# Appendix — Freedman v. Morrissey

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1974
- **Citation:** 414 U.S. 1128

## Text

LIBRARY
SUPREME COURT, U. S.

F pn ye CL ERK
IN THE WICHAES

an

—

Supreme Court of the United States
G3o°-4 TE

October Term, 1973.

ABRAHAM E. FREEDMAN,

Petitioner,
v.

JAMES M. MORRISSEY, JOSEPH PADILLA, and RALPH
IBRAHIM, Individually and on Behalf of the Members of
the NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA,

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

Marvin I. Barisn,
Witrrep R. Lorry,

8th Floor Lafayette Bldg.,
5th & Chestnut Sts.,
Philadelphia, Pa. 19106

Attorneys for Petitioner.

International Printing Co., 711 So. 50th St., Phila., Pa. 19143 — Tel. (215) 727-8711

INDEX TO APPENDIX.

Page
District Court Opinion (June 29, 1972) .............00005. Al
District Court Opinion (October 26, 1972) ................ Al7
Court of Appeals Opinion ............. 0. cc cecececeucucee A35

Agreement Between NMU and Perry Dated August 2, 1966 .. A46
Agreement and Declaration of Trust Between NMU and
Cooper, et al. Dated December 29, 1952 ............... ASO

GALE KD RIAN LAGE DLR LORD Banks daa ge

PO AAT I ROO IES” a OS TG: Pe cag a

Appendix.

DISTRICT COURT OPINION, JUNE 29, 1972.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SouTHERN District or New York

69 C1v. 442.

JAMES M. MORRISSEY, JOSEPH PADILLA, RALPH
IBRAHIM, Inpivipvaxy anv on BEHALF oF THE MEM-
BERS OF THE NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF
AMERICA,

Se ee eee

Plaintiffs,
—against—

JOSEPH CURRAN, SHANNON WALL, WILLIAM 4
PERRY, MARTIN SEGAL, ABRAHAM E. FREED-
MAN anp LEON KARCHMER,

Defendants. :

Appearances :

Durr & Taytor,
74 Trinity Place, New York, N. Y. 10006
Attorneys for Plaintiffs,

OP OE OD Re ee

Artuur E. McInerney, Of Counsel.

Boom AnD Epstein,
110 East 42nd St., New York, N. Y. 10017
Attorneys for Defendants Curran, Wall and
Freedman, 4

(Al)

District Court Opinion (6/29/72)

Harotp Epstein,
Rosert MILNER, AND
Warren Pesetsxy, Of Counsel.

Simpson THacuer & BaRTLETT,
One Battery Park Plaza, New York, N. Y. 10004
Attorneys for Defendant Segal,

Roy L. Rearpon,
Metvyn L, Cantor aND
Joun W. Ontiverer, Of Counsel.

Surrey, Karastk, Morse anp SEHAM,
500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10036
Attorneys for Defendant Karchmer,

Herman E. Cooper anpD
Cart F. Goopman, Of Counsel.

MEMORANDUM.
BonsaL, D. J.

In the earlier proceedings in this action it has been
determined that the 1960 constitution of the National Mari-
time Union of America (‘‘NMU’’) did not authorize the
inclusion of non-officers of NMU in the NMU Officers Pen-
sion Plan (‘‘the Pension Plan*’), and that NMU was en-
titled to recover from the Trustees of the Penson Plan all
amounts paid by NMU into the Pension Plan for the ac-
count of non-officers, plus interest. Morrissey v. Curran,
302 F. Supp. 32 (S. D. N. Y. 1969), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 423 F. 2d 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U. S. 928
(1970), 400 U. S. 826 (1970), on remand, 336 F. Supp. 1107
(S. D. N. Y. 1972). Accordingly, on February 18, 1972,
judgment was entered in favor of NMU against the Pension

SERPS CLI ens, e kid SDT MRO NET hp
“

PIB a SIR MAAS DOM Ot be bal SEP ONG

District Court Opinion (6/29/72) A3

Plan in the amount of $674,222.60 (presenting $520,283.38
paid into the Pension Plan for the account of non-officers,
plus interest in the amount of $153,939.22), which judgment
has been paid. Judgment was also entered on February 18,
1972 in favor of the Pension Plan against the defendant
William Perry (‘‘Perry’’) a non-officer, in the principal
amount of $222,200. (the amount of the lump sum pension
paid to him), plus interest in the amount of $41,107., or a
total of $263,307. This judgment has not been paid. The
court has been advised that the Pension Plan has instituted
supplementary proceedings to collect the judgment.

Plaintiffs now seek to surcharge the defendants Curran
and Wall, officers of NMU, and defendants Segal, Freedman
and Karchmer, Trustees of the Pension Plan, with respect
to amounts paid by the Pension Plan to non-officers of
NMU.

In its Memorandum filed January 11, 1972, the court
stated that the plaintiffs may ‘‘notice a hearing to deter-
mine the personal liability, if any, of the defendant trustees
(of the Pension Plan), Freedman, Segal and Karchmer,
and officers [of NMU], Curran and Wall, to NMU for the
monies which the Pension Plan has paid out to non-officers
and which it is unable to recoup.’’ (336 F. Supp. at 1111).
The hearing was held on April 13, 14 and May 1, 1972, at
which plaintiffs presented their evidence. At the conclu-
sion of the hearing, the defendants moved to dismiss, pur-
suant to Rule 41(b), F. R. Civ. P., on the ground that plain-
tiffs have shown no right to relief.

Plaintiffs are members of NMU, suing on behalf of all
of its members under Section 501 of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (‘‘LMRDA’’), 29
U. S. C. §501. Defendant Joseph Curran (‘‘Curran’’) is
the President of NMU. Defendant Shannon Wall (‘‘ Wall’’)
is the Secretary-Treasurer of NMU. Defendants Martin

A tg LEIP BEE ROWS oh MS at hat Oy

A4 District Court Opinion (6/29/72)

Segal (‘‘Segal’’), Abraham E. Freedman (‘‘Freedman’’)
and Leon Karchmer (‘‘Karchmer’’) are the Trustees of the
Pension Plan pursuant to an Agreement and Declaration of
Trust of December 29, 1952 as subsequently amended.
Freedman is also General Counsel of NMU.

Perry was Assistant to the President of NMU, and in
prior proceedings it has been determined that he was not
an officer of NMU entitled to participate in the Pension
Plan. (302 F. Supp. 32, as affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals, 423 F’, 2d 393.) While there were several other non-
officers who received payments under the Pension Plan,"
the evidence offered by plaintiffs at the hearing primarily
concerned Perry. The evidence established that on Janu-
ary 16, 1969, NMU paid Perry $104,595.16 to cover salary,
severance pay and vacation pay through October 20, 1974,
and that, on the same day, the Pension Plan delivered to
Perry a post-dated check (January 20, 1969) in the amount
of $222,200, The evidence at the hearing showed, in rele-
vant part:

Sratement or Facts (Perry).

Perry had been employed by NMU since 1954, and as
Assistant to the President since 1958. On August 2, 1966,
he entered into an employment contract with NMU which
provided that he would continue in the employ of NMU
to serve as Assistant to the President until October 30,
1974. Paragraph 3 of the contract provided.

‘‘In the event that this Agreement or Perry's
employment should be terminated, with or without
cause, price to the expiration date hereof. . . Perry
shall be entitled to continue to receive his said salary

1. Sarah Laderhandler .... $ 9,201
James Tevan .......--+++ $ 12,799
Sophia Tevan ......-.-- $ 11,561

Irving Brauch ........-- $115,510

District Court Opinion (6/29/72) A5

in full, including contributions to the NMU Officers
Pension Plan and any other fringe benefits payable
to the National Officers as under paragraph 2 hereof,
during the balance of the term hereof... In the event,
however, of such termination . . . Perry shall have
the option to demand and receive at one time. . .
an amount equal to the said total salary, including
contributions to the NMU Officers Pension Plan and
any other fringe benefits payable to National Officers
which he would have received during the balance of the
original term. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

Attached at the end of Perry’s contract is an undated
statement signed by Freedman, Segal and Karchmer, the
Trustees of the Pension Plan, by which they acknowledged
that paragraph 4? of Perry’s Agreement ‘‘shall be binding
upon us and our successors in determining William Perry’s
entitlement to participation in, and benefits from, the NMU
Officers Pension Plan.’’ This statement may have been
added on or about August 29, 1966, on which day Freed-
man, following discussions with Karchmer and Segal, fur-
nished them with his legal opinion that:

‘‘There is no question but that this is a valid and bind-
ing agreement, and Perry’s status as a covered
employee continues at least until October 20, 1974,
regardless of whether his services are discontinued by
the union prior to that date. I recommend that the
Trustees of the NMU Officers Pension Plan approve

2. Paragraph 4 provides:

“4. For the pean of determining Perry’s entitlement to par-
ticipation in and benefits from, the NMU Officers Pension Plan, the

parties recognize, understand and ee that Perry shall be deemed
to be a ‘Participant’ in ‘Covered Employment’ (as defined in the
said Plan) during the full period of the original term of this Agree-
ment, and the full four-year period of each renewal or extension
thereof, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
paragraph 3 or any other provision of this Agreement.”

a) bel etal PUR ates a L0 tee EEE
AOE ha,

A6 District Court Opinion (6/29/72)

and adopt the agreement to the extent that it relates
to the NMU Officers Pension Plan.’’

In May of 1968, the plaintiffs wrote letters to Wall,
Secretary-Treasurer of NMU, requesting that NMU in-
stitute suit or other proceeding to recover, on behalf of
NMU, all monies contributed to the Pension Plan with
rspect to non-officers, including the ‘‘Assistant to the
President’? (Perry). These letters were sent by certified 4
mail on May 17 and May 23, 1968. Wall testified that he
had received the letters. Curran testified that copies of
the letter were handed to him but that he paid no attention
to them as he considered them ‘‘propaganda’’. There is
no evidence that these letters were brought to the atten-
tion of Segal and Karchmer or, but, according to Wall, they
were brought to the attention of Freedman, who was both
General Counsel of NMU and a Trustee of the Pension
Plan.

On November 4, 1968, De Novellis, the Administrator
of the Pension Plan, who worked in Segal’s office, com-
puted, at the request of Breit, the Controller of NMU, the
lump sum equivalent of Perry’s Regular Pension Benefit
as of October 20, 1974, in the amount of $222,200.

On December 18, 1968, Curran sent a memorandum to
Breit instructing him to prepare a check in the amount of
$41,250.01 to be paid to the Pension Plan for Perry’s ac-
count, and on the following day, December 19, NMU for-
warded a check signed by Curran, in this amount, to the
Pension Plan, which was in addition to NMU’s regular
contribution.2 Upon receipt of the check for Perry’s ac-

3. Article II, Section 2 of the amended Agreement and Declara-
tion of Trust between NMU and the Trustees of the Pension Plan
— that NMU shall make quarterly payments to the Pension

lan equal to 26% of the compensation paid by NMU to the partici-
pants in the Pension Plan. There is no provision in the amended
Agreement and Declaration of Trust authorizing special payments,
such as the one made for Perry’s account on Boneber 19, 1968.

District Court Opinion (6/29/72) AT

count, Karchmer, thinking it unusual, photostated the
check. Karchmer testified that the check ‘‘wasn’t accom-
panied with a regular routine report’’, but he believed that
he received Curran’s memorandum of December 18, 1968
or other substantiating data from Breit.

January 16, 1969.

