# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Life of the Land v. Brinegar

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 416 U.S. 961

## Text

Anited States

OcToBER TERM, 1973

No. 3- 1088

LIFE OF THE LAND, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
CLAUDE S. BRINEGAR, Secretary of
Transportation, et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

MicHakEL R. SHERWOOD,
Suite 433,
735 Bishop Street,
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813,
Telephone: (808) 521-7474,

Counsel for Petitioners.

Hart, SHERWOOD, LEAVITT,

BLANCHFIELD and Hatt,
Suite 433,
735 Bishop Street,
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813,
Telephone: (808) 521-7474,

Of Counsel.

January 8, 1974.

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Opinions below
Jurisdiction
Questions presented
Statutory provisions involved
Statement: of the case

Reasons for granting the writ

Subiect Index

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I. The decision below conflicts with the decisions of other

II.

Ill.

Conelusion

circuits with respect to the proper standard of judicial
review of the threshold federal agency decision to omit
discussion or even mention in an environmental impact
statement under NEPA of certain environmental con-
sequences of and alternatives to a proposed project

The decision below conflicts with the decisions of the
District of Columbia Cireuit in NRDC v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827 (D.C.Cir. 1972) and with this court in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971), with respect to the need to discuss and
consider alternatives to a proposed airport expansion
project under NEPA and AADA, respectively
A. NEPA
B. AADA

The decision below conflicts with the decision of the
Second Circuit in Greene County Planning Board v.
FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409
U.S. 849 (1972) as to whether the preparation of an
EIS may be delegated to a private company with a
direet financial interest in an affirmative decision on
the propsed project which is the subject of the EIS..

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Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages
Calvert Clifts’ Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d
COOP (ERE Bisa oasis se nre ook Coss dome eRe eae 11, 14,18
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, F.Supp.
ery ag 9 B.L.R. 20423 (W.D.Tenn. 1973) ......------ 11
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
CO ices cones ea ncee See beet kee eS 11, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27
Conservation Society v. Seeretary of Transportation, 362
F.Supp. 627 (D.Vt. 1973) 2.2.2... eee ee eee eee ee eee 29
Environmental Defense Fund vy. Corps of Engineers, 470
F.2d 289 (Sth Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 1072 (1973) 16
First National Bank v. Riehardson, .... F.2d 2... 5 E.RC.
1830, 3 E.L.R. 20771 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 1973) ........ 15
Greene County Planning Board vy. Federal Power Commis-
sion, 455 F.2d 412 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U.S.
CON CURE de Ones abba cava eee an Oue ere ees 27, 28, 29
Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d $23 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
dea. ... US. —.., SS BCL. F290 CUSTD) oi ccc ckcssicese 15
lowa Citizens v. Volpe, . F.Supp.. ; . + E.R.
1755. 3 RL 2001S (62. dowa 1972)... «6. 6 ccccnsseees 30
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d
Ce Tee ie ED 6, Cu wae ue scea vies ee ee re eice ae eas 14, 21
NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.Cir. 1972) .......... 20
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.
DRE a eee daaousbigcisex ioe eaw cee pees 14, 15,17
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, F.2d, _.., 5 BBC. 1920
eb ok! We a: | Ee nee ar ee 16, 17, 18, 30
Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973) ............ 15
Wyoming Council v. Butz, ... F.2d... 5 E.R.C. 18H, 3
E.L.B. 20630 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1973) ............ 15, 16,17
Statutes
Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970 | AADA)
Traitad: Miaben Come, FRM WO eg nas sia s sededncsecs 4
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ee EN oe acuta se teen Nea ee a eeenwnn 22
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TaBLe oF AUTHORITIES CITED lii
Pages
OR RENO le a leer eros eo eee 22
RM EEO) Cro haa a eee ee 22
National Environmental Policy Aet of 1969 (NEPA) United
pees Cada, Bitee AB ols ec eee cee +
on > ns Ra a Rea MTEL Fa Ak AA Re nS ne 4
chick ae cp EE Te SRE AOR PE eat koe Fatt: +
ee SUI cree oe eee res Laat tice. tak 11
RE ee es Te ee +
MON CR oa ae sy kee a ee 12
ert CO. ee, 9, 12, 13, 27
Pee eee tee ee ee ee 20
ee 1) See Lone eat fal nea ae 20
d U.S.C. (Administrative Procedure Act):
NN EMC e cee cer ee nee 5
NE Co ey ee erat 15. 16
Se an, RD enon ae en a teen 22
Se Wares NO MENDY os ro ee es ah ee al 3
28 U.S.C. (Federal Question) Section 1331 ............... 5
28 U.S.C. (Regulation of Interstate Commerce) Section 1337 5
28 U.S.C. (Mandamus) Section 1361 ..................... 5
Other Authorities
Anderson, NEPA in the Courts: A Legal Analysis of the
National Environmental Poliey Act (Environmental Law
Institute, 1973), Chapter 1 (“NEPA and Congress”). pp.
BOE) oxen skeen Ca kene cee he ee ee. 13
Delegation of the Drafting of Environmental Impact State-
ee ee |S | = | Reig Seen eel ee 30
Environmental Quality, the Fourth Annual Report of the
Council on Environmental Quality (1973) p. 242 ...... 16
House Report 90-601, U.S. Code Cong. Adm. News, pp.
ER co a ne wee ee te Ua ete eee 2
S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong.. Ist Sess. 9 (1969) ........ 13

Stanford Research Institute, Runway Development Require-
ment at Honolulu International Airport (1969) pp. 2, 12.

ee

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Gu the Supreme Court |

OF THE

Rnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1973

No.
LIFE OF THE LAND, et al.,
Petitioners, '
Vs.

CLAUDE S. BrRINEGAR, Secretary of
Transportation, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the United States Court of Appeals :
for the Ninth Circuit

The petitioners, Life of the Land, Hawaii Audubon
Society, Friends of the Earth, Raymond Catania,
J. Abraham Pasadaba, Wilfred H. Paul, Jr., and
Pete Kaululaau G. Thompson, respectfully pray that
a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

¢ RS TNE ee ae ae

2

the Ninth Circuit entered in this proceeding on Sep-
tember 10, 1973, rehearing denied, October 16, 1973."

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
(hereinafter ‘‘Opinion”), not yet officially reported,
appears at 5 E.R.C. 1780, 3 E.L.R. 20811,? and as
Appendix A. That court’s Order denying the Petition
for Rehearing appears as Appendix B. The Decision
and Order of the United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii, dated December 22, 1972,
is reported at 363 F.Supp. 1171 (D.Haw. 1972) and
appears as Appendix C. The Final Decision and
Order of that court, dated April 13, 1973, incorporat-
ing by reference the reasoning set forth in the Decem-
ber 22, 1972 Decision and Order, appears as Appen-

dix D.

JURISDICTION
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit was entered on September 10, 1973. A
timely petition for rehearing en bane was denied by

1Respondents are Claude S. Brinegar, Secretary of the United
States Department of Transportation; John Shaffer, Adminis-
trator, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), National Office;
Jack Webb, Administrator, FAA, Pacific Region; E. Alvey Wright,
Director, Hawaii Department of Transportation; Kalihi Palama
Community Council; James Y, Muraoka; Takeshi Uyesugi; and
Dillingham Corporation.

*“E.R.C.” citations refer to Environment Reporter Cases, pub-
lished by the Bureau of National Affairs: “F.L.R.” citations refer
to Environmental Law Reporter, published by the Environmental
Law Institute.

er . - . “ Sk eee |

that court on October 16, 1973. This petition for
certiorari was filed within 90 days of the latter date.
This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is the standard of judicial review under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of a
threshold agency decision to omit from an environ-
mental impact statement any mention of certain en-
vironmental impacts of and alternatives to the pro-
posed project, whether that decision was arbitrary
and capricious, with the burden of proof upon plain-
tiffs, or whether that decision was reasonable, with

the burden of proof upon the agency ?

2. Is an environmental impact statement for an
airport expansion project that fails to mention reason-
able non-construction alternatives to the project ade-
quate under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and under the Airport and Airways Develop-
ment Act of 1970 (AADA)?

3. Does NEPA permit the preparation of an en-
vironmental impact statement to be delegated to a
private party with a major and direct financial inter-
est in the proposed project which is the subject of that
impact statement?

a

4

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

A. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) United States Code, Title 42:

$4321. Purpose.
(Text set forth in Appendix E)

$4331. Congressional declaration of policy.
(Text set forth in Appendix E)

$4332. Administration consistent with policies of
Act.
(Text set forth in Appendix E)

B. Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970
(AADA) United States Code, Title 49:
§1716. Submission and approval of projects for
airport development.
(Text set forth in Appendix E)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an environmental law case involving the
adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement
(hereinafter **EIS”) for the Reef Runway project at
Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu, Hawaii,
and the appropriate standard of judicial review there-
of, under the provisions both of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
$$4321 et seq., and the Airport and Airways Develop-
ment Act of 1970 (AADA), 49 U.S.C. §$1701 et seq.
The case presents issues of nation-wide importance
concerning which the circuits are in conflict, and upon
which this Court has never ruled.

-

~

Petitioners, the Plaintiffs and Appellants below,
are three environmental organizations and four indi-
vidual residents of Kalihi-Palama, the area most af-
fected by flight patterns of aircraft arriving and de-
parting from Honolulu International Airport (here-
inafter *‘HIA”). Respondents are those agencies and
employees of the Federal and State governments re-
sponsible for construction of the Reef Runway. Ad-
ditional Respondents, allowed by the District Court to
intervene over the objection of Petitioners, see De-
cision and Order of the District Court, 363 F.Supp.
1176, footnote 19, Appendix C, p. 42, are the private
company awarded the construction contract for the
project, and other Kalihi-Palama residents who favor
the runway.

Petitioners filed suit challenging the EIS for the
Reef Runway project in the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii on November 8,
1972. Jurisdiction of that court was based upon 5
U.S.C. §701-6 (Administrative Procedure Act); 28
U.S.C. §1331 (Federal Question); 28 U.S.C. $1337
(Regulation of Interstate Commerce); and 28 U.S.C.
§1361 (Mandamiis). Record p. 3.

The Complaint alleged, inter alia, that Respondents
had not complied with the requirements of Section
102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C), be-
cause the Reef Runway EIS failed to discuss or even
mention certain reasonable alternatives to the pro-
posed runway, Ree. 11-13; that Respondents had not
satistied the requirements of Section 16(¢)(4) of
AAD A, 49 U.S.C. §1716(¢) (4), because they had not

6

established that no feasible and prudent alternative
to the Reef Runway existed, Rec. 14-15; and that
Respondents had violated NEPA’s requirement that
the “responsible [federal] official” prepare the EIS
by delegating preparation thereof to a private con-
sultant with a financial interest in construction of the
proposed Reef Runway, Rec. 15-14.

The Reef Runway would be a new 12,000 foot jet
runway at HIA, 6,700 feet seaward of and parallel
to the existing primary runway, that would nearly
double the capacity of HIA. The runway would cost
more than $70,000,000.00 and is scheduled to be com-
pleted by 1975. It would be built off-shore and would
consume some 1,240 acres of ocean coral reef, 765
acres of which would be paved over. EIS, (D-1 in
evidence below) pp. 11, 12, 38.

Approximately 186 acres of silted coral mudflats
used for roosting and nesting by birds, including the
Hawaiian Stilt, an endangered species of bird unique
to the Hawaiian Islands, would be destroyed. EIS,
p. 26.

The Reef Runway would affect water quality in the
surrounding ocean, although whether that effect would
be beneficial or adverse is in dispute. See: EIS, pp.
18, 31-2: D-6 (“Plan to Enhance Water Quality in
Keehi Lagoon”) (beneficial impact): D-16, Appendix
3 (“Study Report—Proposed Reef Runway—Hono-
lulu International Airport”), p. 5: D-18 (“Hydraulic
Model Study. Proposed Reef Runway, Honolulu In-
ternational Airport”), $4, p. 43: Tr. 241-6: 319, 320:
P-28 through P-33, and P-39 (adverse impact).

See Re oe ee Se ons

~l

Similarly, the Runway would have an impact both
upon air quality and population levels within the
state, although agein the nature of those impacts is
disputed. See Tr. 5746; 686; 766-7 (air quality:
negligible or even beneficial impact); Tr. 134-5; 152,
161-3; 188; 199-200 (air quality: adverse impact) ;
Tr. 767-8; 783-4; 804-5; S07 (demographic impact:
negligible) ; Tr. 24, 27, 29-34, 38-40, 46, 56, 57-8, 65-6,
67, 69, 75 (demographic impact: adverse).

