# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 414 U.S. 860

## Text

FILED.

FILE COPY

AUG 2 1973

Ch et A TK, £2. ch

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1973.

78-223

S. E. NICHOLS SHILLINGTON CORP.,
Petitioner,

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

James L. Burke,
Attorney for Petitioner,
315 Lake Street,
Elmira, N. Y. 14901

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Table of Contents.

Page
nion Below 1
en III co si saasoenllahchiebsiammsacsneienanebditns 1
isons for Granting the Writ 2
RRR Pin. ERIS, ee UO et NN OCR Nec eS ey eC 3

Appendix of Decisions.

lzment Order of the Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit 4

‘ision and Order of National Labor Relations

Board 6
Oe MT PD cece cncecnstccerccotoneientnas 8
CITATIONS.
ber v. N.L.R.B. (CCA-5), 223 F. 2d 748 ............... 2
.R.B. v. Barberton Plasties (CCA-6), 354 F.
2d 66 2
R.B. v. J. P. Stevens, 167 N.L.R.B. (#37) ........ 2

4R.B. v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats (CCA-2),
341 F. 2d 725

R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1...

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In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1973.

a oe
S. E. NicHots SHILLINGTON CorpP.,

Petitioner,
v.
NationaL Lasor Retations Boarp,

Respondent.

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

-etitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to
jew the judgment of the United States Cireuit Court
Appeals for the Third Cireuit entered on the above
e on May 2, 1973.

Opinion Below.

‘he U. S. Court of Appeals, Third Cireuit, rendered
opinion but issued a judgment order. This judgment
ler, as well as the decision and order of the National
bor Relations Board and the Trial Examiner’s de-
ion, are set forth in an appendix at the end of this
ition.

Question Presented.

s an employee who has committed wilful misconduct
‘tected against discharge because the misconduct arose
the course of attempting to organize a union?

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The facts are admitted. An employee in an active retail
department store, in the middle of the store’s operating
hours, ealled a meeting of between 10 and 15 clerks,
held in the store but away from their work areas. These
clerks manned between 40 and 50% of the entire store
area. The meeting lasted for a period of ten to twenty
minutes.

The store manager, to the knowledge of the offending
employee, was absent from the store, but discharged
the employee the next day.

Prior to the discharge there is no allegation or proof
of anti-union animus.

Previously the Board has held that wilful misconduct
will not be condoned even though its purpose is to foster
a union. N.L.R.B. v. Barberton Plastics (CCA-6), 354
F. 2d 66; N.D.R.B. v. J. P. Stevens, 167 N.L.R.B. (#37).

Two Cireuit Courts of Appeal have likewise held that
a purpose of union organization is not a defense against
discharge for wilful misconduct. Huber v. N.L.R.B.
(CCA-5), 223 F. 2d 748; N.L.R.B. v. Park Edge Sheridan
Meats (CCA-2), 341 F. 2d 725.

Reasons for Granting the Writ.

As part of the judicial evolution of employees’ rights
while organizing unions and the rights of business enter-
prises to carry on activities without undue interference,
it was early held by this Court that the National Labor
Relations Act does not interfere with an employer's
inherent right to operate his business including the right
to discharge if the discharge was motivated by reasons
associated with efficient conduct of his business. N.U.R.B.
v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1.

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The Board by the appealed decision and others has
and is ruling directly contrary to Jones & Laughlin.
The Board no longer requires showing of an anti-union
animus but concludes that since the employee was active
in union organization and is discharged, ipso facto,
regardless of normal business conduct, the discharge was
motivated primarily to discourage union organization.

Conclusion.

For the reason set forth above, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that this petition for a writ of certiorari should
be granted.

JAMES L. BURKF,

Attorney for Petitioner,
315 Lake Street,
Elmira, N. Y. 14901

SOUT ee

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4
APPENDIX OF DECISIONS.

Judgment Order of the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

For THE TuHirp CiRcvirt.
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NationaL Laspor Retations Boarp,
Petitioner,
v.

S. E. Nicnots Saiiumncton Corp.,
Respondent.

No. 72-1538
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On APPLICATION OF ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF THE
NationaL Lasor Retations Boarp

Submitted Under Third Cireuit Rule 12(6) April 9, 1973

Before:

Adams and Gibbons, Circuit Judges and Joseph S.
Lord, III, District Judge.

Peter G. Nash, General Counsel.

Patrick Hardin, Associate General Counsel.

Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Assistant General Counsel.

Elliott Moore, Ronald I. Tish, Attorneys.

National Labor Relations Board.

James L. Burke, 315 Lake Street, Elmira, New York
14901, Attorney for Respondent.

ARRON PA DTN

5

After considering the respondent's contention that the
National Labor Relations Board erred in finding that the
S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp. violated Sections 8(a) (1)
& (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, we find that
there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole
to support the Board's finding that the Company violated
Sections S(a)(1) & (3) of the Act by discharging em-
ployee, Rosemary Stamm, because of her union activities,
and it is

ORDERED AND aDsuDGED that the Order of the National
Labor Relations Board in this matter be enforced. Costs
taxed against respondent.

Dated: April 10, 1973.
By the Court,

(Illegible) M. ADAMS
Cirenit Judge

Attest:

THomas FE. Quinn

Certified as a true copy and issue in lieu of a formal
mandate on May 2, 1973.

Costs taxed in favor of petitioner as follows:

Brief & Appx. for petitioner $743.45

Test:

Tomas E. Quinn
Clerk, United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

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6

Decision and Order of National Labor Relations Board.

ee
NationaL Laspor Retations Boarp,

Petitioner,
v.
S. E. Nicnots Sxititixcton Corp.,

Respondent.

<<

On November 8, 1971, Trial Examiner Paul Bisgyer
issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. There-
after, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the General Counsel filed an answering brief.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in
this proceeding to a three-member panel.

The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner’s Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner’s rulings,
findings,’ and conclusions and to adopt his recommended
Order.

