# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Northway Coin-Clean, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 419 U.S. 836

## Text

SUPREME COURT OF THE JNITEDO

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

—_—_—_

“T | LED
ATERy 8 1974

In The

HHIGHAEL RODAK, JR..

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

nw. €38-1815

Petitioner

Vv.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT
and APPENDIX

FRANK E. COHO

ROBERT G. MacALISTER
1410 Grant Building
Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219
Attorneys for Petitioners

PLAS FD CML Se ING BE? SNE SI ey

INDEX

Opinions below
Jurisdiction

Question presented
Constitution and statutes
Statement

Reasons for granting writ
Conclusion

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C (9la)

Appendix D

Appendix E oo

Appendix F (75a

Parts of Transcripts
referred to or relevant to
Appendix A, Note l

(la thru 5a; 32a thru 38a;
Wna-USa; 50a thru 75a, Qla)

CITATIONS
CASES:

BENTON v. MARYLAND, 395 U.S. 784,
795, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063: (1959)

BLOOM v. ILLINOIS, 391 U.S. 194,
195, 88 s.ct. 1477, 1478" (1968)

BODDIE v. CONNECTICUT, 401 U.S.
271, 378-379, 91 S.Ct. 780,786
(1971

FUENTES v. SHEVIN, 407 U.S. 67, 80,

92 S.Ct. 1983, 1994 (1972)
SAUNDERS v. SHAW, 244 U.S. 317,
37 S.Ct. 638 (1917)

II.

Page

CONSTITUTION: 5

Fifth Amendment . 3

Article ITIi 3
STATUTES:

Judicial Code:

28 USC Sec. 132(a 4

28 USC Sec. 43 (a h

28 U.S.C. Sec. 2403 MAY BE
APPLICABLE TO THIS PROCEEDING AND,
THEREFORE, COPIES OF THIS PETITION
ARE BEING SERVED ON THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530, PURSUANT
TO RULE 33 2.(b).

In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1973

No.

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,
: Petitioner

Vv.

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC.,
a corporation, prays that a Writ of
Certiorari issue to review the judgments
of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, dated January 3, 1974,
refusing to grant a rehearing of its
Judgment Order dated November 20, 1973.

be Rt ee es ee ne Soe a

Viele i, dbun DE Oa enone tina iae? i fe meme

2
OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, decided
November 20, 1973 (Appendix A), is not
reported. The Petitioner's petition for
rehearing was denied on January 3, 1974
(Appendix B). The opinion of the United
States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, filed January 1l,
1973, is not reported (Appendix C). The
Order of Mr. Justice Brennan extending
the time to file Petition For Writ of
Certiorari until June 3, 1974, is
Appendix D. The Order of the District
Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania dismissing without prejudice
a prior suit on the same claim is
Appendix E. That Court's refusal to
vacate the dismissal without prejudice
is Appendix F. Appendices & and F are
parts of the record before the court
below referred to in Footnote No. 1 of
Appendix A. Appendix C is page 9la of
the same transcript. Appendix E is at
38a and Appendix F at 75a thereof.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1). The
judgment sought to be reviewed was
entered by the United States District
Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania on January 11, 1973.
(Appendix C). The judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
affirming the District Court judgment
was entered November 20, 1973 (Appendix A).
A Petition for Rehearing was denied on
January 3, 1974 (Appendix B).

PROVES PTI ILL ELIOT OLE ER EW sit . ,
* EE RLS TNE LLLP LL TC OD SIE SIROTA BBD ANY BEANE ces

MRR,

3
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether petitioner, having had a com-
plaint in a diversity action dismissed
without prejudice in the United States
District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania, was deprived of liberty
or property without due process of law,
contrary to Amendment 5 of the United
States Constitution, when it later filed
a similar complaint in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania and the complaint was
summarily dismissed by that court with
prejudice because of the prior dismissal
without prejudice.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE

AMENDMENT 5 TO UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
so far as relevant here:

"ARTICLE V

"No person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; ...

ARTICLE III OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
so far as relevant here:

"ARTICLE III

"Section 1. The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. ....

OLEATE Be Oe Ce IN TS ET SEE SIS ELLE LEK ND RE BAEC OE DEN PA POTS RE 9 Pra eres Ee

ae Se Te eee ee

4

Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat.
869, as Amended, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.,

relating to the creation and composition

of district courts and Courts of Appeals:
28 U.S.C., Section 132(a):

"(a) There shall be in each judicial
district a district court which shall be
a court of record known as the United
States District Court for the district."

28 U.S.C., Section 43(a):

"(a) There shall be in each circuit
a’ court of appeals, which shall be a
court of record, Known as the United

- States Court of Appeals for the circuit.”

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was filed in the District
Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania on June 7, 1972. The com-
plaint filed in the United States
District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania is at pages 2a through
5a of the Transcript following Appendix F.
In the complaint, your Petitioner, in
Paragraph IX, stated that it learned of
the deceit of the defendant for the first
time on or about June 10, 1966, less
than six years prior to the filing of the
action in the Middle District. The
statute of limitation in matters of
deceit in Pennsylvania is six years. The
prior action in the Western District. of
Pennsylvania, at No. 66-865, proceeded
to the point of a pretrial conference,
at which point Petiticner found itself
without sufficient evidence to proceed
to trial. Since that time, Petitioner
has discovered evidence not available
then that Petitioner believes would
enable it to prove its case. Because of
inability to proceed to trial on
October 1, 1969, the District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania
entered an order dismissing the action
"without prejudice." (Appendix E)

Plaintiff moved to have the dismissal
order vacated, but on October 1, 1969,
the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania denied the
motion to vacate and left the order of
dismissal in effect "without prejudice."
(Appendix F) No hearing on the merits of
this case has ever been held by either
District Cour. or any other Court.

ey a an Ate it ce ew Tite aided nt Ho Oo

6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioner has been denied the oppor-
tunity to be heard on the merits of its
cause of action. Petitioner has been
denied a determination of its cause of
action in accordance with the due pro-
cess assured by the United States
Constitution. ,

A reading of the cases collected in
the 52-some volume publication known as
"Words and Phrases" under "Due Process
of Law", pages 194 and 195, shows that
the Supreme Court of the United States
has repeatedly stated that the due pro-
cess clause applies to legal proceedings
as such, as well as actions taken oy
other branches of the government.
Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317, 37 S.Ct.

638 (1917).

Likewise, in the same publication
under "Without Prejudice", it will be
found that cases have universally eld
that the dismissal of an action without
prejudice does not affect the cause of
action and allows a new action to 5e
brought on the same cause of action.

In the present situation, the action
was originally brought in Alleghery
County, Pennsylvania because this is
where the Petitioner we.s located and
service of process could be obtained
on the defendant in Allegheny County.
Later, as Petitioner prepared for triel,
it discovered that there were a number
of similar cases pending in the United
States District Court for the Middle

7

District of Pennsylvania, and that the
evidence necessary to prove the case was
more readily available in the Middle
District than in the Western District of
Pennsylvania. It was for that reason
that when the Petitioner reached the
point at which it felt it would be
possible to prove its case, the renewal
action was brought in the Middle District
rather than in the Western District of
Pennsylvania.

The District Court for the Middle
Dictrict of Pennsylvania dismissed on
the ground that the dismissal witnout
prejudice should be treated as a final
dismissal. Ths Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed on this
basis and also stated that the matter
was beyond the statute of limitations,
although the complaint itself shows that
it is within the period of the statute
of limitations. Invocation of a statute
of limitations is a matter of pleading
rather than dismissal on a preliminary
motion under any circumstances.

It is clear that both Federal courts
and State courts must obey the due pro-
cess requirements of the United States
Constitution. For the Federal courts
those requirements are in the Fifth
Amendment. For the State courts those
requirements are in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.