The Reef Runway EIS, dated January, 1972, is the
document prepared by Respondents to satisfy the pro-
visions of AADA, and particularly 49 U.S.C.
$1716(¢) (4), as well as those of NEPA: Tr. 758;
789-90; Opinion, App. A, p. 29. It consists of a
total of 46 pages, plus appendages, including a one-
and-three-quarter page discussion of four alternatives
to the proposed Reef Runway: (1) a new on-shore
runway oriented in a 100°-280° direction; (2) a new
on-shore runway parallel to existing runway 08-26;
(3) a 4,000 foot westward extension of existing run-
way 08-26 plus an additional new on-shore 6,500 foot
reliever runway parallel thereto: and (4) foregoing
construction of the Reef Runway altogether. EIS,
pp. 34-5.

The purposes of the Reef Runway, as set forth in
the EIS, are (1) to increase the capacity of HIA;
(2) to reduce the level of aircraft noise over adja-

3The EIS does not discuss or even mention the impact of the
project upon either air quality in terms of invisible air pollution,
or upon population levels and the adverse “secondary” effects that
flow from increased population. See Opinion, App. A. pp. 18-21.

8

cent populated areas by moving present overflights
seaward from those areas: (3) to lessen the danger
of an aircraft crash into populated areas by the same
means: and (4) to increase flexibility at HIA to
allow for runway repairs and shut-downs. EIS, pp.
4-5; Opinion, App. A, p. 12.

The chief issue in this litigation has been whether
Respondents have complied with the requirements of
NEPA and AADA that they discuss in the ETS and
consider in their decision-making reasonable alterna-
tives to the Reef Runway which might accomplish
these objectives with less environmental harm and at
a smaller economic cost.

Petitioners demonstrated at trial that a variety of
such reasonable “non-construction” alternatives exist
that were not discussed or even mentioned in the
EIS. One such alternative, for example, would be
to require the two commercial inter-island carriers,
Hawaiian Airlines and Aloha Airlines, to commence
the takeoff runs of their twin jet DC-9’s and Boeing
737’s, respectively, from the far western end of the
existing primary jet runway, rather than from the
present takeoff point, approximately 4,000 feet to
the east and closer to the populated areas. At least
as to those aireraft, which are as noisy as a Boeing
747, this procedure would immediately eliminate noise
and over-flight problems in the Kalihi-Palama Com-
munity. Tr. pp. 206-19; 230-1; D-20 (Stanford Re-
search Institute, Runwan Development Requirement
at Honolulu International Airport (1969), at pp. 2,
12, 32).

Ty tte te tee oe ee

Other reasonable alternatives not mentioned in the
EIS include removing military and general aviation
from HIA (thereby reducing the number of opera-
tions at HIA by a total of 56%, see Opinion, App.
p. 5, and increasing the capacity of HIA by the
same percentage), improving air traffic control, em-
ploying aircraft with less noisy engines, retrofitting
older aircraft with quieter engines, adjusting and
consolidating airline schedules so as to increase the
passenger load factor on individual flights, and con-
verting the aircraft fleet to wide-body aircraft. See
“The Jamaica Bay-Kennedy Airport, A Multi-Disci-
plinary Environment Study”, in evidence as P-4(a)
and P-4(b); Tr. 407-13, 423-4, 427-31 (testimony of
Prof. Joseph Sax); 815-16 (National Transportation
Report).

The Ninth Circuit ruled that the failure of the
Reef Runway EIS to mention these alternatives
(as well as its failure to include other informa-
tion such as the impact of the project upon popula-
tion levels and air quality) did not render it and the
decision-making process inadequate under NEPA.
The court held that such omissions in an EIS violate
that statute only if Petitioners are able to demon-
strate that the threshold agency decisions to omit were
arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.
Opinion, App. A. pp. 22-4 (non-construction alterna-
tives); pp. 18-9 (demographic impact); pp. 20-1 (air
quality impact).

With respect to AADA, the Ninth Circuit held
that the EIS should be taken into account in deter-

Pew ee

10

mining whether the Secretary of Transportation had
satisfied the AADA requirement that he determine
that no feasible and prudent alternative to the Reef
Runway exist before approving the project. Opinion,
App. A, p. 29. Relying on its NEPA rulings, the
court held that the Secretary had complied with
AADA. Ibid.

A private engineering firm, the Ralph M. Parsons
Company (hereinafter “Parsons”), which, as found
by the Ninth Circuit, “had a financial interest in an
affirmative decision on the proposed project”, Opin-
ion, App. A, p. 13, participated substantially in the
preparation of the EIS.

The full extent of Parsons’ participation, and of
its apparent financial conflict of interest therein, is,
however, unclear in the record because the district
court judge ruled several times at pretrial and dur-
ing the course of the trial as a matter of law that the
preparation of an EIS may be delegated to a private
party with a major financial interest in the pro-
posed project. See eg.. Tr. pages 357-8: 363. Con-
sequently, Petitioners were precluded by the trial
court from developing the relative degrees of par-
ticipation by Parsons, the state ageney, and the fed-
eral agency, although Petitioners’ counsel made ample
offers of proof on this issue. Tr. 363: 365-6; 368:
369-70 : 372; 375-81.

Notwithstanding this, the Ninth Cirenit rejected
Petitioners’ improper delegation claim on the eround
that the FAA had participated significantly in the
preparation of the EIS. Opinion, App. A, pp. 14, 15.

11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS
OF OTHER CIRCUITS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPER
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE THRESHOLD
FEDERAL AGENCY DECISION TO OMIT DISCUSSION OR
EVEN MENTION IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT UNDER NEPA OF CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL CON-
SEQUENCES OF AND ALTERNATIVES TO A PROPOSED
PROJECT.

This case involves more than the technical suffi-
ciency of the EIS for the Reef Runway,’ and indeed
more than the fate of the Reef Runway itself. Rather,
the opinion below constitutes an emasculating inter-
pretation of NEPA, ‘‘the broadest and perhaps most
important” of recent federal environmental legisla-
tion, Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. AEC,
449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C.Cir. 1971).

NEPA was intended by Congress to achieve ambi-
tious but vitally important goals. Section 101(a) of
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4331(a), declares it to be the “con-
tinuing policy of the Federal Government... to use
all practicable means and measures . . . to create and
to maintain conditions under which man and nature
ean exist in productive harmony... .” NEPA directs,
moreover, that ‘‘to the fullest extent possible ... the

*Petitioners do not seek merely a superficial rewriting of the
EIS. Petitioners contend, rather, that if the various non-construc-
tion alternatives to the project are genuinely considered by the
decision makers, the ultimate decision that the Reef Runway is
necessary at all may well be reversed. Cf. Citizcns to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, —... F.Supp. —.. —... 3 E.L.R. 20425,
20423 (W.D.Tenn. 1973) (Secretary of Transportation, upon being
compelled to consider alternatives to proposed routing of interstate
highway through park following Supreme Court decision in Cii/-
zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). re-
verses prior decision to approve federal funding for such route.)

Be sere eins oe FB lA A Let CBS

12

policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in ac-
cordance with the policies set forth in this Act.” 42
U.S.C. §4332(1).

The primary device created by Congress to effec-
tuate this policy is the requirement contained in Sec-
tion 102(2)(C) of NEPA that prior to undertaking
‘‘major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment” the ‘‘responsible
[federal] official” must prepare a ‘‘detailed state-
ment” (the so-called **EIS”) including discussion of,
inter alia, *‘the environmental impact of the proposed
action”; ‘‘any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be implement-
ed”; and ‘‘alternatives to the proposed action”. 42
U.S.C. §43832(2)(C).

The importance Congress placed upon the section
102(2)(C) requirements as a means of achieving
NEPA’s goals is emphasized by NEPA’s legislative
history. In hearings concerning NEPA held at a time
when the bills under consideration did not include
these requirements, Senator Jackson, NEPA’s prin-
cipal sponsor, responded as follows to a witness who
suggested the need therefor:

I have been concerned with the adequacy of the
policy declarations in the bill that I introduced.
Obviously, this is not enough... .

. I agree with you that realistically what is
needed in restructuring the governmental side of
this problem is to legislatively create those situa-
tions that will bring about an action-forcing pro-
eedure with which departments must comply.

— ——

Rac POM Ara OSES SOT ae ee IO SE

13

Otherwise, these lofty declarations are nothing
more than that. It is merely a finding and state-
ment but there is no requirement as to implemen-
tation. Heartnys on S.1075, 8.237, and S.1752
before the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Congress, Ist Session 116
(1969).

NEPA was thereupon amended by the Committee
to establish the Section 102(2)(C) EIS procedures,
which were again characterized as ‘‘action-forcing”
both in the Committee Report, S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1969), and by Senator Jackson on
the floor of the Senate during debate on the passage of
the bill. 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969).

Once prepared by the responsible federal agency,
the EIS is to be circulated to ‘‘appropriate federal,
state and local agencies” for their review and com-
ment. The EIS, together with any such comments, is
then to ‘‘be made available to the President, the
Council on Environmental Quality and to the public”
prior to any final determination on the project. 42
U.S.C. §4332(2)(C).

From this statutory scheme, it is manifest that
NEPA is to ‘‘serve as an environmental full disclo-
sure law, providing information which Congress
thought the public should have concerning the par-
ticular environmental costs involved in a_ project,”
Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973)

5For a detailed summary of the legislative history of NEPA,
see Anderson, NEPA in the Courts: A Legal Analysis of the Na-

tional Environmental Policy Act (Environmental Law Institute,
1973), Chapter 1 (“NEPA and Congress”), pp. 1-14.

Ce

14

(emphasis supplied), whose purpose is to compel con-
sideration of environmental factors in the decision-
making process, not only by the particular agency
involved, but also by the ultimate decision makers:
The President, the Congress, and the public. See:
Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committce vu. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Natural Resources
Defense Counsel v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 835 (D.C.
Cir, 1971); Seve Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d
463, 466 (Sth Cir. 1973).

This function was spelled out in a report prepared
for the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs:

To make policy effective through action, a com-
prehensive system is required for the assembly
and reporting of relevant knowledge; and for
placing before the President, the Congress, and
the people, for public decision, the alternative
courses of action that this knowledge suggests.
L. Caldwell, A Special Report to the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, A Na-
tional Policy for the Environment 11, 90th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (Comm. print July 11, 1968). Also at
115 Cong. Ree. S. 12129 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1969).

Because of this fundamental purpose of NEPA and
the EIS, the courts should review with especially
close scrutiny threshold agency decisions not to pre-
pare an EIS at all or to omit discussion in an EIS
of certain environmental impacts of, or alternates
to, a proposed project.

The Ninth Circuit, however, has now held that it
will apply the Administrative Procedure Act’s very

Ran a Pe URE ee NE er a

limited ‘‘arbitrary and capricious” standard of re-
view, 5 U.S.C. §706(2) (A), to these threshold agency
decisions. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit places the
burden upon Petitioners to demonstrate that such
decisions were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. Opinion, App. A, pp. 17-24. For example,
the court held that Petitioners had failed to prove
that the various non-construction alternatives not
mentioned in the EIS, even though ‘‘utilized at other
airports in the continental United States, are neces-
sarily adaptable to the unique situation existing at
HLA.” Opinion, App. A, p. 24, fn. 13.

By adopting this very limited standard of review
the Ninth Cireuit has put itself at odds with at least
four other Courts of Appeals that have passed on the
standard of review under NEPA of these threshold
agency decisions. There are now three different stand-
ards of review in the various circuits: (1) That of
the Ninth Circuit in this ease; (2) That of the See-
ond Circuit in Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823,
829, 836 (2d Cir. 1972), vert. denied, 0. U.S... 93
S.Ct. 2290 (1973), and of the Seventh Circuit in First
National Bank v. Richardson, —... F.2d ....., 5 E.R.C.
1830, 3 E.L.R. 20771, 20776 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 1973)
(arbitrary and capricious standard is appropriate, but
the agency has the affirmative duty to develop a review-
able environmental record and to demonstrate that
its decision was not arbitrary and capricious); and
(3) that of the Fifth Cireuit in Save Our Ten Acres
uv. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465-7, (5th Cir. 1973), and
the Tenth Cireuit in Wyoming Couneil v. Butz, ......
F.24 ....... > E.R.C, 184, 1846, 3 E.L.R. 20830, 20831

ED ones

ros ei ®

16

(10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1973) (arbitrary and capricious
standard rejected; appropriate standard is whether
the agency’s decision was reasonable, with the burden
of demonstrating reasonableness upon the ageney).°

This split among the circuits creates an intolerable
situation. Federal agencies with responsibilities affect-
ing the environment now must devise NEPA proced-
ures and evaluate the adequacy of impact statements
in terms of three different judicial standards. The
matter is complicated by the fact that many agency
actions affect the environment in more than one judi-
cial circuit. With impact statements currently being
prepared by federal agencies at a rate of more than
1,000 per year, see Environmental Quality, the Fourth
Annual Report of the Council on Environmental
Quality (1973), at 242, establishment of a uniform
standard for judicial review is an urgent necessity.