‘The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings
made by the Trial Examiner. It is the Board’s established policy
not to overrule a Trial Examiner’s resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the. clear preponderance of all of the relevant
evidence convinees us that the resolutions were incorrect. Stand-
ard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F. 2d 362
(C.A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing his findings.

. LANA ESE TALE RIS

7
Order

Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the
Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent,
S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp., Shillington, Pennsylvania,
its officers, agents successors, and assigns, shall take
| the action set forth in the Trial Examiner’s recommended

Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C., January 28, 1972.
NationaL Laspor Rexrations Boarp

Edward B. Miller,
Chairman

John H. Fanning,
Member

Ralph E. Kennedy,
Member

[Seal.]

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[Issued November 8, 1971]
Trial Examiner’s Decision.
Statement of the Case

Pavut Biscyer, Trial Examiner: This proceeding, with
all the parties represented, was heard on August 10 and
11, 1971 at Reading, Pennsylvania, on the complaint of
the General Counsel issued on June 25, 1971,’ and the
answer of S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp., herein called
the Respondent or Company. The question litigated is
whether the Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a) (1)
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended,
discriminatorily discharged employee Rosemary Stamm
because of her union or other concerted activities. At
the close of the hearing, the parties waived oral argu-
ment but thereafter submitted briefs in support of their
respective positions.

'The complaint is based on original, first, second, and third
amended charges filed on April 13, 22, May 19 and June 24,
1971, respectively. Copies of these charges were duly served
on the Respondent by registered mail on the respective filing
dates.

*Seetion 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor prae-
tice for an employer ‘to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.”
Insofar as pertinent, Section 7 provides that “[{e]mployees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection .. .”

Section 8(a)(3), with certain qualifications not material
herein, prohibits an employer, ‘‘by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-
ployment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization .. .”

wz TTD

Upon the entire record, and from my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and with due consideration
being given to the arguments advanced by the parties,
I make the following:

9

Fixpincs anp CoNcLUsIONS

I. The Business of the Respondent

The Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation with its
principal office in Shillington, Pennsylvania, operates
a retail discount department store at that location.
In the regular course and conduct of its business the
Respondent’s annual gross sales exceed $1,000,000. It
also annually purchases and receives from outside the
State goods valued in excess of $50,000.

I find that the Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.

II. The Labor Organization Involved

It is conceded, and I find that Retail Clerks, Employees
Union, Local 1393, Retail Clerks International Associa-
tion, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.

Ill. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. The Evidence
This is another one of those familiar cases where the
employer is charged with attempting to stem the organi-

zational tide by unlawfully terminating the leader in the
union movement, while the employer protests his inno-

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cence, insisting that the discharge was motivated solely
by legitimate business reasons. On the basis of the
evidence presented, I find the allegations of discrimination
sustained.

1. Stamm’s employment; the commencement of union
activities

Rosemary Stamm was hired by the Respondent in De-
cember 1970 as a cashier on the night shift.* Her hours
were from 5 to 10 p.m. Monday through Friday and
from 1 to 10 p.m. on Saturday. In February 1971,
Stamm was assigned additional functions previously per-
formed by Shirley Laman, the night head cashier who
left the Respondent’s employ. These duties included
verifying customer checks and charges; supplying cashiers
with change; checking out registers; authenticating
“voids”; releasing cashiers from their stations and seeing
that receipts were brought to the office at the close of
the business day; arranging for rest breaks; and training
new cashiers. She was instructed in these fuctions by
Jean Ann Nyman, the head office cashier, who informed
her that Store Manager Murray Jacobs was pleased with
her performance and thought that she was qualified to
take on the indicated new duties.© On April 7, Stamm

°Stamm also had responsibilities with respect to the operation
of the eandy counter.

‘Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 1971.

‘These findings are based on the persuasive testimony of
Stamm and Sharon DeLong, who was a cashier during Stamm’s
employment. Neither Jacobs’ denial that Stamm was assigned
head cashier functions nor Nyman’s denial of knowledge that
Stamm was performing them impresses me as coming from candid
witnesses. Moreover, it is hardly likely that DeLong, who is
still in the Respondent’s employ, would bear false testimony
against her employer and thus invite its ill will. Georgia Rug
Mill, 131 NLRB 1304, 1305, fn. 2.

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was, nevertheless, summarily discharged under circum-
stances related below.

Because of her dissatisfaction with the wages, hours and
other working conditions in the store, Stamm discussed
the situation and the desirability of union representa-
tion with the employees on the night shift. Receiving a
favorable response from a majority of those employees,
Stamm on March 29 telephoned the Union and advised
its president of the employees’ union interest. The
next day, Organizer Eugene Nissley visited Stamm at her
home, gave her union authorization cards and booklets
and instructed her in the technique of soliciting card
signatures from employees. About 4:30 in the after-
noon, before she was scheduled to begin work, Stamm
arrived at the store and in the employee cloakroom
succeeded in securing 23 signed cards from employees as
they arrived for work. Having thus exhausted her supply
of cards, Nissley on Monday, April 5, furnished her with
more authorization cards.

11

2. The events of April 6

On the morning of April 6, Store Manager Murray
Jacobs left the store to attend a seminar in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. Upon learning this, Robert Soto, the
manager of the leased shoe department, telephoned Stamm
at her home about 11:30 a.m., informed her of Jacob’s
absence and that he (Soto)® and other day shift em-
ployees were interested in having a union and suggested
that she come to the store. Accordingly, about noon-
time, Stamn# arrived there and proceeded to solicit card
signatures at the snack bar and work stations from
employees, some of whom Soto indicated were likely

“Soto had previously expressed his reluctance to become in-
volved in the union movement when Stamm sought his s:pport
and assistance in organizing the day shift employees.

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prospects. When discussing the Union with clerks in
the selling areas, Stamm credibly testified without con-
tradiction, she was careful that there were no customers
around to be waited upon. Soto also engaged in this
organizational effort, securing a number of signed cards
which he turned over to Stamm. By the time Stamm
left the store that afternoon she had collected 25 to
30 signed cards.

