# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Holtzman v. Schlesinger

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 416 U.S. 936

## Text

SUPRER. COURT. UL &.

IN THE i

Supreme Court of the United Sisies
OcTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 23 = Q 4 l

——

EvizabpeTH HoLtTzMaN, individually and in her capacity as a
member of the United States House of Representatives; 1st
Lr. ARTHUR Watson, 43rd Strategic Wing, United States Air
Force, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam; Carrain James H.
Strain, 43rd Strategic Wing, United States Air Force, Ander-
son Air Force Base, Guam; Caprain MicuaeL. FLUGGER, 43rd
Strategic Wing, United States Air Force, Anderson Air Force
Base, Guam; and Captain DonaLp E. Dawson, 307th Strategic
Wing, United States Air Force, U-Tapao, Thailand,

Petitioners.
—against—

JaMEs R. SCHLESINGER, individually and as Secretary of Defense:
Jounx L. McLvcas, individually and as Secretary of the Air
Force; and Wiiiiam P. CLEMENTS, individually and as Deputy
Secretary of Defense,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

\

Burt NEUBORNE

LEON FRIEDMAN

Metvin L. WULF
American Civil Liberties Union
22 East 40th Street
New York, New York

Attorneys for Petitioners

Of Counsel:

Marvin M. KarPATKIN
NorMAN SIEGAL

a TS

INDEX

PAGE
aera la a Sean ae ick ne ill
SN nae anes eevee suena 2
EOI ae LLP LR LEAST NEL LOD 3
NINN NO ccc rcnicbslcindaasntbnceomrresonenelaees 3
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ...... 4
Statement of the Case —_....... he BLEND, RIS PO +

Reasons For GRANTING THE WRIT:

Certiorari should be granted because the decision
of the majority below, upholding the legality of
orders directing petitioners to bomb Cambodia,
incorrectly resolved an issue of critical national
significance and established a potentially disas-
trous precedent validating unilateral executive
Fe gett al ch GRO IA SAY 5 RO NEE SEO NEE 10

1. Congress Neither Authorized Nor Ratified the
Orders Directing Petitioners to Bomb Cam-
ND etn ee ee akicsan 13

2. No Procedural Obstacle Exists to Judicial Re-
view of the Legality of the Orders Directing
Petitioners to Bomb Cambodia ~ 02.0... 19
ei See REEL REID 19

IIR no ne ne a °0

i

PAGE
C. Political Question 2... seers 21
D. Exhaustion of Military Remedies .-.........-.---- 26
CGMCTUBION a cccscenn onc nno nnn nsenesenonetesesenssunnenenseeninsnssenensanerentes 27
APPENDIX:
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit ......-.....-.--.--..----sse--e-onssennereeeneses la
Order Denying Rehearing in Bane ........---------------- 26a
United States District Court's Opinion of June 13,
sien ereree ein menncagmeninpeeenaceencionsinns 28a
United States District Court's Opinion of July 25,
ec esis deatnainaanerenninnnnnnynccterrensneaiea setae tta
Justice Marshall's Opinion Denying Application to
Vacate Stay oon... c-ceseececceecceeecececeesesesnenenensetensnenenses 72a
Justice Douglas’ Opinion Vacating Stay ........----.--- Sta
Justice Marshali’s Opinion Granting Stay -............. 89a
Justice Douglas’ Dissenting Opinion ...........-.------ 91:

Denial of Application for Extraordinary Sitting .. 96a

Justice Burger's Order Denying Extraordinary
dk RMD ae ASME anor iar mere te ara Va

Judgment of District Court: ........----- eee Sa

iii

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: .
Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966) ..........-... 20
Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) -....... 10, 11
Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970) ...........--- 11, 12, 24
Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess
Anne County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) -.....-----------e 20
Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971) cert.
den., 405 U.S. 979 (1972) -..-..--e-eccceeeeeeceesseeeeectetesstees 6, 11, 12
Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) -........... 12

Levy v. Parker, —— F.2d —— (3rd Cir. 1973), cert.
U.S. ——, 42 U.S.L.W. 3235 (Oct. 23,

granted,

UTS) ness nsanennnnancnnnenceennveseceneensncnvserenensennnannsenennavewensennnnsnsenes 27
Massachusetts v. Laird, $51 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971) ...11, 12
Mitchell v. Laird, F.2d —— (D.C. Cir. 1973) ........ 6, 12
Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969)... eee 26

Orlando v. Laird. 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) ..11, 13
Orlando vy. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.) cert. den., 404

TS 6 (i). 6, 11, 12, 15, 24
Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972)... 26
Perkins v. Laird, F.2d —— (8th Cir. 1970) cert.

den.. 403 U.S. 965 (1972) ......-------.-.0--s-c--ceceeesnesnsneeeeneenees 12
Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) ..........-.------- 20
St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1948) -.........--- 20

Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) ...........-.------------ 20

iv

PAGE
United States v. Johnson, 38 CMR 44 (1967) ~.......... 26-27
United States v. SCRAP, US. CREED mceisccsccs 19, 20