Perhaps the standard set forth in the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§706(2) CA), is the correct standard for review of the
ultimate substantive agency decision to proceed or not
to proceed with the project. See, eg. Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289,
297-300 (Sth Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072
(1973); Sterra Club v. Froehlke, ......... | Fae = aie ,
5 E.R.C. 1920, 1925 (7th Cir. Oct. 2, 1973). But the

SThese cases involve agenev decisions whether to prepare an
impact statement at all rather than what to inelude in an impact
statement, Clearly, however, both decisions have the same relation
to the statutory goals and must be judged by the same standard,
Otherwise, an ageney could too easily defeat the purposes of NEPA
by preparing an EIS that was little more than a hollow shell, omit-
ting crucial information on the impacts of and alternatives to the
proposed project.

17

Ninth Circuit has confused the issue of review of the
ultimate substantive decision of the agency with the
question of procedural compliance by the agency with
NEPA, and more particularly of the adequacy of the
EIS in terms of what information should be included
therein. Clearly two different standards of review
should apply to these distinct issues. See Save Our Ten
Acres v. Kreger, supra, at 472 F.2d 467; Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, supra, at ........ F.24¢ ......., 5 E.R.C. 1924.

The narrow arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view under the Administrative Procedure Act is an
inappropriate standard of review of procedural com-
plianee since “NEPA’s specific requirements in [$4332
(2)(C)] clearly speak in mandatory terms, and do
not leave the determination to administrative discre-
tion. [citations omitted]”. Wyoming Council v. Butz.
vewneee BYE cesses! comny O ELR.C, 18+, 1846, 3 E.L.R. 20830,
20831 (10th Cir, Sept. 21, 1973). While “some area
of judgment is [of course] involved . . . the compass
of the judgment to be made is narrow .. .”, and the
test on review should be that ‘the determination must
be reasonable in the light of the mandatory require-
ments and high standards set by the statute. [Cita-
tions omitted.]” 7d. at... Fd... 5 ELL.R. 1847, 3
E.L.R. 20831. Accord: Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger,
472 F.2d 463, 465-7 (5th Cir. 1973).

Moreover, the spirit of the Act demands that the
burden of proving compliance therewith fall upon the
ageney, and not upon citizen plaintiffs, since

the very nature of this legal area is so extensive
that if the burden were placed wholly upon citi-

—_= -—

18

zen plaintiffs, the full disclosure requirements
of NEPA would never be implemented satisfac-
torily, and environmental protection as contem-
plated by Congress would be little more than a
fiction.

Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F.Supp. 1289, 1335 (S.D.
Tex. 1973). See also Calvert Cliffs’, supra, at H9 F.2d
1118-9.

The practical effect of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling,
if left unchallenged is, to render NEPA superfluous
and an act of futility by the Congress, because even
before NEPA an agency's decision to adopt one alter-
native rather than another was subject to review under
the APA standard.

Specifically, the decision below nullifies the two basic
purposes of NEPA. First, it permits an agency too
easily to exclude from its impact statement and its
decision-making process alternatives not compatible
with its own narrow conception of its mission, a con-
ception which may be inconsistent with environmental
protection. A major purpose of NEPA was to compel
agencies to take a broader view.’

*That this result actually will eceur is apparent from this case,
where the Ninth Cireuit appreved an impact statement for a
STO.000,000,00 airpert construction project which devotes only
one-and-three-fourths pages to alternatives and which mentions
no alternatives involving safer and more efficient airport manage-
ment as opposed to additional construction. By employing its
unique standard, the Ninth Circuit was able to justify omission
of the alternative of removing Air Force jets by simply noting
that “the Air Foree had refused to move ... .”. Opinion, App.
A. pp. 22-3. But ene purpese of the EIS should have been to
examine the costs and benefits of the Air Foree decision. The

oe 2 TAN igre 2 ar

19

Second, it allows the agency too easily to frustrate
the goal of NEPA to bring the public into the decision-
making process with regard to environmental matters,
and to open the opportunity for the public, with full
data available to it in the form of an adequate EIS,
to effect changes in substantive decisions made by pub-
lic agencies, even though those decisions might not be
so wrong us to be characterizable as arbitrary, capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion.®

Ninth Cireuit justified non-diseussion of the alternative of higher
landing fees on the bootstrap ground that this alternative was
considered but rejected by Respondents. Jd. at 23. The court held
that Respondents need not mention the alternatives of moving pri-
vate aircraft and requiring inter-island jets to take off at different
points because each of these measures was only a partial solution.
Ibid. And, finally, the Ninth Cireuit ratified Respondents’ failure
to mention the alternatives of consolidating airline schedules and
converting to wide-hody aircraft by stating that nothing in the
record indicated these to be reasonable alternatives, Jd. at 24, and
at the same time brushing off the positive experience with these
techniques at other airports as being irrelevant. Jd. at 24, n. 13.
If NEPA’s requirement that an agency “diseuss in detail” the
alternatives to a proposed action means no more than this, it
might as well not exist.

‘In the Reef Runway situation, for example, had the public
been appraised in the EIS of the full adverse effects upon the
State of increased population and air pollution, or of certain
alternatives to the project which did not happen to appeal to the
ageney, or were not within the agency's jurisdiction (such as
compelling the military to remove its operations from HITA), the
publie might very well, through persuasion or intervention via
Congress, have overruled the ageney decision to proceed, ¢iren
though that decision was not necessarily invalid under the APA
test.

20

Il. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT IN NRDC v.
MORTON, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.CIR. 1972) AND WITH THIS
COURT IN CITIZENS TO PRESERVE OVERTON PARK v.
VOLPE, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), WITH RESPECT TO THE NEED
TO DISCUSS AND CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES TO A PRO-
POSED AIRPORT EXPANSION PROJECT UNDER NEPA AND
AADA, RESPECTIVELY.

A. NEPA.

As previously noted, NEPA requires that the EIS
for a major federal action include discussion of the
**. . . alternatives to the proposed action”. 42 U.S.C.
§4332(2)(C) (iii). Further, $4332(2)(D) mandates
the federal agency to **study, develop, and describe
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of
action in any proposal which involves unresolved
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available re-

= 99

sources.

The Ninth Cireuit held that Petitioners had not
proved that Respondents’ failure to mention in the
EIS a whole range of non-construction alternatives
to the Reef Runway was not arbitrary and capricious
or an abuse of discretion. The propriety of this stan-
dard of review is discussed in Section I, supra. Among

the reasons given fer this general conclusion are (1)
that removing military and general aviation operations
from HIA altogether, and compelling the inter-island
carriers to commence their take-offs from the far
western end of the existing runway, would not, by and
of themselves individually, totally solve the noise and
safety problems at HIA, Opinion, App. A, pp. 22-3,
and (2) that certain alternatives, such as, specifically,
removing the Air Force KC-155 tanker operations

CNS ee re ee

21

from HIA to a nearby military airport, were not
within the immediate jurisdiction of the state agency:
“There is, however, evidence indicating that the Air
Force had refused to move its jet tankers to another
base, effectively eliminating implementation of this
alternative” (emphasis supplied), Jbid.

The Ninth Cireuit’s ruling on alternatives under
NEPA places it squarely in conflict with the other
leading NEPA case on the necessity to discuss alter-
Natives in an EIS, Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833-6 (D.C.Cir. 1972). Mor-
ton held both that an agency may not “disregard
alternatives merely because they do not offer a com-
plete solution to the problem”, 7d. at 458 F.2d 836,
and that an agency may not omit discussion of an
alternative in an EIS merely because implementation
of that alternative is not within the jurisdiction of the
particular agency. Id. at 458 F.2d 834.

The policy reasons for this rule are the same as
those already noted in Section I, supra, to wit, that
the EIS is designed not only to force the particular
agency involved to consider environmental factors in
its decision-making process, but, at least equally im-
portant, is also ‘‘for the guidance of these ultimate
decision-makers [Congress, the President, and the
public]” Id. at 458 F.2d 835.

B. AADA.

The Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970,
49 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq., which authorizes the expen-
diture of substantial federal funds “in order to bring
about, in conformity with the national airport system

22

plan, the establishment of a nationwide system of
public airports adequate to meet the present and fu-
ture needs of civil aeronautics”, 49 U.S.C. $1714(a),
also expresses the Congressional intent that such air-
ports be compatible with the surrounding natural en-
vironment and not contribute to its degradation. See
generally 49 U.S.C. §1716(¢) (4), -(d), and -(e).

To this end, Section 16(¢)(4) of AADA, 49 U.S.C.
§1716(c) (4), imposes even more stringent require-
ments than does NEPA upon the federal agency to
consider alternatives before approving major airport
expansion projects:

... The Secretary [of Transportation] ... shall
authorize no such project found to have adverse
[environmental] effect unless the Secretary shall
render a finding, in writing, following a full and
complete review, which shall be a matter of pub-
lic record, that no feasible and prudent alterna-
tive exists and that all possible steps have been
taken to minimize such adverse effect. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The ‘‘no feasible and prudent alternative” language
of AADA is identical to that of Section 4(f) of the
earlier enacted Department of Transportation Act
of 1966 concerning approval of highways through
parks, 49 U.S.C. $1653(f), [23 U.S.C. $138]. Indeed,
the House Report on AADA states: **The responsi-
bility thus vested in the Secretary of Transportation
is comparable to that contained in Section 4(f) of
. . . the Department of Transportation Act.” House
Report 90-601, U.S. Code Cong. Adm. News, pp.
3057-8.

st Ke — A a a ETRE

23

This Court interpreted é4(f) in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In
Overton Park, Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for a
unanimous Court (Mr. Justice Douglas took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case; Mr. Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun filed short concurring
opinions), stated that

This language is a plain and explicit bar to the
use of federal funds for construction of highways
through parks—only the most unusual situations
are exempted.

... For this exemption to apply the Secretary
must find that as a matter of sound engineering
it would not be feasible to build the highway
along any other route. Id. at 401 U.S. 411. (Em-
phasis supplied).

Further, this Court stated that

. .. The very existence of the statutes indicates
that protection of parkland was to be given para-
mount importance. The few green havens that
are public parks were not to be lost unless there
were truly unusual factors present in a particular
ease or the cost or community disruption result-
ing from alternate routes reached extraordinary
magnitudes. If the statutes are to have any mean-
ing, the Secretary cannot approve the destruction
of parkland unless he finds that alternate routes
present unique problems. Id, at 401 U.S. 412-13.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The Court reversed, indicating that it was not clear
from the record whether the Secretary had made the
requisite findings, and if so, the reasons ‘‘why he

24

believed there were no alternative routes .. .” Id. at
401 U.S. 408.

Although not concerned necessarily with parklands
in section 16(¢)(4) of AADA, Congress must have
been equally concerned with the increased noise and
air pollution, demographic impact, and safety prob-
lems that new airports and airport expansions inevi-
tably bring.’ Thus, the Secretary “cannot approve”
these inevitable adverse environmental impacts unless
he finds “as a matter of sound engineering” that alter-
natives to the proposed airport expansion “would not
be feasible”, or that they present costs or “community
disruption” of “extraordinary magnitude”, or other-
wise present *‘unique problems”.

“Respondents will argue at this point that the Reef Runway is
unique in that its effect would be to improve air quality, noise
levels. and safety in the populated areas adjacent to HIA by mov-
ing aircraft operations 6,700 feet seaward, away from those areas.
This argument is necessarily based upon the premise that use of
the existing runway will be discontinued upon completion of the
Reef Runway. This premise, however, is erroneous. The State Re-
spondents have conceded, for example, that the existing runway
will continue to be used by jet aireraft even after the Reef
Runway is completed. P-107; Tr. 640. Moreover, the United States
Air Force, whose KC-135 tankers are conceded by all parties to be
the worst noise and safety offenders at HLA, has consistently re-
fused to commit itself to utilizing the new Reef Runway. Indeed,
if the Respondents are unwilling to compel inter-island jets to taxi
an additional 4,000 feet to the western end of the existing runway
before taking off because of the extra cost this entails, Tr. 215, it
is difficult to see why either the Air Force or the commercial over-
seas carriers would or should take it upon themselves to incur the
extra cost and fuel consumption in taxiing nearly 7,000 additional
feet out to the Reef Runway. And, in any event, if, as the State
and Federal Respondents maintain, the number of operations at
HIA will have doubled by the year 1985 (from 250,000 operations
in 1971 to an estimated 493,000 operations in 1985), Opinion, App.
A. p. 5, it follows that by 1985, both the Reef Runway and the
existing runway will be employed to full capacity.

