# Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Durovic v. Weinberger

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for A Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 414 U.S. 944

## Text

SUP; = COURT, UB

7

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1973

NaTIoNaL HELIUM CORPORATION, CITIES SERVICE HELEX,
Inc., PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CoMPANY, Petitioners

Vv.

Rocers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, and
Ebert F. Ossorn, Director, Bureau of Mines,
Department of the Interior

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Rosert L. ACKERLY

RaYMOND S. E. PUSHKAR

SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO
1625 K Street, N. W.

Z Washington, D. C., 20006
Of Counsel: K AB

se a MMET A. BLAES
WENDELL J. DoccETT JocHEMS, SaRGENT & BLAEs

General Counsel & 200 East First Street

_ Secretary — Wichita, Kansas 67201
National Helium
Corporation

Attorneys for
Petitioner, National
Helium Corporation

P. O. Box 1642
Houston, Texas 77001

(See page 2 of cover for additional counsel.)

Press or Byron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

>,

eee ITS

Of Counsel:

R. Price Howarp
Senior Counsel
Phillips Petroleum
Company
Bartlesville, Oklahoma
74003

Wruiam H. ALLEN
EvGENE D. GULLAND
CovincTton & BURLING
888 Sixteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

JosePpH W. KENNEDY
Morris, Larne, EvANs,
Brock & KENNEDY,
CHARTERED
Suite 430
200 West Douglas
Wichita, Kansas 67202

Attorneys fer
Petitioner, Phillips
Petroleum Company

Rosert L. ACKERLY

RayMonp S. E. PUSHKAR

SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO
1625 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C., 20006

Wituiam S. RICHARDSON
ADAMS, JONES, ROBINSON AND
MALONE, CHARTERED
P. O. Box 1034
Wichita, Kansas 67201

Dante, R. HOPKINS
P. O. Box 25128
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
73125

Attorneys for
Petitioner, Cities Service
Helezx, Inc.

Page
I Ne Sai ee ae hose UREN ENE EN EE OSES 1
NE Se wea bebe exew ae ehh eRe ee 2
Qunerions PRRSENTED .. ..0. sce cccce secs seesseness 2
eS CIN Sos Soy vo dca Reeve eo kd ee OW ee 3
PAU EEES OP SUR CAM oo kccick he cade rere sewn ence 3
Reasons FoR GRANTING THE WRIT ...........2.000-- 9

I. The Court of Appeals’ Ruling that the Dis-
trict Court was Without Jurisdiction to Engage
in Substantive Review of Agency Action Under
the National Environmental Policy Act, is in
Conflict With Decisions of the First, Fourth,
Seventh and Eighth Cireuits ................ 11

Il. The Court of Appeals Ruling That Review of
the Substantive Ageney Decision was not Avail-
able Under the Administrative Procedure Act
Conflicts with Decisions of the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits ...... 15

III. The Court of Appeals Applied a Standard of
Judicial Review of Impact Statements Under
NEPA that Conflicts with the Standard Applied

by Other Civemits .... cscs sissy setinescvenes 22
ON EE EE PL EMT EES Pe Pee eee Oe ee 26
CITATIONS

CasEs:

Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C.
ee SRS oe ns Ota ag aa anke seis aisha nares 16

Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 4383 F.2d
Sie A SPE a eka a cect en aed Chenoa eces 16

Calvert Cliff’s Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449
F.2a 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1071) ............ 13, 14, 23, 25

Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 188 (1978) ...........- 2. eee 7

Ege ee

ii Table of Contents Continued

Page
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
ik Bb: 6) ey sere 8, 14, 15, 19, 22
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463
3d 788 (PAC. Cir. BBTT) q25 005 cc ceeeseneersss 24
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 4638
F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir, 1971) ......-ccccneseecees 24
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Lynv, 362 F. Supp.
1905 CELE. WTS) nue scccecccses enter resenes 16
Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke,
473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) ...........0. 11, 14, 16
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) .......... 11
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engi-
neers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972) ............ 11,13
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d
$033 (Oth Cie. TOTS) ox noes vkece ce cennctvsese 16
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346
(Othe Cit, ISTE)... «ons cee nes tetas nercaceenees 14, 25

Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (Sth Cir. 1961) .... 16
Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 450 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1972) .. 16
Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412

(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).. 28
Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) .. 14, 16
Hopewell Township Citizens I-95 Committee v. Volpe,

482 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1973) .......ceecseccesce 16
Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th

ae SREP iio acon se reveuedsserbasesr arene ers 16
Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (Ast Cir. 1973) ........- 16

Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969) .... 16
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation,

it eh | er rrr rere 15, 20, 21
Littel v. Morton, 455 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971) ...... 16

Local 2677, American Federation of Government
Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C.

EDGE) oxen nsanxeseues aeeeneners etnseereb seer eh 16
Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe,
£72 PBa GOS (3d Cow. WOTS) ow oan ne ns ce cnsssces 16

Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968) .. 21
National Council of Community Health Centers v.
Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973) .... 16
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,
456 F934 G27 (BO. Cir. WIS) gov ccc cccccxeceveee 26
Northern Helex Co. vy. United States, 455 F.2d 546
(0% Ch BUTE co cscs coches dceeckseacuiseeens 18, 19

Loe ES ES SE TELE Ne RIE OS

Table of Contents Continued ili

Page

Pace Co. v. Resor, 344 F.Supp. 787 (W.D. Tenn. 1971),
reversed on other grounds, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.
ef a rer nn rrr y fer rrr ti 16

Pealo v. Farmers Home Administration, 361 F. Supp.
OO 4 TG. FORE oa edn ks es eee crass rs cass

Scanwell. Laboratories, Luc. ve Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859
(DG. Civ, WTO) 6 xcuu sca ces cee civtcctersosees 16

Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir, 1972) ...--. 16

Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973)... 14

Silva v. Lume, 482 F.2d 1282 (st Cir. 1973) .... 14, 16, 24

Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. |. tt Sees 16
State Highway Commission v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099
(Oth Cir. W907)... sso rene sveceecrseresesness ys 16
Steinthal & Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C.
iy et: 2) ee eee ras pe rergerenyy rere ae 16
Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918) 20... eee ee eee 21
Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C.
eS) pence yey eet eae 16
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484
WeS5 3944 (10th Cir. 1973) 2.2 cece ese seecees 16
STATUTES:

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 ef seq.
(1970)

ein. tees we tC 1) ) ere ners rr eee 19
ie eee bo Nk Sa ee ren Pe ee 3, 21
ie TRRe Be bg. | ee ee rae 2, 8, 17, 22, 23
Re a 6 eee Bde whew aca cawacke these exe 17

Helium Act, 43 Stat. 1110, as amended, 74 Stat. 918, 50
U.S.C. $$ 167 ef seq. (1970)
Se...) ETE CL ER et 3, 4, 17
SS SeE EON as cit eee ere teries ecnawens 15
National Environmental Policy Act, 83 Stat. 852, 42
U.S.C. $$ 4321 et seq. (1970)
nee Me eee eee Tepe ree TE ee Ler. 2, 3, 6, 17
42 U.S.C. § 4831(b) (1)

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

S. Rep. No. 1814, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. CE eb akvass 3
H.R. Rep. No. 1552, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) ...... 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBER TERM, 1975

No.

NaTIoNaAL HentuM CorPoRATION, CITIES SERVICE HELEX,
Ixc.. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, Petitioners
Vv.

Rocers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, and
E.burt F. Ossory, Director, Bureau of Mines,
Department of the Interior

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners National Helium Corporation, Cities
Service Helex, Ine., and Phillips Petroleum Company
respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to
review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in this proceeding.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals ( Appendix pp.
la-19a) is reported at 486 F.2d 995, The opinion of
the District Court for the District of Kansas (Appen-
dix pp. 19a-73a) is reported at 361 F.Supp. 78.

Nese

2

Opinions of these courts at an earlier stage of this
litigation are also reproduced in the Appendix at pp.
73a-83a and 83a-96a, and are reported at 455 F.2d 650
and 326 F.Supp. 151, respectively.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on October 19, 1973. This Court's jurisdiction is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether in judicial review of federal agency
action a court measuring compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Aet properly limits itself to a
determination only of whether the ageney prepared
an adequate environmental impact statement.

9. Whether the federal courts have jurisdiction
to review, pursuant to the judicial review section of
the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency decision
to terminate an important conservation program, on
grounds other than compliance with the procedural
requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act.

2 Whether in the review of the adequacy of an
environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to
the National Environmental Poliey Act a eourt prop-
erly asks only whether, on the face of the statement, the
agency preparing the statement made ‘tan objective
good faith effort to comply with the statutory proce-
dural requirements,”” or whether, on the other hand,
the court should engage in the “thorough, probing, in-
depth review” of the statement required under the
“arbitrary and eapricious” standard of review pro-
vided for in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).

2 ae AE rE EOE wee a OM

STATUTES INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4531, et
seq.. Helium Act, 42 Stat. 1110, as amended, 74 Stat.
918, 50 U.S.C. §§ 167a, et seq. and the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703, 704, 706, are set
forth in the Appendix to this Petition (pp. 120a-
139a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises from the issuance in January 1971
of notices terminating the contracts of four companies
that were extracting helium from natural gas and
supplying it to the Government for storage and conser-
vation in accordance with the helium conservation
program established by the Department of the Interior
pursuant to the Helium Act Amendments of 1960.

The Helium Conservation Program

Helium, the subject of the prematurely terminated
conservation program and of this case, is an extraor-
dinary element with exceptional characteristics, some
of them unique.’

