# Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, Local Union No. 1418 > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0916%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for A Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 1973 - **Citation:** 414 U.S. 1022 ## Text IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1973 NB = 46 | ‘ NEW ORLEANS STEAMSHIP ASSOCIATION, Petitioner Vv. GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, LL.A. LOCAL UNION #1418, an Unincorporated Association, and GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, I.L.A. LOCAL UNION #1419, an Unincorporated Association, AFL-CIO, Respondents PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MONROE & LEMANN Andrew P. Carter 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER June 30, 1973 OPINION BELOW JURISDICTION ‘ QUESTIONS PRESENTED STATEMENT OF THE CASE TABLE OF CONTENTS REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 1. CONCLUSION APPENDIX THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT EXPLICATING FEDERAL POLICY ON THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND RAISES SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS REGARD- ING THE PROPER ROLE OF A REVIEWING COURT IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS THE COURT BELOW HAS AFFIRMED A DIS- MISSAL ON GROUNDS OF “MOOTNESS” WHICH DISMISSAL SO FAR DEPARTS FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO REQUIRE EXERCISE OF THIS COURT’S SUPERVISORY POWERS 11 16 18 BPOREE WR LEPBL ALS Sa» ERD EE RANE aE NAB IERIE I BO ALL oF Ms TABLE OF CITATIONS COURT CASES: Page Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 285 (1970) 8, 10 Gianfala, et al v. Texas Company, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)_ 16 Minnesota Joint Board Clothing Workers v. United Garment Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1964)... 10 New Orleans Steamship Association v. General Long- shore Workers, I.L.A., Local Union +1418, et al, 306 F.Supp. 134 (E.D. La. 1969), rev’d 423 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1970) 6, 7, 13, 14 New Orleans Steamship Association v. General Long- shore Workers, et al, 389 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1968) cert. denied 393 U.S. 828 (1968) 5, 9,11 Owens-Illinois Glass Co, 43 Lab. Arb. 715 (1964) (H. W. Dworkin) Lee ae Piano Workers v. W. W. Kimball Co., 221 F.Supp. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1963) rev’d 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1964) rev'd per curiam 379 U.S. 357 (1964) _....._.. 10, 12 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufac- turing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) 7 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) 8, 12 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) 8 II TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued) COURT CASES: Page US. v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1952)__.____._ 15 John S. Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) 10, 12 STATUTES: 28 U.S.C. §1254 (1) 2 28 U.S.C. §1337 5 29 U.S.C. §185 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1973 No. NEW ORLEANS STEAMSHIP ASSOCIATION, Petitioner v. GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, I.L.A. LOCAL UNION #1418, an Unincorporated Association, and GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, I.L.A. LOCAL UNION #1419, an Unincorporated Association, AFL-CIO, Respondents PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT The petitioner, New Orleans Steamship Association, re- spectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in this proceeding on April 4, 1973. OPINION BELOW The per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, not yet reported, appears in the Appendix hereto. The order of dismissal, with reasons, of the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, in the form of a Minute Entry dated October 18, 1972, appears in the Appendix. The Judgment of the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, in Civil Action No. 69-2653 to which reference is made in the October 13, 1972 order of dismissa], supra, also appears in the Appendix. JURISDICTION The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was entered on April 4, 1973. This Petition for Certiorari was filed within ninety days of that date. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1). QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the federal policy favoring settlement of labor disputes by arbitration is furthered by a summary refusal of a District Court to render a decision in a case praying for judicial enforcement of an arbitration award. 