ASS DEGAS er OOS SEO BS

<8 —— a ee eee

25

The Federal Respondents herein considered the EIS
prepared under NEPA as constituting the “public
record” of the mandated “full and complete review”
of alternatives by the Secretary required by AADA,
Tr. 758, 789-90, 829, and added thereto only a one
paragraph conclusionary letter dated January 21,
1972 from the FAA Regional Director, that “After
careful and thorough consideration of the facts con-
tained herein [i.e., in the EIS], ... it is the finding of
the undersigned . . . that there is no feasible and pru-
dent alternative to the requested action which has not
been considered... .” D-27 in evidence below (empha-
sis supplied).

The Secretary thus not only misread the require-
ment of §16(c)(4), he made none of the findings
required by Overton Park. Moreover, the EIS, as the
“public record”, contains no mention whatsoever, let
alone discussion, of the several alternatives that the
record indicates do exist, have in fact been employed
successfully at other airports, and indeed have been
endorsed by the very same Secretary on another oc-
easion as having significance ‘‘to the nation as a
whole”. Indeed, the “public record” of the review
proceeding reveals no point at which these alterna-

10“The Jamaica Bay-Kennedy Airport, a Multi-Disciplinary
Environmental Study”, in evidence as P-4(a) and P-4(b). This
study, which diseussing in detail the use of non-construction
alternatives only at Kennedy Airport, was endorsed by then
Seeretary of Transportation John A. Volpe in a letter attached to
it dated March 13, 1970 as having signifieance “not only to the
immediate New York situation, but to the nation as a whole . 7
P-4(a), page xiii; Tr. 405.

rer ct BESET RNS Re ER OE

26

tives were considered and rejected after enactment
of Section 16(¢)(4)."

The Ninth Circuit’s cramped interpretation of $16
(e)(4) conflicts in principle with the broad and ex-
pansive interpretation emphatically and unanimously
given the identical Department of Transportation
Act language by this Court in Overton Park. The
court simply incorporated its previous rulings with
respect to alternatives under NEPA, and concluded
that the Secretary of Transportation ‘‘could have
reasonably believed that in this case there are no
feasible alternatives or that alternatives do involve
unique problems”, Opinion, App. A, p. 30, quoting
from Overton Park, supra, at 401 U.S. 416 (emphasis
in Opinion, but not in Overton Park), and that the
Secretary’s action was not arbitrary or capricious.

If the decision below is permitted to stand, the
goals of §16(c)(4) will be defeated. The Court of
Appeals, by stressing the ‘‘could have reasonably be-
lieved” branch of the Overton Park standard and
ignoring the equally important requirement that the
reasonable belief be based on consideration of “all
relevant factors”, in effect turned the FAA’s omis-
sions in this case into a ground for upholding the
agency’s action. This standard of review could wreck
the statutory scheme by allowing agencies to approve
environmentally harmful actions to which feasible

11Any rejection of an alternative which oceurred prior to enact-
ment of §16(¢) (4) in May 1970 could not qualify as a valid ground
for the required finding, since it may have been based on an en-
tirely different standard.

re agen.

27

and prudent alternatives exist simply by ignoring
those alternatives throughout the review process.’*

A rule that would accord with the statutory purpose
of Section 16(¢)(4) and with Overton Park is that
when no evidence appears in the public record that
a rejected alternative is not feasible and prudent,
and plaintiffs present prima facie evidence that it
is, the burden then shifts to the defendant official
to explain further the reasons for his decision. Only
thus can the court be assured that all relevant factors
were considered and that the decision was not arbi-
trary or capricious.

tI. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISION
OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT IN GREENE COUNTY PLANNING
BOARD v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 849 (1972) AS TO WHETHER THE PREPARATION OF
AN EIS MAY BE DELEGATED TO A PRIVATE COMPANY
WITH A DIRECT FINANCIAL INTEREST IN AN AFFIRMA-
TIVE DECISION ON THE PROPOSED PROJECT WHICH IS
THE SUBJECT OF THE EIS.

NEPA requires that the ‘‘detailed statement” be
prepared by the ‘‘responsible official” of the Federal
agency involved. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C).

12The magnitude of planned airport development in the United
States anderlines the significance of this issue: 349 impact state-
ments on file with the President’s Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) through September 30, 1973 involved airport
projects, see 102 Monitor, Environmental Impact Statements, Vol.
3, No. 9, page 178 (Oct. 1973) (Published by the CEQ); in purely
monetary terms, projected major airport development costs for
the next ten vears in the states included within the Ninth Cireuit
(ineluding Guam) amounts to $997,756,000.00; the nation-wide
figure is $4,342,238,000.00. See Federal Aviation Administration,
1972 National Airport Systems Plan (NASP), pp. 30-1.

28

In this case, however, a private consultant, the
Ralph M. Parsons Co., which, as the Ninth Circuit
found, Opinion, App. A, p. 13 did and does have a
‘‘financial interest in the affirmative decision on the
proposed project”, (to wit, 15.5% of the total project
cost, or nearly $11,000,000), actively participated in
the preparation of the EIS. /bid. The court found
nothing wrong in this, holding that a “firm with a
financial interest in the project may ... assist with the
drafting of the EIS”. Jbid.

On the other hand, the court stated, at p. 15,
that the participation by the FAA in the preparation
of the EIS “precludes us from concluding that
there was any improper or illegal delegation in this
ease”. This statement is somewhat bewildering, since,
as indicated above, Petitioners were precluded by
the trial court from developing the relative extent
of participation in the preparation of the Reef Run-
way EIS by the FAA, the State of Hawaii, and
Parsons.

In any event, the Ninth Circuit is now in conflict
with the law of the Second Circuit as set forth in
Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power
Commission, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). Greene County held
that NEPA prohibits the Federal Power Commission
from delegating the task of preparing an EIS to
the applicant for a license to construct the very
project which is the subject of the EIS, on the
grounds that such a procedure creates “the potential,
if not the likelihood, that the applicant’s statement

29

will be based upon self-serving assumptions”, Jd.
at 420. Greene County has been expansively inter-
preted within the Second Circuit. See Conservation
Society v. Secretary of Transportation, 362 F.Supp.
627, 629-32 (D.Vt. 1973) (presently on appeal) (held,
a violation of NEPA for Federal Highways Adminis-
tration to delegate to the Vermont Department of
Highways the task of drafting the EIS for a highway,
even though the federal agency consulted with the
drafters at all stages, commented upon the draft as it
progressed, and adopted the final product as its own).

The extent of federal participation required by
NEPA in the preparation of an impact statement is
an issue of fundamental importance because it ef-
fects most agency procedures for the preparation of
such statements. The conflict in the circuits there-
fore results in an intolerable situation: agencies
must tailor their NEPA procedures for similar
projects in different parts of the country so as to
satisfy conflicting demands.

Moreover, apart from the express statutory require-
ment, strong policy reasons dictate that an EIS be
prepared by the ‘‘responsible official”. An EIS must
be as neutral and objective as possible, since its
basic purpose is not to justify a decision already
made on a proposed project, or even to influence a
positive decision thereon, but rather is to provide
both the agency and the ultimate-decision makers
With an objective survey of the environmental conse-
quences of and the alternatives to the proposed action,
with which information an environmentally informed

pre mre etre oe 1 od dee ORNL ST LT RAAT “ . bak meat SR

30

decision may be made, uninfluenced by strictly mone-
tary interests.'* Thus the very integrity of the impact
statement procedure, and therefore of NEPA itself,
is at stake. See generally, Comment, Delegation of the
Drafting of Environmental Impact Statements, 2
E.L.R. 10153 (1973).

If federal agencies are permitted to entrust prepa-
ration of impact statements to self-interested private
contractors, the objective look at environmental im-
pacts and alternatives which Congress considered so
important is not likely to occur. In this case, for
example, the consultant to whom the preparation was
entrusted had a substantial interest in additional run-
way construction, and many alternatives not involving
construction were therefore quite naturally not even
mentioned in the EIS.

'8While it may be permissible for the federal agency to dele-
wite the preparation of the EIS to the state agency involved, see,
o.g., Lowa Citizens v. Volpe, ....... F.Supp., 1: el , + E.R.C. 1755,
1759, 3 E.L.R. 20013, 20015-6 (S.D. Iowa 1972), for the state
egeney in turn to delegate such task to a private party with an
enormous monetary stake in the project surely goes beyond the
intent of Congress. For the financial conflict of interest involved
herein is to be distinguished from what might be termed a “mission
interest” or an “institutional bias” had by federal or state officials
who are proposing a project, see Sierra Club v. Frochlke, ...... F.2d

, .w» DS E.R.C. 1920, 1922, 3 E.L.R. 20823, 20825 (7th Cir.
Oct. 2, 1973): Parsons stood to lose several million dollars if a
decision were made not to proceed with the Reef Runway, whereas
the Federal and State protagonists retain their positions and con-
tinue to reeeive their salaries regardless.

ee ae)

penne

31

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue
to review the judgment and opinion of the Ninth
Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,
MIcHAEL R, SHERWOOD,
Counsel for Petitioners.

Hart, SHERWOOD, LEAVITT,

BLANCHFIELD and HAt1,
Of Counsel.

January 8, 1974.

(Appendices Follow)

ARETE) REY ONE SIUC RD SARE AP RET O'S hy Ne eee

ieee A ate oe Se TE em

Appendix A

United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

No. 73-1784

‘N

Life of the Land; Hawaii Audubon Society;
Friends of the Earth; Sierra Club; Ray-
mond Catania; J. Abraham Pasadaba;
Wilfred H. Paul, Jr.; and Pete Kaululaau
G. Thompson,

Appellants,
vs.

Claude S. Brinegar, Individually and in his
capacity as Secretary of the United States
Department of Transportation; John Shaf-
fer, Individually and in his capacity as
Administrator, FAA National Office: Jack
Webb, Individually and in his capacity as
Administrator, FAA, Pacifie Region; Fu- >
jio Matsuda, Individually and in his eapac-
ity as Director, Hawaii Department of
Transportation,

OPP REAER ES IP

Appellees,
and

Kalihi-Palama Community Council, James
Y. Muraoka, Takeshi Uvyesugi, General
Contractors Association of Hawaii, a non
profit Hawaii Corporation, and Dillingham j
Corporation, a Hawaii corporation, dba
Hawaiian Dredging and Construction
Company,

ipl llatiadadhticl he.

Intervenors-Appellees.

[September 10, 1973]

iE Lian ae Mabie

2

OPINION

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii

Before: HAMLIN and TRASK, Circuit Judges,
and BELLONI, District Judge*

INTRODUCTION

This environmental law case is an appeal from the
Final Decision and Order of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Hawaii, holding that
appellees have complied with the provisions of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
42 U.S.C. § § 4321 et seq., and the Airport and Air-
ways Development Act of 1970 (AADA), 49 U.S.C.
§ $1701, et seq., and denying appellants’ prayer for a
permanent injunction sought against the Secretary
of Transportation and other officials in connection
with the construction of the reef runway extension
(Reef Runway project) at the Honolulu, Hawaii, In-
ternational Airport (HIA).

We affirm, concluding that appellees have satisfied
the provisions of both NEPA and AADA.
THE PARTIES

Appellants, plaintiffs below, are four environmental
organizations' purportedly “concerned with the pres-

*The Honorable Robert C. Belloni, United States District Judge,
Portland, Oregon, sitting by designation.

1The environmental groups, all non-profit organizations, are Life
of the Land, Hawaii Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth, and
Sierra Club. The National Audubon Society has submitted an
amicus brief.

anaes Do nes eC

3

ervation of our natural environment,” and four named
individual residents of areas affected by flight patterns
of aircraft arriving and departing from HIA. Ap-
pellants all claim to suffer adverse and irreparable
injuries as a result of specific and allegedly illegal
acts committed by appellees.’

Appellees, defendants below, are the Secretary of
Transportation,® as the federal official ultimately re-
sponsible for federal involvement in the Reef Runway
project; two named individual administrators of the
Federal Aviation Agency said to have been contribu-
tors to the Secretary’s alleged malfeasance or non-
feasance; and the director of the Hawaii Department
of Transportation, as the state official ultimately re-
sponsible for prosecution of the project.

Permitted to intervene as defendants below were
the Dillingham Corporation, the contractor which has
been awarded the construction contract on the pro-
posed project; two named individuals who reside in
areas affected by overflights to HIA, and the Kalihi-
Palama Community Council, Honolulu, representing
other residents of those areas.

