# Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for A Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1973
- **Citation:** 411 U.S. 973

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the TMnited States

Y

en Sn 1150

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

RONNIE WEEDON, Petitioner
Against
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

MARVIN O. TEAGUE
Attorney for Petitioner

999 State National Building
412 Main Street

Houston, Texas 77002
222-1728

ee Ser reas ae An EIS
Alpha Law Brief Co., One Main Plaza, No. 1 Main St., Houston, Texas 77002

Page
Opinion Below .......-.- secs sree rece erence eter eees 1
Jurisdiction .........ceceee cece eens ee ceceereceececes 2
Questions Presented ......--.s esses e reece reeset ee reeees 2
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Involved ......---- 2
Statement of Facts ........ccceccccceseccccccnccccsces 3
Summary of the Facts .......--e+eseeeeee seer eee eeees 3
Reasons for Granting the Writ of Certiorari ........----- 12
Ce i pacha ss esa vek vente eveed borer nebere hss 19
Certificate of Proof of Service ......-----+eee eee ee eres 19

APPENDIX “A”
Weedon v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1973), 501 S.W.2d 336 21

APPENDIX “B”
Petitioner's Trial Counsel's Objections and Request for
a Hearing on the Admissibility of the oral statement-

confession of Petitioner .........--eeseeeee eee eeeees 29
APPENDIX “C”

Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment... 40
APPENDIX “D”

Constitution of the United States, Sixth Amendment. . . 41

APPENDIX “E”
Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth Amend-
NS POLO ETE FECT OCEE TEST he 42

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Davis v. Beto, 423 F.2d 633 (Sth Cir. 1970) .......----- 15
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d

QOB (1964) on ccvcccncecccccsssccccnenscesesscccnes 12,16, 17
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d

694 (1966) .... ccc eccccccccscccccrecsesccccesceces 12, 16,17
Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S.Ct. 291, 24 L.Ed.

Sh F008 CIGGR) cn ve cs nvecsncresevessesseeesecnreces» 16

Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d
SUL (19G9) .ncncccvccencvecsccenscncsevssnsscsosnes 18

IT
CASES

People v. Paulin (New York), 25 N.Y¥.2d 445, 255 N.E.2d
eC ei eer rorree en
People v. Rodney P. (New York C.A.), 233 N.E.2d 255

PROUT E bee Nen sek RON Ges ee VERS OREGON SNES ASESEE SDSS
Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31
RNR ate ate ee nae
Procunier v. Atchley, 91 S.Ct. 485, 400 U.S. 466, 27 L.Ed.
ee MUTED 5 nina acceken cre nce onaeenueesents48
Rosario v. Guam, 391 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1968) ..........
Sigler v. Parker, 396 U.S. 482, 90 S.Ct. 667, 24 L.Ed.2d 672
SOE: Soedusueaasions Mane chs SEOTEN EERE ERT Eos e ree

Swenson v. Stidham, 404 U.S. 1058, 92 S.Ct. 732, 30 L.Ed.
2d 745 (1972), 405 U.S. 913, 30 L.Ed.2d 782, 92 S.Ct.

OSE (9S Sat. SOS) CIGIS Ye vv cows ne ec eee ne bees.
Turner v. United States, 387 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1968)....
United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1965).....

United States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1968)....
United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1972)....
Weedon v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1973), 501 S.W.2d 336....
Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968)...

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

Rules of the Supreme Court:
8 St er er eee ne eee yy ye eee ee

United States Constitution:

ERIE TIENT Cocco cnc oie 8 ais wreierok aa hos eee ciate
LE SEIMEI crak cis act cir tie a cre th pra eee ee
POUT) TICINO. go ee co vik kc ee on oe oe See eee

Page

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16

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

NO

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

RONNIE WEEDON, Petitioner
Against
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

The Petitioner, Ronnie Weedon, prays that a writ of
certiorari be issued to review the judgment of the Court
of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas of November
7, 1973.

OPINION BELOW

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence of ten (10) years
confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections, as-
sessed in the 99th Judicial District Court of Lubbock

2

County, Texas, was, on November 7, 1973, affirmed by
the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas.
On December 5, 1973, Petitioner's Motion for Leave to
File Appellant's Motion for Rehearing was denied with-
out written order by the Court of Criminal Appeals of
the State of Texas. See 501 S.W.2d 336. Petitioner has
exhausted all available State remedies for his appeal.
(See Appendix “A”).

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1257 (3) and Rule 19 (1), Revised Rules
of the Supreme Court of the United States of America.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether Petitioner was deprived of due process of
law by failure of the trial court to conduct a Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d
908, (1964), type hearing, out of the jury’s presence,
on the admissibility of the Petitioner's Oral State-
ment-Confession when same did not comply with
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)?

Whether Petitioner was deprived of due process of
law by the trial court admitting Petitioner’s Oral
Statement-Confession in to evidence when same was
in violation of Miranda vs. Arizona, supra, and
Orozco vs. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22
L.Ed.2d 311 (1969)?

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Constitutional provisions and statutes involved are
set out below. (Appendices “C”, “D”, and “E”, pp. 40-42).

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner was tried before a Jury on a plea of not
guilty for the alleged criminal offense of murder with
malice aforethought. found guilty, and his punishment was
assessed by the same jury at ten (10) years confinement
in the Texas Department of Corrections.

The State of Texas did not have any live witnesses to
the killing; her case being presented from evidentiary find-
ings at the scene and, most important, by statements
Petitioner made to law enforcement officials who came to
the scene to investigate the cause of the killings.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

As pertains to the questions Petitioner raises, the fol-
lowing pertinent facts are presented.

