# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 417 U.S. 951

## Text

In The

DEC 29

Supreme Court of the Hnited Shtates,,,.,

October Term, 1973

No '¥3-1315

MORNINGSIDE RENEWAL COUNCIL, INC., and
RIVERSIDE DEMOCRATS, INC.,

Petitioners,

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and TRUSTEES OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT _,

JOHN G. LIPSETT
Attorney for Petitioners
420 Lexington Avenue

New York, New York 10017

(212) 685-4294

(6932) LUTZ APPELLATE PRINTERS, INC.
Lew and Financial Printing

South River, N.J. New York, N.Y. Philedelphia, Pa. Washington, D.C.

(201) 257-6850 (212) $65-6377 (21S) 563-5587 (202) 783-7288

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Official Report of Opinion Below ............. 2
I, = Wl aida sae ty a we le Serer eee 2
Questions Presented ........-.-.---2-+----- 2
Statutes, Regulations and Other Provisions Involved .. 3
Statement of the Case .............22206. 6
Reasons for Granting the Writ:

I. A federal question of general and continuing
importance has been decided in a manner which
appears to conflict with applicable decisions of
EE a as ado in a a we ee a a ee 16

II. The decision below conflicts in an important
respect with decisions of other Courts of
Appeals concerning the scope of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and
otherwise significantly restricts the scope of
EE as Se add ae oe a ae & Oa ae eee 21

a er aa ae 25

il

Contents

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United

States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109
ke er er eee ae 12

Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316
U.S. 407, 421

er ae ee er eee 21
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir.1971) ...... 23
Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert.
i. Ge We CUED nc cee ce eee wee 22
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421
ae ra are a a eae a gon 23
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d
CU Es nw co hw we 6 ee 23
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) .. 17
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.
ka earn ee et a ee eas A rae 22, 23
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) ... . . . 17,20

Statutes Cited:

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Section
102,

ii

Contents

42. U.S.C.A. Section 4332 ......-.-
42. U.S.C.A. Section 4332(2)(c) . . - -
98 U.S.C. Section 2342 ...-..----
98 U.S.C. Section 2350 ....------

98 U.S.C. Section 1254(1) .....-.---

Other Authorities Cited:

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10:
Section 2.801 ......---+e-2-
Section 60.40 ..... 2-2 eee ees
SS? eee a ae a

ae rar eee eee ee

Se avéae acu ee ee oe ee

H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong. 2d Sess., 21-26 (1946).

S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 13-16 (1945)

17

17

PRPS PPR PT PI *

Ee Oe aT See | ’ ‘

iv
Contents
Page
Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality, 36
Federal Register 7724 ............... 6, 24
APPEN DIX
A NN ss 6-5 ow eee a we Oe ake la
Order of United States Court of Appeals ......... 18a

Initial Decision of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board . 21a

Decision of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Dated
aks re at a caning iy he aah oe 102a

Memorandum and Order ..............2.-2e6. 149,

In The

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

October Term, 1973

>
No.

MORNINGSIDE RENEWAL COUNCIL, INC., and
RIVERSIDE DEMOCRATS, INC.,

Petitioners,

US.

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and TRUSTEES OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW
YORK,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioners Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. and
Riverside Democrats, Inc. respectfully pray that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
entered in this proceeding on July 5, 1973.

r

to

: OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPINION BELOW

The official report of the majority opinion and
: dissenting opinion delivered in the Court below is found at
: 482 F.2d 234. Copies of such opinions are annexed hereto.

: JURISDICTION

The judgment sought to be reviewed was dated and
entered on July 5, 1973. A timely petition for a rehearing
was denied by order dated and entered on October 4,
1973. The same petition, treated as a petition for a
3 rehearing en banc, was denied by order dated and entered
4 on October 4, 1973, with three judges dissenting. Copies
i of such orders are annexed hereto. The statutory
provisions believed to confer on this Court jurisdiction to
review the judgment in question by writ of certiorari are
28 U.S.C. Section 2350 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

eT OR ee TTR OW

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Must the Atomic Energy Commission establish
generally applicable substantive safety criteria for research
reactors prior to the licensing and operation of Columbia
University’s nuclear reactor?

2. Must the Atomic Energy Commission prepare an
environmental impact statement pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 prior to the licensing
and operation of Columbia University’s nuclear reactor?

_

3

STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND
OTHER PROVISIONS INVOLVED

With respect to Question 1:
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations:

Section 2.801. Initiation of rule making — Rule
making may be initiated by the Commission at its
own instance, on the recommendation of another
agency of the United States, or on the petition of
any other interested person.

Section 50.40. Common standards — In
determining that a license will be issued to an
applicant, the Commission will be guided by the
following considerations:

(a) The process to be performed, the operating
procedures, the facility and equipment, the use of
the facility, and other technical specifications, or
the proposals in regard to any of the foregoing
collectively, provide reasonable assurance that the
applicant will comply with the regulations in this
Chapter, including the regulations in Part 20, and
that the health and safety of the public will not be
endangered.

(b) The applicant is technically and financially
qualified to engage in the proposed activities in
accordance with the regulations in this Chapter.

(c) The issuance of a license to the applicant will
not, in the opinion of the Commission, be inimical
to the common defense and security or to the
health and safety of the public.

ee | :

(d) Any applicable requirements of Appendix “D”
have been satisfied.

Section 50.41. Additional standards for class 104
licenses. — In determining that a class 104 license
will be issued to an applicant, the Commission will,
in addition to applying the standards set forth in
section 50.40 be guided by the following
considerations:

(a) The Commission will permit the widest amount
of effective medical therapy possible with the
amount of special nuclear material available for
such purposes.

(b) The Commission will permit the conduct of
widespread and diverse research and development.

* * *
With respect to Question 2:

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Section
102 (42 U.S.C.A. Section 4332):

Shui Patino WAN Berg erties net

The Congress authorizes and directs that to the
fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations,
and public laws of the United States shall be
: interpreted and administered in accordance with
: the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all
agencies of the Federal Government shall —

* * *

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(c) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the
responsible official on —

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term
uses of man’s environment and_ the
maintenance and enhancement of longterm
productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.

Prior to making any detailed statement, the
responsible Federal official shall consult with and
obtain the comments of any Federal Agency which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with
respect to any environmental impact involved.
Copies of such statement and the comments and
views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local
agencies, which are authorized to develop and
enforce environmental standards, shall be made

available to the President, the Council on
Environmental Quality and to the public as
provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall
accompany the proposal through the existing
agency review processes.

Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality
(36 Federal Register 7724):

The statutory clause “major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment” is to be construed by agencies with a
view to the overall, cumulative impact of the
action proposed (and of further actions
3 contemplated). Such actions may be localized in
their impact, but if there is potential that the
environment may be significantly affected, the
statement is to be prepared. Proposed actions, the
environmental impact of which is likely to be
highly controversial, should be covered in all cases.

he cs) cena ies ae Mah i HD oR be NIT TD Sa ORK A Ht SLD ha EI: catia ‘

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Sidi eatin eas sad m

Columbia University was granted a construction
permit by the Atomic Energy Commission (the
“Commission”) to build a Triga Mark II reactor on its
Morningside Heights campus in Manhattan, New York
City, on December 30, 1963. Morningside Heights is a
densely populated area, having an average of 628 persons
per net residential acre. Within a few blocks of the area,
population density approximates 1,000 persons per acre.
The median range within Manhattan is 500-600 persons.

SRP TS OS I 0 BPE, PU te rere 4

_—

Triga reactors are research reactors manufactured by a
subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation. According to
information supplied by Gulf and Columbia, 29 Triga
reactors of various descriptions are in operation, under
construction or contracted for in the United States.
Numerous other research reactors are operated by
universities and others in the United States.

The Columbia reactor was built with funds of the
National Science Foundation. The Commission has agreed
to provide funds for the fuel elements needed to operate
the reactor. The total grants from agencies of the federal
government amount to approximately $671,000.

After the reactor was built, Columbia sought an
operating license and on March 18, 1968, the Commission
gave notice of the proposed issuance of an operating
license. The petitioners requested leave to intervene in the
proceeding in April, 1968, and after a long adjournment
requested by Columbia, were granted leave to intervene in
June, 1969.

The proceeding was heard initially before an Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board, composed of three members
— Valentine B. Deale, Esq., a Washington, D.C. attorney,
Chairman; Dr. Eugene Greuling, Professor of Physics at
Duke University, and Mr. Hood Worthington, a retired
physicist from du Pont de Nemours & Co. None of these
was a Commission staff member.

At hearings in New York City in November, 1969, and
July, 1970, the petitioners’ witness, Dr. William J.
Nicholson of the School of Medicine at Mount Sinai
Hospital, New York City, proposed that a catastrophic

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accident could occur by virtue of the rupture of the
cladding of one or several fuel elements of the reactor in
air at a high temperature. He indicated a likely fission
products release fraction of 4 per cent (40,000 parts per
million) based on the results of certain Commission
sponsored tests, known as the SNAPTRAN tests. Such a
release, he testified, could give a thyroid dose of 20 rem
outside the reactor building from the rupture of one fuel
element and 1400 rem from the rupture of all 70 fuel
elements in the reactor. Such a dose compares with the
concentration of one rem or less allowable under the
standards for normal operation set by the Commission.
The Licensing Board noted that there was no questioning
the 4 per cent figure as being properly related to sucha
high temperature accident.

Dr. Nicholson urged a conservative approach to the
type of accident that should be postulated for purposes of
assuring the public safety. His approach was to postulate
an accident producing a release of radioactivity such as had
occurred under experimental conditions. This conservative
approach is similar to that which is used in evaluating the
safety of power reactors, in which the accident postulated
is one resulting in the release of appreciable quantities of
fission products. Dr. Nicholson suggested various accidents
or incidents, including sabotage and a falling aircraft, that
might result in a substantial release of fission products. His
testimony that such accidents might cause serious
consequences was consistent with the Safety Analysis
Report submitted by Columbia.

Columbia and the Commission’s Regulatory Staff, on
the other hand, proposed a less serious accident, the failure
of the cladding of a single fuel element at a lower
temperature while exposed to air. Referring to a

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_

experiment performed in 1966 by Gulf, Columbia
reported that the maximum fission product release from
this accident was 15 parts per million. In presenting this
calculation, however, Columbia failed to take into account
an earlier experiment of which it was aware conducted by
Gulf in 1960. This experiment gave a release fraction for
the same accident of 9600 parts per million. Dr. Nicholson
first exposed this inconsistency, testifying that “this
changes these calculations from a discussion of a minor
problem to that of a major catastrophe.”

It was further brought out at these hearings that the
fission products release fractions postulated by the
Regulatory Staff for purposes of safety calculation in the
case Of previously licensed Triga reactors had been
inconsistent in the extreme, ranging from 10 parts per
million to 28,000 parts per million.

On April 6, 1971, the Licensing Board issued an Initial
Decision denying authorization to issue an operating
license. While not accepting the petitioners’ proposed
accident, the Licensing Board noted the absence of
applicable substantive criteria in regard to accidents to
research reactors and ruled as follows:

“B. The absence of applicable substantive criteria
of the Commission and of convincing objective
standards of the regulatory staff — all quite
distinct from provisions at 10 CFR Part 50, such
as at sections 50.40 and 50.41 (b) — prompts the
Licensing Board to decline answering the question
of whether the health and safety of the public
would be endangered upon the occurrence of a
postulated accident to the applicant’s reactor. The
Licensing Board considers it inappropriate to

10

Ce ee eae eee

enforce an answer derived from the narrow
confines of a single proceeding and its ow
personal views about the degree to which the
health and safety of the public ought to be
protected against accident consequences.”

