# Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Mobil Oil Corp. v. Woolard

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 414 U.S. 1025

## Text

Sacreme Cosrt, U.S.
FILED

AUG 30 1973

MICHAEL RODAK, JR.,CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

73-387

‘NO

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
v.
MRS. GILBERT LEE WOOLARD, et al, Appellees.

' PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

B. Jerr CRANE, JR.
First City National Bank
Building
Houston, Texas 77002
Attorney for Petitioner
Of Counsel:

WILLIAM H. TABB
Mobil Oil Corporation
P. O. Box 900

Dallas, Texas 75221

DaniEL A. HyDE
First City National Bank Building
Houston, Texas 77002

Alpha Law Brief Co., One Main Plaza, No. 1 Main St., Houston, Texas 77002

Appendix “3” (Order Denying Petition for Rehearing)... .

LIST OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Buffalo Lakes, Inc. v. McGrew, 285 S.W.2d 483 (Amarillo
1955, writ ref'd Dre.) .......ccccccccccccccccccccces
Daniels v. Shell Oil Co., 485 S.W.2d 948 (Ft. Worth 1972,
BE GE ED ccccesecdksddscevennceceectcaceswees
Fergeson v. National Bank of Commerce, 174 S.W.2d 1015
(Galv. 1943, Wo writ) .......cccccccccccccccccccccces
Flynn v. Pan American Hotel Co., 183 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.
BR. BOGE) . nccccccccsccccccccccsccccergeesceccoocs
Ft. Worth v. Barlow, 313 S.W.2d 906 (Ft. Worth 1958, writ
EES EEE Ee ee ee ee
Johnson v. Murray Co., 90 S.W.2d 920 (Austin 1936, writ
PL: ccgnntiichser Cee riene Tenant owenes
Marshall v. Heard, 59 Tex. 266 (1883) ................-
Medlin v. Havener, 98 S.W.2d 863 (Ft. Worth 1936, no writ)

UNITED STATES STATUTES
BO , BRED vc ccscwccscvteseccsecnscccssscccease

[Soa EE

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

NO

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
¥
MRS. GILBERT LEE WOOLARD, et al, Appellees.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

The Petitioner Mobil Oil Corporation respectfully prays
that a Writ of Certiorari be issued to review the judgment
and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit entered in this proceeding on June 7, 1973
and the denial of Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing and
Petition for Rehearing En Banc entered on July 16, 1973.

OPINION

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, F.2d appears as Appendix “A”
hereto. The Order denying Mobil Oil’s Petition for Re-
hearing and Rehearing En Banc appears as Appendix “B”
hereto.

2

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
June 7, 1973, and the Petition for Rehearing and Rehear-
ing En Banc was denied on July 16, 1973. This Petition
for Certiorari was timely filed within ninety days from those
dates. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a landlord not in possession or control of the
leased premises owes a duty to the lessee’s employees to
correct unsafe conditions created by the lessee.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
There are no statutory provisions involved in this ap-
peal. ,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action for damages for injuries and death
sustained by Gilbert Lee Woolard as a result of an ex-
plosion and fire occurring at the Beaumont Metering Sta-
tion of Mobil Pipe Line Company on June 20, 1969. The
fatal injuries of the deceased were sustained during the
course of his employment with Mobil Pipe Line Company.
Suit was brought pursuant to Article 4671 et seq. and
Article 5525 of the Revised Civil Statutes of the State of
Texas, and was based on alleged negligence of Mobil Oil
Corporation and alleged gross negligence of Mobil Pipe
Line Company. Federal jurisdiction was based on diver-
sity of citizenship.

The trial of this case began on March 1, 1972 in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas. In Answers to Special Interrogatories submitted by
the court, the jury found that Mobil Oil Corporation was

he PGR AAT RT A GTI LE REE FN OE RT LR NG eR EEO IN

3

negligent in failing to provide a flare system to be used
by the metering station in its operations. It also found
several acts of gross negligence committed by Mobil Pipe
Line Company. Judgment was entered on behalf of the
Plaintiff on May 15, 1972 against both Mobil Oil Cor-
poration and Mobil Pipe Line Company.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the judgment as to Mobil Oil Corporation
and reversed as to Mobil Pipe Line Company. This Peti-
tion for Certiorari is filed on behalf of Mobil Oil Corpora-
tion.

We fully realize that this Court would rarely grant such
a Petition in a case of this nature. The holding in this case,
however, places a new and intolerable burden upon every
landowner in this country. Taken literally, this holding
means that a lessor has a duty to seek out and correct
dangerous or unsafe conditions that are created by his
lessee. That duty would extend not merely to third persons
but also to the very persons that create such a dangerous
condition. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit has ignored
Texas law, and allowing its opinion to stand will create
hopeless confusion among landowners and their attorneys
who attempt to advise them. It clearly calls for an exercise
of this Court’s supervisory powers.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Some review of the facts of this case and of the opera-
tion being conducted the night of the accident is necessary
to enable this Court to understand the simple fact that
Mobil Oil Corporation had absolutely nothing to do with
any of it and the impossible burden placed upon Petitioner
and those similarly situated by the Court of Appeals.

