# Opposition Brief — Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 414 U.S. 975

## Text

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CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.

THE OLD HOMESTEAD BREAD COMPANY and
INTERSTATE BRANDS CORPORATION,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
OLD HOMESTEAD BREAD COMPANY
IN OPPOSITION

FREDERIC L. KIRGIS
JOHN S. PFEIFFER

1900 Security Life Building
Denver, Colorado 80202
(303) 893-1000

Of Counsel:

ROBERT E. WARREN, JR.
ROBERT J. KAPELKE

GORSUCH, KIRGIS, CAMPBELL,
WALKER AND GROVER

1900 Security Life Building

Denver, Colorado 80202

(303) 893-1000

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT OF THE CASE I

REASONS FOR DENYING WRIT 5

I 6

II 16

III 19

CONCLUSION 20

APPENDIX la

Article III of By-Laws — Five States

Supply Company — Exhibit 52 la j
Letter Agreement — Continental Baking
Company and Five States Supply Co. E
Exhibit 124A-D 3a i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES:
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir.
1961) 9 :

Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F.Supp.
796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd. 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.
1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 991 (1956). rehearing
denied 351 U.S. 928 (1956) 11 ¥

Beatrice Foods Co., (1967-1970 Transfer Binder) Trade
Reg. Rep. para. 19,045 (FTC 1969), aff'd. sub
nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.

OMAR SEE BIRD

1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) 10 :
Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 177 (5th
Cir. 1967) 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 :

SRT MOIR SUNY Lt RR

TABLE OF CONTENTS — CONTINUED

Page
Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825
(9th Cir. 1971). 9
FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 646 (1966) 14
Hampton v. Graff Vending Company, 478 F.2d 527,
534 (5th Cir. 1973) 19
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277, 285
(7th Cir. 1966) - 10
Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115,
118 (1954) 16
Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
224 F.Supp (D.N.J. 1963) 11
; Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555 (1931) oe 6
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,
; 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967) 9
} U.S. v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, (1972) 14, 15
MISCELLANEOUS:
Supreme Court Rule 24(1) . 19
16C von Kalinowski, Business a §29.03
[3]; $29.03 [4] 11, 18

Iu the

Supreme Cowt of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1973

No. 73-227
CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY,
Petitioner,

v.

THE OLD HOMESTEAD BREAD COMPANY and
INTERSTATE BRANDS CORPORATION,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
OLD HOMESTEAD BREAD COMPANY
IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Old Homestead Bread Company (“Old Homestead” ;
sought and acquired judgment against Continental Baking
Company (“Continental”) based upon separate jury verdicts,
finding that Continental had violated four different provisions
of the federal antitrust laws: conspiracy in restraint of trade
(JA. 2726) ; attempting to monopolize (JA. 2727) ; conspir-
acy to monopolize (JA. 2728); and unlawful price discrimi-
nation (JA. 2729). All four verdicts were submitted to the
Court of Appeals for its consideration and although that court

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2

discussed only the unlawful price discrimination aspects of the
case it clearly affirmed all four verdicts by its concluding
remark:

“There was indeed sufficient evidence before the jury
upon which to base the verdicts, and we find no error
in the various rulings by the trial court. The case is thus
AFFIRMED.” (Emphasis supplied) App. to Petition
27a.

Continental has sought review of the verdict based upon
the violation of Section 2(a) of The Robinson-Patman Act
amendments to the Clayton Act only and apparently does not
seek review of the judgment based on the other three verdicts.

The parties to this action were the competing wholesale
bakers serving the Colorado and Southeastern Wyoming mar-
ket. Old Homestead, the only locally-owned bakery in the
market, baked “Town Talk” bread; Continental, the world’s
largest baking company (X. 542), baked “Wonder” bread; In-
terstate Brands baked “Butternut” bread; and, the Rainbo
companies baked “Rainbo” bread. The large retail chain
stores, Safeway, King Soopers and Millers (National Tea).
baked and sold their own bread and thus were not in the
wholesale bakery business. JA. 478-79, 548, App. to Petition
8a. The majority of the independent grocers in the market
were members of a cooperative called A.G. (Associated Gro-
cers) and purchased their bread requirements from the whole-
sale bakers. JA. 479. The lead or volume product of all the
wholesale bakers was the one pound loaf of white pan bread.
JA. 476, 1041-42.

In 1962 Continental built and opened the largest bakery
in the Rocky Mountain area (X. 502, JA. 739), which was
more than twice the size of its previous two bakeries com-
bined (JA. 1532, 1538), in spite of its knowledge that this
new plant would be running at no more than 50% of its capa-
city based on production figures available at the time (JA.

3
1538). Continental had to run its new plant substantially in
excess of 50% of its capacity to make a profit. JA. 1695-96.

Prior to August of 1964 the wholesale bakers all mer-
chandised their products through route salesmen, who com-
peted for preferred position and adequate space on the bread
rack in each store served. JA. 474-76. Adequate preferred
space was a Critical prerequisite to the successful merchan-
dising of bread and was obtained by securing the good will
of each store manager through prompt and courteous service.
JA. 475-76, 793, 1253.

