# Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Life of the Land v. Brinegar

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for the Respondents in Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 416 U.S. 961

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Uniteh States

Octoser TERM, 1973

No. 73-1088
|
LIFE OF THE Lanp, ef al., | . te.
Petitioners,
—_—Vi—

CLavpe S. Brrvecar,
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT E. ALVEY WRIGHT,
DIRECTOR, HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, IN OPPOSITION

GeorcE Par
Attorney General,
State of Hawaii

Jouxson H. Wonc
ArtHuR T. Murakami
Deputies Attorney General,
State of Hawai
Hawaii State Capitol
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

Dennis G. Lyons
Special Deputy Attorney
General, State of Hawaii
1229 Nineteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorneys for Respondent
E. Alvey Wright, Director, Hawaii
Department of Transportation
Of Counsel:
Davip BonDERMAN
ArnoLp & PorTER
Washington, D. C.

February, 1974

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
EA REECE Ae ee 1
Questions Presented ._........ : a
Eee nee Rae ae Renn ene

A. Factual Background ....................... 3
1. The Need for the Reef Runway .........00...... 3

2. Preliminary Studies and the Adoption of
the Reef Runway Project —...02. 6
3. Keehi Lagoon and the Reef Runway Project 8
B. The Environmental Impact Statement ............ 10
1. Preliminary Steps ..... . 10
2. Preparation of the EIS : 11
3. The Final EIS baaceedoueduniecdaleuoenancbownis 13
C. Proceedings Below ................. mae 17
ERENT Oe Bee OP Re Ber ae

I. The Court of Appeals Applied Correct Stand-
ards of Review f 22

II. The Decision of the Court Below Was Cor-
rect as to the Discussion of and Findings as to
Alternatives Under the NEPA and AADA ... 25

III. Parsons’ Participation in Drafting the EIS Was
Not Improper : «oe

CoNncLUSION 32

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11

2. Preparation of the EIS

The EIS for the Reef Runway project was prepared
jointly by the Pacifie region of the FAA and the State of
Hawaii, with the Ralph M. Parsons Company, the design
consultant on the Reet Runway project, assisting in the
drafting. (Tr. 298-99) More than ten drafts were prepared.
(Tr. 360) Preparation was in accordance with the FAA
euidelines on the preparation of impact statements. Her-
man Bliss, Chief of the Airports Division, Pacifie Region,
FAA, James Dittmar, a project engineer for Parsons, and
a number of State officials worked closely on drafting the
statement. There were numerous meetings among the FAA,
the State officials and Parsons. (Tr. 298-99, 822) Bliss of
the FAA was in on every stage of the drafting. (Tr. $21)
In response to a question as to who actually wrote the
impact statement, Dittmar testified that:

“T would go through and put one page in and then after
review with perhaps the State and the FAA, they
would revise—that page would be revised extensively,
so... there is no real pride of authorship or any au-
thorship in that page anymore. /t is more or less a
joint effort by Parsons, the State, and the FAA.” (Tr.
299; emphasis supplied)

The draft impact statement was then circulated for com-
ment.’ In addition to the statement itself, there were avail-
able for consultation more than 2,000 pages of supporting
documents and materials. In view of the bulk of these
= pporting references, copies were forwarded to Washing-
ton, D.C., as needed while the originals were maintained at
the FAA regional office in Honolulu and made available to

°A list of those from whom comments were expressly solicited
appears at pages i-x of the final EIS and includes 35 agencies of the
United States Government, as well as numerous State agencies and
private organizations (including Petitioners Life of the Land and
Hawaii Audubon Society).

12

anyone who wished to see them. In fact, Petitioner Life of
the Land did review those references. (Tr. 835-36) The
comments to the draft impact statement by the various
Federal agencies were reviewed and considered by the Chief
of the Environmental Staff, Planning Division, at the
FAA’s Washington office and copies of all comments by
Federal agencies were submitted to the Assistant Secre-
tary of Transportation for Environment and Urban Sys-
tems. (Tr. 747-49) Copies of the comments were also for-
warded to the Council on Environmental Quality. (Tr.
747, 778-79)

