# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hammons Products Co. v. Agrashell, Inc.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0962%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 414 U.S. 1032

## Text

Hammons Propucts Company, Petitioner
v.

AGRASHELL, Inc., Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Wortn Row .eEy

JouN C. Scorr

Sreven K. YABLONSKI
1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Counsel for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
Morris CHERTKOV
1780 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

Puzss or Braon S. Apanes Paorrine, Inc., Wassmncrom, D. C.

=,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ES EO IO CM 1
ore cick eda unapithuinbad engioeaemmadennieatdins 2
ccc nslnceaiacbugieemeemeawase ae
EE sivcicnctgeanueenghiheanaewneerns 2
RTE EN SER ESE GEE Set A OE ne aS 2
Reasons for Granting Certiorari ................... 6

I. The Decision Below Conflicts With Other Courts
of Appeals in That It Holds That Dangerous
Probability of Actual Monopolization, Like Spe-
cific Intent, Is an Essential Element of ‘‘At-
tempt to Monopclize’’ Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, and at All Times Requires Proof
gE RS 6

II. There Is Real Need for This Court to Clarify
Several of Its Decisions That Have Given Rise

i ED cccncendewcsenvadenaneiowwcee 9
I i tin das aah ceed hiahd dia areinemmalbeind a aiees ware a 12
EASTERN tie emer ee Pre eRe pe PE la
IRE L aptzR Ee apa lek Ue PR Re EE 2a

Case CITATIONS:
American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus-

tries, Inc., 360 F.2d 977, 996 (8th Cir. 1966) ...... 5
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
I eee bce be lacie ae atlas eee 9,10

Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp.
1080, 1093 (D. Md. 1969) .................. ot

Table of Contents Continued
Page

Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d
1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1969). ...ceceecncccccccceses
Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir.

BEE pcx paccaskacsksnsesss econ totes cee.
Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203,
906-207 (Sth Cir. 1969) ....------2etttt ye 9
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 US.
690, 699, 707 (1962) ..-----------ree re 8
Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T. & Co., 446 F.2d 825,
932 (9th Cir. 1971) ...-----sereer teeta ene 7
Industrial Building Materials v. Interchemical Corp.,
437 F.2d 1336, 1344 (1971) ..------eerss eres 7
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis Inc., 452
_ F.2d 579, GOB (1971) ...---2--crrecccceecerteees 9
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th
Te ME ca sssaseusseeneneseeseune sats sts. 5
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.
a) cade ag 5, 6, 7, 8, 10
Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 877-8 (W.D.
We WE - cnavvnnceseessncerbonseanssesss+****

Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) ..-- 5,9
Union Carbide €& Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561,
GOS (10th Cir.) ....--c00seoreererrssrtsse es,

Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) ....--+++-:- 11

Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Alcoa, 438 I".2d
1286, 1304 (5th Cir. 1971) ...-.ceeeeeeeeeeeeeen®

ARTIOLE:

Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, Donald F.
Turner, 70 Harvard Law Rev. 281 (1956) ...-----

STALE ST RE _—

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser TERM, 1973

No

Hammons Propucts Company, Petitioner
v.

AGRASHELL, INc., Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Hammons Products Company petitions for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Hight Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals, not yet reported,
appears in Appendix B hereto. No opinion was
rendered by the district court, but its judgment also
appears in Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on March 30, 1973. » Hammons claimed that Agrashell attempted to
monopolize the SGA and the LCM markets although its
proof relating to attempted monopolization of the LCM
market was quite limited, and during the course of the
trial and in its instructions the district court indicated that
evidence of Agrashell’s actions as to LCM was relevant
only to the issue of intent.

RRL Atl Aaa TE mk A

30a

In addition to proving an overt act or acts, the essential
elements which must be proved in a section 2 attempt to
monopolize case are specific intent and dangerous probabil-
ity. See Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396,
402 (1905) ; Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d
643, 663 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 354 U.S. 923 (1957) ; Hib-
ner, Attempts to Monopolize: A Concept in Search of
Analysis, 33 A.B.A.J. 165, 1966 (1967 ); Smith, Attempt to
Monopolize: Its Elements and Their Definition, 27 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 227, 229-231 (1957).