United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953) .... 19

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
SONI, MI car ccacescats cast pscauecestpacermaserereseekacaine 13, 22, 23, 24, 25

Constitutional Provisions:

United States Constitution

RID Be I Ba a pacecsconsrestnpuinicayiexciadosseioberaloriesbiies passim
I I oar es cacccnesesicanessdectonind passim
IE Es Bk a ctestactiniciorncceimenvtniccennss passim
Statutes:
Be se WOR iasccatasteaccciccavane sso aedadsrueniacmncivenmarriaas 3
BP MN ee eee cas 13
I I I ol ectpte ccs peaennceaine cena eens 13, 16
ONIN TU OI asso eacce cs dabcsencieaneheinsceneoseibadelanes 21

Other Authorities:

Cong. Ree. H3558—H3598 (daily ed. May 10, 1973) ........ 14
Cong. Ree. $12561 (daily ed. June 29, 1973) ................ 16, 17
Berger, War Making by the President, 121 U. of Pa.

FM Re kk: : EMRENOS DNR: SETI RENTED et Ere Merck een Sena 11

Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. p. 508
PRI Sisensiaasccasiccislavcaecnaniselin dasscclactaiesdullppiousanaaac msomteonaintein 8

Lofgren, War Making Under the Constitution: The
Original Understanding, 81 Yale L. Jour. 672 (1972) 11

6 Presidential Documents of Richard Nixon, 596 (1970) 6

PAGE

Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M, Nixon,
1970, pp. 405-410; 476-480: 529-541 (G.P.O. 1971) .... 6,7
Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M. Nixon,

1971, pp. 265, 449-50 (G.P.O. 1972) ..........cccecceoseceosesses 8
Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues—Administration
Position, 45 NYU Law Rev. 628 (1970) oo. 6

Stevenson, United States Military Action in Cambodia:
Questions of International Law, reprinted in 3 The
Vietnam War and International Law (Falk ed.

MRD sia auatinn dasa ta reahalicaiica nour otnaseat ama cee ek eee 6-7
Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Powers: A
Critique, 60 Cal, L. Rev. 623 (1972) 0... 1]

pervs Hees

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBeR TERM, 1973

Euizapern Houtrzman, individually and in her capacity as
a member of the United States House of Representa-
tives: Ist Lr. Artruur Warsoxn, 43rd Strategie Wing,
United States Air Foree, Anderson Air Foree Base,
Guam; Captain James H. Stray, 48rd Strategic Wing.
United States Air Force, Anderson Air Foree Base,
Guam; Captaris Micnaret Piuvccer, 45rd Strategie Wing,
United States Air lForee, Anderson Air Force Base,
Guam: and Captars Donatp FE. Dawson, 307th Strategic
Wing, United States Air Foree, U-Tapao, Thailand,

Petitioners,

—against—

James R. Scuvesincer, individually and as Secretary of
Defense: Joun L. MeLucas, individually and as Seere-
tary of the Air Force; and Witiiam P. CLements, in-
dividually and as Deputy Secretary of Defense,

Respondents.

ExizapetH Hoitzman, Individually and in her capacity as a
Member of the United States House of Representatives,

Plaintiff,

ee

Extuiot L. Ricwarpson, Individually and as Secretary of
Defense and Rosert C. Seamans, Jr., Individually and
as Secretary of the Air Force,

Defendants.

<>

Jupp, District Judge:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff, a member of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives from a Brooklyn district, seeks a determination
that the President of the United States and the military
personnel under his direction and control may not engage in
intensive combat operations in Cambodia and elsewhere in
Indochina in the absence of congressional authorization.

> on

29a

Motions

1. Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment declaring
that the defendants may not order American military forces
to combat in Cambodia and granting appropriate injunctive
relief.

2. Plaintiff has also moved to serve an amended and
supplemental complaint adding as plaintiffs three Air
Force officers stationed in Guam, none of whom are resi-
dents of the Eastern District of New York.

3. Congressman Parren J. Mitchell of the Seventh Con-
gressional District of Maryland, togetiier with seven other
Congressmen from districts not within the Eastern District
of New York, have moved for leave to file a brief as amici
curiae.

4. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a valid claim for relief because (a) plain-
tiff lacks standing; (b) the court lacks jurisdiction over the
subject matter; and (c) the complaint involves non-justici-
able political questions on which relief cannot be granted.
Defendants also assert that the motion for summary judg-
ment is premature.

No motion has yet been made to implement the state-
ment that the complaint is brought on behalf of all simi-
larly situated Congressmen. It is not yet necessary to deter-
mine whether the case may properly be treated as a class
action.

Facts

The complaint was filed on April 17, 1973. Plaintiff
asserted among other things that her right to an undiluted

Path be

ita ldo 5d and Aa | ea atte nk be! len tba Dacha Nha?

30a

vote upon the declaration of hostilities was impaired by
presidential action in engaging in extensive combat in Cam-
bodia without congressional authorization. She pointed out
that cease-fire had been negotiated in Vietnam, all Ameri-
ean servicemen had been withdrawn, and all American
prisoners of war had been released; and she asserted that
no congressional authorization exists for committing Amer-
ican forces to combat in Cambodia.