In January, 1972, the final EIS, redrafted by the FAA
and the State, with the aid of Parsons, in light of all the
state, Federal, and private comments, was approved by the
FAA Pacific Regional Director and forwarded to Washing-
ton. On February 29, 1972, the impact statement was ap-
proved by the Assistant Secretary's office and forwarded to
the Council on Environmental Quality. On March 30, 1972,
the Executive Director of Petitioner Life of the Land re-
quested an opportunity to make further comments on the
final EIS. The Assistant Secretary's office and the Council
on Environmental Quality agreed to withhold further ae-
tion on the Reef Runway until Petitioner's comments could
be reviewed. (Tr. 750-52) On May 2, 1972, after recon-
sideration of the final EIS in light of Petitioner's comments,
the Assistant Secretary's office and the Council on En-
vironmental Quality concluded that the EIS was fully
satisfactory and that no further changes needed to be made.
(Tr. 752-56) Finally, on May 3, 1975, the Administrator
of the FAA approved the funding of the Reef Runway pro}-
ect based upon the final EIS. (Tr. 756-57) Through the
time of final Federal approval, the State of Hawaii had
spent close to $1,000,000 in engineering and environmental
studies. (Tr. 570)

2 eg NE en eee

13

3. The Final EIS

The final IIS is 46 single-spaced pages long, plus ap-
pendices. It includes the following:

(a) An introduction, detailing the history of the Reef
Runway project and the present congestion at HLA. (EIS
1-2)

(b) .1 description of the proposed Reef Runway and
associated protective structures, together with a statement
of the purposes for building the runway and a description
of the Keehi Lagoon, as previously discussed. (IIS 3-7)

(ec) A discussion of the public hearing of March 22, 1971,
the participants, and the comments. (EIS 8-10)

(d) A consideration of the impact of the project on the
human and natural environment, as follows:

(i) Noise Abatement. The EIS discussed present
levels of unacceptable noise pollution, described earlier,
and concluded, based upon the standard FA A-approved
methods of noise measurement, that the construction
of the Reef Runway would significantly reduce the
aircraft noise in all areas currently subject to over-
flights. (EJS 12-15)

(ii) Land Use. The EIS reviewed the present land
use in the project area, pointing out that the Reef
Runway would not dislocate any persons lawfully resi-
dent on private or public property, or interfere with
any existing public park, recreation area, or wildlife
or water fowl refuge of national, state or local signifi-
cance, (EIS 15-16)

(iii) Reereational Uses. The EIS noted that due to
the polluted nature of Keehi Lagoon, recreational
uses thereof are presently limited and concluded that
the flushing action resulting from the construction of
the two new channels described above (pp. 9-10)
would enhance the recreational uses of the Lagoon.

nO PMS FOE IL EEF

rerewuenress ere eer

=

14

In addition, Keehi Lagoon Park at the north end
of the Lagoon would experience a marked reduction
of aircraft noise. (EIS 16-17)

(iv) Water Quality. As described above, the EIS
concluded that the water quality of Keehi Lagoon
would be significantly improved by the dredging of the
two new channels. The EIS reached this conclusion
based upon a number of published water quality
studies, including one dealing specifically with the
Keehi Lagoon, and a special testing model for this
project developed by the University of Hawaii. (EIS
17-20)

(v) Visual and Air Pollution. The EIS pointed
out that the Reef Runway would move the major por-
tion of the high-pollution heavy jet aircraft traffic out
to sea, thus reducing the air pollution as to the in-
habited onshore areas and improving the visual appear-
ance of the Lagoon.* (EIS 20)

(vi) Wildlife. The EIS noted that 186 acres of coral
mudflats used by the Stilt, as well as by three types
of migratory birds, would be lost due to the construc-
tion of the Reef Runway. However. the EIS indicated

*Symptomatie of the fault-finding approach of Petitioners is
their critique of the failure of the EIS to discuss the impact of
the project on invisible air pollution and the failure to order
“studies” of air quality effect. (Pet. 7 n. 3) To be sure. no “studies”
of air quality effect were ordered since a threshold determination
was made by both State and Federal authorities that moving air-
craft takeoffs to the Reef Runway almost a mile and a half seaward
and away from populated areas could not increase air pollution
and in fact would alleviate the air pollution problem. (Tr. 574.
766-67) Indeed, there was testimony in the record from Bach.
Petitioners’ own expert, that “When you get further away from
somewhere. pollution tends to decrease with distance” and that to
determine whether standards are met, “one measures, of course,
where people are living.” (Tr. 175, 178) Bach further admitted
that one of the methods of preventing air pollution is “If you just
move it further out . . . you couldn't care less where it goes.”
(Tr. 202) It is hard to analyze Petitioners’ contention that air
quality studies should have been ordered and performed in order
to confirm these obvious truths as anything more than obstrue-
tionism.