On the night of June 20, 1969, Gilbert Lee Woolard,
an employee of Mobil Pipe Line Company, was working

4

on the premises of the Beaumont Metering Station of that
company with two other men—Red Marsh, another em-

of the pipe line, and Walton James Goodwin, an
employee of Mobil Oil Corporation. The Metering Station
is located on a tract of land approximately .8 of an acre
in size just outside the Mobil Oil Corporation Refinery at
Beaumont. The land is leased from Mobil Oil Corporation
to Mobil Pipe Line Company. When a product passes
through the meters on these premises, it in effect has been
transferred from the custody of Mobil Pipe Line Company
to that of Mobil Oil Corporation.

In June of 1969, three pipe lines came into the meter-
ing station in Beaumont. One was a 20-inch crude line,
one a 16-inch crude line, and one a 10-inch liquid petro-
leum gas (LPG) line coming from Corsicana. It is the
operation of this 10-inch LPG line that is at issue in this
lawsuit.

Prior to the date of the accident involved in this law-
suit, it had been necessary for Mobil Pipe Line Company
to repair sections of pipe at two locations between Cor-
sicana and Beaumont. Before the repair work was started,
it was necessary to insert quantities of water into the pipe
line. By inserting the water into the pipe line, the repairs
necessary could be made without great danger of fire or
explosion. ‘Prior to the time the contents of the pipe line
were to be delivered to Mobil Oil Refinery for processing,
it was necessary to remove the quantities of water which
had been inserted into the line. It was the operation of
removing this quantity of water from the pipe line that
was being carried on at the time of the explosion and fire
at the Beaumont Metering Station facility.

In the repair process, the water inserted had become
separated into two slugs. The first slug arrived at the
Beaumont Metering Station at approximately 9:15 on the

morning of June 20, 1969. Approximately 697 barrels
of water were discharged during the next hour and a half.
There are no allegations that there were any problems
with the discharge procedure at this time. At any rate,
there were no accidents.

The second slug of water arrived at the metering station
at approximately 7:00 P.M. on the evening of June 20,
1969. Since it is the operation of discharging this water
that forms the basis of this lawsuit, we will attempt to go
into the nature of this operation in some detail.

As any product enters the Beaumont Metering Station
facility through the 10-inch LPG line, any of several things
can be done with the product. Normally, when the product
is in fact LPG, it simply passes through the meters and is
directed toward the Mobil Oil Corporation Refinery. The
operation being conducted on June 20, 1969, although
not an unusual operation, was not daily routine. Thus,
when the water entered that facility through the 10-inch
LPG lines, it was directed to a 4-inch discharge line and
into a settling tank with a 2-inch discharge line on the
bottom of it. The water was thus discharged through these
two lines into a ditch which paralleled the railroad track
on the east side of the facility. It then ran down this ditch
and into a nearby swamp.

It was also possible to direct the incoming product to
a flare system located on Mobil Oil Corporation Refinery
premises. The product would be directed to the flare if
some sort of an emergency arose.

It is undisputed that at the time of the explosion and
fire, the product coming in through the 10-inch lines was
being diverted through the 4-inch line and also into the
settling tank and through the 2-inch line. There is no evi-
dence that the flare system was used or that its use was

6

even contemplated. Furthermore, the valves on the pipes
leading to the refinery were closed.

At the time of the accident, the metering station was
substantially in the same condition that it had been for
a number of years. One witness familiar with the opera-
tion of the metering station testified that in the seven
years preceding the accident he could recall at least six
times that the draining operation being conducted on the
night of the accident had been performed. During all of
those years, there were no fires or accidents of any kind.
In other words, the operation being carried on on the
night of June 20, 1969 had been conducted safely on
many occasions Over a substantial number of years. It
was only through an unforseeable and bizarre set of facts,
many of which are not understood to this day, that three
men were killed in an essentially safe operation.

As might be expected, there is an area of intermingling
between the water and the LPG known as an interface.
In the interface at both the head and the tail of the slug
of water were inserted scrapers, or pigs, which served the
dual purpose of cleaning the pipe line and signalling the
arrival of the new product. The arrival time of the inter-
face is calculated by the dispatcher in Dallas by dividing
the total amount of displacement in a section of line by
the number of barrels being pumped per hour.

Prior to the arrival of the interface, Marsh was given
an estimated time of arrival of 12:35 A.M., but at 10:45
P.M. was told that it could arrive at any time. The fire
and explosion took place at approximately 11:25 P.M.

The accident occurred when the LPG following the slug
of water arrived at the metering station, discharged ap-
parently through the 4-inch and 2-inch lines, and from
some unknown source, was ignited. The resulting explo-
sion and fire took the lives of all three workers.

It is also without dispute that at the time of his death
Gilbert Woolard was an employee of Mobil Pipe Line
Company, a subscriber to the Texas Workmen’s Compen-
sation Act, and that benefits under that Act have been
paid unto the survivors of Gilbert Lee Woolard.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Texas courts
would impose a duty of ordinary care upon a landlord
who shares control of the leased premises with his tenant.
The elements of sharing found by the Court of Appeals
were:

(1) Mobil Oil could veto any of Mobil Pipe Line’s
proposed alterations in the metering station which
Mobil Oil considered unsafe to its employees;

(2) Mobil Oil employees had keys to unlock gates in
the fence surrounding the metering station;

(3) New Mobil Oil executives were given a tour of the
metering station as part of their orientation; and

(4) Goodwin, the Mobil employee who was killed in
the explosion, had the authority to decide when to
open and close valves during the purging opera-
tion.