An order to show cause why the court should not de-
clare continued military activities in Cambodia to be unlaw-
ful was signed on April 19 by Judge Dooling, to whom the
ease had been assigned as a related case. Before the re-
turn date of the motion, Judge Dooling determined that the
case was not in fact related to prior matters before him, and
directed that it be reassigned under this court’s random as-
signment plan. On the return date of the order to show
cause on April 26, 1973, the matter was adjourned at de-
fendants’ request until May 18, with answering papers to
be served by May 16.

The motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief
was served and filed on May 8, 1973, accompanied by a state-
ment of allegedly undisputed facts pursuant to Rule 9(g) of
this court’s General Rules. In particular, plaintiff asserted
that the United States is currently engaged in large-scale
combat air operations in Cambodia involving hundreds of
war planes based in Thailand and Guam, and that United
States war planes dropped 39,500 tons of explosives on
Cambodia during March 1973 and flew 180 combat missions
daily during the first three weeks of April. Plaintiff fur-
ther asserts as undisputed material facts that the last
American serviceman was withdrawn from Vietnam on
March 28, 1973 and the last American prisoner of war was
repatriated on April 1, 1973, and that although no Con-

3la

gressional authorization exists for the commitment of
American forces to combat in Cambodia, the Executive has
informed Congress that it is prepared to continue its mili-
tary activities whether or not the Congress appropriates
funds for the Cambodian combat operations.

Defendants’ response asserts that there are still over
1,300 missing in action in the Vietnam hostilities who have
not vet been accounted for. Defendants also assert by affi-
davit of the Chief of the Civil Division of the United States
Attorney's office that “there may well be dispute as to asser-
tions made in plaintiff's Rule %(g) statement.” They re-
quest time to submit papers addressed to the merits.

The plaintiffs who are proposed to be added assert that
they are being compelled to comply with unlawful orders,
and to risk their lives in unauthorized bombing missions
over Cambodia.

The brief of the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish religious
groups, which appear as amici, assert that the existence of
Congressional authorization to make war is justiciable, and
point out that participation in Cambodian hostilities may
conflict with the Agreement on Ending the War and Restor-
ing Peace in Vietnam.

Discussion

It is necessary to deal first with the question of the tim-
ing of the motions, then with the issue of plaintiff's stand-
ing and other jurisdictional questions, and finally with the
particular motions of the several parties.

Timing

The government relies on the provision of F.R.Civ. P.
12(a) that the United States or an officer or agency thereof

32a

has sixty days “after the service upon the United States
attorney of the pleading” within which to answer a com-
plaint.

Rule 56, however, provides that a party may move for
summary judgment “at any time after the expiration of 20
days from the commencement of the action.” Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment was served 21 days after the
complaint was filed.

The difference between the two rules is significant. The
time is computed in different ways. Since an action is com-
menced under F.R.Civ.P. 3 by the filing of a complaint,
regardless of the time when it is served, the measure of
time in Rule 56 is unrelated to the time in Rule 12. More-
over, Rule 56 does not provide for a longer time before a.
motion can be made against a government agency than one
against a private party.

Judge Charles E. Clark, a distinguished authority on
procedure, criticized the original federal rule for not per-
mitting the filing of a motion for summary judgment as
soon as an action is brought. See his dissent in United
States v. Adler’s Creamery, Inc., 107 F.2d 987, 992 (2d
Cir. 1939). The 1946 amendment, which permitted a mo-
tion for summary judgment in advance of answer, should
be interpreted in a manner to expedite the disposition of
litigation. There is no need to impart into it the 60-day
period for government answer that was specified in old
Rule 12. A plaintiff moving for summary judgment before
answer may be required to face a somewhat higher stand-
ard, however. As Professor Moore has suggested, a motion
before answer should not be granted “unless it is clear that
an issue of material fact cannot be presented.” 6 Moore’s
Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948, 1972) § 56.07, p. 2092.

33a

There has never been any requirement of any delay in the
consideration of a preliminary injunction in an action
against a United States officer or agency, except as the
court in its discretion may find to be appropriate.

The court therefore rejects the argument that the motion
for summary judgment was premature.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Jurisdiction

Defendants’ three grounds for this motion to dismiss are
all essentially jurisdictional, whether described as relat-
ing to standing, subject matter, or political question.

Standing

Under Article TIT, § 2, Clause 1, of the Constitution, the
jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to “eases” and “con-
troversies.” Judicial definitions of the elements requisite
for “eases” and “controversies” have proved to be elusive.

Unlike case or controversy, terms specifically enumerated
in Article III, “standing” is not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion. It received its first full expression in Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923).

Later, in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20
L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), the Court stated that political ques-
tions, advisory opinions, and lack of standing result in there
being no justiciable controversy. Whether standing is de-
nominated a component of jurisdiction or of justiciability
may at first blush seem unimportant, due to the require-
ment that both issues must be resolved before any deter-
mination can be made of the merits of the controversy.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663
(1962); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).

way: )

Bidtiaws ihn ad

34a

However, a complaint may be dismissed for lack of juris-
diction of the subject matter only if the claim is so at-
tenuated and insubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of
merit. Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S.
561, 24 S.Ct. 553, 48 L.Ed. 795 (1904) ; Baker v. Carr, supra.