Although we do not rest our decision relating to section 2
on this issue, we note that the evidence presented at trial
with regard to ‘‘specific intent”’ bordered on being insuffici-
ent as a matter of law. The issue before the jury was
whether Agrashell specifically intended to monopolize hard
nutshells within the soft grit abrasive markets by seeking
to extend the patent beyond its terms or by extending the
life of the patent.

At the outset, we emphasize that the trial court did not
submit the issue of fraudulent procurement of the patent to
the jury and no cross-appeal was taken on that issue. Thus
the declaration of patent invalidity did not prohibit Agra-
shell from relying on the presumptive validity of the patent.
It therefore had every right to bring each of the three law-
suits against Sirotta, Hammons, and Block if its purpose in
each case was merely to enforce its rights under the patent.
The obvious and difficult problem in this case relates to
differentiating between Agrashell’s intent to bring suits and
enter into contracts under a presumptively valid patent,
thereby enforcing and utilizing a lawful monopoly, and its
alleged intent to bring suits and enter into contracts under
a presumptively valid patent for the purpose of extending
the scope of the patent beyond the grant allowed by law.
The proof of that alleged illegal intent is thin indeed.

The evidence in this case indicates quite clearly that
Hammons sold a product that, but for the declaration of

fs yor rm

DEL LOL ESIES EL LOTEL ELEOE

3la

invalidity, would have infringed Agrashell’s patent; that
Sirotta sold the Hammons product, which, as the trial judge
indicated, was an ‘‘admittedly infringing’? one; that
Gravette and Block also sold an SGA product which was
composed of black walnut shell and that Pangborn at one
time merchandised Gravette’s product; and that Sirotta’s
patent counsel and Pangborn’s patent counsel could not find
sufficient grounds for challenging the patent on the grounds
the patent was subsequently declared invalid.

Much of Hammons’ case rested on the deposition testi-
mony of Sirotta relative to Ayers’ statement that Sirotta
‘chad no right in the walnut shell business. This is my do-
main.”? It is noted that when this statement was made
Ayers had already filed his infringement suit and placed the
infringement issue before a court. Moreover, it was Sirotta
and not Ayers who precipitated the meeting at which the
statement was allegedly made. Understandably we are
hesitant to attach much significance to this statement.

We are also hesitant to attach any significance to the evi-
dence which indicates that Agrashell sued Hammons in
retaliation for Hammons underbidding Agrashell on an
LCM account or to evidence which tends to indicate that
Agrashell sued Block because Block would not agree to
maintain prices in the LOM market.

We question this evidence because, although Hammons
pleaded an attempt to monopolize the LCM market, the
relevant markets which were the subject of the attempt to
monopolize as defined by the trial judge were solely the
SGA markets. Hammons does not question this instruc-
tion. Indeed by supplemental brief Hammons argued that
it need not prove ‘‘dangerous probability’’ in the LCM
markets precisely because of the judge’s limited instruc-
tion. Although Hammons contends that the LCM intent
evidence somehow relates to the issue of intent in the SGA
market, we attach little significance to conduct related to a

32a

totally distinct product being sold in a different geographic
market.

We turn next to an analysis of whether or not Hammons
proved ‘‘dangerous probability”’ of monopolization.

‘The phrase ‘attempt to monopolize’ means the
employment of methods, means and practices which
would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and
which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so
close as to create a dangerous probability a
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
785 (1946) ; Central Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, 422 F.2d 504, 509 (8th Cir.
1970) ; Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968,
971 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969) ;
Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, supra.

Thus in this case we must determine whether Hammons
presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could
properly conclude that Agrashell approached ‘‘so close [to
monopolization] as to create a dangerous probability of it
*#** >» American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra, 328
US. at 785.