15

that a joint program of state and Federal agencies
was under way to create three new bird habitats which
would consist of a number of islands and ponds and
would be of equal or greater value to the Stilt and
other birdlife.” (EIS 26)

(vii) Marine Life and Fish. The EIS here referred
to a number of studies and scientifie collection experi-
ments, all of which indicated that the marine and fish
life in the Lagoon is presently poor due to the polluted
waters. The EIS concluded that the improved cir-
culation in the Lagoon which would result from the
Reef Runway project would improve the ecological
situation in the Lagoon, increasing the numbers of
most forms of sea life from microorganisms to fish.
(EIS 27-32)

(e) A notation of the only probable adverse impact of
the project; namely, the use of 765 acres of the Lagoon
for the runway. (EIS 33)

(f) A discussion of alternatives to the Reef Runway
project, as follows:

(i) “10-28” Runway. This alternative, originally pro-
posed in the 1962 study mentioned above, would have
been built on HIA grounds without the necessity of
utilizing part of the Lagoon. It was rejected because
the prevailing wind patterns at HLA would have sub-
jected this runway to an unsafe level of erosswinds.
Furthermore, while such a runway would lessen the
overflight problems for the metropolitan areas east of
HIA, it would create new ones for the metropolitan
areas west of the airport. (EIS 34)

(ii) Close-in Parailel Runway. This alternative,
originally recommended by the 1967 HLA Development

* This program is now virtually complete. A 25-acre wildlife
habitat at Honouliuli, not previously used by Stilts, is now being
used by a numier of these birds. The improved habitat in Pearl
Harbor has also enjoyed increased usage by Stilts.

16

Plan. called for a runway similarly oriented to the
Reef Runway, but onshore. Such a runway would have
solved HLA’s capacity problems but would not have
moved the heavy jet traffic patterns significantly fur-
ther away from the densely-populated portions of
Honolulu and thus would not have significantly lowered
the noise pollution or appreciably improved the safety
situation. (EIS 34)

(iii) Stanford Research Institute Proposal. The SRI
proposal, suggested by a number of airlines, advocated
the extension of the existing principal 8L-26R runway
4,000 feet to the west and the construction of a smaller
6.500 foot runway to the south of 8L-26R. This alter-
native was rejected for a number of reasons. The Air
Force objected that the westward extension of 8L-26R
would significantly increase the noise pollution at
Hickam Air Force Base and its adjoining residential
areas. Furthermore, there would have been no appre-
ciable lessening of overflights of the metropolitan areas
west of the airport. (EIS 34-35)

(iv) Nonconstruction. Another alternative consid-
ered was simply to forego the project entirely. This
alternative was rejected because the continuation of
the high noise pollution-high safety problem situation
posed by the present overflights of the Honolulu area
was considered unacceptable and because it would re-
sult in a limitation on the use of HIA due to capacity
problems. (EIS 35)

(g) A description of the construction procedures and of

the irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
to be used in the project. (EIS 36-39)

(h) A discussion of actions taken to assure maximum

safeguards against adverse environmental impact from
the project. These actions include the development of
water circulation criteria, the provision of pollution control

guidelines during construction and a review of the criteria

for the new bird habitats. (EIS 40-43)

17

C. Proceedings Below

On November 8, 1972, one day prior to the scheduled
opening of bids for the construction of the Reef Runway,
Petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii and sought to enjoin the con-
struction of the runway on the ground that the EIS was
insufficient in a number of respects. A temporary restrain-
ing order was issued but was dissolved by the District
Court on December 22, 1972, after a thorough examination
of the EIS at the seven-day hearing on Petitioners’ appli-
cation for a preliminary injunction. That hearing resulted
in a District Court finding that the EIS complied with
all statutory requirements. (App. 33-42)° The District
Court’s final decision, dated April 12, 1973, adopted its
earlier decision on the preliminary injunction as its deci-
sion on the merits. (App. 43-44) The Court of Appeals
unanimously affirmed. (App. 1-30)

Petitioners made a multiplicity of contentions at the
trial and on appeal, ranging from the claim (now aban-
doned) that the EIS was invalid because the 2,000 pages
of reference material mentioned in the draft EIS had not
physically accompanied the draft EIS at all times, to the
claim that the EIS was invalid because of the participation
of Parsons, the project design consultant, in its drafting.
Petitioners’ major contention, however, was that although
the EIS did discuss the alternative of foregoing the project
entirely, in that discussion it failed to treat of a number
of so-called “nonconstruction alternatives”—"“alternatives”
raised for the first dime by Petitioners in court.

Specifically, Petitioners contended that the EIS should
have mentioned the “alternatives” set out below. The Dis-

* We so designate the Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari.

