# Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — Stamatakos v. Hunter Shipping Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the Respondent in Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 419 U.S. 831

## Text

Supreme Court of the Unite

October Term, 1973.

No. 73-1696.

ANASTASSIOS STAMATAKOS,

Petitioner,

0.

HUNTER SHIPPING COMPANY, &. A.,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT LY OPPOSITION.

Rawis & Henperson,
Of Counsel. —

International Printing Co., 711 So. 60mm St, Phila., Pa. 19143 — Tel. (215) 727-8711

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INDEX TO BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT.

Page
OUI TREE -cccscccnucncascccsndonnscccessscessese 1
CounTer-STATEMENT OF QuESTIONS PresENTED ror Review 2
CounTEeR-STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........-.0e0eeeeee: 3
Reasons ror DENYING THE WRIT ..............+-00000: 7

1. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Affirming the
District Court’s Judgment in Favor of Petitioner in
the Amount of $10,000 Is Not in Conflict With This
Court’s Decisions or With Those of Other Circuits 7

2. The Decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals Is Not in
Conflict With the Treaty Between the United States
SE REE au vdcbdcancuchsnesnosudunctesbnanseus 11

3. The Supreme Court Should Not Grant Certiorari
Merely Because the Circuit Court of Appeals Chose
to Affirm Without a Full Opinion ................. 14

INDEX TO RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX.
Page
Letter Dated April 2, 1971, Shuster to Judge Van Artsdalen A19
Excerpts From Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Application of

ee MEE EAU 00ncnscscnensebecanbabcutacuwawes A20
United States Court of Appeals Release, January 17, 1973 .. A25
Excerpt From Appellant's Brief Before Third Circuit ....... A27

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

Page
Anastasiadis v. SS Little John, 346 F. 2d 281 (C. A. 5, 1965) 14
Andrews v. Chemical Carriers, Inc., 457 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 3,

DEE) Won cUsdwnneauesdscnnncecescoscesasescescoccsce 8
Brillis v. Chandris USA, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 520 (S. D. N. Y.

ME Adeansksevsadburoucccneéneusecctocsoccocceoses 12
Damaskinos v. Soc. Nav. Interamericana S. A., 255 F. Supp.

es Oe ik ED ccncccccpesseccccccocsecsees 9,11
Dassigienis v. Cosmos Carriers & Trading Corp., 442 F. 2d

ao cece speenoeneausaessqeeses ll
Gaiven v. Pease, 367 U. S. SEB (ISGS) 2. cccccccccccccecee 16
Hatzogliou v. Asturias Shipping Co., S. A., 193 F. Supp. 195

Dt i PhD POT I, ES OTA om

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RO ETRE te GEE LEE ELE EOE LE TT LS = 5s 2 - ~~

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 13

conveniens and after discussing at length the policy consid-
erations involving a contract with a specified foreign forum,
the U. S. Supreme Court reversed the two lower courts. In
reaching that decision, the court substantially repudiated
the philosophy that foreign forum selection clauses are
‘‘contrary to public policy’’ and held:

‘*that such clauses are prima facie valid and should be
enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting
party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.
We believe this is the correct doctrine to be followed by
District Courts sitting in Admiralty.’’

On discussing the burden of the resisting party to show
that enforcement is ‘‘unreasonable’’, the Court stated:

‘*thus in light of present day commercial realities and
expanding international trade, we conclude that the
forum clause should control absent a strong showing
it should be set aside. The correct approach would
have been to enforce the forum clause specifically un-
less Zapata could clearly show that the enforcement
would be unreasonable and unjust or that the clause
was invalid for such reasons as fraud or over-reach-
ing.’’ (Emphasis supplied).

In another portion of the Court’s decision it placed on
the resisting party, Zapata, a ‘‘heavy burden”’ to show the
foreign forum selection clause should not be enforced. See
also note discussing Bremen case in The Supreme Court,
1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 52, pp. 52-62.

In the instant case there is absolutely no evidence or
even an allegation that the contract signed by plaintiff re-
quiring that Greek Law be applied to the dispute was signed
by him as a result of fraud or overreaching.

Even more significant is the fact that the Court in
reaching its verdict in Bremen (decided since Rhoditis)

14 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

cites the case of Anastasiadis v. SS Little John, 346 F. 2d
281 (C. A. 5, 1965) to support the proposition in the first
quote above. The Anastasiadis case involved a Greek sed-
man who was injured on a Liberian flag vessel, owned by a
Liberian corporation which in turn was owned by an
American corporation, owned and controlled by a U. S.
citizen. In affirming the district court’s decision to decline
jurisdiction, the appellate court placed great emphasis on
the fact Anastasiadis had signed an employment contract
agreeing to the applicability of Greek law.

