# Petition for ReHearing — Baldridge v. Hadley > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0912%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for ReHearing - **Published:** January 1, 1974 - **Citation:** 417 U.S. 910 ## Text A { JUL 1 13% WICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED BEREES™ OCTOBER TERM, 1973 | NO. 73-1361 FRED BALDRIDGE, TRAVIS W. TAYLOR and HERMAN D. TERRY, Petitioners, vs. JOHN R. HADLEY, J. D. MONTOYA and ED GARY, individually and as members of THE NEW MEXICO STATE AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION and CONSERVATION COMMITTEE; and CLIFFORD M. HARDIN as Secretary of Agriculture of the United States, COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION , Respondents, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PETITION FOR REHEARING LYNELL G. SKARDA, ESQ. Counsel for Petitioners P. O. Box 400 Clovis, New Mexico, 88101 GARRETT, HARTLEY, & TATUM Of Counsel P. 0. Box 520 Clovis, New Mexico, 88101 GROUNDS FOR REHEARING 1. REPLY TO THE MEMORANDUM 2 FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION. 2. THE TENTH CIRCUIT CANNOT 7 CONVERT THIS CASE INTO AN ACTION TO REFORM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS . 3. THERE IS NEITHER STATUTORY 15 _ NOR CASE LAW CREATING A LEGAL LIABILITY ON FRED BALDRIDGE TO RETURN MONIES WHICH HE NEVER RECEIVED. A. USE OF SOIL BANK ACT 15 PAYMENTS TO PURCHASE DRAPER'S LAND WAS LEGAL AND APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONGRESS. B. ACQUISITION OF THE LANDS 18 BY FRED. BALDRIDGE. CONCLUS ION 24 CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 27 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ii CITATIONS Cases: ew v. Landers 59 N.M. 54, 278 P.2d 970 (1955) 48 A.L.R. 405 54 A.L.R. 1246 117 A.L.R. 69 Aragon v. Boyd 80 N.M. 14, 450 P.2d 614 (1969) Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Insurance ny 45 U.S. 185, 4 How. 185, 42-45 S.Ct. 931, 11 L.Ed. 931 (1846) C.I.R. v. Estate Bosch 387 U.S. 456, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967) Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943) iii CITATIONS (Continued) Cases: Page Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 17,25 y. Democratic National Committee 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080 (1973) Gavinzel v. Crump 89 U.S. 308, 22 Wall. 308, 86-89 S.Ct. 783, 22 L.Ed. 783 (1875) Gregory v. Lloyd 13 284 F.Supp. 264 (D.C. Fla., N.D., 1968) er v. Reynolds 20 1N.M. 255, 466 P.2d 101 (1970) Howland v. Blake 11,12 97 U.S. 624, 94-97 S.Ct. 1027, 24 L.Ed. 1027 (1878) 20 y v. Jones 20 9 U.S. 1, 2 Wall. 1, 66-69 S.Ct. 762, 17 L.Ed. 762 (1864) Kempner v. Churchill 12 75 U.S. 362, 8 Wall. 362, 74-77 S.Ct. 461, 19 L.Ed. 461 (1869) Lawber v. Bangs 20 69 U.S. 728, 2 Wall. 728, 66-69 S.Ct. 768, i7 L.Ed. 768 (1864) “ier v. Bis 20 F.2d 1277 (Cir. 10, 1972) iv CITATIONS (Continued) Cases; Page Mitchell v. Sheppard Mall 4 State Bank 458 F.2d 700 (Cir. 10, 1972) Moran v. Prather 20 90 U.S. 492, 23 Wall. 492, 90-93 S.Ct. 121, 23 L.Ed. 121 (1874) Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 3 45 N.M. 230, 114 P.2d 740 (1941) Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance 12 Company v. Nelson 103 U.S. 544, 102-105 S.Ct. 437, 26 L.Ed. 436 (1880) Oriel v. Russell 13 278,U.S. 358, 49 S.Ct. 173, 73 L.Ed. 419 (1929) Pacific Royalty Co. v. Williams 22,25 227 F.2d 49 (Cir. 10, 1956), c.d., 39. U.S. 951, 76 8.Ct. 847, 100 L.Ed. 1474 mags iw: Broadcasting Co., Inc. 17,25 Vv. . * e 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) Reimann v. United States 4 315 F.2d 746 (Cir. 9, 1963) Rowdon v. Stanley 13 455 F.2d 482 (Cir. 10, 1972) CITATIONS (Continued) Cases: Sauter v. St. Michael's College 70 N.M. 380, 374 P.2d 134 (1962) Sharpe v. Smith 68 N.M. 253, 360 P.2d 917 (1961) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Petsch 261 F.2d 331 (Cir. 10, 1958) State of Maryland v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co. 89 U.S. 105, 22 Wall. 105, 86-89 S.Ct. 713, 22 L.Ed. 713 (1874) U.S. v. Burnison 399 U.S. 87, 70 S.Ct. 503, 94 L.Ed. 675 (1950) U.S. v. Lazy F C Ranch 481 F.2d 985 (Cir. 9, 1973) U.S. v. Little Lake Misere Land Company, Inc. 412 U.S. 580, 93 S.Ct. 2389 (1973) U.S. v. Sommerville 324 F.2d 712 (Cir. 3, 1967) U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of California . 