AEE eA RALLIES CTI BE BN MOTE EI NE NR OE TENET ER TIN ERI NP

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18

trict Court and Court of Appeals considered these claims
and rejected each one as a factual matter, based t.on the
evidence in the record:

(a) Moving the Air Force KC-135 tankers to another
field. The evidence showed that the FAA had initially
considered this possibility but that the Air Force had been
consulted and had refused to move its tanker operations
from HIA. (Ds. Ex. 35; App. 22) Furthermore, this alter-
native would do nothing to alleviate the noise and safety
problems stemming from overflights of commercial aircraft.
(App. 23)°

(b) Transferring private aircraft to another airfield.
The evidence showed that a ban on “general” (7.e., private)
aviation at HIA would violate prior HIA legal agreements
guaranteeing access to the airport to all users. In addition,
such a ban would have no effect on the major overflight
problems caused by commercial and military aviation.
(App. 23) Finally, there was simply nowhere else on the
island (of Oahu) to relocate general aviation, although in
the future other sites might become available. (Tr. 550-51,
554-56)

(c) Changing the takeoff patterns of inter-island flights.
The evidence indicated that requiring the two-engined air-
craft used for inter-island flights, which require a shorter
runway than do the larger trans-Pacific aircraft, to take
off from a different position (the end, rather than the

* Petitioners contend, apparently in passing (Pet. 24 n. 9), that
“The United States Air Force, whose KC-135 tankers are con-
ceded by all parties to be the worst noise and safety offenders at
HIA, has consistently refused to commit itself to utilizing the new
Reef Runway.” In fact, the record contains (Tr. 624-28) a com-
mitment, signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, to
use the Reef Runway at HIA | which has been designed to Air Force
design standards) except during emergencies.

SNE ae oS ee aN.

19

cross) on the existing runway would affect only a small
percentage of airport operations and, of course, would
have no effect upon the larger and noisier military and
trans-Pacific commercial aircraft. (App. 23) Furthermore,
under the present crowded conditions at HLA (without
the Reef Runway) the additional time required for inter-
island takeoffs under this “alternative” would cause seri-
ous additional airport congestion.” (Tr. 565)

(d) Imposition of higher landing fees. The evidence
demonstrated that higher landing fees were not a reason-
able alternative because fees four to five times higher at
other airports have made no significant difference in air
traffic patterns. (Tr. 557-58; App. 23)

(e) Other “alternatives.” There was no evidence at all
in the record to suggest that any of the other “alternatives”
alleged for the first time in court, such as forcing the
airlines to change their schedules, imposing curfews, retro-
fitting older aircraft with less noisy power-plants, or con-
verting to wide-body aircraft, are reasonable possibilities
at HLA. (App. 23-24) Furthermore, most of these “alter-
natives” are not within the scope of the powers of HIA or
the State of Hawaii. Thus, this Court held in City of
Burbank vy. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U. S. 624
(1973), that local authorities cannot impose curfews. Simi-
larly, support for retrofitting older aircraft—which can
hardly be done by HIA alone—was denied by the United
States Office of Management and Budget. (Tr. 562-63)
Finally, none of these “alternatives” would have alleviated

*° However. once the Reef Runway is in operation, there is a
likelihood that the inter-island carriers would be required, if they
did not use the Reef Runway, to start at the end of the existing
runway. since the reduction of traffic on the existing runway occa-
sioned by the construction of the Reef Runway would make this
feasible. (Tr. 640)

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20

the safety problems from overflights of populated areas
due to the location of the present principal runway.

For all of the above reasons, both courts below rejected
in toto Petitioners’ contentions as to the insufficiency of the
EIS treatment of alternatives, holding that the EIS need
set forth only those alternatives “suflicient to permit a rea-
soned choice.” (App. 24) They rejected the contention
that every conceivable alternativ: must be set forth in the
EIS even where the implementation, feasibility or efficacy
of the alternative is “remote and speculative.” (App. 24)
Then, after a full review of the EIS in light of the require-
ments of § 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Poliey
Act and § 16(e)(4) of the Airport and Airways Develop-
ment Act, the lower courts upheld the adequacy of the EIS.
After the Court of Appeals’ decision, it denied a petition
for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing en bane.