2. Whether a finding of “mootness” based upon the filing of subsequent litigation between the same parties but upon different factual circumstances is not such a deplorable departure from accepted and usual judicial proceedings as to warrant exercise of this Court’s super- visory powers. STATEMENT.OF THE CASE The New Orleans Steamship Association (hereinafter “NOSA”) representing various employers engaged in ship- ping in the Port of New Orleans, and the two I.L.A. local unions representing the General Longshore Workers in the Port, Local Unions #1418 and #1419 (hereinafter the “Unions”) have engaged in collective bargaining for over thirty-five years. The shipping industry is the largest in- dustry in the City of New Orleans. One of the contracts resulting from this bargaining re- lationship had an effective date of October 1, 1964 and an expiration date of September 30, 1968. This contract contained a “no strike—no lockout” clause as well as a comprehensive arbitration commitment by NOSA and the Unions: ARTICLE XVIII NO STRIKES, NO LOCKOUTS— DISPUTES AND ARBITRATION (a) NO STRIKES—NO LOCKOUTS There shall be no strikes, work stoppages, nor shall there be any lockouts. (b) DISPUTES PROCEDURE AND ARBITRATION The parties accept the principle that any dispute involving the interpretation or application of the terms of this agreement shall be resolved in an orderly and expeditious manner. They commit themselves to the procedure outlined below. * * * (c) Step 1. When a problem arises it shall be dis- cussed immediately .... Step 2. ... If the matter is not disposed of in this Step 2... either party may take the dispute to final and binding arbitration. Step. 3. ... The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on both parties. * * * SNE a RENAE OIE RN SE De ‘ (d) Either party to a dispute may by-pass the pro- cedure leading up to arbitration and obtain arbi- tration forthwith whenever a violation of section (a) and/or (b) of this Article shall be alleged . . . the arbitrator shall make findings of fact con- cerning the alleged violation and shall prescribe appropriate relief, including an order to desist therefrom. . Since the expiration of the 1964-68 Agreement, the parties have negotiated and executed two collective bargain- ing agreements: (1) covering the period October 1, 1968 through September 30, 1971 and (2) one that went into effect on October 1, 1971 and will expire on September 30, 1974. All collective bargaining agreements between NOSA and the Unions, subsequent in time to the 1964-1968 version, have incorporated, without alteration, the “no strike—no lockout” clause found therein, as well as the same commitment to arbitration of disputes.’ In the latter half of 1965, a series of short work stoppages by members of the Unions occurred. NOSA pro- cessed a grievance over these work stoppages to arbitra- tion under the terms of the 1964-68 contract. The issue as defined in the decision of Arbitrator Leonard Oppenheim was: Did the Unions engage in work stoppages in violation of the current contract between the Parties? Arbitrator Oppenheim on December 13, 1965 found the work stoppages or “quickie strikes” to be a violation of the contract and ordered the Unions “. . . to cease and desist from work stoppages ... .” 1 The arbitration clause has changed only by a variance in the identity of the members of the arbitration panel. $2 ¢ BCS TANTS. 5 The Unions did not so cease and desist and on March 16, 1966 NOSA sought a judicial sanction by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis- trict of Louisiana, praying for enforcement of the De- cember 13, 1965 arbitration award. Jurisdiction was al- leged to exist u..ver 29 U.S.C. §185 and 28 U.S.C. §1337. The District Court, with H. W. Christenberry presiding, dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction on February 28, 1967. This dismissal was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on January 26, 1968 find- ing that the District Court had jurisdiction to enforce the award of the arbitrator and remanding the case “. . . for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.” New Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore workers, et al, 389 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 828 (1968). A trial was held by the District Court in December of 1970 following remand from the Fifth Circuit. Briefs were filed and there the matter rested for twenty-two months. On October 13, 1972, the District Court filed a Minute Entry sua sponte dismissing NOSA’s suit as “moot” because a later, different suit between the parties had been filed that allegedly involved the same issues as found in the earlier action. The District Court in its Minute Entry noted that the extraordinary lapse of time following trial had been caused by “inadvertance” charge- able to the Court. NOSA, following the dismissal by the District Court on October 13, 1972, filed a timely appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That Court refused to grant NOSA the relief requested in a per curiam opinion dated April 4, 1973. This petition for an extraordinary writ has followed. CLR PB LIN ILE OPS E LIBEL II SII PION TE The later suit between the parties, to which the Dis- trict Court had reference in its dismissal of the instant