It is important to point out in connection with Good-
win’s authority that even assuming the Court of Appeals’
statement is true, which it is not, liability was imputed to
Mobil Oil Corporation not on the basis of anything Good-
win did or did not do, but rather on the failure of Mobil
Oil Corporation to provide the pipe line company with a
flaring system for use in the pipe line company’s opera-
tions.

Out of this “control” over the premises arose the
duty, according to the Court of Appeals, to interfere

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actively with the busineses operation conducted on the
adjoining premises. Specifically, in this case, the Court
of Appeals has now held that Mobil Oil Corporation
was negligent in not providing additional equipment for
use by another company in that company’s operations.
The holding that these elements constituted sufficient con-
trol to establish a duty on the part of the landlord com-

pletely ignores established Texas law.

The Court of Appeals, moreover, in its apparent effort
to hold Mobil Oil Corporation liable on some invented
theory neither argued nor briefed by either side, has
ignored the established law of the State of Texas that
an employee of the tenant stands in no better shoes
than the tenant himself. The court could have disposed
of this entire matter without having to strain to find
joint control had it not ignored Texas law in this regard.

It is ironic that the very cases cited by the Court
of Appeals in arriving at its conclusion that “Texas
courts would impose a duty to use ordinary care upon a
landlord who shares control of the leased premises with
his tenant” preclude liability on the part of Mobil Oil
Corporation in this very situation. Consider, for example,
Johnson v. Murry Co., 90 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Austin 1936, writ dism’d), cited by the court for the
proposition that Texas court impose upon the landlord
a duty owed to his tenant and those entering under the
tenant to use ordinary care when the lease is a mere
sham employed by the landlord to fraudulently conceal
his continued control over the premises. We do not so
read that case, but that is immaterial. That case stands
much more clearly for the proposition that “it is settled
law that where a dangerous or defective condition of the
leased tenement or machinery is as well known to the
lessee as to the lessor, the latter may not be held liable

Sn tie RT ah RP ae

9

at the suit of the lessee’s servant or employee; because
of action, if any exists, is against the lessee.” Id. at
924, citing Marshall v. Heard, 59 Tex. 266 (1883).
A careful reading of the case will show that the landlord
there maintained at least as much “control” over the
premises as in this case. In fact, it is almost incon-
ceivable that a landlord would not retain at least this
much “control” over the premises. It is important for
this Court to realize that this decision completely changes
the nature of the duty owed by every landlord in this
State. This degree of control over the premises can al-
ways be found, and the landlord will always then be
deemed to control the premises jointly with his tenant.
This is sheer nonsense.

The Court of Appeals did cite in footnote 4 of its
decision in Fergeson v. National Bank of Commerce, 174
S.W.2d 1015 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1943, no
writ). In that case plaintiff sued the owner of an office
building for negligence in maintaining the stairways and
lights in the common parts of the building. The court in
that case held that the landlord’s only legal duty was
to use reasonable care to keep its stairs and lights in a
reasonably safe condition. This makes complete sense,
as do the cases cited by the Court of Civil Appeals hold-
ing that the landlord is under a duty to use reasonable
care to eliminate unsafe conditions on portions of the
leased premises over which he has retained exclusive
control, and in those areas reserved for the common
use or benefit of several tenants. This makes sense be-
cause only the landlord is in a position to undertake
that duty. It is in no sense an exception to the rule con-
cerning the duties of landlords, as found by the Court
of Appeals, but rather is a statement of the duty of a
landlord concerning unleased property.

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10

In Medlin v. Havener, 98 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.
—Ft. Worth 1936, no writ), plaintiff alleged that the
lessors of land on which a swimming pool was located
were negligent in failing to provide a cover over a drain-
age pipe that would prevent the foot or leg of a swimmer
from being drawn by suction into the drain while the
pool was being drained. In that case the court stated:

“Tt is a well settled rule of decisions of this State
that in the absence of a special contract to the con-
trary, and in the absence of fraud and deceit induc-
ing the lessee to believe the landlord would make
such repairs, the lessor is under no implied obliga-
tion to the lessee to keep the rented premises in a
condition safe and suitable for the uses to be made
of the demised premises by the lessee. And in the
absence of a showing that the condition of the prem-
ises causing the injury constituted a nuisance exist-
ing at the time the lease was made, and that the lease
was made with the intention of the lessor that it
would be used by the lessee in that condition, then
the lessor is not liable to the lessee or his servant
or agent or invitee for injuries sustained as a result
of the unsafe condition of the premises. It is specifi-
cally held that the servant or agent or invitee stands
in the shoes of the lessee and with no higher right.
See Marshall v. Heard, 59 Tex. 266; Perez v. Ra-
baud, 76 Tex. 191, 13 S.W. 177 L.R.A. 620;
O’Connor v. Andrews, 81 Tex. 28, 16 S.W. 628,
629; Paternostro v. Bradley (Tex. Civ. App.) 262
S.W. 896; Jackson v. Amador (Tex. Civ. App.) 75
S.W.2d 892 (writ of error dismissed). Id at 864
(emphasis supplied).