1Its value has long been recognized. The first important use
of helium was as a lifting gas for lighter-than-air ships. That
and uses associated with medicine and deep-sea diving were vir-
tually its only uses until World War IT. (App. 23a-25a). Since
World War IT many other more advanced and complex applica-
tions of helium have been discovered and put into practices.
(App. 25a-26a). By 1960, the annual consumption of helium was
80 times what it had been in 1937. In 1960, helium was authori-
tatively described as ‘‘essential to our missile and atomic energy
programs and. . . inereasingly valuable as industrial material.”’
At that time it was said that ‘‘the new field of eryogenics involv-
ing extremely low temperatures in the region of absolute zero
opens up exciting new frontiers of science."" S. Rep. No. 1814,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1552, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1960).

4

Helium has the unique properties of inertness, of
not liquifying until a temperature just above absolute
zero is reached, and of remaining liquid down to abso-
lute zero. These properties make helium essential—
there is no known practical substitute—to the creation
of very low temperatures and thus the recognized key
to the development of critical new and economic meth-
ods of power generation and transmission that will
have to be put to use as fossil fuel runs out. These
methods include magnetohydrodynamie power genera-
tion, power generation by nuclear fusion and super-
conducting power transmission. (App. 252).

Helium that can be economically extracted and used
is found only in association with natural gas. Helium-
rich natural gas has been found in significant quanti-
ties in the United States only in the Hugoton-Pan-
handle fields of Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas, which
contain 99 percent of the nation’s known helium re-
serves. (App. 26a). As the gas is extracted for use
as fuel, the gas is consumed, and the helium, which is
not combustible, is wasted into the atmosphere unless
steps are taken to conserve it. Because of the demand
for fuel, the gas and the helium will be gone well before
the end of this century. (App. 26a-27a).

A national program for conserving helium first came
under serious consideration in the late 1950’s. An
interdepartmental study concluded that helium should
be conserved (App. 25a-28a). Soon thereafter, in
1960, Congress enacted amendments to the Helium
Act of 1925, specifically authorizing a conservation
program. 74 Stat. 918 (App. 28a-29a).

As authorized by the amended Helium Act, the See-
retary chose to implement the conservation program by

5

contracting * with four companies to extract and sup-
ply to the Government crude helium from the Hugoton-
>anhandle Field to be stored for future use. (App.
30a). The helium conservation pr ram based on these
contracts was intended to be se!f-liauidating. Outlays
for the acquisition of helium in the early years were
to be repaid with interest as the Government sold
helium from storage in later years.

The helium conservation program has been eriti-
cized over the years by financially oriented government
officials who have been unable or unwilling to appre-
ciate the full implication of the fact that some day
there will be no more helium to be economically re-
covered from natural gas. In addition, the curtailment
of the space program has diminished the current gov-
ernmental demand for helium, and the Government's
helium program has suffered financially from the in-
roads of private helium producers into the current
helium market.

The First Termination

The Department of the Interior in 1970 undertook
negotiations with the contractors lo« ‘king toward a con-
servation program that would be less expensive to the
Government. (App. 32a). These negotiations were

2 Bach of the contracts, entered into in 1961, extends to 1983
but contains a clause allowing the Government to terminate the
contract if, ‘tin the opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, the
discovery of large new helium resources or a substantial diminu-
tion in helium requirements or any cireumstanee of similar nature
should occur which would make the continued operation of {the
contractor's] plant and the continued purchase of helium-gas
mixture extracted therein unnecessary to accomplish the purposes
of the [Helium] Act or any amendment thereto... .7° (App.
33a. Tha). (The quotation is from the contract of petitioner Na-
tional Helium Corporation. The other contractual termination
clauses are substantially identical.)

Se eee

eC NE Po . mes

still in progress when the notices of termination of the
contracts were served in January, 1971. Documents
that subsequently came to light made it clear that,
until very shortly before the termination notices were
issued, the Department had urged continuation of the
helium program and that it was not the Secretary of
the Interior who decided upon termination but officials
in the Office of Management and Budget. (App. 33a,
dda).

After receiving the notices of termination and un-
successfully asking for reconsideration, three of the
contractors, petitioners here, brought suit in the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin the
termination of the conservation program, naming as
defendants the Secretary of the Interior and the di-
rector of the Bureau of Mines, respondents here, * as-
serting not merely a private interest but the interest
of the public in the conservation of a wasting natural
resource.

On petitioners’ motions the District Court tempo-
rarily enjoined the termination of the program. It
did so principally on the ground of the agency’s fail-
ure to comply with Section 102(2)(C) of the National
Environmental Policy Act. No environmental impact.
statement had been prepared in advance of the ter-
mination of the conservation program even thougi)
Section 102(2)(C) requires such a statement in the
case of any proposal for any major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. (App. 73a-
83a) Respondents at that point did not seek review in

* The fourth contractor, Northern Helex Company, had elected
already to treat its contract as breached by nonpayment and had
brought suit in the Court of Claims for damages. (See p. 19,
fn. 13.

7

this Court or a trial on the merits. Instead, they
undertook to prepare and publish an environmental
impact statement, which was accomplished in No-
vember, 1972.

The Second Termination

Several rounds of pleadings and hearings in the
District Court and interlocutory appeals in the Court
of Appeals followed the issuance of the impact state-
ment. The upshot was that the Secretary of the
Interior on February 2, 1973, issued new notices of ter-
mination of the three contracts. (App. 33a-34a) The
outstanding preliminary injunction remained in effect,
and these notices therefore did not become effective in
the prescribed 60 days pending review of their validity.

Judicial Review
A. The District Court

Petitioners filed verified amended complaints chal-
lenging the attempted new termination, reiterating cer-
tain of their original allegations of illegality relating
to the inconsistency of the termination with the relevant
provisions of the contracts themselves, with the Helium
Act and with the duty of the Secretary of the Interior
and not OMB to make any termination decision; and
alleging further that the Secretary had still not com-
plied with NEPA because the impact statement relating
to the termination did not satisfy the statute, and that
the termination of the helium conservation program
was not consistent with the environmental values
identified in the impact statement. The Court of Ap-
peals directed the District Court to proceed to de-
termine the case forthwith and to do so, in accordance
with the court’s reading of this Court’s opinion in
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), solely on the

Cee

8

basis of the administrative record and without an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the amended
complaints. *

On that record and on briefs and oral argument of
the parties, the District Court ruled on June 11, 1973,
that the decision to terminate the Helium Conserva-
tion Program was arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of
discretion and otherwise not in accordance with law
because there had not yet been compliance with the
procedural and substantive mandates of NEPA. The
court continued the preliminary injunction in effect
pending further order of the court to give the agency
the opportunity to comply with NEPA. ( App. 72a-
73a).

Following the directive of this Court in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Ine. vy. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
415-16 (1971), that in the application of the ‘arbitrary
and capricious’? standard of review enunciated in 5
U.S.C. §706(2) (A) there should be ‘ta substantial in-
quiry ...a thorough, probing, in-depth review .. .
[an] inquiry into the facts [that] is to be searching
and careful,’’ the District Court found the assessmeut
and consideration of environmental factors evidenced
in the impact statement and the Secretary's statemeut
of reasons for terminating the conservation program
“woefully inadequate’, (App. 51la-68a)

The District Court found it unnecessary to decide
the other issues petitioners had raised, notably the
legality of the termination under the Helium Act.
However, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction to
determine these issues, contrary to the position taken
by respondents. (App. 41a-42a).

***The hearing in the district court consisted of judicial review
of the administrative record. It was not a trial de novo. (This
was in accordance with the adjudication of this court after the
mentioned interlocutory appeals).’’ (App. 4a).

ae eat oy

9
B. The Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with
directions to dismiss the complaints. It limited it-
self to a review of the impact statement and in making
that review rejected the ‘arbitrary and capricious”’
standard applied by the District Court. Instead, it
assessed the impact statement on its face against a
standard of whether the ageney had made ‘tan objec-
tive good faith effort to comply with the statutory
procedural requirements, * a test that it elsewhere de-
scribed as a ‘‘rule of reason.”? There is no statutory
basis for this standard of judicial review. By this
standard, the impact statement was inevitably found
not wanting for, of course, some kind of ‘effort’? at
compliance with NEPA had quite evidently been
made. The Court of Appeals also rejected the Dis-
trict Court’s conclusion that review of the termination
action could be had under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act on grounds other than failure to comply
with the procedural requirements of NEPA (App.
8a)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

In its practical effect the decision below is of the
greatest significance. A foresighted program of con-
serving the invaluable, scarce and wasting resource,
helium, adopted more than a decade ago pursuant to

*The Court of Appeals delineated its review as, ‘‘In summary,
then, our view is that the review of the FES is limited to the
following: (1) Whether FES discusses all of the five procedural
requirements of NEPA. (2) Whether the environmental impact’
statement constitutes an objective good faith compliance with the
demands of NEPA. (3) Whether the statement contains a rea-
sonable discussion of the subject matter involved in the five re-
quired areas.” (App. 12a).

10

Congressional authorization and_ direction, is
abandoned. °

Abandonment of this program has been permitted
without the kind of judicial inquiry into the legality
of the agency action terminating it that is required by
decisions of this Court and of other courts of appeals,
including in various aspects, the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits. Because the several conflicts relate
to important and recurring questions of federal law,
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit should be reviewed by this Court.

Judge Breitenstein, in a concurring opinion, ac-
knowledged one of the conflicts explicitly. He said:

‘*T reject, and I believe the majority opinion
rejects, the apparent holdings of the Eighth and
Fourth Circuits that an environmental impact
statement is judicially reviewable on its merits
to determine sufficiency.’’ (App. 18a).

The question whether an impact statement is re-
viewable ‘‘on its merits to determine sufficiency’’ or
whether, as the court below held, a good faith effort at

6 Abandonment of the conservation program, ironically, coincides
with the abrupt and forceful coming to public awareness of an
energy crisis that, we are told, will be a chronic condition until
sources of energy other than fossil fuels are developed for prac-
tical application. The irony lies in the fact that among the most
promising substitutes for fossil fuels are methods of power genera-
tion—nuclear fission and fusion and the even more exotie method
called magnetohydrodynamics—that, in the present state of our
knowledge, require helium with its singular behavioral characteris-
tics at very low temperatures. Those characteristics also make
helium uniquely suitable for inducing superconductivity in metals
so as to create greater efficiency in the transmission of energy pro-
duced from whatever sources are available.