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On the subject of the conflict in experimental data,
the Licensing Board ruled as follows:

“C. In the Licensing Board’s opinion, the fission
3 products release fraction under postulated accident
: conditions for such a standard product as a Triga
reactor ought to be a matter of proven
determination and unquestionable validity. From
the Licensing Board’s standpoint, resolution of
existing conflict in data and ascertainment of firm
figures ought to be accomplished through a new
experiment under the auspices of the regulatory
staff. The sponsorship of such an experiment, in
the Licensing Board’s view, is within the province
of the regulatory staff in attending to the interests
of the public in the process of licensing Triga
reactors. There ought to be an end to the past
practice of the regulatory staff, which lessens its
credibility, of shifting basis in its safety evaluation
: of accident conditions from one Triga case to
another by varying the combination of postulated
; accident and fission products release fraction
4 assumed.”

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In its exceptions to the Initial Decision filed with the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, Columbia did
not take issue with these principal rulings of the Licensing
Board and indeed called upon the Commission to conduct

11

a further experiment on “‘an objective and impartial basis”’.
The Regulatory Staff filed exceptions claiming that the
operating license should have been issued. The petitioners,
while concurring in the principal rulings of the Licensing
Board, also filed exceptions to certain rulings of the
Licensing Board, including its refusal to require a NEPA
environmental impact statement. The Gulf Oil Corporation
initially stated on April 12, 1971, in a letter from Ralph H.
Peters to all U.S.A. Triga owners, that it was ‘“‘most
anxious to see that new independent experiments are
conducted as quickly as possible.”

Barely a month after writing this letter, Mr. Peters
wrote a letter to Dr. Peter A. Morris, the Director of the
Commission’s Division of Reactor Licensing, the first of an
exchange of letters signed “Ralph” and “Pete’’, in which
he advised that Gulf intended to conduct further
experiments. The letter stated: ‘‘We hope to have you or
members of your staff participate fully in these
experiments so that they will be deemed to have been
done ‘under the auspices of the Regulatory Staff’.”’ Dr.
Morris responded by advising that Robert J. Schemel of his
Division would attend the tests “tas an observer”. This
correspondence was submitted to the Appeal Board on
May 27, 1971. Dr. Morris was then advised by Mr. Peters
on May 27, 1971, that the tests would begin on June 17,
1971. The Appeal Board was then so advised. On June 14,
1971, the Appeal Board ordered a new hearing, stating
that it desired that information conceming the results of
the new experiments be included in the record as new
evidence.

On September 9, 1971, Columbia requested that the

hearing date then scheduled for October 27, 1971, be
cancelled and the proceeding held in abeyance “until there

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has been a reasonable opportunity for Columbia University
— and for any other party who may so desire — to assess
the implications of Calvert Cliffs for this proceeding and to
inform the Appeal Board of its views in connection
therewith.”” The decision referred to, Calvert Cliffs
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic
Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), held
in part that the Commission’s regulatory processes had
failed to meet NEPA requirements. The Regulatory Staff
indicated that it had no objection to this request.
Nonetheless, the request was denied by the Appeal Board
and the hearing date of October 27, 1971, was confirmed.
The petitioners, who had maintained that the evidence
already in the record mandated an environmental report,
then moved for leave to introduce further evidence from
Dr. Ernest J. Sternglass of the School of Medicine at the
University of Pittsburgh, regarding the effects of Triga
reactors on the health, safety and environment of
surrounding residents.

Hearings were held on October 27, 1971, and
February 15, 1972, before the three-member Apped
Board, which included two ranking permanent staff
members of the Commission. At these hearings Dr.
Sternglass, who previously had published papers presenting
evidence that low levels of environmental! radiation from
nuclear weapons tests, nuclear power reactors and fuel
processing facilities appear to have led to detectable rises
in childhood leukemia, chronic respiratory diseases and
infant mortality, reported his study of infant mortality
and prematurity in the neighborhood of three Triga
reactors.

_—

13

Data on infant mortality rates for the town of State
College, Penna., in which is located the Pennsylvania State
College reactor and for Lebanon City, a control city 90
miles to the east, were compared. With 1962 as a reference
equal to 100, infant mortality in State College rose to 229
in 1968 but in Lebanon City declined to 48. Moreover, in
addition to this upward trend, two clear peaks of infant
mortality occurred in State College in 1965 and 1968.
These peaks correspond to the measured peaks of total
beta activity and also of unidentified beta activity
discharged by the reactor.

In Urbana, Illinois, site of the University of Illinois
Triga reactor, infant mortality, with 1962 as a reference
equal to 100, increascd to 296 in 1963, 233 in 1964, 430
in 1965, 314 in 1966, 287 in 1967 and 151 in 1968, while
in McLean County, a control county 20 to 60 miles to the
northwest, infant mortality declined during this period.
Again, the levels of infant mortality were related to
possible increases and decreases in radioactive discharges,
in that the reactor became operative in late 1960, was
upgraded to a power of 250 kilowatts in 1965, sustained
an accidental release in 1966 and was shut down for
extensive modifications in 1968.

With respect to the Triga reactors operated by Gulf Oil
Corporation in San Diego, California, rises in infant
mortality up to 10.7% (2-'’% standard errors) took place in
San Diego County relative to California as a whole within a
year after a prototype Triga reactor went into operation,
peaking the year following the reported release of fresh
fission products from a damaged fuel element in 1963.
Following start-up of the Gulf Trigas in 1960, the rate of
infant mortality in San Diego County exceeded the rate in

ee a ee

14

California as a whole in each of nine consecutive yeos.

whereas in previous years there was no such uninterrupted
pattern.

Additional evidence was introduced at these hearings
concerning radioactive discharges from the Pennsylvania
State College Triga reactor. In the case of this reactor,
argon-41 radioactive gas is released to the environment
from the pneumatic sample changer and the dry irradiation
tubes and from the reactor pool water. No accurate
measurement of such releases has been made, although it
was brought out at the hearings that such releases were
underestimated in official reports by three to nine times in
the last five years. In addition, liquid radioactive wastes
have escaped into the environment either through
accidental leakage from the reactor pool or through
deliberate discharges from the hold-up tank which receives
the liquid waste produced in the regeneration of the
reactor pool demineralizer. Leakage from the reactor tank,
which amounted in 1970 alone to 101,180 gallons,
presumably reached the underground water system.
Except for the pool water leakage, all other liquid waste
was discharged to a storm water system. This waste
included or may have included thirteen different isotopes.
Total liquid waste release reached peaks of 3,475
microcuries in 1965, 2,292 microcuries in 1968, 11,321
microcuries in 1970 and 2,969 microcuries in 1971.

The Appeal Board, on May 18, 1972, issued a Decision
authorizing the issuance of an operating license. On the
issue of standards, the Appeal Board agreed with the
Licensing Board that there were no applicable regulations
establishing safety standards for research reactors. The
Appeal Board went on to hold, however, that the absence

— >
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_—
15

of standards would not inhibit it from passing on the
safety of the reactor “under the circumstances of this
case.” It did, nonetheless, strongly recommend that
specific standards for the evaluation of an accident
situation in a research reactor should be formulated.

The Appeal Board further held that the operation of
the reactor would not have a significant impact on the
environment and therefore a NEPA environmental
statement was not required.

In two important respects, however, the decision of
the Appeal Board indicated, in petitioners’ opinion, a
considerable potential environmental effect. First, as
pointed out in Judge Oakes’ dissenting opinion in the
Court of Appeals, the Appeal Board did not consider it
desirable to use the limits for permissible radiation doses
under normal operations for evaluating the effects of a
postulated accident in a research reactor “inasmuch as
they are unduly restrictive for that purpose”. Second, the
Appeal Board and Licensing Board found it necessary to
impose numerous conditions in order to provide
reasonable assurance that the public health and safety
would not be compromised by willful damage or
destruction and otherwise to limit radioactive releases
from the reactor. Among these conditions are limitations
on the access to keys; alarm systems for the reactor
control room, the outer reactor control room, the outer
reactor room and the reactor itself; an hourly guard
inspection of the reactor control room and outer reactor
room, facilitated by a wide-angle viewing system in each
room; sealing of the truck door in the parking area during
operation of the reactor; amendment of Columbia’s
emergency plans to assure compliance with Appendix E,

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16

10 CFR Part 50; and measures for reducing the discharg
of radioactive gas from the reactor.

By order of July 28, 1972, the Appeal Board denie under the regulatory staff’s postulated accident situa-

Perens

LYE ETS et eR PR Ag ET ee

16a

Opinion of the Court

tion “the health and safety of the public will not be «
dangered” do not take away from the proposition that ;
the event of an accident the damage would be great, 1);
fact that the Appeal Board in its decision did “not considd
it desirable to use the standards of 10 CFR Part 20 f
evaluating the effects of a postulated accident in a researd
reactor” even while it “strongly recommend[ed] that sp
cific standards for the evaluation of an accident situatioy
in a research reactor should be formulated” in and of its¢
indicates to me that there is here involved a suffciey
“potential” of environmental effect to require an imp
statement.
Moreover, ten pages of the Appeal Board decision ;
devoted to answering the testimony of appellant’s exper,
a Dr. Sternglass, relative to infant mortality rates in th
vicinity of Triga reactors at Penn State College, the Un
versity of Illinois and in San Diego where the Gulf-Ga
eral Atomic Corporation has its plant. It may be that br
Sternglass’s determinations do not have any “valid scia
tific foundation,” as the Appeal Board held. (I supp
that many thought that Rachel Carson’s thoughts and fear
expressed in Silent Spring had none either.) But does thi
mean that there is not a potential environmental eff
that at least bears examination through the preparatia
of an EIS? I should suppose that even though this is
“little” research reactor its potential environmental impa
is at least as significant as that of a federal jail, Hanly:
Kleindienst, supra, or the abandonment oi a 1.8 mile strett!
of railroad, City of New York v. United States, 337 fF.
Supp. 150, 158-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (three-judge cout)
See generally Developments in Environmental Law,
E.L.R. 50001, 50005 (1973). The finding here by the Co
mission that no impact statement is required in my ve
was arbitrary and capricious.

———

17a

Opinion of the Court

Tere an impact statement to be required the AEC could
targue that the Appeal Board’s decision amounted to
, This is so because (A) the Board relied quite heavily
, data furnished by the manufacturer contrary to the
quirements of Greene County Planning Board v. FPC,
pra, and because (B) there has not been consultation
ith other concerned federal agencies such as EPA or
EW, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).

Because I think that the AEC did not meet the require-
ents of its own Act in reversing the Safety and Licensing
ward and because I think enough potential environmental
sect was demonstrated to require the preparation of an
IS, I dissent.

| 18a

ORDER OF UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT

% spas Eiite 5 Ay

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
in and for the Second Circuit held at the United States
Court House, in the City of New York on the fourth day
of October, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-three.

Present:

(isda kasi OF Oy Ne Pe a Te he ane EN

HON. PAUL R. HAYS,
HON. WILLIAM H. MULLIGAN,

HON. JAMES L. OAKES,

eee pee One eee

Circuit Judges.
Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. and_ Riverside
Democrats, Inc.,

Petitioners- Appellants,

Docket No. 72-2093

United States Atomic Energy Commission and United
States of America,

Respondents-A ppellees,

Trustees of Columbia University of the City of New York,
Intervenor.

19a

Order of United States Court of Appeals

A petition for a rehearing having been filed herein by
counsel for the appellant,

Upon consideration thereof, it is
Ordered that said petition be and it hereby is denied.

s/ A. Daniel Fusaro
Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated term of the United States Court of
Appeals, in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United
States Court House, in the City of New York, on the
fourth day of October, one thousand nine hundred and
seventy-three.

cn eee ee Oe eae OSE HRD ODO aeereaan eae eeeceor22=? ee >

Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. and Riverside
Democrats, Inc.,

Petitioners- Appellants,
™ Docket No. 72-2093

United States Atomic Energy Commission and United
States of America,

Respondents- Appellees.

20a

Order of United States Court of Appeals

Trustees of Columbia University of the City of New York,

Intervenor.