case, is New Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 1.L.A., Local Union +1418, et al, 306 F.Supp. 134 (E.D. La. 1969), rev’d 423 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1970). That dispute is commonly known as the “LASH case,” involving as it did a refusal by the Unions in October of 1969 to work on a vessel that utilized an in- novative technique of handling and transporting cargo, i.e., Lighter Aboard Ship, or “LASH”. This boycott was appealed to arbitration by NOSA in November 1969. The Unions protested that work on LASH vessels was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement (1968-1971) then in effect. This matter was coincidentally also heard by Arbitrator Leonard Oppenheim and an award was entered on November 5, 1969 directing that the Unions “. . . cease and desist from refusing to work aboard or in connection with the Motor Vessel Acadia Forest ... .” As they had in the “quickie strikes” case in 1965-1966, the Unions again refused to abide by the arbitrator’s decision and accordingly NOSA was forced to seek a judicial order enforcing the LASH dispute award from the U. S. District Court. That Court, the Honorable James A. Comiskey presiding, refused to enforce the arbitration award finding that LASH work was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. See 306 F.Supp. 134 (E.D. La. 1969) at 139. This decision was timely appealed and on February 24, 1970, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed Judge Comiskey stating in part: The question before the trial court, and now before us, is whether the issues between the parties were arbitrable or not. * * * 3 : The dispute between the above, is whether the term ‘cargo’, as used in the contract, could reasonably be found by an arbi- trator to include the barges that were lying along could be construed by an arbitrator as including men whose duty it was to lift these barges aboard the vessel. These questions are for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide. The judgment is REVERSED and the case is RE- MANDED .. . 423 F.2d 38, 39, 41 (1970) Accordingly, on July 8, 1970 a Judgment of Permanent Injunction was signed by Judge James A. Comiskey en- joining the Unions from disobeying the November 5, 1969 arbitration award or boycotting LASH vessels being worked by employers party to the collective bargaining agreement (Appendix). REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 1. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH AP- PLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT EXPLI- CATING FEDERAL POLICY ON THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION IN LABOR-MAN- AGEMENT RELATIONS AND RAISES SIGNIFI- CANT QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PROPER ROLE OF A REVIEWING COURT IN THE AR- BITRAL PROCESS. This Court committed the Federal judiciary to a national labor policy promoting industrial peace through arbitra- tion of grievances in a trio of landmark decisions issued on June 20, 1960: United Steelworkers of America v. 2 fies ngpartetnidienn nig sage te American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 368 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v, Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 368 U.S. 693 (1960). A decade later this court indicated clearly that it had not wavered in its decision to endorse voluntary arbi- tration in the decision styled Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 898 U.S. 285 (1970). The major question presented in this case is whether the Court will permit this commitment to be undermined by an apparent practice of judicial inaction or whether it will once more exercise its supervisory powers over the federal courts to insure continued fidelity to that commitment. The “Steelworkers Triology” defined the respective roles of the private industrial arbitrator and the judiciary, and in Enterprise, supra, the judicial standard to be used in enforcing arbitration awards already rendered was enunciated : The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbi- tration under collective bargaining agreements. p. 596 The obligation and the responsibility of a reviewing court to duly enforce arbitration awards was brought home in this very case by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit when they reversed the District Court’s initial order of dismissal: The question presented now is the power of the District Court to enforce the award of an arbitra- tor in a setting where the arbitrator, in the ex- ercise of undisputed contractual jurisdiction, has ordered an end to work stoppages. The union has refused to abide by his order and asserts that the court is without jurisdiction to remedy the breach. Practically, this is the ultimate or last step in the arbitration process. p. 371 In this case the parties agreed to the remedy of a desist order by the arbitrator. Such an order was entered and breached. The court in enforc- ing such order or award, although