NRE IT Le TAD TREE Sat x . ors

we ae

11

compliance with the impact statement requirement is
enough is the third of three important federal ques-
tions presented and dealt with hereinbelow. (pp. 22-
26, infra).* The other two questions arise from the
actions of the Court of Appeals in (1) limiting its re-
view of agency action to determining ‘*compliance with
the [NEPA] requirement of the environmental im-
pact statement’’ and (2) dismissing without considera-
tion other and substantial questions raised concerning
the validity of the challenged agency action.

L

The Court of Appeal’s Ruling That the District Court Was
Without Jurisdiction To Engage in Substantive Review of
Agency Action Under the National Environmental Policy
Act Is in Conflict With Decisions of the First, Fourth,
Seventh and Eighth Circuits.

The Court of Appeals correctly reaffirmed in the
decision below its ruling on the earlier appeal from
the preliminary injunction of 1971 that the District
Court had jurisdiction to determine agency compliance
with NEPA. (App. 5a-6a; 455 F.2d at 653-54).
But it limited review in a manner that conflicts with
decisions of other courts of appeals.

7 Judge Breitenstein cited for the ‘‘apparent holdings’’ of the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits on reviewability of impact statements,
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d
289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972), and Conservation Council of North Caro-
lina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d, 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973). In fact, those
cases, discussed in the text of this Petition below, relate at the
pages cited to review of the substantive agency decision for com-
pliance with NEPA, not review of the impact statement. But
both courts have reviewed or called for review of impact statements
on the ‘‘merits’’ to determine sufficiency’’ in the way that Judge
Breitenstein and his brethren eschewed. See Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Frochlke, 473 F.2d 346, 348-52 (8th Cir. 1972);
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971).

Eres tener eS =

12

The District Court conducted a properly careful
examination of the impact statement in making its
NEPA review and found it unnecessary to go fur-
ther. There was no need to ‘‘reach the propriety of
the Secretary’s actual decision to terminate’’ because
the inadequacies of the impact statement made it im-
possible for the Secretary to have sensibly balanced
adverse environmental impacts against the benetits of
his proposed actions as NEPA substantively requires.
(App. 42a.)

The Court of Appeals, viewing the impact state-
ment against a far too uncritical standard, found it
adequate—and stopped there. It did not make the
further inquiry required of it once it had ruled that
the necessary condition precedent to valid agency
action was satisfied by the impact statement. That
inquiry is into whether the action itself, the decision
to terminate the conservation program, reflected the
the balancing of environmental and other values
that NEPA requires. The court was explicit on this
point. It said that its review was ‘‘strictly limited
to compliance with the requirement of the environ-
mental impact statement,’’ that ‘‘the only issue giv-
ing the district court jurisdiction to entertain the
injunction suit was non-compliance with the require-
ment of an impact statement.’” (App. 8a, 6a,).
While it said that this review ‘‘includes consideration
given to the statement by the Secretary,’’ it did not, on
the face of its opinion, actually probe the extent, if
any, of the consideration of the impact statement.
Much less did it inquire into whether the Secretary’s
consideration of the environmental factors entering
into his decision satisfied the substantive standards of
NEPA.

OTE al Sa Ce Da UE BOCRE. £ era

13

In so limiting NEPA review, the court ruled in a
way that squarely conflicts with decisions of at least
four other courts of appeals.

The leading decision is that of the Eighth Circuit
in Environmental Defense Fund vy. Corps of Engi-
neers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). The court there
held:

“Given an agency obligation to carry out the
substantive requirements of . .. [NEPA] we
believe that courts have an obligation to review
substantive ageney decisions on the merits.”

Id. at 298.

It later explained what it meant by review on the
merits.

‘“‘Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court
must first determine if the agency reached its
decision after a full, good faith consideration and
balancing of environmental factors. The court
must then determine, according to the standards
set forth in §§101(b) and 102(1) of the Act,
whether the actual balance of costs and benefits
that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave in-
sufficient weight to environmental values.’’ /d.
at 300, quoting from Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating
Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.Cir.
1971). +

The court proceeded to engage in the type of review
suggested in the foregoing quotation. Jd. at 301.
While it sustained the agency action in the case, the
court subsequently reversed a district court decision
in favor of an agency in a NEPA ease and made un-
mistakable its view that the district courts have an
obligation ‘‘to review agency decisions on the merits
to determine if they are in accord with NEPA.”

14

Environmental Defense Fund vy. Froehlke, 473 F.2d
346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972).

The Fourth Circuit has followed these rulings of the
Eighth Circuit and has reversed a district court
judgment in a NEPA ease on the sole ground that
the district court erred in not engaging in ‘ta ‘sub-
stantial inquiry’ to determine whether there has been
a clear error of judgment’’ on the merits of the agency
decision. Conservation Council of North Carolina v.
Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973).

The Seventh Circuit in Sierra Club v. Froehlke,
486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973), held that:

‘San agency's decision should be subjected to a
review on the merits to determine if it is in accord
with substantive requirements of NEPA. The
review should be limited to determining whether
the agencies’ decision is arbitrary or capricious.
‘The Court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the ageney,’ ’’ quoting from
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).

See also Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v.
AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ; Hanley.
Kleindienst 471 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1972), and Silva
v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973).

The conflict between the decision below and the
decisions of these other courts of appeals is square
and unavoidable. The question, simply put, is
whether review of agency action under NEPA ends
with a determination that a procedurally adequate im-
pact statement has been prepared and includes no in-
quiry into whether the agency has given full con-
sideration to environmental values including alterna-
tives to the proposed action or whether the environ-

mental considerations revealed by the statement have
properly entered into the agency decision to which the
impact statement relates. This question of the scope
of review in NEPA eases arises here in the context of
a truly major federal action that will significantly
affect the quality of the human environment and of
human life for years to come.* The case is therefore
an appropriate vehicle for resolving the conflict.
This Court should grant review.

Il.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling That Review of the Substantive
Agency Decision Was Not Available Under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, Conflicts With Decisions of the
Second, Fourth, Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits.

The court below denied review of the termination of
the helium conservation program on any ground other
than procedural compliance with NEPA. The Helium
Act, supra, provides in part that the Administrative
Procedure Act shall apply to any ageney proceeding
and any agency action taken under the Act. 50
U.S.C. See. 167h. Nevertheless the Court below re-
fused to review the termination of the program relying
principally upon Larson vy. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corporation, 337 U.S. 682 (1949). To the
extent that the Larsen decision precludes judicial re-
view of agency action it is in conflict with the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, the apparent position of
this Court as reflected in decisions such as Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, and a host of
lower court decisions which have consistently re-

8A cardinal purpose of NEPA is ‘**. .. that the Nation may—
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations . .. .’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(b) (1).

re tase hss EAN ENS Le n «OO ee BL RT OS

16

viewed agency action under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.* The NEPA contains no provisions for
judicial review, yet federal courts have unhesitatingly
reviewed agency compliance with the Act, granting
injunctive relief where non-compliance was ap-
parent. *°

Petitioners’ principal contention relating to the
merits of the decision to terminate the helium conser-
vation program is that the termination was incon-

® Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir.
1970): Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969) ; Littell
v. Morton, 455 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971); Estrada v. Ahrens,
296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961); Ballerina Pen. Co. v. Kunzig, 433
F.2d 1204, 1207, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Blackhawk Heating &
Plbg. Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ;
Steinthal and Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ;
Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ;
Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 450 F.2d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Pace
Co. v. Resor, 344 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), reversed on
other grounds, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1971); State Highway
Commission v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1105 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973) ;
Local 2677, American Federation of Government Employees v.
Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973); National Council of
Community Health Centers v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897
(D.D.C. 1973); Pealo v. Farmers Home Administration, 361 F.
Supp. 1320 (D.D.C. 1973) and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973).

” Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Hanley v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); Monroe County Conser-
vation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972); Con-
servation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 665
(4th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (Ast Cir. 1973) ;
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Frochlke, 477 F.2d 1033
(Sth Cir. 1973); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973);
Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973) ; Hopewell Township
Citizens 1-95 Committee v. Volpe, 482 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1973) ;
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244
(10th Cir. 1973) and Indian Lookout Alliance vy. Volpe, 484 F.2d
11 (18th Cir. 1973).

ee ee ee

17

sistent with the provisions and intent of the Helium
Act, particularly when those provisions are interpreted,
as they must be **to the fullest extent possible,” in ac-
cordance with the policies set forth in NEPA." The
argument in brief is: Congress by the Helium

25

We think an alternative source, equally applicable
is the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.§ 702
and 706. In any eveut, the judicial inquiries are
whether the agency’s findings and conclusions in
the EIS are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,
and whether the agency followed the procedures
required by law.”’

The court found the impact statement there in issue
to be inadequate in that it lacked sufficient discussion
of alternatives and a reasoned basis for the choices
made.

In operational terms, the court below in this case
has adopted a standard that is satisfied by ‘‘a catalog
of environmental facts,’’ Environmental Defense Fund
v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972), and an
incomplete catalog at that."

The District Court applied the standard of review
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706
(2)(A) and found glaring deficiencies in the impact
statement. (App. 5la-68a). The Court of Appeals
ignored the record below in a comment unrelated to
the issues presented saying that ‘‘the statement did
not have to dwell on the imaginary horribles posed by
the plaintiffs.’”” (App. 14a). The issues presented
to the District Court and the Court of Appeals were,
as required, supported solidly by the record in this
ease. To avoid review by a statement as quoted above
permits an agency to completely circumvent NEPA
which requires the agency, among other things, to

16The notion that NEPA is merely a full-disclosure law has
been flatly rejected. So to construe NEPA would render it a
‘paper tiger’’. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. AEC,
supra.