Similar allegations of an unsafe swimming pool were
contained in City of Ft. Worth v. Barlow, 313 S.W.2d
906 (Tex. Civ. App.—Ft. Worth 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Again the Court stated:

il

“Where there is no agreement by the landlord to
repair the demised premises and he is not guilty of
any fraud or concealment by failing to disclose hid-
den defects of which he has knowledge, the tenant
takes the risk of their safety and the landlord is not
liable to him or to any other person entering under
his title or by his invitation for injury caused by
their unsafe condition.” [Citations] Id at 917 (em-
phasis is original opinion)

In Buffalo Lakes, Inc. v. McGrew, 285 S.W.2d 483
(Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1955, writ refd n.r.e.), the
court again affirmed the rule of Marshall v. Heard, supra,

that:

“At common law the occupant, and not the owner,
is bound, as to the public, to keep the premises in
such repair that they may be safely visited by the
public. . . . And it is well settled that to give the
party injured a right of action for damages arising
from defects in rented premises against the owner,
he must show that such defects existed at the time
the premises were leased. . . . Those who claim upon
the ground that they were invited into a dangerous
place must seek their remedy against the person who
invited them. If they are the guests of the tenant he,
and not the landlord, is the person from whom they
must seek redress for injuries caused by defects in
the premises.”

As applied to the facts of Buffalo Lakes, Inc. v. McGrew,
supra, the lessor of land on which a junk car race track

was

located was not liable to an injured spectator. As

the court stated,

“There is no evidence in this record that there was
any defect in the leased premises at the time of the
making of the parol lease between Buffalo Lakes,
Inc. and Ralph Roberts as the race track was con-

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12

structed by Roberts following the making of the
lease. If there was any defect in the construction
of the race track since it arose following the exe-
cution of the lease by Appellant, Buffalo Lakes, Inc.,
and was due solely to the acts of the lessee, Roberts,
he was solely liable for the injury proximately caused
thereby.” Id. at 486.

Flynn v. Pan American Hotel Co., 183 S.W.2d 446
(Tex. Sup. 1944), makes completely clear that “the em-
ployee of the tenant or lessee occupies no better position
as against the landlord than that of his employer.” Jd. at
449.

In Daniels v. Shell Oil Co., 485 §.W.2d 948 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Ft. Worth 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) a service
station employee sued the landlord, Shell, alleging negli-
gence in the operation of the station. As might be ex-
pected, the degree of “control” over the premises and
operation in that case makes the “control” found by this
Court in the case at bar look minute by comparison.
Plaintiff in that case alleged that Shell retained the right
to regulate the work hours of the service station attend-
ants. The allegations were quite similar to those in this
case. They alleged that Shell Oil Company was not the
employer of plaintiffs, but that the agreement between
Shell and its tenant gave Shell the right to control plain-
tiff in such a way as to require him to work alone in the
early morning hours. The court found that Shell, while
it did retain many rights, did not retain those rights
relied on. The court, however, went further:

“But even if Appellee did have the right of control
in the two respects referred to we would still be re-
quired to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

—— ee ee a 4

DON a AC NEA FR

13

“In the absence of an agreement by a landlord to
make repairs during the term of the lease and in the
absence of hidden defects of which the landlord was
aware that existed at the time the premies were let,
the tenant takes the risk of the safety of the leased
premises, and the landlord is not liable to lessee or to
lessee’s employees for injuries that are caused by an
unsafe condition of the premises. ({Citations] The
courts hold that an employee of the lessee in such
a case stands in the shoes of the lessee and has no
higher right. Citations.” Jd. at 951. (emphasis sup-
plied)

Certainly there is no dispute that Mobil Pipe Line
Company, the tenant, would have no cause of action
against Mobil Oil Corporation for damages araising out
of a condition it created. Woolard, Mobil Pipe Line’s
employee, has no higher right. Texas law is completely
settled in this regard.

The theory on which this Court chose to find Mobil
Corporation liable was neither advanced nor argued nor
briefed by any party to this lawsuit. In its haste to hold
Mobil Oil Corporation liable on some theory, the court
has completely disregarded Texas law. It has rendered
a decision that can meet the test of neither precedent
nor logic.

We urge that this Honorable Court consider the far ‘
reaching nature of the Court of Appeals opinion. We :
urge that it realize that it completely changes the duty
of every landlord. We urge that it understand that the
opinion is contrary to every reported opinion in the
State of Texas. We urge that it note that in reaching :
this extraordinary conclusion the Court of Appeals was
able to cite neither a case nor a commentator support-
ing its position. The opinion is clearly wrong.

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CONCLUSION

Because the Court of Appeals has, contrary to existing
law in Texas and other jurisdictions, created an im-
possible and intolerable burden for lessors of property,
a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review the judgment
and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted

B. JEFF CRANE, JR.
First City National Bank Building
Houston, Texas 77002 225-2411

Of Counsel:

WILLIAM H. TaBB
Mobil Oil Corporation
P. O. Box 900

Dallas, Texas 75221

DanreEL A. HyDE
First City National Bank Building
Houston, Texas 77002

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

‘ I hereby certify that on this day of August,
§ 1973, three copies of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
were mailed, postage prepaid, certified, return receipt
4 requested, to Mr. John O’Quinn, Attorney at Law, 500
: Houston First Savings Building, Houston, Texas 77002,
3 counsel for the respondent. I further certify that all
“4 parties required to be served have been served.