332 U.S. 301, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) Page 22,26 19 22 20 6,7,23 3,4 15 vi CITATIONS (Continued) Cases: Westover v. Harris 47 N.M. 112, 137 P.2d 771 (1943) Woodson v. Lee 73 N.M. 425, 389 P.2d 196 (1963) Treatises: 28 Am. Jur.2d, Escrow, §10, p.15 37 Am.Jur.2d, Fraud and Deceit, §19, p.44 26 C.J.S., Deeds, §40, p.670 30A C.J.S., Escrow, §9, p.993 37 C.J.S., Fraud, §123, p.450 Restatement Law of Property, §9, Comment c., Id. 153, Comment on Subsection (1l)c. Regulations: 7 C.F.R. §750.150 7 C.F.R. §750.150(q) 7 C.F.R. §750.164(b) (5) 7 C.F.R. §750.170 Page 16 16 vii CITATIONS (Continued) Miscellaneous: H.R. Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1960), and 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1959) Page 16,21,25 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1973 NO. 73-1361 FRED BALDRIDGE, TRAVIS W. TAYLOR and HERMAN D. TERRY, Petitioners, vs. JOHN R. HADLEY, J. D. MONTOYA and ED GARY, individually and as members of THE NEW MEXICO STATE AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION and CONSERVATION COMMITTEE; and CLIFFORD M. HARDIN as Secretary of Agriculture of the United States, COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION , Respondents, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PETITION FOR REHEARING Petitioners present their petition for a rehearing of this Court's order dated May 28, 1974, denying the petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, a suspension of the effect of the denial and leave until July 1, 1974, to file this petition having been granted by Mr. Justice Byron R. White on June 4, 1974. GROUNDS FOR REHEARING 1. REPLY TO THE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION. The govern- ment characterizes the issues here as being "factual". - Nothing could be farther removed from the truth than that. There has never been any sub- stantial dispute about the facts. The deeds from Draper, the seller, to the purchasers, their notes and mortgages to Draper, the respective escrow contracts with Fred Baldridge, the escrowed deeds, the subsequent releases by Draper, and delivery of the deeds when the C.R.P. contracts were wrongfully terminated, have not been attacked by the government. These careful steps taken by the par- eee to stay rere within the regulations, 7 C.F.R. §750.150, et seq., stand completely unimpeached and, in truth, not controverted. The issues here are strictly those of law. When the facts are undisputed, a determination of fraud is a question of law. 37 Am.Jur.2d, Fraud and Deceit, §19, p.44; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, §123, p.450. The government States that there was no purpose for the "complicated scheme" other than to evade the maximum payment Limitation. The con- veyancing had here was not complicated, but rather elementary, and the purpose was to insure that there were no viola- tions either of the regulations or of the purpose of the Soil Bank Act. Fred Baldridge never received more than $5,000 in any one year from the Department of Agriculture. To state otherwise is to foster on this Court a deliberate untruth, The government next takes the position that New Mexico law of real property is ats factor. pe rely at Mosley v. Magno Petroleum Co., N.M, » 114 P74 740 > which is a famous case in New Mexico jurisprudence holding that a deed placed in escrow to be delivered upon a condition subsequent will be given effect as of the date of the final or effective delivery. This is the law everywhere, and were there a federal common law as to real property, petitioners believe that such would be the decision of this Court. 