Curran testified that at 9:30 a.m. he called Perry into
his office and fired him, and that he immediately thereafter
notified such officers as were available, adding that not
many officers were available since they were conducting
an election. (Apparently, pursuant to the order of Judge
Motley, 284 F. Supp. 47 (1968).)* Curran then instructed
Sovel, Freedman’s partner, (Freedman being in Phila-
delphia that day), to examine Perry’s contract and to see
what Perry had coming to him. As Wall, the Secretary-
Treasurer, was not available, Curran instructed Breit ‘‘to
prepare everything that was coming to him’’ [Perry]. At
some time during the same day Perry was handed a check
signed by Curran, in the amount of $104,595.16, which
check, according to Curran, covered Perry’s wages, sever-
ance pay, vacation pay, and ‘‘all other monies due him’’
through October 20, 1974

Freedman testified that at about 9:30 a.m. Sovel tele-
phoned him in Philadelphia and told him that Perry had
been fired. Apparently, by 10:00 a.m, Perry’s application
for pension benefits was prepared by Breit and delivered
to Segal, because Freedman testified that at about 10:00
a.m. Segal telephoned him in Philadelphia asxing for his

4. Curran testified that he had fired Perry a month before, but
continued him when Karchmer interceded. In his deposition taken
on November 11, 1970, Curran testified that on January 21, 1969
he told Perry he was preparing to recommend to the NMU National
Office that Perry’s position be abolished and that Perry’s employment
be terminated. Curran also testified in his deposition that he told
no one about —. Perry until NMU’s National Office meeting held
on January 23, 1969.

A he Cig tte ID aT PR COIS

A8 District Court Opinion (6/29/72)

legal opinion. Freedman testified that he immediately
called Sovel. After satisfying himself that the $41,250.01
had been paid to the Pension Plan (which the record in-
dicates was done on December 19, 1968), Freedman dic-
tated his legal opinion® over the telephone to Sovel and
authorized Sovel to sign his (Freedman’s) name to it and
deliver it to Segal. Apparently, Freedman’s opinion was
delivered to Segal forthwith because before the lunch hour
Perry’s application had been processed by Segal’s office,
delivered to the Trustees for their authorization,’ and the
authorization had been signed by Karchmer and Segal as

Trustees, and by Sovel, who signed Freedman’s name as
Trustee.’

5. Freedman’s legal opinion reads as follows:

“You have certain questions in connection with the re-
tirement of Mr. William Perry as Assistant to President Joseph
Curran of the National Maritime Union. The following are my
answer to your inquiries:

1) Is Mr. Perry entitled to credit for covered employment

for the period through October 20, 1974?

Yes, based on his contract with the Union, dated August

2, 1966, and pursuant to which contributions have been made b

the Union to the Plan for the period through October 20, 1974.

2) In determining the amount of his pension benefits what
attained age of William Perry is to be used?

His attained age as of October 20, 1974.

3) Is Mr. Perry entitled to receive immediate payment of
the benefits which are payable to him in accordance with the
answers to the above questions?

Yes.
I trust that the foregoing answers your inquiries.”

6. The Pension Plan provides that it is within the sole discre-
tion of the Trustees to make a lump sum payment of a Regular
Pension Benefit (Article II, Section 1).

7. There is no provision in the Agreement and Declaration of
Trust providing that a trustee may delegate his authority to a non-
trustee. Freedman testified that he authorized Sovel to sign his
name as hie oy after a 220 — Perry is anxious to
it through (the pa t of $222,200.) and every here [NMU]
is anxious to get Bnished with the thing... .” (Tr. 305)

District Court Opinion: (6/29/72) A9

After lunch, Perry, accompannied by at least two
gentlemen, one of whom was an officer of NMU, appeared
in Karchmer’s office and Perry presented the approved ap-
plication to Karchmer and received from Karchmer a check
payable to him in the amount of $222,200. postdated Jan-
uary 20, 1969.

So, despite being fired at 9:30, it wasn’t a bad day for
Mr. Perry.

On February 4, 1969, NMU not having started suit pur-
suant to plaintiffs’ request of May, 1968, Judge Bryan
signed an order authorizing the plaintiffs to sue under
LMRDA.

Motions To Dismiss.

Each of the moving defendants contends that plain-
tiffs, as members of NMU, lack standing to seek to sur-
charge the defendants and that this court has no juris-
diction under Section 501 of LMRDA. Defendant Trustees
Segal, Freedman and Karchmer contend that they have
not breached their fiduciary duty as Trustees, and defend-
ants Curran and Wall contend that they have not breached
their fiduciary duty as union officers.

In 1958, the Senate Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor or Management Field issued an
interim report stating that over ten million dollars in union
funds were either stolen, embezzled, or misused by the offi-
cials of five labor unions over a period of fifteen years. One
of the purposes of Congress in enacting LMRDA was to
correct these abuses. Senate Report No. 187, 86th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1959); H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959). Section 401 of LMRDA, the Congressional declara-
tion of findings, purposes and policy, provides in part as
follows:

Pees Oe ee FST EOS Oe DE,

District Court Opinion (6/29/72)

‘‘(b) The Congress further finds, from recent in-
vestigations in the labor and management fields, that
there have been a number of instances of breach of
trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual
employees, and other failures to observe high stand-
ards of responsibility and ethical conduct which re-
quire further and supplementary legislation that will
afford necessary protection of the rights and interests
of employees and the public generally as they relate
to the activities of labor organizations, employers,
labor relations consultants and their officers and repre-
sentatives.’’

Section 501(a) provides that ‘‘the officers, agents, shop
stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization
occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization
and its members as a group.’’®

8. “. . . It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking
into account the special problems and functions of a labor organiza-
tion, to hold its money and property solely for the benefit of the
organization and its members and to manage, invest, and expend
the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any
resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain
from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf
of an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and from
holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which con-
flicts with the interests of such organization, and to account to the
organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity in
connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction
on behalf of the organization. A general exculpatory provision in
the constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization or a general
exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve
any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by this
section shall be void as against public policy.”

Section 501(b) provides:

“When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of
any labor organization is alleged to have violated the duties declared
in subsection (a) of this section and the labor organization or its
governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover damages
or assure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a reason-

NEUE NIRA LEANED NER DEG EG Wei

Ci MAINT Bk lt a

District Court Opinion (6/29/72) All

In Garton v. Arons, 339 F. 2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964),
the Court of Appeals held that Section 501 is applicable
only to those breaches of fiduciary duty involving union
funds and property. Therefore, the threshold issue is
whether for the purposes of Section 501 the funds which the
Pension Plan paid to non-officers were funds of NMU.

There is authority that Section 501 does not reach
employer appointed trustees of a ‘‘trust in which a labor
organization is interested.’’ (Section 402(1) of LMRDA.)
Tucker v. Shaw, 308 F. Supp. 1, 8 (E. D. N. Y. 1970). But
see, Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under the New Act, 48
Geo. L. J. 277, 293-94 (1959); Clark, The Fiduciary Duties
of Union Officials Under Section 501 of LMRDA, 52 Minn.
L. Rev. 437, 476 (1967). Here, however, the Pension Plan
was established by NMU for the exclusive benefit of its
officers, and the Trustees were appointed by NMU. The
Court of Appeals determined that the Trustees were
fiduciaries under Section 501 (423 F. 2d at 400), and they
have been enjoined from making payments to non-officers
out of the Pension Plan.

Pursuant to the judgment of this court in this action
filed February 18, 1972, the Trustees of the Pension Plan
have returned to NMU the full amount of its contributions
made for the account of non-officers. Pursuant to the same

8. (Cont’d.)

able time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor
organization, such member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward,
or representative in any district court of the United States or in any
state court of competent jurisdiction to recover damages or secure
an accounting or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor
organization. No such proceeding shall be brought except upon
leave of the court obtained upon verified application and for good
cause shown, which application may be made ex parte. The trial
judge may allot a reasonable part of the recovery in any action under
this subsection to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting the suit at the
instance of the member of the labor organization and to compensate
such member for any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by him
in connection with the litigation.”

LOLA RN ROTOR POULT I BELIBN TONS

Al2 District Court Opinion (6/29/72)

judgment, the Trustees of the Pension Plan were granted
judgment against Perry, a non-officer, in the amount of
$222,200. paid to him on January 16, 1969, and which the
Trustees are now seeking to recover from Perry. This
judgment was obtained by the plaintiffs, suing on behalf
of NMU, and it is the law of the case that the action is
under Section 501. There is no assurance that the Trustees
of the Pension Plan will be able to recover the amounts
which they improperly paid to Perry. Indeed, it may be
that because of this payment to Perry the Trustees will be
unable to make the payments to officers of NMU in accord-
ance with the Agreement and Declaration of Trust unless
further contributions to the Pension Plan are made by
NMU. Therefore, plaintiffs, suing on behalf of NMU, have
an interest under Section 501 to surcharge the Trustees of
the Pension Plan in the event that the payment to Perry
was in breach of their fiduciary duty as Trustees, it having
been already determined that the payment to Perry was not
in accordance with NMU’s constitution. The payment to
Perry came out of funds received from NMU and, ac-
cordingly, constituted NMU funds for the purposes of
Section 501.

Defendant Trustees also contend that plaintiffs have
no standing as a matter of trust law since they sue deriva-
tively on behalf of NMU which, as settlor of the trust
created under the Pension Plan, has no claim against the
Trustees. III A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, § 200.1 (3d ed.
1967). But see Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 679 (1933) ;
Note, Right of a Settlor to Enforce a Private Trust, 62
Harv. L. Rev. 1370, 1374-75 (1949). However, as the court
in Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 10 v. Cohen,
102 F. Supp. 608 (E. D. Pa.), aff’d, 284 F. 2d 162 (3d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U. S. 833 (1961), said:

‘Section 501, with which we are particularly con-
cerned, is entitled ‘Fiduciary responsibility of officers

eon Da themes FINS ele weld abet RMIT IRN NS IG the MOTO IE A £3 5 a LN ey RTL Vi PIM EEA

————,r—r

District Court Opinion (6/29/72) A13

of labor organizations.’ This section, quoted earlier,
attempts to define in the broadest terms possible the
duty which the new federal law imposes upon a union
official. Congress made no attempt to ‘codify’ the law
in this area. It appears evident to us that they in-
tended the federal courts to fashion a new federal labor
law in this area, in much the same way that the federal
courts have fashioned a new substantive law of collec-
tive bargaining contracts under §301(a) of the Taft-
Hartley Act, 29 U. S. C. A. §185(a). See Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 1957, 353
U. S. 448, 77 S. Ct. 923, 1 L, Ed. 2d 972. In undertak-
ing this task the federal courts will necessarily rely
heavily upon the common law of the various states.
Where that law is lacking or where it in any way con-
flicts with the policy expressed in our national labor
laws, the latter will of course be our guide.’’

182 F. Supp. at 617)

In carrying out the policy of LMRDA, the court con-
cludes that, on the facts here stated, NMU has a claim
against the Trustees if they violated their fiduciary duty,
Moreover, as a matter of trust law, ‘‘it is the function of
the court to see that the directions of the settlor [NMU]
are carried out, even though no one complains to the court
of the failure of the trustee to carry them out... .”’
Scott, supra, § 200.4 at 1640.

A reading of Perry’s contract and of the Pension Plan
fails to reveal any basis on which the Trustees of the
Pension Plan could pay Perry a lump sum pension in 1969
based on his continuing in NMU’s employ until October 20,
1974. Indeed, Perry’s contract provided that in the event
of his discharge he would be paid an amount equal to his
total salary, ‘‘including contributions to the NMU Officers
Pension Plan.’’ This was the $41,250.01 which NMU paid

Al4 District Court Opinion (6/29/72)

to the Pension Plan on December 19, 1968 at the direction
of Curran.