In the course of the foregoing activities some 10 to 15
employees gathered in the receiving room which is sepa-
rated from the public areas of the store. Several of
these employees had left their work stations on the
selling floor to be present while others were in the re-
ceiving room or were passing through in connection with
the performance of their regular duties. Probably other
employees on their lunch period were also there. The
number in the group at any particular time, however,
varied as some left and others entered the room. Whether
or not Stamm and Soto deliberately convened this meet-
ing and invited employees to attend,’ it is quite clear
; that they were responsible for it. Manifestly, there was
i nothing secretive about this meeting which appears to
i have been more in the nature of a question and answer
; period where Stamm and Soto explained the advantages
of unionization in response to questions put to them.
This meeting lasted 10 to 20 minutes and no employee
was reprimanded for leaving his or her work station
unattended. After this meeting, Stamm resumed her
solicitation in the store until! her departure about 1 or
1:30 p.m.

The above events were promptly reported the same
afternoon to the Respondent’s executive offices in New

12

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*In view of my findings and conclusions, it is unnecessary to
determine whether Stamm and Soto had actually assembled
these employees which they denied they did in contradiction of
other testimony.

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York and then to Store Manager Jacobs while he was
still in Laneaster. The testimony relating to these re-
ports was given by Jacobs, the only witness produced
hy the Respondent, and is as follows: While still in
Lancaster Jacobs received two telephone calls, urging
him to return to the store immediately because there
were “meetings and disruptions.” One call was from
Alma Dietrich, then an employee in the Shillington store
office, who simply relayed a message to Jacobs that
he was wanted back in the store. The second call came
from Gerald Holt, the area supervisor of ladies’, men’s
and children’s wear departments. Holt works out of
the New York offices and occasionally visits the Shilling-
ton store. Stating that he was making the call on behalf
of Company President Rosenbaum, Holt told Jacobs that
he should immediately return to the store because “all
hell was breaking loose—or something to that effect”;
that union organization “meetings” were being held in the
hack stockroom; that employees were off the floor; and
that store operations were being disrupted. Although
earlier in his cross examination Jacobs denied that Holt
mentioned that Stamm or any other person was involved
in the organizational activities or attended “the meet-
ings” or that Stamm solicited cards or discussed the
Union in the store, he later testified that Holt told him
that Soto “was behind” the union organizational drive
and was at the meeting. As for Stamm’s union activity,
so Jacobs testified, he first learned about it after he
returned to the store from Lancaster and was unhappy
with this development. However, in subsequent testi-
mony, Jacobs stated that Holt informed him in the above
telephone conversation that Stamm and Soto, were the
two “principals” who “were leading the meetings.” Con-
cerning the reports of the above episode made to the
Respondent’s executive offices in New York, Jacobs testi-
fied that in the same telephone conversation Holt ad-

13

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vised him that he had previously conveyed the informa-
tion to President Rosenbaum in New York after Juanita
Wentzell, an area supervisor who was then visiting the
store, called him at home and apprised him of the
situation.

Jacobs further testified that after the second telephone
eall he left Lancaster, arriving at the store between 3:30
and 4 in the afternoon, at which time Stamm and Soto
had already gone. He also testified that he then received
reports from his assistant managers, Wentzell, and
several employees, that in his absence Stamm and Soto
had been “conducting meetings in the stockroom” and that
employees were off the floor. However, he testified,
his informants did not furnish him with details regarding
the meetings and dislocations or the duration of the em-
ployees’ absence from their work stations. Admittedly,
Jacobs did not reprimand any employee for leaving his
or her station to attend a meeting. In fact, he denied
knowing who attended the meeting except the two “prin-
cipals,’ Stamm and Soto. Furthermore, there is no
direct, convincing testimony that Stamm’s and Soto's
union solicitation and discussions in the store caused
any serious disruption or dislocation of store operations.
Indeed, if they did, it is difficult to understand why the
persons in charge of the store in Jacohs’ absence or
other supervisors did not take measures to halt such
conduct. According to the head office cashier, Jean Ann
Nyman, who unquestionably was unsympathetic to the
union organizational campaign, testified that when = she
reported the afternoon happenings to Jacobs, he simply

14

SAceording to the testimony of DeeDee Schillermann, the
manager of the ladies’ and girls’ wear department, she told
one or two girls in her department that Stamm and Soto wanted
to talk to them in the receiving room. This information was
passed on to other employees in this department. Schillermann
and apparently other employees in that department joined the
group in the reeeiving room.

| EN a NOME AEA

15

commented “Don’t worry about it. These things happen.”
In the evening (April 6), Stamm came to work as
usual. However, according to her uncontroverted testi-
mony, which I credit, Jacobs personally kept her under
surveillance, following her wherever she went, including
to the door of the ladies’ room. She further credibly
testified without contradiction that, while working at
her cash register, one of the security guards approached
her, patted her clothes pocket which contained union
cards, and cautioned her that she “better not let Mr.
Jacobs see [the cards] ... He’s watching you.” Never-
theless, during her break at the snack bar Stamm secured
additional signed cards from a few employees.

3. The involvement of the New York office in Stamm’s
discharge

It is disputed that the Respondent's executives in the
New York offices, including President Rosenbaum, Execu-
tive Vice President Manfred Brecker, and Vice President
Keller were fully conversant with Stamm’s and Soto’s
organizational activity in the Shillington store during
the afternoon of April 6. Later in the evening Jacobs
received a long distance telephone call from Brecker in
New York to discuss the subject of discharging Stamm.
Jacobs gave the following account of this conversation :*°
Brecker asked Jacobs whether he had been aware of
Stamm’s organizational activity. When Jacobs re-
sponded in the negative, Brecker retorted that he “was
very remiss as store manager in not having knowledge
of some of these things that went on under—[his] roof.”
In discussing Stamm’s employment status, Brecker pointed
out that she was a security risk who had previously con-

*It appears that Soto was discharged by his employer, the
lessee of the store’s shoe department, on April 6 or 7.

“Brecker did not testify, nor did any other company execu-
tive in the New York office.

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fessed to giving unauthorized discounts and taking candy
for her own use. Jacobs further testified that, although
Area Supervisor Katz had 3 weeks before Stamm's
discharge advised him that Stamm was a security risk,
this was the first time he learned the details. The facts
of this accusation will be later considered.