A petition for a rehearing containing a suggestion that
the action be reheard in banc having been filed herein by
counsel for the appellant, a pollof the judges in regular
active service having been taken at the request of such a
judge, and there beisug uv majority in favor thereof,

Upon consideration thereof, it is
Ordered that said petition be and it hereby is DENIED.
Judges Mansfield, Oakes and Timbers dissent.

s/ Irving R. Kaufman

Irving R. Kaufman
Chief Judge

_—

2la

INITIAL DECISION OF
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
in the Matter of

TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK
Docket No. 50-208

ATOMIC SAFETY AND
LICENSING BOARD

Eugene Greuling

Hood Worthington

Valentine B. Deale, Chairman

PREFATORY NOTE

The Licensing Board acknowledges that much time has
elapsed between the beginning of the hearing and the
Initial Decision and believes that a word or two of
explanation is in order.

The major factor holding up the Initial Decision was
the unforeseen circumstance of competing heavy demands
on the time of two of the Licensing Board’s members,
particularly its Chairman, arising out of their commitments
in conducting other nuclear reactor licensing proceedings.
One of these proceedings, a contested one involving two
power reactor operating licenses, practically preempted the
time of the Chairman for several months. Additionally,

Initial Decision

illness of one of its members reduced the Licensing Board’s
capacity to move ahead at normal pace.

Apart from those circumstances, the present
proceeding raised certain troublesome problems for the
Licensing Board which added to the lapsed time between
the first hearing and the Initial Decision. The problems,
discussed in the Initial Decision, occasioned extended
study following the first hearing, a certification to the
Appeal Board and a request to the parties for additional
data, a second hearing, and thereafter further extended
study in the course of preparing the Initial Decision.

The foregoing considerations in no way pertain to the
deferral of the proceeding prior to the hearing for 12-%
months at the applicant’s request.

E. G.
H. W.

April 6, 1971

23a

Initial Decision

CONTENTS
OF

INITIAL DECISION

APPEARANCES IN BEHALF OF PARTIES
PRELIMINARY MATTERS (Pars. 1-13)

ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL AND OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS (Pars. 14-21)

FINDINGS OF FACT (Pars. 22-62)

Applicant’s Qualifications and Related Matters (Pars.
23-32)

Common Defense and Security (Par. 33)

Location and Characteristics of Applicant’s Reactor
and Other Data (Pars. 34-41)

Applicant’s Reactor under Normal Operation —
Radioactive Releases and Safeguards (Pars. 42-48)

Applicant’s Reactor under Accident Conditions (Pars.
49-62)

Tables I-V (following Par. 62)

Re...

24a
Initial Decision

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS PROPOSED BY
PARTIES (Par. 63) d

CONCLUSIONS (Pars. 64-70) d
ORDER (Par. 71) §

APPEAL AND REVIEW PROCEDURES (Par. 72) ;

Attachment
LICENSING BOARD’S POSITION WITH RESPECT TO —

Applicant’s Proposed Findings and Conclusions i

Regulatory Staff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

Findings and Conclusions of Mrs. Mary Hays Weik (

Proposed Findings of Fact of Morningside Renewal
Council, Inc. and Riverside Democrats, Inc.

Proposed Conclusions of Law of Morningside Renewal
Council, Inc. and Riverside Democrats, Inc. I

25a
Initial Decision

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
In the Matter of
TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA Docket No. 50-208
UNIVERSITY IN THE
CITY OF NEW YORK

INITIAL DECISION

APPEARANCES IN BEHALF OF PARTIES

Bennett Boskey, Esq., in behalf of Trustees of
Columbia University in the City of New York, Applicant;

Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq., Neil J. Newman, Esq., and

Thomas F. Engelhardt, Esq., in behalf of the Regulatory
Staff of the United States Atomic Energy Commission;

Mrs. Mary Hays Weik, Intervenor, pro se;

Justus C. Poole in behalf of Morningside Renewal
Council, Inc., Intervenor; and

John G. Lipsett, Esq., in behalf of Riverside
Democrats, Inc., Intervenor.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS
1. The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of

New York (applicant) filed with the Commission an
application, dated May 6, 1963, for a permit to construct a

alii leh aie.

26a

Initial Decision

Triga Mark II nuclear reactor on Columbia University’s
campus in the Morningside Heights area of New York City.
Following review by the Commission’s regulatory staff of
the application and of amendments thereto including
responses to inquiries of the regulatory staff, Construction
Permit No. CPRR-78 was issued to the applicant on
December 30, 1963. By letter amendment of February 3,
1967, to its original application, the applicant sought an
operating license and, at that time and later in due course,
it furnished to the regulatory staff data relating to the
proposed operation of its facility. On March 18, 1968, the
Commission gave notice of the proposed issuance of an
operating license; its notice was published in the Federal
Register on March 26, 1968 (33 F.R. 5021).

2. Among other matters, the notice provided that
within 30 days from the date of publication, any person
whose interests might be affected by the issuance of the
proposed license could file a petition for leave to intervene
in accordance with the requirements of the Commission’s
Rules of Practice. Mrs. Mary Hays Weik, Morningside
Renewal Council, Inc. (Morningside) and Riverside
Democrats, Inc. (Riverside) sought to intervene in the
proceeding. Other expressions of interest were received.
The Commission’s regulatory staff filed an answer to the
three requests to intervene, taking the position it would
not object to the granting of intervention. The applicant
filed no response. On May 24, 1968, the applicant filed
with the Commission a request that the Commission defer
consideration of its pending application for an operating
license. On June 10, 1969, the applicant requested the
Commission to resume consideration of the application.

27a

Initial Decision

3. On June 25, 1969, the Commission issued a notice
of hearing. This notice, published in the Federal Register
on June 28, 1969 (34 F.R. 10011), provided for a public
prehearing conference and hearing in New York City,
permitted Mrs. Weik, Morningside and Riverside to
intervene, defined the issues for consideration at the
hearing, and established this Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board (Licensing Board) to conduct the proceeding.

4. On July 30, 1969, the Licensing Board, for its own
orientation purposes, visited the location of the reactor
and surrounding premises. The parties were given notice of
this tour by the board and were invited to accompany it
on the occasion. Representatives of the applicant and the
regulatory staff and intervenor Mrs. Weik did so.

5. On the following day, July 31, the prehearing
conference was held. After giving consideration to the
earlier application of Riverside for a postponement of the
scheduled hearing date and the comments thereon by the
other parties, the Licensing Board rescheduled the hearing
from August 19, as set out in the notice of hearing, to
September 23. The Licensing Board requested the
following items, all of which it subsequently received: a
consolidated safety analysis report from the applicant and
its operating procedures, the regulatory staff’s evaluation
thereof, financial liability and indemnity information from
the regulatory staff, and the views of the parties
concerning the relevance in the proceeding of radiological
safety factors involved in the transportation of radioactive
material to and from the subject facility. In keeping with
prehearing conference procedure, the Licensing Board
re-identified the issues to be considered by it at the hearing
and determined which of the same were in controversy. It

ee

28a

Initial Decision

confirmed that pulse mode was well as steady state
: operation was within the scope of the hearing and noted
questions and areas of particular interest to it for
development by the parties at the hearing. The Licensing
Board also addressed itself to limited appearance requests
and procedural matters relating to the conduct of the
hearing. The Licensing Board issued a memorandum on
August 20, 1969, embracing the prehearing considerations
noted herein.

6. By letter of September 8, Riverside requested a
further postponement of the hearing. By a request of the
same date, the Director Office of Radiation Control,
Department of Health, City of New York, also sought a
postponement of the hearing. In addition, the Licensing
Board determined that there had been inadequate public
notice regarding the opportunity afforded interested
persons to make a limited appearance (there was nothing
on the subject in the initial notice of hearing or later order
changing the date of hearing). In view of the foregoing, the
Licensing Board on September 12 rescheduled the hearing
to begin on November 18, 1969, and saw to it that the
official announcement of the new hearing date in the
Federal Register included information concerning limited
appearances (34 F.R. 14616, September 19, 1969). The
hearing then took place in New York City as rescheduled,
continuing for three days —— November 18, 19, and 20,
1969.

7. There were thirty-two limited appearances pursuant
to section 2.715(a) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice.
This section provides that a person who is not a party may,
in the discretion of the presiding officer, be permitted to
make a limited appearance by making an oral or written

-

29a

Initial Decision

statement of his position on the issues. The purpose of
limited appearances is to enable members of the public
who are not parties to the proceeding to bring their views
and concerns to the attention of the parties and the
Licensing Board so that such views and concerns, though
they do not constitute formal evidence, may be given
appropriate consideration in the course of the evidentiary
hearing.

8. Of the thirty-two persons making limited
appearances, thirty indicated opposition to Columbia
University operating a reactor on its Morningside Heights
campus. Of the opponents six were members or
members-elect of federal, state and city legislative bodies
representing people living in the immediate area of the
reactor or nearby. These political officials were United
States Representatives William F. Ryan (20th Cong. Dist.,
N.Y., represented at the hearing by Mrs. Jean Faust) and
Edward I. Koch (17th Cong. Dist., N.Y., represented at the
hearing by Peter Bernuth);State Senator Basil A. Paterson,
27th Senatorial District, New York City; State
Assemblyman Franz S. Leichter, 69th District, New York
City; and New York City Councilmen-elect Carter Burden
(4th District — who forwarded his views by telegram) and
Eldon R. Clingan (At-large, Manhattan — who forwarded
his views by letter).

9. Representatives of four neighborhood organizations
asserted the opposition of their organizations to Columbia
University’s application for an operating license: Mrs.
Edith Bach, Social Worker, Midwest Side Neighborhood
Health Council; Robert W. Hedges, Chairman,
Morningsiders United; Mrs. Naomi Patterson, President,

_ —_—_

30a

Initial Decision

Parents Association P. S. 36-125 (represented at the
hearing by Mrs. Ports); and Miss Marie M. Runyon,
Chairman, Morningside Tenants’ Committee.

10. Residents of the community, including Columbia
University students at graduate level, also spoke as private
individuals against the proposed operating license. These
persons included Mrs. Mary Boyd ( who also presented her
views to the Licensing Board by letter), Miss Glenda
Cimino, John W. Grifalconi (who supplemented his oral
statement with two exhibits), Dr. Janet Karlson, Mrs. Ann
Margetson, Stonewall Jackson McMurray, III, Mrs. Pamela
Rich, and Miss Deborah Solomon (who supplemented her
oral statement with a later letter to the Licensing Board).
Melvin Morgulis, Jeff Newman, and Robert Lee Smith also
voiced their opposition to the proposed operating license.

11. Others who made known their opposition to the
applicant’s position by means of a letter or telegram to the
Licensing Board were Mrs. Anna M. Bennett, Dr. and Mrs.
Michael Bender, Robert M. Ginsberg, George H. Hickerson,
Mr. and Mrs. Michael McKeen, Dr. Robert J. Von Gutfeld,
and Edward H. Wright.

12. The remaining two persons among the count of
those making limited appearances were Miss Mary Ann
Sweeney, a third year Columbia University student, and
Hanson Blatz, Director, Office of Radiation Control, New
York City Department of Health. Miss Sweeney confined
her oral statement to telling of the difficulty which she
and another person had in gaining entrance to the hearing.
Mr. Blatz’s prepared statement, which included an
explanation of the safety precautions followed in

3la

Initial Decision

transporting radioactive material through New York City,
concluded that there is no reason for the government of
New York City to object to the operation of Columbia
University’s reactor as planned.

13. Principal contentions of the limited appearers
opposing the proposed license are set forth below, together
with comments thereon by the Licensing Board:

a. Contention: The community in the vicinity of
the reactor site is unwilling to accept the risks,
whatever they might be, of having a nuclear reactor in
its midst, particularly in the absence of suitable
consultation by the applicant with the community and
in the absence of compensating benefits to itself. The
situation is aggravated by the applicant’s record in
dealing with the interests of the community and also
by the fact that the location of the reactor on the
Morningside Heights campus is simply for the
convenience of teaching but a dozen or so students.