In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), the Supreme Court
held that enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent
may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act provided all other
elements are established. This case relates to extending a
patent beyond its lawful bounds, but we think the same con-
siderations expressed in Walker Process are applicable
here. Those considerations are essentially that, even though
one possesses & fraudulently procured patent or a patent
which is allegedly used in a way to enlarge its scope or life,
an analysis of market factors is still necessary. Indeed, the
Court specifically stated that the trial court had not
‘‘analyzed any economic data’’ when it reversed. Id. at 178.
Thus it is not enought to argue that one has used a patent

in a predatory manner thereby enlarging the scope or life
of the patent; one must look to economic data to determine
the impact of the purported illegal activity on the market
which is the subject of the attempt to monopolize.

‘To establish monopolization or attempt to monopo-
lize a part of trade or commerce under § 2 of the Sher-
man Act, it would then be necessary to appraise the
exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms
of the relevant market for the product involved. With-
out a definition of that market there is no way to mea-
sure Food Machinery’s ability to lessen or destroy
competition.’? Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v.
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., supra, 382 U.S. at
177. See also Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v. Dietene
Corp., 415 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 912 (1970).

The counterclaim filed by Hammons indicated the product
to be ‘‘ground black walnut shell,’’ and in submitting the
matter to the jury the trial court referred to ‘‘the soft
grit abrasive industry’? and ‘‘hard nutshells within the
soft grit abrasive markets.’? The patent refers to ‘‘an
abrasive material comprising pelletized nut shells having
the hardness of black walnut shells.”” Our conclusion is
that while the exact definition of the product is elusive, the
proof primarily related to crushed black walnut and apri-
cot pit nutshell used as SGA.

Assuming that the product was thus defined, the defini-
tion of the geographic market is even less explicit. Since
no attempt was made to narrow , the geographic area, we
assume the relevant area is the entire United States. How-
ever, no market data was introduced showing the total vol-
ume of sales of hard nutshell SGA in the United States or
any specified portion thereof ; therefore, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to know exactly what geographic market Ham-
mons claims Agrashell attempted to monopolize. The two

34a

principal submarkets identified by Hammons were Detroit,
Michigan and Columbus, Ohio. In Detroit, Hammons ap-
parently had the entire market, and in Columbus, it had a
larger share than Agrashell.

Not only did Hammons fail to show the total sales or
volume of SGA, it also failed to show what shares of that
market were held by Agrashell, Hammons, and several other
major competitors. Continental was referred to as one
of the five largest companies in the field but no evidence was
introduced relating to its volume of sales. Only by associ-
ating widely disconnected and at times contradictory por-
tions of the evidence is it possible to piece together the
respective sales of Agrashell and Hammons.

Hammons’ pleadings attempted to structure the relevant
market to include LCM, but by supplemental brief Ham-
mons agreed that LCM was not within the markets the jury
was instructed to consider as being the target of the at-
tempt.

In conclusion, we view the evidence relating to ‘“‘danger-
ous probability” in this case much as Judge Brown viewed
the evidence in Becker v. Safelite Glass Corp., Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 625, 638 (D. Kan. 1965), in which he noted as follows:

‘<Tn the case at bar, plaintiff is unaware of the total
annual volume of commerce * * * in the relevant market
area; the portion or percentage of that volume held by
defendants; the portion or percentage of that volume
held by the plaintiffs ; and the portion or percentage of
that volume affected by any activities of the defend-

ants * * *.
* 7 6

® Of the three manufacturers sued or threatened with suit by
Agrashell (Block, Gravette, and Hammons), Block continued
to produce SGA throughout the periods relevant here, Hammons
sales nearly doubled, and Hammons acquired the controlling in-
terest in Gravette in 1966.

a
BE CS Bees Pe a z ——
. a i EE A OES oe ainpiwat &

Ge ee late On Bribe’ ls lt

OD Rg AT TT ERE Fk + FOG RE

‘Without the facts and evidence which plaintiff
admittedly does not have, a §2 Sherman case simply
cannot, in our opinion, be established.”’

See generally Central Saving and Loan Ass’n v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, supra; Hiland Dairy, Inc. v.
Kroger Co., supra; Kansas City Star Co. v. United States,
supra; Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 466 F.2d
825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972) ;
Hibner, Attempts to Monopolize: A Concept in Search of
Analysis, 33 A.B.A.J. 165, 171-177 (1967).