2Appellees below did not question, nor did the district court
consider, the propriety of appellants’ standing to maintain this
action. We are satisfied, however, that appellants are properly
before this court. See United States v. SCRAP, |... US... (June
18, 1973) (slip opinion at 13-19). Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972): San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d
1021, 1023-24 (9 Cir. 1973).

3At the time of this suit’s initiation in the district court, John A.
Volpe was the Secretary of Transportation. He has subsequently
been replaced by Claude S. Brinegar.

Ce eS Sa Rae BS 2 ote

Whey os Doe eth

i a TVR Re a re Lt nema

THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

On November 8, 1972, one day before the scheduled
opening of bids for construction of the Reef Runway
project, this action for injunctive relief was filed by
appellants in the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii. Upon said filing, the district court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order.

A hearing on appellants’ motion for a preliminary
injunction was held from December 13, 1972, to De-
cember 22, 1972. On the latter date. the district court
denied the prayer for a preliminary injunction and
dissolved the Temporary Restraining Order previ-
ously entered.

On March 29, 1973, trial was held on the merits, at
at which time the evidence of the previous hearing
was incorporated as if adduced at that time. Addi-
tional testimony was also presented.

On April 13, 1975, the district court filed its Final
Order and Decision, denving appellants’ prayer for a
permanent injunction. The district court also denied
appellants’ motion for an injunction pending appeal.‘

After filing a timely notice of appeal, appellants on
April 27, 1973, sought an injunction pending appeal
to this court. On June 11, 1973, after oral argument,
we granted that motion. On August 7, 1973, we heard
oral argument on the merits, and the case was sub-
mitted for decision.

4In its Final Order and Decision, the district court incorporated
by reference the reasoning set forth in its Deeember 22, 1972,
Decision and Order. The latter is reported at _.. F.Supp. ......
(D. Haw. 1972).

-

3)

BACKGROUND OF THE PROPOSED PROJECT

There was evidence before the district court sup-
porting the following statement of facts.

Hawaii is approximately 2,400 miles from the con-
tinental United States. Over 99 per cent of all pas-
Sengers travel to and from Hawaii by aircraft, and
the Honolulu International Airport has consequently
assumed the status of that state’s principal gateway.
Further, due to its unique location, HITA is the third
largest point of entry for international arrivals in the
United States. During labor disputes involving marine
transport, HIA takes on special importance, as air-
craft become the sole means of shipping and receiving
cargo.

HIA serves not only the personal and commercial
interests of Hawaii and the nation, but is also vital
to the military. With the closing of adjacent Hickam
Air Field, the United States Air Force engages in
substantial operations at HTA. Of the over 250,000
operations (a landing or take-off) at the airport in
fiscal 1971, military operations accounted for 52.221,
with 113,701 commercial operations, and 89,992 for
general aviation.°

HIA is presently operating at capacity levels dur-
ing peak hours. Forecasts indicate that the number
of aircraft operations will increase to 382,000 by 1975,
at which time HIA is expected to reach and surpass
both hourly and annual capacity levels, and to 493,000
by 1985.

5HIA is 32nd in small craft operations.

6

Accompanying projected increases in aircraft opera-
tions at HLA has been an increasingly disturbing prob-
iem of aircraft noise pollution. This noise problem,
which first appeared in substantial form with the
introduction of jet aircraft around 1960, is accentu-
ated because of the airport’s location in close prox-
imity to densely populated residential areas, and to
downtown business sections. Further, the prevailing
trade winds, which affect aircraft landings and take-
offs, complicate the problem.

Increasing operations by jet aircraft have also en-
hanced the danger of a disaster in the event of a
landing or take-off aceident. There is evidence that
jet aircraft mishaps most often occur within forty
seconds after take-off, or about 1.6 miles from the
end of the runway. In the case of HIA’s present
configuration, this would place the aircraft in the
midst of the Kalihi-Palama residential neighborhood.

In 1961 or 1962, public concern encouraged investi-
gations of potential solutions, including that of simply
moving the jet aircraft seaward, away from human
habitation.

In 1962, subsequent to the State Legislature’s pas-
sage of a resolution reflecting official concern for
I{IA’s noise problem, the state authorized preparation
of a report on means to alleviate the problems con-
comitant with the introduction of jet aircraft at HIA.
This early study resulted in the recommendation of
the construction of a “Seaward Jet Runway.” a pro-
posal which was, however, never implemented because
its unfavorable alignment with prevailing winds made
it too hazardous to use,

PAA Oe hs 5 ERIE! PEELE IE, BT 2 ba SO ERTS REE 8 RS

7

In 1967, consultants were authorized by state offi-
cials to prepare a plan for future development of HLA.
These consultants recommended the construction of
a runway to be located 1.500 feet south and parallel
to the existing runway. This plan was in turn sub-
mitted to a citizens’ Task Force committee, appointed
by the Governor of Hawaii. Committee members in-
cluded responsible local, state and federal officials, and
members of the general public. Beginning in Febru-
ary, 1967, and continuing through April, 1970, the
Task Force committee met monthly on some 46 or
47 occasions to consider various aspects of the run-
Way construction proposals. These meetings were for
the most part open to the public, and publicized in
the news media. Included in these discussions were
considerations of possible alternatives to, and enviren-
mental effects of, the proposed new runway.

The Task Force committee’s work culminated in a
June, 1968, recommendation that there be constructed
what is essentially the project here at issue—a new
12,000 foot long runway on filled reefland. located
6,700 feet south of the existing runway. Such a run-
way would largely eliminate the spectre of a disastrous
aircraft accident in a populated residential area, and
would also reduce noise pollution by moving it more
than a mile away.

In September, 1968, airline representatives to the
Task Foree committee commissioned their own study,
which concluded that the proposed runway was un-
necessary. and that the noise problem could he effec-
tively alleviated with an extension of the existing
runway, and the construction of a shorter runway for

Bee 6 he hen

~8

inter-island traffic. After review and discussion, the
Task Force committee in January, 1970, concluded
that the airline proposal provided insufficient benefits
to justify a change from the plan of the Reef Runway
concept. The final recommendation of the Task Force
committee in favor of the Reef Runway was approved
by the Governor of Hawaii in February, 1970.

In order to fund the project, the state applied to
the Federal Aviation Agency for a matching 50-50
grant pursuant to the Airport and Airways Develop-
ment Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. In compli-
ance with that statute, a hearing was held on the
proposed Reef Runway in Honolulu on March 22,
1971. Life of the Land and the Hawaii Audubon
Society, two of the appellants herein, appeared at
the hearing, urging consideration of measures to pro-
tect a rare water bird endangered by the proposed
project.

The Federal Aviation Agency and the State of Ha-
waii are presently committed to the construction of
the Reef Runway. It is to be located in Keehi Lagoon,
Manala Bay, south of the existing runway system.
The project, whose estimated cost is upwards of $60
million, is scheduled to be completed in two increments
by 1975.

There is nothing in the record indicating that the
planners of the project believed, or had reason to
believe, that the project would have an irreparably
deleterious effect upon the environment. On the econ-
trary, the possibility of various environmental side
benefits, such as reduction of air and water pollution,

rrr sist 8 ITALIA I AEE TT BAS = “ OR ut eam

ca iow

Pee wee

9

enhancement of recreational boating facilities and im-
provement in area fishing, see infra, were all hope-
fully anticipated.

THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. § § 4821 et seq., became effective on Janu-
ary 1, 1970. The Reef Runway project is conceded by
appellees to be a “major federal action, significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment,” and
is therefore subject to compliance with that statute.

NEPA, termed by one court “the broadest and
perhaps most important” of recent federal environ-
mental legislation, Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Com-
mittee, Inc. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971), “essentially states that every
federal agency shall consider ecological factors when
dealing with activities which may have an impact on
man’s environment.” Zabel v. Tabb, 480 F.2d 199, 211
(5 Cir. 1970). See generally, Calvert Cliffs’, supra,
449 F.2d at 1111 et seq.

To insure that environmental ramifications of pro-
posed projects are properly considered by those re-
sponsible for their implementation, section 102(2)
(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 43832(2) (C)® requires
that an environmental impact statement (EIS) he
prepared to “assess adverse environmental effects and

®Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA provides in part:
“See. 102. The Congress authorizes and directs that. to the
fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations. and public
laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administere<

10

discuss alternatives to the proposed action.” Com-
mittee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg,
463 F.2d 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1971). As such, the EIS
“provides a basis for (a) evaluation of the benefits
of the proposed project in light of the environmental
risks, and (b) comparison of the net balance for the
proposed action with the environmental risks pre-
sented by alternative courses of action.” Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

Compliance with NEPA’s requirement that an EIS
be prepared required the officials involved to essen-
tially duplicate in the form of more formalized studies
the accumulated considerations of the preceding sev-
eral vears of investigation and planning, which we
have described, supra.’ Preparation of the EIS com-

in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2)

all agencies of the Federal Government shall
e*#¢

(C) inelude in every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a de-
tailed statement by the responsible official on

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.

* * *”

7NEPA does not apply retroactively, but it is applicable to con-
tinuing or on-going federal projects commenced prior to January
1, 1970. Lathen v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1116, 1121 (9 Cir. 1971),
The cases are collected in Citizens Organized to Defend the En-

SETI oa

Peiiemews=

PER TORII IE Ae

il

menced in December, 1970, and continued until the
draft environmental statement was sent out for com-
ments on September 23, 1971. Participating in the
writing of the draft EIS were federal and state offi-
cials, and employees of the Ralph M. Parsons Com-
pany, a private consulting firm. After comments were
solicited and received from numerous federal, state
and local agencies, private organizations (including
three of the appellants), and interested individuals,
the team returned to work and prepared the final EIS
for official approval and submission to the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ).

The final EIS, dated January, 1972, was approved
by the Federal Aviation Agency’s regional director,
in connection with his obligation under AADA. On
January 21, 1972, the director transmitted the EIS
and the comments thereon to the Federal Aviation
Agency's Washington, D.C. headquarters, for the ap-
proval of the Department of Transportation’s Assist-

vironment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F.Supp. 520, 538 (S.D. Ohio 1972)
and Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F.Supp. 1289, 3 ELR 20248,
20259 (S.D. Tex. February 16, 1973).

NEPA does not contemplate that the decision to proceed with
the project be first made by the officials involved, subsequent to
which the EIS is prepared as a mere technicality in fulfilment of
the statute. Here, however, the federal and state officials involved
had contemplated and acquiesced in proeceding with the Reef Run-
way project before NEPA’s passage. The faet that EIS was here
prepared after a decision to proceed with the runway project had
been made is attributable to the timing of NEPA’s effectiveness.
We reject the implication made by appellants’ counsel at oral argu-
ment that the appellecs have undermined the thrust of the statute.
To the contrary, there is ample evidence in the record indicating
that appellees have acted in a good faith attempt to comply with
both the spirit and letter of NEPA. Sec City of New York v.
United States, 344 F.Supp. 929, 938 (E.D. N.Y. 1972).

12

ant Secretary for Environment and Urban Systems.*
The Assistant Secretary approved the EIS on Febru-
ary 29, 1972, and transmitted it to the CEQ on March
1, 1972.

The EIS totals 46 pages, plus appendages. It sets
forth four purposes for construction of the Reef
Runway project: (1) Reduction of the level of air-
craft noise over metropolitan Honolulu, and the
Kalihi-Palama area, adjacent to HIA, in particular;
(2) improvement in safety by moving operations sea-
ward and away from populated areas in the event of
aircraft accidents: (3) increasing airfield capacity to
provide for efficient handling of the increasing traffic;
and (4) providing an alternative runway during pe-
riods when the existing principal runway is under
repair.

The major thrust of this appeal is appellants’ con-
tention that the preparation, contents and distribution
of the EIS failed to comply with NEPA require-
ments. We will examine the specifies of the EIS in
our discussion and disposition of this contention.

Delegation of the EIS’ Preparation

Appellants first assert that the preparation of the
instant EIS was improperly delegated to a private
consulting firm which had a major and direct con-

‘As reasonably interpreted, NEPA does not require the Secretary
of Transportation to personally review and approve every EIS
submitted to Washington. (f. United States v. King, ... F.2d.

(9 Cir. February 28, 1973) (delegation of authority to authorize
interception of oral and wire communications pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516).

2 ae RO a on ee EES Lt oe ert

13

tingent financial interest in the Reef Runway’s con-
struction.

In June, 1968, the state appellees entered into a
contract with Ralph M. Parsons Company (Parsons),
a private consulting firm, whereby Parsons agreed to
render management consultant services for the engi-
neering, design and construction of the Reef Runway
project. According to the contract terms, Parsons was
to receive a “Guaranteed Maximum Compensation”
which consisted of °15.5% of the Estimated Total
Project Cost.” The contract defined “project” as “con-
struction, ready for operation by state,” of five com-
ponents, one of which was the Reef Runway.