B. JEFF CRANE, JR.

BE cp ancl hat be gs Bind

Counsel for Petitioner

ITA IR ae RRR SR ba A

15
APPENDIX “A”

IN THE
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-2726

MRS. GILBERT LEE WOOLARD, a widow, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

MOBIL PIPE LINE COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants-A ppellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas

(June 7, 1973)

Before TUTTLE, THORNBERRY and DYER,
Circuit Judges.

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge: On the night of June
20, 1969, Gilbert Lee Woolard, an employee of Appellant
Mobil Pipe Line Company, was working at that com-
pany’s Beaumont, Texas, metering station with two other

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16

men: Red Marsh, another Pipe Line Company employee,
and Walton Goodwin, an employee of appellant Mobil
Oil Corporation, which leased the land on which the
metering station was located to Mobil Pipe Line, its
wholly-owned subsidiary.’ The men were removing water
from a ten-inch liquid petroleum gas (LPG) pipeline
running from Corsicana, Texas, through Pipe Line’s
Beaumont metering station and into the Mobil Oil re-
finery immediately adjacent to the metering station. The
water was moving down the line under pressure, having
been inserted to facilitate repairs on two sections of the
line. During the repairs, the water had become separated
into two slugs, the first of which arrived at the metering
station at approximately 9:15 am. on June 20, 1969,
and was removed without incident, by diverting it from
the ten-inch LPG line into a four-inch and then a two-
inch line, and thence into an open ditch along the east
side of the metering station.

The second slug of water arrived at the metering sta-
tion at approximately 7:00 p.m. on June 20, and the
three men began discharging it through the four- and
two-inch lines into the open ditch. Directly behind this
slug of water, the pipe was filled with extremely flam-
mable LPG; in order to prevent the LPG from being
discharged into the open ditch where it might ignite, the
men at the metering station had to have an accurate idea
of the arrival time of the “interface” between the water
and the LPG, so that they could divert the LPG either
into the Mobil Oil refinery through the ten-inch line, or

1. Pointing to the fact that the lease calls for a consideration
of only one dollar per year, appellees urge us to treat the lease as
a mere formality. We decline, however, to base our decision on this
ground.

WOM eae sk a

17

into Mobil Oil's flare system, which was available for
the metering station’s use in emergencies.

Mobil Pipe Line’s dispatcher in Dallas had earlier told
Marsh, the other Pipe Line employee at the metering
station, that the estimated time of arrival of the water-
LPG interface at the metering station was 12:35 a.m.,
June 21; but at 10:45 p.m. on June 20, while the second
slug of water was discharging from the line, Marsh was
told that the water-LPG interface could arrive at any
time. The interface arrived at 11:25 p.m.; LPG was dis-
charged into the atmosphere through the four-inch and
two-inch lines and was ignited by some unknown source.
The resulting explosion and fire took the lives of all three
men in the metering station.

Woolard’s parents and his widow, on behalf of herself
and her children, filed this wrongful death and survival
action in the court below. In response to special interroga-
tories, the jury found that Mobil Oil Corporation was
negligent in failing to provide a flare system for the ex-
clusive use of Mobil Pipe Line’s metering facility, and
that Mobil Pipe Line, Woolard’s employer, was grossly
negligent in several respects to be fully discussed below.”
Judgment was entered against Mobil Oil Corporation for
$125,000, and against Mobil Pipe Line Company for
$100,000, and this appeal followed. We affirm the judg-
ment against Mobil Oil Corporation, but reverse the judg-
ment against Mobil Pipe Line Company.

2. It is without dispute that Woolard’s employer, Mobil Pipe
Line, is a subscriber to the Texas Workman’s Compensation Act,
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 8306, and that benefits under that
Act have been paid to his survivors. Under Texas law, therefore,
Woolard’s survivors can recover from Mobil Pipe Line only if Mobil
Pipe Line was grossly negligent. Jd. § 5.

LDAP EATEN uly TL?

18

L
Negligence of Mobil Oil

Pointing to the fact that it leased the land on which
the metering station was located to Mobil Pipe Line
Company, Mobil Oil claims that it was a mere landlord
without possession Or control of the premises, and as such
owed its tenant’s employee, Woolard, no duty to use
reasonable care to eliminate dangerous conditions at the
metering station. Appellees, on the other hand, contend
that the evidence established that Mobil Oil was a “joint

metering station, and that Mobil Pipe Line’s negligence
could therefore be imputed to Mobil Oil.

The Texas doctrine of “joint venture” makes each party
thereto the agent of the other for purposes of tort liability;
when the facts show a joint interest in the purpose of
the enterprise and an equal right to control its conduct,
the doctrine imposes vicarious liability upon a party for
the other’s negligence. Bonney Vv. San Antonio Transit
Co., 325 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1959); Straffus v. Barclay,
219 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. 1949). In the case at hand, the
jury found that Mobil Oil Corporation was negligent, in
its own right, in failing to provide a flare system for the
exclusive use of the metering station,’ Mobil Oil argues

a

3. Mobil Oil’s refinery flare system, whereby petroleum products
could be safely disposed of, was available for the metering station’s
use in emergencies; there was no flare system for the exclusive use
of the metering station. The testimony suggested that the refinery
flare system was inadequate to handle the quanitity of water that
would have to have been discharged through it to insure the safe
discharge of the LPG (App. 212; 369), and that the men in the
metering station knew that the refinery flare system was inadequate
for this purpose. (App. 369).