Although A.G. had previously asked, the wholesale bakers
had refused to provide a private label bread program (JA.
524), because of the bitter wholesale price war that would
result from any attempt by one baker to tie up the majority
of bread purchasers in the market (JA. 560-61, 719, 726-27).

Continental needed volume of sales (JA. 776, 1695-96).
and A.G. wanted a private label bread program which would
provide its members with greater profits (JA. 686). In the sum-
mer of 1964 Continental began increasing its volume of sales
and A.G. acquired its private label bread program through
what became known as the “Tender Crust Program.”

An affiliated corporation of A.G. was formed called Five
States Supply Co. (“Five States”). X. 764-67, JA. 579. Upon
payment of a $100 fee (X. 822, JA. 626) and the execu-
tion of a statement binding the applicant to covenants set
forth in the Company by-laws (App. 1a), a member of A.G.
could join Five States (JA. 591). These covenants required
all members to give first position on their bread racks to the
private label baked by Continental (Tender Crust) and sec-
ond position to the Continental's advertised products (Won-
der) (X. 753, JA. 579) and, that they keep the price of Ten-
der Crust “. . . so that it will always be offered [to the public!
at the same price of any other bakery products of the same
quality, weight or size” (X. 753, JA. 579).

4

Five States and Continental entered into a written agree-
ment (App. 3a), which provided that the wholesale price of
Tender Crust to the retail grocery store member of Five States
would be at least one cent per loaf less than the price charged
for Wonder products (JA. 754-55, 773, 841-42, 846, 866, 881-
82, X. 852, JA. 600). And further, the wholesale price of the
Wonder products would always be maintained at the whole-
sale prices of Continental’s competition (JA. 755, 841-42, 846,
866, 881-82), that is, Rainbo, Old Homestead and Interstate.
As a result, the profit to the grocer was always at least one
cent greater on Tender Crust products than on the products
of any competitor of Continental. JA. 623-24, 686-87, 1266.
Under the Tender Crust program there clearly were no price
benefits available to the public.

The Board meetings of Five States were frequently at-
tended by Continental personnel (X. 673, 676-77, 712-13,
730, JA. 579), and its weekly newsletters were typed and
mailed by Continental to all member grocers after the con-
tents thereof were reviewed and discussed by representatives
of Continental (JA. 614-15, X. 770-821). New Members solici-
tation meetings were held by Five States at the Continental
plant with representatives of Continental urging membership.
JA. 625-27, 674. In 1965, 112 grocers joined the program; by
February of 1967 there were 167 members; and in January
of 1968, the membership had grown to 200 members, out of
a total of 415 eligible A.G. stores. X. 775, JA. 616, X. 833-42,
JA. 588.

Immediately after the Tender Crust program began, Con-
tinental’s competitors reduced prices (JA. 761, 1955), gave
discounts, introduced private and secondary labels and em-
ployed other defensive tactics (JA. 971, 1 167-68, 1191-92). Con-
tinental, in addition to granting discounts, would always match
the price of its competition with its Wonder products, then
sell its Tender Crust products to the grocer at least one cent be-

5

low the price of its Wonder products. JA. 971, 981. The whole-
sale prices of bread plummeted as did the volume sold by Old
Homestead. JA. 796, 934. The wholesale price of the one

und loaf went from 20.5 cents in July of 1964 to 13.2 cents
in the fall of 1967. JA. 915-16, X. 843, JA. 742.

Between July of 1964 and January of 1968, Continental's
volume of sales went from 27.7 million pounds to 40.8 million
pounds, and its receipts from $5.1 million to $7.3 million.
X. 827. Between 1963 and 1966 Continental lost money at its
Denver plant. X. 823, JA. 2099. In 1967 it made a modest
profit of $14,000. Nationally, Continental profits were in the
millions of dollars for all years. X. 823. In contrast, and as
noted by the Court of Appeals (App. to Petition 12a) Old
Homestead’s volume of sales went from 22.8 million pounds
in 1963 to 5 million pounds in 1967 and its dollar sales from
$4.1 million in 1963 to $900,000 in 1967. X. 432, JA. 518.

Predictably (JA. 1034, 1265-67), Continental's only local
competitor (JA. 474), Old Homestead, after successfully
serving the market since 1892 (JA. 801) closed its doors and
left the industry on December 31, 1967 (JA. 515). Two days
later Continental removed all discounts and raised its prices
on all products. JA. 919-20.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The holding below does not pose any substantial issues of
federal law or public policy. Nor does it, as Continental con-
tends, represent an attack on the institution of private label
merchandising. Only Continental's peculiar methods of mis-
using the private label system for predatory purposes were at
‘esue in this case. Continental's private label program not only
failed to afford any benefit whatsoever to the consumer but
it actually prevented price competition at the retail level, by
requiring retail grocers to sell all of their bread loaves at the
same price, regardless of differences in cost or label. More-
over, there are no conflicts between the decision in this case
and the decisions of any other United States court of appeals,

6

as an analysis of the decisions and the evidence of record will
demonstrate.*

Further, since Continental attacks but one of the four
antitrust verdicts against it, no useful purpose would be served
by consideration of the single verdict now being assailed.