Plaintiff has raised a serious constitutional question deal-
ing with the war-making power of Congress enumerated in
Article I, ¢8 of the Constitution. The seriousness of this
question has been recognized repeatedly within this circuit.
Berk vy. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970); Orlando v.
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971). The delicate balance
in the relationship between Congress and the President con-
cerning the power to wage war is a controversy arising
under the Constitution and therefore within the jurisdic-
tion of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).

Whether a particular party has a sufficient stake in an
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolu-
tion of it is what has traditionally been referred to as the
question of standing to sue. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), the
Supreme Court held that when a party, such as the plain-
tiff here, does not rely on any specific statute authorizing
invocation of the judicial process,

the question of standing depends upon whether the
party has alleged such a “personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy,” Baker v. Carr... as to en-
sure that “the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form his-
torically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”
Flast v. Cohen.

The heart of the question becomes whether the plaintiff
has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the

35a

controversy as to assure the concrete presentation of issues
in an adversary context so that a court will be properly
guided in determining difficult issues. The controversy in-
volved must be a substantial one admitting of specific relief.
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct.
461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937).

In the present case the court is not being asked to decide
ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues. The
issue has been focused as sharply as possible: Whether the
President’s orders directing the bombing of Cambodia con-
stituted a usurpation of Congress’ war making power under
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. Nor is this a case in which
the court is being asked to decide a hypothetical question or
abstract issue. Plaintiff is not asking for a determination
whether the President would violate the Constitution by en-
gaging in certain acts, but rather a determination that the
present action of the President violates the Constitution.
Nor is this a collusive suit where the parties are suspected
of sharing the same interests.

Plaintiff gua Congresswoman does not merely suffer in
some indefinite way in common with people generally. She
is a member of a specific and narrowly defined group—the
House of Representatives. As a Congresswoman, plaintiff
is called upon to appropriate funds for military operations,
raise an army, and declare war. Additionally, plaintiff has
a continuing responsibility to insure the checks and bal-
ances of our democracy through the use of impeachment.
When a plaintiff is a member of a narrowly defined group,
which has been more directly affected by the conduct in
question than has the general population, the test for stand-
ing should be met. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court
—a Functional Analysis, 86 Harv. L.Rev. 645 (Feb. 1973).

Vee 7 wy ee TE IEE Le rs - - “ Ce CS LE a3;

36a

The question whether a particular person is a proper
party to maintain the action does not, by its own force,
raise separation of powers problems related to improper
judicial interference in areas committed to other branches
of the federal government. Flast v. Cohen, supra.

Professor Jaffee has stated, in Standing Again, 84 Harv.
L.Rey. 633, at 634, 635 (1971),

My own view has been and continues to be that a plain-
tiff who does not have a “protected interest,” whether
as an individual or as a group, does not have a right
to review, but that a court in its discretion may at the
suit of such a person review the legal question if it
deems such consideration to be in the public interest.

...I1 believe ... that any citizen can constitutionally
be a plaintiff ... in a “public law” suit even though
he suffers no injury whatever beyond his concern for
the public interest.

In Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. March 20,
1973), thirteen members of the United States House of
Representatives filed a complaint against the President
and the Secretaries of State, Defense, Navy. and Air Force,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against continued
warfare in Indochina. In finding that the plaintiffs had
standing, the Court relied upon the fact that it would be
the duty of plaintiffs to consider impeachment if defen-
dants’ actions contravened the Constitution, that plaintiffs
have a quite distinct duty to determine whether to make ap-
propriations to support the hostilities, and that plaintiffs
might have to take other legislative actions related to such
hostilities, such as raising an army or enacting other civil
or criminal legislation.

37a

Standing of legislators was also upheld in Trombetta v.
State of Florida, 353 F.Supp. 575 (M.D.Fla. 1973), ruling
that members of the Florida Legislature had standing to
seek a declaratory judgment whether the proposed Twenty-
seventh (Equal Rights) Amendment to the United States
Constitution was repugnant to Articles V and VI of the
United States Constitution; and in Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939), an original pro-
ceeding in mandamus by members of the Kansas Legisla-
ture against the Secretary of the Senate of Kansas and
others to compel the Secretary to erase an endorsement
on the Senate resolution ratifying the Child Labor Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The Trombetta
and Coleman cases, involving state legislatures, are not
completely parallel, but a member of Congress should have
an equal right to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court.

Congresswoman Holtzman is a member of a well defined
group that is directly affected by defendants’ action. She
has presented a sharply focused controversy in an adver-
sary context. Her responsibilities as a Congresswoman
give her the nexus necessary to have standing to contest
the policies of defendants that allegedly infringe upon her
Article I duties.

The standing of the airmen as added plaintiffs is clear,
Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), if they can
pass the test of venue, discussed later.