PIR RE LTTE

19

that it could not have been negligent because in its role
as landlord it owed no duty to Mobil Pipe Line’s em-
ployees. The doctrine of joint venture, however, is one
of imputed, not actual, negligence; if one of two joint
venturers is negligent, then the negligence of the other is
immaterial to the imposition of vicarious liability upon
him. A determination of whether Mobil Oil and Mobil
Pipe Line were joint venturers in the operation of the
metering station is therefore irrelevant to the question
whether Mobil Oil itself breached a duty it owed to
Woolard. Accordingly, we intimate no view as to whether
the evidence showed that Mobil Oil and Mobil Pipe Line
were joint venturers, and instead turn to the question
whether Mobil Oil owed to Woolard a duty to use reason-
able care to eliminate dangerous conditions at the meter-
ing station.

According to Texas law, a landlord who does not agree
to repair the leased premises and who does not fraudu-
lently conceal defects of which he has knowledge, is under
no duty to either his tenant or the tenant’s employee to
correct an unsafe condition on the premises. Flynn v.
Pan American Hotel, 183 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1944); Yar-
brough v. Booher, 174 §.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1943); Daniels
v. Shell Oil Co., 485 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.—Ft.
Worth 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Katz v. Southwestern
Scrap Materials Co., 412 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Dallas 1967, no writ).* This rule, however, is subject
to exceptions. If the lease is a mere sham employed by
the “landlord” to fraudulently conceal his continued con-
trol over the premises, Texas courts impose upon him a
duty owed to his tenant and to those entering under the

4. But see Fergeson v. National Bank of Commerce, 174 S.W.2d
1015 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1943, no writ).

ences

| PANO "ena

exclusive control, Brown v. Frontier Theaters, Inc., 369
S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1963), and in areas reserved for the
common use or benefit of several tenants occupying the

ises. Hall v. Medical Building of Houston, 251 S.W.
24 497 (Tex. 1952); Lang v. Henderson, 215 S.W.2d
585 (Tex. 1948).

In each of these situations in which Texas courts im-
pose a duty of ordinary care upon a landlord, the land’
lord, by virtue of his continued possession or control of
the premises, is in a position to know of the defect and

Furthermore, our review of the record discloses sufficient
evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude
that control over the Beaumont metering station was
shared by Mobil Oil and Mobil Pipe Line. Mobil Oil
could veto any of Mobil Pipe Line’s proposed alterations
in the metering station which Mobil Oil considered un-
safe (App. 314); Mobil Oil employees had keys to un-
lock gates in the fence surrounding the metering station
(App. 294-95), and new Mobil Oil executives were given
a tour of the metering plant as part of their orientation
(App. 291); Goodwin, the Mobil Oil employee who was

gE.
REDE ME EL LICL IEE LI I POG

21

killed in the explosion, had the authority to decide when
to open and close valves during the purging operation
(App. 343-52; 363). Accordingly, we hold that there
was evidence from which the jury could properly decide
that Mobil Oil owed to Woolard a duty to use ordinary
care to eliminate dangerous conditions at the metering
station.

Mobil Oil’s contention that proximate causes was not
established need not detain us long. Mobil Oil argues
that the failure to provide an adequate flare for the ex-
clusive use of the metering station had nothing to do
with Woolard’s death, because there was no proof that
any of the men attempted to close the one valve neces-
sary to divert the LPG into the refinery’s flare system.
But the jury could reasonably conclude that the valve
was not closed because the LPG had vaporized and
frozen it (App. 396-97), or because the men at the
metering station knew that the refinery’s flare system was
inadequate under these circumstances (App. 366-69). In
short, the failure to close the valve did not preclude a
finding of proximate cause.

Mobil Oil contends further that the trial court errone-
ously overruled its objections to evidence showing altera-
tions in procedure and equipment made subsequent to
the accident at the metering station. In particular, Mobil
Oil objected to evidence showing that employees of Mobil
Oil and Mobil Pipe Line jointly decided to leave un-
locked the gates in the fence surrounding the metering
station (App. 324), and to testimony concerning the
method of discharging water and LPG that is now fol-
lowed at Mobil Oil’s new Spindletop facility. The general
rule in both the Texas and the federal courts is that evi-
dence of subsequent repairs or modifications is not ad-

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mnissible, owing both to the strong policy favoring TY
sedial qeasures and to the danger that the jury may Grew
me unwarranted inference that the repairs or modifice-
tions are an admission of negligence. Roosth & Genecov
Production Co. v. White, 262 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1953);

Cir. 1963, 321 F.2d 683. Such evidence is admissible,

tion with the operation of the metering station. Evidence
that its employees participated in the decision to leave

no bearing on that issue, because the Spindletop station
is wholly separate from the Beaumont metering station
and was not completed until after the occurrence in
question. But a thorough study of the record convinces
us that any error in the admission of this evidence was
harmless.