Ee 7
Pardee: te T°

26

compare ‘“‘the net balance [of benefits and environ-
mental risks] for the proposed project with the en-
vironmental risks presented by alternative courses of
action.” Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

This Court should review the decision below to de-
termine whether the standard for judging the adequacy
of environmental impact statements is to be the lenient
standard applied by the Tenth Circuit or the more rig-
orous standard applied by other Courts of Appeals.
Only the latter, we submit, will ensure that impact
statements serve the high purposes intended for them
by Congress.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the writ of certiorari
prayed for should issue.

Respectfully submitted,

Rosert L. ACKERLY

RayMonp S. E. PUSHKAR

SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO
1625 K Street. N. W.
Washington, D. C., 20006

Of Counsel:
Emmet A. BLAES

WENDELL J. DocGeTt JocHEMS, SARGENT & BLAES
General Counsel & 200 East Pirst Street
_ Secretary Wichita, Kansas 67201
National Helium
Corporation Attorneys for
P. 0. Box 1642 Petitioner, National

Houston, Texas 77001 Helium Corporation

Of Counsel:

R. Price Hlowarp
Senior Counsel
Phillips Petroleum
Company
Bartlesville, Oklahoma
74003

Witulam H. ALLEN
EUGENE D. GULLAND
COVINGTON & BURLING
888 Sixteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

JOSEPH W. KENNEDY
Morris, Lainc, EVANs,
Brock & KENNEDY,
(CHARTERED
Suite 430
200 West Douglas
Wichita, Kansas 67202

Attorneys for
Petitioner, Phillips
Petroleum Company

Ropert L. ACKERLY

RayMONp S. E. PUSHKAR

SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO
1625 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C., 20006

Wituram S. RICHARDSON
ADAMS, JONES, ROBINSON AND
MALONE, CHARTERED
P. O. Box 1034
Wichita, Kansas 67201

DanteL R. HOPKINS
P. O. Box 25128
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
73125

Attorneys for
Petitioner, Cities Service
Heler, Ine.

kia ret te er

\ISRARY *&
SUPT, OL ge

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1973

No 78-1129

NATIONAL HELIUM CORPORATION,
and

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,
and

CITIES SERVICE HELEx, INc.,

Petitioners,
Vs

Rocers C. B. Morton, Secretary of Interior,
and

Exstrt F. Osporn, Director, Bureau of Mines,
Department of Interior,
Respondents.

—_—————_—_

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
TENTH CIRCUIT

————_—_

Press or Byron S. Apams Printinc, Inc., WASHINGTON, D. C.

=S.

2

INDEX TO APPENDIX
Page

Opinions BELow:

National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th

Cle. B0FE) vc cccccnscvertsrveavesvescauesessers la
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78

(D. Kan. 1973) .....cccccccccsccescccsccnccces 19a
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th

Che, TFG) vnc nese ccnsacSccesevenverstesrentees 73a
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151

(D. Kan. 1971) ........cccccersccvcvcccccccces 83a
Judgment, Tenth Cireuit Court of Appeals, October

TE. DUSE c h cnc cbderesestvccestonsseeeveseaviess 140a

Termination of Helium Purchase Contracts by the Sec-
retary, Department of Interior, February 2, 1973 97a

STATUTES:
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.

Beetions 4321-4335 (1970) ....csvcccvvcsvssvens 120a
Helium Act, 50 U.S.C. Sections 167-167n (1970) ..... 124a

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
Sections 701-706 (1970) ....ccsccscvescccsceces 136a

la

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

SerreMsBer Term, 1973

NationaL Hetium Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and

Pururps PerroLeum CoMPANY
and

Citres Service Hetex, Ixc.,
Intervenor-Plaintiff-
Appellees,
v.

Rocers C. B. Mortox, Secretary of the Interior, and -
Exbvrt F. Ossory, Director, Bureau of Mines,
Department of the Interior,
Defendants-A ppellants.

Nos. 73-1169
73-1449

Opinion

Before Brerrensters, Hit and Doyte, Cireuit Judges.
Doyte, Cireuit Judge.

This cause has been appealed on prior occasions. In
National Helium Corporation v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th
Cir. 1971), the district court had ruled that helium pur-
chase contracts entered into pursuant to the Helium Act,
50 U.S.C. § 167 et seq. could not be terminated by the See-

CEB, Or ee

2a

retary of the Interior without the filing by the Interior
Department of an environmental impact statement in
accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. This court affirmed
that decision, holding that the Department was required
to comply with this provision of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA). Following the filing of an
environmental impact statement by the Department, the
Secretary again terminated the helium purchase contracts
and once again plaintiffs-appellees filed an injunction suit
in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas. The district court again enjoined the Secretary.
On this occasion it was due to the dissatisfaction of the
court with the impact statement. There have been two
other appeal proceedings presented to us. One of these
involved the scope of the retrial—whether it was to be an
agency review or a de novo hearing. The other had to do
with efforts of plaintiffs-appellees to discover government
documents.

The district court filed the decision leading to the instant
appeal on June 11, 1973. It again enjoined the Secretary
of the Interior from terminating three of the helium pur-
chase contracts. Although the Department had filed an
impact statement the court ruled that it had failed to
comply with the mandate of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969; that the impact statement, if not
deficient in scope, was essentially lacking in depth. At
present, then, the primary issue before the court is whether
the Department’s impact statement or report was in accord-
ance with the statutory standards and in accordance with
this court's mandate in the prior ease.

Qn the prior occasion and now the Secretary terminated
the contracts pursuant to their express termination provi-
sions. He did so on the basis that the helium program
had been substantially carried out. The mentioned provi-
sions authorize him to terminate when there has been a
substantial diminution in helium requirements, discovery of

3a

large new helium resources or other changes of a similar
nature.’

At the time that these contracts were entered into, the
U.S. helium requirements amounted to 530 million eubie
feet of helium per year. This requirement increased in
subsequent years, but commenced to decline in 1967 and has
declined every year since so that in the year 1970 the
demand had decreased to 400 million cubic feet. An
average of 3.126 billion cubie feet of helium had been pur-
chased each year. In the years 1971-72 the demand dimin-
ished in substantial amounts and all of the purchases have
decreased, although they continue to be in excess of two
billion cubie feet annually. During this entire purchase
period the government through the Bureau of Mines had
purchased enough helium to meet all of its needs and has
not needed to use the purchased helium. Furthermore, the
government believes that it has much more of a supply than
can possibly be used between now and 2000. It is estimated
that it is six times as much as will be needed.

1In our prior opinion, 455 F.2d at 653, we said:

Under the Act the Secretary is not required to purchase
any helium. The entire matter is left to his discretion. In
deciding to terminate the contract the Secretary stated that
the basic purposes of the Act had been fulfilled, that is that
the 25-year purchase program envisioned by the Act was
unnecessary because as of the time of termination his esti-
mates showed that there was enough helium in storage to
fulfill government requirements through 1995. The Secretary
notified the companies on January 26, 1971, that the contracts
would be terminated effective March 27, 1971. In his letter he °
stated that there had been a diminution in the requirements of
helium for essential governmental activities, and that there had
been new discoveries since the execution of the contract, which
discoveries had provided large sources of available helium if
more of the gas ‘‘is required for essential government activ-
ities than is now in storage or will be recovered in govern-
ment plants.”

28 SY RE

da

Following this court’s decision the Interior Department
proceeded at once to conduct a study leading to the prepar-
ation and filing of an environmental impact statement. The
initial draft was submitted to interested parties, including
the plaintiffs, and comments were received. These are in-
cluded as part of the report of the Department. The final
environmental statement was issued November 13, 1972.
The hearing in the district court consisted of a judicial
review of the administrative record. It was not a trial
de novo. (This was in accordance with the adjudication of
this court after the mentioned interlocutory appeal.) The
proceedings in the district court were extensive as to the
composition of the administrative record. Plaintiffs had
full opportunity to express their views, and the court’s
opinion was thorough and exhaustive.

In its final decision the court ruled that it was limited to
determining whether the agency’s action was arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with the law. It concluded that the Depart-
ment’s effort in preparing the impact statement was an in-
sufficient one which failed to come up to the mentioned
standard in numerous respects. It characterized the state-
ment as ‘‘feeble,’’ ‘‘obviously incomplete,’’ ‘‘appallingly
deficient,’’ ‘‘startling in its brevity and lack of depth,’’ and,
finally, said that the statement totally failed to consider
the environmental impact of termination. The court dis-
approved the statement in its entirety and remanded the
cause for further proceedings.

Reversal is demanded on the following grounds:

First, it is contended that there was a lack of jurisdiction
for the district court to even entertain the case in view of
the Supreme Court’s recent decision (rendered since our
last decision) in United States v. Students Chal. Reg. Agey.
Pro. (SCRAP), —— USS. , 93 S.Ct. 2405 (1973).

Second, the environmental! statement was valid and suf-
ficient ; the district court erred in condemning it.

—*

5a

Third, the Secretary complied with the procedural re-
quirements of NEPA as well as with this court’s mandate.
Hence, there was no justification for issuing the injunction.

Fourth, the district court erred in considering grounds
other than sufficiency of F.E.S. since it lacked authority
to enjoin for any ground except noncompliance with NEPA.