Both Curran and Wall signed the Perry employment
contract on behalf of NMU. On December 19, 1968, when
NMU paid $41,250.01 to the Pension Plan for Perry’s ac-
count, and on January 16, 1969 when the Pension Plan paid
Perry $222,200., Wall and probably Curran were aware of
plaintiffs’ request that NMU institute suit to recover all
monies contributed to the Pension Plan with respect to non-
officers. This, coupled with the events of January 16, 1969,
establishes at least a prima facie case that, as to the pay-
ment to Perry, the NMU officers, Curran and Wall, breached
their fiduciary duty under Section 501(a).

The Trustees, Segal, Freedman and Karchmer, knew
about the Perry employment contract. Freedman drew it,
and as early as August, 1966, Segal and Karchmer had re-
quested Freedman’s legal opinion. Freedman’s opinion
letters of August 29, 1966 and January 16, 1969 do not show
why the Trustees were authorized either to receive the
payment of $41,250.01 for Perry’s account or to pay Perry,
as of January 16, 1969, a lump sum pension benefit com-
puted to October 20, 1974. Indeed, there was nothing in
the Agreement and Declaration of Trust or the Pension
Plan providing for accelerated payments by NMU to the
Pension Plan, and under the Pension Plan and Perry’s con-
tract it appears that October 20, 1974 was the earliest date
on which Perry could have become eligible to receive a lump
sum pension payment of $222,200.

The role of Mr. Freedman is particularly hard to
understand. The evidence discloses that he was acting as
a Trustee of the Pension Plan, giving legal advice to the
other Trustees as to the Perry contract, which he had
drawn, and at the same time was counsel for NMU. More-
over, in the early stages of this litigation he had acted as
counsel for Perry.

District Court Opinion (6/29/72) A15

On January 16, 1969 when defendant Freedman dic-
tated his legal opinion over the telephone and had his name
signed to it by Mr. Sovel, the evidence is clear that Mr.
Freedman was on notice that the plaintiffs had requested
NMU to institute an action to stop payments under the
Pension Plan to non-officers, and he knew that Perry was a
non-officer. While there is no evidence that defendants
Segal and Karchmer knew this, the undue haste in which
they were called upon to act on January 16 should at least
have put them on inquiry. Indeed, Segal telephoned Freed-
man in Philadelphia and it must have seemed strange to
have the opinion returned to him in New York bearing
Freedman’s signature an hour or so later. As to Karchmer
it is hard to understand his haste in giving a post-dated
check to Perry.

Segal and Karchmer contend that they were entitled to
rely on the opinion of counsel. This proposition is true as a
general rule, but here they were relying on the opinion of
their fellow Trustee, Freedman, whom they knew to be
general counsel for NMU, and Segal, at least, knew that
the opinion of counsel was not the result of any delibera-
tion on Freedman’s part.

It is true that the Agreement and Declaration of Trust
limits the liability of the Trustees to wilful misconduct.
However, plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of
wilful misconduct on the part of the Trustees as to the
payment to Perry.

As to the payments by the Pension Plan to the other
non-officers, plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Curran, Wall, Segal, Freedman
or Karchmer were guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty for
which they can be held personally liable.

The motions of the defendants Curran, Wall, Segal,
Freedman and Karchmer at the end of plaintiffs case, are

Z RAL Lee HILAL SDI
?

Bite ha Opie Pn i Nte! B/ KDE.

Al6 District Court Opinion (6/29/72)

granted with respect to the payments made to non-officer
employees other than Perry. The motions are denied with
respect to the payment made to defendant Perry by the
Pension Plan on January 16, 1969. The hearing will be
continued on July 7, 1972, at 10:00 A. M. in Room 618,
United States Court House, at which time these defendants
may present their evidence.
It is so ordered.

Duptey B. Bonsat,
U.S. D. J.

Dated: New York, N. Y.
June 27, 1972.

=.
J
rs

hl a ai hid

District Court Opinion (10/26/72) A17
DISTRIOT COURT OPINION, OCTOBER 26, 1972.

Bonsat, D. J.

In prior proceedings it has been held that the 1960 con-
stitution of the National Maritime Union of America
(‘“‘NMU’’) did not authorize the inclusion of non-officers
of NMU in the NMU Officers Pension Plan (‘‘the Officers
Pension Plan’’), and that NMU was entitled to recover
from the Trustees of the Officers Pension Plan all amounts
paid by NMU into the Officers Pension Plan for the account
of non-officers, plus interest. Morrissey v. Curran, 302
F, Supp. 32 (S. D. N. Y. 1969), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 423 F. 2d 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U. S. 928
(1970), 400 U. S. 826 (1970), on remand, 336 F. Supp. 1107
(S. D. N. Y. 1972). Accordingly, on February 18, 1972,
judgment was entered in favor of NMU against the Officers
Pension Plan in the amount of $674,222.60 (representing
$520,283.38 paid by NMU to the Officers Pension Plan
for the account of non-officers, plus interest in the amount
of $153,939.22), which judgment has been paid. On Feb-
ruary 18, 1972, judgment was also entered in favor of the
Officers Pension Plan against the defendant William Perry
(‘‘Perry’’), a non-officer, in the principal amount of
$222,200. (the amount of the lump sum pension paid to
him), plus interest in the amount of $41,107., or a total
of $263,307. This judgment has not been paid, The court
has been advised that the Officers Pension Plan has insti-
tuted supplementary proceedings to collect the Perry
judgment.

By Memorandum filed January 11, 1972, plaintiffs were
authorized to ‘‘notice a hearing to determine the personal
liability, if any, of the defendant trustees [of the Pension
Plan]. Freedman, Segal and Karchmer, and officers [of
NMU]. Curran and Wall, to NMU for the monies which

Al8 District Court Opinion (10/26/72)

the Pension Plan has paid out to non-officers and which
it is unable to recoup.’’ The hearing was held, and plain-
tiffs presented their evidence on April 13, 14 and May 1,
1972. The defendants then moved to dismiss, pursuant
to Rule 41(b), F. R. Civ. P., on the ground that plaintiffs
had shown no right to relief. By Memorandum filed June
29, 1972, the defendants’ motions were granted with respect
to the payments made to non-officer employees of NMU
other than Perry,’ and were denied with respect to the
payment made to defendant Perry by the Officers Pension
Plan on January 16, 1969. On July 12, 1972, the hearing
was resumed and the defendants presented their evidence.

Plaintiffs are members of NMU, suing on behalf of all
of its members under Section 501? of the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (‘‘LMRDA’’),
29 U. S. C. $501. Defendants Martin Segal (‘‘Segal’’),
Abraham E, Freedman (‘‘Freedman’’) and Leon Karch-

1, These payments were made as follows:

Pe EE ng bdc0ebedescsececces $ 9,201
PE PEE Videbwsbacdeneescacsataess $ 12,799
CT ccrecescdeacesatsebnenens $ 11,561
SE IEE ng. beck cch00ussesdaneees $115,510

2. Section 501(a) provides, to the extent here relevant:

“(a) The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other repre-
sentatives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in
relation to such organization and its members as a group. It is,
therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into account the
special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold
its money and property solely for the benefit of the organiza-
tion and its members and to manage, invest, and expend the same
in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolu-
tions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from
dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf
of an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and
from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest
which conflicts with the interests of such organization, and to
account to the organization for any profit received by him in
whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by
him or under his direction on behalf of the organization.”

SRN A tly cra ben! Pik La, 4 pate” 4 # ede

District Court Opinion (10/26/72) A19

mer (‘‘Karchmer’’) are the trustees of the Officers Pension
Plan pursuant to an Agreement and Declaration of Trust
of December 29, 1952 as subsequently amended. Freedman
is also General Counsel of NMU. Defendant Joseph Cur-
ran (‘‘Curran’’) is the President of NMU. Defendant
Shannon Wall (‘‘Wall’’) is the Secretary-Treasurer of
NMU.

Freedman became a trustee of the Officers Pension Plan
in 1963 when he became General Counsel of NMU. As
trustee, Freedman drafts legal documents for the Officers
Pension Plan and renders legal opinions to the other trus-
tees.

Segal has been a trustee since the inception of the Offi-
cers Pension Plan in 1953, and the Martin E. Segal Com-
pany (‘‘the Segal Company’’), of which Segal is Chair-
man of the Board, has administered it. The Segal Com-
pany processes pension applications and computes pen-
sion benefits. The Segal Company also is the actuary for
the NMU Welfare Plan and a pension plan covering the
membership of NMU.

Karchmer, an original trustee of the Officers Pension
Plan, is a Certified Public Accountant whose firm acts
for NMU, the NMU Welfare Plan, the NMU Vacation
Plan and the pension plan covering the membership of
NMU. Karchmer keeps the books of the Officers Pension
Plan and issues and receives checks on its behalf.

Statement of Facts With Respect to Perry.

Perry had been employed by NMU since 1954, and as
Assistant to the President since 1958. On August 2, 1966,
he entered into an employment contract with NMU which
provided that he would continue in the employ of NMU
to serve as Assistant to the President until October 20,
1974. Paragraph 3 of the contract provided:

District Court Opinion (10/26/72)

‘*In the event that this Agreement or Perry’s em-
ployment should be terminated, with or without cause,
prior to the expiration date hereof . . . Perry shall
be entitled to continue to receive his said salary in
full, including contributions to the NMU Officers Pen-
sion Plan and any other fringe benefits payable to the
National Officers as under paragraph 2 hereof, dur-
ing the balance of the terms hereof. . . . In the event,
however, of such termination . . . Perry shall have
the option to demand and receive at one time. . .
an amount equal to the said total salary, including
contributions to the NMU Officers Pension Plan and
any other fringe benefits payable to National Officers
which he would have received during the balance of
the original term. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

Attached at the end of Perry’s contract is an undated
statement signed by Freedman, Segal and Karchmer, the
Trustees of the Officers Pension Plan, by which they
acknowledged that paragraph 4° of Perry’s Agreement
‘¢shall be binding upon us and our successors in determin-
ing William Perry’s entitlement to participation in, and
benefits from, the NMU Officers Pension Plan.’’ There
is appended at the end of this opinion a copy of the Perry
contract and of the statement signed by the trustees. The
statement signed by the trustees may have been added on
or about August 29, 1966, on which day Freedman, follow-

3. Paragraph 4 provides:

“4. For the purposes of determining Perry’s entitlement to
—— in and benefits from, the NMU Officers Pension
an, the parties recognize, understand and agree that Perry
shall be deemed to be a ‘Participant’ in ‘Covered Employment’
(as defined in the said Plan) during the full period of the
original term of this Agreement, and the full four-year period
of each renewal or extension thereof, notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained in paragraph 3 or any other provision
of this Agreement.”

District Court Opinion (10/26/72) A21

ing discussions with Karchmer and Segal, furnished them
with his legal opinion, quoted in part as follows:

“It is my considered judgment that Perry would
continue as a ‘Participant’ in ‘Covered Employment’,
even though his services may be discontinued by the
union. The contract specifically so provides and must
be so construed without any question.

‘It is made crystal clear in the agreement that
both the union and Perry agreed that Perry shall be
deemed to be an employee of the NMU during the full
term of the agreement, including any renewals or
extensions. As above indicated, the agreement first
of all provides that Perry shall continue in the ‘em-
ploy’ of NMU as Assistant to the President until
October 20, 1974.