Political Question

In determining whether there is subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, the court must consider whether the case presents a
“political question” outside its jurisdiction, before it can
reach the merits of the controversy. This is a facet of the
problem of justiciability.

Sa Peoke = . rm core ae

38a

The Second Circuit has shaped its formulation of the
political question doctrine from guidance provided by the
Supreme Court in cases such as Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153
(1952); and Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct.
1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). In Berk v. Laird, supra, 429
F.2d at 305, it held that a soldier seeking to enjoin orders in
the Vietnam hostilities as lacking constitutional authority
had a right to ask a court to determine whether there were
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for re-
solving the issue. In Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042
(2d Cir. 1971), it held that courts should not review the
form of congressional authorization, once it had been de-
termined that there was “any action by the Congress suffi-
cient to authorize or ratify the military activity in ques-
tion.” In DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir.
1973), it held that judges could not appropriately deter-
mine

whether a specific military operation constitutes an
“escalation” of the war or is merely a new tactical ap-
proach within a continuing strategic plan.

Defendants rely on this statement but fail to consider the
court’s further statement (p. 1156) that

We specifically do not pass on the point urged by ap-
pellant whether a radical change in the character of
war operations—as by an intentional policy of indis-
eriminate bombing of civilians without any military
objective—might be sufficiently measurable judicially to
warrant a court’s consideration, i.e., might contain a
standard which we seek in this record and do not find.

39a

The appeal in that case was from an order denying injune-
tive relief, after the court had reviewed documentary mate-
rial submitted by both sides. Here the issue arises on a
motion to dismiss the complaint on its face. The motion for
summary judgment on the merits is not being considered
vet.

The teaching of those cases is that the political question
exception to jurisdiction depends on the facts of the par-
ticular case, but that the question of the balance of con-
stitutional authority to declare war, as between the execu-
tive and legislative branches, is not a political question.

The Second Circuit rule was not repudiated by the Su-
preme Court’s summary affirmance of Atlee v. Laird,
347 F. Supp. 689 (1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 911, 93 S.Ct. 1545,
36 L.Ed.2d 304 (1973). The district court there dealt with
a question whether Congress could constitutionally au-
thorize warfare by appropriation bills rather than whether
Congress had in fact given approval to the acts of the
executive. The district court in Atlee referred to the rapid
changes in world polities as a reason for not taking juris-
diction, but stated (p. 707):

This, of course, is one reason justifying a court’s taking
small steps in sensitive areas, because the judiciary
lacks the flexibility found in the political departments,
to deal adequately with a constantly chang.ng world
scene.

The Atlee case dealt with a general challenge to “the con-
stitutionality of the war in South East Asia.” 347 F.Supp.
at 691. Lack of merit may also have been mingled with
procedural issues in the affirmance of the Aflee case, since
the Supreme Court had previously refused to review cases
which upheld the President’s authority to use American

spepswiowen: _— eh ee AI Pa) mae . bau = a ee REN ERNE ORR

40a

forces in Vietnam. It had denied certiorari in the Berk,
Orlando, and DaCosta eases. Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. S869, 92 S.Ct. 94, 30 L.Ed.2d 113
(1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 869, 92 S.Ct. 94, 30 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); DaCosta v.
Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979, 92 S.Ct.
1193, 31 L.Ed.2d 255 (1972).

The present case, dealing with Cambodian combat opera-
tions, involves other issues, for the Senate and the House
have spoken separately on Cambodia, and the entire Con-
gress, in approving limited foreign aid to Cambodia, 22
U.S.C. § 2415(g), expressly stated in 1972 (P.L. 92-226)
that such aid

. shall not be construed as a commitment by the
United States to Cambodia for its defense.

Judge Dooling said in his opinion in DaCosta v. Laird
of May 24, 1972, concerning political question:

The actual conduct of a defined war, when that war is
in its lawful progress, is such an area. (Emphasis
added).

The present case, attacking only the use of bombers in
Cambodia after the Vietnam cease-fire, has a narrower
reach than Atlee and may present one of the “small steps
in sensitive areas” which is within the realm of justiciabil-
itv under the district court’s opinion in Atlee.

This is one of the first suits brought after the withdrawal
of American troops from Vietnam and the return of pris-
oners of war. Reluctance to jeopardize the safety of
American soldiers or prisoners is no longer a barrier to
judicial determination of the constitutionality of a phase
of war activity.

—— anne

4la

Therefore the case does not prersent a tactical decision
in an ongoing war like DaCosta ILI, supra, 471 F.2d 1146
(whether to mine Haiphong harbor). Rather it involves
the question whether the authorized Vietnam war has ter-
minated. Courts have often been asked to determine when
| a war has ended and peace has begun. F.g., United States
| v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81
L.Ed. 255 (1936); cf., United States v. Swift, Crim. No.
72-747-W, District of Massachusetts, Opinion of Wyzan-
ski, J., March 28, 1973.
The political question doctrine does not appear to justify
dismissal of this complaint before examination of the
merits, on which this court has reached no decision,

Advisory Opinion

Plaintiff is not seeking a judicial determination as to
her rights upon the happening of some events in the future.
Rather, she is seeking a judicial declaration that military
operations currently being conducted in Cambodia are in
violation of the United States Constitution. This does not
come within the rule forbidding advisory opinions, a rule
which stems from the risk that comes from passing on
abstract questions rather than limiting decisions to con-
crete cases in which a question is precisely framed by a
clash of genuine adversary argument. Wright, Federal
Courts (2d ed. 1970) pp. 37-38; Berger, Standing to Sue
in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78
Yale L.J. 816, 830-31 (1968).