Comment: The responsibility of the Licensing
Board is to adjudicate issues set out in the notice of
hearing. Other issues, which may be decisive to other
authorities or interests, are beyond the Licensing
Board’s regard. It has no occasion to determine the
sentiment of the neighboring community toward the
proposed license or to weigh the benefits or lack
thereof which the community may derive from the
proposed operation of the reactor. Nor is the
proceeding a trial of the applicant’s public relations
policies and practices toward its neighbors.

32a

Initial Decision

b. Contention: The hazard to public health and
safety in transporting radioactive material in the City
of New York, especially in the area of the reactor site,
is enough to preclude justification of licensing the
reactor.

Comment: The concern about the possibility of
serious accidents in transporting radioactive material in
the streets of New York City is irrelevant to the
proceeding, not because of the nature of the subject
matter but rather because of a division of
responsibility between the Atomic Energy Commission
and the Department of Transportation. The latter has
jurisdiction over the transportation of radioactive
materials and over safety regulations with respect
thereto; the former does not. As an arm of the
Commission, the Licensing Board must confine its
determinations to matters within the scope of the
Commission’s authority. Thus, in the present case, the
Licensing Board focuses on radiological health and
safety factors bearing upon the operation of the
reactor at the reactor site. Nevertheless, for the
information of the public, the Licensing Board both
permitted and arranged for data to be included in the
record bearing upon safety questions and safety
measures relating to the transportation of radioactive
material to and from the reactor site. Information
about the infrequency of such anticipated
transportation was also included in the record.

c. Contention: The proceeding itself is weighted in
favor of granting the license, as evidenced by the
following: (i) AEC’s promotional role is in conflict

33a

Initial Decision

with its regulatory responsibilities; (ii) earlier AEC
permission to build the reactor practically forecloses
AEC now from denying an operating license; and (iii)
notice to the public about the hearing is inadequate,
the Federal Register being a largely unread and
generally unobtainable publication.

Comment: This contention attacks the licensing
system and implicates the underlying law and
regulations. The Congress can act on the statutory
basis for the licensing system; the Commission can act
on the regulations implementing the governing
statutory law; the Licensing Board can act on neither.
With respect to (i), the broad political controversy of
whether it is desirable to permit an agency at one and
the same time to be a promoter and a regulator has
persisted through several decades of development in
administrative law. The controversy, while an
appropriate matter for a legislative body to consider if
it so chooses, is clearly beyond the province of the
Licensing Board. With respect to (ii), the Initial
Decision itself is reply enough. With respect to (iii), the
official status of the Federal Register as a legal vehicle
of notice, and its circulation, are matters outside the
Commission’s authority. In addition to notices placed
in the Federal Register, the Commission, in accordance
with its regular practice, distributed to the news media
public announcements of its own regarding the
proposed licensing and related hearing matters
associated with this proceeding. The participation
herein of two citizens associations and an individual as
intervenors and of 32 others as limited appearers
indicates a degree of effectiveness of the notices
undertaken by the Commission.

34a’

Initial Decision

d. Contention: Operation of the reactor in the
Terrace Building involves serious risk of radiological
hazards to a densely populated area, including a
residential community, both from the planned usage of
the reactor and from accident circumstances, including
those from external causes.

Comment: The contention relates directly to basic
issues in this proceeding which are adjudicated by the
Licensing Board in this Initial Decision.

e. Contention: There is little or no knowledge
about the effects of adding radioactive pollutants to an
already heavily polluted atmosphere. The potentid
danger from the emission of Argon-41 from the stacks
has not been adequately assessed. The AEC standands
are not sufficient.

Comment: The AEC standards governing limits of
permissible exposure to radiation are based on
recommendations which had been developed by the
Federal Radiation Council and approved by the
President. In the absence of substantial, authoritative
data to the contrary, expressions of dissatisfaction
with the standards and general allegations aimed 2
raising doubts about them are not sufficient to move
the Licensing Board to seek their re-examination. For
further statement and references, see last paragraph
beginning on page two, Attachment D.

35a

Initial Decision

ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL AND
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

14. Following the three days of hearing and following
the completion of the customary post-hearing filings in the
middle of January 1970, the Licensing Board, after
extended study of the full record, concluded that it
required advice concerning certain AEC regulations and
standards and also, additional factual information.
Accordingly, on April 6, it certified two questions to the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (Appeal
Board) and requested the parties to submit specified
additional data. The two certified questions were as
follows:

Is the applicant’s reactor a “testing facility”
according to the defintion at 10 CFR Section
50.2(r)(1)?

If a substantial meltdown of the core with
subsequent release of appreciable quantities of
fission products is not the type of major accident
which should be hypothesized for purposes of site
analysis, then what sort of an accident should be
hypothesized for such purposes in the present
proceeding —— wherein a Triga Mark II reactor is
proposed to be operated in the midst of a densely
populated community?

The additional data requested of the parties pertained to
the following: whole body and thyroid dosages at specified
locations under hypothesized accident conditions; details
of experiments forming the basis of certain calculations of

36a

Initial Decision

the applicant bearing upon fission product releases under
accident conditions; reports concerning applicant’s
operation of the reactor at Industrial Reactor
Laboratories; AEC records of accidental fission product
releases at Triga reactors; public health and safety
considerations associated with the location of the
applicant’s reactor above an old water course and its
proximity to the Croton aqueduct system; operating
procedures for protecting the reactor against industrial
sabotage or damage or destruction as a result of civil
disturbance; use of COg2 instead of air in the reactor’s
beam tubes; operating procedures for opening and closing
the ventilation system; possible new amendments to the
applicant’s Safety Analysis Report and its operating
procedures; underlying supports for emergency
procedures; extent of applicant’s control, possession or use
of unlicensed radioactive material or unlicensed sources of
radiation within the vicinity of the reactor site; and
proposed amendment to operating license to give specific
acknowledgementof brief pulsing to high power peaks.

15. In light of the responses which it received from the
Appeal Board and the parties, the Licensing Board by
order of June 16 reopened the hearing for limited
purposes. At the reopened hearing in New York City on
July 10, the Licensing Board received further evidence and
arguments from the parties on specific subjects which it
had identified in its June 16 order. The submission by the
parties of amended proposed findings and conclusions and
also of supplemental factual data and comment wa
completed shortly before the end of September 1970.

37a

Initial Decision

16. During the three days of hearing in November
1969, the applicant’s witnesses supporting the
quthorization of an operating license were: Ralph H.
Peters, Manager, Triga Reactor Program, Gulf General
Atomic Incorporated; Marvin E. Wyman, Ph.D. (nuclear
physics), Chairman, Nuclear Engineering, University of
Illinois; Warren F. Goodell, Ph.D. (physics), Vice President
for Administration of Columbia University and member of
the University’s Radiation Safety Committee and its
Reactor Safety Committee; William W. Havens, Ph.D.
(physics), Director of the Division of Nuclear Science and
Engineering of the School of Engineering and Applied
Science of Columbia University; and Michael G. Woram,
Columbia University’s Reactor Supervisor. At the
continued hearing on July 10, 1970, Dr. Havens and
Messrs. Peters and Woram gave further testimony in behalf
of the applicant and Leon J. Lidofsky, Ph.D. (physics),
Chairman of Columbia University’s Reactor Safety
Committee, also testified in support of the proposed

17. Witnesses for the regulatory staff, which supported
the proposed license, gave testimony at both the
November 1969 and July 1970 hearing sessions. Those
members of the staff providing testimony at the earlier
hearing session were Robert J. Schemel, Chief, Operating
Reactor Branch No. 1, AEC Division of Reactor Licensing;
Thomas P. Flood, Reactor Engineer, Operating Reactor
Branch No. 1, AEC Division of Reactor Licensing; Floyd
Cantrell, Reactor Inspector, AEC Division of Compliance;
Richard B. Chitwood, Chief, Irradiated Fuel Branch, AEC
Division of Materials Licensing; and Charles A. Lovejoy,
Staff Accountant, Office of the Controller, AEC

38a

Initial Decision

(testimony by affidavit upon consent of parties and the
Licensing Board). Members of the regulatory staff
providing testimony at the July 10, 1970, hearing were
Messrs. Schemel, Flood and Cantrell, and also Anthony T.
Cardone, Geologist, Site, Environmental and Radiation
Safety Group. AEC Division of Reactor Licensing.

18. The three intervenors produced the following
witnesses. At the hearings on November 18-20, 1969, Mrs.
Mary Hays Weik, a newspaper woman, testified in her own
behalf, and at the hearing on July 10, 1970, Mrs. Weik
again testified and John W. Grifalconi, a city planner and
architect, who had previously made a limited appearance,
also testified as a witness in support of Mrs. Weik’s general
position. Riverside Democrats, Inc., with whom
Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. joined in the
presentation of, in effect, a single case of opposition to the
proposed license, had one witness at each of the hearing
sessions, namely, William J. Nicholson, Ph.D. (physics),
Assistant Professor of Community Medicine at Mount
Sinai School of Medicine, New York City. In addition,
there was introduced into the record at the first of the two
hearing sessions as part of the case of Riverside Democrats,
Inc. (and also of Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. by
adoption) the written statement of Martin Sonenberg,
M.D., Chief of the Division of Endocrinology of the
Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research.

19. The issues for consideration by the board as
prescribed by the Commission in the notice of hearing are:

a. Whether there is reasonable assurance (i) that
operetion of the reactor at not in excess of 250

39a

Initial Decision

kilowatts (thermal) under the conditions and
limitations proposed can be conducted without
endangering the health and safety of the public, and
(ii) that such operation will be conducted in
compliance with the rules and regulations of the
Commission;

b. Whether the applicant is technically and
financially qualified to engage in the activities as
authorized by the operating license in accordance with
the rules and regulations of the Commission;

c. Whether issuance of the license to operate the
facility under the terms and conditions proposed will
be inimical to the common defense and security or to
the health and safety of the public.

20. At the prehearing conference it was determined
that among the parties, including the intervenors, only a
part of the three issues were in controversy. The applicant
and the regulatory staff on the one hand and the three
intervenors on the other hand confined their disagreement
to those parts of the first and third issues above (a and c)
relating to the health and safety of the public. There was
no contest then about the applicant’s compliance with the
Commission’s rules and regulations, about the applicant’s
technical and financial qualifications, or about the
common defense and security issue. However, in their
proposed findings and conclusions, Riverside and
Momingside contested every issue with the applicant and
the regulatory staff except the applicant’s financial
qualifications. At the prehearing conference, intervenor
Mrs. Weik controverted the applicant and the regulatory

as i lee bh = Ue

40a
Initial Decision

staff on the health and safety issues alone; in her proposed
findings and conclusions following the November 18-20,
1969 hearings, she also addressed herself to the applicant’s
financial qualifications.

21. The proceeding is a “contested”’ one within the
meaning of section 2.4(n) of the Commission’s Rules of
Practice and the Commission’s procedures applicable to
contested proceedings (Section VI, Appendix A, Rules of
Practice) are guidelines for the Licensing Board.

FINDINGS OF FACT

22. The record of this proceeding contains detailed
information about the applicant’s reactor, associated
facilities and arrangements for the reactor’s operations.
The information embraces factual, analytical and expert
opinion data as to such related subjects as the site of the
reactor, safety features provided in the reactor’s design,
safeguards to prevent accidents and to limit their effect,
evaluations of various hypothetical accidents, operating
procedures, and financial and technical qualifications of
the applicant. Significant data in the record, or the absence
thereof, bearing upon the Licensing Board’s conclusions
with respect to the issues set out in the notice of hearing
are indicated in this section.

