areas. Before making
such determination, the Administrator shall consult with
the Secretary of the Army. The Administrator shall set
forth in writing and make public his findings and his
reasons for making any determination under this sub-
section.

June 30, 1948, c. 758, Title IV, § 401, as added Oct. 18,
1972, Pub. L. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 884.”

A-Ke
Title 42, U.S.C.
§4321. Congressional declaration of purpose

The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a na-
tional policy which will encourage productive and enjoy-
able harmony between man and his environment; to pro-
mote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health
and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the
ecological systems and natural resources important to the
Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental

Quality.

Pub.L. 91-190, § 2, Jan. 1, 1970, 83 Stat. 852.

55
A-Kd
Code of Federal Regulations, §209.120(g)(1) and (2)

(g) Public hearing. (1) It is the Policy of the Chief
of engineers to conduct his civil works program in an at-
mosphere of public understanding, trust, and mutual co-
operation, and in a manner resposive to public needs and
desires. To this end, public hearings are helpful and will
be held whenever there appears to be sufficient public
interest to justify such action. In case of doubt, a public
hearing should be held.

(2) Among the instances warranting public hear-
ings are general public opposition to isuance of a permit
for work in navigable waters of the United States. Dis-
trict Engineers will notify the Division Engineers of the
need for a hearing, state the proposed arrangements and
obtain his concurrence. Public hearings will be held in
connection with applications for permits in navigable
waters of the United States when Congressional interests
or responsible local authorities make an official and valid
request therefor and such action will fulfill the above
stated policy and objectives.

A-Ke
GENERAL RULES

RULE 10. MOTIONS

A. FILING. Every motion when filed shall be ac-
companied by a memorandum of law citing supporting
authorities, and stamped addressed envelopes for each

56

party entitled to notice of the order when issued by the
judge. The Clerk shall not accept for filing any motion
which is not in conformance with this rule.

B. HEARINGS. No hearings will be held on mo-
tions unless set by the Court.

C. REPLY MEMORANDUM. Each party oppos-
ing a motion shall serve and file a reply memorandum not
later than five days after service of the motion as computed
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to do so
may be deemed sufficient cause for granting the motion
by default.

D. MOTIONS PENDING ON REMOVAL. When
an action or proceeding is removed to this Court with pend-
ing motions on which briefs have not been submitted, the
moving party shall file and serve a memorandum in sup-
port thereof within five days after removal, or within five
days after denial of any motion to remand. Each party
opposing the motions shall then comply with paragraph C
hereof.

E. NOTICE THAT ACTION iS AT ISSUE. All
counsel shall have a continuing duty to notify the court
promptly upon an action or proceeding becoming at issue.

F. MOTIONS TO TAX COSTS. Motions te tax
costs in actions or proceedings shall be filed by the parties,

nee”

57
A-Kf
U. S. COURT OF APPEALS—RULES

RULE 18. SUMMARY CALENDAR

(b) A separate summary calender will be maintained
for those cases to be considiered without oral argument.
Cases will be placed on the summary calendar by the clerk,
pursuant to directions from tthe court.

(e) Notice in writing shall be given to the parties or
their counsel of the transfer of the case to the summary
calendar.

See Isbell Enterprises, Ince. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of
New York, et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 209.
Adopted Dec. 24, 1968.
A-L
[12] GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.
LEGAL DESCRIPTION:
All that land in the Citty of Coral Gables, Dade
County, Florida, lying east of Red Road and

south of Bella Vista Awenue, which is a part of
the land shown in Plat. Book 68, at page 60, of

58

the Public Records of Dade County, Florida,
known as Coral Bay, which land when dredged
and filled is designated as Blocks 15 through 24,
inclusive, on said Plat, and also Blocks 25 and
26, Tract A, as shown on replat of a portion of
Coral Bay, Section D, appearing in Plat Book
76, at page 69, of the Public Records of Dade
County, Florida. All of said property lies west
of bulkhead line of the City of Coral Gables,
Florida.

EXHIBIT B
[13] DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Note—It is to be understood that this instrument
does not give any property rights either in real estate or
material, or any exclusive priviléges; and that it does not
authorize any injury to private property or invasion of
private rights, or any infringement of Federal, State, or
local laws or regulations, nor does it obviate the neces-
sity of obtaining State consent to the work authorized. It
merely expresses the assent of the Federal Government so
far as concerns the public rights of navigation. (See Cum-
mings v. Chicago, 188 U.S., 410.) 10—13165-c

PERMIT

SAKSP 8060.61 (56-188)

District Engineer, Corps of Engineers.
erecemony Florida
18 June _ Se SS Se 3S Oe.

5Y

Gables Venetian Waterways, Inc.
6801 Granada Boulevard
Coral Gables 46, Fla.