‘Paragraph 1 of the agreement specifically re-
quires the union to pay his salary, contributions to the
NMU Officers Pension Plan and fringe benefits during
the entire term of the agreement. Paragraph 2 of the
agreement pointedly covers the inquiry made by Marty :
and provides that the payment of salary, contributions
to the NMU Officers Pension Plan must be paid to the
end of the term, notwithstanding any termination of
his services with or without cause prior to the expi-
ration date. Paragraph 3 expressly provides that
Perry is to be deemed to be a ‘Participant’ in ‘Cov-
ered Employment’ (as defined in the Plan) during the
full term of the original agreement and any extension.
Paragraph 4 of the agreement specifically shows that
the parties recognize, understand and agree that Perry
shall be deemed to be a ‘Participant’ in ‘Covered Em-

ee.

OREN He REEL re RA SS ott

A22 District Court Opinion (10/26/72)

ployment’ as defined in the NMU Officers Pension
Plan to the very end of the term of the agreement or
any extension notwithstanding anything that might be
construed to be to the contrary elsewhere in the agree-
ment, such as a termination of services with or without
cause.

‘In summary, in consideration of Perry’s services
to the union, past and future, the union agreed to
maintain Perry in its employ at least until October 20,
1974 with full pay and all other benefits until the very
end of that term or any renewal thereafter. There
is no question but that this is a valid and binding
agreement, and Perry’s status as a covered employee
continues at least until October 20, 1974, regardless
of whether his services are discontinued by the union
prior to that date. I recommend that the Trustees of
the NMU Officers Pension Plan approve and adopt
the agreement to the extent that it relates to the NMU
Officers Pension Plan.’’

In May of 1968, the plaintiffs wrote several letters to
Wall, Secretary-Treasurer of NMU, demanding that NMU
institute suit or other proceeding to recover, on behalf of
NMJ, all monies contributed to the Officers Pension Plan
with respect to non-officers, including the ‘‘ Assistant to the
President’’ (Perry). These letters were sent by certified
mail on May 17 and May 23, 1968. Wall received the let-
ters, made copies of them available to Curran and Charles
Sovel, Freedman’s law partner, and after checking the
NMU constitution and conferring with Sovel, Wall decided
not to institute suit on behalf of NMU. There is no evi-
dence that plaintiffs were notified. Curran testified that
copies of plaintiffs’ letters were handed to him but that he
paid no attention to them as he considered them ‘‘propa-

RIVA BRIO VEO ie Po Her ee A elt Me ee ee 2 ee Ae ee 8 oe her

District Court Opinion (10/26/72) A23

ganda.’’ There is no evidence that plaintiffs’ letters were
brought to the attention of Segal and Karchmer.

In a letter dated November 4, 1968, Mr. De Novellis,
an administrator of the Officers Pension Plan at the Segal
Company, informed Perry, at the request of Milton Breit,
the controller of NMU, that as of October 20, 1974 the
lump sum equivalent of his Regular Pension Benefit would
be $222,200.

On December 18, 1968, Curran sent a memorandum to
Breit instructing him to prepare a check in the amount of
$41,250.01 to be paid to the Officers Pension Plan for
Perry’s account. The memorandum read in part, as fol-
lows:

‘‘This check represents the monies due in ac-
cordance with the employment contract agreement with
the National Maritime Union of America and William
Perry. The computation of the amount of $41,250.01
is based upon Mr. William Perry’s current regular
and vacation pay and is for the period December 1,
1968 thru and including October 20, 1974 multiplied
by the current percentage rate of contribution which
is 26%.”’

On the following day, December 19, NMU forwarded a
check, signed by Curran, to the Officers Pension Plan in
this amount for the account of Perry, which was in addi-
tion to NMU’s regular contribution due at that time.‘

4. Article II, Section 2 of the amended Agreement and Declara-
tion of Trust between NMU and the Trustees of the Pension Plan
rovides that NMU shall make quarterly yp gees to the Pension
an equal to 26% of the compensation paid by NMU to the partici-

pants in the Pension Plan. ere is no provision in the amended
Agreement and Declaration of Trust authorizing special payments,
and the Officers Pension Plan did not maintain separate accounts
for each participant.

A24 District Court Opinion (10/26/72)

Karchmer photostated the check before depositing it
as he had not previously received a payment of this kind.
Karchmer testified that the check ‘‘wasn’t accompanied
with a regular routine report,’’ but he believed that he
received Curran’s memorandum or other substantiating
data from Breit.

January 16, 1969

Curran testified that at 9:30 a.m. he called Perry into
his office and fired him, and that he immediately notified
such officers as were available. He said that not many offi-
cers were available since they were conducting a Union
election.

Curran testified that after firing Perry, he instructed
Freedman’s partner Sovel (Freedman being in Philadelphia
that day), to examine Perry’s contract and to see what
Perry had coming to him. As Wall, the Secretary-
Treasurer, was not available, Curran instructed Con-
troller Breit ‘‘to prepare everything that was coming to
him’’ [Perry]. At some time during the same day, Perry
was handed a check signed by Curran, in the amount of
$104,595.16, which, according to Curran, covered Perry’s
wages, severance pay, vacation pay, and ‘‘all other monies
due him’’ through October 20, 1974. Curran testified that
he had first fired Perry a month before when he directed
that the $41,250.01 be paid the Officers Pension Plan for
Perry’s account, but that he had changed his mind when
Karchmer interceded on Perry’s behalf.

Freedman testified that at about 9:30 a.m. on January
16, 1969, Sovel telephoned him in Philadelphia and told him
that Perry had been fired. Apparently, by 10:00 a.m.
Perry’s application for pension benefits was prepared by
Breit and delivered to Segal, because Freedman testified
that at about 10:00 a.m. Segal telephoned him in Philadel-
phia asking for his legal opinion. Freedman testified that
he immediately called Sovel. After satisfying himself that

sninan ty

—_e ne VEIT Sl

District Court Opinion (10/26/72) A256

the $41,250.01 had been paid to the Pension Plan (which
the record indicates was done on December 19, 1968), Freed-
man dictated his legal opinion ® over the telephone to Sovel

5. Freedman’s legal opinion reads as follows:
(Letterhead of)

ABRAHAM E. FREEDMAN
COUNSELLOR AT LAW AND PROCTOR IN ADMIRALTY
36 Seventh Ave., New York, N. Y. 10011
Oregon 5-4211

Charles Sovel Philadelphia, Pa. Office
Stanley D. Gruber Freedman, Borowsky and Lorry
Ned R. Phillips Chestnut Street at Fifth
Edward M. Katz Walnut 5-8400

Martin L. Katz

January 16, 1969
Mr. Martin E. Segal
Martin E. Segal Company
730 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Re: William Perry
Dear Mr. Segal:

You have posed certain questions in connection with the
retirement of Mr. William Perry as Assistant to President
Joseph Curran of the National Maritime Union. The following
are my answers to your inquiries:

1) Is Mr. Perry entitled to credit for covered employment
for the period through October 20, 1947?

Yes, based on his contract with the Union, dated
August 2, 1966, and pursuant to which contributions
have been made by the Union to the Plan for the period
through October 20, 1974.

2) In determining the amount of his pension benefits what
attained age of William Perry is to be used?

His attained age as of October 20, 1974.

3) Is Mr. Perry entitled to receive immediate payment of
the benefits which are payable to him in accordance with the
answers to the above questions ?

Yes.
I trust that the foregoing answers your inquiries.
With best personal regards, I am,
Sincerely,
/s/ ABRAHAM E, FREEDMAN
Abraham E. Freedman

AEF/ft

A26 District Court Opinion (10/26/72)

and authorized Sovel to sign his (Freedman’s) name to it
and deliver it to Segal.

Segal testified that after he learned Perry was leaving
NMU he telephoned Freedman and asked him whether the
period of service to be credited in computing Perry’s lump
sum pension benefit was to be through 1974. Freedman
said it was, and promised to send Segal an opinion letter.
In his deposition, Segal testified that this conversation oc-
curred prior to January 16, but at trial he testified that the
conversation occurred on the morning of January 16, 1969.
Segal also testified that he did not know at the time of the
conversation that Freedman was in Philadelphia.

Apparently, before the lunch hour on January 16, 1969,
the Freedman opinion letter was delivered to the Segal
Company, Perry’s pension application was processed and
written approval had been given by Segal and Freedman
(Sovel signed Freedman’s name as trustee). Freedman
explained that he authorized Sovel to sign his name after
Sovel told him, ‘‘Mr. Perry is anxious to get it through
[the payment of $222,200] and everybody here [NMU] is
anxious to get finished with the thing . . .’’ (Transcript p.
305).

Karchmer testified that Perry, accompanied by Sovel
and two other gentlemen associated with NMU, appeared in
his office after lunch and presented him with the pension ap-
plication. Karchmer testified that before approving the
application he carefully studied Freedman’s opinion letter
because the payment to Perry was the first of its kind.
Since there were insufficient funds on hand in the Officers
Pension Plan’s checking account to cover Perry’s lump
sum benefit of $222,200, and Perry demanded immediate
payment, Karchmer approved the application and issued
Perry a check postdated to January 20, 1969.

Karchmer testified that it was unprecedented for an
application to be prepared by NMU, processed by the Segal

fae REI Bt te ERAT ORE IE 5 Ry Pt RAR etna: ote 2) a

District Court Opinion, (10/26/72) A27

Company and approved by the trustees, with payment be-
ing made on it, in little more than half a day. Karchmer
also testified that the payment to Perry was the first of its
kind and was the largest payment ever made by the Officers
Pension Plan.

On February 4, 1969, since NMU had not commenced
suit as requested by plaintiffs in May of 1968, Judge Bryan
signed an order authorizing the plaintiffs to sue under
LMRDA.

In its memorandum of June 29, 1972, the court found
plaintiffs had standing to sue defendants under Section
501 of LMRDA (29 U.S. C. § 501). Therefore, the issue re-
maining is whether in making the payment of $222,200 to
Perry on January 16, 1969, Freedman, Segal and Karch-
mer breached their fiduciary duty as trustees and Curran
and Wall breached their fiduciary duty as NMU officers.

As to the Trustees (Freedman, Segal and Karchmer)

Article III, Section C of the Agreement and Declara-
tion of Trust as revised to October 28, 1961 deals with the
powers and duties of the trustees. Paragraph 1 provides:

«¢. . . The Trustees shall have full and sole discre-
tion to determine the amount of such benefits and the
terms and conditions of payment and shall have the
power to conclusively determine all questions concern-
ing the payment of benefits to any individual recipient
or proposed recipient.’’

Paragraph 4 provides that the trustees shall not be liable
‘‘for any loss to, or diminution of the Fund, except due to
their own wilful misconduct.’’ Paragraph 5 provides:

‘‘The Trustees . . . shall be protected in relying
and acting upon the opinion of legal counsel (includ-
ing opinion of legal counsel who is . . . a trustee
hereunder) in connection with any matter pertaining
to the administration or execution of this Trust Fund.

District Court Opinion (10/26/72)

No trustee shall be liable for any action taken. . .

by him unless such act . . . is the result of wilful mis-

conduct, nor for the acts of any . . . attorney selected

by the Trustees with reasonable care, nor for any act
. . of any other Trustee.’’

These provisions must be strictly construed, and they
do not relieve a trustee of liability for a breach of trust
constituting a willful violation of his duty, or committed
in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the interests
of the trust, or for any profit a trustee may have derived
from the breach of trust. Restatement (Second) of Trusts,
§ 222 (1959); Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 F. 321,
325 (3d Cir. 1918) cert. denied, 248 U. S. 564 (1918) ; New-
house v. Canal National Bank of Portland, 124 F. Supp.
239 (D. Maine, 1954).

While these provisions protect the trustees against
liability resulting from negligence, Thompson v. Hays, 11
F. 2d 244, 248 (8th Cir. 1926), the trustee may be held
liable if they have ‘‘intentionally disregarded the rules
which control the actions of prudent men in conducting
their own business affairs.’’ Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56,
57 (1883) ; In re Howard, 110 App. Div. 61, 97 N. Y. S. 23,
24 (2d Dept. 1905), aff’d 185 N. Y. 539 (1906).