The Supreme Court of the United States
has repeatedly emphasized the meaning of
due process, pointing out that whether
the Fifth Amendment. or the Fourteenth

Amendment is applicable, "an opportun-
ity to be heard must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 80, 92 S.Ct. 1933, 1994 (1972).

5 Similar declarations will be found in
following recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States:
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 734, 793-

> x A , 2062 (1969); Bloom

2 v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 195, 88 S.Ct.

: 1477, 1470 (1968); Boddie v. Connecticut,

q hol U.S. 271, 378-379, 91 S.Ct. TU,

: 786 (1971).

It is therefore respectfully submitted
that this is a situation deserving con-
sideration of granting a petition of
certiorari to determine whether a sum-
mary dismissal of a diversity action
pecause of a prior dismissal of a simi-
lar complaint without prejudice devrived
petitioner of liberty and property with-
out due process of law, contrary to
Amendment 5 to the United States
Constitution.

¥
.
»
-
7

9

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
should be granted for the reasons set out
above.

Respectfully submitted,

Veena ,
RANK E. COHO
ROBERT G. MacALISTER

Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Petitioner
1410 Grant Building
Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219
(412) 471-6963

Mesos eee |

: 10

; APPENDIX A

{ . In The

3 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

4 No. 73-1227

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,
Aopellant

Ve

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION

Meee tena ty Rhalok

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA

Cnet antl lelbe Dh aaiaee Xe Sela oi Teenie os tat

Submitted under 3rd Cir. Rule 12(4)
July 27, 1973 Before VAN DUSEN and
WEIS, Circuit Judges

Resubmitted under 3rd Cir. Rule 12/5)
August 15, 1973 Before VAN DUSEN,
ROSENN and WEIS, Circuit Judges

i

Robert G. MacAlister, =sqa.,
Frank E. Coho, Esa., and
Gilbert E. Morcroft, =Esa.,
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Christian V. Graf, Esa.,
Harrisburg, Pa.,
Attorneys for Avpellant

£4

aa

Clayton A. Sweeney, Esq. and
Thomas L. VanKirk, Esq., of
Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald,
Kyle & Buerger,
| Pittsburgh, Pa.,

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGMENT ORDER

After consideration of the contentions
of plaintiff-appellant, fhe briefs of
counsel, and the record,

It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
January 11, 1973, district court order,
entering judgment in favor of defendant,
is affirmed and costs are taxed against
appellant.

BY THE COURT:-

/s/ Van Dusen
Circuit Judge

Dated: Nov. 20, 1973

+- For example, see the trenscript of
the proceedings before the district court
(W.D. Pa., Civil No. 66-865) on Septem-
ber 8, 1970 (5la-74a). Also it is noted
that no appeal was taken from the Septem-
ber 8, 1970 final order of the United
States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania in Northway
Coin-Clean, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corpora-
tion, Civil No. 66-865 (75a).

ad

ee Oa eh arte eR. eR)

ELST OB BION BE SR Py ee eee

12
APPENDIX B
In The
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,
Aopellant

Ve

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge, an
: VAN DUSEN, ALDis=xt, ADAMS,
GIBBONS, ROSEN, HUNTER,
WEIS and GARTH, Circuit

Judges.

The petition for rehearing filei by
appellant in the above entitled case
having been submitted to the judzes who
participated in the decision of tis
court and to all the other availaoie
circuit judges of the circuit in regzgu-
lar active service, and no judge wo
concurred in the decision having asxed
for rehearing, and a majority of the
circuit judges of the circuit in regu-
lar active service not having voted for
rehearing by the court in banc, the
petition for rehearing is denied.

By the Court,

OES II EE II CT BN I BEING ISNA ORE TE SEE TO be

x

ae Bites

13
APPENDIX D
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A-920
NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC.,
Petitioner
Vv.

BORG WARNER CORPORATION

ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

UPON CONSIDERATION of the appli-
cation of counsel for petioner(s).

IT IS ORDERED that the time for
filing a petition for writ of certiorari
in the above-entitled cause be, and the
same is hereby, extended to and includ-
ing June 3, 1974.

/s/ William J. Brennan, Jr.
Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States

Dated this lst
day of April, 1974

14-16
PARTS OF TRANSCRIPT

referred to in

Opinion of lower court,

APPENDIX A, Note 1,

pages la thru 5a;
32a thru 38a;
4ha-Uoa;

50a thru 75a; QJla

17

Docket Entries. la

June 7, 1972, 1—COMPLAINT—filed at Harrisburg, Pa.
and demand for trial by jury.

June 7, 1972, 2—SUMMONS—Issued and together with
copies of Complaint handed to U. S. Marshal for service.

June 7, 1972, J. S.5

July 21, 1972, SUMMONS—returned served 7/6/72,
together with copy of Complaint. (MF&E $9.24)

July 24, 1972, 3—MOTION—of Defendant to Dismiss,
and

July 24, 1972, MOTION—of Defendant for Summary
Judgment.

Oct. 6, 1972, 4—NOTICE—of Clerk to counsel of record
listing Defendant’s Motion to dismiss and Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment for October 20, 1972 at 2:00 P. M. at Harris-
burg, Pa.

Oct. 12, 1972, S—AFF.DAVIT—of Clayton A. Sweeney,
Esquire, Counsel for the defendant, Borg-Warner Corp.

Oct. 12, 1972, 6—BRIEF—in support of defendant’s
motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment.

Oct. 12, 1972, 7—CERTIFICATE—of service of Thomas
L. Van Kirk.

Oct. 18, 1972, 8—PLAINTIFF’S BRIEF—contra motion
to dismiss and defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
and

CERTIFICATE—of service thereof.

Oct. 18, 1972, 9—AFFIDAVITS—of Erle M. Heath and
Robert G. Mac Alister

Oct. 20, 1972, 1O0—MINUTE SHEET—of Clerk, re
argument on defendant’s motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment.

OLS EEE LEE DE SOE

NA | ee

Tete i ct EE a tl

18

Complaint.

Oct. 20, 1972, Argued and taken under advisemert. (H)

Jan. 11, 1973, 11I—ORDER—Re Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment. Motion of
defendant is granted because action is granted because the
action is barred by the statute of limitations and because the
action has already been, dismissed with finalty of Civ. Action
No. 66-865 by the U. S. Dist. Ct. for the Western Dist. of
Penna.

Summary judgment is accordingly entered in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff. (H).
Jan. 11, 1973, J. S. 6 Copy to counsel, from Hbg. office.

Feb. 5, 1973, 12—NOTICE OF APPEAL—of Plaintiff
from final judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint and en-
tering summary judgment for defendant on Jan. ii, 1973.

Copy to counsel of record and to U. S. Court of Appeals
for Third Circuit.

Feb. 5, 1973, 13—STATEMENT—that ceitified check in
amount of $250.00 is deposited with Court to secure payment
of costs if appeal is finally dismissed or judgment affirmed.

Mar. 2, 1973 RECORD ON APFEAL—mailed to U. S.
Court of Appeals for Third Circuit.

Mar. 8, 1973, 14—RECEIPT-—-for record on appeal.

Complaint.
(Filed June 7, 1972.)

I Plaintiff, Northway Coin-Clean, Inc., herein called
Northway, is a corporation organized and existing under the

ERT Ae REN 6S RE Ley

/9

Complaint.

3a

laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with principal
place of business at 2423 Saw Mill Run Boulevard, City of
Pittsburgh, County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.

II Defendant, Borg-Warner Corporation, herein called
Borg-Warner, is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Illinois with principal place of
business in the City of Chicago therein. Defendant maintains
a branch office in York, Pennsylvania, within the Middle
District of Pennsylvania.

The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of costs and
interest, the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars.