I.

THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AMPLY DEM-
ONSTRATES THE CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN
CONTINENTAL'S UNLAWFUL PRICE DISCRIMINA-
TION AND OLD HOMESTEAD’S INJURY, AND
THERE EXISTS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
HOLDING OF THE COURT BELOW AND THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT'S HOLDING IN THE BORDEN CASE.

Continental has made an imaginative attempt to create
a phantom conflict between two circuits in this case. The
alleged conflict is said to exist between the holding of the
Fifth Circuit in Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (Sth Cir.
1967), and the ruling of the Tenth Circuit in the present case
on the question of causal connection between the price dis-
crimination and the injury to plaintiffs. In Borden the Fifth
Circuit commented by way of dictum that among several
other deficiencies in the case against Borden the evidence had
shown that “Borden did not subsidize below-cost or unrealis-
tically low prices on its private label milk with profits received
from sales of the Borden brand.” 381 F.2d at 177.

*Continental’s statement that Plaintiff's damage theory “was sup-
ported solely by assumptions of Plaintiff's counsel which were totally
without support in the record” is palpably erroneous. Plaintiff's dam-
age theory is supported in law by this Court's decision in Story Parcn-
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931), and
in fact by the following references: JA. 506-509, 742-44, X. 428-36
JA. 1224, 1452, 1457, X. 843-47, JA. 742.

7

In the present case the Tenth Circuit did not discuss the
question of subsidization, for it found that “the record shows
that both plaintiffs suffered some injury during the complaint
period” and that “taking the record as a whole, the jury could
easily infer that Continental’s price discrimination incorpor-
ated in the Tender Crust program was the proximate cause”
of the plaintiffs’ injuries. App. to Petition, 10a. It may thus be
seen that the “conflict” which Continental so dramatically
emphasizes lies between a comment on the evidence or a dic-
tum by the Fifth Circuit and the fact that the Tenth Circuit
did not even feel the need to discuss whether there was or
was not a “subsidization.”

Continental's primary argument is that there was no rela-
tionship or “causal nexus” between the damages suffered by
Old Homestead and the differences in prices charged by Con-
tinental for its private and advertised label breads respectively.
Petition, 2, 5, 6, 9-12, 14.

This is. indeed, an ostrich-like position for Continental to
take, for it is precisely this price differential that prevented
any wholesale baker in the market, including Old Homestead,
from competing with Continental. JA. 1285-87. The very key-
stone of the “Tender Crust” program was Continental's abso-
lute guarantee that its private label products would always
be priced at least one cent per unit less than its advertised
label products (JA. 623, 755-56, X. 723, JA. 579). no matter
what the cost (JA. 841-42).

This price differential must be considered in context. how-
ever. The by-laws of Five States contained the price sta-
blization provision (App. 1a) that the retail price of Tender
Crust would be the same as the retail prices of all advertised
products. Continental, of course, was well aware of this by-
law provision; its representatives had even discussed it with
the Board of Five States on several occasions. JA. 620-21.
Being familiar with the by-laws of Five States, it took

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little imagination on Continental’s part to insert the following
provision in the “Tender Crust” private label agreement:

“13. In the event prices on any of our regular adver-
tised products shall, in response to, a general price
decrease in any market fall below the prices in effect
as of June 1, 1964, then any private label price set
forth in paragraph 7, 8, and 9 shall be reduced in that
market to a price at least 1 cent below the price on our
comparable advertised items.” (Emphasis added.) X.
852, JA. 600. App. 6a.

It was also understood that Continental would always keep
the per unit wholesale price of its advertised label products
equal to the price of its competitors’ products (JA. 755, 841-
42, 846, 866, 881-82) and, in accordance with the by-laws of
Five States, each member was required to charge the same
retail price for all products of the same size and quality re-
gardless of label or baker (X. 753, JA. 579, X. 822, JA. 626).
In this context, only one result could obtain: the grocer would
always make at least one cent more profit on the sale of Ten-
der Crust bread than any other label bread on the market.
JA. 648, 708, 756, 846, 1266, 1287. This one cent or more
guaranteed price differential arises out of the difference in
price between Continental’s advertised label products and its
Tender Crust products. App. 6a. As the program was ad-
ministered, if any other baker in the market attempted to
meet the wholesale price of “Tender Crust” by lowering the
price of its own bread, Continental would, under the Tender
Crust program, lower the price of its advertised label bread
to “meet competition” and lower its “Tender Crust” prices at
least one cent under the advertised label price, thus beating
competition in every case. JA. 648, 672, 773, 841-42, 846, 850-
52, 866, 881-82, 981. On one occasion, the price of bread
dropped one cent per day for a weck: Rainbo dropped the
price of its secondary label bread to meet the price of Tender
Crust, then Continental dropped the price of its advertised
label Wonder bread to meet Rainbo’s secondary label price

9

and the price of Tender Crust was automatically dropped one
cent below. JA. 881, 981.