Under the Pension Plan, the trustees were given sole
discretion to make lump sum payments to a participant
(NMU Officers Pension Plan, Article V, Section 8). How-
ever, neither the Plan nor the Agreement and Declaration
of Trust authorized the trustees to make a lump sum pay-
ment to Perry in 1969 computed on the pension he would
have been entitled to receive at the expiration of his con-
tract on October 20, 1974. Nor does Perry’s contract en-
title him to such a lump sum payment. Paragraph 3 of
Perry’s contract hereinbefore set forth gave Perry two
options upon the termination of his contract prior to Octo-

portale ss DAE A ee AO NN 5

8 AEN INR BELTS OHO VAI EE Dat TROLS ha RA CN A MLE

District Court Opinion (10/26/72) A29

ber 20, 1974—he could either continue to receive his salary
in full, including contributions to the NMU Officers Pen-
sion Plan during the balance of the term, or he could
demand and receive at one time an amount equal to the
total salary he would have earned to the termination,
‘including contributions to the NMU Officers Pension
Plan.’’ On January 16, 1969, NMU paid Perry an amount
equal to the total salary he would have earned to the ter-
mination (October 20, 1974). Previously, on December
18, 1968, NMU prepaid the Officers Pension Plan the con-
tributions it would have been required to pay to the
termination ($41,250.01).

The only obligation the trustees undertook when they
signed the rider to Perry’s contract was to include Perry
as a participant of the Officers Pension Plan during the
full period of the original term of the contract even if his
employment was terminated prior to that time. With
respect to accepting contributions to the Officers Pension
Plan for Perry and paying Perry pension benefits, the
trustees were bound by the terms of the Agreement and
Declaration of Trust and the Pension Plan.

Freedman’s legal opinion of January 16, 1969 stated
that Perry was entitled to credit for covered employment
for the period through October 20, 1974 based on his con-
tract with NMU, pursuant to which ‘‘contributions have
been made by the Union to the Plan for the period through
October 20, 1974,’’ and that Perry was ‘‘entitled to re-
ceive immediate payment.’’ This was wrong, on both
counts.

Under the Agreement and Declaration of Trust, the
prepayment of contributions to the Officers Pension Plan
on behalf of Perry was not authorized. Article II, Section
2 of the Amended Agreement and Declaration of Trust is
the sole provision covering contributions to the Officers

A30 District Court Opinion (10/26/72)

Pension Plan. It provides that NMU shall make quarterly
payments to the Officers Pension Plan equal to 20% of
the compensation paid by NMU to the participants in the
Officers Pension Plan for that quarter. Moreover, as
Karchmer testified, ‘‘Payments which were made to the
trustees were made without specific application to any
beneficiary of the Plan. There were no separate accounts
for beneficiaries.’’

Nor was there any legal basis, despite Freedman’s
opinion, for the payment to Perry of a lump sum pension
of $222,220 on January 16, 1969. This pension was payable
on October 20, 1974, and then only if the trustees at that
time exercised their discretion under Article V, Section 8
of the Pension Plan to pay Perry a lump sum. Before
October 20, 1974, this court and the Court of Appeals held
that the inclusion of Perry in the Officers Pension Plan
violated NMU’s constitution.

Freedman acted simultaneously as a trustee, counsel to
the trustees, and counsel to NMU. He had drawn the
Perry contract, and represented Perry in the earliest stages
of this litigation. The evidence shows that he dictated his
legal opinion from the top of his head while in Philadel-
phia and had his name signed to it by Sovel. He showed
a reckless indifference to his duty as a trustee as well as
the interests of his fellow trustees, who relied on his opin-
ion. Indeed, he was iuJifferent to his duty to NMU as
well, as he knew that Perry’s participation in the Officers
Pension Plan had been challenged by the plaintiffs (which
challenge was later sustained by this court and the Court
of Appeals). Moreover, he knew, or should have known,
that NMU made quarterly payments to the Officers Pension
Plan equal to 26% of the compensation paid for that quar-
ter, and, as pointed out by Karchmer, the payments were
made without specific application to any beneficiary, as
there were no separate accounts for beneficiaries.

District Court Opinion (10/26/72) A31

The court concludes with regret that Freedman acted
with reckless indifference to his duty as trustee. There-
fore, as trustee, he will be subject to surcharge for the
lump sum pension paid to Perry.

Segal, an acknowledged expert in the pension field, tes-
tified that the payment of Perry’s lump sum pension sev-
eral years before the termination of his contract was unique
in his experience. He was also aware of the pressure to
which the trustees were being subjected to make the pay-
ment on the same day that Perry was presumably fired, and
that very little time elapsed between his request for Freed-
man’s legal opinion and its delivery.

Karchmer was put on inquiry the previous December
when he received NMU’s check for $41,250.01 for Perry’s
account, which he thought unusual enough to photostat.
He testified that Perry’s lump sum payment was the first
of its kind and largest ever made by the Officers Pension
Plan, and processed faster than any other. Despite this,
he delivered a post-dated check to Perry on the day of
Perry’s application.

The evidence does not show that Segal and Karchmer
knew that the inclusion of Perry and other non-officers in
the Officers Pension Plan had been challenged by the plain-
tiffs. Moreover, the Agreement and Declaration of Trust
specifically protected them in ‘‘relying and acting upon the
opinion of legal counsel (including opinion of legal counsel
who is. ..atrustee . . .) in connection with any matters
pertaining to the administration or execution of this Trust
Fund.’’ Both Segal and Karchmer relied on, and acted
upon, Freedman’s opinion in making the payment to Perry.
While on the facts presented they were negligent in doing
so, there is no evidence that they willfully violated their
duty as trustees or were guilty of bad faith. The Agree-
ment and Declaration of Trust specifically protects them

a ag oS Tek a ay

er SS ne

ad

A32 District Court Opinion (10/26/72)

from liability from the acts of any other trustees. Accord-
ingly, they cannot be surcharged for the payment to Perry,
and judgment may be entered dismissing the action as

against them.
NMU Officers (Curran and Wall)

Curran, President of NMU, had a fiduciary responsibil-
ity under Section 501(a) of LMRDA (29 U. S. C. §501(a))
with respect to the funds of NMU. For the purposes of
Section 501(a), the funds paid by NMU to the Officers Pen-
sion Plan and by it to Perry were funds of NMU. Curran
negotiated the Perry employment contract and signed it on
behalf of NMU, and had also signed the Agreement and
Declaration of Trust. Although he dismissed plaintiffs’
request as propaganda, Curran knew that the plaintiffs had
requested NMU to institute this action to recover monies
paid to the Officers Pension Fund for the account of non-
officers on the ground that such payments violated the
NMU constitution, and that it was charged that Perry was
a non-officer. Curran was in a position of trust to expend
NMU funds only in accordance with the NMU constitution.
Curran also knew or should have known that the Agree-
ment and Declaration of Trust did not authorize the pre-
payment of contributions to the Officers Pension Plan.
Nevertheless, on December 18, 1968, when he fired Perry
for the first time, he instructed Breit to prepare a check
from NMU funds in the amount of $41,250.01 to be paid to
the Officers Pension Plan for Perry’s account, and on the
following day he signed the check, which was then for-
warded to the Officers Pension Plan. However, the
$41,250.01 has been recoverd by NMJ, so that even if he
violated his fiduciary duty, there is no occasion for sur-
charging him in this amount.

Curran testified that on January 16, 1969 he fired Perry
(for the second time), and that immediately thereafter he

ES A OF Ene Mes RG Hy Ns ee eee a Te

District Court Opinion (10/26/72) A338

instructed Controller Breit to prepare everything that was
coming to Perry. He signed the check to Perry in the
amount of $104,595.16 covering Perry’s wages, severance
pay, vacation pay, and ‘‘all other monies due him’’ through
October 20, 1974. This would appear to have been in ac-
cordance with Paragraph 3 of Perry’s contract, which pro-
vided that in the event of termination, Perry could demand
and receive at one time an amount equal to his total salary
and other fringe benefits which he would have received dur-
ing the balance of the original term. The evidence indi-
cates that Curran dominated the people who had anything
to do with the payment from the Officers Pension Plan to
Perry. Karchmer testified, ‘Well, to go in to Joe [Curran]
is a very fearful process.’’ (451). Freedman testified that
he was told by Sovel, ‘‘Mr. Perry is anxious to get it
through and everybody here is anxious to get finished with
the thing.’’ (305). When Perry appeared in Karchmer’s
office to obtain the check for $222,200, he was accompanied
by Freedman’s partner Sovel, Strassman, an officer of
NMU, and Shapiro, Executive Director of the NMU Pen-
sion Welfare Fund. (459). Undoubtedly, Curran used the
power of his office to get Perry everything that was coming
to him on January 16th. However, there is no evidence
that on January 16th Curran directed the payment to
Perry of $222,200 or directed Freedman to furnish the legal
opinion to the trustees. Consequently, on the evidence pre-
sented, plaintiffs have failed to prove that Curran breached
his fiduciary duty under LMRDA. See Richardson v. Tyler,
309 F. Supp. 1020 (N. D. Ill. 1970).

Wall, Secretary-Treasurer of NMU, knew that plain-
tiffs had requested NMU to institute action to recover
monies attributed to the Officers Pension Plan with respect
to non-officers. Indeed, he testified that he brought this to
the attention of Curran and the NMU lawyers. However,

A34 District Court Opinion (10/26/72)

the evidence establishes that he played no part either in the
payment of the $41,250.01 paid to the Officers Pension Plan
on December 18, 1968 or in the events of January 16, 1969.
Accordingly, there is no basis for finding that Wall
breached his fiduciary duty under LMRDA.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Freedman is
surcharged with respect to the $222,200 paid by the Officers
Pension Plan to Perry and which has not been repaid. The
application to surcharge the defendants Segal, Karchmer,
Curran and Wall is denied, and the action is dismissed with
respect to them.

The foregoing constitutes the court’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law. F. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

Settle judgment on notice.

Dup.ey B, Bonsat,
U.S. D. J.

Dated: New York, N. Y.
October 26, 1972.

ee

Court of Appeals Opinion A35
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For tue Seconp Circuir

No. 689, 1089, 1090, 1091—September Term, 1972.

(Argued April 11, 1973 Decided June 18, 1973.)
Docket Nos, 72-2443
73-1082
73-1363
73-1383

James M. Morrissey, Joserpu Pavria, Raven Isranim,
individually and on behalf of the members of the
National Maritime Union of America,
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Appellees,

Vv.

Josepu Curran, Suannon Wai, WiuuiaMm Perry,
AsranaM FE, Freepman,
Defendants-A ppellees-Appellants,

Martin Secau and Leon Karcumer,
Defendants-A ppellees.

Before: Smirn, Hays, and Timers, Circuit Judges.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Dudley B.
Bonsal, Judge, holding that (1) the decision of this court
on a prior appeal did not require that all payments made
to the Officers’ Pension Fund on account of non-elected
personnel be refunded to the Union; (2) the trustees Segal
and Karchmer should not be surcharged for the payments

A36 Court of Appeals Opinion

to Perry and Brauch; (3) the trustee Freedman should
be surcharged for the payment to Perry but not Brauch ;
(4) the defendant officers Curran and Wall are not per-
sonally liable for the payments to Perry or for the amount
set aside to establish a trust fund for current employees;
and (5) award of counsel fees to plaintiffs in the sum of
$111,864 shall be assessed against the Union.
Affirmed.

Arruur BE, McInerney (Duer & Taylor, New
York, New York, on the brief), for Plain-
tiffs-Appellants-A ppellees.