According to Jacobs, the final discharge decision was
made the following day, April 7. It is clear that the
decision emanated from the New York executive offices
and that Jacobs’ participation was apparently to agree
that this action was “long overdue.” Jacobs conceded
that he did not initiate the discharge, even though as
store manager he had the power to terminate store em-
ployees.

Jacobs testified that on April 7 Vice President Keller
visited the store and instructed him to discharge Stamm.
He further testified that Keller told him that “the biggest
reason” for Stamm’s dismissal was the fact that she
was a security risk, adding another reason that “to a
great extent” she caused disruption of the store operation
the day before when “most of the staff” left their work
stations to attend the organizational meeting. Admittedly,
Stamm was never given the opportunity to answer these
charges.

4. Stamm’s discharge on April 7; the Respondent's
reasons asserted at the hearing

On April 7, at 5 p.m. Stamm reported for work on
her regular shift. While hanging up her coat in the
cloakroom, she was paged over the intercommunication
system to go to the office. There she met Jacobs who
asked her to enter the conference room. Stamm ex-
pressed her reluctance to do so, stating that anything
Jacobs had to say to her could be said in the office.
This evoked Jacobs’ angry response that he hoped she

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17

had a good lawyer. Stamm, nevertheless, proceeded to
the conference room where Jacobs told her that company
rules did not permit the employment of relatives and
that she therefore had to go. Stamm protested her
selection and pointed out that she had been in the Com-
pany’s employ longer than her sister-in-law, Linda Stamm.
Besides, Stamm noted, a sister and brother, Susi and
Mike Warner, were then working in the store. Jacobs
answered that this was none of her business and Stamm
walked out of the conference room and went to the
snack bar.”

At the snack bar, Stamm heard the Warners being
paged. A few minutes later the Warners left the con-
ference room. Susie Warner was in tears when her
brother approached Stamm and aceused her of causing
Susie’s discharge."*? Stamm disavowed responsibility.

At the hearing, Jacobs admitted telling Stamm that
she was being separated because of the Company’s “no
relative” rule. However, he testified that this was not
the true reason. When questioned why he gave Stamm
a false reason, Jacobs testified that he was “a coward”:
that he “didn’t want to start a commotion by going into
details”; and that he “thought the best way to solve the
situation was to invoke the relationship rule.” However,
this leaves unexplained the separation of Susie Warner
under this alleged rule except to suggest that it was

"The foregoing findings are based on Stamm’s testimony.
Jacobs did not contradict Stamm’s account except that he denied
that he stated that he hoped she had a good lawyer. I find
Stamm to be a more credible and candid witness than Jacobs
who demonstrated his unreliability, among other things, in his
highly dubious testimony regarding the reasons for Stamm’s
discharge discussed below.

Stamm testified that she later learned that Susie Warner
was transferred to the Antietam Valley store. No contradicting
testimony was adduced.

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prompted by a desire to lend an air of legitimacy to
Stamm's discharge."

After staying at the snack bar for a short while, Stamm
made a telephone call to Union Organizer Nissley and
reported her discharge. Thereafter, when Area Super-
visor Holt began to follow her in the store, Stamm in-
vited him to walk with her. Holt then told her that
he had to ask her to leave, adding that she knew why;
that “[t]here’s things going on” in which he id not
want to get involved; that she was a “good worker”
and “a nice person”; and that it was “nothing personal.”
Stamm agreed to leave, and Holt took her to the snack
bar and bought her a soda. While there, Vice President
Keller approached and angrily reminded Holt that he
had directed him to get Stamm out of the store. Holt
answered that Stamm wasn't doing anything and was
going to leave peacefully as soon as she finished her
soda. Keller remained at the snack bar until Stamm
departed.

Although the discharge obviously originated in the
Respondent’s New York executive offices, Jacobs was the
only management witness to attest to the asserted under-
lying reasons for this action, namely, Stamm was a
security risk; she caused a disruption of store operations
on April 6; and her repeated unauthorized absences
from her regular cashier’s post at the checkout counter.
As for Stamm’s purported designation as a security risk,
the undisputed facts are contained in Stamm’s follow-
ing testimony: Tn accordance with her agreement noted
in her employment application, Stamm submitted in
January to an interview and polygraph test conducted

According to the undisputed testimony of employee DeLong,
at a company meeting of employees on April 7 or 8, a manage-
ment official also stated, in answer to an employee's question,
that Stamm was terminated because of the company rule pro-
hibiting the employment of relatives of employees.

19

by Lincoln Zohn for the Respondent. After preliminary
interrogation and testing, the examiner told her that
because of her nervousness no valid results could be
achieved and that therefore he would forego the poly-
graph test. In the interview, Stamm freely admitted
that at one time while cleaning up candy shelves, which
was one of her assigned duties, she found a half-empty
bag of candy. After making an appropriate notation in
a markup book, she shared the candy with several cashiers.
The examiner expressed his opinion that this was not
stealing. Stamm also told him that she once gave an
unauthorized discount. The examiner assured her that
these admissions would not affect her job and that she
need not worry. At the examiner's request, she signed a
statement containing her admissions and the interview
ended. Nothing was said to her thereafter concerning
her acts in question or the necessity for taking another
polygraph test.”

As indicated above, Jacobs testified that on April 17,
when he was instructed by Vice President Keller to
terminate Stamm, he was advised that Stamm’s being a
security risk was “the biggest reason” for this action.
Jacobs further testified that about 3 or 4 weeks before
the discharge, he was orally informed by Area Super-
visor Katz for the first time that she was a_ security
risk but that he was given no details regarding the basis
for this designation. Under cross examination, it de-
veloped that at that time he was given a list of about
half a dozen “[slecurity risk employees that were sched-
uled for dismissal” and that all but Stamm were dis-
charged before April 6. When questioned why she was

‘At the hearing, the Respondent's counsel stated that one
ground for discharging Stamm was the Company's belief that
she was a security risk because of her refusal to submit to a
polygraph examination. However, not only was no evidence
presented to substantiate this assertion, but the record establishes
the contrary to be the fact.