It was this one cent or more price differential, provided
for in the “Tender Crust” private label agreement, therefore,
that made it impossible for Old Homestead or any other
wholesale baker in the market to compete with Continental.
JA. 648, 672, 1266, 1287. It requires no surfeit of imagination
to conclude, as did both the jury and the court below, that
there was clearly a proximate causal connection between Con-
tinental’s price discrimination and Old Homestead’s injury.
App. to Petition 10a.

In addition to these facts in the record leading to the
inevitable conclusion that Continental’s price differential
caused Old Homestead’s injury, it is significant to note that
there was ample evidence of predatory behavior on the part
of Continental, including sales below cost. JA. 1649, X. 113-
115. The Court of Appeals acknowledged the evidence in the
record from which a strong inference of predatory intent on
the part of Continental could be drawn. App. to Petition,
9a-10a.

By significant contrast, in Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d
175, 177 (5th Cir. 1967), the court concluded quite explicitly
that “Borden is not in any sense guilty of predatory behav-
ior... .” The importance of this factual distinction is aptly
capsulized in the following statement of this Court in Utah
Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967) :

i Sas a a Sa

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“Courts and commentators alike have noted that the
existence of predatory intent might bear on the likeli-
hood of injury to competition.” , j

See also, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 4
1961) ; Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825
(9th Cir. 1971).

Bi a i lal hd

NYY

10

The ciffere’ results in the present case and Borden are
easily recets....d by recognition of the principle enunciated by
the Federal Trade Commission in Beatrice Foods Co., (1967-
1970 Transfer Binder) Trade Reg. Rep. para. 19,045 (FTC
1969), aff’d. sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372
(6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971):

“a finding of primary line injury might be based
either on proof of predatory intent or on a market anal-
ysis, sufficient under the circumstances of the case to
raise a reasonable probability of injury to competition.
National Dairy Products Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605,
612-13 (7th Cir. 1969).”

Both the present case and the Borden case reflect an applica-
tion of this principle to the facts of each case. In Borden (as in
Beatrice) there was no evidence of predatory intent while in
the present case the record was replete with such evidence.
The decisions are comfortably compatible rather than in a
“square conflict” as Continental would have this Court be-
lieve.

The Fifth Circuit’s single comment upon the evidence in
Borden to the effect that Borden did not subsidize below cost
or low price sales on its private label milk with profits from
its sales of advertised label milk can hardly be read as a hold-
ing that proof of subsidization is a sine qua non of liability
under the Robinsun-Patman Act. Indeed that suggestion was
categorically rejected by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277, 285 (7th
Cir. 1966) :

“Petitioners urge that there can be no violation of Sec-
tion 2(a) in area price discrimination cases unless the
Commission finds that the higher prices elsewhere sup-
port the lower prices in the market under examination.
We have been cited to no authoritative decision to sup-
port this view. No such requirement was enunciated

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11

in Moore v. Meaa’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 75
S.Ct. 148, 99 L.Ed. 145, or E. B. Muller & Co. v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
Congress and the cases assume that the ‘higher price to
purchasers supports the lower price to others’. . .”

The critical distinction between the cases such as the pres-
ent one and Fry Roofing on the one hand, and Borden and the
other decisions relied upon by Continental on the other hand
is that in the former there was evidence of predatory intent
or behavior while in the latter there was a total absence of
such proof. The omission of evidence of predatory intent was
recognized by the respective courts in Borden Co. v. FTC,
supra; Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
294 F.Supp. (D.N.J. 1963) ; and Balian Ice Cream Co. v.
Arden Farms Co., 104 F.Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd.
931 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 991
(1956), rehearing denied 351 U.S. 928 (1956). This factual
distinction and its importance have been emphasized by com-
mentators. See, for example, 16C von Kalinowski, Business
Organizations, $29.03[4', p. 99-99-29-93, fn. 99 where it is
concluded, following a discussion of the decisions, that proof
of predatory intent “clearly establishes the requisite nexus be-
tween the price discrimination and the competitive injury.”

Since Continental's position is primarily based upon its
expansive reading of the dictum in the Fifth Circuit Borden
decision, a close scrutiny of the evidence in that case is both
necessary and instructive. Incredibly enough, Continental ven-
tures the bold and conclusory proposition that “the facts of
this case are indistinguishable” fromm those in Borden. Peti-
tion, 11. The deceiving inaccuracy of this statement is high-
lighted by the following comparative analysis:

(1) Borden did not charge “below-cost or unreal-
istically low prices on its private label milk . . 381
F.2d at 177. Continental sold at prices below cost for
extended periods. JA. 1649, X. 113-15.