Thus, this Court in the Bremen case has, by implica-
tion, approved giving great weight to a contract stipulating
the applicable law where there is no showing of fraud or
over-reaching, neither of which is claimed here.

3. The Supreme Court Should Not Grant Certiorari Merely
Because the Circuit Court of Appeals Chose to Affirm
Without a Full Opinion.

Petitioner’s position appears to be that the Third
Circuit by its decision of January 18, 1974, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by failing to render
a formal opinion and further by the alleged lack of notice
that it would dispose of some appeals without full opinions.

Carried to its logical extreme, adoption of petitioner’s
argument would require that this Court as well, render a
full opinion in every case or at least provide an explanation
as to why ‘‘his appeal (or petition) did not warrant a (full)
written opinion’’. Petitioner’s Brief p. 15. As a matter
of fact, the number of cases in which formal decisions were
rendered by this Court during the 1971 Term was 151 or
less than 5 percent of the 3,645 cases given disposition dur-
ing that Term. In addition, 3,190 or about 89 percent were
disposed of by denial of petitions for certiorari or by dis-
missal of appeals. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 52 (especially Table IT at p. 303).

LO Re FT SENS PS OS RNIN I rN aT oe.

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Brief for Respondent in Opposition 15

That table also shows that petitions for certiorari
and/or appeals were granted in 8.5 percent of the cases on.
the Appellate Docket and 1.7 percent on the Miscellaneous
Docket. 3

Given the great increase in cases coming before this ©
Court, the requirement of a full opinion or even an expla- —
nation as to why no full opinion was written in each case
would totally stagnate the disposition of cases. That the

same result would occur in the Cireuit Courts is evidenced’ ~

by the remarks of Chief Justice Burger at the Semiannual
Meeting of the U. S. Judicial Conference on March 7-8,
1974:

‘‘The startling increase in cases flooding into the fed-
eral appeals courts shows no sign of abating. Rather,
the increase goes on. Filings in federal appeals courts
have risen another 11 percent during the first six
months of this fiscal year. This is imposing immense
burdens on the federal judges as they attempt to keep
abreast of the demands of justice.’’

Traditionally due process has required that a person
not be deprived of life, liberty or property without a fair
hearing, ‘‘one before a tribunal which meets at least the
currently prevailing standards of impartiality’. Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1949) at p. 50. In
the instant case, petitioner through his able counsel stipu-
lated that the issue of applicable law was to be decided by
the trial court; prepared and filed proposed findings of
fact, and a brief in support of his position; prepared and
filed a brief for reconsideration aft-r receiving from the
trial court a result which disappointed him; prepared and
filed an extensive brief before the Third Circuit ; and finally
was afforded the opportunity to present, and in fact pre-
sented, oral argument before the Third Circuit. Surely, the

16 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

constitutional requirements of due process have been met
in the instant case. Even counsel for the petitioner would
agree that the Third Circuit is a ‘‘tribunal which meets at
least the currently prevailing standards of impartiality’’.
The mere fact it decided this case by a Judgment Order and
not a full opinion does not violate due process or the ‘‘pre-
vailing standards of impartiality.’’

Petitioner brought to respondent’s attention the case
of Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1953). In that case,
Galvan urged that his deportation under Section 22 of the
Internal Security Act of 1950 violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment since it was applied to his
having been a member of the Communist party from 1944
46. The Court rejected this argument specifically and in
doing so said:

‘*Tn light of the expansion of the concept of substantive
due process as a limitation upon all powers of Con-
gress, even the war power, see Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 155, much could be said
for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the
Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political dis-
cretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress
in regulating the entry and deportation of aliens. And
since the intrinsic consequences of deportation are so
close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be said
also that the ex post facto Clause, even though appli-
cable only to punitive legislation, should be applied to
deportation.

‘‘But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the
power of Congress under review, there is not merely ‘a
page of history,’ New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U. S. 345, 349, but a whole volume. Policies pertaining
to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here
are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of

— SRP OS PL TIE ERO TR REPRO OT SRL a

Way Rorss-

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 17

government. In the enforcement of these policies, the
Executive Branch of the Government must respect the
procedural safeguards of due process. The Japanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101; Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49. But that the formulation
of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress
has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative
and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect
of our government.’’