It does appear from the record that Parsons had a
financial interest in an affirmative decision on the
proposed project. We find nothing, however, in either
the wording of NEPA or the case law, which indicates
that, as a matter of law, a firm with a financial interest
in the project may not assist with the drafting of
the EIS. As the Eight Circuit has indicated, compli-
ance with section 102 of NEPA is based upon good
faith objectivity rather than subjective impartiality.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,
470 F.2d 289, 296 (8 Cir. 1972). aff’g 342 F.Supp.
1211 (D. Ark. 1972). See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke,
359 F.Supp. 1289, 35 ELR 20248, 20268 (S.D. Tex.
February 16, 1973).

Appellees concede that under NEPA, the applicable
federal agency must bear the responsibility for the
ultimate work product designed to satisfy the re-
quirement of section 102(2) (C). We find no de-

Te

ileal ad

14

parture from this requirement here. The record indi-
cates that Federal Aviation Agency officials actively
participated in all phases of the EIS preparation
process. The chief of the Airport Division of the
Federal Aviation Agency's Pacific Region testified
that he assisted with the preparation from its early
stages onward. He stated that, as part of the prepara-
tion, regular meetings with other federal officials,
State of Hawaii officials, as well as the Parsons rep-
resentatives, were held. Further, an employee of Par-
sons testified as to the active involvement of the
Federal Aviation Agency in the EIS preparation
process. The Parsons employee concluded that the EIS
“was more or less a joint effort by Parsons, the State
and the F.A.A.”

The record further reveals that federal officials in
Washington, upon receipt of the EIS, continued active
examination thereof.

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that
“the evidence shows that F.A.A. officials did in fact
work together with state officials and a private con-
tractor and gave it close attention.” The case law
dealing with the delegation of EIS preparation has
heretofore been limited to federal agency delegation
to a state agency, and has permitted such delegation
where the federal agency significantly participated in
the preparation of the EIS. See Citizens for Mass
Transit Against Freeways v. Brinegar, 357 F.Supp.
1269 (D. Ariz. 1973): National Forest Preservation
Group v. Volpe, 352 F.Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972).
Unlike Greene County Planning Board v. F.P&.. 455
F.2d 412, 420 (2 Cir.) cert. denied 409 U.S. 852 (1972

and Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc.
v. Secretary of Transportation, —.. F.Supp. ——,
(D. Vt. July 27, 1973) (opinion at 6), the federal
agency here involved did not “abdieate a significant
part of its responsibility” to another organization.

While Parsons may have assisted in the EIS’ prepa-
ration, the significant and active participation by the
F.AJA. therein precludes us from concluding that
there was any improper cr illegal delegation in this

case?

Publication and Dissemination of the EIS

Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C),
provides in part:

Prior to making anv detailed statement, the re-
sponsible Federal official shall consult with and
obtain the comments of any Federal agency which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with
respect to any environmental impact involved.
Copies of such statement and the comments and
views of the appropriate Federal, State and local
agencies, which are authorized to develop and
enforce environmental standards, shall be made
available to the President, the Council on En-
vironmental Quality and to the public as provided
by seetion 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the
proposal through the existing agency review proc-
esses: (emphasis added)

It is uncontested that the comments to the draft
statement were not attached to the final ETS and

*Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d, supra, at 1122, 1126, relied upon by
appellants, is not apposite. There. no EIS statement had been
prepared.

al i leila

16

further, that the FAA failed to include within the
EIS the text of all references used in the statement’s
preparation. Appellants urge that these omissions ren-
der the EIS legally insufficient. We disagree.

The federal agency comments: These comments to
the draft statement were compiled as a separate docu-
ment. The comments did, however, follow the proposal
through the agency review process, as required by
NEPA. See Monroe County Conservation Society, Inc.
v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 698 (2 Cir. 1972). The record
indicates that the comments were submitted to the
Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Environ-
mental and Urban Systems. The Comments were sub-
sequently forwarded to the Council on Environmental
Quality and the National Technical Information Serv-
ice, where they became a part of the public record.
In Monroe County, supra, relied upon by appellants,
the court noted that “there is no indication that [the
comments] accompanied the statement through the
review process.” 472 F.2d at 698.

References to the EIS: Appellants also assign error
to the fact that the F.A.A. failed to include within the
EIS the text of all 22 references used in the state-
ment’s preparation.

The record indicates that these references consisted
of approximately 2,000 pages of technical material.
They were kept on file and made available at the
F.A.A.’s regional office in Honolulu. The appellants
had ready access to these documents, and did in fact
avail themselves of them. The references were also
available for forwarding to Washington upon request.

I ee EO PR Fee ee

17

Appellants’ insistence that the federal agenev com-
ments and technical references physically accompany
the EIS is an attempt to place form over substance.
We have previously rejected such tacties in the NEPA
context. Sce Jicarrilla Apache Tribe of Indians v.
Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1283-85 (9 Cir. 1973). As one
court has indicated, “[NEPA] must be construed in
the light of reason.” N.R.D.C. v. Morton, supra, 485
F.2d at 837.

There was no error in either the publication or
dissemination of the EIS in this case.

Substantive Content of the EIS

Appellants further contend that the EIS is sub-
stantively inadequate, and have submitted voluminous
briefs in support of their argument. Appellants’ sub-
stantive attack on the EIS encompasses assertions
that the statement fails to discuss the proposed
runway’s environmental consequences of increased
population and air pollution, fails to discuss “non-
construction” alternatives to the project. and in-
adequately discusses those alternatives which are
considered. Further, appellants assert that the EIS
discussion of the runway’s environmental effeets upon
noise pollution, water quality, recreation and wildlife
is inadequate.

Standard of Review: Agency action under NEPA
is subject to judicial review pursuant to §10(e) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(A). See Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, supra, 470 F.2d at 298-99, n.14: Town of
Groton v. Laird, 353 F.Supp. 344, 348 (D. Conn.

eo

18

1972). As such, a reviewing court may set aside agency
action which is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the
law.” See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971). See also Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., 453 F.2d 463, 467
(2 Cir. 1971), cert. denied 407 U.S. 926 (1972). Cf.
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465-66
(5 Cir. 1973). As we recently stated in Jicarilla
Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275,
1281 (9 Cir. 1973):
“Reversal of a substantive decision is appropriate
only to situations where ‘the actual costs and
benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly
gave insufficient weight to environmental fac-
tors.’ ” (citation omitted) See also, Environmental
Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 352-53
(8 Cir. 1972); N.R.D.C., Ine. v. Morton, supra,
458 F.2d at 838.

We examine appellants’ substantive challenges,
therefore, mindful of the circumscribed nature of our
review.

Demographic Effects: Appellants argue that the
EIS is inadequate in that it fails to include a study
of the effect of the Reef Runway project upon the
population of Honolulu and Hawaii. Appellants con-
tend that a major incentive behind construction of
the Reef Runway is Hawaii’s need to accommodate
and encourage increased tourism to the state. Ap-
pellants then posit that the effect of increased tour-
ism will be to increase the permanent population of
Honolulu, to the detriment of the local “quality of

el meee 2 eee eer bare

19

life.” Hence, they argue that the EIS must contain
an analysis of the demographic effects of the project.

We reject this reasoning. That an increase in Hono-
lulu’s tourism will result in an increase in that city’s
permanent population is speculative. Certainly, there
in no empirical data in the record supportive of the
allegation. We agree with the district court’s conelu-
sion that “requiring the kinds of demographic discus-
sion suggested by [appellants] is unreasonable in the
context of this project.”

Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2 Cir.), cert. de-
nied 409 U.S. 990 (1972) and Lathan v. Volpe, 350
F.Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash. 1972) where EIS diseus-
sions of demographic ramifications of the projects in
issue were held to be warranted, are factually distin-
guishable. Hanly involved the proposed construction
of a prison detention facility in New York City, while
Lathan involved the proposed construction of a high-
way through a populated Seattle area. In both cases,
the proposed project could reasonably be projected to
have an effect upon local population patterns to a
degree not evidenced here.’°

10In Havly v. Mitchell, supra. the court noted, 460 F.2d at 642:
“Plaintiffs are all living members of the Chatham Square
Civic Community for a Planned Community, a non-profit
group concerned with the development and protection of that
portion of lower Manhattan called the Civie Center. Although
the area contains many government buildings, including sev-
eral courthouses, surprisingly at least 50,000 people live there
and in adjacent Chinatown. Included in that group are over
3,000 persons living in approximately 660 cooperative apart-
ment buildings called Chatham Towers and Chatham Green.
These face the proposed new jail, some 100-150 feet away.”
In Lathan +. Volpe, supra, the proposed highway was described
as follows, 350 F.Supp. at 263:

Poteet IO BOTT wane ies

20

Air Pollution: It is agreed by all parties that no
Studies were made of the effect of the Reef Runway
project upon air pollution. The failure to conduct
such a study, however, was not an inadvertent omis-
sion. Rather, a threshold decision was made by federal
and state officials that air pollution studies were un-
necessary in this specific case because of the very
nature and location of the proposed project.

The Reef Runway will relocate aircraft take-offs,
the major source of aircraft air pollution, 6,700 feet
seaward, and away from the populated areas of Hono-
lulu. The essence of this project, therefore, involves
moving the sources of the air pollution away from
people. The federal and state officials concluded that
detailed air pollution studies were unnecessary, on
the premise that at the verv least. the project was
extremely unlikely to worsen the air quality in any
relevant sense.

Further, appellants do not claim that the project
will deteriorate the existing air qualitv; rather, they

“The proposed segment involved herein would create a ten-
lane highway along the alignment of an existing four-lane
highway. It would cross Lake Washington from the east on a
floating bridge, enter Seattle by a tunnel through the Mount
Baker district, emerge and continue through a heavily popu-
lated area, and join I-5, a north-south interstate highway.”
See also Lathan v. Volpe, supra, 455 F.2d 1114, where we noted
that this highway ran “through a densely populated, low in-
come, city area; * * *.”

Similarly distinguishable is Sierra Club v. Froehlke, supra, 3
ELR at 20271-20272, where the court observed that “there is rea-
son to believe that there will be development, growth and industrial
expansion as a result” of the project there in issue. As we note in
the text, appellants’ contention that the Reef Runway project will
result in expansion of the permanent population of Honolulu is
mere speculation, unsupported by the record.

eat we < ee e

21

urge that a detailed study may conceivably reveal that
anticipated environmental improvement may be less
than expected.

The distriet court acknowledged that the EIS may
well have set forth in more detail the reasoning lead-
ing to the conclusion that there were no significant
air pollution problems inherent in the project. But,
on the record as a whole, we are unable to conclude
that the district court erred in rejecting appellants’
air pollution arguments.

Alternatives: Section 102(2)(C) (iii) of NEPA,
42 U.S.C. § 4832(2)(C) (iii), requires that the EIS
include a discussion of “alternatives to the proposed
action.” See CEQ Guideline, § 62 (iv), 36 Fed. Reg.
7725 (1971). Appellants contend that the EIS here
‘*fails completely to discuss some reasonable and feasi-
ble alternatives to the proposed action,” and “treats
other alternatives in insufficient detail.”

The EIS contains a brief discussion of four alterna-
tives to the proposed construction of the Reef Run-
way extension. Three involve various runway concepts
and configurations, and the fourth, the alternative of
taking no action.

In support of their allegation that the alternatives
which were considered were insufficiently treated, ap-
pellants introduced at trial testimony calculated to
discredit certain data considered in rejecting only
one alternative—that of extending the existing runway
back into adjoining Hickam Air Field.’ The planners,

11The other construction alternatives considered were construc-
tion of the “Seaward Jet Runway,” and construction of a close-in

GE tt acess

22

in addition to concluding that this alternative would
create more noise than it would alleviate, noted that
the replacement cost to the military would be $37 mil-
lion. At trial, appellants introduced evidence indicat-
ing that this figure was inflated. No other evidence on
the subject of alleged insufficiently treated alterna-
tives was offered. There is, for instance, no allegation
that an important consideration in connection with a
given alternative was ignored. We find no error in the
EIS’ discussion of alternatives.

In addition to challenging the disposition in the
EIS of alternatives which were in fact considered,
appellants further contend that there exist alterna-
tives not considered which could well accomplish the
objectives of the Reef Runway project. These alleged
alternatives are identified by appellants as “non-con-
struction alternatives,” which they defined as ‘‘those
arrangements for managing airports as to questions
like noise and capacity and air pollution which do not
involve the building of new structures.”