>]

Disrrvicsais Ld A ceeaaeide ictans.s

retained during the 3 or 4 week period, Jacobs testified
that it was to keep her under surveillance “as a means
of leading us to other employees who might be involved
with her.” Yet, since Jacobs concededly was not in-
formed why Stamm was considered a security risk, her
asserted retention for surveillance purposes while the
other listed security risks were discharged is highly
questionable. Moreover, although Jacobs admitted that
he had no evidence that Stamm had repeated the alleged
offenses which made her a security risk, she was never-
theless subsequently discharged.

The transparency of the security risk reason for
Stamm’s termination requires no further discussion. In-
deed, the Respondent in its brief realistically discounts
the security risk ground in observing that “the polygraph
report, while justifying unusual surveillance, did not
produce anything of substance against Stamm.” As for
my appraisal of Jacob’s testimony, I do not believe that
the Respondent ever regarded Stamm a security risk or
that she was kept under surveillance for that reason.

With respect to Stamm’s asserted disruption of store
operations on April 6, this has already been discussed
earlier in this Decision. Turning then to the final reason
for Stamm’s discharge, her alleged unauthorized absence
from her assigned station at the cash register, the Re-
spondent presented such a dismal picture of her neglect
of duties which, if true, leaves one perplexed why it
had not gotten rid of her sooner. Moreover, if she
were actually guilty of these derelictions, and they really

“In its brief, the Respondent acknowledges the understand-
able doubt that Stamm’s neglect of duties really motivated her dis-
charge. Thus, the brief states that ‘‘the employer knowing of
her neglect for a long period of time did not act on it previously,
so that taken alone it does not appear to be the reason for dis-
charge.”” However, it argues that Stamm’s neglect of duties
“taken in conjunction with the disruption of store operations
amply justifies discharge.”

PRET LtePC PS,

21

prompted the discharge, it is incomprehensible why Jacobs
should have failed to inform Stamm at her discharge
interview of such fact.

In any event, Jacobs recited the following account of
Stamm’s neglect of duties: For at least several weeks
before her dismissal, Stamm failed to perform her job
at the cash register. She would wander around in the
store, requiring him “frequently” to page her to return
to her register at the checkout counter. This happened
approximately three times an evening, despite the fact
that he had admonished her that her business was to be
at her register and not to leave it except for breaks
and “under . .. [his] direction.” As time went on,
Jacobs’ warnings to Stamm became more severe. He prob-
ably verbally warned her four or five times but could
not remember the nature of those reprimands. On some
occasions of her absence from her register, he asked
her for the reason she was away but could not recall
the most recent date of such inquiry. However, he re-
called that when he found Stamm in the shoe department
a week before her discharge, he questioned her about
her absence and ordered her to return to her register.
Jacobs testified that he kept no written record of Stamm’s
reprimands or unauthorized absences; nor did he have
records of any employee’s performance.”

Also testifying on the Respondent’s behalf was Jean
Ann Nyman, the head office cashier, who I find was hostile
to the Union” and inclined to gross exaggeration. She
testified, in substance, that her workday began 8 o’clock
in the morning but she usually worked to 7, 8 or 9

Because of the absence of written records of this nature,
Jacobs indicated that the New York executive offices would have
no knowledge of Stamm’s performance.

“Although not contended to be a supervisor within the mean-
ing of the Act, Nyman enjoys a position of responsibility with
respect to employees. About noon on April 6, in response to
the Union's organizational drive, Nyman initiated and drafted

PDisatanseviacitcwrat scr wh Seu Five

22

o'clock in the evening and thus had an opportunity to
observe Stamm’s work habits on the night shift. Accord-
ing to Nyman, Stamm was a fine cashier until the middle
of January when she began leaving her register to walk
around the store or sit at the snack bar. Before Stamm
developed these bad habits, she (Nyman) had intended
to recommend Stamm to Jacobs as a replacement for
the night head cashier who had left the Company's em-
ploy. Nyman testified that she did not make the recom-
mendation because of Stamm’s repeated delinquences in
“never” being at her register; that she wandered around
in areas where she had no right to be and “constantly”
had to be called back; that for 2 or 3 weeks before her
discharge, Stamm was called back to the register “several
times”—“four or five times, six, seven, eight, nine times a
night”—and, on occasions after returning, she would leave
again, necessitating her being paged again; that through-
out February and March several eashiers and office em-
ployees complained to her (Nyman) about Stamm’s ab-
sences; that she reported Stamm’s conduct and employee
complaints to Jacobs who stated that he would observe
Stamm; and that one day in the middle or end of March,
Nyman also spoke to Stamm about her wanderings which
griped employees with the result that her conduct only
worsened.

(footnote continued):

a petition that the employees ‘‘did not wish to be part of any
Union organization” and thereafter solicited and secured some
50 employee signatures. She also furnished employees advice
on sending individual letters to the Union, requesting return of
their previously signed authorization ecards. According to the
testimony of DeeDee Schillermann, the department manager of
ladies’ and girls’ wear whom the Respondent produced as a wit-
ness, she and several other employees gave Nyman the with-
drawal letters they had written to be forwarded to the Union
by certified mail, without affixing postage stamps. The com-
plaint, however, does not allege that the Respondent violated
the Act by reason of Nyman’s conduct.

23

The testimony of Carol L. McElwee, a former em-
ployee and witness for the Respondent,** was in the
same general vein. According to her, Stamm was “fre-
quently” in the shoe department and soft goods depart-
ment areas in the rear of the store where she overheard
conversations between Stamm and Soto. McElwee fur-
ther testified that these conversations occurred at least
once a night and sometimes more often; that Stamm’s
wanderings began in December when Stamm was first
employed and remained away from her work stations
until paged to return; that she (McElwee) heard Stamm
being paged at least every night with its frequency in-
creasing as time went on; and that she (McElwee) on
several occasions complained to management that Stamm
was talking in the rear of the store and was disturbing
employees working there.