Venue

There is no doubt of the proper venue of this action as
originally brought by plaintiff, a Brooklyn resident, since

42a

express provision in 28 U.S.C. §1391(e)(4) permits suit
against a federal officer or agency in any judicial district
where the plaintiff resides. Suit by the airmen might have
to be brought in some other district if they were not joined
in this action, or if plaintiff Holtzman did not have stand-
ing. Their presence as plaintiffs in a suit properly brought
by Congresswoman Holtzman, however, does not prevent
the venue being proper for all plaintiffs, since only one
plaintiff need be a resident of the district. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
340 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d on other grounds,
459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972).

Amount in Controversy

In determining the amount in controversy, the court may
consider the pecuniary result to either party which a judg-
ment might produce. Berman v. Narragansett Racing
Assoe., 414 F.2d 311 (ist Cir. 1969); Bass v. Rockefeller,
331 F.Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Note, Federal Jurisdic-
tional Amount: Determination of the Matter in Contro-
versy, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1960).

With millions of dollars in expenditures involved as part
of the bombing operation, there is no question that the
requirement of $10,000 or more in controversy is met.

Plaintiff's Motions

Addition of parties is not governed by F.R. Civ. P. 15,
concerning amendments of pleadings, but F.R. Civ. P. 21,
which states that

Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court
on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action... .

43a

Burlington Hospital v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 48 F.R.D. 348
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) ; Maynard, Merel & Co. v. Carcioppolo, 51
F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.¥. 1970).

It is entirely appropriate and timely to permit the addi-
tion of the proposed military plaintiffs.

Summary Judgment

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be held
in abeyance pending the receipt of additional papers from
the defendants. In view of the length of time the court has
had the matter under advisement, during which defen-
dants have had an opportunity to assemble the pertinent
facts, they should be prepared to set forth their contentions
without much further delay.

It is ordered:

(1) That defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint be
denied ;

(2) That plaintiff be granted leave to serve an amended
and supplemental complaint adding First Lieutenant Ar-
thur Watson, Captain Michael Flugger, and Captain James
H. Strain as plaintiffs;

(3) That defendants answer such amended and supple-
mental complaint within ten days after its service on the
United States Attorney;

(4) That Hon. Parren J. Mitchell, Bella S. Abzug, Don-
ald M. Fraser, Herman Badillo, Benjamin I. Rosenthal,
Robert W. Kastenmeier, Don Edwards, and Michael J.
Harrington, Members of Congress, be granted leave to file
briefs in the case as amici curiae;

(6) That the matter be set down for argument on that
motion for summary judgment by June 25, 1973; and

(6) That the amtter be set down for argument on that
motion at 10:00 a.m. on June 29, 1973.

tia

United States District Court’s Opinion
of July 25, 1973

United States District Court,
E. D. New York.
No. 73-C-537.
July 25, 1973.

~—

EuizaBetH Hoitzman, Individually and in her capacity as

a member of the United States House of Representa-
tives, et al., Plaintiffs,

Vv.

James R. Scutestncer, Individually and as Secretary of
Defense, et al., Defendants.

of
U. 3. Forees from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release
of Americans held prisoners of war.” S84 Stat. 2037.
These provisions have been attached to every subsequent
military appropriations act.” Moreover. in the Special
Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. Congress prohibited the
use of funds to support American ground combat troops
in Cambodia under any circumstances and expressly pro-
vided that “[inJilitary and economic assistance provided
by the United States to Cambodia ... shall not be con-
strued as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia
for its defense.” *

Congressional efforts to end American air activities in
Cambodia intensified after the withdrawal of American
ground troops from Vietnam and the return of American
prisoners of war. On May 10. 1973. the House of Rep-
resentatives refused an administration request to author-
ize the transfer of $175 imillion to cover the costs of the
Cambodian bombing. See 119 Cong. Ree. H. 3561, 3592-
3593 (daily ed. May 10. 1973). Shortly thereafter. both
Houses of Congress adopted the so-called Eagleton
Amendment prohibiting the use of any funds for Cam-

*The Fulbright Proviso states:
“Nothing [herein] shall be constrned as authorizing the use of any
such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in
setions designed to provide military support and sssistanee to the
Government of Cambodin or Laos. S4 Stat. 910.

"See S5 Stat. 425: 85 Stat. 716: 86 Stat. 754: 86 Stat. LIs4.

*S4 Stat. 1945. See also 22: U.S. C. $2416 (2).