Again, ‘‘the slate is not clean’’; ‘‘whole volumes’’ have
been written; and it is equally imbedded in the ‘‘judicial
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our govern-
ment”’ that a court can regulate its own procedures. The
entire rationale of disposition of petitions for certiorari
underscores this point.

However, the Third Circuit did not merely dismiss peti-
tioner’s appeal. It gave ‘‘careful consideration’’ to the
issues raised by petitioner, ‘‘particularly that the district
court erred in its choice of law governing this action’’, and
affirmed. The affirmance means the Third Circuit found
no reversible error in the procedures, law, or application
of the facts to the law in the district court’s decision on
the choice of law. In effect it agreed with and adopted the
lower court’s reasoning as set forth in the latter’s opinion
of January 18, 1972. (A2-3).

Petitioner’s second argument on the due process issue
is an alleged lack of prior notice (by publication) that cases
would be disposed of without full opinions but rather by
orders. Petitioner does not challenge the usage of Judg-
ment Orders subsequent to the alleged first date of pub-
lication and thus accepts the fact and necessity of their
usage thereafter.

This Court does not have the benefit of the Internal
Operating Procedures cited by petitioner as having been

9 AS GEER EER TE ES SE Ie =

18 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

published in the Legal Intelligencer on April 8, 1974. How-
ever, it was there stated:

‘*These IOP’s implement: A. Statutory Mandates;
B. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; C. Rules of
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; and D. Cus-
toms practices and traditions of this Court.’’

It then went on to explain when a Judgment Order would
be used.

Petitioner states on page 14 of his Petition that ‘‘on
or before January 18, 1974, the Third Circuit had not given
public notice of the standards and criteria, if any, it utilized
in deciding an appeal without a written opinion’’. This
statement is untrue. One year and one day prior to Jan-
uary 18, 1974, the same Legal Intelligencer published the
Third Circuit’s ‘‘New Procedures’’ which pointed out that
‘*no longer [would the court] prepare opinions for publica-
tion in all cases’’ and that ‘‘ccriain cases will be terminated
by orders’’. The standards and criteria for full opinions
versus orders was then specified. (A25-A26).

It is thus apparent petitioner has had all the safeguards
of due process and even the notice provisions he alleges
were not made. There is thus no reason for this Court to
grant certiorari on this issue.

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 19

CONCLUSION.

The granting of a writ of certiorari is discretionary
under Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936. That discretion
should not be exercised by the Court in the instant case.

In the last analysis this petition for certiorari is made
by a litigant who has been disappointed in the resolution of
disputed facts below and their application to the law. As
stated by Chief Justice Taft in Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262
U.S. 159, 163 (1923) :

‘*The jurisdiction (of the U. S. Supreme Court to re-
view cases by way of certiorari) was not conferred
upon this Court merely to give the defeated party in
the Circuit Court of Appeals another hearing. Our
experience shows that eighty percent of those who peti-
tion for certiorari do not appreciate these necessary
limitations upon our issue of the writ.’’

Respectfully submitted,
Wii E. Rapp,
Attorney for Respondent.

Raw.e & HENDERSON,
Of Counsel.

/

Letter Dated April 2, 1971 ——

RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX.
(Letterhead of)

Mores M. Suuster
Attorney at Law and Proctor in Admiralty
1530 Western Saving Fund Bldg.
Broad and Chestnut Streets
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107

PE 5-3223
April 2, 1971

Honorable Donald W. Van Artsdalen
3058 U. S. Courthouse

9th & Chestnut Streets

Philadelphia, Pa. 19107

Re: Anastasios Stamatakos
Vs: Hunter Shipping Co., S. A.
Civil Action No, 68-1094

/

Dear Judge Van Artsdalen:

I am enclosing with this letter Plaintiff’s Brief In Sup-
port Of Application Of United States Law.

Mr. Rapp joins with me in requesting that Your Honor
postpone the filing of Pre-Trial Memoranda in this case
until there has been a final determination of the choice of
law issue.

Respectfully yours,

Morris M. Shuster

MMS :at
enc.
ce: William E. Rapp, Esquire w/enc.

A20 Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Eastern District or PENNSYLVANIA.

t eee

' Crvm Action No. 68-1094. ©

Ce ‘

- ANASTASSIOS STAMATAKOS
Vv,

HUNTER SHIPPING CO., S. A.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION
OF UNITED STATES LAW.