1.
JURISDICTION

A. WHETHER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY IS
SUPERSEDED BY NEPA.

First we consider the renewed challenge to jurisdiction.
As above noted, this question was determined adversely to
the government in the early appeal. See 455 F.2d at 653-
54. The government now urges that the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, supre, has changed the
applicable law and that this issue must be reexamined. In
this recent case the Supreme Court reviewed the decision
of the District of Columbia three-judge court which en-
joined a proposed railroad rate increase of the Interstate
Commerce Act. Under that Act a railroad is required to
give at least 30 days notice for carrying out a proposed rate
increase. During this period the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission may, pursuant to $15(7) of the Act, suspend the
operation of the proposed rate for a maximum of seven
months pending an investigation and decision of the lawful-
ness of the new rates. The Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion refused to suspend the rate increase and the environ-
mental issue arose from the fact that the increase involved
a 2.5 percent surcharge on nearly all freight rates. Plain-
tiffs alleged that the modified rate structure would dis-
courage the transportation of recyclable material and pro-
mote the use of raw materials which compete with scrap
material and would thereby affect the environment. The
Court based its decision on Arrow Transportation Co, v,

a a . 3 ce

rr rrr ere Fee eed

6a

Southern Railway Co., 372 U.S. 658 (1963), which had held
that Congress had in the ICC Act vested exclusive power in
the ICC to suspend rates pending final decision and had
deliberately extinguished judicial power to grant this relief;
the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant an injunction.

It seems apparent that the case at bar differs from the
so-called SCRAP decision in that the Helium Act does not
vest the Secretary with the same kind of regulatory
authority as was present in the SCRAP case. The holding
that NEPA did not subvert the power of the Interstate
Commerce Commission was not surprising since the Com-
mission is a tribunal in its own right with peculiarly exelu-
sive authority within its sphere.

The SCRAP decision does create at least a shadow of
doubt as to whether the Secretary’s power was undermined
by NEPA. The fact, however, that it gives pause is not
enough because the differences between the two conditions
are marked.

The district court held that additional bases of jurisdic-
tion existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question),
§ 1361 (action to compel a federal officer to perform his
duty), and §§ 2201 and 2202 (declaratory judgments). Jur-
isdiction on other than NEPA grounds becomes important
only if we find compliance with NEPA. This argument is
superfluous since NEPA furnishes a jurisdictional base,
and the case being properly in federal court it is there for
all purposes. Hence, we have no concern over jurisdiction
outside the NEPA base.

B. Contract TERMINATION—UskE or INJUNCTION

The trial court did not follow this court’s mandate that
the only issue giving the district court jurisdiction to enter-
tain the injunction suit was the noncompliance with the re-
quirement of an impact statement. We stated in our
former opinion that the Secretary was not compelled to
purchase any helium; that the matter was left to his dis-

7a

cretion and he was within his rights in terminating the con-
tracts. We adhere to these views.

We have fully considered the Supreme Court cases which
prohibit injunctive relief against governmental officers on
account of their upholding the rights of the government
arising under a contract. Such a suit is distinguished by
the Supreme Court from actions seeking compensations for
an alleged wrong and are regarded as actions against the
sovereign to which there has not been consent. See Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation, 337 U.S.
682 (1949).?

It is fundamental that the Tucker Act which contains a
limited consent of the United States to be sued does not
authorize an action in injunction. See Richardson v.
Morris, U.S. ——, 93 S.Ct. 629 (1973) and United
States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969).

We view the action seeking to require the Department to
file an impact statement to stand on a different footing in

2In distinguishing between actions seeking damages and suits
like the case at bar, the Supreme Court said:

But the reasoning is not applicable to suits for specific relief.
For, it is one thing to provide a method by which a citizen
may be compensated for a wrong done to him by the Gov-
ernment. It is a far different matter to permit a court to
exercise its compulsive powers to restraiin the Government
from acting, or to compel it to act. There are the strongest
reasons of public policy for the rule that such relief cannot be
had against the sovereign. The Government as representative
of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks
by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property
or contract right. As was early recognized, ‘‘the interference
of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties
of the executive departments of the government, would be
productive of nothing but mischief. * * * ”’

337 U.S. at 704. See also some of the numerous other cases which
support the Larson holding: Dugan vy. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) ;
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584 (1941).

So ee Se

8a

relationship to the sovereign immunity doctrine and the
cited cases because the action merely seeks * to obtain com-
pliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 and is not for the purpose of asserting and enforcing a
private right. Also, if the impact statement is to be mean-
ingful the requirement must be virtually absolute. Thus,
we conceive of the review of the Secretary’s action as being
strictly limited to compliance with the requirement of the
environmental impact statement. This, of course, includes
consideration given to the statement by the Secretary, for if
he failed to consider it his action would assume arbitrari-
ness and capriciousness.

Efforts to enjoin the Secretary from terminating the
contracts for an indefinite period of time must, of course,
fail. We reject the plaintiffs’ argument that review of the
termination is permissible under the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act. We fail to perceive any violation of the 1960
Helium Act Amendments.

II.

Next we consider whether the Secretary and the Depart-
ment fulfilled the requirements of § 4332. A primary issue
is the scope and the test of judicial review. First, what is
the standard to be used in such review and, second, whether
the court correctly assessed the agency’s action in the light
of the NEPA requirements.

A. Tue Staxparp To Be Apptiep.

The specific procedural requirements of NEPA are de-
lineated in 42 U.S.C. $4332. Section 4332(2)(A)-(H)
imposes specific procedural duties on federal agencies, one
of which is the duty of preparing a detailed impact state-
ment to accompany any recommendation for a major federal
action significantly affecting the environment. The require-

5 Since the defendants are engaged in upholding a publie right
they can only be acting pursuant to publie laws.

9a

ments of this impact statement contained in § 4332(2)(C)
include five specific areas to be covered in the impact state-
ment:

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

_ (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposed be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses
of the man’s environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-terin productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments
of resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.

The trial court employed the ‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’
standard of § 706 of the APA.‘ This sets aside the action
if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or other-
wise not in accordance with law. The trial court pur-
portedly relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-
14 (1971). This ease did not, however, involve the prepara-
tion of an environmental impact statement. This was a
review of the decision of the Secretary of Transportation
in respect to the building of a highway through a park. This
was in truth ‘‘agency action.’’ The decision of the Sec-
retary in Overton Park was concerned with the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act of 1966 and the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1968. In assessing the adequacy of the
impact statement, we are not here reviewing, as we said
above, agency action within the meaning of $706 of the
APA. Rather, we are concerned with the NEPA require-
ment which is, to be sure, a prerequisite for agency action
but is not agency action itself. The trial court’s conclu-

4 National Helium Company, et al. v. Morton, No. W-4568, filed
June 11, 1973 (D. Kansas), page 26.

10a

sion that it was required by Overton Park to apply the
arbitrary and capricious standard was, in our view,
erroneous.

The better reasoned decisions have required an objective
good faith effort to comply with the statutory procedural
requirements. Other than that, the courts have demanded
that the agency do more than mechanically pursue the pro-
eedural standards. Thus, in Calvert Cliffs’ Coord. Com. v.
United States A. E. Com’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
the court added to the good faith standard by saying that
the agency must comply with the procedural requirements
to the fullest extent possible. The same Cireuit in
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972), has said that the procedural
requirements are not intended to be a straitjacket or to
demand what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible.

Finally, the most recent decision of the D.C. Circuit,
Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Commission, D.C. Cir., No. 72-1331, June 12, 1973,
expounds the standards more clearly than eatlier decisions:

It is apparent, however, that the Commission seeks to
avoid issuing its forthcoming ‘‘environmental survey’’
as an impact statement under Section 102, not out of
any desire to cireumvent NEPA’s procedural require-
ments, but rather because of a fear that Section 102’s
requirements as to the contents of an impact statement
are so strict, particularly as to the need for ‘‘detail’’
in the statement, that any Commission attempt to issue
its environmental survey as a NEPA statement would
be doomed to failure. While we do not altogether
understand the Commission’s fears, we feel they are
based on certain misapprehensions as to what NEPA
requires.

* * * #

Accordingly, if the Commission’s environmental
survey is prepared and issued in accordance with
NEPA procedures, and if the Commission makes a
good faith effort in the survey to describe the reason-

jo owen jaatiiieeiatae

lla

ably foreseeable environmental impact of the program,
alternatives to the program and their reasonably for-
seeable environmental impact, and the irreversible and
irretrievable commitment of resources the program in-
volves, we see no reason why the survey will not fully
satisfy the requirements of Section 102(C).

The environmental impact statement should be placed in
perspective. The relevant provisions bring environmental
factors into the agency decision-making placing them on an
equal footing with economic, technical and other considera-
tions. .Also, this environmental impact statement serves as
EEN ENE MN TB SE ES Foes ee ee

26a

helium program the primary, rather than incidental, ob-
jective of the Department of Interior.

A working group was subsequently established, com-
prised of representatives from the Departments of Com-
merce, Defense and Interior, Atomic Energy Commission,
Office of Defense Mobilization, Bureau of the Budget, and
Federal Power Commission. Headed by then Undersecre-
tary of Interior, O. Hatfield Chilson, now our esteemed
colleague on the federal bench in the District of Colorado,
the group compiled a study entitled ‘*Cost and Implemen-
tation of a National Helium Conservation Policy.’’ (The
Chilson Report, January 24, i958). As a result of the
study, a national helium conservation policy was subse-
quently recommended to President Eisenhower and for-
mally approved on April 25, 1958.

The Report noted that approximately 99% of the known
helium-bearing natural gas resources in the United States
was concentrated in four fields containing approximately
119 billion cubie feet of potentially recoverable helium:
(1) the Hugoton Field of Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas;
(2) the Panhandle Field of Texas; (3) the Keyes Field of
Oklahoma; and (4) the Greenwood Field of Kansas. The
Report further noted that these fields had been developed
by private companies to supply natural gas to fuel mar-
kets, and that since the companies merely considered the
helium to be a minor impurity no effort was being made
to remove it; consequently, the helium was merely passing
into the atmosphere without serving any useful purpose.