75a

bodian combat operations... Although this provision was
vetoed by the President, an amendment to the Continu-
ing Appropriations Resolution was ultimately adopted
and signed by the President into law which stated:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law. on
or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or here-
tofore appropriated may be obligated or expended
to finance directly or indirectly combat activities
by United States military forces in or over or from
off the shores of North Vietnam. South Vietnam.
Laos or Cambodia.” H. J. Res. 636. The Joint Reso-
lution Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal 1974.
Pub. L. 93-52."
II

Against this background, petitioners forcefully con-
tend that continued United States military activity in
Cambodia is illegal. Specifically, they argue that the
President is constitutionally disabled in nonemergency
situations from exercising the warmaking power in the
absence of some affirmative action by Congress. See,
e. g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dall. 37 (1800): Talbot v. Seeman,
1 Cranch 1 (1801); Mitchell v. Laird. — U.S. App.
D. C. —, 476 F. 2d 533, 537-538 (1973): Orlando v.

® The Eagleton amendment provided:

“None of the funds herein appropriated under this Act or heretofore
appropriated under any other Act may be expended to support di-
rectly or indirectly combat activities in. over or from off the shores
of Cambodia. or in or over Laos by United States forces.”

*The President contemporsneously signed the Second Supple-
mental Appropriations Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-50, which contained
& provision stating that
“[nJone of the funds herein appropriated under this Act may be
expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or
over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam by United
States forces, and after August 15, 1973, no other funds heretofore
appropriated under any other Act may he expended for such
purpose.”

FADER pe

a Nas ic ta laa

Dye Beh

PAY § GERI AE MIR MARIN R BRINE IOMARST EL ION fe AS MUD

Bh cin lat 1h ta cal

Sk aa LE ik hs

IT OT Re

wen

76a

Laird, 443 F. 2d 1030, 1042 (CA2 1971). Cf. Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
In light of the Fulbright Proviso, petitioners take the
position that Congress has never given its assent for
military activity in Cambodia once American ground
troops and prisoners of war were extricated from Vietnam,

With the case in this posture. however, it is not for
me to resolve definitively the validity of petitioners’ legal
claims. Rather. the on'y issue now ripe for decision is
whether the stay ordered by the Court of Appeals should
be vacated. There is. to be sure, no doubt that I have
the power, as a single Circuit Justice. to dissolve the
Stay. See Meredith v. Fair, 83 8. Ct. 10 (1962) ( Black.
J.. Cireuit Justice); 28 U. 8. C. $§ 1651, 2101 (f). But at
the same time, the cases make clear that this power
should be exercised with the greatest of caution and
should be reserved for exceptional circumstances. Cf.
Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Co. v. Students Challeng-
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures, 409 U. s. 1207. 1218
(1972) (Burcer, C. J., Circuit Justice).

Unfortunately, once these broad propositions are rec-
ognized, the prior cases offer little assistance in resolv-
ing this issue. which is largely sui generis. There are,
of course, many cases suggesting that a Circuit Justice
should “balance the equities” when ruling on stay ap-
plications and determine on which side the risk of ir-
reparable injury weighs most heavily. See, e. g.. Long
Beach Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Federal Home Loan
Bank, 76 S. Ct. 32 (1955) (Dovetas. J.. Circuit Justice):
Board of Educ. v. Taylor, 82 8. Ct. 10 ( BRENNAN, J... Cir-
cuit Justice). Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 89 8. Ct.
3 (1968) (Stewart, J.. Circuit Justice ).

But in this case. the problems inherent in attempting
to strike an equitable balance between the parties are
virtually insurmountable. On the one hand, petitioners
assert that if the stay is not vacated, the lives of thou-

a RP a ee ee ee ee eee es

77a

sands of Americans and Cambodians will be endangered
by the Executive's arguably uneonstitutional conduct.
Petitioners argue. not linplausibly, that if the stav is
not vacated. American pilots will be killed or eaptured.
Cambodian civilians will be made refugees. and the prop-
erty of innocent bystanders will be destroved.

Yet on the other hand, respondents argue that if the
bombing is summarily halted, important foreign poliev
goals of our gevernment will be severely hampered. Soimne
may greet with considerable skepticism the ¢laim that
vital security interests of our country rest on whether
the Air Foree is permitted to continue bombing for a
few more days, particularly in light of respondents’ failure
to produce affidavits from any responsible government
official asserting that such irreparable injury will oeeur.
But it cannot be denied that the assessment of sueh
injury poses the most sensitive of problems, about which
Justices of this Court have little or no information or
expertise. While we have undoubted authority to judge
the legality of executive action, we are on treacherous
ground indeed when we attempt indgments as to its
wisdom or necessity.”

The other standards utilized for determining the pro-
priety of a stay are similarly inconclusive. Opinions by
Justices of this Court have frequently stated that lower
court decisions should be staved where it is likely that
four Members of this Court would vote to grant a writ
of certiorari. See. ¢. g.. Edwards vy. New York, 76.8. Ct.
1058 (1956) (Harlan. J.. Cireuit Justice): Appalachian
Power Co. v. American Institute of C.P. A. 808. Ct. 16

™ While respondents offered to produce testimony at tris} by high
government other's ss te the importance et the bombing, no affi-
davits by sneh officials alleging irreparable injury in conjunetion with
the stay application were offered.