injunctive in — nature, would be doing no more than enforcing the agreement of the parties. . Norris-LaGuardia is limited to labor disputes and we consider the instant controversy to be out- side the scope of a labor dispute as such... . We think the logic of the arbitration policy com-- pels this result; otherwise one of the parties to a collective bargaining agreement containing arbi- tration and no strike or work stoppage clauses has a hollow right indeed. (Emphasis added) New Orleans Steamship Association v. General Long- shore Workers, 1.L.A. Local Union +1418, et al., 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 828 (1968) Following the foregoing 1968 remand, the District Court duly conducted a full trial on NOSA’s petition for en- forcement. It then “inadvertently” misplaced the record for almost two years and on October 13, 1972 the District Court, true to its reluctance of some seven years’ standing to deal with the issue on its merits, entered an order of dismissal sua sponte claiming the controversy had been mooted by subsequent litigation. While the initial thrust of this Court’s decisions in de- fining the role of the judiciary in litigation arising from 16 private arbitration was to restrict the role of a reviewing court, as illustrated by the “Steelworkers Trilogy” supra, the proper balance cannot be struck without also defining the extent of judicial authority and responsibility. Boys Market, supra, was a contribution to the balance in the latter regard and serves as legal precedent for both the issuance of an injunction below and as a reminder of the obligation of the reviewing court to act: . . . the effectiveness of such agreements would be greatly reduced if injunctive relief were with- held. Indeed, the very purpose of arbitration pro- cedures is to provide a mechanism for the ex- peditious settlement of industrial disputes with- out resort to strikes, lockouts, or other self-help measures. This basic purpose is obviously largely undercut if there is no immediate, effective rem- edy for those very tactics that arbitration is de- signed to obviate. p. 249 In the present case the relationship between labor and management has been on-going, with an uninterrupted sequence of collective bargaining agreements to prove it. The two agreements that have been negotiated by the parties since the arbitration award in question have all reaffirmed the parties’ commitment to voluntary arbitra- tion—a commitment that the District Court should not be permitted to render meaningless. This Court and others have recognized the continued viability of an arbitration clause after the expiration of the source collective bargain- ing agreement. Eg., Piano Workers v. W. W. Kimball Co., 221 F.Supp. 461, (N.D. Ill. 1963), rev’d 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1964) rev’d per curiam, 379 U.S. 357 (1964) ; John S. Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Minnesota Joint Board Clothing Workers v. United Garment Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1964); see » ae wee DA OPTED 1 also Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 715 (1964) (H. W. Dworkin). A fortiori, where the arbitration commitment continues to exist without lapse, as here, the need to insure compliance with the obligation to arbitrate and, where ap- propriate, to provide judicial sanctions to enforce arbitra- tion awards duly rendered is of undeniable importance. In denying the parties a decision on the merits and in effect refusing the prayer for judicial enforcement of an arbitration award, the District Court has both violated the direction and spirit of this Court’s developing precedent and created a new, significant problem regarding the judi- cial role in the industrial arbitral process. Review of that court’s action is warranted and necessary. 2. THE COURT BELOW HAS AFFIRMED A DIS- MISSAL ON GROUNDS OF “MOOTNESS” WHICH DISMISSAL SO FAR DEPARTS FROM THE AC- CEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO REQUIRE EXERCISE OF THIS COURT’S SUPERVISORY POWERS. The trial court herein, as eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals, did three things to avoid having to make a decision on NOSA’s petition for enforcement of the “quickie strikes” arbitration award: (1) it first dis- missed the petition claiming it lacked jurisdiction—but this decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit in 389 F.2d 369 (1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 828 (1968), (2) it “through inadvertance” overlooked the record of the case following a full trial on the merits in December 1970 for twenty-two months, and (3) it finally dismissed the 4 eens egnonmne 12 case for “mootness” allegedly rising from the filing of another action between the parties.’ It is difficult to imagine how the filing of a subse- quent petition seeking enforcement of a later, different arbitration award in the “LASH case” could render the instant case “moot.” Citation of the “LASH case” for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel would have been more orthodox and understandable. Yet “mootness” is the sole reason given by the District Court in its order of dismissal dated October 13, 1972 (Appendix), and that “mootness” is allegedly based upon the 1969-70 “LASH case.” Except for the fact that both the “LASH case” and the instant case involved violations of a “no strike” clause, the facts and relief sought in the two controversies are not the same. The arbitration in the instant case was over a series of work stoppages in 1965, NOSA complaining of a grow- ing tendency on the part of the Unions to engage in “quickie strikes” aimed at obtaining satisfaction of Union grievances, circumventing thereby the contractual griev- ance procedure. The Union in defense raised minor pro- cedural points (ie. staleness) and also denied that the work stoppages were anything but random occurrences, for which they had no responsibility. The positions of the parties in the 1969 “LASH case” arbitration differed radically from those in the “quickie 2 The trial court did not adopt arguments made by the Unions below to the effect that expiration of the 1964-68 collective bargaining agree- ment vitated any arbitration award arising thereunder. Such arguments are not supported by decisional law, see Piano Workers v. W. W. Kimball Co., 221 F.Supp. 461 (N.D. 111.1963) rev'd 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd, per curiam 379 U.S. 357 (1964); John S. Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); and United Steel v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). _ 1B strike” arbitration four years earlier. Issue in 1969 was joined only on the question of arbitrability. Without much risk of oversimplification, the Unions claimed there that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction or authority to interpret certain terms found in the collective bargaining Unions to work on “LASH” vessels. In the 1965 arbitration over the “quickie strikes” the Unions did not raise,a question of substantive arbitrability —such as they did in the “LASH case”. In like fashion in the 1969 “LASH case” arbitration, the Unions did not disavow responsibility for the action that was the subject of complaint—such as they had in the arbitration on “quickie strikes,” The difference in issues described above was continued and supplemented in the first District Court hearings upon each of the two arbitrations. In the hearing on enforce- ment of the arbitration award on “quickie strikes,” the Court found that it was without jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and denied the petition for an in- junction, thus adding a new issue to the general denial of responsibility pleaded by the Unions. In the first hear- ing of the United States District Court on the “LASH case” the Court heeded the Union’s argument on substan- tive arbitrability and found that the arbitration award had been issued on a subject beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. See 306 F.Supp. 134 (E.D. La. 1969). The Fifth Circuit reversed both of the foregoing District Court decisions. The question of substantive arbitrability and the scope of judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision, as found 2 tae ip a eT ee ae ian nite SA ws) LP Re ee yey rg ee oie 14 in the litigation under the “LASH case” has never been raised in the instant case. Those questions and the answers provided by the litigation reported in 806 F.Supp. 134 (E.D. La. 1964), rev’d 423 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1970) do not, it is submitted, answer the unresolved questions left below by the District Court’s order of dismissal, i.e., whether or not the December 13, 1965 arbitration decision is enforce- able by the Court under the rubric of Supreme Court de- cisions in this area. The questions that remain, including the fidelity of the arbitrator’s award to the contract and the evidence, as well as the precedental value of a judicial decision on the issue of “quickie strikes” under the sub- sisting collective bargaining relationship existing in the Port, are not answered by the 1969-70 litigation in the “LASH dispute.” Note that the Unions by disobeying the arbitration award and forcing NOSA to seek judicial enforcement have by their actions proven that there exist unresolved questions—a continuing controversy—that is not settled by the 1965 decision of Leonard Oppenheim or the de- cisions in the “LASH case.” This continuing controversy, or at least manifestation by “quickie strikes”, may have been temporarily and partially abated by the fact that the case was before one judicial tribunal or another for the past seven years, but if the District Court’s current order of dismissal is upheld no one can say with certainty when the basic disagreement on the legality of “quickie strikes” will again plague the Port of New Orleans, or be resolved. The possibility of a resumption of illegal conduct