Josseu P, Autrer (Ira Gammerman, Bromsen,
Gammerman, Altier & Wayne, New York,
New York, on the brief), for Defendants-
Appellees-Appellants Joseph Curran and
Shannon Wall.

Simon H,. Rirxinp (Neil H. Cogan, Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New
York, New York, on the brief), for De-
fandant-Appellee-Appellant Abraham E.
Freedman.

Antruur S. Onickx (Kriendler, Relkin, Olick
& Goldberg, New York, New York, on the
brief), for Defendant-Appellee-Appellant,
William Perry.

Roy L. Rearpon (Melvyn L. Cantor, Ronald
L. Ginns, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett,
New York, New York, on the brief), for
Defendant-Appellee Martin Segal.

Herman E. Cooper (Surrey, Karasik, Morse

& Seham, New York, New York, on the

brief), for Defendant-Appellee Leon

Karchmer.

< acptperargomeyo

ee

St

Court of Appeals Opinion A37

Hays, Circuit Judge:

This action was brought under the provisions of Sec-
tion 501 of the Labor Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act, 29 U .S. C. § 501 by plaintiffs as members of
the National Maritime Union of America. Defendants
Curran and Wall were the President and Secretary-Treas-
urer of the NMU. Defendants Karchmer, Segal and
Freedman were trustees of the NMU Officers’ Pension
Plan. Defendant Perry is the former Assistant to the
President of the NMU.

In the original complaint plaintiffs asked for several
forms of relief:

(a) an accounting of monies expended by the NMU
and the trustees of the NMU Officers’ Pension Plan for
pension benefits on behalf of non-elected officers and em-
ployees of the Union; (b) damages from certain of the
defendants; (c) an injunction against the trustees to re-
strain them from paying any pension benefits to non-
elected officers and employees of the Union; and (d) an
award of counsel fees,

The origin of the dispute is to be found in a trust
agreement executed in 1952 by the National Council of
the NMU pursuant to its authority to provide pensions for
its officers and employees. Originally, the trust agreement
provided for pensions only for officers, and in 1953, the
trustees under the agreement adopted a pension plan for
the officers of the NMU. The funds of the trust came from
an initial contribution from the union supplemented by
quarterly installments.

In 1961 the trust was amended to include in the pension
plan certain employees of the Union.’ The Union contrib-

1. The 1961 amendment broadened the coverage of the pension
fund to include the following categories of persons:

1) “Union Representatives,” defined as persons employed in the

Pre

a a ed

A38 Court of Appeals Opinion
uted additional funds to cover the cost of the expanded
pension plan.

In 1964 the pension plan was again altered to include
some full time employees of the Union not previously
covered.”

In this action, originally brought in 1969, plaintiffs
charged that the 1961 and 1964 amendments to the trust
agreement including non-elected employees in the pension
plan were void because they were adopted on behalf of
the NMU by the National Office rather than the National
Council. The district court granted plaintiffs’ cross-motion
for summary judgment, holding that the inclusion of cer-
tain non-officer employees of the NMU Officers’ Pension
Plan was improper. The district court ordered the defend-
ants to account, enjoined the trustees from paying pen-
sion benefits to non-officers, and directed the trustees to
return to the Union all moneys received by them for the
benefit of non-officers.

This court affirmed ® the decision of the district court,
Morrissey v. Curran, 423 F, 2d 393 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,

1. (Cont’d.)
positions of Assistant to the President and Organizer; and 2) “Su-
pervisory or Professional” employees of the Union occupying the
positions of Maintenance Supervisor, Bookkeeping Supervisor, Rec-
ords and Supply Supervisor, Executive Secretary, Publicity Director
and Editor of the “Pilot.”

2. Under the 1964 Amendment, the coverage was broadened
to include:

“All other employees of the union except (a) any employee
whose compensation, hours of work or conditions of employment
are determined by or with reference to a collective bargaining
agreement, (b) any employee whose customary employment by
the union is for not more than twenty (20) hours in any one
week or for not more than five (5) months in any one calendar
year, and (c) aliens employed in a foreign country.”

3. The district court had held effective an attempt by the union
to validate retroactively the pension amendments. This court re-
versed that aspect of the district court’s determination.

BR OER AS ROB RA RB ONT DBAS LA it

Bernt cat AN RD Ga ree PPB Li PaO WO" SRP ee EY at

Court of Appeals Opinion A39

400 U. S. 826 (1970) and remanded the case to insure that
the accounting and the return of funds to the union
treasury proceed as ordered. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari.

On remand, the district court entered judgment against
the trust fund and in favor of the union in the sum of
$520,283.39, the amount of contributions made to the plan
on behalf of the employees who were held to be ineligible.
Although the district court found that the trustees had
made unlawful pension payments to employees in the
amount of $371,271 it held that except with respect to the
payments made to Perry, none of the defendants could be
surcharged. As to Perry it held that Freedman, one of
the trustees of the pension plan, was personally liable for
the payments.

Plaintiffs contend that the jvdgment of the district
court is inadequate because it does not include moneys paid
on account of the NMU officers who were appointed rather
than elected. Plaintiffs also claim that the trustees should
have been surcharged for payments made by them to
Irving Brauch, a non-officer employee, that defendants
Curran and Wall should have been surcharged for the
payments to Perry, that defendants Karchmer and Segal
should have been surcharged for the payments to Perry,
and that the award of fees to their attorneys and account-
ants was inadequate. Defendants Curran and Wall appeal
on the grounds that the award to plaintiffs’ attorneys and
accountants was excessive. Defendant Freedman appeals
on the grounds that he should not have been surcharged
with respect to payments to Perry.

I.

The first issue raised by plaintiffs is whether the dis-
trict court correctly ruled that agents, field patrolmen and

Mon ae

A40 Court of Appeals Opinion

patrolmen, who were appointed, not elected officers of the
NMU, were entitled to pensions under the Officers’ Pension
Plan. As the district court found, eligibility for payments
under the pension plan depended not on whether the per-
sons in question were elected or non-elected but on whether
they were officers or only employees. Under the NMU con-
stitution patrolmen, field patrolmen and agents were clearly
designated as officers, though by virtue of amendments to
the constitution some of these officers were at some times
appointed rather than elected.

The plaintiffs contend that on the prior appeal this
court interpreted the NMU constitution to deny coverage to
non-elected officers. That issue was not before us on the
previous appeal and we did not decide it one way or the
other. There is nothing in our prior opinion which pre-
vents our accepting the ruling of the district court which
seems to us to be correct.

IL.

The district court held that none of the three trustees
was liable for the payments to Brauch, and that Segal and
Karchmer could not be surcharged for the payments to
Perry, but that Freedman should be so surcharged.

A. Surcharge of Karchmer and Segal.

The district court correctly held that the exculpatory
provisions of the 1952 Trust Agreement exonerated the
trustees except for wilful misconduct and that Karchmer
and Segal were not involved in any wilful misconduct in
their actions concerning these payments.

The 1952 Trust Agreement provided, in relevant part:

‘‘4. The Trustee shall not be liable for the making, re-
tention, or sale of any investment or reinvestment
as made by them, as herein provided, nor for any

ae A LR Ae RADE OE AERP IESE AE NN PELE LE LEIA ELLA ON ot AER 25 2h TN

Court of Appeals Opinion A41

loss to, or diminution of the Fund, except due to
their own wilful misconduct.’’

‘“*5. The Trustees shall be protected in acting upon
any paper or document believed by them to be
genuine and to have been made, executed, or de-
livered by the proper party purporting to have
made, executed or delivered the same, and shall
be protected in relying and acting upon the opinion
of legal counsel (including opinion of legal counsel
who is or may be a trustee hereunder) in connec-
tion with any matter pertaining to the administra-
tion or execution of this Trust Fund. No Trustee

shall be liable for any action taken or omitted by

; him unless such act or omission is the result of

wilful misconduct, nor for the acts of any agent,

employee, or attorney selected by the Trustees
with reasonable care, nor for any act or omission
of any other Trustee.’’ (Emphasis added.)

ONAN tantmenion tae

The plaintiffs, arguing that the amendments to the trust
agreement ‘‘in effect creat[ed] new trusts . . .’’, contend :
that the effective date of the trust agreement was not 1952,
but October 28, 1961 and September 28, 1964, the dates of
the amendments. This point has significance because be-
tween 1952 and 1961 Section 501(a) of the LMRDA be-
came law. That section reads:

‘*A general exculpatory provision in the constitu- |
tion and bylaws of such a labor organization or a ;
general exculpatory resolution of a governing body :
purporting to relieve any such person of liability for :
breach of the duties declared by this section shall be 4
void as against public policy.’’

Thus, according to plaintiffs, Section 501(a) invalidates :
the trustee exculpatory clause, at least as it applies in thiis 4

3
case.

=

A42 Court of Appeals Opinion

There is no reason to treat the amendments of 1961 and
1964 as anything other than they purported to be,—that is
amendments to the basic agreement which otherwise re-
mained in full force and effect. The amendments made no
change whatsoever in the original agreement as far as the
exculpatory clause of that agreement is concerned.

Moreover, even if the effective date of the agreement
were held to be subsequent to the enactment of Section
501(a), the plaintiffs could not prevail. The ban of Sec-
tion 501(a) against all ‘‘general exculpatory provisions by
a labor organization in its constitution, by-laws or resolu-
tions’? does not apply to a standard trustee exculpatory
clause of a trust agreement. Neither the express language,
the legislative history of the section or the purpose of the
section indicate the desire of Congress to include trustee
exculpatory provisions within the general ban on exculpa-
tory provisions. The language of the section is clearly
aimed at union officers, not trustees; nor can a trust be
equated with ‘‘a labor organization.’’ The purpose of Con-
gress in enacting Section 501(a) supports this literal in-
terpretation of the provision. The section was aimed at
stopping the pilfering of union funds by union officers,
not at the conduct of trustees acting in their capacity as
fiduciaries.

B. Surcharge of Freedman

The district court found that Freedman showed a ‘‘reck-
less indifference’’ to his duty as a trustee and therefore
should be surcharged for the lump sum pension paid to
Perry. The facts as shown in the record amply support
this finding.

Freedman’s opinion letter of January 16, 1969, stated
that Perry was ‘‘entitled to credit for covered employ-
ment for the period through October 20, 1974 based on
his contract with NMU, pursuant to which ‘contributions

Anes aNSs “ SOLS EBON PE L5 Ee EINES UL ITE MEE, ia OMEAE

Court of Appeals Opinion A43

have been made by the Union to the Plan for the period
through October 20, 1974,’ and that Perry was ‘entitled
to receive immediate payment.’ ’’ Morrissey v. Curran, 351
F. Supp. 775, 783 (1972). As the district court noted,
‘*This was wrong, on both counts.’’ In the first place, pre-
payment of contributions is not authorized by the trust
agreement, which contains the only provision authorizing
payments to the fund. Second, there was absolutely no
basis for Freedman’s conclusion that the payment of the
lump sum to Perry could be made immediately. It is en-
tirely clear ‘‘that the pension was payable on October 20,
1974, and then only if the trustees at that time exercised
their discretion under Article V, Section 8 to pay Perry
a lump sum.’’

These are not complex legal questions on which rea-
sonable men could disagree. Freedman’s 1969 legal opinion
constituted gross error and warranted the conclusion of
the district court that he had acted in reckless disregard
of his duty as a trustee.

Il.

A. Liability of Curran and Wall for payments
to the Pension Fund

The evidence in the record shows that Curran and Wall
acted in good faith, relying on the advice of the union’s
general counsel. In a matter such as this in which the
issue is reasonably open to legal dispute an officer acting
in good faith is justified in relying on counsel and is not
liable, if he so acts, for breach of trust.