"For similar ressons, it would be a formidable task to judge
where the public interest lies in this dispnte, as courts traditionally
do when determining the appropriateness of a stay. See. 6. a.
O'Brien vo Brown, 400 U.S. 1,3 (1972).

De ee, oD Ae eR

oP

ny

Bebe ath Tee ee a EE ee

UL NO ee ed ee

PPP ary

78a

(1959) (Brennan, J., Circuit Justice); Knglish v. Cun-
ningham, SOs, Ct. IS (1950) (Frankfurter, J.. Cireuit
Justice). But to some extent, at least, this standard re-
flects a desire to maintain the status quo in those cases
which the Court is likely to hear on the merits. See, e. 7.
In re Bart, 82 8. Ct. 675 (1962) (Warren, C. J.. Cireuit
Justice): MeGee v. Eyman, 83.8, Ct. 230 (1962) ( Dove-
Las. J.. Cireuit Justice). This case is unusual in that
regardless of what action T take, it will likely be im-
possible to preserve this controversy in its present form
for ultimate review by this Court. Cf. O'Brien v. Brown,
401 U.S. 1. 9-10 (1972) (MarsHatt, J., dissenting). On
August 15, the statutory ban on Southeast Asian military
activity will take effect, and the contours of this dispute
will then be irrevocably altered. Hence, it is difficult to
justify a stay for purpose of preserving the status quo,
since no action by this Court can freeze the issues in their
present form."

To some extent, as well, the “four-vote” rule reflects
the policy in favor of granting a stay only when the losing
party presents substantial contentions which are likely to
prevail on the merits. See. e.g., O'Brien vy. Brown, supra;
Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S. 273 (Dove ras,
J.. Cireuit Justice); Railway Express Agency v. United
States; 828. Ct. 466 (1962) (Harlan, J.. Cireuit Justice) ;
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 396 U.S. 1201 (1969) ( Black, J.. Cireuit Jus-
tice). In my judgment. petitioners’ contentions in this
ease are far from frivolous and may well ultimately pre-
vail. Although tactical decisions as to the conduct of an
ongoing war may present political questions which the
federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide, see, e. g.,

1—_$
EvizaBeTH HoitzMay, ete., et al.,
Petitioners,

—vV.—

James R. ScHuesincer, ete., et al.

>

ORDER

Petitioners’ application, by counsel, for an extraordinary
sitting of the Supreme Court of the United States having
been filed on August 10, 1973, and having been considered,

Now THEREFORE, IT Is ORDERED that the application be,
and it is hereby, denied.

Warren E. Burcer
Chief Justice of the United States

Dated this 13th
day of August, 1973.

ain ee ae Owes

wre eS

Ee RPS me Be ee ee ee

98a

Judgment
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Eastern District or New York

73-C-537

<>
ExizaBetH HottzMay, individually and in her capacity as a
member of the United States House of Representatives;
Ist Lr. ArtHturR Watsox, 43rd Strategie Wing, United
States Air Foree, Anderson Air Force Base. Guam;
Captain Micnac. Fivacer, 43rd Strategic Wing, United
States Air Force, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam;
Captain James H. Strain, 43rd Strategic Wing, United
States Air Force, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam;
and Captaris Doxatp E. Dawsoy, 307th Strategic Wing,
United States Air Force, U-Tapo, Thailand,
Plaintiffs,
—against—

James R. ScHvesincer, individually and as Secretary of
Defense; Joun L. McLvcas, individually and as Acting
Secretary of the Air Force; and Witiiam P. CLEMENTs,
individually and as Deputy Secretary of Defense,

Defendants.

>

Plaintiffs having moved for summary judgment and de-
claratory and injunctive relief, and the court having re-
ceived the papers submitted by both parties and having
heard argument and having issued a Memorandum contain-
ing a statement of facts and a discussion of the applicable
law, and due deliberation having been had, and the court
having determined that no bond is required of the plain-
tiffs; it is

a es ee mou

99a

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECLARED, that there is no existing
Congressional authority to order military forces into com-
bat in Cambodia or to release bombs over Cambodia, and
that military activities in Cambodia by America, armed
forces are unauthorized and unlawful; and it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that defendants James
S. Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense, John L. McLucas
as Acting Secretary of the Air Force, and William P. Clem-
ents. as Deputy Secretary of Defense, their officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and all persons in ac-
tive concert or participation with them who receive actual
notice of this judgment, are permanently enjoined and re-
strained from participating in any way in military activi-
ties in or over Cambodia or releasing any bombs which
may fall in Cambodia; and it is

Orverep, that the effective date of the foregoing injunc-
tion shall be postponed until 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon,
Eastern Daylight Savings Time, on Friday, July 27, 1973,
in order that defendants may have an opportunity if so
advised to apply to the Court of Appeals for a stay pend-
ing appeal.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
July 25, 1973

Orrin G. Jupp
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_1645%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