Disputing the foregoing recitation of her derelictions,
Stamm testified, in effect, that her absences from the
register were in connection with the performance of her
duties or when she was on a break and referred to three
such incidents. One incident involved the handling of
a refund about 4 weeks before her discharge. According
to Stamm, she took care of the refund in the rear of
the store, at Nyman’s direction, when Jacobs paged her
to return to the checkout counter to approve a check.
In the office, Jacobs reprimanded her for running around
in the store. When Stamm explained her presence in
the rear of the store, Jacobs turned to Nyman who
answered that she told Stamm to have somebody else
handle the refund.

Although McElwee also enjoyed a position of responsibility
over employees while she was in the Respondent’s employ, it is
not urged that she was a supervisor within the meaning of the
Act. She admitted that employees tried to keep knowledge of
the Union’s campaign from her because they considered her un-
friendly as to the Union.

pratt sesh ere 5S ere = = ee De Ses ag Pie le NA SOY,

Disiticisisitcttsiconwiccinncrs Fad R

24

The second occasion she was paged, Stamm testified,
was when she went to the ladies’ room. As for the third
incident, Stamm testified that she went to the jewelry
counter after she was called by a salesgirl to show her
how to make out a charge; that while she was explaining
the procedure, she was paged; and that when Stamm
informed Jacobs the reason for being at the jewelry
counter, Jacobs told the salesgirl that if she needed as-
sistance in preparing a charge, to go to the office. Stamm
also testified that she was never warned that she risked
discharge or other consequences if she persisted in ab-
senting herself from the register.

Employee DeLong, who worked as a cashier near
Stamm, substantially corrohorated Stamm’s testimony in
various respects. She testified that Stamm was not
absent from her register too often, probably three or
four times, but did not know the purpose of those ab-
sences. She further testified that Stamm did not operate
a register at times when she was engaged in performing
other duties, such as checking coupons, getting change
for the cashiers or signing “voids” or charges. In addi-
tion, DeLong denied that she ever complained about
Stamm’s absences from the register nor, to her knowl-
edge, did the other cashiers complain.

From my appraisal of the testimony in the context of
all the circumstances related above, I find that the testi-
mony of Jacobs and other company witnesses concerning
Stamm’s delinquencies was greatly exaggerated and _ be-
yond reasonable belief. T seriously doubt that if her
conduct were as bad as it was pictured to be Jacobs
would have retained her as long as he did or that he
would not have mentioned her shortcomings at the time
of her dismissal. Accordingly, T credit Stamm’s and
DeLong’s testimony. In any event, as I later conclude,
whatever estimate the Respondent might have had of
Stamm’s work habits or performance, it did not enter
into its decision to discharge her.

—eSSEeooX__“ SDSS SB

25
5. Stamm’s subsequent evictions from the store

On April 10, Rosemary Stamm and her husband visited
the store to purchase a pair of shoes for their child.
While their child was being fitted, Store Manager Jacobs
approached and asked them to leave. When Stamm’s
husband protested that there was no reason for this re-
quest, Jacobs responded that Rosemary was a union
organizer, and that he was going to call the police unless
they left. After Jacobs walked away, two security guards
informed the Stamms that Jacobs wanted them out of
the store. Asserting their constitutional right to shop
in the store, the Stamms nevertheless departed.

On April 15, pursuant to prior arrangement with the
Union’s attorney, Joseph E. Organtini, constable of the
Township of Cumru, accompanied Rosemary Stamm and
her husband on another visit to the store. The following
is Organtini’s version as corroborated in substantial
respects by Rosemary Stamm. The Stamms first bought
a carton of cigarettes at the tobacco counter and pro-
ceeded to the dry goods department. While Rosemary
Stamm was examining a dress pattern, a security officer
appeared and ordered the Stamms to leave the store.
Organtini identified himself and inquired whether the
Stamms had done anything wrong. When the security
officer answered that he was only acting on orders from
Jacobs, Organtini asked to speak to Jacobs and was
directed to him at the front of the store. There, with
the Stamms standing nearby, Organtini introduced him-
self and stated that he accompanied the Stamms to the
store at the request of the Union’s attorney. Organtini
then inquired whether the Stamms had done anything
wrong to be ordered out of the store. Receiving Jacobs’
reply that Rosemary Stamm had been discharged, Organ-
tini asked whether the discharge was for shoplifting, steal-
ing or anything like that. Jacobs gave a negative re-

peers IR IP AAMAS ta coe Be ca! + — SusDaotes RS Ae eae . . MAL he LD SBLE |
4
os

eibecsisirincine aD le ide EA GUE Vk tas ito ee

26

sponse, adding that she was discharged because she was
a union organizer. This elicited Organtini’s expression
of doubt that such activity was unlawful. At that point,
a town police officer appeared at the scene. Organtini
advised the officer the purpose of his mission, which was
to protect the Stamm’s civil rights. Organtini then state!
that if the police officer wanted the Stamms to leay-
they would do so peacefully. When Jacobs affirm:
that was his wish, the Stamms and Organtini left tl»
store.

Jacobs’ account of this incident is essentially the same
except that he eategorically denied telling Organtini
that Rosemary Stamm was discharged because she was
a union organizer. According to Jacobs, he said he wanted
her to leave the store because she was “a known or-
ganizer.” Concerning the reasons for her termination,
he testified, he told Organtini that they were for “an
infraction of the rules and we were not permitted to
employ relatives in the store.” As previously indicated,
Jacobs did not impress me as a reliable witness. Organ-
tini’s testimony, corroborated by Rosemary Stamm’s, was
very persuasive, and I accordingly credit. In any event,
even were Jacobs’ testimony credited in this respect, my
ultimate determination would be the same.

Under cross examination, Jacobs admitted that at the
time of the Stamms’ eviction from the store, they had
not caused any disruption of operations but that his
action was taken “on advice of counsel and other execu-
tives.” There is also undisputed testimony that 2 or 3
weeks later Rosemary Stamm experienced another un-
gracious invitation to leave the store. On that occasion,
she and a union organizer entered the store and while
they were having a soda at the snack counter, Jacobs
directed them to leave, which they did.