B. Payments by the Pension Fund

The district court said there ‘‘is no evidence that on
January 16th Curran directed the payment te Perry of
$222,200 or directed Freedman to furnish tre lega! opinion

FS

Add Court of Appeals Opinion

to the trustees. Consequently, on the evidence presented,
plaintiffs have failed to prove that Curran breached his
fiduciary duty under LMRDA.”’ Morrissey v.Curran, supra,
at 785.

Plaintiffs now argue that Curran dominated the trus-
tees and it was through this power that the payment to
Perry was made. This is properly a factual question for
the district court which ruled on the basis of all the evi-
dence presented that the plaintiffs failed to prove their con-
tention. There is no reason for believing that the ruling of
the district court on this question was clearly erroneous.

The district court held that the evidence established
that Wall played no part in the events of January 16th, and
the payment to Perry. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that that ruling is incorrect.

C. Liability of Curran and Wall for payments to
Shapiro as Trustee

Plaintiffs contend that Curran and Wall are liable for
any payments made to Shapiro as trustee. In February,
1972, after the ruling of this Court, the union deposited
$460,363 in a bank account under union control. This money
was part of the funds paid by the trustees to the NMU to
comply with the court order. The union estimated that this
was the amount necessary to fund the pensions for current
employees. A trust agreement was drawn up, and Shapiro
was named as trustee. Plaintiffs now attack this action.

Plaintiffs’ contentions fail for several reasons. First,
the union never paid the money to Shapiro; the trust agree-
ment was never executed. Even if the money had been
paid, the proposed pension plan for current employees was
for future payments. Consequently, the establishment of
the fund was permissible and not prohibited by this court’s
prior decision.

Court of Appeals Opinion A45
IV.

The district court awarded counsel fees, accountants’
fees and expenses to plaintiffs in the amount of $111,864.00,
and directed that this amount be paid out of the judgment

recovered by the union. This is the correct approach; the

| union, not the pension fund should shoulder these costs.

The fees requested are adequate but not excessive.
Affirmed.

A46 Agreement (NMU € Perry)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL MARITIME
UNION AND PERRY.

AcreEMENT made this 2d day of August, 1966, and be-
tween the Nationau Maritime Union or America, AFL-CIO
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘NMU’’), and WittiuaM
Perry (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Perry’’).

Wuereas, Perry has been employed by NMU in the
capacity of Assistant to the President since the
day of , 1958, pursuant to Article 13, Section
1(f) of the Constitution of the National Maritime Union of
America, AFL-CIO; and

Wuenreas, Perry has been of invaluable service to the
President of the NMU in the performance of his vast re-
sponsibilities and important duties in the conduct of the
union activities, and Perry also has been of great assistance
to all the National Officers in assisting them in their duties
and in otherwise performing important duties on behalf of
NMU; and

Wuereas, the NMU, its President and the National
Officers desire that Perry continue to serve as Assistant to
the President of NMU, as an inducement to him to continue
to serve in this capacity and intending to be legally bound
hereby, it is mutually agreed by and between the parties
as follows:

1. The parties hereby agree that Perry shall continue
in the employ of NMU to serve as Assistant to the Presi-
dent of NMU until October 20, 1974. Upon the expiration
of said original term, said employment shall continue there-
after under the same terms for successive additional terms
of four (4) years each, unless either party notifies the other
in writing, at least six (6) months prior to the expiration

ee coe s Fi Deb ee ee ee

Agreement (NMU € Perry) A47

of any term of this Agreement, of intent to terminate said
Agreement, at the end of the then current term. In ab-
sence of such notice, this Agreement shall continue from
four years to four years until so terminated.

2. Perry’s compensation during the term of this
Agreement, or any renewal or extension thereof, shall be
the same as the compensation paid to him as of July 1,
1966, including all contributions to the NMU Officers Pen-
sion Plan and any insurance or other fringe benefits pres-
ently available or payable, or which may become payable
or available in the future to the NMU National Officers
during the term of this Agreement or renewal or extension |
thereof. The rights, compensation and benefits conferred
hereunder shall be in addition to those presently and here-
after enjoyed by and accruing to Perry (including but not
limited to severance pay and pension benefits, inter alia),
and shall not be deemed to take away, change, diminish or
limit any of same in any manner.

a a ns 9 eR ie an Selene Ot:

3. In the event that this Agreement or Perry’s em- .
ployment should be terminated, with or without cause, prior
to the expiration date hereof or of any renewal or exten-
sion, or in the event that Perry should become incapaci- :
tated from performing his duties, either totally or partially,
by reason of illness, injury, physical incapacity or any
other cause, Perry shall be entitled to continue to receive
his said salary in full, including contributions to the NMU
Officers Pension Plan and any other fringe benefits pay-
able to the National Officers as under paragraph 2 hereof,
during the balance of the term hereof or any renewal or
extension. In the event, however, of such termination, or
if such incapacity should be substantial or total, Perry
shall have the option to demand and receive at one time
or over any period that he shall specify an amount equal

| |

To See oe

A48 Agreement (NMU & Perry)

to the said total salary, including contributions to the NMU
Officers Pension Plan and any other fringe benefits payable
to National Officers which he would have received during
the balance of the original term or any renewal or exten-
sion hereof,

4. For the purposes of determining Perry’s entitle-
ment to participation in and benefits from, the NMU Of-
ficers Pension Plan, the parties recognize, understand and
agree that Perry shall be deemed to be a ‘‘Participant’’
in ‘‘Covered Employment’’ (as defined in the said Plan)
during the full period of the original term of this Agree-
ment, and the full four-year period of each renewal or
extension thereof, notwithstanding anything to the con-
trary contained in paragraph 3 or any other provision of
this Agreement.

5. This Agreement and all the terms and conditions
hereof shall be binding upon the parties, and their heirs,
beneficiaries, representatives, successors and assigns,

In Witness Wueneor, the parties have hereunto duly

executed this Agreement the day and year first above
written.

NationaL Maritime Union or America,
AFL-CIO

By Josepn Curran,
Joseph Curran,

President
WiLuiaM Perry Smannon Want,
William Perry Shannon Wall,

Secretary-Treasurer

Mew Banrisio,
Mel Barisic,
Vice-President

Agreement (NMU @ Perry) A49

Rick Mruzr,
Rick Miller,
Vice-President
James J. Martin,
James Martin,
Vice-President
Rosert Nessirt,
Robert Nesbitt,
National Representative
Perer Booker,
Peter Bocker,
National Representative
Leo Srrassman,
Leo Strassman,
National Representative

Intending to be legally bound hereby and in consider-
ation of the reliance hereto by the parties to the foregoing
Agreement, we hereby acknowledge and agree that para-
graph 4 of the said Agreement shall be binding upon us
and our successors in determining William Perry’s entitle-
ment to participation in, and benefits from, the NMU
Officers Pension Plan.

—— a ee ee

Se

| ApranamM FE, Freepman,
| Abraham E. Freedman,

Martin EB. Seoat,
Martin E. Segal,

Leon KarcuMer,
Leon Karchmer,

Trustees, National Maritime Union
Officers Pension Plan,

A50 Agreement (NMU & Cooper, et al.)

AGREEMENT AND DECLARATION OF TRUST
BETWEEN NATIONAL MARITIME UNION
AND COOPER, ET AL.

Aoreement anv Deciaration or Trust first dated as
of December 29, 1952 and revised this 28th day of October
1961, by and between the Nationa Maritime Union oF
America, AFL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as the
‘*Union’’), and Herman E. Cooper, Martin BE. Szoat and
Lzon Karcumer (hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘Trus-
tee’’), as Trustees under this Agreement and Declaration
of Trust.

WITNESSETH:

Wuenreas, the National Maritime Union of America,
AFL-CIO, by agreement with Herman E. Cooper, Martin
E. Segal and Leon Karchmer, dated as of December 29,
1952, established a trust fund for the exclusive benefit of
its elected officials through payments, upon the terms, and
subject to the conditions and limitations therein set forth;
and

Wuereas, by custom, practice and usage the term
‘*elected official’’ has historically been deemed to include
officials duly appointed in accordance with the Union’s
constitutional procedures; and

Wuenreas, said fund has continuously been adminis-
tered by the Trustees from the date of its establishment
and is presently being so administered; and

Wuenreas, the Union desires to extend the benefits con-
templated by the aforesaid Agreement to those of its em-
ployees who represent the Union in the conduct of its
business (commonly referred to as ‘‘Representatives’’)
and to those of its employees who are engaged in super-
visory or professional activities, none of whom is repre-

ee Cette vem a

Agreement (NMU & Cooper, et al.) A51

sented by another labor organization for purposes of col-
lective bargaining; and

Wuenregas, the Union desires to amend and revise the
aforesaid Agreement to reflect the foregoing understand-
ings and purposes, effective as of December 29, 1952; and

Wuenegas, the Trustees have declared and do hereby
declare that they will receive, hold, administer and dispose
of all money and securities paid, transferred, or delivered
to them as Trustees, pursuant to the provisions of this
Agreement and Declaration of Trust, with the duties and
powers and for the uses and purposes herein set forth,
and none other;

Now, Tuererore, in consideration of the premises, it
is mutually agreed between the parties that the aforesaid
Agreement be and the same hereby is amended and revised,
effective as of December 29, 1952, as follows:

| I, Derinirions,

Wherever used in this Agreement and Declaration of
Trust:

1, ‘‘Agreement’’ means this Agreement and Declara-
tion of Trust.

2. ‘*Union’’ means the National Maritime Union of
America, AFL-CIO.

3. ‘‘Trustees’’ means the Trustees designated herein,
as well as their successors designated in the manner
herein provided.

4, ‘‘Fund’’ means all moneys and property paid to the
Trustees and all securities purchased by the Trus-
tees, pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement,
together with all interest or other income thereon,
and the net proceeds of any sale or other disposition
of such securities.

ELLER REL AGRON SIPURA HN AI 8 sta VGN DDS AAAS ROMATINA NPT 9 Ant GS ER eA ; W ¥

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A52 Agreement (NMU € Cooper, et al.)

5. ‘*Plan’’ means the Pension Plan adopted by the
Trustees, pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

6. ‘‘Official’’ or ‘‘Officer’’ means a person holding any
of the following offices, in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Union constitution:

a) National President

b) National Secretary

c) National Treasurer

d) National Vice-President

e) National Representative

f) National Port Committee Member
g) Branch Agent

h) Field Patrolman

i) Patrolman

7. ‘‘Representative’’ means any person, other than an
elected National Representative referred to in Sec-
tion 6 of this Article, who is employed by the Union
in the capacity of ‘‘ Assistant to the President”’’ or
‘*Organizer.’’

8. Employees engaged in ‘‘supervisory or professional
activities’? means the following employees of the
Union: ‘‘Maintenance Supervisor’’, ‘‘ Bookkeeping
Supervisor’’, ‘‘Records and Supplies Supervisor’’,
‘‘Executive Secretary’’, ‘‘Publicity Director and
Editor of The Pilot.’’

9. ‘*Participant’’ means an Officer, Union Representa-
tive, or any employee who is engaged in a super-
visory or professional activity.

II. Source or ASSETS OF THE FUND.

1. In consideration of this Agreement and upon its ex-
ecution, the Union has made an initial payment of
$80,000.00 to the Trustees.

2 ——aO

Agreement (NMU & Cooper, et al.) A53

2. Commencing with the calendar quarter of January
1, 1953 to March 31, 1953, and for each calendar
quarter thereafter, the Union has been making pay-
ments to the Trustees a sum of money equal to
23% of the compensation paid by the Union to the
participants for the calendar quarters then ending.
The Union agrees to continue making such pay-
ments in the same manner as heretofore, i.e., within
ten days after the end of each calendar quarter.