48 A.L.R. 405; 54 A.L.R. 1246; 117 A.L.R. 69; 28 Am.Jur.2d, Escrow, §10, p.15; 30A C.J.S., Escrow, §9, p.993; 26 C.J.S. Deeds, §40, p.670; Restatement Law of Property, §9, Comment c., Id. §153, Comment on Subsection (1)c. In support of its statement that actions under the Soil Bank Act are governed strictly by federal law, whatever that may be, the government cites three (3) cases, to- wit: Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. ; 6s $.Ce. 3735, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (Cir. 3, 1967); — 4 and Reimann v. United States, 315 F.2d 746 (Cir. 9, 1963). None of these even remotely support the statement for which cited. Clearfield Trust Co., supra, confined itselt to the law merchant, i.e., could there be recovery a year and a half after negotiation on an indorsement forged on a government check contrary to Pennsylvania law. This case on its own facts is of dubious validity now in view of the fact that 49 of the 50 states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code which effectively resolves the issue uniformly. But at the least Clearfield has nothing to do with real property. Sommerville, supra, similarly falls into the commercial law category as it concerned cattle sold by an auctioneer which were subject to a security agree- ment in favor of the Farmers Home Administration. The Tenth Circuit from which the case at bar originates, re- versed itself, or at the least retracted, in Mitchell v. Sheppard Mall State Bank, 458 F.2d 700 (Cir. OF 1972) , which held that the Uniform Commercial Code pro- visions of state law are the appropriate sources of federal law. Sommerville cannot possibly be authority for any principle involved in the case at bar. Reimann v. United States, supra, stands for precisely the opposite of what the government contends. It con- cerned the validity of a Soil Bank Contract executed by a husband as to lands in Idaho which is a community property state. The wife did not join in executing the contract, which failure the husband contended made the contract void. The Ninth Circuit stated: "But we need not, and do not, decide whether we should adopt, for the purpose of this decision, the law of Idaho as being the federal law in re- lation to what authority a husband has, and to what constitutes an encumbrance - « « « We assume, for the purposes of this case, that Idaho law should be the standard we adop pt, since this is appellant's position." The court then went on to decide that the husband under Idaho law could validly enter into a Soil Bank Contract without the wife joining. In all fairness, Reimann supports petitioners. The government should not be permitted to cite authority that is so wide of its mark. Of course, the excuse for so doing is that there is not a single case from this Court which holds that long standing principles of state real property law can be ignored notwithstanding a federal interest. U.S. v. Little Lake Misere Land C Ys Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 93°S5.Ct. 2385 U.S. v. Burnison, 399 U. s. 87; 70 S.Ct. 503 34~ L.Ed. 675 (1950); I.R. Vv. Estate Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 87 oe 1776, 86 (1967). Petitioners are unable to find in the instant case moral grounds necessitating so drastic a de- parture from what has so long been settled law. ee The decision in United States v. Laz FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (Cir. 9, 1973), Is brushed off by the goveriment as not being in conflict with the opinion of the Tenth Circuit in the case at bar on the ground that the partners had relied on the advice of the county A.S.& C.S. manager in making the leases which quad- rupled their collective income from the Acrease Reserve Contracts. Amazingly, the government there stipulated that there was no "scheme or device". This got the A.S.