Applicant’s Qualifications
and Related Matters _

23. The applicant is a non-profit, educationa
institution incorporated under the laws of the State of
New York. As of June 30, 1969, the applicant’s assets

4la

Initial Decision

totaled $490 million, of which $160 million represented
land, buildings, and equipment, and $279 million,
investments. Income for the year ended June 30, 1969
totaled $151 million; expenditures, $160 million.

24. The estimated operating costs of the applicant’s
reactor for the 1970-1971 year (exclusive of overhead
which is budgeted separately) amounts to approximately
$54 thousand. Such costs would be paid out of the
applicant’s general operating funds. Research costs
associated with the use of the reactor would be met by
other funds, grants and contracts. The Commission, under
its Nuclear Education Training Program, has entered into
an agreement with Columbia University under which funds
have been granted to the University for fabrication of fuel
and all use and other charges for the Commission-owned
special nuclear material required by the applicant’s reactor
have been waived.

25. Because the proposed license is for the conduct of
educational activities by a non-profit, educational
institution, the applicant’s commitment of its own assets
against possible public liability losses attendant to a
nuclear accident involving the subject reactor is effectively
limited to $250,000 —— an amount which can be covered
by nuclear accident liability insurance. For public liability
losses in excess of this amount to an aggregate of $500
million, the United States Government, under Section
170k of the Atomic Energy Act, agrees to indemnify and
hold harmless the licensee and other persons as their
interests may appear.

—

26. The applicant’s contractor, Gulf General Atomic
Incorporated, designed, manufactured and installed the
subject reactor. Gulf General Atomic has extensive
experience in a wide range of activities in the fields of
nuclear research, development, and manufacture. Its
research resulting in the development of Triga reactors
dates back to 1957 and its experience with Triga reactors
since then has been continuing and comprehensive. In his _
testimony, the manager of the company’s Triga reactor |
program reported that his company’s experience includes
the operation of three Triga reactors at its laboratories in
San Diego, California. Two of these have been operating
for several years at steady state power levels of 1500 kw,
or six times the steady state power level of the applicant’s
Triga, and two have been pulsed for a total of over 18,000
times with maximum fuel temperatures of about 450

degrees centigrade.

42a

Ini tial Decision

27. For fuel loading and startup, Gulf General Atomic
will send to the applicant a startup engineer thoroughly
familiar with Triga reactors and after he and his electronics
‘ expert aide have double checked the _ installation
completed by previous members of a Gulf General Atomic
installation team and after the AEC inspectors are satisfied
with all systems, fuel loading and reactor startup will be
performed in accordance with detailed procedures
prepared by Gulf General Atomic and accepted by the
AEC. Such procedures, according to the testimony, have
been in effect for ten years and during that time have been
followed in the course of all Triga reactor startups. Once
the subject facility is demonstrated to operate
satisfactorily, Gulf General Atomic then will turn it over
to the applicant.

43a

Initial Decision

28. The applicant’s Triga Mark II reactor is part of the
nuclear engineering program supervised by the Division of
Nuclear Science and Engineering of the Faculty of
Engineering. The Director of the Division is responsible for
all of the programs in nuclear science and engineering in
the applicant’s Engineering School. Under current
planning, two licensed senior reactor operators are to be
directly responsible for the operation of the reactor ——
one, the Reactor Director who has the rank of professor
with a background of experience in atomic energy since
1941, and the other, the Reactor Supervisor, who is a
full-time nonacademic staff member with reactor
operation experience. Both will be licensed operators
under AEC rules and regulations.

29. Independent surveillance of the _ reactor’s
operations within the applicant’s organization will be the
responsibility of its Reactor Safety Committee —— a group
of persons with distinguished technical background ——
appointed by the President of the University. The
Committee is scheduled to review the formulation of and
the adherence to appropriate rules and procedures to
insure safe operation of the subject reactor. In particular,
the Committee will (a) review and approve experimental
programs prior to execution, (b) review and approve all
changes in existing experimental plans involving any
changes in the reactor core, core loading, control rods, or
shielding components, and (c) insure that all activities and
experiments conform with all applicable government
‘regulations and licenses in regard to the operation of the
reactor facility, handling special nuclear materials, and
possession and handling of activated by-product material.

44a
Initial Decision

30. The University’s Health Physicist will assign to the
reactor installation members of his staff as needed to
handle radiation monitoring problems in aid of the
University’s Radiation Safety Committee —— a committee
approved by and reporting to the University President with
respect to general problems of radiation hazards at the
University.

31. The applicant has prepared written operating
procedures for its reactor and the regulatory staff has
reviewed these procedures in light of the requirement in
the Technical Specifications that there shall be written
instructions in effect for, but not limited to, the following
subject: (a) checkout and calibration of reactor operating
instrumentation and control, control rod drives, and area
radiation monitors and air particulate monitors, (b) reactor
startup, routine operation and reactor shutdown, (c)
emergency and abnormal conditions, including evacuation,
re-entry and recovery, (d) fuel loading or unloading, (e)
control rod removal or replacement, and (f) maintenance
operations which may affect reactor safety. The regulatory
staff found that the applicant’s procedures carry out the
requirements of the proposed license. Certain suggestions
of the regulatory staff with respect to amending or
augmenting the procedures have been taken care of by the
applicant and other limited recommendations are suitable
for implementation, as the regulatory staff sees fit, prior to
the issuance of an operating license.

32. Subsequent to the first hearing and prior to the
second hearing, on May 21, 1970, the Commission
published for public comment certain proposed
amendments to 10 CFR Part 50. The _ proposed

a

_—

45a

Initial Decision

amendments provided that information required of an
applicant for a construction permit or an operating license
concerning plans for coping with an emergency be in
accordance with a proposed new Appendix E to 10 CFR
Part 50, entitled “Emergency Plans for Production and
Utilization Facilities.” Later, the proposed amendment
with limited modifications was adopted by the
Commission, becoming effective January 23, 1971. The
record shows that the applicant developed its emergency
procedures following discussions with, among others, the
Director, Office of Radiation Control, Department. of
Health of New York City; the Security Office of Columbia
University; the Chief in Charge of Fire Prevention, New
York City Fire Department; and the Chief, Nuclear
Facilities Section, Environmental Surveillance and Control
Program, National Center for Radiological Health,
Department of HEW. The record also shows that the
method for evacuating the reactor building and other
buildings is based on the fire evacuation plan of Columbia
University and that following notification of civil
authorities of an emergency, the plans and emergency
procedures of the civil authorities will be followed.
According to the regulatory staff at the second hearing,
the applicant’s emergency procedures met the intent of the
then proposed amendment to 10 CFR Part 50 with regard
to plans for coping with emergencies.

Common Defense
and Security

33. The record contains no evidence that the interests
of common defense and security are involved in the
proposed operation of the applicant’s reactor. The
activities which would be covered by the proposed

2
N On

46a

Initial Decision

operating license will be within the jurisdiction of the
United States. The principal officers of the administration
of Columbia University are all United States citizens,
There is no suggestion that the applicant is owned,
controlled, or dominated by a foreign party. The record
contains no classified information and the applicant has
agreed to safeguard in accordance with Commission
regulations any Restricted Data which might become
involved. Further, no problem is indicated with respect to
the need for military uses of special nuclear material
required for the proposed facility and, as regards the
safeguarding of special nuclear material which it obtains,
the applicant will be required to comply with applicable
Commission regulations.

Location and Characteristics
of Applicant’s Reactor and
Other Data

34. The applicant’s reactor is housed in the basement
of a four-story building (three stories above ground)
known as the Terrace Building. The Terrace Building is
located in the block of Columbia University campus
bounded by College Walk, 120th Street, Amsterdam
Avenue, and Broadway. This block is in the midst of the
residential community Morningside Heights, Borough of
Manhattan, New York City. Morningside Heights is a
densely populated area, having an average of 628 persons
per net residential acre. In a few blocks of the Morningside
Heights area, population density approximates 1,000
persons per acre. By way of comparison, the median range
within Manhattan is 500-600 persons per net residential
acre.

47a

Initial Decision

35. From a geological standpoint, the site of the
reactor is over bedrock with no history of surface ground
displacement which might be expected to cause damage to
the reactor. The site, being approximately 100 feet above
the level of the nearby Hudson River, is free from danger
of flooding as a result of a rising of the river. The reactor
site is on the side of a hill. No flooding of the storm sewers
in the area has occurred in the past fifty years.

86. The applicant’s reactor is a research reactor. It is a
Triga Mark II reactor designed by Gulf General Atomic
Incorporated, formerly the General Atomic Division of the
General Dynamics Corporation. It is a heterogeneous
pool-type reactor cooled by water, moderated by
zirconium hydride and water, and designed to be operated
in a steady state condition at power levels up to 250 kw. It
also incorporates the capability to conduct experiments
involving rapid insertions of excess reactivity which result
in split second pulses at peak powers of approximately
250,000 kw. The reactor core is to be located near the
bottom of a concrete-aluminum lined tank, 6.5 feet in
diameter by 20.5 feet deep, and will be covered by
approximately 16 feet of water. Surrounding the core is a
l-foot thick graphite reflector, water and a minimum of 8
feet 2 inches of concrete. Experimental facilities include 4
horizontal beam ports, a graphite thermal column, a
pneumatic transfer system, a central thimble, and a bulk
shielding facility.

37. The core utilizes solid fuel elements in which the
zirconium hydride moderator is homogeneously combined
with 20% enriched uranium. The reactor loading will have
a maximum excess reactivity of 2.45% delta k/k above the

48a

Initial Decision

cold, clean, critical condition. A core composed of this
type of fuel element has a demonstrated negative prompt
temperature coefficient of reactivity. The reactor’s peaked
power pulse is limited to an energy release which results in
fuel temperatures less than 400° centigrade. The
experimental program for the reactor is so designed that
the maximum reactivity insertion for pulsed operation is
1.5% delta k/k. A mechanical stop assures that this
limitation will not be exceeded. The design incorporates
four instrumentation channels to monitor and indicate on
the control console the neutron flux, power level, and the
rate of change of the flux. Three control rods with a total
worth of about 5.4% delta k/k are provided to control the
power level. In addition, a system of interlocks, radiation
monitors and alarms has been provided.

38. The distinctive safety characteristic of the
applicant’s reactor is the negative prompt temperature
coefficient associated with Triga reactors. Because of this

_ characteristic, safe operation of the reactor is assured oy

the very nature of the fuel material which limits its power
output to safe levels. The Triga reactor is distinguished
from other research reactors, which secure safety of
operation entirely through administrative and engineered
safeguards (such as mechanical and electronic safety
devices). Research reactors, in turn, are vastly different
from power reactors in that the latter generally relate to
power levels thousands of times the power levels of
research reactors, which produce no electric power and are
operated solely as sources of nuclear radiation.

39. The fuel material for the applicant’s Triga is 2
mixture of uranium and zirconium hydride. The uranium
is enriched with 20% of the fissionable isotope

49a

Initial Decision
uranium-235. This mixture is incapable of nuclear

explosion. It is capable of sustaining a chain reaction at the
low power levels useful in research reactors.

40. The Licensing Board asked the regulatory staff to
furnish a summary of contents of the AEC records of each
accidental release of fission products at a Triga reactor,
including time, place, model of reactor, its operation
licensee, extent of release and its cause, amount of damage
or injury, if any, and remedial action. In response to the
Licensing Board’s request, the regulatory staff introduced
into the record data identifying nine accidental releases of
fission products at Triga reactors since November 1963.
According to the data, all of the releases were within
licensed limits, none resulted in concentration in
unrestricted areas in excess of 10 CFR Part 20 limits for
continuous exposure, and none of the occurrences resulted
in facility damage of personnel injuries. Domestic locations
of Triga reactors under AEC operating licenses! with
steady state power levels from 250 kw (same as
applicant’s) to 1500 kw, are: Aerojet-General Corp., San
Ramon, California; Armed Forces Radiobiology Research
Institute, Bethesda, Maryland; Gulf General Atomic, Inc.