III. Tue Trustees.

A. Terms of Office and Successors.

1. The Trustees designated herein shall continue to
serve as Trustees for life, unless they or any one of them
resign or become incapable of discharging their duties as
Trustees. A resignation must be submitted in writing to
the President of the Union and the question of a Trustee’s
incapacity to discharge his duties shall be conclusively de-
termined by the other Trustees.

2. In the event of a vacancy created by the death, resig-
nation or incapacity of one of the Trustees, the remaining
two Trustees shall immediately meet and designate a suc-
cessor Trustee, who shall serve for the same term and upon
the same terms and conditions as his predecessor. In the
event that the remaining Trustees are unable to designate a
successor Trustee, such designation shall be made by a ma-
jority vote of the National Officers of the Union.

3. During the interim period prior to the designation of
a successor Trustee, the remaining Trustees acting in the
manner herein provided, shall administer the affairs of this
trust fund.

ee

deta eee ate CA spec PALA IA ARI ER POD

A54 Agreement (NMU ¢ Cooper, et al.)

B. Meetings and Voting.

1. Decisions of the Trustees shall be made by the con-
curring vote of the majority of the Trustees. The vote of
the Trustees may be cast by them in person at a meeting,
or may be evidenced by a written instrument signed by
them, or telegrams from a requisite number of Trustees,
after written notice to all of the Trustees of the question to
be decided.

2. Any Trustee may call a meeting of the Trustees at
any time by giving written notice not less than forty-eight
hours in advance of the time and place thereof to each
Trustee. Meetings of the Trustees may also be held at any
time without notice if all the Trustees consent thereto.

3. A majority of the Trustees, present in person at any
meeting, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of
business.

C. Powers and Duties.

1. The Trustees shall continue to administer the Pen-
sion Plan, heretofore adopted by them on February 16,
1953, pursuant to this Agreement and Declaration of Trust.
Consistent with the purposes of this Agreement the Trus-
tees shall have full and sole discretion to determine the
amount and nature of such benefits and the terms and con-
ditions of payment and shall have the power to conclusively
determine all questions concerning the payment of benefits
to any individual recipient or proposed recipient.

2. The Trustees shall deposit all moneys received by
them in such bank or banks as they may designate for that
purpose and in such manner as the Trustees, in their sole
discretion, shall determine. The Trustees shall invest and
reinvest such moneys as in their sole discretion they may
determine are not required for current expenditure in any
securities and without distinction between principal and

Agreement (NMU € Cooper, et al.) A55

income. The Trustees, in their discretion, may keep such
portion of the Fund in cash or cash balances as the Trustees
may, from time to time, deem to be in the best interests of
the Fund.

3. The Trustees are authorized and empowered:

a) To sell, exchange, convey, transfer, or otherwise
dispose of any property held by them by private
contract or at public auction.

b) To make, execute, acknowledge, and deliver any
and all documents of transfer and conveyance
and any and all instruments that may be neces-
sary or appropriate to carry out the powers
herein granted.

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c) To register any investment held in the Fund in
their own names or in the name of a nominee and
to hold any investment in bearer form, but the
books and records of the Trustees shall at all
times show that all such investments are part of
the Fund.

4. The Trustees shall not be liable for the making, re- ;
tention, or sale of any investment or reinvestment as made !
by them, as herein provided, nor for any loss to, or diminu-
tion of the Fund, except due to their own wilful misconduct.

5. The Trustees shall be protected in acting upon any
paper or document believed by them to be genuine and to
have been made, executed, or delivered by the proper party
purporting to have made, executed or delivered the same,
and shall be protected in relying and acting upon the opin-
ion of legal counsel (including opinion of legal counsel who
is or may be a trustee hereunder) in connection with any
matter pertaining to the administration or execution of this
Trust Fund. No Trustee shall be liable for any action taken

:

PULLIN TG LLANES AREA HN he Ba to Soe

A56 Agreement (NMU é Cooper, et al.)

or omitted by him unless such act or omission is the result
of wilful misconduct, nor for the acts of any agent, em-
ployee, or attorney selected by the Trustees with reasonable
care, nor for any act or omission of any other Trustee.

6. No party dealing with the Trustees in relation of
this Trust Fund shall be obliged to see to the application of
any money or property of the Trust Fund; or to see that
the terms of this Trust Fund have been complied with, or
be obliged to inquire into the necessity or expediency of any
act of the Trustees, and every instrument executed by the
Trustees shall be conclusive in favor of every person rely-
ing thereon: (a) that at the time of delivery of said instru-
ment the Trust Fund hereby created was in full force and
effect, (b) that said instrument was executed in accordance
with the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement,
and (c) that the Trustees were duly authorized and em-
powered to execute such instrument.

7. The receipt given by the Trustees for any money or
other property received by them shall effectually discharge
the person or persons paying or transferring the same, and
such person or persons shall not be bound to see to the
application, or be answerable for the loss or misapplication
thereof.

8. The Trustees may deduct from and charge against
the Trust Fund any taxes paid by them, which may be im-
posed upon the Trust Fund, the income, property, or trans-
fer thereof, or of any part thereof, or upon or with respect
to the interest of any individual therein, which the Trustees
are required to pay. The Trustees, in their discretion, may
contest the validity or amount of any tax, assessment, claim
or demand which may be levied or made against, or in re-
spect of the Trust Fund, or against or in respect of any
part of the Trust Fund, the income, property or transfer
thereof, or in any matter or thing connected therewith.

een . : Ma aR arn 28 A NL
pues

Agreement (NMU Cooper, et al.) A57

9. The Trustees shall be empowered to obtain and de-
termine compensation for legal counsel, accounting, tech-
nical, actuarial and investment services and such adminis-
trative assistance as they may, in their discretion find
necessary. If any Trustee shall have a financial interest in a
firm whose services are desired by the Fund, that Trustee
shall not participate in discussions or decisions relating to
7 the retention of such firm or the terms and conditions of
| compensation for the services to be rendered.

10. The Trustees may delegate any of their ministerial
powers and duties hereunder to one or more of the Trustees
or to one or more officers of the Union designated by them
for that purpose.

11. In the event of any ambiguity, the Trustees shall
have the power to construe this Agreement and Declaration
of Trust, and their construction of the same shall be final
and conclusive.

12. The Trustees shall have all other powers necessary
and proper to the carrying out of the purposes of the Trust.

IV. Tue Union.

1. The Union shall promptly pay to the Trustees the
contributions due, in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement, or of the Pension Plan adopted pursuant to
this Agreement, or, if the Trustees so direct, to deposit such
contributions in such depository as the Trustees shall
designate.

2. The Union shall provide the Trustees with all
records and information requested by the Trustees and
designated by the Trustees as being necessary to the per-
formance of their duties.

Oe

A58 Agreement (NMU & Cooper, et al.)

3. Liability for the payment of the pensions and bene-
fits provided for under the Pension Plan adopted pursuant
to the within Agreement and Declaration of Trust and any
other liability arising under or out of this Agreement shall
be limited exclusively to the assets of the Trust Fund, and
in the event that such assets are at any time insufficient to
provide for the payment of any pension or benefit payments
due under the Pension Plan, or any other such liability, no
liability for the payment thereof shall attach to or may be
asserted against the Trustees.

V. MiscELLANEOus.

1. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in this Agreement and Declaration of Trust, as now ex-
pressed or hereafter amended, it shall be impossible at
any time for any part of the trust corpus or income to
revert to the Union or to be used for or diverted to any
purpose other than the exclusive benefit of the eligible
participants and their beneficiaries, through the payments,
upon the terms, and subject to the conditions and limita-
tions contained in the Pension Plan adopted pursuant to
this Agreement, or in the event of termination, in such
manner as shall be designated by the Trustees.

2. No participant, or any individual claiming by,
through, or under any participant, shall have any right,
title or interest in or to or claim against the trust fund or
any part thereof, except the right to receive pensions or
benefits in the amounts and subject to the terms and con-
ditions provided in the Pension Plan.

3. Neither the pension nor any other benefit under the
Pension Plan, nor the assets in the individual account of
a participant entitled to receive such pension or benefits
shall be subject in any manner to anticipation, alienation,

re , 7 e . i i Ee

Agreement (NMU € Cooper, et al.) A59

sale, transfer, assignment, pledge, encumbrance or charge,

and any attempt so to anticipate, alienate, sell, transfer,

assign, pledge, encumber or charge the same shall be void; |
nor shall any such pension or other benefit or such assets

be in any manner, whether by action of the participant

or his beneficiary or by operation of law, liable for or

subject to the debts, contracts, liabilities, engagements or

torts of the person entitled to such pension or other bene-

fit.

3 Nanded tee. fae de a RE

na dewee

4, Every individual receiving or claiming a pension
or other benefit under this Agreement and Declaration of
Trust or Pension Plan enacted pursuant hereto, shall be
conclusively presumed to have been competent until the
date on which the Trustees shall have received written
notice, in a form and manner acceptable to them, that such
an individual is an incompetent or a minor, for whom a
guardian or other person legally vested with the care of
his person or estate shall have been appointed; provided,
that the Trustees may, in their discretion, validly recog-
nize actions by, and conduct transactions with, others act-
ing, prior to the receipt of, or in the absence of such writ-
ten notice, in behalf of an individual found by the Trustees
to be an incompetent or a minor, if the Trustees shall find
such actions or transactions to be in the best interests of
such individual.

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5. This agreement and the Trust Fund and Pension
Plan established hereunder and pursuant hereto have been
executed in the State of New York and all questions per-
taining to the validity or construction of this instrument
and of the acts or transactions of the parties hereto shall
be determined in accordance with the laws of the State of
New York.

A60 Agreement (NMU € Cooper, et al.)

6. In case any provisions of this Agreement shall be
held illegal or invalid for any reason, said illegality or in-
validity shall not affect the remaining parts of this Agree-
ment, but this Agreement shall be construed and enforced
as if said illegal and invalid provisions had never been
inserted herein.

VI. Termination.

1. The trust created by this Agreement and Declara-
tion of Trust shall terminate: (a) When the Trustees, in
their sole discretion, determine that the purposes of this
Agreement can no longer be carried out; (b) Upon the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of the membership of the
Union, but in no event shall the trust be terminated by
vote of the membership for a period of at least twenty
years from the date of execution of this Agreement and
Declaration of Trust.

2. If there shall be assets remaining in the Trust Fund
upon the termination of this trust, such remaining assets
shall be distributed and disposed of in such manner and
upon such terms and conditions as the Trustees shall, in
their sole discretion, determine.

VII. AMENDMENTS.

1. This Agreement and Declaration of Trust may be
amended at any time by an instrument in writing, executed
by the President of the Union and a majority of the Trus-
tees.

VIII. Name.

The fund established by this Agreement and Declara-
tion of Trust shall be known as the ‘‘National Maritime
Union Officers’ Pension Fund’’, and the Trustees may con-
duct business under that name.

Agreement (NMU € Cooper, et al.) A61

In Witness Wuerezor, the Trustees and the National
Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, by its duly author-
ized officers, have executed this Agreement and Declara-
tion of Trust to evidence their acceptance of the trusts
hereby created and their agreement to be bound thereby.

NationaL Maritime Union or America,
AFL-CIO,

By Joseru Curran, National President,

Steve Feperorr, National
Secretary-Treasurer,

Davw M. Ramos, National Vice-
President,
TRUSTEES :
Herman E. Cooper,
Leon Karcumenr,
Martin E. Szoat.
ad

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_1160%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