III On or about August 1, 1962, Northway entered into a
business known as “Northway Cleaning Village”, located
71S McKnight Road, McCandless Township, Allegheny
County, Penasylvania, for the purpose of providing to the
public certain self service coin Operated laundry and dry
cleaning facilities.

IV During the year 1962 and thereafter Borg-Warner un-
dertook to sell and deliver to purchasers thereof certain
newly developed commercial coin operated dry cleaning
machines and similar equipment through a division of Borg-
Warner known as Norge.

V_ At all relevant times, Borg-Warner did through its
own servants, agents and employees, sell and deliver in
Pennsylvania commercial coin operated dry cleaning
machinery and similar equipment through its aforesaid
Norge division.

VI On or about August 1, 1962, defendant Borg-Warner,
through its servants, agents and employees, who at said time
were acting on said defendant’s behalf within the scope of

5
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r | MRD tn on cesstcesen WO pct Rel ETERE RSA ARORA > SM PSTONA CEE :

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METS

20

4a
Complaint.

their authority and upon defendant's business contacted
plaintiff and urged plaintiff to invest in a “Norge Village”
dry cleaning concept developed by defendant, which concept
required. utilization of the aforesaid Norge division
machinery and equipment to be purchased by plaintiff.

VII At said time defendant, through and by its aforesaid
servants, agents and employees, represented to plaintiff that

purchase by plaintiff of the Norge equipment recommended
and the establishment by plaintiff of a cleaning village

utilizing same could and would lead to unusual and sub-
stantial profits for plaintiff because:

(a) the total per load operating cost using Norge
—~—-- equipment was substantially lower than that using com-
petitive machinery;

(b) full time attention to management of such village
by plaintiff would not be required in that no more than
10 to 20 ‘hours per’ week personal supervision or
management was required for such operation.

VIII In reliance upon such representations and assuran-
ces by defendant, acting by and through its aforesaid ser-
‘vants, agents and employees, plaintiff, on or about August l,
1962, purchased from Borg-Warner, defendant, and took
delivery of, all that certain Norge coin operated automatic
jaundry and dry cleaning equipment which defendant ad-
vised plaintiff was necessary to provide the basic equipment
needed for the operation by Northway of an integrated and
‘coin operated plant pursuant to the Norge concept.

IX On or about June 10, 1966, plaintiff learned for the
first time that defendant's representations and assertions to
it relating to its purchasing of said Norge equipment and its
operation of a Norge village were false, fictitious and

fraudulent in that:

‘

‘

2/

5a
Complaint.

(a) the total per load cost of operating Norge equip-
ment was then and there grossly and deliberately un-
derstated by defendant, its servants, agents and em-
ployees aforesaid, and the falsity of such cost statement
was well known to defendant at the time;

(b) the management time requirement statements
were totally false;

(c) besides the falsity of such statements of which it
was-aware as aforesaid, defendant further knew that it
did not at the time have in its possession adequate facts
upon which to base a belief or any statement as to actual
and true total per load cost;

(d) in defendant's eagerness and anxiety to secure a
top position in the newly developing coin operated dry
cleaning machinery market, defendant deliberately and
fraudulently misrepresented said machinery and equip-
ment and the uses thereof to plaintiff although defen-
dant knew or had every reason to know that the
representations so made by it to plaintiff were false and
fraudulent.

X As the direct and proximate result of the aforesaid
fraudulent practices and statements of defendant, plaintiff
was thereafter forced to dispose of its aforesaid business,
“Northway Cleaning Village’, suffering great financial loss
in the process thereof.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against
defendant in the sum of Two Hundred Thousand
($200,000.00) Dollars, together with interest and costs.

FRANK E. COHO,
Attorney for Plaintiff.

Ppewtevvisnswer ice Dod MIR a tegen

22

Exhibit “G”" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

32a

Exhibit “G”.

In the
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
For the Western District of Pennsylvania

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC.,
| a corporation,

Plaintiff.
v.
BORG-WARNER CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 66-865.

MOTION TO DISMISS.

NOW COMES the defendant, Borg-Warner Corporation,
by its attorneys, Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle &
Buerger, and moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 41 b. of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss with prejudice
the within action, and as grounds therefor avers the
following:

1. This action was filed on July 19, 1966.

2. Thereafter, the parties carried on discovery by means
of depositions and interrogatorics.

3. Since this lengthy discovery period disclosed that it
was virtually impossible to determine the basis of the plain-

23

33a
Exhibit “G" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

tiff's alleged cause of action, the attorneys for both parties
conferred with the Court on November 7, 1968, in an at-
tempt to establish a special pretrial procedure which would
compel the plaintiff to state the basis of its cause of action
and allow the defendant a brief period of discovery based
on the plaintiff's statement.

4. The plaintiff's attorneys drafted such an order, to
which the attorneys for both parties consented.

5. On November 18, 1968, the Court signed the order as
prepared by the attorneys for the plaintiff, which order
required the following:

a. Plaintiff to complete all of its discovery within 60 days
of the order [that is, by January 17, 1969}:

b. Plaintiff to file within 70 days of the order [that is, by
January 27, 1969] a narrative written statement of facts and
law, including citations;

c. Defendant to complete all its discovery within 130
days of the order [that is, by March 28, 1969];

d. Defendant to file within 140 days of the order [that is,
by April 7, 1969] a narrative written statement of facts and
law, including citations;

e. Attorneys for the parties to meet within 150 days of
the order [that is, by April 17, 1969] and to make a pretrial
stipulation, to mark exhibits and to explore settlement
possibilities;

f. Extensions of time to be granted only upon timely
motion;

g. The Court to notify the parties thereafter of the
scheduling of a pretrial conference.

Sean MRE tb gin

24

34a
Exhibit “G”" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

6. On or about November 18, 1968, the Court notified
the attorneys for the parties that motions for further ex-
tensions of time would not be viewed with favor by the
Court because of the lengthy period of time during which
this action had already been carried on the Court's docket.

7. The attorneys for the plaintiff engaged in no discovery
pursuant to the November 18 order until December 30, 1968,
on which date the plaintiff's attorneys mailed to the defen-
dant’s attorneys a lengthy set of interrogatories.

8. On January 13, 1969, the fact having become plain to
the attorneys for the defendant that they could not obtain
from the defendant the material necessary to make timely
response to the interrogatories, the attorneys for the defen-
dant requested and were granted an extension of time so to
respond of 10 days, that is, to January 23, 1969.

9. On January 23, 1969, the defendant answered all but
two of the plaintiff's interrogatories, to which two it fiied
objections.

10. By an order dated January 24, 1969, this Court di-
rected the parties to file briefs and set a date for argument.
This order made no provision for staying the November 18,
1968 consent order and, to the best of defendant's attorneys’
knowledge, no such stay was requested.

11. On February 14, 1969, having received briefs from
the parties and having that day heard argument on the defen-
dant’s objections to interrogatories, this Court ordered that
those objections be sustained. No stay of the November 18
order was requested at that argument and none was granted.

12. After the said argument, an attorney for the defen-
dant questioned an attorney for the plaintiff regarding the
filing of the narrative written statement required of the
plaintiff by the November 18 order and regarding discovery

25

Exhibit “G" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

35a

procedure which the defendant desired after such filing. The
defendant's attorney agreed to refrain from calling the
plaintift’s delinquency to the Court's attention if the plain-
tiff’s attorneys would file their statement and facilitate the
defendant’s discovery within a short time after that
discussion.

13. What followed were more than six weeks of silence
from the plaintiff's attorneys which virtually circumvented
and destroyed the intention and the efficacy of the Novem-
ber 18. 1968 order.

14. Because the plaintiff's failure to file its narrative
written statement was depriving the defendant of its right to
discovery as provided in the order of November 18, the at-
torneys for the defendant, on April 1, 1969, demanded that
the plaintiff's attorneys immediately file their narrative writ-
ten statement.