For instance, appellants suggest removal of the Air
Foree’s KC-135 jet tankers, the loudest of the aircraft
operating from HIA, to an adjacent airfield. There
is, however, evidence indicating that the Air Force
had refused to move its jet tankers to another base.
effectively eliminating implementation of this alter-

parallel runway. Both were rejected because of inability to alleviate
the noise and safety problems.

The alternative of taking no action was rejected because, without
the proposed project, high noise levels would continue unhampered,
and the problems of safety would remain unsolved. Further, the
failure to provide for the expected growth in airport traffie would
result in inereasing delays.

@ RES

tees Pott ca ee ae

23

native. Further, removal of the jet tankers would
obviously do little to alleviate the significant noise
pollution and safety problems attributable to com-
mercial aviation.

Another alternative urged by appellants is the im-
position of higher landing fecs at HLA, in the hope
of reducing commercial aircraft traffic. This alter-
native was considered early in the planning process,
but rejected as ineffectual inasmuch as attempts at
other airports to reduce trattie by such means have
proven unsuccessful.

Appellants further suggest that private aircraft be
transferred to another airfield. Again, however, such
a transfer would have no effect upon the noise and
safety problems presented by larger aireraft. It fur-
ther appears that a ban en general aviation would
violate legal agreements entered into by HLA, guaran-
teeing the airport’s accessibility to all users.

Appellants also urge that the inter-island aircraft
operating out of HIA could be required to commence
their take-offs at a different point on the present run-
way configuration, thereby eliminating the noise prob-
lem. The record, however, indicates that only a minor
percentage of the aircraft operating at HLA would
be affected by this alternative. and it would therefore
have onlv a token effect on the over-all situation.

Finally, there is nothing in the record to indicate
that alternatives such as the readoption of airline
schedules, imposition of curfew restrictions,’? or con-

12At any rate, the state is apparently without constitutional au-

thority to impose aircraft curfew restrictions. City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, ........ US. ...... (May 14, 1973).

See 6

24

version to wide-body aircraft design are either rea-
sonable or feasible alternatives in this case.’®

NEPA’s “alternatives” discussion is subject to a
construction of reasonableness. N.R.D.C., Inc. v. Mor-
ton, supra, 458 F.2d at 834. Certainly, the statute
should not be employed as a crutch for chronic fault-
finding. Accordingly, there is no need for an EIS to
consider an alternative whose effect cannot be reason-
ably ascertained, and whose implementation is deemed
remote and speculative. Id. at 834. Rather, the EIS
need only set forth those alternatives “sufficient to
permit a reasoned choice.” Jd. at 836. This has been
done. See also Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Ine. v. Seaborg, supra, 463 F.2d at 787; Pennsylvania
Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F.Supp. 238,
250 (M.D. Pa. 1970).

Appellants also challenge the adequacy of the EIS’
discussion of the Reef Runway’s impact upon the
human and natural environment. They challenge’ state-
ments as unsupportable, contradictory and factually
erroneous. We examine these contentions, again mind-
ful of the limited scope of our review, supra.

Noise Pollution: Appellants do not assert that the
project will have an adverse effect upon the environ-
ment by increasing noise pollution. Indeed, a prime
reason for the Reef Runway project is to reduce the
level of jet noise in the areas adjacent to HIA.

The EIS does discuss and graph the noise situation
in some detail. There is substantial evidence in the

13We reject appellants’ implication that various techniques util-
ized at other airports in the continental United States are neces-
sarily adaptable to the unique situation existing at HIA.

. 8 PARLE LR REPEALED LS

25

record, including testimony by responsible federal of-
ficials, supporting the EIS’ conclusion that the project
will result in significant reduction of noise pollution.

Appellants’ prime objection to the EIS’ treatment
of noise pollution is the omission therein of “on-site”
noise measurement techniques. In lieu thereof, the
F.A.A. utilized another well-recognized scientific tech-
nique, which rendered “on-site” measurement unneces-
sary. The record indicates that “on-site” measurements
of independent organizations were in fact considered
by the planners.

Undoubtedly, there exists a plethora of scientific
studies which could have been, but were not, used to
measure the noise pollution levels in the area involved.
We cannot, however, conclude that the district court
made a “clear error in judgment,” Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, supra, 401 U.S. at 416, in concluding
that ‘‘(t)he kinds of studies suggested by [appel-
lants}] may be useful but are hardly necessary.”

Water Quality: The EIS, utilizing four scientific
studies undertaken for the project, concluded that the
project would result in an improvement of the water
quality in the marine area adjacent to the Reef Run-
way.

At trial, appellant presented scientific studies and
various letters from university professors purportedly
contradicting the EIS’ water quality conclusions.

One scientist testified that one of the studies re-
ferred to in the EIS, a report of a hydraulic study
prepared under the auspices of the University of
Hawaii, might be read as indicating a different con-

26

clusion from that given in the EIS. The record indi-
cates, however. that this study was based upon a
proposed configuration of the project which was sub-
sequently changed, An analysis of the project based
upon this new configuration was supportive of the
hydraulie study.

Appellant also introduced letters at trial after testi-
mony was terminated, which questioned certain data
and conclusions relied upon in the preparation of
the EIS’ water quality analysis. Apart from the
obvious observation that the letter writers were, for
the most part. not available for cross-examination,
we note that disagreement among experts will not
serve to invalidate an EIS. Indeed, **(f)urther studies,
evaluation and analyses by experts are almost certain
to reveal inadequacies or deficiencies.” Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 342 F.Supp.
1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd 472 F.2d 289 (8
Cir. 1972). The purpose of the EIS is to inform the
decision makers of the environmental ramifications of
the proposed action. See Committee for Nuclear Re-
sponsibility v. Seaborg, supra, 403 F.2d at 787. The
statement need not achieve scientific unanimity on the
desirability of proceeding with the proposed action.

Recreation: The EIS anticipates an enhancement
of recreational boating facilities and an improvement
in fishing conditions as a result of improvement in
the water quality of Keehi Lagoon, supra, and the
construction of channels to the open sea.

Appellants contend, however, that construction of
the Reef Runway will result in “loss of surfing sites”

and “loss of the effective use of the proposed Sand
Island Park due to high aircraft noise.”

In support of the first allegation, appellants intro-
duced at trial the tetimony of the founder of a local
surfing club, who was described as an “out-reach”
worker with disadvantaged vouths. The witness testi-
fied that the vouths feared the project might result
in adverse surfing conditions. This was the sole evi-
dence produced at trial supportive of the “loss of
surfing site” arguments. The district court was under-
standably unpersuaded by this hearsay testimony.

The contention that use of a proposed nearby park
will be adversely affected as a result of noise from
aircraft utlizing the Reef Runway was adequately con-
sidered in the EIS.

On the record as a whole, we are unable to upset the
district court’s conclusion that the EIS adequately
deals with the recreational aspects of the Reef Run-
way project.

Wildlife: The EIS: acknowledges that the pro-
posed project will have an adverse environmental ef-
fect upon certain wildlife. This is the only clearly
documented adverse environmental effect of the proj-
ect which could be said to be signifieant. The statement
notes that the Reef Runway project will displace some
186 acres of silted coral mudflats used for feeding and
roosting by birds, including the rare Hawaiian Stilt.
Up to 100 of these endangered birds may be affected.
Appellants’ concern for the Hawaiian Stilt is the
basis of their attack upon this aspect of the EIS.

WOT IT?

Prepewy seemnmpans ape neon MRE RENTER OM NE LIE SANIT OBRINT ETT FER RM ON

28

The record indicates that the plight of the Stilts
has continuously been a matter of concern to the plan-
ners of the project. As recommended by appellants,
the replacement habitats at nearby Pearl Harbor
Naval Station are being developed in conjunction with
the project. Also included in the project itself is the
construction of certain ponds and islets suitable for
the birds at a cost in excess of $350,000. Cf. Sierra
Club v. Froehlke, supra, 3 ELR at 20272.

The main contention of appellants here is that the
size of the replacement habitats may prove to be in-
adequate. But the district court noted, and we con-
cur, that if the size of the habitats do indeed prove
to be inadequate, there is no reason why adjustments
could not be made even if the construction as planned
proceeds to completion.

The record indicates that the project’s planners
were concerned with, and took adequate steps to mini-
mize, the harm presented te the birds. The discussion
in the EIS of the project’s environmental ramifica-
tions upon wildlife was adequate.

It is our conelusion that the EIS here in issue ade-
quately complies with NEPA requirements."

14Appellants, noting that the EIS must stand or fall on its own
merits, also contend that the distriet court impermissibly permitted
the Federal Aviation Ageney to “bolster” the document with “ex-
trinsic evidence.”

The record indicates otherwise. The “extrinsic evidence” was
testimony showing why certain matters were not contained in the
EIS. and was presented after appellants had challenged such deii-
ciencies. The testimony was by “the administrative officials who
participated in the decision * * * explaining their action.” Cifizes
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, 401 U.S. at 420. Ther
Was no error.

SE RR EL SS

29

AIRPORT AND AIRWAYS DEVELOPMENT
ACT OF 1970

In addition to their NEPA contentions, appellants
asselt that appellees have failed to comply with the
requirements of section 16(¢)(4) of the Airport and
Airways Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1716
(c) (4). We find this contention equally without merit.

Section 16(¢)(4) of AADA requires. in pertinent
part, that the Secretary of Transportation

shall authorize no [airport extension] project
found to have adverse effect unless (he) shall
render a finding, in writing, following a full and
complete review, which shall be a matter of public
record, that no feasible and prudent alternative
exists and that all possible steps have been taken
to minimize such adverse effect.

The record indicates that the required finding was
made as a product of lengthy review by federal of-
ficials. The finding is supported by the EIS which,
one court has held, may itself be considered as a sec-
tion 16(¢)(4) finding. Cifizers Airport Commission
of Chesterfield County ve Velpe, 351 F.Supp. 52, 59
(E.D. Va. 1972).

There are virtually no cases indicating the standard
of review a court must employ when analyzing com-
pliance with section 16(¢) (4). In Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, however, the Supreme
Court construed section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f).
which contains virtually the identical relevant lan-

30

guage of AADA.” The Supreme Court there stated
that “the reviewing court must be able to find that
the Secretary could have reasonably believed that in
this case there are no feasible alternatives or that
alternatives do involve unique problems.” 401 U.S. at
416 (emphasis added). The Court further noted that,
pursuant to section 702(2)(A) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Secretary’s action must not have
been arbitrary or capricious. /d.

Incorporating the discussion of the adequacy of the
EIS in our analysis of appellees’ compliance with
NEPA, we conclude that under the applicable stand-
ards of review, appellees have complied with AAD A.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the injunction pend-
ing appeal is hereby dissolved effective immediately,
and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

15Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966,
49 U.S.C. § 1653(f), mandates that the Secretary of Transportation
disapprove any project which requires the use of parklands unless
“(1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such
land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to mini-
mize harm to such park, recreational area [ete.] * * *.”

The relevant language in section 16(¢)(4) of AADA reads “no
feasible and prudent alternative exists,” and “all possible steps
have been taken to minimize” harm to the environment.

Te NIT ORE Ba RR Sg DE aS © ERE OH od

Appendix B

In the United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit

No. 73-1784

Life of the Land, et al., ]
Appellants, |
Ve

Claude S. Brinegar, et al.,
Appellees, r
and

Dillingham Corporation, ete.. |
Intervenor/Appellee. J

[Filed Oct. 16, 1973]

ORDER
Before: Hamutn and Trask, Cireuit Judges, :
and BeELLont, District Judge*
The panel as constituted in the above case has voted
to deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the
suggestion for a rehearing en bane.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion
for en bane rehearing, and no judge of the court has
requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en
bane. Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).

*Honorable Robert C. Belloni, United States District Judge,
Portland, Oregon, sitting by designation.

32

The petition for rehearing is denied and the sug-
gestion for a rehearing en bane is rejected.

The panel has also voted to deny the motion to
stay the dissolution of the injunction, and further,
to deny the alternative motion for reinstatement of
the injunction pending appeal.

Dated: October 15, 1973.

O. D. Hamlin,
United States Circuit Judge.

Tes --- oO SEES UR DA XK Seer

Appendix C

363 F.Supp. 1171 (1972)
United States District Court,
D. Hawaii.

Civ. No. 72-3683

Life of the Land et al., Plaintiffs, |
¥.

John Volpe, Individually and in his ea- |
pacity as Secretary of the United |
States Department of Transporta- \
tion, et al., Defendants, |

|

and

Kalihi-Palama Community Council et |
al., Defendants-Intervenors. j

Dee. 22, 1972.
DECISION AND ORDER
SaMUEL P. Kine, District Judge.
This case involves the administrative steps taken
in authorizing the Reef Runway Project at Honolulu
International Airport.’