12

(2) Borden was “not in any sense guilty of preda-
tory behavior similar to that which may accompany
territorial price wars.” 381 F.2d at 177. The Court of
Appeals in the instant case expressly acknowledged the
existence of evidence of predatory behavior in the rec-
ord, including sales below cost (JA. 1649, X. 113-15,
JA. 1632), discriminatory price cuts “represented by
discounts to Tender Crust customers only,” (JA. 590-
91, 928-29), as well as the evidence that Continental
set for itself and accomplished the seemingly impossi-
ble goal of increasing production by 50% in four years
in order to operate its oversized Denver plant at a
profit (JA. 823, 930, 2078, 2080, X. 823, JA. 2099).
The Court of Appeals found this achievement indica-
tive of more than “fierce competitive instincts.” App.
to Petition, 10a. Another significant fact evidencing
predatory intent was Continental's price raise and abo-
lition of discounts merely two days after Old Home-
stead had ceased to do business. JA. 919-20. The Court
of Appeals noted the existence of other evidence as well
which would create a “strong inference” of predatory
intent by Continental. App. to Petition, 10a.

(3) The Borden case did not “involve any device
similar to the conventional volume discount.” 381 F.2d
at 177. Continental employed such a device in the form
of its so-called weekly specials which clearly constituted
a thinly-disguised discriminatory allowance in favor of
the A.G. stores. JA. 694-95.

(4) In Borden, “all of Borden’s customers, large
and small alike, paid the same prices for the Borden
brand milk or for the private label milk.” 381 F.2d at
177. In the present case the Tender Crust private label
bread and its special pricing schedule were made avail-
able by Continental only to A.G. stores who were mem-
bers of Five States and who were thus willing
to accept the strictures imposed by Continental (JA.

ary

13

591, 765, X. 822, JA. 626), including the requirement
that Tender Crust be given the preferred rack position
and Wonder the second best position (X. 850, JA. 579).
Moreover, Continental’s other private label breads
were not made available at the same price and on the
same basis as Tender Crust. JA. 912. Finally, a vast
number of customers purchased Wonder bread at the
regular list price rather than the lower price offered

to the purchasers under the Tender Crust program. JA.
2074-75.

(5) The evidence in Borden demonstrated that
“Borden's practices did not lead to a substantial in-
crease in Borden’s market position at the expense of
[its] competitors.” 381 F.2d at 179. The practices of
Continental permitted it to increase its tonnage of sales
from the Denver plant by a phenomenal 50% and its
increase in market share by 15% resulting in a 51.5%
of the market as noted in the opinion of the Court of
Appeals. App. to Petition, 8a, JA. 853. This increase
was manifestly at the “expense of its competitors” as
dramatically illustrated by the fact that Old Home-
stead, the only true independent in the market, was
driven out of business altogether. JA. 907-08.

The record in the instant case so overwhelmingly dispels
any suggestion that the Borden case is factually “indistinguish-
able” that one may safely conclude that the only notable simi-
larity between the cases is the fact that they both involved
private label products.

Continental consistently attempts to characterize the
Court of Appeal’s ruling as an all-out frontal assault on the
whole concept of private labeling. For example, Continental
inaccurately frames the issue in the case as “the degree to
which . . . [the Robinson-Patman] Act may be construed to
prevent sellers from passing along to their customers the cost
savings inherent in private label merchandising.” Petition, 8, 9.

14

Old Homestead has no quarrel with the basic institution
of private label merchandising—but only with the predatory
and piratical abuse of the institution of which Continental has
been guilty. This Court has not been deceived by the bold sug-
gestion that private label programs are entilted to an auto-
matic immunity status under the federal antitrust laws.

For example, in FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 646
(1966) this Court concluded:

“The arguments for exempting private brand selling
from §2(a) [of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act} are, therefore, more appropri-
ately addressed to the Congress than to this Court.”

Similarly, in the very recent holding in United States v.
Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, (1972) this Court flatly re-
jected the notion that private label programs, no matter how
conducted, are endowed with an aura of per se legality under
the antitrust statutes.

By quoting out of context, Continental has tried to char-
acterize the holding of this Court in FTC v. Borden Co., 383
U.S. 637 (1966) as being favorable to the concept of private
label programs. The following statement is from page 14 of
Continental’s Petition:

“fT his Court itself has characterized the provisions of
the Robinson-Patman Act that are applicable to the
sale of private label products as being ‘flexible . . . pro-
visions’ that may take account of the difference be-
tween “branded and unbranded commodities,’ ” quoting
from 383 U.S. at 646.

Compare the generality and coloration of Continental's
statement with the actual language of this Court in Borden:

“Tangible consumer preferences as between branded
and unbranded commodities should receive due legal

15

recognition in the more flexible ‘injury’ and ‘cost justi-
fication’ provisions of the statute.’” 383 U.S. at 646,
quoting from Report of the Attorney General’s Na-
tional Committee to study the Antitrust Laws 159
(1955).