15. The plaintiff answered this demand by filing, on
April 4, 1969, a motion to transfer this action to the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. The motion to transfer clearly con-
templated that this action of the plaintiff would be turned
over to other attorneys and consolidated with other actions.

16. On April 7, 1969, the defendant filed a Motion to
Dismiss, the first fifteen paragraphs of which are republished
hereinabove.

“17. Argument on the said Motion to Dismiss and on the
plaintiff's Motion to Transfer was held on April 16, 1969.

18. By its Order dated April 16, 1969, this Court, after
argument, denied the plaintiff's Motion to Transfer.

19. In a separate order dated April 16, 1969, this Court
found that the plaintiff had failed to file a pretrial narrative
Statement as and when required by this Court’s Order of
November 18, 1969, that the plaintiff had been unable to

. %
Bisnnis Py oe ee nee oe

26

Exhibit “G" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

36a

secure certain documents, that the defendant's attorneys
would make these documents available at Harrisburg, and
that the plaintiff's attorneys would require five months to
copy and organize these documents. This Court then made
the following Order:

NOW, THEREFORE, it is ordered that the defen-
dant’s Motion to Dismiss be and the same hereby is
denied, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff may con-
tinue its discovery and shall file its narrative written
statement in accordance with the order of November 18,
1968 on or before September 16, 1969, and the timetable
established by the said order of court shall be then con-
strued as if September 16, 1969-were 70 days from the
date of the said order; PROVIDED THAT if the plain-
tiff shall fail to file its narrative statement as provided
for herein, then upon proper motion, the action shall be
dismissed with prejudice, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the pretrial con-
ference in this action, scheduled for May 20, 1969, be
and the same hereby is continued. [Emphasis supplied. }

20. On the day following the argument and Orders
discussed in the three paragraphs immediately above, the
defendant's attorneys confirmed the availability of the
documents discussed in paragraph 19 hereof by a letter to the
plaintitf’s attorneys, a copy of which is attached hereto
labelled Exhibit “A” and made a part hereof.

21. As represented in Exhibit “A”, the said documents
have been available from April 17, 1969 to the present. The
plaintiff's attorneys have never during that period ap-
proached the defendant's attorneys, either in Pittsburgh or in
Harrisburg, for the purpose of examining or copying the said
documents or for any other purpose. The defendant can ©

“7 37a

Exhibis *\ 3" JA ttached to Defendant's * ‘otion.

conclude only that representations made by the plaintiff's at-
torneys at argument on April 16, 1969 were intended to
delay the adjudication of this action.

22. At the time of filing this Motion—fully two weeks af-
ter the deadline set by this Court in its Order of April 16,

23. The plaintiff has ignored two orders of this Court,
namely that of November 18, 1968 and that of April 16, 1969,

1969 as required by this Court's order of April 16, 1969. The
defendant moves the Court to implement the Proviso con-
tained in its Order of April 16, 1969.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/) JAMES D. MORTON,
/s)\ ALAN BRUCE BOWDEN,
Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald,
Kyle & Buerger,
Attorneys for the Defendant.

2?

5 38a
Exhibit “H" Attached to Defendant's Motion.
PENDIX E Exhibit “H”.
In the
4 DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
: For the Western District of Pennsylvania
i
j
; NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC.,
’ a corporation,
j Plaintiff,
: v.
BORG-WARNER CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 66-865.

ORDER.

AND NOW, to wit, this Ist day of October, 1959, upon
consideration of the within Motion to Dismiss, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above-
captioned action be and the same hereby is dismissed
without prejudice.

'
Sadi tive, a. sensi at Aenean a Ryesgade LN Sai diate, SL

:
RABE F. MARSH,
United States District Judge.

29
44a ~
Exhibit “J” Attached to Defendant's Motion.
Exhibit “J”.
In the

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
For the Western District of Pennsylvania

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,

Plaintiff,
v.
BORG-WARNER CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 66-865

MOTION TO VACATE ORDER.

Plaintiff, Northway Coin-Clean, Inc., moves the Court to
vacate and set aside its Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice
in the above-entitled Action, entered on October 1, 1969,
and allow the above action to Proceed to trial, on the
grounds that plaintiff's failure to Prosecute this action prior
to said order was inadvertent and unintentional, that plain-
tiff has now located necessary witnesses not heretofore
known or available to plaintiff in this case, and that the in-
Crease of known claims against the same defendant involving
Similar questions of fact and law in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania since October 1, 1969 indicates this is a proper
case for consideration by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

30

Exhibit “J” Attached to Defendant's Sfotion.

45a

Finens ar igeets,

Litigation, as appears more fully from the affidavit of
Robert G. MacAlister, Esquire, attached hereto.

June 25, 1970.

i igh A i a ole ay

ee ees

ROBERT G. MacALISTER,
Robert G. MacAlister,
FRANK E. COHO,

Frank E. Coho,

ALAN R. ASH,

Alan R. Ash,

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
1410 Grant Building,

Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219,
471-6963.

Saati aces Sip eas a Sb aa ala cde a

RRA cht, NARA LAS RIE EE RAE ROIE RARER

bie Rese es

3]
50a
Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.
Exhibit “K”.
In the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For the Western District of Pennsylvania

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE BORG-WARNER CORPORATION,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 66-865.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS.

Pretrial Conference held at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
Tuesday, September 8, 1970, before: Honorable Herbert P.
Sorg. -

Appearances:

For the Plaintiff: Robert G. MacAlister, Esq., 3320
Grant Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 15219

For the Defendant: Clayton A. Sweeney, Esq.,
Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle and Buerger, 1800
Oliver Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 15222

Marion C. Wike, Official Reporter.

cS ee

Fei Ui ROBES ROR RG ER NP bal Sindy OD Be LN le, Bre tend ae

32

Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Mation.

5la

{2] PROCEEDINGS.

The Court: Good afternoon. This is Northway Coin
against Borg-Warner, Motion to vacate order of June 26th,
1970.

I dismissed this action without prejudice on October l,
1969, having allowed about eight postponements for the
Plaintiff to get ready.

Why should I restore it?

Mr. MacAlister: If Your Honor please, for one simple
and basic reason:

The Court: Tell me what rule you are under first.

Mr. MacAlister: I am under 60, and also 1407, transfer
to the multi-district panel.

The Court: That was in effect October 1, 1969.

Mr. MacAlister: You are right, sir, and I didn’t know
about it.

The Court: I can’t help that. Ignorance of the law is no
excuse.

Mr. MacAlister: I know that, Your Honor. 1 am sure it is
not. I don’t think every lawyer is supposed to know all the
law. At least, I don’t.

The Court: No lawyer, and no judge, knows [3] all the
law.

Mr. MacAlister: 1 didn’t know the existence of the rule
at that time, or I would have followed it.

The Court: Why did I dismiss it without prejudice? I told
you I was going to dismiss it with prejudice.

33

Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

52a

Mr. MacAlister: I, at that time, thought you did it to give

‘us a chance'to do something about it.

The Court: So you can bring another suit?

Mr. MacAlister: We can not, because the statute has long
run against us.

The Court: That is why I think I did it.

Mr. MacAlister: I think you are more than fair, under
some of the circumstances, you know, to dismiss it without
prejudice, and I interpreted that you must have felt there was
some reason and some legitimacy and some basic right in the
case which we had.

Now, my position is simply this: This case is relatively sim-
ple, but we have to carry the burden of proof on two, really
three, bases of facts.

First, this being a fraud and deceipt case, we have to be
2ble to go to the Jury and be able to give evidence to the
Jury as to who prepared the financial statements wherein
Borg-Warner represented the profitability of these fran-
chises that my client bought from them. Now, I can’t [4] do
that, your Honor, unless 1 know who prepared the financial
Stutements. I can’t do it, Your Honor, unless 1 get a chance
to see the records upon which they were prepared, and I
have never been able to get that information.