After construction of the Reet Runway commenced fol-
lowing the decision of the Court of Appeals, Petitioners
submitted to the Circuit Justice an application for stay
of the mandate of the Court of Appeals and for reinstate-
ment of an injunction pending appeal of that court pending
application for certiorari. On November 2, 1973, Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas granted that application, pending reconsidera-
tion of the application when memoranda from the Respon-
dents were received. Upon such reconsideration, Mr.
Justice Douglas, on November 7, 1973, adhered to his origi-
nal order. Thereafter, various of the Respondents, includ-
ing the Director, Department of Transportation, State of
Hawaii, moved the full Court to vacate the order. The
Director’s motion appended an affidavit of an oceanographer
in support of the contention that “more harm than good
results to the environment by the injunction”, for the rea-
son, among others, that the stage of construction which
had been reached at the time of the order created increased

21

stress on the marine environment in the Lagoon. An affi-
davit of the Chief of the State Airports Division stressed
the economic consequences in terms of layoff of workers,
costs incurred without benefit and the extent of idle work-
ers and equipment occasioned by the stoppage. On Novem-
ber 21, 1973, this Court entered an order vacating the stay
order. Construction has progressed since then on the Reef
Runway and protective structure.

ARGUMENT

This case involves the attempt of Petitioners Life of
the Land, e¢ al., to halt the construction of the Reef Run-
way at Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu, Hawaii,
on the grounds that the EIS for the project is legally in-
sufficient. Abandoning most of the thirteen or so sepa-
rate contentions asserted in the Court of Appeals as to
alleged deficiencies in the EIS and in the project, Peti-
tioners make three claims here as to errors on the part of
the courts below. They claim conflicts among the Courts of
Appeals on all three issues. In fact, Petitioners’ real quar-
rel is with the interpretation of the evidence concurred in
by both courts below. There is no conflict with the decisions
of other Courts of Appeals, and no issue warranting fur-
ther review. Accordingly, certiorari should be denied.

ATE RT PRS SOLON

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99

I. The Court of Appeals Applied Correct
Standards of Review

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals errone-
ously applied the Administrative Procedure Act's (*"APA”)
“arbitrary and capricious” standard in its review of the
question of what alternatives were required to be included
in the EIS and that, as a result, there is a conflict among
the Courts of Appeals as to the scope of review. This
contention is simply based upon a misreading of the opin-
ion below. The court below in fact quite properly applied
two diiferent standards of review to two different matters:

(a) Review of the substantive dectsion.—With respect
to the FAA’s substantive decision to proceed with the Reef
Runway project, the court applied the “arbitrary and ¢a-
pricious” standard of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The
court quoted from its decision in Jicarilla Apache Tribe of
Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973):

“Reversal of a substantive decision is appropriate only
to situations where the... [decision] was arbitrary or
clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental fae-
tors.” 475 F.2d, at 1281; App. 18.

The court then observed that it would “examine appel-
lants’ substantive challenges, therefore, mindful of the cir-
cumscribed nature of our review.” (App. 18)*

This limited examination of the substantive decision is
in accord with the law in every circuit; indeed, this Court

* The positive environmental effect of the Reef Runway—as
made evident by the discussion at pp. 3-10, 13-15, supra—is such that
the substantive decision would have survived any conceivable stan-
dard of review. Petitioners’ scanty Statement of the Case (Pet.
4-10) ignores the environmental problems which the Reef Runway
helps solve and essentially contents itself with a critique of the
EIS and a discussion of the steps in the present litigation.

has indicated that the “arbitrary and capricious” standard
must be applied in such instances:

“(T]he ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.
The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency.” Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).

See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke,
473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972); Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1972).

Petitioners’ complaint that this result makes the NEPA
“an act of futility,” because even before NEPA an agency’s
substantive decisions were subject to this standard of re-
view, misses the point. The NEPA was not designed to
create a new standard of review as to an agency's substan-
tive decisions—rather, it created new procedural require-
ments, and also created a right to review as to compliance
with those procedures, as discussed below. See Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, supra, 401 US.,
at 419-20; Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (Sth
Cir. 1973).

(b) Review of procedural decisious.—With respect to
the review of the FAA’s procedural decisions within the
scope of the NEPA*—for example as to whicn alterna-
tives would be discussed in the EIS—the court below ap-
plied an entirely different standard, that of “reasonable-
ness.” (App. 24) Obviously, it would be impossible for any

?The NEPA requires that the EIS include a statement on “al-
ternatives to the proposed action.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(2)(C) (iii). There is no question but that the EIS here discussed
“alternatives to the proposed action.” The only issue is how many
and which “alternatives” had to be discussed. It is as to this nar-
row sort of procedural issue within the scope of the NEPA that
the court below applied a standard of “reasonableness.”