1. The following information is a matter of public record:
Except for the present matter, the issuance of an AEC operating
license for any reactor in the research reactor category (which
includes Trigas) has never been the subject of a prior public hearing
and review by an atomic safety and licensing board. The reason is
that in the history of atomic safety and licensing boards no one
before now has ever formally contested the issuance of an operating
license for a research reactor. As of December 31, 1970, there were
AEC licenses in effect for 72 operating research reactors of which 22
were Trigas.

7

50a

Initial Decision

(3), San Diego, California; Kansas State University,
Manhattan, Kansas; Michigan State University, Lansing,
Michigan; Northrop Corporate Laboratories, Hawthome,
California; Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon;
Pennsylvania State University, University Park,
Pennsylvania; Reed Institute, Portland, Oregon; US.
Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, Jefferson
County, Colorado; Universities of —— California (2) at
Berkeley and Irvine, Illinois at Urbana, Texas at Austin,
and Wisconsin at Madison; and Washington State
University at Pullman. The remaining four Trigas under
AEC operating licenses all have authorized steady state
power levels of less than 250 kw. .

41. The inspector from the AEC Division of
Compliance assigned to the applicant’s reactor reported at
the November 1969 hearings that AEC inspections had
made ten inspections of the applicant’s reactor,
surrounding facilities, and associated procedures and found
compliance by the applicant with its safety commitments
in the building of the reactor. Those items which were
incomplete were identified and were regarded as items
understandably incomplete at the given stage of
construction. The regulatory staff identified no safety
problem which it considered to be unresolved.

Applicant’s Reactor under
Normal Operation —— Radioactive
Releases and Safeguards

42. Normal operation of the applicant’s reactor is of
two types, namely, steady state operation and pulse mode
operation. Whereas the text of the proposed license refers

-

Sla

Initial Decision

only to the former type of opération, the latter type is
provided for in the Technical Specifications of the
applicant’s reactor which are incorporated into the
proposed license by reference. Steady state operation
involves positioning the reactor control rods so that the
reactor power is kept at levels not in excess of 250 kw for
indefinite lengths of time. Pulse mode operation involves
the rapid withdrawal of a single rod. In this mode of
operation, a peak power level of approximately 250,000
kw can be attained for a very short length of time (several
one-thousandths of a second). In the pulse mode of
operation, the peak power is limited by the inherent
nuclear characteristics of the reactor, i.e., the higher fuel
temperatures cause self-termination of the transient.
Although the rate of energy generation (power) during a
pulse is high; the total energy generated is relatively small,
because of the short time involved. Further, the regulatory
staff calculated that if the applicant were to operate the
reactor repetitively in the pulse mode, the resultant fission
product inventory (in terms of curies) would be less than if
the reactor had been operated continuously at 250 kw for
the same overall length of time.

43. As a result of normal operation of the reactor,
radioactive gases, liquids and solids are produced. Of the
gases released in normal operation, the most important
from the standpoint of potential hazard is Argon-41. This
gas is generated in air-filled beam holes in or near the core
of the reactor. If all the beam holes were full of air and all
were simultaneously discharged immediately after the
reactor had run steadily at 250 kw, the consequence would
be a brief rise of the radioactivity in the stack to about 4.5
times the maximum concentration of Argon-41 permissible
for continuous discharge under 10 CFR 20.106(a) and 10

Initial Decision

CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 1. The applicant
recognizes the desirability of minimizing the discharge of
radioactivity and intends either to fill the beam holes with
carbon dioxide, helium or other gas that presents no such
activation problem as air, or to shut down the reactor until
the Argon-41 has decayed to a level that presents no
difficulty in meeting regulations.2. The applicant has
shown the will and has the means to keep the releases from
its reactor of Argon-41 and other radioactive gases well
below the maximum concentration permitted under AEC
regulations for release to the atmosphere. The applicable
regulations are the Licensing Board’s criteria for
determining when releases endanger public health and
safety and there was no meaningful evidence before the
Licensing Board challenging the validity of the regulations.

44. Effluents from the reactor which reach the air in
the reactor room will be diluted by the air entering the
room through fresh air inlets and through inleakage
resulting from the room being maintained below the
outside pressure by the ventilating system. All exhaust air
from the reactor room will pass through a system of filters,
including a pre-filter and a 0.3 micron absolute filter
located on the suction side of the reactor room exhaust
blower. The blower discharges through an automatic
damper into the reactor exhaust stack. The stack, which is
a welded, stainless steel duct three feet in diameter, goes
up the side of the adjacent, +8-story S.W. Mudd Building
and continues above the tower roof 15 feet higher in the

2. A wait of 24 hours will reduce the concentration of Argon-41
by a factor of over 8000 through the natural process of radioactive
decay.

Initial Decision

air. The 25 mph velocity at which the ventilating air is
exhausted from the stack extends the effective height of
the stack beyond the height specified in the Technical
Specifications as the minimum height for release of air or
other exhaust from the reactor room, namely, 249 feet
above ground level. Under normal operation, the air in the
room and at the mouth of the stack offer no hazard to
public health and safety under AEC standards. The
applicant’s witness indicated that the exhaust air at the
mouth of the stack is likely to be cleaner than the intake
air because of the purifying effect of the filtering system.

45. A three-inch vent from the reactor thermal column
and beam ports and another line at one of the reactor faces
are included in the ventilation system. Blower and damper
controls are managed by the operator in the control room
and in the event of a power failure, all dampers fail in a
shut position. Each door opening to the reactor room,
except the truck entrance door, will have two locks, one of
which is electrically actuated by the reactor operator in
the control room. The truck entrance door will remain
locked except when loading and unloading operations
require it to be open. The doors are the only non-sealed
penetrations through the reactor room walls. According to
calculations of the applicant, the truck entrance door
accounts for 50% of the total leakage rate from the reactor
room through its six doors when the ventilation system is
off.

46. No liquids are continuously discharged from the
reactor to the outside world in normal operation. The
reactor core is cooled by the natural convection currents
of the water pool in which the reactor is immersed. Heat is

54a

Initial Decision

removed from the water of this pool by means of a
water-to-water heat exchanger external to the reactor
tank and by an evaporative cooling tower on the secondary
water loop. The reactor water circulates in a closed loop
system. The elevation of this system is well above the
reactor core so that the core cannot be exposed as a result
of a rupture in the loop.

47. The drainage systems in the reactor room are
closed systems with no tie-in to the public sewer system.
The floor area in the immediate vicinity of the reactor base
is slanted toward a sump capable of containing all of the
shielding water in the reactor tank. The sump, made of
water-proofed concrete reinforced with steel rods and
covered with five coats of epoxy, rests on bedrock.
Additionlly, all sink and shower drains about the reactor
drain into a 750-gallon stainless steel hold-up tank.
Disposal of contaminated water in the tank and sump is
provided for according to AEC regulations.

48. The principal solid material which would be
activated as a result of operation of the applicant’s reactor
is used fuel. At infrequent intervals, the applicant might
choose to remove used fuel elements from the reactor core
by transferring them to a-storage rack in the reactor tank.
The rack itself is designed to prevent a critical mass. Later,
the applicant could place the used fuel elements while still
under water in a protective cask for removal from the tank
and delivery at the reactor room to a carrier licensed for
such purposes by the Department of Transportation. The
used fuel ceases to be the applicant’s responsibility when
the carrier takes over. According to Gulf General Atomic,
most of the Trigas in operation, even those in operation

Initial Decision

for ten years, have never occasioned the shipment of
radioactive fuel. Other solid material activated in the
reactor in normal operation, such as sample carriers, parts
of the core framework, and small tools, will be handled by
conventional means developed over many reactor-years of
experience.

Applicant’s Reactor
under Accident Conditions

49. Consideration of the applicant’s reactor under
accident conditions bears upon the issue in the notice of
hearing of whether the issuance of the proposed license
will be inimical to the health and safety of the public.
Thus, if under accident conditions the public would be
exposed to excessive radiation, the issuance of the license
would be regarded as inimical to the health and safety of
the public regardless of the extent of the assurances that
the reactor could and would normally be operated under
the terms of the proposed license without endangering
public health and safety.

50. At 10 CFR Part 100, the Commission has set forth
reactor site criteria for stationary power and testing
reactors. These criteria are measures for determining
whether it is acceptable to locate a particular reactor of
either of these types at a given site. The criteria provide
guidelines for permissible public exposure to radiation
under reactor accident conditions. The guidelines are
identified in terms of dosages, length of exposure,
populatior. affected and distances from the reactor site.
The guidelines also indicate the nature of the accident to
be postulated, which historically has been a double-ended

56a

Initial Decision

rupture of the primary coolant piping with a fission
products release calculated on the basis of a 100% core
meltdown. For further guidance, the reactor site criteria
refer to Technical Information Document 14844, US.
Atomic Energy Commission, dated March 23, 1962.

Rey a ee

51. The Commission has set forth no comparable site
criteria for research reactors in general or for the Triga
type research reactors in particular. Nor has it under its
i statutory authority directed any special class treatment of
: Triga reactors in terms of safety standards or required
: findings antecedent to licensing. The absence of specific
guidelines oriented to research reactor licensing led the
Licensing Board to certify to the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Appeal Board the question of what sort of
accident should be hypothesized in the present proceeding.
The Licensing Board, which has been concerned about
licensing a nuclear reactor for operation in the midst of a
dense population center, particularly noted that depending
: on the nature of the accident hypothesized and the
postulated fission products release associated therewith,
the applicant’s reactor might be considered either safe or
unsafe for licensing. The Licensing Board stated its view
that such substantive factors of measurement are proper
subjects for the Commission’s determination rather than
the Licensing Board’s or the parties’. The Appeal Board
took the position that the Commission’s regulations at 10
CFR Part 50 provide sufficient guidance to the Licensing
Board. Accordingly, without providing any substantive
answer to the certified question, the Appeal Board referred __
it back to the Licensing Board for determination of an
answer on the basis of the record. The referenced Part 50
of the Commission’s regulations identifies general

57a

Initial Decision

procedures for the licensing of production and utilization
facilities and section 50.34, noted in passing by the Appeal
Board, identifies certain data which are required to be
included in applications for construction permits and
operating licenses. Following receipt of the Appeal Board’s
response, the Licensing Board reopened the hearing record
for limited purposes, including further development of the
subject of postulated reactor accident conditions and
related exposure of the public to radiation.

52. Drawing upon the Commission’s approach to
standardize the analysis of safety considerations pertaining
to site and to accidental events for stationary power and
testing reactors by hypothesizing or postulating a major
accident (see 10 CFR 100.11, including footnote 1), the
Licensing Board considers that the accident to be
postulated in the present proceeding ought to be one
which would result in potential hazards not exceeded by
those from any accident considered credible. In this sense,
the accident is the type (though obviously with vastly
different physical characteristics) which the regulatory
staff uses in measuring whether public health and safety
are adequately protected under power reactor accident
conditions. Speculation about how the accident might
come about is obviated, the principle being that the hazard
from the postulated accident is as great or greater than the
potential hazard reasonably associated with any credible
accident. on

—— 53. The applicant, the regulatory staff, and Riverside
and Morningside together each proposed an accident to be
postulated for the purpose of determining whether public
health and safety are endangered under accident
conditions. The applicant’s proposed accident, identified

58a

Initial Decision

by it as the maximum credible accident, is a defect in the
cladding of a fuel element with the shielding water in place
either prior to or simultaneously with an accidental
insertion of all the available excess reactivity. This is the
worst type of accident reported as having actually
happened to a Triga reactor. In identifying a substantially
more severe accident as its design basis accident, the
regulatory staff stated that it “‘examined all ordinary
means by which high temperature conditions could be
attained and found that, in the case of the Columbia Triga
reactor, physical limitations precluded the high
temperature rupture of the cladding of ali or any
significant number of the fuel elements.” The design basis
accident of the regulatory staff is the failure of the
cladding of a single fuel element while exposed to air. Both
the applicant’s maximum credible and the regulatory
staff’s design basis accidents do not contemplate
temperatures in excess of 400° centigrade. Momingside
and Riverside proposed the most serious accident, namely,
a rupture in air at temperature in the neighborhood of
1000° centigrade of one or several fuel elements.