I think Mr. Sweeney should, answer that. Why has Borg-
Warner fought me getting that information? If I had that in-
formation, and if I was able to review it, I could readily
determine whether or not the financial statements were
honest, whether they were dishonest, who prepared them,
and on what basis.

the tet

Tat, tiie ele i tad 9 ee ae

SET TTI Be

i.

34

53a
Exhibit “K” ‘Attached to Defendant's Motion.

If I found out they were honestly prepared, and if I found
out they did represent the facts at that time, | would walk
away from this lawsuit so fast that 1 would actually file my
own order, asking a dismissal.

But I have never had a chance to find that out yet, and that
is basic to any fraud and deceipt.

Secondly, I have not been able to find out who determined
the process and equipment which Borg-Warner sold my
client were satisfactory and suitable for a profitable, self-
operated business. They have never given me the opportunity

‘to find out. They refuse to tell me who the employees were

who worked on it, and where the reports are, and where the
records are. Again, if I could find that out, —I don’t want to
be in Court fighting lawsuits I can’t win, but why not let Mr.

‘Sweeney answer that? Why have they re- [5] fused to make

that information available? It seems to me if they are going
to win lawsuits denying discovery, and keeping us from get-
ting information, is this justice?

As I see it, you had a legitimate position in this last
argument. I wasn’t here, but you said, “Why have you not
filed a narrative statement?”

I will tell you why we have not done it, because we
couldn't file an honest one, a complete one and full one,
without that basic information. That is the whole case, and I
am not in the habit of filing any narrative statement unless |
expect to be held to that when I come to court, and I was not
able to do that, because I didn’t have the two basic bits of in-
formation. |

I know certain things. I know my client lost $200,000. I

know the, people who sold them went bankrupt in less than a
year, because everybody lost money. I know publicly in

35

54a
Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Time Magazine they admitted, Borg-Warner, that the deal
didn’t work the way it was supposed to. I know those things,
but I don’t know the true foundation of the lawsuit; first,
who prepared the financial statements, were they false or
true. I don’t know who made the determination as to
whether or not the equipment was suitable for the use they
sold it.

Then, again, I have not been able to get any information
as to who put out that glowing advertisement that all the in-
vestor had to do was put his money in the deal and [6] he
was taken care of.

Again, I say if I had those three bits of information and I
was able to see for my own eyes these people weren’t guilty
of fraud and deceit, because it appeared from everything
else they did that they were, and I say to you in conclusion,
there is one other—incidentally, my related counsel, counsel
in related cases that are down in the Middle District, are in
pretrial today with Judge Sheridan, and that is why they are
not here to appear with us and answer your questions which
were legitimate: Are those cases consolidated down there?
We don’t know. I think we will know after today.

The Court: Well, they have not been consolidaied up to
this day?

Mr. MacAlister: No, but I think we will know after this
pretrial meeting.

Seriously, my case is really simple. Why won't Borg-
Warner make available for us the evidence that would prove
those financial statements were honest, and why won't they
make available the proof that the process was suitable and
satisfactory for the operation, when, in fact, we know that
last part from our own observation, that it wasn’t.

WO OO. er ae Pie

an
wee

36

55a
Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

We don’t know anything about the financial statements,
except when we got into the business we found out what they
said represented profitability just wasn't possible under [7]
the operation. Again, I would like Mr. Sweeney to answer
that.

In closing, your Honor may well believe from what the
record shows to date that somehow or other we have been
sitting on our hands and not doing any work in this case. I
checked my own records this morning in my own office on
the amount of time we put into this case already. In my of-
fice—and this doesn’t include Mr. Shearer, who keeps his
own records, we have spent 427 hours in this case since we
first got it. Out of my own pocket I have advanced $1,800-
plus in out-of-pocket expenses, so we have been trying to get
the information. We have been trying, and I seriously believe
it would be a great miscarriage of justice if because of
technical arguments which are quite well done by Mr.
Sweeney—he has cited the rules—he has cited them weil. But
one thing he has not emphasized is what a harsh application
of them would do, and that is that it would take away from
us an Opportunity to lose our own lawsuit in a Courtroom,
and this we should have. This we should do.

Here we are alleging fraud and deceipt, and fraud and
deceipt is not done under Kaufmann’s clock at high noon. It
is done in secret. We should have the opportunity to see that
evidence.

If the Court please, if you would give us that opportunity
and instruct the defendant they must furnish us [8] that
evidence, and not say, “We don’t know where the records
are. We don't know where the witnesses are.”

Then I think we can dispose of this case honestly and
quickly. That is the only thing I would like to have, and that

37

Sha
Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

is all I want. If I am asking for too much, I just can’t un-
derstand why, because all I want here is justice.

I also further think that when you read their deposition
saying they don’t know where the records are, and they sold
them to a corporation called Fedders, and that we can get
the records from Fedders, what right? We have no contract
with Fedders, even if they did sell the records. It makes it
difficult for me to believe, and I think your Honor might
find it difficult to believe, that this Borg-Warner keeps the
responsibility of defending these suits and sold the records,
so they don’t have any records to defend it on.

These are practical things I am talking about. I know if !
had a corporation I represented and they were being sued, I
wouldn't have sold my records, and I would know who the
witnesses were that I needed to defend the cases. It just
doesn’t make any sense to me, none whatsoever.

The Court: You say you have located necessary witnesses
not heretofore known or available to the Plaintiff? Who?

Mr. MacAlister: These are the ones in the Middle
District case.
‘(9] The Court: Who are they?

Mr. MacAlister: There are scads of them.
The Court: Name them.

Mr. MacAlister: I don’t have the list, but there are many
of them. When Mr. Shuman was here the last time at the
arguments, he—I forget how many thousands of records he
has compiled with the names of witnesses, the evidence, and
where he—he found them all the way from Texas to
Delaware. They have spent a tremendous amount of time on
this case, and a tremendous amount of effort.

' 38
: 57a
4 Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

The Court: You have access to them, don’t you?

ta ct

Mr. MacAlister: Only in the Middle District. How can I
get them here?

The Court: Copy them.

Mr. MacAlister: I can copy the records, but I am

Deeb aes ee one

to get it, and they got it before we got into the picture.

: thinking of the witnesses.

/ The Court: Four thousand records, you say?

i Mr. MacAlister: Yes.

$

: The Court: Copy them and bring them up.

Mr. MacAlister: Without the witnesses, they are not
' much good. They are pieces of paper.

| The Court: There are ways of getting witnesses,
- depositions, subpoenas.

Mr. MacAlister: We have tried the deposition [10] route,
i and we have failed pretty well, because, as I have said to
' your Honor, Borg-Warner has very effectively kept us from
; getting any information, and yet these people have been able

Every time Borg-Warner found out somebody knew about
this case, then the next Plaintiff is shut out.

The Court: The co-counsel in the Middle District has the
names of those witnesses?

ee ee ee nT

Pry

Mr. MacAlister: Yes, but the case has to be tried there. It
must be tried there. It must be consolidated. Why take up the
time of this Court to go through a case that can take a month
or six weeks to try? Why shouldn't it go to the Middle

District?

The Court: Because you brought it here.

39

58a
Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Mr. MacAlister: We should have brought it there. Had
we known there was cases there, it sure would have brought
there.

In our Interrogatorics, we asked if there were other cases,
and this Court saw fit to say “You have no right to know
that.” .

The Court: Oh, no. I said you do have a right to know,
but you could find it out just as easily as the person you
asked.

Mr. MacAlister: Maybe I misunderstood.

{11} The Court: Why make these people go around to the
records of the United States, when you could do the same
thing?