We are aware that the case of Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964), is not in accord with the result we have reached in
this case, but we choose not to follow its rationale,"°
especially in view of the fact that the case of Walker Pro-
cess Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.,
supra, was decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to the
Lessig case and in view of the decisions of this Court here-
inbefore cited.

Other Alleged Errors

Agrashell claims that Hammons’ recovery of litigation
expenses was barred by principles of res judicata and com-
pulsory counterclaim. Our resolution of the sufficiency of
proof with regard to section 2 of the Sherman Act obviates
the necessity of resolving this issue with regard to litiga-
tion expense damage. Likewise errors allegedly made in
instructing the jury with regard to litigation damages
need not be discussed.

Agrashell further argues that Hammons’ section 1 claims

should have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in
the first infringement suit filed by Agrashell against Ham-

10 The strength of the Lessig rationale in the Ninth Circuit is
questionable. See Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121
(9th Cir. 1972) ; Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.8. Co., supra.

OIE ESI DI IN TNE in PT CO aah ROENCANOP NRA KOLO PIN OS 4 5 Bie?

36a

mons in the Western District of Missouri. However, we
think that the instant case is controlled by Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944), which indicates
that cases such as this one involve permissive, not compul-
sory, counterclaims. Furthermore, since the first suit was
dismissed because of Agrashell’s failure to join an indis-
pensable party, since no judgment on the merits was had,
and since Agrashell was explicitly allowed to file a new
action, which it elected to do, no injustice has resulted from
permitting the filing of the counterclaim in this action.

Agrashell argues that the instructions were in error be-

cause of a failure to adequately define Agrashell’s agency

arrangements. We do not think that if any error occurred
that it was prejudicial, and our resolution of the section 1
claim assumes that valid agency relationships existed.
Agrashell further argues that it was an abuse of discretion
to relieve Hammons of its waiver of jury trial. Due to the
complexity of this case and the fact that Hammons changed
from patent counsel to antitrust counsel during the varying
procedural phases of this case we do not think that such a
decision was an abuse of discretion. See generally, 9 C.
Wricut & A. Miier, Feperan Practice anp PRocepure
§ 2334 at 123 (1971).

Agrashell next argues that it was an abuse of discretion
to allow Hammons to deviate from a pretrial narrative
statement by introducing into evidence the deposition testi-
mony of Cox and Sirotta. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allows for modification of a pretrial order
to prevent manifest injustice. The trial judge explicitly
indicated that he was acting in the interest of justice and
fair play in allowing the deposition testimony, and indi-
cated that the testimony might well have not been available
earlier because the parties were in litigation in 1967 and
could have been reluctant to speak. We do not think that
the decision in this case was an abuse of discretion. See
generally, 6 C. Wricut & A. Mrier, Feperat Practice anpD
Procepure § 1527 at 608 (1971) ; Cf. Labbee v. Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., 469 F.2d 169, 172 (8th Cir. 1972).

Ta comd, te a

37a

Finally, Agrashell argues that it was error to exclude
its evidence of settlement offers made to Hammons after the
filing of the suit. The trial judge indicated quite clearly
that he was afraid the probative value of this evidence was
outweighed by the prejudicial impact the evidence might
have had on the jury. We think the judge’s decision in this
respect was carefully considered and not error. Other alle-
gations of error raised in the briefs have been considered,
but in our opinion are not valid and do not require com-
ment.

Conclusion

We affirm that part of the judgment awarding Hammons
$41,750.00 trebled in the amount of $125,250.00. The re-
maining judgment, consisting of litigation expense dam-
ages, is reversed with directions to dismiss that portion of
the case. Attorneys fees and costs in the prosecution of
this case should be redetermined by the district court and
substantially reduced to an amount more in keeping with
the revised judgement.

Appendix B—Continued

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

September Term, 1972
No. 71-1538
AGRASHELL, Inc., Appellant,
v.
Hammons Propucts Company, Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri.

Petition of appellant for rehearing filed in this cause
having been considered, it is now here ordered by this Court
that the same be, and it is hereby, denied.

May 1, 1973

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0962%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