54. In the opinion of the Licensing Board, credibility
is not the mark of the accident possibilities which the
intervenors have described in suport of the accident
which they would postulate .or safety calculation
purposes. The first of these accident possibilities is
sabotage of the reactor by high temperature destruction of
the fuel elements with the shielding water removed. This
theoretical possibility supposes that determined saboteurs
with advanced knowledge of physics and mechanics could
plan and successfully execute without prior detection a
most complex feat, even under ideal experimental

59a

Initial Decision

conditions, involving extensive preparation, highly
specialized skills and tools, and serious personal risk.
Another accident possibility invoked by the intervenors is
a burning aircraft crash. Because of the physical
arrangements of the buildings about the reactor, a crashing
aircraft, if it were to have any chance of causing the
disaster envisioned by the intervenors, would have to fall
vertically through a pin-point location (14’ x 14’) on the
roof of the Terrace Building four stories above the reactor
core, then across a steel beam and into the reactor core’s
cellar housing, namely, a shielding water pool 6.5’ in
diameter, 20.5’ in depth and with walls of concrete 8’2” in
thickness, which is assumed to be insufficiently protective
of the core at the time of the crash. Other references by
the intervenors to accident possibilities at 1000°
centigrade were mere conceptualizations — a core loading
accident out of context with the applicant’s reactor and an
overheating of the fuel elements in an undefined manner
causing a rupture of the cladding, which, according to Gulf
General Atomic’s experience and analysis, can sustain
operation at temperatures in excess of 1000° centigrade.

55. Of the three accidents, the Licensing Board prefers
for present purposes the one proposed by the regulatory
staff. In terms of the Licensing Board’s thinking, a
yardstick accident ought to be greater than one which
actually happened and accordingly, the applicant’s
maximum credible accident is regarded as unsuitable. At
the same time, in the Licensing Board’s opinion, it would
be unrealistic to postulate the sort of accident proposed by
Morningside and Riverside because the consequences of
such an accident are too far removed from the potential
hazard reasonably associated with any credible accident.

60a

Initial Decision

As the Licensing Board sees the situation, no credible
accident would result in a potential hazard greater than the
one which would come about under the regulatory staff's
proposed accident.

56. In addition to the postulated accident, the
assumed fission products release fraction is also critical to
any determination of whether the health and safety of the
public are adequately protected under reactor accident
conditions. The applicant and the regulatory staff assumed
a fission products release fraction of 1.5 x 10-5, that is, 15
parts per million. This figure was based on an experiment
and calculations performed in 1966 by General Atomic
Division of General Dynamics Corporation (General
Atomic). The figure was accepted by both the applicant
and the regulatory staff, which had checked the figure
with independent analytical calculations of their own but
with no new experimental data. The figure was challenged
by a witness for Morningside and Riverside as not being
proper for use in measuring the hazards associated with the
applicant’s reactor under accident conditions. The witness’
attack on the figure was based on two points: first, by its
very nature the high temperature accident proposed by
Morningside and Riverside would involve a substantially
higher fission products release fraction than would result
from the accidents proposed by the applicant and the
regulatory staff, and second, the release fraction assumed
by the applicant and the regulatory staff for their
accidents is open to question because of an experiment in
1960 by General Atomic which supported a higher release
fraction than 1.5 x 10-5. Following through with his
second point, Riverside’s witness noted, too, differences of
indeterminate significance between the conditions of the

6la

Initial Decision

later experiment and those applicable to the subject
reactor as well as certain variances among the data derived
from the later experiment. The manager of the Triga
reactor program of Gulf General Atomic Incorporated
(which succeeded to General Atomic) affirmed his
conviction as to the validity of the conclusion derived
from the later experimental data (as did the applicant and
the regulatory staff, and all with supporting reasons) but
candidly stated that a determined search by his company
uncovered no satisfactory explanation for the different
experimental results. Nor did the applicant or the
regulatory staff disclose any experimental data of its own
or of another source which would either shed light on the
discrepancy of fission products release fractions derived
from the two experiments or establish a fission products
release fraction of unquestionable validity. The two release
fractions as determined in 1960 and 1966 are 9600 parts
per million (0.96%) and 3 parts per million (3 x 10°6),
respectively. Neither the 1960 figure nor the 1966 figure,
which are more than 3,000 times apart, includes any
multiplicative safety factor. The fission products release
fraction 15 parts per million (1.5 x 10-5) represents the
product of multiplying the figure of 3 parts per million by
a safety factor of 5.

57. Morningside and Riverside proposed a fission
products release fraction of 4% (40,000 parts per million)
as appropriate for their yardstick accident, namely, a
rupture of the cladding of one or several fuel elements in
air at temperature in the neighborhood of 1000°
centigrade. The two intervenors based the 4% figure on the
results of certain AEC sponsored tests, known as the
SNAPTRAN tests (completed in 1964). These tests

Initial Decision

involved the deliberate destruction at high temperature —
the record indicates 1100° centigrade — of a reactor
chemically similar to the applicant’s in that it was an
uranium-zirconium hydride fuel reactor. The applicant’s
and the regulatory staff’s challenge to the proposed fission
products release fraction of 4% was based on their
contention that a high temperature accident as proposed
by the two intervenors has no applicability in the
proceeding. There was no questioning the 4% figure as
being properly related to such a high temperature accident.
The fission products release fractions considered at the
hearing thus range from a low of 3 parts per million (to
which a safety factor of 5 had been applied) to a high of
40,000 parts per million.

58. In its consideration of the applicant’s Triga
reactor, the regulatory staff mainly relied on information
supplied by the manufacturer of Triga reactors and by
Triga reactor operators and on its own analysis of such
information. Relevant experimantal data developed either
by itself or by one of its contractors were not in evidence.
Further, the regulatory staff did not appear to have an
objective standard for determining the acceptability of
Triga reactors under accident conditions or to have a stable
approach for making calculations pertinent to determining
radiation exposure under such conditions. In about half of
the cases of licensed, operating Trigas, the regulatory staff
hypothesized an accident while shielding water was in
place. In the remainder of cases, the more recent ones, the
hypothesized accident involved the failure of one fuel
element while in air. For just four Trigas, the maximum
fission products release fraction assumed was 10° (10
parts per million). For other Trigas — including a number
licensed after the General Atomic experiment in 1966 —

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63a
Initial Decision

the corresponding release fraction figure used for purposes
of safety evaluation was 1% or 2% (10,000 or 20,000 parts
per million). In one instance, the regulatory staff made a
safety calculation for a Triga on the basis of a fission
products release fraction of 2.8% (28,000 parts per
million) — which is the approximate equivalent of
multiplying the 1960 experimentally derived figure of
96% by a safety factor of 3.

59. As noted earlier, the reactor site criteria for
stationary power and testing reactors at 10 CFR Part 100
set certain guidelines for evaluating a reactor site under
accident conditions. According to these guidelines, an
individual located on the boundary of the defined
“exclusion area” for two hours immediately following
onset of the postulated fission products release should not
receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess
of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to
the thyroid from iodine exposure. Similarly, an individual
located on the outer boundary of the defined “low
population zone” who is exposed to the radioactive cloud
resulting from the postulated fission product release
(during the entire period of its passage) should not receive
the foregoing radiation doses. The guidelines also provide
that the distance from the reactor to the nearest boundary
of a densely populated center containing more than about
25,000 residents should be at least one and one-third times
the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the
low population zone and that greater distances may be
necessary where large cities are involved. The Licensing
Board endeavored to extract criteria from these guidelines
to evaluate the dangers to public health and safety of a
postulated accident to the applicant’s reactor. The

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64a

Initial Decision

Licensing Board’s extended efforts to arrive at objective
criteria in this manner were unproductive. “Exclusion
area” and “low population zone,” together with the
indicated radiation exposure limits therefor, and
“population center distance’”’ have no sensible application
to the applicant’s situation. In the Licensing Board’s
judgment, the concept of “exclusion area” at 10 CFR Part
100 is not compatible with any part of the area
immediately outside the reactor room within the Terrace
and Mudd Buildings complex. Though the applicant may
exclude persons from such area, the area is much too
public to fit into the category of an “exclusion area.”
Clearly, there is no “low population zone.” about the
reactor site, and “population center distance” is
non-existent. Nor do the radiation exposure limits at 10
CFR Part 20, which are applicable to normal operation,
afford a practicable approach for dealing with the issue of
public health and safety under conditions of a postulated
accident unless the accident consequences are of such a
minor sort that they might be assumed to be embraced in
normal operation.

60. U 235 is the primary source of radiation in nuclear
reactors. The amount of U 235 for possession and use by
the applicant in connection with the proposed operation
of its reactor is 3.3 kg. This compares to amounts ranging
from 54 kg to 216 kg for the four licensed test reactors in
operation and to amounts ranging from 250 kg to 5,000 kg
for licensed power reactors in operation.3 From an

3. Data compiled from information available to the public
through the Public Proceedings Branch, Office of the Commission’s
Secretary.

65a

Initial Decision

individual’s standpoint, there is no difference between a
given dose of radiation from a power or test reactor and
one in the same amount from a research reactor.

61. The extent of public exposure to radioactive
releases emitting from the reactor exhaust stack was
calculated by the applicant for the following locations: (i)
at ground level at West 119 Street and Amsterdam Avenue,
(ii) in the S.W. Mudd Building for floors above the 7th
(reflecting the proximity of air intakes to the mouth of the
stack), and (iii) by a window of the highest occupied floor
(the 19th) of the nearby Interchurch Center. In the course
of the applicant’s calculations for location (i), a dilution
factor of greater than 20,000 was arrived at. With respect
to location (ii), the calculations indicated that a fuel
element cladding failure with the shielding water in place
would cause exposure for the first hour to be at the most 7
millirem. With respect to location (iii), a dilution factor of
more than 16,000 was calculated. On the other hand,
apropos to the interest of Morningside and Riverside in the
extent of exposure of people living in nearby apartment
buildings to stack emissions of Argon-41, the regulatory
staff stated that the applicable dilution factor varies from
40 to 200.

62. A summary of the calculated radiation doses in
millrem (mr) under various accident conditions at
specified locations outside the reactor area with different
assumptions as to the fission products release fraction and
the status of the ventilation system (whether on or off) is
presented in the five tables below. Tables I and III presents
figures submitted by the applicant in response to the
Licensing Board’s request for additional data following its

Initial Decision

study of the record of the earlier hearing. Table I]
represents an extension of Table I and Tables IV and V
represent extensions of Table III. The regulatory staff
noted its “essential agreement” with the applicant’s
calculations and though they gave a different application
to the calculations than did the applicant, the intervenors
did not dispute the applicant’s figures as such. With
reference to whether the ventilation system is on or off
during accident conditions, the applicant’s operating
procedures of August 15, 1969 provide for the ventilation
system being shut down under conditions of an accident
involving radiation releases and its turning on thereafter
depending on evaluation of the accident.

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67a

Initial Decision

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TABLE II

APPLICANT’S MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT

(Defect in Cladding of a Fuel Element With Shielding Water in Place and Fission
Products Release Fraction Assumed To Be 2.8% or 28,000 ppm)

Doses at Truck Door Doses at West 119 St. Doses at Mouth

8 Exposure _in Parking Area and Amsterdam Ave. of Stack :

a % Time Whole Body Thyroid Whole Body Thyroid Whole Body Thyroid
g 3

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Ventilation On* ;

2hours 15mr 0 7.5x10°3 mr 0 15 mr 0 |

* Occupation for time greater than 2 hours does not lead to increased dose.