Mr. MacAlister: I could have. Admitted. I could have,
but why were they afraid to answer that question? Why
didn’t they want us to know? If that Interrogatory comes
across my desk, as corporate counsel, I wouldn't hesitate to
answer that at all. I really can’t understand why they were
afraid to admit that. For fear we might find out something
about the case? For fear we might win the case? For fear we
might get some evidence? These are the things that bother
me. I wouldn’t have hesitated to tell them. I would have
thought this my duty, as a member of the Court.

The Court: Well, you found out, anyway.

Mr. MacAlister: How did I find out? Let me tell you.
One rainy night in New York City, I, about 5:30 in the
evening, | am walking down Lexington Avenue, and I
remember where I had read that there is a trade magazine
which deals with the cleaning and dying industry. I stop ina
phone booth and I looked up the name of this magazine, and

Bieta a Maat ie 5 a

YO

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant’s Motion.

§$9a

1 happened to be within a block of it. I went up into the—to
see if there was anybody in the office, and there was. The
editor was there. And I introduced myself, and I told him
what I wanted to know. I said, “What have you written in
your trade magazine about these franchise deals so I could
[12] get some practical background?”

He said, “Who do you represent?”

I told him I represented Northway, out of Pittsburgh. I
asked him, because | couldn't find out from Mr. Sweeney. I
asked him, “Do you know of any other cases?”

He said, “Oh, sure.”
I said, “Where are they?”

He told me, and he gave me the name of a man to call,
who, incidentally, when I called him, was so afraid to talk
for fear he would get himself in trouble—he finally did. He
told me that there were cases right in the Middle District.
This man happened to live in Harrisburg. That is how I
found out. That was the first time.

Up until that time, the—I had no knowledge of it, and, the
fact of the matter—in the Philadelphia case, which is also
under this 1407 Petition, in there, Borg-Warner, in their In-
terrogatories, say, state clearly there are no other cases. The
one in the Eastern District, which is also attemping to get up
in the Middle District through the use of 1407—now, if this
is not misrepresentation, if this is not bald, outright lies, I
would like to know what it is. They knew that. They had to.
Those Interrogatories were signed by Mr. Houchias, who is
the house counsel for Borg-Warner, and who stood there the
days we took the depositions, and we were told the
deposition—the one we did take, they [13] didn’t know
where the records were, and they didn’t know who the em-

4/7

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

60a

ployees were. They didn’t know this. They didn’t know that.
They had no information about this. And here we are in this
Court today, and I believe we have been put on, to say the
least. | wouldn’t want to think that the Court would also be
put on like we have been.

The Court: There has been many a potential lawsuit lost
because they couldn’t get the witnesses.

Mr. MacAlister: You are right. But everybody has a right
to get into a courtroom. Why can’t we lose it there? Why
isn't that fair?

The Court: Because you won't comply with the pretrial
order.

Mr. MacAlister: We couldn’t. We would have, but we
couldn't. These people kept up from getting the evidence.

The Court: I say it frequently happens you can not prove
your case, and then you have no case.

Mr. MacAlister: I would like to see the eviderce on
which I couldn't prove it.

The Court: It seems to me I gave you a lot of time.

Mr. MacAlister: You did, and I know your fairness in
doing that, but sometimes a lot of time is not enough, par-
ticularly when, here we are, we are little Goliaths— [14]
rather, little David, fighting big Goliath. We can not even get
a pebble to throw at Goliath. We are held out from getting
the basic information which we need for our lawsuit by
evasions, by statements, by conduct and all the other things.

Now, I think justice—and that is the only important thing
I think we should be interested in; not technicalities, not
time or anything else—we ought to be interested in deter-

a ey

Pe Bhdos

aaa naire Lh Ae Sader) > von

42

Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

6la

mining whether or not these people did fraudulently and
deceiptfully do what they did, which we say they did. How
can anybody be injured here by this Court opening up this
judgment and permitting us to try through 1407 to get it over
to the Middle District? How can justice be hurt by doing
that? Maybe the Panel will say, “Look you are too late,” or
any number of reasons, and throw us out, and then we will
be dead. But I think we should have that chance.

The Court: You say the statute of limitations has run?
Mr. MacAlister: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: When did it run?

Mr. MacAlister: Quite some time ago.

The Court: When?

Mr. MacAlister: Well, it was long before. It ran shortly
after we started the lawsuit, because it took us [15] the best
part of three or four years to realize what had been done to _
use.

The Court: When did it scart?

Mr. MacAlister: I think it started at a date when we en-
tered into the agreement.

The Court: When was that?

Mr. MacAlister: This is so many years back now, I would
be guessing. I think it was sometime around ‘62 that—We
filed in July, 1966, and it was a four-year statute, so it was
sometime in 1962 of "63.

The Court: It was a four-year statute?

Mr. MacAlister: I don’t know. Maybe it was six years.
But I know it was shortly before the statute was run that we
filed it.

43

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

62a

Also, Your Honor might like to know how it actually
dawned upon stupid me that this could have well happened
to us, this fraud and deccipt.

I was corporate counsel for the company catiee Carmen
Pittsburgh Company. Their business is here in Pittsburgh,
and their business is selling supplies to cleaning and dying
and laundry companies. As such, I had to go to the directors’
meeting, and when I was there it became increasingly clear,
as the months weny by, all these little coin-clean operators
weren't able to pay their bills for their supplics, so I began to
wonder why is this? Then the people started [16] to come to
see me. I sent for them to talk about—to talk to them
about—why didn’t they pay their bills. They told me what
happered after they entered into these franchises, how they
weren't profitable; they couldn't be profitable.

My client happens to be a very successful—the client, the
principal owner of my client’s business happens to be a
lawyer who was able to afford to pay his commitment for
this equipment. Most of the people couldn't do that. Most of
them had to close up. Many of them lost all their savings,
and there was more than one company in this business.

I think you would be hard put today, with the exception of
a few operations in this country, to find out they are even
existing today, because they weren't profitable. They were
mis-stated. They were sold under misrepresentation.

This is how I began to find out about the situation. I
blamed the situation on my client and myself of maybe poor
businessmen, but we never had a chance. We never had a
chance. And why didn’t we have a chance? It appears as how
the business could never have been operated profitably in
such a way to have done to get out of the deal. This is how 1]
found out about it. That is why I was a long time bringing

BJ
2
3
3
2
2
a
4
a
$

oy
63a
Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

the lawsuit. It took a while, stupid as I am, believing what
big corporations say, and thinking they tell the truth,
because this is my background. I have been as- [17] sociated
in business all my life, and generally they tell the truth, but
this time I think they put us on.

I still think the only fair thing for Your Honor to do is to
give us a chance in a courtroom with—after giving us an op-
portunity to again confront Borg-Warner and say, “Let us
see those records on which you prepared those financial
records. Let us see the record itself. Let us talk to the people
who did it.”

If they are honest, I guarantee you—and I promise you I
will file my own Motion to Dismiss.

The Court: It is not as simple as you state.

Under the Rule 16 that you say you are under, I don't
think | can grant your Motion. You don’t fit any one of
them.

Mr. MacAlister: But Mr. Sweeney says, “Oh, yes, I do.
Only one.”

The Court: Which one is that?

Mr. MacAlister: That is the only one I want. I agree on
the other ones, I don’t. He says this on page 22 of his brief.
The only Rule 60-B reason which could conceivably cover
this ground is the sixth clause, “Any other reason justifying
release of judgment.”

He says Rule 60-B is a residual clause to cover these few
extraordinary circumstances which do not come within [18]
the preceding five clauses.

But the overriding justice rules are only to make it
possible for the litigation to take place. They are not to be

a

ota
Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

the substance of my argument, Your Honor. The substance is
we have been kept from getting the basic information we
have to have to find out whether or not we should lose or
win a case in a courtroom, and if we had that op-
portunity—and it is that simple. It is not complicated.