This Court was simply saying that if any; special consid-
eration were to be afforded private label pricing, such con-
sideration would have to be pleaded under one of the Act’s
defense provisions. The private label concept would not pre-
vent a finding of a prima facie violation. As this Court’s
quotation makes clear, special recognition would only be given
private label pricing where the price differential reflected
“tangible consumer preferences.” Continental’s pricing scheme
in the present case has nothing to do with consumer prefer-
ences and indeed even stifles this notion; for although Con-
tinental sold its Tender Crust bread to the Five States stores
at a price guaranteed to be one cent lower than the price
of Wonder bread, the by-laws of Five States required that the
two brands of bread be resold at retail to the housewife at
identical prices. X. 753, JA. 579. Indeed this provision was at
the very core of Continental’s scheme. Consumer preference
is thus completely absent from this case, which involves dis-
crimination and injury at the primary level rather than a dif-
fering price structure between private labeled advertised prod-
ucts at the secondary or retail level.

It is absurd to suggest, as does Continental, that the de-
cision in the present case dealt a death blow to private label
marketing. Indeed it is the contrary result which would have
been shocking and economically destructive, for it would mean
that a national giant such as Continental could stage predatory
and even fatal wars on its local competitors, provided it fought
behind the banner of the private label. Moreover, Continental
is hardly in a position to analogize itself to or champion the
cause of “smaller grocery stores” (Petition, 9), or “small in-
dependent retailers” (Petition, 14). The Court of Appeals’ de-
cision, like the ruling of this Court in Topco, merely vindicates

ROO ERS “8

16

the overriding policy of the Sherman and Clayton Acts— anti-
competitive and predatory conduct, under whatever guise, will
not be condoned.

Although the evidence abundantly established the causal
nexus between Continental's price discrimination scheme and
Old Homestead’s injury, and although the existing state of
law does not require any additional showing of “subsidization”,
the record does demonstrate that Continental had a sufficient
national “treasury” to enable it to finance its warfare and
absorb losses in the Denver market. cf.. Moore vo. Mead'’s Fine
Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954). While Continental's
Denver bakery lost cighty thousand dollars in 1964, one hun-
dred seventy-nine thousand dollars in 1965 and two hundred
fifty thousand dollars in 1966 during the Tender Crust Pro-
gram, its national bakery operations showed an average yearly
profit of approximately fifteen million four hundred thousand
dollars during these three years. XN. 823, JA. 2099,

NELTHER THE EVIDENCE NOR THE APPLICA.
BLE LAW SUPPORTS CONTINENTAL'S CONTEN-
TION THAT TT MAY AVOTD LIABILITY ON THE
GROUND THAT THE PRIVATE LABEL PRICING WAS
“AVAILABLE” TO ALL OF TTS CUSTOMERS.

Continental contends that it cannot be held liable be-
cause both its advertised label and private label breads were
made “available” to all of its customers.

This “availability” argument is deficient in two respects:
the law and the facts. From a factual standpoint the record
is simply barren of any evidentiary showing of “the full avail-
ability of both the lower priced private label and the higher
priced advertised bread to all purchasers.” Petition, 17. On
the contrary, the evidence demonstrated that Continental of-
fered its Tender Crust private label program only to A.G.
stores. This fact was openly admitted. JA. 693, 765, 928.

own

oe pee — 2 SRK

17

Beyond this, “Continental served approximately 253
charge account customers from its Denver bakery who pur-
chased Wonder label bread . . . at the regular list price” (i.c.,
rather than at the special prices prevailing to those in the
Tender Crust program). JA. 2075.

Moreover, the conditions and strictures which Continental
attached to its proposal to sell the private label bread to even
the A.G. stores dispel any notion that both breads were “avail-
able.” within any commonly accepted and reasonable meaning
of the word. ‘The opinion of the Court of Appeals expressly
acknowledged the “unavailability” of the private label pro-
gram in view of the fact that the A.G. customer, in order to
he eligible for the program, had to become a Five States
member and aceept the following conditions and require-
ments imposed by Continental :

“These requirements included a membership fee of
$100.00, an agreement to give Tender Crust bread the
best shelf space, with the second best to Continental's
advertised label and to participate in the promotion of
weekend specials. We find mo basis to apply the availa-
bility doctrine.” App. to Petition, 16a.

At this juncture Continental apparently does not argue
with the fact that it did not offer its Tender Crust label pro-
gram to all of its purchasers. However, it now argues that it
offered bread “under a variety @f private labels to all buyers
in the market at the established private label price.” Petition,
p. 18.

The patent fallacy of this argument is that Tender Crust
bread was not sold at the so-callled “established private label
price.” i.c., the price shown in X.. 915 upon which Continental
relies in staging this argument. Instead. the Tender Crust
bread was sold at various discownt rates rather than at the
list price. JA. 587, 845. Thus, umder the Tender Crust agree-
ment (X. 885, JA. 600) there was a 2% central billing dis-

an einyinbwesonnan dt

count in effect (X. 886, JA. 600), along with a monthly
volume discount of from 7% to 11% (X. 886, JA. G00), both
of which discounts were applied to the Tender Crust list price.
The net result was that while Wonder bread was being sold
at sixteen cents per unit and Continental's other private label
products were being sold at fifteen cents per unit, the Tender
Crust bread was, as a result of the discounts, being sold at ap-
proximately 13.5 cents per unit.