was a key in the refusal of this Court to find ‘“mootness” in U.S. v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1952). Both sides agree to the abstract proposition that 15 voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot. ... A defendani is free to return to his old ways. p. 632 The Court there also noted that “mootness” was not to be lightly implied for: . . . to say that the case has become moot means that the defendant is entitled to dismissal as a matter of right. p. 632 In addition to the unresolved controversy between the parties herein consideration must be given to the public interest in having the legality of certain practices (i.e. “quickie strikes”) settled before a finding of “mootness” will lie, see W. T. Grant, supra at 632. The ultimate public interest in the resolution of this dispute is based in the main in avoiding the disruption to commerce and attendant expense that arise from work stoppages in the largest single industry of a large metropolitan city. In this regard the public interest is coincident with one of the more obvious interests of the parties herein. The cost to NOSA of abandoning seven years of litigation with- out ever obtaining a henefit by judicial sanction of an award in its favor will be inequitably piled on top of the costs of beginning a whole new arbitration procedure when the controversy flares anew. Should the Unions contest a new arbitration award, further dilatory tactics in Federal court could again prevent NOSA from ever benefiting from its award. For a court in these circumstances to avoid the basic judicial responsibility of rendering a decision on the merits we 6 eee cas PATER PhO at eas iPOD a 16 not only keeps alive the continuing controversy between the parties, but ironically it renders impotent the private arbitral process, while at the same time denying to the parties any relief in the public judicial system. CONCLUSION For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Fifth Circuit; or more appropriately, the writ should be granted on the face of the papers and the lower court judgments reversed forth- with, Gianfala, et al v. Texas Company, 350 U.S. 879 (1955). Respectfully submitted, MONROE & LEMANN Andrew P. Carter Eugene G. Taggart David E. Walker By 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 June 30, 1973 A EO CN a CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 30th day of June, 1973 three copies of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed, postage prepaid to Alvin J. Liska, Esq., 7952 Chef Menteur Highway, New Orleans, Louisiana 70126 and Victor H. Hess, Esq., 1411 Decatur Street, New Orleans, Louisiana. - we PILOTS FRO TONS RT IR NEA oN he is IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 72-3697 Summary Calendar* NEW ORLEANS STEAMSHIP ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, LL.A. LOCAL UNION +1418 and GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, L.L.A., LOCAL UNION +1419, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (April 4, 1973) Before THORNBERRY, GOLDBERG and RONEY, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: AFFIRMED. See Local Rule 21.' *Rule 18, 5 Cir., Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens ney Com- pany of New York. et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I iSee N.L.R.B. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 5 Cir., 1970, 430 F.2d 966. TD Tae et eA SE TS PE ae ae MINUTE ENTRY OCTOBER 13, 1972 CHRISTENBERRY, J. SECTION “A” No. 16398 CIVIL ACTION NEW ORLEANS STEAMSHIP ASSOCIATION VS GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, LL.A. LOCAL UNION #1418, an Unincorporated Association, and GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, I.L.A. LOCAL UNION #1419, an Unincorporated Association, AFL-CIO In this matter the court granted a motion of defendant General Longshore Workers I.L.A. Local Union +1418 and +1419 to dismiss plaintiff New Orleans Steamship As- sociation’s motion for a mandatory injunction to enforce an arbitrator’s award ordering the Unions and their members to cease and desist from work stoppages in vio- lation of their contract with the Association, which was effective October 1, 1964 and remained in effect until twelve o’clock midnight, September 30, 1968. Plaintiff appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on January 26, 1968, and remanded for further proceedings. PPE PR IE ERR IAB Mae AE oe Thereafter there was a change in counsel for the plain- tiff. Without discussing motions filed in the interim it is sufficient to say that the matter was ultimately set for trial on December 17, 1970. Trial was had on that date after which counsel were given time to file briefs. The last brief was filed on January 18, 1971 and the matter should have been under submission at that time. However, this did not occur. Through inadvertence the record went to the Clerk’s files instead of the submitted drawer and was overlooked. The delay in disposing of the