a re ae ey

24

EIS to consider and expressly reject every alleged “alterna-
tive” which litigation counsel, in a subsequent court attack
on the EIS, might imagine. Accordingly, the court below,
citing Natural Resources Defense Council, lne. v. Morton,
supra, and other authorities, held that “the EIS need only
set forth those alternatives ‘sufficient to permit a rea-
soned choice’.”. The Court of Appeals specifically stated
that the requirement of “NEP A’s ‘alternatives’ discussion
is subject to a construction of reasonableness.” (App. 24)
The “reasonableness” standard is followed in all the cir-
cuits insofar as We are aware. See, in addition to the cases
cited above, Wyoming Council v. Butz, 5 E.R.C. 1844 (10th
Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Aleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1972).

ted

As a result of NEPA, therefore, an agency’s procedural
determinations are subject to a more thoroughgoing re-
view than are its ultimate substantive decisions. This re-
sult is entirely consistent with Congress’ view of NEPA
as “action forcing” in the sense that it requires the agency
to put on the table, and weigh and consider, environmental
costs; NEPA does not require particular substantive re-
sults. See Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973);
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir, 1971).

Under this “reasonableness” standard, the court below
examined the record in detail, reviewed the evidence, and
concluded that, based upon the evidence before it, Peti-
tioners’ contended-for “alternatives” were unreasonable
and the procedural decisions of the FAA with respect to
the alternatives to be included and discussed in the EIS
were reasonable. See, ¢.a@.—kpp, 21-24.

* We note that a number of the cases cited by Petitioners in
support of their contention that a conflict exists between the Courts

25

II. The Decision of the Court Below Was Correct
as to the Discussion of and Findings as
to Alternatives Under the
NEPA and AADA

1, NEPA.—As the earlier discussion (pp, 15-16, supra)
makes plain, the EIS here contained a discussion of the
serious alternatives to the Reef Runway and was prepared
after extensive opportunity for comment and the fullest
publicity as to the proposed project. (Pp. 10-12, supra)
Petitioners’ principal contention in this litigation now is
that the EIS should have contained a discussion of still
more “alternatives”"—‘alternatives” which Petitioners,
who participated in the administrative process, never
voiced there. But, as pointed out in the preceding section,
the Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence in the record
and determined that the decision not to include in the EIS
a discussion of certain of Petitioners’ now-proposed
*nonconstruction alternatives” was reasonable. Petitioners
now contend that in this respect the decision conflicts with
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, supra
(“NRDC"). (Pet. 20-21) In fact, as the opinion below
makes clear, there is no such conflict. The court below
expressly relied upon the NRDC case in reaching its con-
clusion. (App. 24)

of Appeals involve cases in which the decision of the agency was
to prepare no EIS at all. 2£.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger,
supra; Hanly v. Kleindicnst, supra. While we believe, as demon-
strated above, that there is no conflict between these cases and the
present case, we would also note that that line of cases specifically
states that there is a significant distinction between instances where
no EIS is prepared at all and those where the dispute involves
how many, and which, “alternatives” need be discussed in the
EIS. See Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, supra, 472 F.2d, at 465
n.4. Obviously, no EIS can discuss every conceivable alternative,

DE SSE ae

26

NRDC held that an agency may not disregard alterna-
tives merely because their implementation is within the
jurisdiction of another agency, 458 F.2d, at 884. Petitioners
see a conflict between that holding and the holding below
that there need be no EIS discussion of the removal of the
Air Force tanker operation from HIA to another location
in the present case. (Pet. 20-21) But, as the court below
pointed out, the Air Force—the other agency involved here
—had been approached and had flatly refused to go along
with this “alternative.” (App. 22-23) Thus, there is no ques-
tion here of failure to consult other agencies or to consider
an “alternative”. Rather, as a result of that consultation
it was clear that implementation of this “alternative” was
impossible. That sort of “alternative” need not be dis-
eussed. NRDC vy. Morton, supra, 458 F.2d, at $34, 836.

Petitioners next note that NRDC held that “discussion of
particular alternatives may not be omitted merely because
they are not complete solutions in and of themselves” and
claim that the court below discounted the possibility of
moving the Air Force and “general” aviation operations
somewhere else for just such a reason. (Pet. 20-21) In
fact, as just recounted, the court below held that moving
the Air Force operations need not be discussed because it
was not possible. (App. 22-23) Similarly, the court noted
that a ban on general aviation would be impossible because
of HIA’s legal commitments.’ Furthermore, the court
pointed out that moving the general aviation operation
would have “no effect” at all on the problems of noise pol-

* As set forth above, moving the inter-island DC-9 and Boeing 737
two-engine takeofi’s so that they would commence at a different
point on the existing runway was also not feasible as a nonconstrue-
tion alternative because, absent expansion of the airport through
hew runway construction, moving the takeoff point for these flights
would cause intolerable congestion. See pp, 18-19, supra.

lution and safety, which are caused by the commercial and
military operation, (App. 23) NRDC does not require a
discussion of such “alternatives.”