The Court: Mr. MacAlister, I should have been told that
last fall.

Mr. MacAlister: You should have been. I am sorry. I
wasn't here, or maybe I would have said that.

Mr. MacAlister: I was not here in person at the
arguments, but this has been my deep feeling in this case
from the beginning. | am in the embarrassing position of a
lawyer who represented the people that went into this deal,
and it is a pretty serious thing when based upon represen-
tations which I believe also—you may be sure I find that my
clients have lost all this money, and is generally true in the
whole business of these coin-operated laundries.

The Court: It seems last fall—and my recollection may
be faulty—but you had the lawyer for the cases in the Middle
District, and he was right here, and you said you needed five
months to get the records of the Defendant in the Middle
District, and they were sent to Pittsburgh, [19] and you
never looked at them.

You had access to the 4,000 exhibits that the Plaintiff had.
You had access to the names of the witnesses the Plaintiff
had, and you were not able to file your pretrial narrative
statement.

Mr. MacAlister: If your Honor please, it came to me as
a tremendous surprise when I read Mr. Sweeney's brief and
arguments that these records were in Pittsburgh. We never
were told that.

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* diss Raden aes

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Exhibit “K”" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

65a

The Court: Whether you were or not, they were available
to you in Harrisburg.

Mr. MacAlister: They were available in Harrisburg, and
counsel in the related cases said, “You are wasting your
time. There is nothing relevant in there. Don’t spend your
time and money.”

The Court: You asked me for five months to do it.

Mr. MacAlister: Admittedly, and you fairly granted it to
me, but when we found out it was a red herring—

The Court: You never looked at them.
Mr. MacAlister: Counsel in the related cases did.
The Court: Well, you had his records and witnesses.

{20} Mr. MacAlister: They are only good in the Middle
District. I couldn’t see how I can bring those records there,
and bring them into this District.

The Court: I can’t argue with you.

Mr. MacAlister: If I understand you to say that if I
brought those copies of those records down here I could use
them in this courtroom, — |

The Court: Copies of records time and again are offered
in evidence in this courtroom. It is very rarely I get an
original anymore.

Mr. MacAlister: Again, why is it too late for me to do it
now? How is anybody injured?

The Court: We will have to hear Mr. Sweeney on that.
Mr. MacAlister: Except me?

The Court: If nobody is injured, he ought to agree.

47

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

66a

Mr. MacAlister: Thank you, your Honor.

The Court: Who is injured, Mr. Sweeney?

Mr. Sweeney: If your Honor please, I am Clayton
Sweeney, and I believe at the monent nobody is injured, but
if your Honor reconsiders his order dated, correctly, Oc-
tober I, 1969, I believe my client would be injured, and: I
believe my client would be injured for a very good reason.

{21] We have filed with your Honor affidavits addressing
ourselves, as ‘best we were able, to what _we believed Mr.
MacAlister’s position would be when we got here.

The Court: I must compliment you on your very
thorough brief.

Mr, .Sweency: With your Honor’s permission, I would
like to pass it on to Mr. Thompson.:He was the one who
prepared the brief.

The Court: It was very thorough and diligent.

Mr. Sweeney: I would like to accept it, but I am not en-
titled, so I must pass it on to him.

The Court: If you get into more litigation, Mr. Thomp-
son, it is a very good brief.

Mr. Thompson: Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Sweeney: I think my client would be injured for a
number of reasons, and Mr. MacAlister repeats a series of
allegations and accusations I Suppose against me, my law
firm, and my client, for not permitting them to do a lot of
vague things which I can not, frankly, identify.

We filed affidavits by Mr. Houchins, by Mr. Schisler, who
was the attorney in three unconsolidated actions in

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3

67a
Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Harrisburg, and Mr. Bowden in our office, in which we at-
tempted to set forth what had taken place here.

We made available the witnesses who were in our [22]
power to make available, and if memory serves me correctly,

‘produced all who were sought. Mr. MacAlister is frank in _

admitting atthe moment he has no cause of action, and I
can’t help that.

But. I .submit to your Honor that last October we had a
right to come back and ask’ you to make that dismissal with
prejudice, because you had earlier indicated you would.

The Court: I can’t recall why I didn’t.

Mr. Sweeney: I can’t answer that. We filed the motion
some weeks after the default had taken place, and after five
months had been granted. I was not snapping a judgment.
You will recall on April 18, 1969. Mr. MacAlister’s co-
counsel frankly admitted they were in default then.

The Court: And I lost patience in April, and he per-
suaded me to give him another five months, and he had the
lawyer from Harrisburg who said he would cooperate with
him, and the Defendant said he,would open up his records to
him, and I was overcome and I gave him five months.

I don’t know why I did it without prejudice.

Mr. Sweeney: In that connection, I would like to state on
April 17, the day after you were overcome, our firm wrote a
letter making available in Pittsburgh or Harrisburg all these
documents. We kept them in Harrisburg, if memory serves
me correctly, a couple months. We had them [23] available,
and then we brought them to Pittsburgh. I did not go
through them on behalf of Mr. MacAlister.

At the enc of that period, Mr. Bowden—I at that time was

' engaged in another case—and Mr. Bowden called and said,

47

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

68a

“Gentlemen, your time has run, and perhaps we ought to
clear the default.”

Nothing. A couple weeks went by, and we decided, if I
recall, we made another call, and we didn’t hang on a
technical dissent. This time went on, and nothing happened,
and so we filed it and requested in that that it be with
prejudice.

The Court: Do you know when the statute of limitations
would have run?

Mr. Sweeney: Your Honor, | pleaded in the Answer to
the original Complaint that the statute of limitations had
already run, and I am convinced it had run before the filing
of the Complaint in 1966, the transaction having taken place
in 1962.

If it was a fraud, Mr. MacAlister admits it was when he
discovered it way back then. The exact date, I can’t pin-
point.

The Court: Why would it be only four years?

Mr. Sweeney: I think that is the four years provided un-
der the Uniform Commercial Code.

[24] The Court: Is that your idea?

Mr. Sweeney: That is one of the bases, but their Com-
plaint does not state on what basis it was filed.

Your Honor may remember the somewhat unusual pretrial
order when I urged your Honor to permit them to complete
their discovery before we went forward with ours, because
we couldn’t identify what their cause of action was.

As I recall, Mr. Shearer drafted this, and we went over
and submitted it to your Honor.

A Wiha Demtitalae nad Crd etl owe tert

woe” “ete

Jo

69a
Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Apparently, Mr. MacAlister does not know to this day. I
submit we have answered everything we had to answer. I will
not waste your Honor’s time justifying my client.

The Court: The reason I was searching for answers on
the statute of limitations is because heretofore when I en-
tered in default without prejudice it is to give them a chance
to bring another suit within the statute of limitations. I can’t
understand why I did it without prejudice here.

Mr. Sweeney: I assumed at the time you entered the or-
der that was the reason, and I thought, to be honest with
you, perhaps there was a six-year statute. They could allege
they didn’t become aware of the fraud until a subsequent
date. I thought there would be a factual allegation and your
Honor thought “I will put this out and let them go.”

[25] Then there arrived a Motion to Transfer before the
Multi-District Panel. You can not transfer—I am mixing this
up in my language.

The Multi-District Panel can not transfer something that
does not exist. They are doing nothing. | would add, the
Motion to Transfer was made before you. You denied the
transfer. I don't believe the circumstances have changed. I
don't have the names of any witnesses. The situs is here in
Western Pennsylvania. The Plaintiff is here, and we went
through Mr. Bowden's argument outlining where all the
people are. There is nobody in the Middle District, with the
possible exception of one witness, and we could depose him,
if we need it.

Now we come to the Motion under 1407, which was enac-
ted almost two years before your Honor ruled last October.

As I recall, the enactment date was April, 1968.

a/

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

70a

The Court: That is right. April 29.