Thus, even assuming arguendo that some private label
bread was available to all of Continental's customers, the ‘Ten-
der Crust discount pricing was clearly not available to all of
the purchasers, and this argument is again totally precluded
by the facts of record.

Although the evidence at trial provided no underpinning
for consideration of Continental's “availability” defense, and
although (as the discussion below will demonstrate) the appli-
cable law does not permit use of such a defense in a case such
as the present one, the trial court, in an apparent abundance
of caution, actually instructed the jury that there would be
no violation if the ‘Tender Crust private label bread was “of-
fered indiscriminately to everybody...” JA. 2659. ‘The jury,
like the Court of Appeals, obviously found Continental's avail-
ability claim to be factually unsupportable.

From a legal standpoint it is imperative to stress that the
so-called “availability” doctrine is not applicable in a case in-
volving injury at the seller level; ic., the primary line of com-
petition. See 16C von Kalinowski, Business Organizations
$29.03 [3) at p. 29-87:

“To date... .. the ‘availability’ doctrine has not been
successfully invoked in any primary line proceeding.
Perhaps the principal reason is that while the availabil-
ity of the lower price might negate competitive injury
to buyers to whom the lower prices are readily avail-
able. it is, according to one view, ‘more difficult logic-

NR cate IE ee ee ey er?

19

ally to conclude that competing scllers have not been
injured merely because buyers had available to them
the lower prices of the challenged seller.’ (Quoting
Attorney Gen. Rep. 127, n. .20 (Supp. 1968) ).

This logical rule was recognized in the quite recent ruling
of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in Hampton v.
Graff Vending Company, 478 F.2d 527, 534 (5th Cir. 1973)
and the court rejected the defendant's availability argument:

“Based on the findings of the district court, Graff has
continued to assert that no discrimination occurred be-
cause the sale price was available to Hampton. This
secondary line argument carries no weight in a primary
line case.” 478 F.2d at 534. fn. 12.

The Court of Appeals in the present case also noted this legal
principle: see App. to Petition, 159.

In summary, the evidence at trial refuted rather than sup-
ported Continental's contention that both its private label and
advertised label breads were available to all purchasers, and,
as the Court of Appeals recognized, there is neither factual nor
legal support for this contention. As far as the present pro-
ceeding is concerned the “availability” defense is simply not
available.

Ill.

THE THREE ADDITIONAL UNREVERSED VER-
DICTS IN FAVOR OF OLD HOMESTEAD BASED ON
VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT PROVIDE A
STRONG ADDED GROUND FOR DENIAL OF RE-
VIEW.

Rule 24(1) of ‘he Supreme Court Rules provides that a
respondent shal! file “an opposing brief disclosing any matter
or ground why the cause should not be reviewed by this
Court.”

An additional reason why this cause should not be re-
viewed is that the judgment under attack is supported by four

separate verdicts and Continental has attacked only one of

such verdicts. If Continental desired a reversal as to Old
Homestead it should have brought all four verdicts to this
Court. As it has failed to do so, its petition for certiorari based
on but one of the verdicts should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein stated the Petition for Certiorari
should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

FREDERIC L. KIRGIS
JOHN S. PFEIFFER

1900 Security Life Building
Denver, Colorado 80202
Of Counsel:

ROBERT E. WARREN, JR.

ROBERT J. KAPELKE

GORSUCH, KIRGIS, CAMPBELL,
WALKER AND GROVER

1900 Security Life Building
Denver, Colorado 80202

Dated: August 30, 1973

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have this date served the attached
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari on Con-
tinental Baking Company and on Interstate Brands Corp. by _
mailing three copies of the same, airmail postage prepaid, to
their respective counsel of record, John H. Schafer, 888 16th
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, E. Edward Bruce,
Covington & Burling, 888 16th Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20006 and Edward L. Foote, Winston, Strawn, Smith &
Patterson, First National Bank Building, Chicago, Illinois ,
60603. All parties required to be served have thus rved.

August 30, 1973

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APPENDIX

(Portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit #52 X752-753)

Article III of the By-Laws
Five States Supply Co.

COVENANTS OF MEMBERS

The members recognize that one of the primary purposes
of this Corporation is to foster, promote and encourage the
business of supplying its members with bread and bakery prod-
ucts for resale to the retail public, and to reform abuses in said
business and to secure for such members freedom from unjust
and unreasonable exactions. The members also recognize and
agree that this Corporation has secured the exclusive use of
the trade and service mark “Tender Crust” for their benefit
and each member agrees, in consideration of the agreement
of the other members, to use his best efforts to establish the
name “Tender Crust” in order that there will be a demand
in the retail trade sufficient to create the sale of “Tender
Crust” bread and other bakery products equal to that of na-
tional and local bakery brands.