I. INTRODUCTION.

On September 7, 1966 plaintiff was seriously injured
while employed as a seaman aboard the defendant’s vessel,
SS ‘‘Michael L’’ while it was berthed in Bayonne, New
Jersey. Plaintiff claims that defendant is liable to him
under United States statutory and non-statutory mari-
time law, which provides for ‘the recovery of damages for
injuries caused by the vessel’s unseaworthiness and/or
defendant’s negligence as well as a recovery for main-
tenance and cure. The items of damage recoverable under
United States maritime law include past and future loss
of earning power, past and future medical expenses, past
and future pain, suffering and inconvenience, and past
and future loss of life’s pleasures.

The resolution of plaintiff’s action requires the Court
to make a threshold decision on the choice of substantive
law. It is plaintiff’s position that the substantial relevant
contacts in the action with the United States mandate the

Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief A21

application of United States maritime non-statutory and
statutory law, the Jones Act, 46 U.S. C. A. Sec. 688.

Since September 9, 1968, plaintiff has been a permanent
resident of the United States and intends to become a
United States citizen. He has been employed in the United
States as a dishwasher because his injuries prevent him
from returning to work at sea. His earnings in the United
States are substantially less than he could earn in the
United States maritime industry. He has continued under
the medical care of United States doctors since his return
to the United’ States. Plaintiff’s allegiance and domicile
is thus now to the United States. Although he was a
Greek citizen at the time of his accident, Greece no longer
has an immediate concern for his well being as does the
United States. ‘‘We extend to such an alien the same con-
stitutional protections of due process that we accord citi-
zens.’’ Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Phoditis, supra, 8. Ct. 1734.

Since the United States does have an immediate con-
cern for plaintiff’s well being, even the disseniers in
Rhoditis, supra, would extend the benefits of United States
law to plaintiff. Justice Harlan’s dissent stated, 90 S. Ct.
1736:

‘‘The only justification that I can see for extending
extra-territorially, a remedial-type provision like Sec.
688 is that the injured seaman is an individual whose
well-being is a concern of this country.’’

The other choice of law factors which result in con-
tacts with Liberia, Panama, and Greece are inconsequen-
tial compared with the United States contacts. Moreover,
the contact with Liberia, the law of the flag, adds further
support to the application of United States law since
Liberian law adopts the non-statutory general maritime

A22 Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief

law of the United States. Title 22 of the Liberian Code
of Laws of 1956, effective March 1, 1958, as amended April
23, 1964 and effective August 18, 1964, Section 30, provides:

‘* Adoption of General American Maritime Law.—In-
sofar as it does not conflict with any other provisions
of this Title, the nonstatutory general Maritime Law
of the United States of America is hereby declared to
be and is hereby adopted as the general Maritime Law
of the Republic of Liberia.’’

The only contact with Panama is defendant’s incorpo-
ration in that country. The insignificance of this factor
is demonstrated by the anonymity of defendant’s stock-
holders. Defendant’s stock is made to bearer. In this
action, the individual stockholders have yet to file an
affidavit of ownership in which they identify themselves.’

The contact with Greece other than plaintiff’s Greek
citizenship at the time of the accident is Nereus Shipping,
a Greek corporation, the vessel’s ‘‘Operating Manager’’.
Other than contacting with Triton Shipping Company, Inc.
to act as agent for the vessel, the record is devoid of any
other activity by Nereus on behalf of the vessel other than
as a conduit between Triton and Hunter.

It is thus evident that the i -ertion of Nereus between
Triton and Hunter was for the purpose of giving the
vessel’s operation a Greek facade.

In Rhoditis, supra, the Supreme Court refused to apply
Greek law where there was more Greek contacts than here
and held at 99 S. Ct. 17341735: _

“Tf . . . the liberal purposes of the Jones Act are to
be effectuated the facade of th, operation must be

2. An officer of defendant has taken an. affidavit which states
that bas:d on information and belief that a named Greek citizen who
resides in Great Britain owns defendant’s stock. However, no affi-
davit from the alleged owner has been obtained and filed of record.

NG BS RR ewe ee oe > Oe ee EN en ey IN eee ae —————

Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief A23

considered as minor, compared with the real nature
of the operation and a cold objective look at the actual
operational contacts that this ship and this owner
have with the United States.’’

IV. CONCLUSION.

United States statutory and non-statutory maritime
law govern this action because the substantial choice of
law contacts are with the United States in that:

1. The SS ‘‘Michael L’’ and Hunter Shipping Com-
pany, S. A. are subject to United States law and the con-
trol of the Maritime Administration.