69a

Initial Decision

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70a

Initial Decision

TABLE IV

REGULATORY STAFF’S DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT

(One Ruptured Fuel Element in Air With Fission Products Release Fraction Assumed To
Be 2.8% or 28,000 ppm)

Doses at Truck Door Doses At West 119 St. Doses at Mouth

Exposure in Parking Area and Amsterdam Ave. of Stack
Time Whole Body Thyroid Whole Body Thyroid Whole Body Thyroid
Ventilation Off

Q2hours 2.4x103mr 1.9x10’mr 1.3mr 1.5x103 mr 0 0
20 hours 11.7x103mr 12.1x107’mr 6.5 mr 9.3x105 mr 0 0
50hours 20.5x103mr 22.4x107mr 11.0mr _ 17.0x103mr 0 0

Ventilation On
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Tla

Initial Decision

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109a

Decision

To deal first with the postulated accident, the
Licensing Board accepted the regulatory staff’s design basis
cident, which consisted of the “‘failure of the cladding of
, single fuel element while exposed to air’’. It also noted
that the applicant’s operating procedures provide that the
operator shut down the ventilation system under
conditions of an accident involving radiation releases; and,
after evaluation of the accident, decide whether or not to
restart the ventilation system. The Decision included
release figures for both situations, but did not specify
which condition should be used for evaluating the
postulated accident. Intervenors have postulated an
accident with fission releases several times that adopted by
the Licensing Board. In the opinion of the Licensing
Board, they made no showing that such an accident is
credible, and we concur.

Intervenors have also taken exception to the failure of
the Licensing Board to prescribe whether the ventilation
system is best left open or shut in the event of an accident.
It is our opinion that, under accident conditions, it is
possible that the ventilation system may not be operable.
The postulated accident must therefore be considered as
occurring, and its hypothetical results evaluated, with the
system turned off. Accordingly, we accept the postulated
accident adopted by the Licensing Board with the
foregoing modification.

2.Fission Products Release Resulting
From Postulated Accident

As we have previously noted, evaluation of the effect
on the public health and safety of an accident requires that
the fission products release fraction under such conditions
be ascertained.

110a

Decision

With respect to this question, we pointed out in our
Memorandum of June 14, 1971, that the Licensing Board
had before it the results of two experiments performed at
Gulf General Atomic Inc. (GGA), one in 1960 and the
other in 1966. These results gave two release fractions, 9.6
x 10-3 and 3 x 10%, respectively, which differed by a
factor of more than 103. It was for this reason that the
Licensing Board recommended _ that further
experimentation be undertaken. Consequently, the Appeal
Board was obliged to consider whether a definitive fission
products release fraction for Triga reactors was available.
Accordingly, in our Memorandum, we asked a number of
questions, and elicited additional information, designed to
enable us to ascertain whether the differing figures were
reconcilable, and whether a definitive fission products
release fraction for Triga reactors could be obtained.

IE Ee ee SL he

Subsequently, on June 18, 1971, the staff transmitted
to the Appeal Board for its information, a letter dated
June 1, 1971, from Ralph H. Peters of Gulf Energy and
Environmental Systems, Inc. (GEES) (GGA’s successor) to
the Director of the AEC Division of Reactor Licensing,
forwarding material describing an error GEES had found in
the 1960 experiment.2 GEES found its recalculated
release fraction to be between 6.1 x 10-5 and 8.0 x 10°5
and, although somewhat higher than the 1966 result, to be
in ‘“‘reasonable agreement” with the release data obtained
in 1966.

Furthermore, GEES performed additional experiments
during the summer of 1971 to obtain additional data

3. This material was formally incorporated into the record at the
October 27, 1971, proceeding.

i

LODE RIEL WR RT et

lila

Decision

concerning the appropriate fission products release
fraction. The results of the additional experiments also
were incorporated into the record at the October 17,
1971, proceeding. GEES first repeated the 1960
experiments and obtained a release fraction normalized to
a standard Triga element of 0.5 x 10°5. A new 1971
experiment, also normalized to a standard Triga element,
gave a release fraction of 0.8 x 10°°.

The applicant and staff have provided satisfactory
answers to questions asked in the June 14, 1971,
Memorandum. GEES reports inserted in the record,
together with the answers to our questions, provide data
corroborating portions of the GEES experiments.
Reviewing the data on all the experiments, together with
the related information corroborating certain of the results
of these tests, the Appeal Board agrees with the conclusion
of GEES Report A10801 that these experiments have
provided release fraction data that are reasonably
consistent. We also find that the release fraction of 1.5 x
10-5 proposed by the applicant and staff in this proceeding
is an appropriately conservative figure for use in evaluating
results of a postulated accident involving a Triga reactor of
the type under consideration. 4

In their exceptions, and during the course of the
October 27, 1971, proceeding, the intervenors questioned

4. This release fraction is five times that ascertained in the 1966
experiments, three times that ascertained in the rerun of the 1960
experiments, and twice that ascertained in the 1971 experiments.

EST TD, TE NEES

112a
Decision

the independence and, inferentially, the validity of the
1971 experiments.They contended that the experiments
should have been performed by the Commission itself (as
suggested by the Licensing Board in its Initial Decision),
rather than by GEES, the manufacturer of the reactor. The
1971 experiments were monitored by two Commission
representatives, one of whom appeared at the October 27,
1971, hearing and indicated that it was a high quality
experiment and that he had a high degree of confidence in
the release fraction. (App. Tr. 102) Moreover, we find
nothing of record to undermine the validity of the results
of the 1971 experiments. This is particularly true in view
of the recalculation of the 1960 experiment which
indicated substantial agreement among the results of all
the experiments. While the Appeal Board, under some
circumstances, might be sympathetic to the suggestion that
independent experiments should be performed by the
Commission, we see no reason to impose any such
requirement in the particular circumstances of this case.
To the extent that intervenors’ exceptions advocate a
different conclusion, they are hereby denied.

Using the release fraction of 1.5 x 10-5, and under the
hypothetical postulated accident conditions which we are
adopting (see part 1 of this Decision), radiation doses
would exceed the exposure limits of 10 CFR Part 20 only
at the truck door in the parking area. © If this door were
sealed to reduce substantially the airflow around the door,

5. 10 CFR Part 20 sets forth maximum releases of radiation
permitted during normal operation of research as well as other
reactors. In the following section of this Decision, we discuss 10
CFR Part 20 in relationship to the postulated accident.

6
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113a

Decision

the radiation at that location would be reduced to a level
below the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. (App. Tr. 109) As a
condition of the operating license which this Decision will
authorize to be issued, the applicant will be required to
have the truck door in the parking area sealed with rubber
tape during all periods of time in which the reactor is in
operation.

3. Criteria for Evaluation of
Postulated Accident Effects

As we have pointed out, the Licensing Board’s failure
to reach a health and safety conclusion was predicated in
part on what it described as “the absence of applicable
substantive criteria of the Commission and of convincing
objective standards of the regulatory staff” for evaluating
the effects of a postulated design basis accident.
Accordingly, in our June 14, 1971, Memorandum, we
asked for briefs and/or oral argument on this matter.

Our review of the material submitted leads us to the
conclusion that Part 100 is not applicable to research
reactors and hence to this proceeding, and that there are
no other Commtission regulations which specifically define
the criteria for evaluating the effects of a postulated design
basis accident of a research reactor. Under the
circumstances of this case, however, the absence of
regulations specifically formulated for this purpose is not
an impediment to reaching a conclusion as to whether the
health and safety of the public will be endangered by the
occurrence of a postulated accident to the reactor. In the
discussion of the fission product releases in the preceding
section, we indicated that, under the conditions we are

ATOPIC ESS IRE PPE TIS

ll4a

Decision

imposing, radiation releases from the postulated accident
would be below the limits for normal operation set forth
in 10 CFR Part 20. Since the Commission has determined
that these very low releases are acceptable for normal
operation, they are clearly acceptable in a postulated
accident situation. (See App. Tr. 250, 256) Under those
circumstances, we find that the health and safety of the
public will not be endangered by the occurrence of a
postulated accident to the reactor. §

As a general proposition, the Appeal Board does not
consider it desirable to use the standards of 10 CFR Part
20 for evaluating the effects of a postulated accident in a
research reactor inasmuch as they are unduly restrictive for
that purpose. The Appeal Board strongly recommends that
specific standards for the evaluation of an accident
situation in a research reactor should be formulated. We do
not believe that the internal standards referred to by the
staff are an appropriate substitute.

4. Protective Measures

In our Memorandum of June 14, 1971, we requested

the applicant, through oral argument and through a brief if
it desired to submit one, to address itself to the sufficiency of

the physical security measures it proposed to adopt.We did
this since we are of the opinion that the physical security

6. We note in this connection that this approach is eminently
practical. Thus, the Licensing Board in this proceeding reviewed data
concerning nine accidental releases of fission products at Triga
reactors and found that none of the releases resulted in
concentration in unrestricted areas in excess of 10 CFR Part 20
limits for continuous exposure. (Initial Decision, par. 40.)

115a

Decision

of the reactor must be such that there is reasonable
assurance that the public health and safety will not be
compromised as a result of willful damage or destruction.
In response, the applicant presented testimony at the
proceeding on October 27, 1971, by Dr. William W.
Havens, Jr., Director of the Division of Nuclear Science
and Engineering at Columbia University. Dr. Havens’
October 27, 1971, testimony on protective measures was
supplementary to testimony which he had _ earlier
presented to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. In
addition, the regulatory staff, in a statement dated
October 12, 1971, analyzed the evidence presented to the
Licensing Board on this subject, ard provided its views as
to the adequacy of the proposed system.

As a result of this material, and particularly Dr.
Havens’ answers to questions on cross-examination, and his
responses to questions of the Appeal Board, it is apparent
that the applicant is placing primary reliance for the
effectiveness of its security system on the use of special
magnetic keys. Dr. Havens testified that, from outside the
reactor building, at least two different magnetic keys are
required to get into either the reactor room or the control
room. The number of keys to the control room is limited
— quite properly, we might note — to responsible faculty
members and the Reactor Supervisor. Control room keys
are not given to graduate students. (App. Tr. 273) In
contrast, however, Dr. Havens also indicated that keys to
the reactor room would te considerably more numerous,
and would be distributed (‘‘on a ‘need’ basis only’’) to
graduate students as well as faculty members who are
working with the reactor or performing experiments
associated with it. (Prepared Testimony, p.4; App. Tr.
263)

TELL RENTON PR

1l6a

Decisi

The applicant further indicated that during off-hours
all doors except one to the building in which the reactor is
located are supposed to be locked, and that at present a
guard is stationed near the one door available for entrance
during off-hours. Dr. Havens stated that the University did
not plan to have a physical security alarm system, since it
did not believe such a system was necessary. (App. Tr.
274)

The Appeal Board recognizes the desirability of
maintaining relatively free access to the reactor room for
research by students and faculty. We are concerned,
however, with the possibility that lost or stolen keys,
coupled with the lack of assurance of effective guard
control, and the absence of any physical security alarm,
may give easy access to the reactor room during off-hours
to unauthorized persons. With these factors in mind, the
Appeal Board has concluded that the operating license
which we are authorizing in this Decision must include
specified conditions designed to enhance the physical
security of the reactor. Unfortunately, as in the case of
standards for evaluating the effects of a postulated
accident in research reactors,’ there are no standards
available for evaluating the physical security of a research
reactor, and it is necessary for us to establish conditions
for the purpose of providing reasonable assurance that the
public health and safety will not be compromised by
willful damage or destruction. These conditions, which
appear in the Appendix to this Decision, are intended to
limit the availability of keys and the likelihood of their
loss or theft, and to require installation of a physical
security alarm system.

7. See Part 3 of this Decision.

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117a

Decision

5. Challenge to 10 CFR Part 20 —
The Sternglass Testimony

Intervenors Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. and
Riverside Democrats, Inc. at the October 27, 1971,
proceeding, presented testimony by Dr. Ernest

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_1790%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