The study group recognized a number of significant
factors suggesting the need for a long term helium con-
servation program. First, although the demand for helium
had been consistently rising, the emphasis of the helium
program was on meeting current, short term needs. Sec-
ond, helium was essential to the country’s missile and
atomic energy programs, and an invaluable industrial tool.
Third, the helium supply being conserved by the Bureau

27a

of Mines, although sufficient to meet current foreseeable
governmental needs, would likely not be sufficient to meet
future governmental and private demands resulting from
expected and unforeseeable developments in new and ex-
panding technologies. Fourth, natural gas was the only
known commercial source of helium, since recovery from
the atmosphere and other sources was impracticable due
to the economic and environmental barriers. Fifth, the
world’s largest helium-bearing gas fields were located in
the United States, yet the helium was being allowed to
vent into the air without serving any useful purpose and
would probably be totally depleted by 1985. Sixth, due to
the inability to place a ‘‘value’* on helium as a result of
the speculative nature of its future demand and the pre-
dominant government utilization, there was no economie
incentive for private industry to extract and store the he-
lium for future use. Seventh, if nothing was done, the
nation’s richest source of helium would be least available
at a time when it was needed the most. Finally, that pres-
ent legislation did not permit the implementation of a long-
range conservation program as envisioned.

In order that an effective long-range helium conserva-
tion program might be implemented, the Report recom-
mended that the Helium Act, 50 U.S.C. $161 et seq., be
amended in such a way so as to give the Secretary of In-
terior the authority to build up to thirteen new helium
production plants to extract the helium prior to transmis-
sion of the natural gas to fuel markets, and to store the
helium thus conserved in the government-owned Cliffside
gas field or in some other suitable underground reservoir.
In addition, the Report suggested that it might be feasible
to augment this basic conservation plan by acquiring and
shutting in relatively small isolated helium-bearing gas
fields, although the acquisition of all of the fields was
thought to be impracticable.

Since it was not certain that private companies would
be willing or able to participate in the program, however,

28a

and in light of the current and unforeseeable importance
of helium to the national welfare, the Report suggested
that the legislation be drafted in such a way so as to au-
thorize the Secretary to condemn the helium-bearing nat-
ural gas after its removal from place of deposit in nature.
Furthermore, although suggesting an end to the long-
standing governmental monopoly on the production of he-
lium, the Report recommended that the Secretary retain
control over the sale and use of helium produced by pri-
vate companies not participating in the program, and thus
be able to control the price of the gas and determine its
end uses,

Due to the magnitude of the expense involved in ae-
complishing the conservation program, the Report recom-
mended that: (1) private industry be encouraged to par-
ticipate in the program by entering long-term contracts
with the Government which would give the companies
a reasonable return on their capital investment and, at the
same time, help to defray the overall costs of the program;
(2) the Secretary be authorized to set the price for the
helium at a level which would enable the Department of
Interior to cover all costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of the program; (3) all federal agencies and
contractors purchase all major requirements of helium
from the Secretary; and (4) the private companies par-
ticipating in the program be prohibited from selling any
helium to any purchaser other than the Secretary at a
price lower than the lowest price paid by any government
agency.

In 1958 the Department of the Interior proposed legis-
lation to Congress for the implementation of the recom-
mended conservation program. This was not acted upon,
however, and redrafted proposals were subsequently sub-
mitted to Congress on July 27, 1959. After lengthy hear-
ings and incidental revisions and amendments of the pro-
posed bill, a legislative amendment was adopted on Sep-

29a

tember 13, 1960, to be known as ‘‘An Act to amend the
Helium Act of March 3, 1925, as amended, for the defense,
security, and the general welfare of the United States.’’?
50 U.S.C. ¢ 167 et seq. The Act became effective on March
1, 1961, and a limitation on the annual contracting author-
ity of 47.5 million dollars was established by the Act of
August 3, 1961, 75 Stat. 246, 253.

The 1960 Helium Act Amendments authorized the See-
retary of the Interior to enter into long-term contracts
for the acquisition, processing, transportation, or con-
servation of helium, not exceeding twenty-five years. 90
U.S.C. §167a(a)(2). In addition, he was given the power
to acquire, by eminent domain, helium contained in he-
lium-bearing natural gas and so much of such gas as was
necessarily removed in the extraction process, if he were
unable to acquire helium otherwise upon reasonable terms
and at the fair market value. 50 U.S.C. § 167a(a)(2). In
an attempt to make the program self-liquidating, the Act
provided for a comprehensive system similar to that ree-
ommended by the Chilson Report. 50 U.S.C. $$ 167a(e),
167¢. 167d and 167j. The Secretary was given authority to
set his own price for the helium that he sold (50 U.S.C.

1 Pub.L. 86-777. 74 Stat. 920. All proceedings were before the
séth Congress. The bill which became the Helium Act Amend-
ments of 1960 was H.R. 10548. Other bills which were considered
are S, 827, 8. 2567, S. 3376, TLR. 8440, HLR. 8451 and HLR. 11030.
The Reports of the hearings before the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, United States Senate, on H.R. 1054s and 8. 3376,
June 1 and 15, 1960, and the Report of Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, House of Representatives on H.R. 8440, FLR. 5451,
ILR. 10348 and H.R. 11030, February 19, Mareh 10 and 11, 1960,
are printed. The Report of the House Committee is designated
H.Rptr. No. 1552 and of the Senate, 8.Rptr. No. 1814, U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1960, p. 3595, with a minority report by
Senator Carroll designated Part 2. Debate in the House and Sen-
ate is reported in 106 Cong.Ree., pp. 9089-9099, 15119-15125, 17855,
18936-18538, 18544-18546, 18602-18609 and 18902-15904.

ee oe we Oe ent gr aa

30a

§167d(c)), and to establish and promulgate such rules
and regulations, consistent with the directions of the Act,
which were necessary to carry out its provisions. 50 U.S.C,
§ 167g.

Pursuant to the authority given the Secretary by the
Helium Act Amendments, the Secretary of Interior en-
tered into helium procurement contracts with the plain-
tiff companies and with Northern Helex Company in Aug-
ust, October, and November, 1961. These companies were
chosen due to the large amount of helium which they could
assure, and their ability to accomplish the necessary pro-
duction assemblage and perform the underlying contracts.
The award of the contracts to these four companies obli-
gated all of the available 47.5 million dollars contracting
authority and thus completed that phase of the helium
conservation program, unless and until the contracting au-
thority was increased. That authority has not been in-
creased by Congress.

Each contract provided for the sale and delivery to the
United States of a helium-gas mixture for a term of
twenty-two years. The companies were required to con-
struct at their own risk and expense helium extraction
plants and necessary facilities capable of processing at
least 500 million eubie feet of Hugoton area’ gas per day
(in the ease of National Helium, approximately 840 mil-
lion eubie feet of natural gas per day). The contracts fol-
lowed a general pattern, although they varied in detail.
Each contract contained an initial price per MCF of con-
tained helium varying from $10.30 to $11.78. The prices
were broken down into two parts, one related to the cost
of gas and the other related to other costs. The companies
have at all times fully met their obligations under the con-
tracts.

Subsequent to the implementation of the expanded he-

lium conservation program, numerous studies and reports
concerning the program were prepared by federal agen-

eens susserawe

3la

cies and by interested private groups and, in accordance
with §167n of the Helium Act Amendments, the Secre-
tary of Interior made annual reports to advise Congress
of the current status of the government’s helium program.
Generally, these reports contained financial, statistical,
and operating information concerning the program for
each fiseal year that it was in operation.

The helium conservation program apparently ran
smoothly until some time in 1968. After the passage of the
1960 Act, however, several private companies had begun
their own helium extraction outside of the government
program. Because the Secretary’s price for helium re-
flected not only direct extraction costs, but also a portion
of the costs involved in the administration of the conser-
vation program, the Secretary’s price for helium exceeded
the private producers’ price. As the private companies’
sales increased, the Secretary’s sales decreased, despite
increased overall demand.

In response to this situation, the Secretary proposed
regulations in 33 Fed. Reg. 5219-20 (1968), which were
later revised and officially published on October 18, 1968,
in 33 Fed. Reg. 15478-80, to become effective December
2, 1968. The regulations would heve forbidden govern-
ment agencies and their contractors from purchasing their
major requirements of helium from any source other than
the Secretary, or private companies ‘‘eligible’’? under the
regulations.

In Air Reduction Company v. Hickel, supra, these regu-
lations were stricken down. The Court held that, although
Congress had intended that the Seceretary not lose his
market because of private competition, it had not pro-
vided statutory authority to require government con-
tractors to purchase their helium from the Secretary. The
Court noted, however, that the Secretary’s purpose could
be accomplished by obtaining an Executive Order requir-
ing that such provisions be included in all contracts en-

err nee eS SN et ATRL Sp OE RL 4 ~ oA ~~?

32a

tered into by government agencies. Air Reduction Com-
pany v. Hickel, supra, 420 F.2d at p. 597. An Executive
Order was never obtained.

It became increasingly evident that the costs of the
program were not diminishing according to expectations
and that the program was being adversely affected by the
intrusion into what had been a virtually exclusive gov-
ernment market of private producers of helium. More-
over, the program was suffering financially from a tem-
porary lull in sales occasioned principally by the large
cuts in the space program. Consequently, the Department
of Interior started negotiations with the four helium con-
servation contractors in an attempt to modify the con-
tracts in a way that would reduce the costs of the program
to the Government and still fulfill the goals of the program.

Due to diminished sales, however, the Department of
Interior had fallen into arrears in making payments to
the four helium contractors. Partial payments were made
for a while, but payments ceased entirely in November,
1969, notwithstanding the continuance of deliveries. At
the close of the calendar year of 1970, the Government
owed large sums to the helium contractors for delivered
helium. Consequently, on December 24, 1970, one of the
helium contractors, Northern Helex Company, brought an
action in the Court of Claims against the United States
for breach of contract. In Northern Helex Company v.
United States, 455 F.2d 546 (Ct.C1.1972), the Court of
Claims held that the Government was liable for anticipa-
tory breach of the contract, but the issue of damages is
still pending.