27
B. Concluding Findings

The question whether an employee was illegally dis-
charged because of his union activities is not susceptible
of easy determination as it involves an inquiry into
the employer's state of mind. In resolving this question,
therefore, all the facts and circumstances surrounding
the separation must be carefully appraised with due
recognition being accorded to the settled principle that
an employer may terminate an employee for any reason,
good, bad, or indifferent, provided he is not motivated
by union considerations. It is equally well established
that the existence of a “justifiable ground for dismissal
is no defense if it is a pretext and not the moving
cause."””

From my analysis of the evidence, I am convinced that
Stamin’s discharge was dictated by her leadership in the
Union’s organizational drive and not by the reasons ad-
vanced by the Respondent. As shown above, there can
be little doubt that the Respondent became aware of
Stamm’s union activities on April 6, the day before her
termination, and that it did not weleome the prospect of
its store being unionized. It is also clear that, upon
learning of Stamm’s activities, the Respondent's execu-
tives in its New York offices promptly initiated steps
to terminate her the following day. In a conceded effort
to conceal the real reason for her discharge, Store Man-
ager Jacobs falsely informed Stamm in her exit inter-
view that he was simply enforcing a company rule pro-
hibiting the employment of relatives of employees. How-
ever, when she pointed out that she had entered the Re-
spondent’s employ before her sister-in-law, and that a
brother and sister, Susie and Mike Warner, were then

working in the store, Jacobs retorted that it was none

°N.L.R.B. v. Solo Cup Company, 237 F. 2d 521, 525, (C.A.
8).

fotsede dade stat
3
cf

Peiienairerciisciici cx: iewta eke

28

of her business. The transparency of the reason thus
given to Stamm for her discharge probably induced
Jacobs to retract it on the witness stand and acknowl-
edge its pretextual nature. However, his explanation
for giving Stamm a false reason—that he lacked the
courage to tell her the truth—only serves to cast graver
doubts on the purity of the motivation underlying the
discharge. Not only am I unable to discern anything in
the assertedly honest reasons for the discharge requiring
secrecy or confidentiality, but the inexcusable extreme to
which Jacobs went in dismissing an innocent employee,
Susie Warner, in an effort to lend an air of legitimacy
to his purported enforcement of the “no-relative” rule,”
strongly suggests that impermissible considerations en-
tered into the discharge decision.

Turning to the discharge reasons urged at the hearing—
that Stamm was a security risk, neglected her duties in
frequently absenting herself from her station at the cash
register, and disrupted store operations on April 6,—
I‘find that they, too, cannot withstand scrutiny. As found
above, the Respondent actually never regarded Stamm
as a security risk, even though Jacobs testified that he
was advised by Vice President Keller that this was “the
biggest reason” for the discharge. Indeed, in its brief,
the Respondent concedes that the polygraph report “did
not produce anything of substance against Stamm.”

As for Stamm’s asserted neglect of duties, it is diff-
cult to understand why, :f her conduct were really as
intolerable as it was pictured to be, she was retained in
the Respondent’s employ as long as she was, without
even a warning that she risked discharge unless she
mended her ways. The inescapable answer for her re-
tention is that actually she was not an unsatisfactory em-

2>Apparently to make amends for the injustice done to
Susie Warner, the Respondent subsequently reinstated her in its
Antietam Valley store. <A similar offer was not made to Stamm.

cD aie ir Fata ee Re easib.

29

ployee but that, by more than a strange coincidence,
she became persona non grata only when her union
activities became known to the Respondent.

Conceding that Stamm’s derelictions do not appear to
be a justifiable ground for her discharge in view of the
Respondent’s toleration of this conduct for a long period
of time, the Respondent argues that Stamm’s neglect
of duties considered in conjunction with her disruption
of store operations on April 6, nevertheless warranted
the discharge. However, I am not convinced that the
Respondent believed that Stamm caused such a serious
disruption in the store as to compel her summary dis-
charge in the middle of the workweek, without prior
warning or desire to learn her version of the April 6
events. Significantly, neither the so-called disruption nor
her asserted neglect of duties was even given to Stamm
as a reason for her discharge; instead, Jacobs admittedly
attempted to justify his action to Stamm on the basis
of a pretextual reason. Such a deliberate effort to hide
the true motivating reason clearly supports the infer-
ence that Stamm’s alleged acts of misconduct are merely
afterthoughts and that her discharge was really inspired
by her union activities.”

Weighing all the evidence including the timing and
summary nature of Stamm’s discharge,” the involvement
of the Respondent’s executives in New York in a dis-
ciplinary matter ostensibly of local concern, the assign-
ment of pretextuous reasons for the discharge, and the
Respondent’s purposeful efforts to conceal its real mo-
tive, T conclude that the Respondent discriminated against

"\Winchester Spinning Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 402 F.2d
299, 306, (C.A. 4) in which the court observed that ‘‘[w]here
an asserted business motive is discredited or contradicted by sub-
stantial evidence, the Board is free to treat it as pretextuous
and infer discrimination on account of union activity.’’

*2N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 242 F.2d 497,
502 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied 355 U.S. 829.

ADORE Se cd Lata

Dries

PRIOR IE CIS NIB IN a sans acta . te one CO Rt Ane py
s Bs
Vv :

30

Stamm because of her union activity. Such conduct, I
find, necessarily discouraged union membership in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act and interfered with,
restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their
self-organizational rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. The validity of these findings is buttressed
by Jacobs’ admission to Constable Organtini at the time
of Stamm’s eviction from the store on April 15 that
she was discharged because she was a union organizer.
Finally, even assuming that Stamm’s alleged neglect of
duties and disruption of store operations to some extent
entered into the Respondent's decision to terminate her, I,
nevertheless, find that a significant factor causing her dis-
charge was her leadership in the union movement and
that therefore her discharge would still be violative of
the same provisions of the Act.**

IV. The Remedy

Pursuant to Section 10(¢c) of the Act, as amended, I
recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and
desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices found
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.