Mr. Sweeney: So that I submit. your Honor, it could not
be an after-discovered effect, and, furthermore, there is a
mistake on our brief on page 8 in a date at the top of the

page.

Your Honor, we pointed out beginning on page 7, “There
has been no change in this litigation, and no increase in
claims since September 5, 1969.”

With your Honor’s permission, I would like to [26] orally
correct that to 1965. There has been no increase in the plain-
tiffs. There has been no consolidation.

You recall on April 16 you pointed out they could move
to consolidate before the summer. Why this switch in the
Middle District? I represent a client against whom suit was
filed. We were not technical or harsh, with our adversary.
Nothing has happened. Nothing new has been added that
would require, in the interests of justice, you do it, and, as
we indicate, respectfully, in our brief, I don’t think your
Honor can do it. I think that is legitimate.

The Court: As much as I would like to give them another
chance, I don’t think I can.

Mr. Sweeney: I don't think the law permits it. I think,
quite frankly, they have had every chance.

This is not a case of somebody snapping a judgment, and
the discovery was extended seven or eight times.

The Court: Eight times. I counted.

Mr. Sweeney: We did object to an Interrogatory, but
from what Mr. MacAlister says, I find out that didn’t matter.

I will add one thing. The Pennsylvania cases pending in
Harrisburg are being argued before Judge Sheridan. There

52
Tia
Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

has been a severance motion filed. | am not one to suggest
that you can predict what any Judge will do, but in- [27]
dications are Judge Sheridan is not going to consolidate
them.

Mr. MacAlister has indicated the background is com-
pletely different. The 4,000 documents that were the big
thing, suddenly only relate to that case. Why would we
transfer it to the Middle District anyway?

The Court: I can’t think of the detail, but I was con-
vinced it would have been an imposition on the Middle
District for me to transfer this case down there. The reason
for it, I don’t know now, but I would have resented it if they
had transferred theirs up here.

Mr. Sweeney: I think the reasons are simple, if I can jog
your memory, the business was operated out of the Western
District and it was and is still in operation in the Western
District by a man who, according to the records, operated it
at a profit ever since 1964. The Plaintiff is a resident of the
Western District, and the sales people involved are here in
the Western District. The only people who would be in-
convenienced were our people, and all the documents were
here in the Western District. There was no reason to transfer

it.

And 1 submit they are articulated before your Honor in

the April, 1969, hearing. There is a transcript of that hearing.
The Court: 1 know. I was hoping I would get the time to

read it today, but I didn’t.

[28] Mr. Sweeney: I think the reasons are in there. I

won't, unless your Honor has questions to ask me, extend

the argument.

33

72a
Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

I think with all deference to Mr. MacAlister, the equities
are with us. They had their day in court, and they are frank
to admit today they are unable to prove a claim. I think the
end of the line is here. It has to be so.

The Court: I think the end of the line is here.

Mr. MacAlister: If your Honor please, again, not-
withstanding your determination that the end of the line is
here, I must again say that this case is being lost by client
because he never was able to get the information under
which he could have won the case by the actions of Borg-
Warner.

Unfortunately, I have not been able to convince your
Honor of that. But I am sure in my own mind and heart that
this is what happened to us.

The Court: Well, Mr. MacAlister,—

Mr. MacAlister: I think it is quite a tragedy that we are
now—our Case is all over with your statement, “The end of
the line is here.” It is all over, and I shouldn't be making any
more speeches, but I just have to.

The Court: Go right ahead.

[29] Mr. MacAlister: I just have to, because we have been
put on, and I am afraid your Honor has been, too.

I stood up before your Honor representing a man in a
criminal tax case, and he was lying to you in the sentencing
here, a man by the name of Bachman.

The Court: Bachman?

Mr. MacAlister: Yes. But you had the card in your hand.
You had the probation officer's report with the truth in it,
and he told your Henor that héwas going to the doctor so

x4
73a
Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Mation.

many times, and you looked down at him and said, “Stop
putting me on.”

I think if your Honor had that same kind of information
in front of him today from an independent third source, you
_ could look down and, not say to Mr. Sweeney, because I am
- not accusing him of any of this, but 1 think you could look
+ down at him and say, “Your client is putting me on.”

cb dis » oe "
Nace ata siti and oN Kalas er |

Can you believe, your Honor, that they don’t know who
- made those financial statements? Can you believe that they
don’t know whether or not that was suitable for a use? Can
you believe what you are doing here? Can you believe they
- g0ld those records and they couldn’t get them?

These are so simple and so direct and so real.

The Court: All I can see, Mr. MacAlister, for a period of
years, and over eight continuances, I gave you [30] the op-
3 portunity to get it.

Mr. MacAlister: You did. And, remember, I say fraud is
not commited under Kaufmann’s cl< ck. It is very difficult to

’ prove.

When you get into a case like this, you have got dif-
ficulties. You carry a tremendous burden. But, still, if I had
those three things, as | said today, if they are telling the
truth, they will hear nothing more from me, but I doubt that
they are. I think through technicalities and through skills
which I don’t have, they have been able to keep me from get-
ting the truth, and if—Who is afraid of the truth— Who is
afraid of the truth? The man who is not telling it.

If they weren't afraid of the truth, they would say,
“MacAlister, come here and look at these things and see for

yourself.”

PORT eee ee, eT ee eS

ee

SS

74a
Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

The Court: They told you they sold the records to Fed-
ders Company. Did you go to Fedders?

Mr: MacAlister: No, I have no right. All they need to say
to me is, “Why are you coming here? These records belong
to us.”

I have no right to look at their records.

The Court: Why do you say that?

Mr. MacAlister: Because it makes common sense to me.
[31] The Court: I can’t argue with you.

Mr. MacAlister: I don’t want your Honor to argue with
me. I would hope before you write your order you will con-
sider those three simple, basic arguments of mine, which go
right to the argument of the whole case, and Mr. Sweeney
could, if he would, he could stand up and say, “What do we
have to lose? Let MacAlister look at those and shut him up
once and forever.”

The Court: If Mr. MacAlister and Mr. Shearer, who is
an excellent lawyer, couldn't get those things you have wan-
ted since 1966, you are not going to get them now.

I hate to impose on you, gentlemen, but if you will now
write the proper order, I will sign it.

Mr. Sweeney: Yes, your Honor.

(Court was adjourned.)

I HEREBY CERTIFY the foregoing to be a true and
correct transcript of the testimony had in the matter of Civil
Action 66-865, September 8, 1970.

MARION C. WIKE,
Official Reporter.

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75a
Exhibit “L” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Exhibit “L”. APPENDIX F

In the
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

For the Western District of Pennsylvania

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC.,
a corporation,

Plaintiff.
Vv.
BORG-WARNER CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 66-865.

ORDER OF COURT.

AND NOW, to-wit, this 8th day of September. 1970, after
hearing and upon due consideration of Plaintiff's Motion to
Vacate Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice entered on Oc-
tober 1, 1969, IT IS ORDERED that said Motion be and the
same hereby is denied.

s/ RABE F. MARSH,
United States District Judge.

57

9la
APPENDIX C

Order.

(Fiied January 11, 1973.)

AND NOW, this 1 ith day of January 1973, Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment
having come on for hearing, and the court having duly con-
sidered the said motions with accompanying exhibits and af-
fidavits, and having duly considered the contra affidavits of
the plaintiff; and after consideration of the briefs and
arguments of both parties and being fully advised, the
motion of the defendant is granted because the action is
barred by the statute of limitations and because the action
has already-been dismissed with finality at Civil Action No.
66-365 by the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania.

Summary judgment is accordingly entered in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff.

R. DIXON HERMAN,
United States District Judge,
Middle District of Pennsylvania.

FD ELE PLAS TIAL Tn Ee

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_1988%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