2. AADA—Petitioners contend that the holding of the
court below of compliance with } 16(¢)(4) of the AADA,
$4 Stat. 227, 49 U.S.C. § 1716(¢) (4), conflicts with this
Court's interpretation of certain similar language (in an-
other context) in §4(f) of the Department of Transporta-
tion Act, as amended, S82 Stat. S24, 49 U.S.C. §1653(f).
The claim is that Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Ine.
Vv. Volpe, supra, in effect holds that compliance with AADA
requires a showing of “the most unusual situation” before
the project can proceed. (Pet, 21-27) Petitioners quote at
length from Overton Park, relying on this Court's state-
ment that the DOT Act's

“... language is a plain and explicit bar to the use
of federal funds for the construction of highways
through parks—only the most unusual situations are
exempted.” 401 U. S., at 411; Pet. 23.

Petitioners’ argument is a classic example of attempted
literal transterence of words from one context to another
without concern for statutory purpose or common sense.*
Congress in the DOT Act unnistakably meant a bar, ab-
sent “the most unusual situation,” on the construction of
highways through parks. The purpose of that Act was cer-
tainly not to encourage the construction of highways
through parks, But it is hardly likely that Congress in

*In the context of the AAD, the lancuage is to the effect that
the Secretary “shall authorize no such [airport extension] project
found to have adverse effect [on natural resources . . . and other
factors affecting the environment] unless the Secretary shall render
a finding ... that no feasi‘le and prudent alternative exists and
that all possible steps have been taken to minimize such adverse

effect.” § 16(¢) (4).

Peesarererrgrr: or

28

enacting legislation—the AA DA—for “the establishment of
a nationwide system of public airports to meet the present
and future needs of civil aeronautics,” { 14(a), 84 Stat.
224, 49 U.S.C. §1714(a), intended “a plain and explicit
bar to the use of federal funds” for the construction of
airports and runways. Indeed, the entire purpose of the
AADA was to provide the mechanism for Federal finane-
ing of airport and runway improvements.*®

As the court below concluded, based upon its detailed
examination of the record and upon this Court's holding in
Overton Park, the responsible Federal ageney reasonably
believed—tor the reasons discussed at length in the State-
ment—that there were no feasible alternatives to the Reef
Runway project and that steps had been taken to “mini-
mize” whatever adverse effects it had on the environment.’

* Petitioners argument that the language in AADA § 16(c) (4)
must be interpreted to mean the same as the language in § 4(f)
of the DOT Act produces extraordinary conseyuences. While the
occasion for adding $4\(f) to the DOT Act was the passage of
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1963, see Pub. L. 90-495, § 18(b),
82 Stat. 824 (1965), §4(f) is not limited to highway projects.
It requires the making of the finding in question for “any program
or project which requires the use of any publicly-owned land from
a public park” if the “program or project” is one within the juris-
diction of the Secretary of Transportation. Thus. §4(f) requires
the finding in question to be made in the case of the Federally-
financed construction or extension of an airport through or in a
public park (such as in the well-publicized airport extension pro-
gram in Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming). Petitioners’
argument thus leads to the absurdity that no higher standard is re-
quired under DOT Act § 4(f) to construct an airport extension in
a public park than is required under the AADA to construct an
airport extension elsewhere.

* As the Court of Appeals pointed out. the factor which triggers
the necessity for the finding under the AAD. is the existence of
an “adverse effect” upon the environment through the project.
(App. 29) But it is plain that virtually every airport expansion
project will have some adverse effect upen certain aspects of the
environment. In this context. the language in the AADA is
obviously intended to move the Federal agency toward carrying

SR gE ei IME

29

(App. 30) The appropriate procedures were followed when
that finding was made* (App. 29-30), and the AADA re-
quires no more. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, supra, 401 U.S., at 416.