I.
Gross Negligence of Mobil Pipe Line

In answer to special interrogatories, the jury found
that Mobil Pipe Line Company was grossly negligent in
five respects, each of which was 4 proximate cause of
Woolard’s death:

2 SOIR RE <

23

(1) In locating an office building on the premises
of the metering station with window unit air condi-
tioners, a water heater with an open flame, and a
non-explosion-proof telephone;

(2) In actively furnishing inaccurate dispatch in-
formation under the circumstances;

(3) In discharging water and gas into the atmo
sphere;

(4) In building and maintaining the four-inch line
used to bleed off water followed by LPG

(5) In requiring Woolard, a novice at this type
of operation, to work without providing him a flare
system to be used exclusively by the metering station.

We are compelled to reject these findings. The first
three set out above were clearly insufficient predicates
for awarding exemplary damages. First, even assuming
that the presence of the air conditioners, water heater,
and non-explosion-proof telephone was evidence of gross
negligence on Mobil Pipe Line’s part, the record contains
not a shred of evidence suggesting that any of these
devices caused the explosion and fire. A Pipe Line em-
ployee testified that when he arrived at the metering
station shortly after the explosion, some grass and a
sample building on the premises were on fire, but the
office building containing the air conditioners, water
heater, and telephone was not burning. Moreover, appel-
lee’s expert witness testified that if these devices had been
the source of ignition, the office building probably would
have exploded. Apart from whether Mobil Pipe Line was
grossly negligent in maintaining the equipment in the
office building, then, its conduct in this respect was clearly
not a proximate cause of Woolard’s death.

aa ae ae Ee ae

24

Secondly, Mobil Pipe Line cannot, under Texas law,
be held liable for the gross negligence, if any, of its
dispatcher in “actively furnishing inaccurate dispatch
information.” Texas law permits the award of exemplary
damages against a corporation only if the grossly negli-
gent employee is a “vice principal,” a category including:
(1) corporate officers, (2) employees authorized to hire
and fire, (3) employees performing “nondelegable” corpo-
rate duties, and (4) department or division managers.
Fort Worth Elevators Co. Vv. Russell, 70 S.W.2d 397
(Tex. 1934); LeJeune v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 410
S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont, 1966, writ refd
n.r.e.); Wooley v. Southwest Portland Cement Co., 5th
Cir. 1959, 272 F.2d 906. There is nothing to suggest
that the dispatcher had sufficient managerial authority to
’ make him such’a vice principal, and Mobil Pipe Line
consequently may not be held liable for his alleged gross
negligence.

Thirdly, the finding that Mobil Pipe Line was grossly
negligent in “discharging water and gas into the atmo-
sphere” is not a proper basis of liability. The discharge of
the LPG is the very accident complained of. It was not
the purpose of the purging operation to discharge water
and LPG. into the atmosphere; indeed, Mobil Pipe Line
had taken measures (including an arrangement to use
the refinery flare system and the employment of a dis-
patcher to warn the men of the arrival of the interface)
to avoid such an accident. A finding that an accident
occurred is by itself insufficient to impose liability upon
a defendant for gross negligence or even for ordinary
negligence. There must be a finding that the defendant's
conduct caused the accident.

The last two jury findings set out above do not satisfy
the strict Texas requirement for proof of gross negligence.

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2

IP Rot ERIE PL

25

In Sheffield Division, Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376
S.W.2d 825, (Tex. 1964), the Texas Supreme Court
reaffirmed the definition of gross negligence first stated
in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Shuford, 10 S.W. 408
(1888):

Gross negligence, to be the ground for exemplary
damages, should be that entire want of care which
would raise the belief that the act or omission com-
plained of was the result of a conscious indifference
to the right or welfare of the person or persons to
be affected by it. (Emphasis supplied).

In Sheffield the deceased was killed when an electrical
spark ignited gas in a machine he had been ordered by
his supervisor to inspect. The procedure established by
the employer for removing gas from the machine before
inspection had proven inadequate. The deceased’s super-
visor knew that gas was present when he ordered the
deceased to inspect the machine, but assured the deceased
that it was safe to begin the inspection nevertheless. The
Supreme Court held that this evidence did not warrant
a finding of gross negligence, pointing to the existence
of admittedly inadequate safety measures. In the court’s
view, the “evidence failed to meet the requirement that
there be an entire want of care so as to raise the belief
that the acts complained of were the result of a conscious
indifference to the rights or welfare of others. There does
not appear to be an indication of willfulness, wantonness,
or malice.” 276 S.W.2d at 832.

In the wake of Sheffield, Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
have decided several cases which illustrate the stringent
requirements of the Texas concept of gross negligence.
Armstrong v. Texas Power & Light Co., 399-S.W.2d 922

SO ETE Te ee et

26

(Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler, 1966, writ refd mr.c.), for
example, arose out of the electrocution of a utility com
pany lineman engaged in the removal of a charged wire
from a utility pole near a highway. The job required that

coming cars; a car drove into or across the line, suddenly
bringing it into fatal contact with the deceased. The
Court of Civil Appeals held that this evidence failed to
demonstrate that the foreman acted with a conscious dis-
regard of the deceased’s safety.

In Loyd Electric Co. v. DeHoyos, 409 S.W.2d 893
(Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio, 1966 writ refd), an
employee was killed while inspecting aircraft fuel pumps.
The pumps were mounted on a stand, under which were
placed drip pans to catch highly volatile aircraft fuel. In
close proximity to the drip pans were electrical connec-
tions with clamps that were described at trial as not
being of the safest variety available. A spark from the
faulty connections ignited the fuel in the drip pans, killing
the employee. The court held that, although the employer
failed to use ordinary care to avoid such an accident,
the evidence did not reveal an entire want of care and
therefore there was no gross negligence.