T have found that the Respondent unlawfully discharged
employee Rosemary Stamm because of her union activiy.
To remedy this violation, IT recommend that the Respond-
ent offer her immediate and full reinstatement to her
former job, or if that job no longer exists, to a sub-
stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her
whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by

23N_.L.R.B. v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F. 2d 725, 726
(C.A. 2); Winchester Spinning Corporation v. N.L.R.B., supra,
304; N.L.R.B. v. Historic Smithville, Inc., 414 F. 2d 1358, 1361
(C. A. 3).

, a eval BRITA NST 7 Poe

reason of the discrimination against her by payment to
her of a sum of money equal to that which she normally
would have earned from April 7, 1971, the date of her
discharge, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less
her net earnings during the said period. Backpay shall
he computed with interest on a quarterly basis in the
manner prescribed by the Board in I’. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 N.L.R.B. 289-294, and Jsis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 716. To facilitate the compu-
tation, as well as to clarify the named employee's rights
to reinstatement, the Respondent shall make available
to the Board, upon request, payroll and other records
necessary and appropriate for such purposes. The post-
ing of a notice is also recommended.

In view of the nature of the discrimination for union
membership and activity which “goes to the very heart
of the Act,’** there exists the danger of the commission
by the Respondent of other unfair labor practices pro-
scribed by the Act. Accordingly, I recommend that the
Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from in any
other manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed em-
ployees in Section 7 of the Act.*°

Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case, T make the following:

31

Concivsions or Law

1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.

*N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F. 2d 532, 536 (C.A.
4).

*N.L.R.B. v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426,
433.

peewee SLT PIE NG ABR EINER ELI Wash PNR EILEEN AEN iS RR MT Deen te ee Su oe RE WIRE IO EU Ri ie

BEAL A

Fiat Fast tt

Fe GES Fat eat

DS cet Ate at Ke

32

3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure
of employment of Rosemary Stamm to discourage mem-
bership in, and activities on behalf of, the Union, the
Respondent has engaged, and is engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section S(a)(3) of the
Act.

+. By the foregoing conduct, the Respondent inter-
fered with, restrained and coerced employees in the exer-
cise of their statutory rights within the meaning of
Section S(a)(1) of the Act.

5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.

Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(e) of
the Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended :*°

ORDER

The Respondent, S. E. Nichols Shillington Corp., Shil-
lington, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors and
assigns shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Discouraging membership in Retail Clerks, Em-
ployees Union, Local 1393, Retail Clerks International
Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization,
by discharging employees or discriminating against them

26In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section
102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order
herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Reg-
ulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, con-
clusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.

in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment.

33

(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join
or assist the above-named Union or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through represent-
atives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any
and all such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:

(a) Offer Rosemary Stamm immediate and full rein-
statement to her former job, and if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make her whole for any loss of earnings she may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination against
her in the manner set forth in the section of this De-
cision entitled “The Remedy.”

(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
ecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary or useful in analyzing the amount of backpay
due and the right to reinstatement and employment under
the terms of this recommended Order.

ite

34

(c) Post at its store in Shillington, Pennsylvania, the
attached notice marked “Appendix.’”** Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 4, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.

(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 4 in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.

Dated at Washington, D. C., November 8, 1971.

/s/ PAUL BISGYER
PAUL BISGYER
Trial Examiner

"In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judg-
ment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the no-
tice reading “Posted By Order Of The National Labor Relations
Board”’ shall be changed to read ‘‘Posted Pursuant To A Judg-
ment Of The United States Court Of Appeals Enforeing An
Order Of The National Labor Relations Board.”

*SIn the event that this recommended Order is adopted by
the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be
modified to read: ‘‘Notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.”

,

Appendix.

35

Form NLRB-4727
(9-69)

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board

An Agency of the United States Government
The Act gives all employees the following rights:
To organize themselves.
To form, join or support unions.

To bargain as a group through a representative
they chose.

To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.

We Witt Nor discharge or layoff any employee or
otherwise discriminate against him or her because of his
or her membership in, or activities on behalf of, Retail
Clerks, Employees Union, Local 1393, Retail Clerks Inter-
national Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organ-
ization.

We Wit Nor in any other manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join
or assist the above-named Union or any other labor or-
ganization, to bargain collectively through representa-

36

tives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted ae-
tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all
such activities except to the extent that such right may
he affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as au-
thorized by Section S(a) (5) of the Act.

We Wut offer Rosemary Stamm immediate and full
reinstatement to her former job, or if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make her whole for any loss of earnings suffered
hy reason of the discrimination against her.

All our employees are free to become, remain, or re-
frain from becoming or remaining, members of Retail
Clerks, Employees Union, Local 1393, Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, except to the extent that such right may
he affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as au-
thorized by Section S(a) (3) of the Act.

S. E. NICHOLS SHILLINGTON CORP.
(Employer)

Date
By
(Representative) (Title)

37

Tuis is AN OrriciaL Notice anp Must Nort Be DeFracep
by ANYONE

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. Any ques-
tions concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions may be directed to the Board’s Office, 1700 Bank-
ers Securities Building, Walnut & Juniper Sts. Phila-
delphia, Pa. (Tel. No. 215-597-7601).

{Issued December 7, 1971]
OrperR

On November 8, 1971, Trial Examiner Paul Bisgyer
of the National Labor Relations Board issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding and, on the same
date, the case was transferred to and continued before
the Board in Washington, D. C. The Trial Examiner
found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, and recommended that it take spe-
cifie action to remedy such unfair labor practices.

No statement of exceptions having been filed with the
Board, and the time allowed for such filing having ex-
pired,

Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, and Section 102.48 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations,
Series 8, as amended, the Board hereby adopts the find-
ings and conclusions of the Trial Examiner as contained
in his Decision, and orders that the Respondent, S. FE.
Nichols Shillington Corp., its officers, agents, successors,

38

and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Kixaminer’s recommended Order.

Dated, Washington, D. C., December 7, 1971.
By direction of the Board:

/s/ GEORGE A. LEET
GEORGE A. LEET
Associate Executive Secretary

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0623%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