III. Parsons’ Participation in Drafting the
EIS Was Not Improper

As indicated (pp. 9-12, supra) the EIS in the present
case Was jointly prepared by the FAA, the State of Hawaii.
and the Ralph M. Parsons Company, the Reef Runway
project’s design consultant. Both courts below concluded
that the fact that Parsons, which was undisputedly finan-
cially interested in the project, participated in the drafting
did not invalidate the EIS because the responsible FAA
officials participated at every step. (App. 13-15; 40-41)
Petitioners claim that this holding conflicts with the Court
of Appeals’ decision in Greene County Planning Board v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert.

out the expansion in a way which minimizes the adverse effect
upon the environment. Here, the only such adverse effect was
the effect on Keehi Lagoon (EIS 33) and, in particular, upon the
Hawaiian Stilt. The project, however, involved construction of
suitable alternative grounds for the Stilt, and it was on this basis
that the agency found that “all possible steps have been taken
to minimize such adverse effect.” AADA, § 16(c)(4). There is
no attack in this Court on the adequacy of the measures to provide
alternative grounds for the Hawaiian Stilt.

* There is no dispute that, pursuant to DOT Order 5050.2, the
finding required by the AADA is to be made by the director of
the FAA’s Pacific region, or that such a finding was in fact made.
A copy of that finding appears in the final EIS immediately pre-
ceding the title page. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the
EIS itself may serve either as the § 16(c) (4) finding. or, in the
alternative, as the record in support of that finding. Citizens’
Airport Committee v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Va. 1972):
App. 29.

30

denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972), and with a District Court deci-
sion, Conservation Soc’'y v. Secretary of Transportation,
362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973).

In Greene County, the FPC had required the applicant
for a permit to write the impact statement, which the FPC
then adopted verbatim with no input of its own. See 455
F.2d, at 416-17. Similarly, in Conservation Soc’y, the Fed-
eral Highway Administration delegated responsibility for
the preparation of the EIS to the Vermont Highway De-
partment. The FHWA’s representative occasionally con-
sulted with, but never supervised, the Vermont personnel
who did the actual drafting. Furthermore, the FHWA had
no significant input on the fina! EIS, contenting itself
with three general comments. 362 F. Supp., at 629-30. The
FHWA did not write or edit a single passage of the EIS.
Id., at 632. In both these instances, the courts held that the
EIS involved was improperly prepared.®

These cases are inapposite here. Both courts below con-
cluded that “the evidence shows that F.A.A. officials did
in fact work together with state officials and a private con-
tractor and gave it [the EIS] close attention.” (App. 14:
40-41) There is thus no question here of a Federal agency
“entrusting” the drafting of an EIS to outsiders, as Peti-
tioners claim. No court has held that it is forbidden for
the Federal agency in charge to work with others, so long
as that agency performs its statutory duty of controlling

°To be sure, there have been a number of cases which appear
to look the other way from Greene County and Conservation Soc’y,
and uphold such delegations of the responsibility for the drafting
of an EIS. See National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352
F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972); Finish Allatoona’s Interstate
Right, Inc. v. Volpe, 355 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Whatever
the difference in approach in the cases, the decision below is not
at variance with the decisions relied upon by Petitioners.

Sa eS Fe I a LD OE

31

the drafting of the EIS. That is precisely what the courts
below found, as a matter of fact, was done here.*°

The EIS in this case and the concurrent rulings of the
two lower courts make it plain that the Reef Runway proj-
ect will have a positive, beneficial effect on noise and air
pollution over the densely populated city of Honolulu and
that the construction projects incident to it will actually
improve the present water pollution situation in Keehi
Lagoon. The only material environmental problem identi-
fied in the review process was the problem as to the
Hawaiian Stilt, and Petitioners raise no question here as
to the adequacy of the measures developed to produce
equivalent grounds for the Stilt. There is no conflict among
the Courts of Appeals as to the various questions of pro-
cedure tendered to this Court in the present litigation, and
there is no reason for further review of the concurrent
findings of the two courts below.

*° Petitioners complain (Pet. 10, 28) that they were restricted
in their examination of the Parsons’ representative to show the
extent to which he had participated in drafting the EIS. But
this is irrelevant. It was not disputed that Parsons participated
materially in drafting the EIS. The only question is whether the
Federal agency also participated materially and performed its
statutory duty of controlling the drafting of the EIS.

32

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari should be denied.

Of Counsel:

Davin BonDERMAN
Arnotp & PorTER

Respectfully submitted,

GrorGE Pai
Attorney General,
State of Hawaii

JoHNson H. Wone
ArtHurR T. Murakami
Deputies Attorney General
State of Hawaii
Hawaii State Capitol
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

Dennis G. Lyons
Special Deputy Attorney
General, State of Hawaii
1229 Nineteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Attorneys for Respondent
E. Alvey Wright, Director, Hawaii
Department of Transportation

,

Washington, D. C.

February, 1974

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_1728%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