Finally, in Thomas v. T. C. Bateson Co., 437 S.W.2d
386 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a
construction worker fell four floors to his death when a
cement buggy he was operating slipped off a ramp, which
was only two inches wider than the wheel base of the
buggy. The ramp was covered with wet concrete, and
the employer had furnished no guard rails or other pro-
tective devices. The employee was a novice at this type

ee nf

27

of work, and had made only two trips up and down the
ramp at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, the court,
relying on Sheffield, supra, held that gross negligence had
not been established. See also Stevens v. Dunn, 417 S.W.
2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler, 1967, no writ) (state-
ment by driver of truck which had struck and killed
employee that “the son of a bitch is better off dead shan
he would be alive,” held not to evidence intent or con-
scious disregard for the safety of the deceased workman).

As these cases indicate, the Texas view of gross negli-
gence contemplates something just short of intentional
wrongdoing. Indeed, the summary contained in 13 Tex.
Jr. § 133 and quoted approvingly in Sheffield, supra,
states that recovery of exemplary damages requires a
showing, not merely that defendant could have or ought
to have foreseen the injury, but that “he acted inten-
tionally or willfully or with that degree of ‘gross negli-
gence’ which approximates a fixed purpose to bring about
the injury of which Plaintiff complains.” The Texas
standard demands both advertence to an unreasonable
risk of harm to the plaintiff and an entire want of care
(not merely a failure to take reasonable precautions) to
avoid harm to the plaintiff.

Appellees cite only one instance in which a plaintiff
in a case like the one at bar has carried the seemingly
impossible burden imposed by this view of gross negli-
gence.” In Phillips Petroleume Co. v. Linn, 5th Cir. 1952,

5. Appellees rely on several cases arising under the Texas guest
statute, to support the verdict against Mobil Pipe Line. In Sheffield,
supra, the Texas Supreme Court stated that such cases do not govern
suits against employers for exemplary damages for the death of
deceased employees, because exemplary damages are compensatory in
nature in guest statute suits, but are considered punitive in nature
in such cases as the instant one. 376 S.W.2d at 831.

28

194 F.2d 903, an employee was killed while operating
a sandblasting machine attached to a hose labeled “H.P.
Air.” (meaning “high pressure air”). In fact, the hose
contained high pressure gas, and a spark thrown by a
particle of sand caused the gas to explode. The foreman
of the deceased workman had known for some time that
the hose was mislabeled, and prior to the accident the
foreman had written “gas” on the line in soapstone. By
the time of the accident, however, the soapstone marking
had worn off (the foreman testified that he had expected
it to wear off), leaving only the deceptive label “H.P.
Air.”

This court’s holding that the foreman was grossly negli-
gent was fully consistent with the Texas case. As wit-
nessed by his half-hearted effort to correct the label on
the hose, the foreman reco, i the almost inevitable
consequences of attaching a sandblasting machine to the
gas line. But by the same token, the precautions he took
to correct the defective label—the soapstone marking
which he knew would wear off—were not “precautions”
at all. They were, in short, an “entire want of care.”

Phillips, however, is not this case. True enough, the
end of the four-inch line in the instant case extended
only a few feet outside of the fence surrounding the
metering station, a fence that was locked and that was
difficult to climb. The water heater, telephone, and air
conditioners in the office building were possible sources
of ignition; and it was known that the dispatcher could
give an estimate of the arrival time of the LPG that
might be inaccurate by as much as thirty minutes. More-
over, the jury could reasonably have found that Woolard
was a novice at the purging operation, and was required
to do the work without having exclusive access to an

TLE EVIE FL AAI AGL ALS APNG TREAT NS

29

adequate flare system. From all of this, the jury could
reasonably conclude that Mobil Pipe Line Company failed
to exercise ordinary care to avoid harm to Woolard. It
may even be assumed that Mobil Pipe Line, through its
managerial personnel, knew that Woolard was being sub-
jected to an unreasonable risk. But the obstacle to re-
covery of exemplary damages in this case is the fact that
Mobil Pipe Line had taken measures to avoid such a
tragedy by arranging for the use of the refinery flare
system in emergencies and by employing dispatchers to
calculate the estimated arrival time of the LPG at the
metering station. However inadequate these steps may
appear in retrospect, they are nevertheless sufficient to
negate a finding of an entire want of care on the part
of Woolard’s employer. Accordingly, the award of ex-
emplary damages against Mobil Pipe Line Company is
reversed.

In conclusion, we affirm the judgment against Mobil
Oil Corporation, and reverse the judgment against Mobil
Pipe Line Company.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.

ot

30
APPENDIX “B”

Muited States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 72-2726

MRS. GILBERT LEE WOOLARD, a widow, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees,
versus
MOBIL PIPE LINE COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION
FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(Opinion June 7, 1973, 5 i975 _.. F.2d —.. ).

(July 16, 1973)

Before TUTTLE, THORNBERRY and DYER,
Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: The Petition for Rehearing is DE-
NIED and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular
active service on the Court having requested that the
Court be polled on rehearing en banc, (Rule 35 Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule
12) the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0955%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