“The proposed action involves Federal financial assistance pur-
suant to the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 to con-
struct a new runway at Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu,
Hawaii. The construction of this runway, generally referred to as
the ‘Reef Runway’. consists of filling, grading and paving an air-
plane runway 12,000 feet long, 200 feet wide with a 1,000-foot long
runway safety area on each end and 250-foot wide shoulders. The
runway, to be located approximately 6,700 feet seaward of existing
Runway 8-26, will include a protective structure 1,050 feet seaward
of and parallel to the new runway to prevent storm wave damage.”
EIS page i.

o+

The pending issue requires a decision as to whether
a preliminary injunction shall be granted prohibiting
further implementation of the project. A temporary
restraining order was signed by Judge Pence just be-
fore the opening of bids for the construction of the
runway. That order resulted in’a suspension of the
bidding process and is still in effect.

Plaintiffs are four organizations concerned with our
natural environment and four individuals living in
an area affected by this airport’s operations. Defend-
ants are the federal and state officials concerned with
the project. Intervenors, as defendants, are the con-
tractors who submitted bids for the construction of
the runway, the General Contractors Association of
Hawaii, two residents of Kalihi-Palama, and the Ka-
lihi-Palama Community Council representing other
residents of the affected area.

The operative statutes are the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA), especially § 102(2)(C),
and the Airport and Airway Development Act
(ADAP), especially § 16.°

The defendants appear to have complied with the
requirements of these statutes.

NEPA demands that all agencies of the Federal
Government

‘include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by
the responsible official on—

242 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

349 U.S.C. § 1716.

a 2 FRGRES Btn eo coro TS

35

(1) the environmental impact of the proposed
action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented, .

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term
uses of man’s environment and the main-
tenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable com-
mitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.”*

A detailed statement called a Final Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared. It purports
to discuss the required matters.

ADAP demands that the Secretary of Transporta-
tion shall consult with the Secretaries of the Interior
and Health, Education and Welfare, regarding envi-
ronmental effects, and shall not authorize an airport
project

“found to have adverse effect unless the Secre-
tary shall render a finding, in writing, following
a full and complete review, which shall be a
matter of public record, that no feasible and pru-

4Portion of 42 U.S.C. § 4832(2)(C). There are other provisions
of 42 U.S.C. § 4332 which are pertinent and have been considered.
For example, plaintiffs pointed to the requirement that copies of
the EIS and of the comments and views of the appropriate federal.
state, and local agencies “shall accompany the proposal through
the existing ageney review process” and argued that this was not
done. The evidence showed that this was done.

St err owes

36

dent alternative exists and that all possible steps
have been taken to minimize such adverse ef-
fect.’

The Secretary of Transportation obtained com-
ments from the other two referenced departments and
made the necessary finding.

[1] Case law makes it clear, nevertheless, that a
NEPA statement may be inadequate even though it
contains material covering the statutory subjects of
inquiry, and that the administrative process may be
improper even though it includes the use of such a
statement.®

So it is necessary to consider the several questions
raised by plaintiffs as to the adequacy of the EIS as
measured by the standards developed by these cases.’

In doing so, I consider the statements in the EIS
to be augmented by the attachments thereto and the
references listed therein.’ I also make distinctions

5Portion of 49 U.S.C. § 1716(c)(4). Other requirements of
ADAP are mentioned below.

‘Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Calvert Cliffs’
Coordinating Committee, Ine. v. United States Atomie Energy
Commission, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109 (1971); Lathan
y. Volpe, 350 F.Supp. 262 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Brooks v. Volpe,
350 F.Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972).

‘Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91
S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); Environmental Defense Fund,
Ine. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (Sth
Cir. 1972).

‘There are 24 documents, including the required comments by
concerned federal agencies, among the references to the EIS. Many
of these references ran well over 100 pages in length. The refer-
ences were made available to interested mmbers of the public in-
eluding plaintiffs, along with the EIS itself, before the public
hearings which were held in connection with the project.

37

among these cases based upon the character of the
project.®

I have made these measurements. I find that the
discussion set forth in the EIS complies with the re-
quirements of NEPA, or that in those instances where
additional discussion or disclosure should be set forth
in the EIS the only delinquency is in draftsmanship
and not in any failure to consider the deleted matter
as if it had been set forth in full in the EIS, or that
the question raised by plaintiffs is one to which the
EIS need not address itself.!° Without attempting an
exhaustive discussion of each of the matters as to
which plaintiffs argue that the EIS is deficient, I
shall illustrate the three categories mentioned.

Plaintiffs question the treatment in the EIS of the
problem of noise pollution. But the EIS does discuss
and graph the noise situation in some detail. The
kinds of studies suggested by plaintiffs may be useful

®*For example, an adequate EIS in connection with the establish-
ment of a new airport might well differ quantitatively and quali-
tatively from an adequate EIS in connection with the expansion of
an existing airport.

“On March 22, 1971, a publie hearing was held... At the
hearing, the State of Hawaii... presented evidence that the Reef
{vomway would:

Reduce noise over Honolulu

Keduce overflights over Honolulu

Increase airfield capacity

Provide an alternate runway during periods when the exist-
ing principal runway is under repair”

EIS page 8.

10See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 ERC
1126 (D.C.Cir. October 5, 1971); Conservation Couneil v. Frochike,
340 F.Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd 4 ERC 1044 (4th Cir.
May 2, 1972); Jiearilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471
F.2d 1275 (9 Cir. 1973).

EP ED GNI Re a Pe ae

-

EP eee one es >

38

but are hardly necessary. They suggest a degree of
certainty to which the situation does not lend itself.

Plaintiffs question the treatment in the EIS of air
pollution. But building the runway does not permit
air pollution beyond limits set by other laws which
control air quality. The EIS does treat of the visual
aspects of air pollution, and the evidence adduced in-
dicates that nobody considered other aspects of air
pollution to be an important problem until this action
was filed, and that the government agencies charged
with policing air quality felt that there would be no
significant problem in this area. Perhaps the EIS
should set forth in more detail the reasoning leading
to this conclusion. But it cannot be said that air pol-
lution was not considered by the decision makers.

[2,3] Plaintiffs question the omission from the
EIS of any discussion of the demographic impact of
the traffic facilitated by the runway. Undoubtedly an
EIS should discuss all of the significant primary en-
vironmental effects, and all of the substantial see-
ondary environmental effects, of a project. How far
beyond these effects an EIS should go may still be an
open question, but there must be some limit. A ‘‘rule
of reason” was suggested in argument."! In my opin-
ion, requiring the kinds of demographic discussion
suggested by plaintiffs is unreasonable in the context
of this project.

11See Natural Resources Defense Council, Ine. v. Morton, 148
U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1972); Committee for Nuclear Re-
sponsibility v. Seaborg, supra n. 10; EDF v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, supra n. 7,

- 3 RICE Snerremcrnsmmenrs ee ere

39

The discussion in the EIS of alternatives needs
separate consideration. Case law places special em-
phasis on this NEPA requirement and especially on
the inclusion of abandonment of the project as an
alternative."* The EIS here is very sketchy in this
area. Yet it does appear from the evidence that the
responsible officials in the decision making process and
in the review processes did in fact consider many
alternatives, including nonconstruction alternatives. I
am persuaded that Mr. Thompson is right when he
argues that a detailed discussion of national pro-
grams to reduce noise pollution and to improve op-
erational efficiency should not have to be repeated in
every EIS for every airport project. On the other
hand, these statements are designed as much to alert
and inform the public as to perform the function of
the devil’s advocate for the decision makers.’* What
is obvious and platitudinous to those who live with a
program daily for several years is new and fearful
to one who is confronted with the same program for
the first time. While the EIS here may be minimally
in technical compliance with statutory requirements,
it leaves much to be desired as an example of the art
of communication.

Mention should be made here of the extensive con-
sideration of this project over a period of some 10

12Natural Resources Defense Council, Ine. v. Morton, supra n. 11.

18The eases emphasize the functions of the EIS in (1) providing
evidence that the decision-making process required by NEPA was
in fact followed, and (2) giving the decision makers who are re-
moved from the initial proposal, sufficient data from whieh to make
their own determination of costs and benefits. See Brooks v. Volpe,
supra n. 6,

FE PP ey PE OLE Te

40

years. Planning did not begin with NEPA, and waile
some of the present vocabulary is new, the concerns
to which planners addressed themselves are not. A
special task force on the airport development, in-
volving responsible local, state and federal officials
and members of the public, met about once a month
for some + years, and wound up recommending the
reef runway. The secretary of that committee testified
to the many matters discussed. Because of the input
from this committee’s members and from other
sources, the original plan was in fact materially al-
tered, as, for example, by the change from a straight
sea wall to an S-curve sea wall.

Again, it should be noted that many of the effects
feared by plaintiffs can be alleviated or prevented, if
they eventuate, even if construction as planned pro-
ceeds to completion.

Other questions were raised with respect to com-
pliance with NEPA and ADAP requirements.

[4] I ruled previously that NEPA does not pre-
vent the employment of a private contractor who
has a financial stake in the project to draft an EIS.
NEPA does require that the final EIS be sufficiently
reviewed and considered by the *‘responsible official”
to insure that it was a part of the decision making
process.'* Here the evidence shows that FAA officials
did in fact work tegether with state officials and a

4EDF v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, supra n. 7; Greene
County Planning Board v. Federal Power Com‘n, 455 F.2d 412
(2d Cir. 1972): Upper Pecos Association v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233
(10th Cir. 1971).

OE EN os OO WEE ree ES sees

41

private contractor in the preparation of the EIS and
gave it close attention.

The absence of a national airport development SVs-
tem plan is proposed as a basis for prohibiting this
development.’® The evidence is that there is such a
plan although it has not yet been published.

The certificate of the governor and the finding of
the Secretary of Transportation’’ are said to be un-
supported. Assuming without deciding that these exee-
utive actions are subject to judicial review, there is
ample support in the record for the proposition that
they are deliberate conclusions based upon ample in-
formation.

[5] Under all of the cireumstances and upon the
evidence adduced it is my opinion that it is improb-
able that plaintiffs will prevail upon the merits of
their complaint. Therefore, a preliminary injunction

Plaintiffs assert that the “comments and views of the oppre-
priate Federal, State, and local agencies” did not “accompany th
proposal through the existing ageney review processes” as requircd|
by 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The short answer to this assertion is
that they did.

49 USC. § 1716(a): “. . . No project application shall propose
airport development other than that included in the then curr it
revision of the nacional airport system plan formulated by the
Secretary under this subehapter . . .”

49 USC. § 1716 (e) (1): “The Secretary shall not approve any
project application for a project involving airport location, a major
runway extension, or runway location unless the frovernor of the
State In which such project may be located e>rtifes in writing te
the Seerctary that there is reasonable assurance that the project
will be lecated, designed, constructed. and operated so as te eon pls
with epplicable air and water quality standards... .” a

49 U.S.C. $1716.) (4). See quote referenced to n. 5 supra,

yee

AUNTS IE TIN SEEN

bail il a

2

will be denied.*® The temporary restraining order is
lifted.

[6] I will entertain requests for additional find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law.*”

19The matter eame on before me for hearing on a permanent
injunction on Mareh 29, 1973. No further substantial evidence was
addueed, and the matter was submitted on the reeord made at the
hezring on a preliminary injunction with some additional offerings.
I reaffirmed my earlier decision. denied a permanent injunction.
and denied the request for a stay pending appeal. (There were
some changes in parties between Deeember 22. 1972. and Mareh
29, 1973. Following the December 22. 1972. decision. bids were
opened, and a contract was awarded. The unsnecessful bidders
withdrew as defendants-intervenors herein. There was earlier a
passing suggestion that there might be a standing issue. but imas-
much as at least one plaintiff had standing the issue was not pur-
sued. I was prepared to hold that all plaintiffs had standing.
Plaintiffs had sought to prevent intervention by the defendants
intervenors, but I earlier ruled against them and allowed the inter-
vention. )

*"Defendants-intervenors sought to avoid plaintiffs’ challenge by
charging them with laches, citing Clark v. Volpe, 342 F.Supp.
1324 (E.D.La.1972). aff'd 461 F.2d 1266 (Sth Cir. 1972). The
appellate court cited Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1196 (Sth Cir.
1972), which held that it was unreasonable to apply NEPA retro-
actively to a road project when 16 of 20 miles had already been
fully completed and the right-of-way for the remaining 4 miles
had already been aequired. I ruled previously that plaintiffs were
not barred by laches. There was no showing that plaintiffs’ timing
constituted unreasonable delay. Rather, the evidence showed that
plaintiffs tsed the period between approval of the EIS on Feb-
ruary 29, 1972, and the filing of this action on Nov

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_1728%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