& C.S. manager off the hook, so to speak, despite the fact that the partners were trying to maximize their income from the contracts. Notwith- standing, the partners admittedly received monies in excess of the maximum payment limitations. The Ninth Circuit simply held that the sear | had received full benefits rom the land taken out of production and the partners had lost their profits from farming, so that there was no good reason for requiring them to return the monies received just because those monies exceeded the maximum payment limitation. The prohibition is against receiving more than $5,000 from the contracts in any one year. Whether received as the result of a "scheme or device" is immaterial. It is shocking to note that Fred Baldridge never did receive payments ex- ceeding the maximum limitation, but is being required to return payments aeeceeny eatenves by others anyhow. Further, ed Baldridge never even tried to maximize the annual payments to himself. Every effort was exerted, and petitioners think successfully, to a, do just the opposite. If there was no “scheme or device" in Idaho, there can be none in New Mexico. There is no rationale that can equate ownership of the land after the Soil Bank Contracts are terminated as being the same thing as receiving more than $5,000 per year. It was not the parties intent for any to receive more than the regulations allowed. Further, they didn't. Finally, the government has not been damaged just as it was not damaged in Lazy F C Ranch, supra. The disposition of this a after the conclusion of the Soil Bank Contracts cannot in any sense be a concern of the government. For Baldridge to be treated as others have not, would require review of every Soil Bank Contract thet was made which is an administrative impossibility. The results in this case and Lazy FC Ranch, supra, are irreconcilable. Government application of what it thinks is the law mocks every "American ideal of fairness". 2. THE TENTH CIRCUIT CANNOT CONVERT THIS CASE INTO AN ACTION TO REFORM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. The government approach has been that notwithstanding the documents that were executed, they are meaningless, ineffective, worthless, void, and the government, with or without documents, will determine what the parties meant and simultaneously determine the legal effect of this implied a Not argued in this Court was the evidentiary side of the issues from the standpoint of both federal and state law. In order to achieve the result had by the Tenth Circuit it is necessary to set aside or else hold void or otherwise rewrite the following written instruments be- tween the parties: (1) Warranty Deeds: (a) Draper to Taylor. (Ex. 27). (b) Draper to Henderson. (Ex. 29). (c) Draper to Adams. (Ex. 31). (d) Draper to Henry E. 7 st Jr. (Ex. 3 (e) Draper to Terry. (Ex. 35). (f) Draper to Fred Baldridge. (Ex. 37). (2) Mortgages: (a) Taylor to Draper. (Ex. 40). (b) Henderson to Draper. (Ex. 41). (c) Adams to Draper. (Ex. 42). (d) Henry E. Baldridge, Jr. to Draper. (Ex. 43). (e) Terry to Draper. (Ex. 44). (f) Fred Baldridge to Draper. (Ex. 45). (3) Promissory Notes: (a) Taylor to Draper. (Ex. 13). (b) Henderson to Draper. (Ex. 14). (c) Adams to Draper. (Ex. 15). (d) Henry E. Baldridge, Jr. to Draper. (Ex. 16). (e) Terry to Draper. (Ex. 17). (f) Fred Baldridge to Draper. (Ex. 18). (g) Draper to Fred Baldridge. (Ex. 20). (4) Contracts With Escrowed Deeds: (a) Taylor and Fred Baldridge. (Ex. 21). (b) Henderson and Fred Baldridge. (Ex. 22). (c) Adams and Fred Baldridge. (Ex. 23). (d) Henry E. Baldridge, Jr. and Fred Baldridge. (Ex. 24). (e) Terry and Fred Baldridge. (Ex. 25). (f) Draper and Fred Baldriage. (Ex. 26). (5) Conservation Reserve Contracts otee Department of Agriculture and: (a) Taylor. (Ex. 142). (b) Henderson. (Ex. 3). (c) Adams. (Ex. 5). —_— 10 (d) Henry E. Baldridge, Jr. (Ex. 6 & 7). (e) Terry. (Ex. 8). es Fred Baldridge. (Ex. 9). g) Draper. (Ex. 10 & 11). This requires reformation of 26 instru- ments, i.e., 5 warranty deeds, 5 mortgages, 5 notes, 6 contracts, between the parties, and 5 Conservation Reserve Program contracts by substituting the name of Fred Baldridge wherever the names of Taylor, Henderson, Adams, Henry E. Baldridge, Jr., and Terry appear. The magnitude of the lower courts' broad brush cover-up of 26 instruments, all of which were stipulated into evidence, is unbelievable. The Tenth Circuit in most ungentle- manly words, and petitioners think in gross violation of the language and the ~ oe of the Code of Judicial Conduct, stated: "We are of the opinion that the trial court was eminently correct in ignoring the forms which were erected and recog- nizing the true facts. Counsel for Baldridge argues that this was all legal and therefore non-fraudulent. We disagree. The arrangement has the evidences of a devious sham which was designed to deceive. Its elaborate legal structure, while giving it the look of legality, does not bear scrutiny." (Emphasis writer's). Petition For aa of Certiorari, Attachment 2, |. p.1l. . 