On January 26, 1971, and while negotiations were still
in progress with at least one of the remaining contractors,
the Department of Interior advised plaintiffs that, pur-
suant to paragraph 12.1 of the contracts, the contracts
would be terminated effective sixty days thereafter. Al-

33a

though specific language varied, each contract provided
for termination as follows:

‘612.1 Buyer [Federal Government] may, at is option,
terminate this contract at any time if, (1) in the
opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, the discovery
of large new helium resources or a substantial dimi-
nution in helium requirements or any circumstance
of similar nature should occur which would make the
continued operation of Seller’s plant and the contin-
ued purchase of helium-gas mixture extracted therein
unnecessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act or
any amendment thereto, or (2) a material circumstance
of force majeure making it impracticable or impossible
for either Buyer or Seller to carry out its obligations
under this contract which circumstance cannot be
remedied with reasonable dispatch.”’

The President’s Budget, issued on January 29, 1971,
coincidentally, did not include a request for appropria-
tions for continued funding of the contracts.

On March 17, 1971, the plaintiffs filed the instant action
against the defendants, and on March 26, 1971, this Court
issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the termination
of the contracts. Following the decision of the Tenth Cir-
euit Court of Appeals in National Helium Corporation
y. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), affirming this
Court’s holding, the decision to terminate the contracts
was remanded to the Secretary for reconsideration in
light of the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4831 et seq.

A draft environmental impact statement was subse-
quently prepared by the Department of Interior, and its
availability was officially announced in the Federal Regis-
ter on May 23, 1972. A final environmental impact state-
ment entitled ‘‘Termination of Helium Purchase Con-
tracts—United States Department of Interior—Bureau
of Mines’? was issued on November 13, 1972. On Feobru-

Bt wesetrmrien ete rire

34a

ary 2, 1973, the Secretary of Interior gave notice of termi-
nation to the plaintiffs, to become effective sixty days
thereafter. Accompanying the notices was a statement
prepared by the Secretary justifying the termination of
the helium conservation program in terms of the termina-
tion clauses of each of the helium purchase contracts.

The Seeretary’s termination statement, which is based
on the Department’s final environmental statement and
the comments received from the private contractors, rec-
ognizes that: (1) the direct result of the decision to ter-
minate the contracts will be that the Government will
forego the storage of an estimated 20 billion cubic feet of
helium which will be ‘‘wasted’’ or ‘‘depleted’’ if the con-
tractors do not continue to extract and store the helium,
prior to delivery of the natural gas to fuel markets; (2)
natural gas—primarily fuel gas—is the only known source
of helium other than the atmosphere, an environmentally
and economically inferior source; (3) the currently proved
‘‘helium-rich’’ natural gas reserves (containing at least
0.3% helium) will probably be exhausted before the turn
of the century; (4) it is unknown exactly how much, if
any, ‘‘lean’’ helium-bearing natural gas will be available
after the year 2000; (5) present studies predict large de-
mands for helium for environmentally beneficial uses be-
ginning around the turn of the century which could rap-
idly deplete the helium supply then in storage; (6) as-
suming a lack of supply at a later time, future environ-
mentally beneficial technological advancements might be
precluded due to unacceptably adverse environmental ef-
fects of recovery from other sources.

In contrast to the above possibilities, the Secretary’s
statement notes that: (1) government demand for helium
has decreased consistently since 1966, and is presently be-
low the 1961 level; (2) present technological advancement
enables recovery of helium from ‘‘lean’’ sources of he-
lium-bearing natural gas expected to be available in large
quantities in the future; (3) the Bureau of Mines estimates

PPM rm ree vances 5

35a

a total of 17 to 24 billion cubic feet of probable shut-in
‘shelium-rich”’ reserves (i.e., found in natural gas fields
not being exploited for present fuel purposes); (4) in-
cluding the helium currently in storage, in shut-in govern-
ment reserves, and expected to be recoverable from gov-
ernment-owned plants, total reserves approximate 44.5
billion eubie feet; (5) storage of recoverable helium at
today’s costs does not necessarily assure ‘‘low-cost’’ he-
lium in the future; (6) the forecasted large demands for
the future are ‘‘speculative’’ and of questionable reliabil-
ity; (7) government agencies’ estimates for future helium
demands would not require removal of helium presently
in storage ‘‘to meet essential government needs’? until
well into the next century; and (8) assuming the esti-
mated total future demands were to materialize at the
beginning of the next century, as predicted, the storage
now of an additional 20 billion cubic feet of helium would
merely delay, rather than foreclose, the necessity of ob-
taining helium from presently unknown or environmentally
disadvantageous sources.

On the basis of the above assumptions, the Secretary
determined that there had been a substantial diminution
in helium requirements for essential government activi-
ties and that the termination was therefore authorized
under Section 12.1 of the contracts, since the purposes of
the Helium Act Amendments of 1969 had been satisfied,
citing § 167m of the Act, 50 U.S.C.:

‘‘It is the sense of the Congress that it is in the na-
tional interest to foster and encourage individual en-
terprise in the development and distribution of sup-
plies of helium, and at the same time provide, within
economic limits, through the administration of this
chapter, a sustained supply of helium which, together
with supplies available or expected to become avail-
able otherwise, will be sufficient to provide for essen-
tial Government activities.”’

reser Hts Rae et er erg 2 REE EET OT ti

a EN IEE = ERAT ATS RE OTS FPR EE - - “ RE a aa ae eee CES F
- 7

102a

cast that 589 billion cubie feet of helium would be contained
in natural gas produced during the period 1971-2005, and
more than 300 billion eubic feet would be contained in
natural gas produced during the period 1986-2005. The
Bureau of Mines has estimated that over 500 billion eubie
feet of helium will be available from natural gas discovered
during the period ending with the year 2030. Therefore,
considerable amounts of yet-to-be-discovered helium will
probably be available to meet future helium needs.

Finally, I turn briefly to the costs of recovering helium
from sources other than ‘‘helium rich’’ natural gas, since
too costly helium might discourage the use of environmen-
tally beneficial technology which is dependent upon helium.
As I noted above, estimates of recovering helium from the
atmosphere range from $1000 to $3000 per Mef. Cost esti-
mates for recovering helium from leaner gases range from
about $50 per thousand cubic feet of helium recovered from
natural gas containing 0.1 percent of helium to a range of
$500 to $700 per thousand cubic feet recovered from natural
gas containing only 0.006 percent of helium. These costs
must be compared with the cost of obtaining helium from
rich gas at the present time and then storing it. Storing
this relatively cheap helium now for use in the future does
not necessarily result in ‘‘low cost’? helium. For the
helium in storage, the Government is now paying an aver-
age price of $13 per thousand eubie feet with funds bor-
rowed from the Treasury. If helium purchased today at
this price were to be held either until the year 2000 or the
year 2030, the value of each 1000 cubie feet (compounding
at 10 percent) would be $170 and $2973, respectively ; if the
cost were compounded at 6 percent, the value in the year
2000 and 2030 would be $65 and $360 per Mef, respectively.

Research and development during the last quarter of this
century should bring clearer perceptions of the feasibility—
scientific, environmental, and commercial—of various
processes which require helium and promise environmental
advantages, and judgments as to the magnitude of helium
requirements will rest on firmer ground. Over this period

1038a

of time, the prospect is that private industry will be able
to obtain helium to use, and to store for use, in processes
which ‘‘prove out’’ at costs which will not be prohibitive.
Further, it is improbable that any of the presently stored
helium will be required to meet demands through the next
decade, and it may well be that none of it will be used
before the turn of the century or beyond.

As ean be seen from the circumstances discussed above,
it is possible that demand may outrun the supply of helium
recoverable from natural gas, thus forcing recourse to
recovery from the atmosphere. In this event, assuming no
advance in present technology, there would be adverse en-
vironmental impacts resulting from the large amounts of
energy which would be needed or from the inability to adopt
environmentally beneficial technology due to the high cost
of helium. However, since such considerations are based
upon technology which is still to be developed and applied
and which, if successful, may require considerably less
helium than has been so freely forecast, | do not believe
that these risks alone are sufficient as the basis for con-
tinuing the contracts or for greatly expanding the helium
conservation program. Parenthetically, it ought to be noted
that if it is assumed that enormous requirements for helium
will niaterialize in twenty-five, fifty, or seventy-five years,
only the latter alternative—a greatly expanded helium con-
servation program—would satisfy such requirements. Stor-
age of an additional 20 billion eubie feet of helium would
merely postpone, for a relatively short period of time, the
environmental impacts attendant upon recovery from the
atmosphere and continuation of the contracts would do little
to solve helium needs in such circumstances.

I am fortified in my judgment by the realization that
helium is not an ‘‘irretrievable’’ resource. It can be ob-
tained from the atmosphere, and it is by no means clear
that the incremental costs of obtaining helium from the
atmosphere in the year 2025 or 2050 will be so high as to
delay or preclude the adoption of technology to which en-
vironmental advantages are attributable. Further, by that

Es AO es — a

So ARR NCA MER, ERE TE i

104a

time, extractive processes may have been developed which
may have significantly less adverse impact upon the envi-
ronment than is presently foreseen. To summarize, the ad-
verse environmental effects of terminating these three con-
tracts are so problematical as not to warrant further expen-
ditures in this area, as the purposes of the Helium Act
have been achieved.