matter is not chargeable to counsel. It was the court’s responsibility. The contract out of which the issues in this case arose expired on September 30, 1968, but the parties continued to operate under it until a new agreement effective February 25, 1969 and remaining in effect until midnight September 30, 1971 was entered into by the parties. On November 6, 1969 New Orleans Steamship Associa- tion brought suit, No. 69-2653 of the docket of this court, against the Unions, defendants in this case, alleging vio- lation of the 1969-71 contract and seeking an injunction to enforce an arbitration award. The issues involved in that case are the same ones involved in the instant case. With the filing of that suit this suit became moot and should have been dismissed at that time. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that this suit be and it is dismissed. H.W.C. ce: All counsel of record UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA NEW ORLEANS DIVISION | NEW ORLEANS STEAMSHIP ASSOCIATION, . a Corporation vs. GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, I.L.A. LOCAL UNION NO. 1418, an Unincorporated Association, and GENERAL LONGSHORE WORKERS, I.L.A. LOCAL UNION NO. 1419, an Unincorporated Association, AFL-CIO CIVIL ACTION NO. 69-2653 SECTION “G” JUDGMENT OF PERMANENT INJUNCTION This cause came on to be heard on the verified complaint of plaintiff and the affidavits submitted in support of and in opposition thereto, and the court having heard oral evi- dence in open court, and considering the opinion and mandate of the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit, it appearing to the court that the defendants are committing acts, and are about to commit acts as set forth in plaintiff’s complaint, and will continue to do so unless restrained by order of this court, and that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to plaintiff and the parties that it represents; and that plaintiff, as : a representative of the waterfront employers in the Port of New Orleans, including Central Gulf Steamship Corpora- tion, time charterer of the M/V ACADIA FOREST, a vessel engaged in foreign shipping commerce, and T. Smith & Son, Inc., its contract stevedore, entered into a valid and existing Deep Sea Agreement with defendant Unions ef- fective February 25, 1969, under the terms of which no work stoppages were permitted and any arbitration of a dispute arising under said contract permitted the arbitrator to issue a cease and desist order final and binding on all parties; and that the arbitrator, Leonard Oppenheim, hav- ing found that a work stoppage existed, by the arbitrator’s award issued November 5, 1969 ordered defendants to cease and desist violating the “no work stoppage” provisions of the contract and to perform stevedoring work on the M/V ACADIA FOREST under the terms of the Deep Sea Agreement; and it further appearing that defendants have failed to obey the award of said arbitrator made pursuant to said contract, and are violating the terms of said con- tract, and that their refusal so to perform stevedoring work on said vessel has prevented Central Gulf Steamship Corp- oration from carrying on its shipping business under the provisions of the Deep Sea Agreement to its considerable immediate and continuing economic detriment, therefore IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that General Longshore Workers, I.L.A. Local Union No. 1418, AFL-CIO and General Longshore Workers, I.L.A. Local Union No. 1419, AFL-CIO, their officers, agents, repre- sentatives, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert and participation with them, be and they hereby are permanently enjoined and restrained from in any manner refusing to obey the award of Arbitrator Leonard Oppenheim issued pursuant to the Deep Sea Agreement between plaintiff and defendants, by refusing to perform on behalf of any employer-party to the Deep Sea Agreement stevedoring work in the M/V ACADIA FOREST or like vessel in accordance with said Deep Sea Agreement, and said persons are hereby affirmatively directed to perform upon request on behalf of any employer-party to the Deep Sea Agreement such stevedoring work in accordance with said award and are permanently enjoined and restrained from in any manner interfering with or stopping the loading, unloading or sailing of said vessel M/V ACADIA FOREST or like vessel, where the said vessel was or is to be loaded or unloaded by an employer-party to the Deep Sea Agreement. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE- CREED that the said defendants, General Longshore Workers, I.L.A. Local Union No. 1418, AFL-CIO and General Longshore Workers, I.L.A. Local Union No. 1419, AFL-CIO pay the costs of these proceedings to be taxed by the clerk of this court, and that execution issue for the same. Issued at New Orleans, Louisiana, July 8th, 1970. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0916%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.