11 The implications of this quotation are startling and fearsome. It projects a Pepper tyranny which is not only ncomprehensible but intolerable in American jurisprudence. No court, federal or state, should be permitted to let such outrageous theories stand as law in this nation. Authority from this Court is not lacking on the meaning and effect to be given written instru- ments. In Howland v. Blake, 97 U.S. 624, 94-97 S.Ct. 1027, 24 L.Ed. 1027 (1878), in , suit to reform a deed, this Court said: "where a written instrument is sought to be reformed... ." "the burden rests upon the moving party of overcoming the stron Presumption arising from the terms of a written instrument. If the proofs are doubtful and unsatis- factory, if there is a failure to overeome this presumption by testimony entirely plain and con- vincing Léon reasonable controversy, the writing will be held to express correctly the intention of the parties. A judgment of the court, a delib- erate deed or writing, are of too much solemnity to be brushed away by loose and inconclusive evidence." (Emphasis writer's). Singularly, there is no testimony or evidence at all that the written instru- ments were intended by the parties to mean anything other than what they said. 12 On the contrary, the parties meticulously followed the text of the instruments. The language of Howland v. Blake, supra, was adopted in toto in Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Nelson, 4 Ff » L02-105 5.Ct. 437, 26 L.Ed. 436 (1880), which stated: "Where a deed or mortgage, regular in appearance, and bearing the genuine signature and duly certified acknowledg- ment of the grantor or mortgagor is attached, the evidence to impeach it should be clear and convincing."' (Emphasis writer's). Not only did the Tenth Circuit deliber- ately ignore the deeds, mortgages, notes, contracts, and releases, all contrary to established precedent, but by doing so it elevates a lawful and simple transaction into fraud. This is to say that the lower court presumed fraud. This cannot be done. Kempner v. Churchill, 75 U.S. 362, 8 Wall. 362, 74-77 S.Ct. 461, 19 L.Ed. 461 (1869). In Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Insurance Company, 45 U.S. 185, 4 185, 42-45 S.Ct. 931, > Ow. 11 L.Ed. 931 (1846), where an insured alleged fraud in his insurer not endorsing on his set get the fact of procurement of other insurance, this Court said as to proof required of fraud: 13 “and so grave a charge as fraud, by very satisfactory auxiliaries . - . that is by evidence which is 'irrefragable,' and not open ‘to opposing presumption. '" The evidence to prove fraud is consid- erably more than that required by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Proof of fraud must be made by "clear evidence". Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 49 S.Ct. 173, 73 L.Ed. 419 (1929). It is noted that the trial court, without reason, refused to give credence to Fred Baldridge's unimpeached and un- contradicted testimony that he offered all of the documentation to Mr. Joe Peterson, the Lea County, New Mexico, A.S.