# Reply Brief of Petitioner — Springer v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_1971%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief of Petitioner
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 419 U.S. 834

## Text

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-1771

Curtis HowE SprinGer, ET AL., Petitioners
7.
UnitTep STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

This Brief is submitted by Petitioners pursuant to
Rule 24 in reply to the Memorandum for the United
States in Opposition filed by the Solicitor General of
the United States.

1. In its Memorandum, the United States asserts
that Petitioners have contended ‘‘that 30 U.S.C. 38
removes the requirement of discovery of a valuable
mineral deposit where the claimant has been in pos-

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session for a period equal to the period of the appli-
cable state statute of limitations.’’ (Memo. p. 2).
This characterization of Petitioners’ contentions is
erroneous. At no time have Petitioners contended
that 30 U.S.C. 38, which is applicable to holding of
mineral lands over long periods of time, removes the
element of discovery. Petitioners have asserted that
said section lowers the burden of proof as to the element
of discovery as well as other elements usually required
to establish a mining claim, but nowhere have Peti-
tioners contended that discovery is not required.
Petitioners argue that such lower burden of proof
should have been applied in the proceedings below
instead of the higher burden actually employed.

2. The United States further asserts, and quotes
from the Court of Appeals below, that Petitioners’
‘‘activities cannot by any stretch of the imagination
be considered the mining of valuable minerals.”’
(Memo. p. 3). Petitioners submit that this very point
is the subject of extensive argument in the Petition
(Pet. pp. 26-34) and cannot be summarily dismissed by
a quotation unsupported by rebuttal argument, par-
ticulavl7 since Petitioners’ argument demonstrates
that this view of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.

3. The Memorandum in Opposition next suggests
that Petitioners are attempting by this action to locate
‘bathing salts”? and that ‘‘bathing salts’? are not
locatable because their primary constituency is sodium.
(Memo. p. 3). Again, this is an erroneous interpreta-
tion of Petitioners’ contentions. The Petition ade-
quately demonstrates why such a neat and pat char-
acterization is in error, because the minerals are not
relied upon chiefly for the sodium contained in such
minerals and, if the Government’s argument has any

o~-+~9

3

validity, the natural pervasiveness of sodium would
prevent almost all mining activities and minerals from
being subject to location. (Pet. pp. 26-28).

4. The Memorandum in Opposition asserts that
Petitioners bear the burden of proof in this case, citing
two cases for this proposition, Foster v. Seaton, 271
F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d
616 (9th Cir. 1968), certiorari denied, 393 U.S. 1025
(1969). (Memo. p. 3). These cases, however, relate
to the burden of proof required under other parts of
the Mining Laws and do not consider the extent of the
burden of proof required under 30 U.S.C. 38. The
Petition herein (pp. 15-22) adequately shows that 30
U.S.C. 38 establishes a lower burden of proof as to the
element of discovery for a long term claimant and that
Petitioners have met this burden.

5. The United States urges on this Court the
proposition that estoppel does not apply against the
federal Government. (Memo. pp. 3-4). Petitioners,
on the other hand, have adequately pointed out why
the doctrine of estoppel should apply in this ease. As
shown in the Petition, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Cireuit, has applied estoppel
against the federal Government in circumstances very
similar to that presented here. United States v. Lazy
F C Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973). As pointed
out in that case, justice and fair play on the part of
the Government when dealing with its citizens in cir-
cumstances such as those involved in the instant case
require that the Government be estopped from denying
the validity of Petitioners’ claims. The Government
has simply ignored this case and the reasoning set forth
therein.

8 Sted aad

:
‘

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6. The United States contends that, in any event,
there were no circumstances constituting estoppel.
(Memo. p. 4). Petitioners attempted to argue
estoppel in the District Court but the court there held,
erroneously, that such issue was not applicable.
(Hearing on Application of Defendant for Stay of
Injunction Pendente Lite, August 2, 1971, Tr. pp. 5-7) ;
(Contempt Proceeding, October 20, 1973, Tr. pp. 212-
213); and (Hearing on Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, January 9, 1973, Tr. p. 19). Consequently,
no direct evidence on that issue was introduced.
Nevertheless, the record shows the elements of
estoppel have been established, (See Pet. pp. 23-25),
and the factors supporting such elements have not
been denied previously by the Government.

In short, the Memorandum for the United States in
Opposition disregards the facts, the Mining Laws of
the United States and the applicable decisions of this
Court. The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should
accordingly be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

GroRGE W. NILSSON,
714 West Olympic Boulevard,
Los Angeles, Calif. 90015,
Attorney for Petitioners,

Enpwarp A, McCabe,
Hamel, Park, MeCabe & Saunders,
1776 F Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20006,

Of Counsel.

August 1974

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_1971%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