2. A United States bank extended credit to Hunter
so that Hunter could acquire ownership of the vessel.

3. A United States company was appointed by Hunter
to accept service of process on its behalf in the United
States.

; 4. A United States company was the active agent for
Hunter.

5. The charter agreements for the vessel were executed
in the United States.

6. From January, 1963 to the time of plaintiff’s acci-
dent, United States ports were regular ports of origin or
termination of the vessel’s voyages.

7. Payment for the vessel’s services, Hunter’s entire
scurce of income, were made in the United States in United
States currency.

8. Plaintiff’s accident occurred in the United States.

9. Plaintiff was originally employed by Hunter in
the United States.

Am Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief

10. Plaintiff is now and has been a permanent resident
of the United States and intends to become a citizen of the
United States.

The other choice of law factors which result in con-
tacts with Liberia, Panama, and Greece are inconsequen-
tial compared with the United States contacts.

The defendant has reaped the benefits of United States
law and United States commerce. Accordingly, it should
be required to meet the obligations of the United States
law. Moreover, the plaintiff is an individual whose well
being is now the concern of the United States. He should
be given those rights or recovery and damages provided
by United States law.

Respectfully submitted,

Morgis M. Suvuster,
Attorney for Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Release A2%5
FOR RELEASE JANUARY 17, 1973.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
DEALS WITH DELAY.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reports that it has made substantial progress in dealing
with the problem of delay in appeals of criminal cases and
has now instituted an experimental system to reduce the
delays in civil cases as well.

Bacxcrounp. Since 1961, there has been a steady an-
ual increase in case load. In 1961, there were 334 appeals
filed ; for the year ending June 30, 1972, the number rose to
1179, an increase of 253%. The current rate of increase in
filings is approximately 7% a year. Over the past two
years, the Court of Appeals has taken several steps to cope
with the situation such as:

— Reducing or eliminating oral arguments.
— Increasing the number of sittings per judge.

— Increasing by 334% the number of cases for dis-
position each argument week.

The result of these steps has been a progessive reduc-
tion in the mean average time for disposing of criminal
eases, as follows:

— For eases docketed in Fiscal Year 1970—11.5

months

— For eases dockected in Fiscal Year 1971—9.5
months
— For eases docketed in Fiscal Year 1972—7 or 8
months (est.)

a a Re ee as — a

A26 Court of Appeals Release

New Procepurgs. To further reduce the aging of cases,
the Court will soon increase the number listed for dis-
position each argument week by another 25%. Thus, the
case lists will have been increased from 15 per week, which
was the practice prior to September, 1971, to 25 per week,
or an increase of 40%.

Also, to furnish the judges with necessary time to
handle the increased case load, the Court of Appeals has
accepted the recommendation of the Federal Judicial Center
and the Advisory Judicial Appellate Council and has estab-
lished new guidelines for the publication of opinions. The
Court no longer will prepare opinions for publication in all
eases. Under a new plan, certain cases will be terminated
by orders which will be duly recorded in tables and indices
in the Federal Reporter Series. There will be no publica-
tion of dispositions which are without general significance
to the public, to the legal profession, or to the institutions
of the law. Published opinions will be limited to those
eases which establish a new rule of law, which alter or
modify an existing rule, or involve a jegal issue of con-
tinuing public interest, or which criticize existing law, or
represent a significant new contribution to the legal litera-
ture through historical review or resolution of apparent
conflict. Thus, traditional opinions will be written only in
those cases having precedental or institutional value. The
Court is confident that it will be able to handle the con-
stantly increasing case load without undue delay to the
litigants and, at the same time, carry on its important
mission as an appellate court.

A27
EXCERPT FROM APPELLANT’S BRIEF
BEFORE THIRD CIRCUIT.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Page
DR eS: his aia cat eee etek ea cdkey 8
Goodrich, Handbook on Conflict of Laws (4th Ed., 1964) ... 20
Jones Act:
4 eee a ean eens 10, 16, 22, 25
46 U. S. C. Sec. 688, 45 U. S. C. Sec. 55 ......... 10, 16, 22, 25
Liberian Code of Laws, Title 22:
GN ns Vcvcicns cadoeinonsdscueak ae 35
es ON ee ao ection te 2, 17, 22, 23
Restatement 2nd Conflict of Laws, Section 187 Com. b. (1971) 21
UE SS ks Tika bei Soescc ce ee 3

FD fe mes gets care I ee eee ener

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_1935%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