& C.S. Manager, who refused to look at them. This was improper under both state and federal law. Rowdon v. Stanley, 455 F.2d 482 (Cir. 10, 1972); agon v. Boyd, 80 N.M. 14, 450 P.2d 614 (1969): Petitioners have looked long and hard to try to find some precedent that sup- ports the lower courts' determination that the deeds, mortgages, notes, contracts, and releases are a "sham". The only case surfacing in this regard is one where a group of decedent's children brought suit to set aside a parent's deed to another child where in Gregory v. Lloyd, 284 F.Supp. 264 (D.C. Fla., ND. “1568S, that court said: "The deed in this case was challenged also on the ground 14 that it was a sham deed. It is clear that the deed was, in fact delivered, so that it could not under any circun- Stances, be a sham deed. For the deed to be a sham there would have to be evidence that the parties did not intend for it to be effective as a duly delivered deed conveying title, and no testimony or evidence indicates that such was the case."" (Emphasis writer's). It is not arguable but that the parties performed fully in all respects accord- ing to the requirements of their deeds, mortgages, notes, and contracts. It is equally obvious that each intended these instruments to be effective according to their texts. Where, then, is there any basis for the Tenth Circuit to messiah- like abrogate the parties' plain agreements under which each had fully performed? More especially where is there any basis for the Tenth Circuit to attach the stigma of fraud and deceit as if the documents had never existed? There . B.ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969), in the light of H.R. Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on nic riations, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1 59), and 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1960), that the Tenth Circuit be directed to determine all issues of real property law in accordance with that had in New Mexico, and that the issues of fraud, if such remain after decision on the afore- going, be determined in accordance with existing law of the Tenth Circuit as shown in Pacific Royalty Co. v. Williams, 227 F.2d 49 (Cir. " 56), ¢.d., JL 26 U.S. 951, 76 S.Ct. 847, 100 L.Ed. 1474, which was adopted in New Mexico in Sauter . y. St. Michael's College, 70 N.M. 380 374° P.2 a ° ; By this Court assuming a limited jurisdiction, not involving a measurable expenditure of time, there should be a good chance that the Tenth Circuit would get back on the track without its usual stubbornness and decide this case based upon proper legal direction without emotional involvement. The huge amount of money, in excess of $300,000, is significant and not a usual thing even in this Court. But the stigma attaching to Fred Baldridge and his family of an adjudication of fraud is simply unbear- able. There is no better hardworking farmer and stockman in this county than he. Counsel for petitioners believe that the opinion of the Tenth Circuit reflects adversely on their ethics and without any justification whatsoever. Adding it all up, the decisions of the lower courts are unconscionable from any direction. Peti- tion for certiorari or remand for reconsideration is merited. Respectfully submitted, LYNELL G. SKARDA, ESQ. Counsel for Petitioners P. O. Box 400 Clovis, New Mexico, 88101 GARRETT, HARTLEY, & TATUM Of Counsel P. O. Box 520 ico, 88101 27 CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL I, Lynell G. Skarda, counsel for the above-named petitioners, do hereby certify that the foregoing Petition For Rehearing on Petition For Writ of Certiorari is presented in good faith and not for delay, and that it is re- stricted to the grounds specified in Rule 58, subd the Rules of this Court. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Lynell G. Skarda, one of the attorneys for the Petitioners herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that, on the 2b day of June, 1974, I served copies 0 e Petition For Rehearing on Petition For Writ of Certiorari on the several parties thereto, as follows: 1. On The Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 20530, by mailing three (3) copies in a duly addressed envelope, with airmail postage prepaid. 2. On Robert E. Kopp and Michael H. Stein, Appellate Section, Civil Division, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 20530, by mailing three (3) copies in a duly addressed envelope, with il -¥ e prepaid. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0912%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.