ConTRACTUAL ASPECTS

By issuing the notice of termination of the three helium
purchase contracts, I have exercised the option which each
of the contracts provides to the Government. The termina-
tion provision in the contract with Cities Service Helex,
Ine., reads as follows:

**12.1 Buyer may, at its option, terminate this con-
tract at any time if any of the following circumstances
or any other circumstance of similar nature should
occur which, in the opinion of the Secretary of the In-
terior, would make the continued operation of Seller’s
plant and the continued purchase of helium-gas mixture
extracted therein unnecessary to accomplish the pur-
poses of the Act or any amendments thereto: (1) the
discovery of large new natural helium resources, or (2)
a substantial diminution in helium requirements. Upon
such termination, the provisions of paragraph 15.1
shall apply.’’

The termination provision in the contract with Phillips
Petroleum Company is identical, except for the fact that
the latter provision mentions Phillips’ two plants. The
termination provision in the contract with National Helium
Corporation reads as follows:

©1921 Buyer may, at its option, terminate this con-
tract at any time if, (1) in the opinion of the Secretary
of the Interior, the discovery of large new helium re-
sources or a substantial diminution in helium require-
ments or any circumstance of similar nature should

105a

occur which would make the continued operation of
Seller’s plant and the continued purchase of helium-gas
mixture extracted therein unnecessary to accomplish
the purposes of the Act or any amendment thereto, or
(2) a material circumstance of foree majeure making
it impracticable or impoxsible for either Buyer or Seller
to carry out its obligations under this contract which
circumstance cannot be remedied with reasonable dis-
patch.’’

On January 26, 1971, a determination was made by the
Under Secretary of the Interior that the continuation of
the three helium purchase contracts was unnecessary to
achieve the objectives of the Helium Act to provide, within
economic limits, ‘ta sustained supply of helium, which, to-
gether with supplies available or expected to become avail-
able otherwise, will be sufficient to provide for essential
fovernment activities.’ The Under Secretary reached
this conclusion in light of the substantial diminution in
Government requirements for helium since 1966, particu-
larly when there was taken into account the new discoveries
of helium resources that had been made since the execution
of the contracts and the availability within economie limits
of helinm from a much wider range of natural gases than
was apparent before 1961, the year in which each of the
three contracts was consummated.

The actions taken by the Under Secretary in January of
1971, to terminate the three contracts did not become effee-
tive because of the issuance of an injunction resting on the
procedural requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act. That injunction has now been interpreted in a
fashion which permits me to consider this matter.

I have reviewed the circumstances pertaining to these
helium purchase contracts, and I am persuaded that the
determination made by the Under Secretary in 1971 was
sound, and in my view, the justification for termination is
even clearer now than in January of 1971.

a SN ee. ae

106a

The purposes of the Helium Act are stated in Section 15
(50 U.S.C. § 167m), which provides as follows:

‘It is the sense of the Congress that it is in the
national interest to foster and encourage individual
enterprise in the development and distribution of sup-
plies of helium, and at the same time provide, within
economic limits, through the administration of this
chapter, a sustained supply of helium which, together
with supplies available or expected to become available
otherwise, will be sufficient to provide for essential
Government activities.’’

While uses of helium other than by the Government are
mentioned in discussions of the bill (H.R. 10548, 86th Cong.)
which beeame the Helium Act Amendments of 1960, and in
the Committee reports on the bill, each report states that:

‘‘The primary objective of H.R. 10548 is to furnish
authority to the Department of the Interior to carry
out an effective, long-range program for the produc-
tion, distribution, and storage of helium in order to
assure a sustained supply, taking into account supplies
from other sources, to meet essential Government needs
** * > (H.R. Rep. No. 1552, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1960): S. Rep. No. 1814, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960).)

The section-by-section analysis of the bill in the House
Report states that:

‘*Section 14 [later renumbered as section 15] states
the policy of the Congress favoring individual enter-
prise in the helium industry waile relying principally
upon administration of the act to assure helium for
essential Government activities.”’ (H. Rep. No. 1552,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960).)

The Senate Committee Report on H.R. 10548 contains a
similar discussion of that section (as renumbered):

‘‘Section 15 declares the sense of the Congress that
it is in the national interest to foster individual enter-

107a

prise in the development of the helium industry while
relying principally upon administration of the act to
supply helium for essential Government activities.’’
(S. Rep. No. 1814, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1960).)

Section 15 did not appear in the bills submitted to the
Congress by the Department or in H.R. 10548 as intro-
duced. The House added the section, for reasons explained
by the House Committee:

**A new section 14 [the present section 15] contain-
ing a policy statement was added. It emphasizes the
need to foster individual initiative and avoid Govern-
ment monopoly in helium production and distribution
as the volume of helium produced and consumed in-
creases, and declares that Government operations un-
der the Act should, with other sources, be on a scale
‘sufficient to assure a sustained supply of helium for
essential Government activities.’’ (H.R. Rep. No. 1552,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960).)

In the termination provisions, each of the circumstances
of termination is related to the ‘‘purposes of the 0m ow - he CE OTT eS 7

122a

§ 4332. Cooperation of agencies; reports; availability of
information; recommendations; international and
national coordination of efforts.

The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest
extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public
laws of the United States shall be interpreted and admin-
istered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall—

(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach
which will insure the integrated use of the natural and
social sciences and the environmental design arts in
planning and in decisionmaking which may have an
impact on man’s environment;

(B) identify and develop methods and procedures,
in consultation with the Council on Environmental
Quality established by subchapter IT of this chapter,
which will insure +uat presently unquantified environ-
mental amenities and values may be given appropriate
consideration in decisionmaking along with economic
and technical considerations ;

(C) inelude in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on—

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed
-action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which can-
not be avoided should the proposal be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses
of man’s environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and

123a

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented.

Prior to making any detailed statement, the respon-
sible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the
comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved. Copies of such state-
ment and the comments and views of the appropriate
Federal, State, and local agencies, which are author-
ized to develop and enforce environmental standards,
shall be made available to the President, the Council on
Environmental Quality and to the public as provided
by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the pro-
posal through the existing agency review processes ;

(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alter-
natives to recommended courses of action in any pro-
posal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
alternative uses of available resources;

(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range char-
acter of environmental problems and, where consistent
with the foreign policy of the United States, lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and
programs designed to maximize international coopera-
tion in anticipating and preventing a decline in the
quality of mankind’s world environment;

(F) make availabie to States, counties, municipali-
ties, institutions, and individuals, advice and informa-
tion useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the
quality of the envirenment;

(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in
the planning and development of resource-oriented
projects; and

(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality
established by subchapter II of this chapter.

oe a — . * + * + *
Administrative Procedure Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970)
$701. Application; definitions.

(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions
thereof, except to the extent that—

(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or

(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion
by law.

AE a I FR

137a
(b) For the purpose of this chapter—

(1) ‘‘agency’’ means each authority of the Govern-
ment of the United States, whether or not it is within
or subject to review by another agency, but does not
include—

(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States ;

(C) the governments of the territories or posses-
sions of the United States;

(D) the government of the District of Columbia;

(E) agencies composed of representatives of the
parties or of representatives of organizations of the
parties to the disputes determined by them;

(°) courts martial and military commissions ;

(G) military authority exercised in the field in
time of war or in occupied territory ; or

(H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739,
1743, and 1744 of title 12; chapter 2 of title 41; or
sections 1622, 1884, 1891-1902, and former section
1641(b) (2), of title 50, appendix; and

(2) ‘*person’’, ‘‘rule’’, ‘‘order”’, ‘‘license’’, ‘‘sane-
tion’’, ‘‘relief’’, and ‘‘agency action’’ have the mean-
ings given them by section 551 of this title.

$702. Right of review.

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action, within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof.

138a

$703. Form and venue of proceeding.

The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special
statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter
in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or inade-
quacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, includ-
ing actions for declaratory judgments or writs of pro-
hibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a
court of competent jurisdiction. Except to the extent that
prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial re-
view is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial
review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforce-
ment,

§ 704. Actions reviewable.

Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy
in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not
directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of
the final ageney action. Except as otherwise expressly
required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final
for the purposes of this section whether or not there has
been presented or determined an application for a declara-
tory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the
action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior
agency authority.

$705. Relief pending review.

When an agency finds that justice so requires, it may
postpone the effective date of action taken by it, pending
judicial review. On such conditions as may be required
and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury,
the reviewing court, including the court to which a case
may be taken on appeal from or on application for cer-
tiorari or other writ to a reviewing court, may issue all

139a

necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effec-
tive date of an agency action oi to preserve status or rights
pending conclusion of the review proceedings.

£706. Scope of review.

To the extent necessary to decision and when presented,
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action. The reviewing court shall—

(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed; and

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusions found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privi-
lege, or immunity;

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
or limitations, or short of statutory right;

(D) without observance of procedure required by
law ;

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case
subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or other-
wise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute; or

(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that
the facts are subject to trial de novo by the review-
ing court.

In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a
party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prej-
udicial error.

ee ~ — wor Re Re ENA I

peer ees

140a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 73-1169 & 73-1449

September Term — October 19, 1973

Before: Honorable Jean F. Breitenstein, Senior Circuit
Judge Honorable Delmas C. Hill and Honorable
William E. Doyle, Circuit Judges.

NationaL Hetium Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
Puiturrs PetroLerm Company,
and
Cites Service Hevex, Ivc., /ntervenor-Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.

Rocers C. B. Mortox, Secretary of the Interior, and
Exsvrt F. Osporne, Director, Bureau of Mines, De-
partment of the Interior, Defendants-Appellants.

These causes came on to be heard on the records on
appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas and were argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, it is ordered that the judg-
ment of the U.S. District Court is reversed and the causes
remanded with directions to dismiss the action in ac-
cordance with the opinion of this Court. Breitenstein,
Cireuit Judge, concurs.

DF Kanchvesatseektneedoceceeeces
Howard K. Phillips, Clerk

By: Lavon M. Irlbeck

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0774%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