In consideration of these premises the members agree
that they will each use their best efforts as members of this
Corporation to promote the aims and purposes thereof and
agree specifically that they are duty bound to and will promote
the “Tender Crust” bakery label at all times and in every pos-
sible manner including the following:

1. To buy and resell “Tender Crust” label bakery
products and assist and give their best effort in pre-
senting, maintaining and enlarging the sale of “Tender
Crust” label bakery products for their own benefit and

2a

for the benefit of all other members hereof who also
handle such label.

2. To always provide fresh bread on the regular
bread rack.

3. To give first position on the regular bread rack
to “Tender Crust” label bakery products.

4. To devote % of space on the regular bread
rack to “Tender Crust” label bread.

5. To give second position on the regular bread
rack to the bakery products carrying the label of the
baker or manufac :cr providing or baking “Tender
Crust” products.

6. To take particular care of the bread rack at all
times in order that the “Tender Crust” section shall
always be neat, clean and orderly.

7. Each member agrees that said “Tender Crust”
label bread shall always be on consignment to the mem-
ber and ownership thereof and title thereto shall re-
main in the Company until disposed of by a member
in the ordinary Course of retail trade.

8. Each member agrees that, in order to maintain
and keep “Tender Crust” bakery products in a com-
petitive price position, he will, upon notice to him from
any other manufacturer of other bread products, of any
change of price, whether decrease or increase, imme-
diately change the retail price of “Tender Crust” so
that it will always be offered at the same price of any
other bakery products of the same quality, weight or
size.

j
{
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| 3a
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 124A-D X 849-852)

Five States Supply, Inc.
Denver, Colorado

Gentlemen:

In view of the recent competitive developments in our
market we wish this letter to serve as our written offer to you
on a private label arrangement. This confirms recent oral of-
fers made by us with reference to our supplying your member
stores with bakery products carrying your own brand name.
These products will be produced by us at our Denver, Colo-
rado Bakery and will be sold to your member stores in accord-

ance with the following terms and conditions:

1,

All bakery products sold to you pursuant to this con-
tract will be of quality comparable to our regular
Wonder and Hostess Products. Formulations will be
made by us in consultation with our Research and
Development Laboratories.

All packaging and labels will be supplied by us sub-
ject to your prior approval.

We will assist your personnel in the proper display
and promotion of all products. When advisable, we
will supply point of purchase material and dislo-
cated displays to accomplish this aim. Sampling and
in-store demonstrations will be used from time to
time at our discretion. Five States Supply agrees to

use their best efforts causing their members to co-

operate with us in these activities. Qualified and
experienced sales personnel will be assigned by us
to assist your member stores in the above program.

You agree to make available to us adequate pre-
ferred space on your member bakery products racks
for the display of our regular Bread, Cake and

OORT nore aI RER SEO NCEE eR ERRNO PIT:

4a

Sweet Goods products so that the full sales potential
of these advertised brands can be realized. You
agree in requesting your members to cooperate with
us in arranging special weekly promotions on said
advertised brand items.

5. Deliveries of all products to your member stores
pursuant to this agreement shall be made by our
regular Wonder and Hostess route salesmen from
their regular delivery trucks. We will give complete
rack service and will be responsible for all stale re-
turns.

6. Introduction into your member stores of products
listed below will be made as soon as practical after
August 10, 1964. At any time during the existence
of this contract, we will discuss with you the addi-
tion of other items to be sold hereunder.

7. You agree to pay us for products produced and de-
livered under this contract at the following prices
on weekly credit terms.

Advertised
Brand Price
as of
Variety Price ‘June 1, 1964
1 Pound Expanded Bread 175 185
114 Pound Round-Top Bread —_.22 .235
114 Pound Sandwich Bread .22 .235*
8 Pack Cluster Buns 21 By
8 Pack Coficy Buns 21 .23

The above prices will apply to both White and Wheat
Bread if there are both varieties in the same weight
category.

*This price was not in effect on June 1, 1964 but will be con-
sidered to have been in effect on that date for the purposes
of this contract.

ee

5a

8. In the event you wish to purchase products with no
stale returns to be absorbed by us, the prices will
be as follows:

Advertised
Brand Price
as of
Variety Price — June 1, 1964
1 Pound Expanded Bread __ .16 185
14% Pound Round-Top Bread — .195 .235
14% Pound Sandwich Bread 195 .235
8 Pack Cluster Buns .20 .23
8 Pack Coney Buns .20 AY

9. In the event you wish to purchase products on a
drop-shipment basis to each of your member stores
whereunder you will be responsible for rack service
and stale returns, prices will be as follows:

Advertised
Brand Price
as of
Variety Price June I, 1964
1 Pound Expanded Bread ao 185
144 Pound Round-Top Bread — .185 .235
14% Pound Sandwich Bread 185 .239
8 Pack Cluster Buns 19 a
8 Pack Coney Buns 19 .23

10. All products hereafter sold by us to you pursuant to
this agreement are hereby guaranteed not to be
adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as
amended, or any substantially similar state law. We
agree to indemnify you against any claims made
against you or losses sustained by you arising out of
the purchase or use of products covered by this
agreement provided such claims or losses do not re-
sult from your negligence or that of your agents and

it ails 28

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0791%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