Gentlemen :

Referring to written request dated 13 April 1956
I have to inform you that, upon the recommendation of
the Chief of Engineers, and under the provisions of Sec-
tion 10 of the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1899,
entitled “An act making appropriations for the construc-
tion, repair, and preservation of certain public works on
rivers and harbors, and for other purposes,” you are here-
by authorized by the Secretary of the Army.

to dredge and fill, the dredged material to be contained
by adequate dikes, in and connecting with Lower Bis-
cayne Bay, westerly shore, -

at your property, southerly from the mouth of Snapper
Creek Canal and north of Shoal Point, in the City of Coral
Gables, Dade County, Florida,

in accordance with the plans shown on the drawing at
tached hereto marked: Proposed Dredging in Biscayne
Bay South of Snapper Creek and North of Shoal Point,
Dade County, Florida,

Subject to the following conditions:

[14] (a) That the work shall be subject to the super-
vision and approval of the District Engineer, Corps of
Engineers, in charge of the locality, who may temporarily
suspend the work at any time, if in his judgment the in-
terests of navigation so require.

60 a

(b) That any material dredged in the prosecution of
the work herein authorized shall be removed evenly and
no large refuse piles, ridges across the bed of the water-
way, or deep holes that may have a tendency to cause
injury to navigable channels or to the banks of the water-
way shall be left. If any pipe, wire, or cable hereby author-
ized is laid in a trench, the formation of permanent ridge:
across the bed of the waterway shall be avoided and the
back filling shall be so done as not to increase the cost of _
future dredging for navigation. Any material to be de-
posited or dumped under this authorization, either in the
waterway or on shore above high-water mark, shall be
deposited or dumped at the locality shown on the drawing
hereto a:tached, and, if so prescribed thereon, within or
behind a good and substantial bulkhead or bulkheads, such
as will prevent escape of the material in the waterway.
If the material is to be deposited in the harbor of New
York, or in its adjacent or tributary waters, or in Long
Island Sound, a permit therefor must be previously ob-
tained from the Supervisor of New York Harbor, White-
hall Building, New York City.

(c) That there shall be no unreasonable interference
with navigation by the work herein authorized.

(d) That if inspections or any other operations by
the United States are necessary in the interest of navi-
gation, all expenses connected therewith shall be borne
_by the permittee.

(e) That no attempt shall be made by the permittee
or the owner to forbid the full and free use by the public

of all navigable waters at or adjacent to the work or struc-
ture.

61

(f) That if future operations by the United States
require an alteration in the position of the structure or
work herein authorized, or if, in the opinion of the Sec-
retary of the Army, it shall cause unreasonable obstruc-
tion to the free navigation of said water, the owner will
be required upon due notice from the Secretary of the
Army, to remove or alter the structural work or obstruc-
tions caused thereby without expense to the United States,
so as to render navigation reasonably free, easy, and unob-
structed; and if, upon the expiration or revocation of this
permit, the structure, fill, excavation, or other modifica-
tion of the watercourse hereby authorized shall not be
completed, the owners shall, without expense to the United
States, and to such extent and in such time and manner
as the Secretary of the Army may require, remove all or
any portion of the uncompleted structure or fill and
restore to its former condition the navigable capacity of
the watercourse. No claim shall be made against the Unit-
ed States on account of any such removal or alteration.

(g) That the United States shall in no case be liable
for any damage or injury to the structure or work here-
in authorized which may be caused by or result from fu-
ture operations undertaken by the Government for the
conservation or improvement of navigation, or for other
purposes, and no claim or right to compensation shall ac-
crue from any such damage.

(h) That if the display of lights and signals on any
work hereby authorized is not otherwise provided for by
law, such lights and signals as may be prescribed by the
U. S. Coast Guard, shall be installed and maintained by
and at the expense of the owner. 3

62

(i) That the permittee shall notify the said district
engineer at what time the work will be commenced, and
as far in advance of the time of commencement as the
said district engineer may specify, and shall also notify
him promptly, in writing, of the commencement of work,
suspension of work, if for a period of more than one
week, resumption of work, and its completion.

(j) That if the structure or work herein authorized
is not completed on or before the 31st day of December,
1959, this permit, if not previously revoked or specifically
extended, shall cease and be null and void.

By authority of the Secretary of the Army:

/s/ E. E. KIRKPATRICK

E. E. KIRKPATRICK
Colonel, Corps of Engineers
District Engineer

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: 648163-87- THE-3EA,INC.
‘ , ‘ 3 4990 4UC0 ave
puta CORAL GABLES, FLA.
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SCALE INSET NOVEMOLF 12, 1365

or’

75
A-N
UNITED. STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 73-752-Civ-WM

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC,,

a Florida corporation, ,
Plaintiff,
-VS-
EMMETT C. LEE, JR., etc., et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER QUASHING NOTICES TO TAKE
DEPOSITIONS AND STAYING DISCOVERY

The defendants having moved to quash notices of
taking depositions in three separate cities on October 3,
4, and 5, 1973, respectively, and having also moved for a
protective order, and the Court being advised in the prem-
ises, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the notices of tak-
ing depositions in Vero Beach, Jacksonville and Atlanta
be and the same hereby are quashed, and that all discovery
in this cause be and the same hereby is stayed pending
resolution of the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment, or until further order of the Court.

76

DONE and ORDERED at Miami, Florida, this 2nd
day of October, 1973.

/s/ W. O. Mehrtens
United States District Judge

ec: Robert N. Reynolds,
Assistant U. S. Attorney
Marion E. Sibley, Esq.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_2136%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