JAMES SINGLETON, Texas Ranger Investigator, testified
he received a telephone call from Bill Neely (133), of the
Sheriff's Office around 6:30 O'Clock A.M. (64), arrived
at Appellant’s residence at approximately 6:50 O'Clock
A.M. (65). Other police officers were already at the scene.
He saw and spoke to Appellant after entering the premises.
(117). After this, Singleton then saw the other police
officers as well as Perry and two dead bodies on the
floor in one of the rooms. He recognized the body of
McGann. He then learned the other body was Meshell.
At this time, Appellant approached Singleton. (119).
Over objection and without being given the opportunity
by the Learned Trial Judge to conduct a “Jackson v.
Denno” type hearing, (121). Singleton testified first on
a bill of exception out of the jury’s presence that Appel-
lant “explained to me the circumstances that occurred
prior to our arrival.” The Appellant related to Singleton
that:

4

“He had shot and killed Mr. McGann and possibly
used both weapons.” (122, 138)

Singleton testified he gave Appellant on/y the following
warning:

“He didn’t have to make a statement and he could
have an attorney present.” (123, 128, 136, 137)

The Learned Trial Judge then overruled another objec-
tion of Appellant. This action of His Honor was tanta-
mount to permitting Singleton to relate to the jury the
conversation he had with Appellant. “I believe in the
state of the record at this time that the Court will re-
spectfully overrule your objection.” (124) (128) (137).
The Learned Trial Judge permitted Appellant’s counsel
“to object to it now ... and not object to it while he is
on the stand” as “It will be all right for you to make it
as a part of your bill without making further objections
to it if you want.” (124). A further attempt, after the
objection was overruled, to take the witness on voir dire
was again made and again overruled. (126).

Singleton related to the jury that Appellant approached
him and told him that “I would like to talk to you” and he
“desired this to be in private.” (127). The two then
stepped into another room. It was after the Appellant told
Singleton “that he could clear this matter up and say
specifically what had happened,” that Singleton then gave
Appellant the deficient oral “Miranda” warning. See
supra and see also pp. 128 of the Statement of Facts.
Even though Appellant asked Singleton “would I need one
[an attorney]?”, and that he had attempted to contact two
(2) attorneys, one in Lubbock and one in Houston,
Singleton, nevertheless, permitted Appellant, without first

5

obtaining a waiver of his right to counsel, to state that
“he had shot and killed George McGann, possibly with
both guns.” At this time Singleton left the room.

On cross examination, it was developed that even
though the Appellant was neither in custody, under in-
vestigation nor suspected of anything, the purpose of
giving a legal warning was “Nothing other than normal
procedure.” (137). However, he varied from his “normal
procedure” when he talked with the witnesses Frances
Keith and Marshall Perry in that he did not warn them
when he spoke to them. (138). As to the conversation
between Appellant and Singleton, Appellant told him:

“That during his excitement that he had shot and
killed George McGann and had possibly used both
guns.” (138).

Singleton related that Appellant told him that McGann,
after shooting Meshell, “threatened Mr. Perry and Mr.
Weeden and possibly Miss Golden, if she was still in the
room.” (139). The threat encompassed pointing a gun
at them. (140). “As I recall he [McGann] told them
[Perry, Appellant and Miss Golden] that he would have
to dump the body somewhere and to get all their stuff
gathered up” and “he [McGann] also told him [Weeden]
that he wasn’t going to leave any witnesses . . .” (139).
Appellant also related to Singleton that:

“. . . he examined the body of Mike Meshell. [after
McGann had shot Meshell] and McGann was hold-
ing the gun. Mr. Weeden raised up from the body
and as he did he saw a .45 laying on the counter
top near the body, where Mr. Meshell was laying.”
That as he [Weeden] turned and faced George
McGann he reached and got the .45 and stuck it

6

either in his rear pocket or up in the small of his
back under his trouser belt, and at that time he
[Weeden] approached McGann in some type of
conversation more or less pleading with him not to
shoot the other people in the house . . . including
himself . . . but that McGann was threatening to kill
everybody in the house.” (141).

Singleton was not told nor did he know that McGann
was questioned previously regarding “a bunch of crimes
in Dallas and Ft. Worth that was Mafia connected.” (142-
143). He was aware of two or three murder investigations
involving McGann. Appellant also related to him that:

“He [Appellant] said that he did get into a scuffle
in an effort to obtain the weapon from Mr. McGann.
(146).

This information, related to Singleton by Appellant,
was also placed in Singleton’s offense report as an official
report of the episode. He also did not recall telling the
Assistant District Attorney that McGann “had killed
twelve people and Mike Meshell was his thirteenth.”
(171). He further related in his offense report that Ap-
pellant told him.

Subject Weeden advised the writer that he desired
to talk with him in private to clear up the matter,
stepping into an adjacent utility room in the kitchen,
stating that he desired to tell me specifically what
had occurred at that time and the writer advised
Weeden of his constitutional rights and he asked if
he would need an attorney and I asked if he had
called an attorney. Weeden said that he had con-
tacted his other attorney Bill Broom, in Houston
relating the prior events. Weeden stated that he had
shot and killed McGann during a fight and he thought

7

that he shot him with both weapons during his ex-
citement as a result of McGann shooting subject
Meshell (175-176).

Weeden also told the writer that Meshell and
McGann came to his house sometime after midnight
(179), that they had several drinks and both of
them were very intoxicated and were spilling drinks.
Weeden suggested that they go to bed, and that
Meshell went to bed in the northeast bedroom and
that Weeden had to help him undress because he
was intoxicated and that he assisted McGann to the
middle or east bedroom where McGann took off his
sweater, shirt, and pants. Weeden noticed that
McGann pulled a .38 caliber snub nose revolver from
the rear of his pants or belt and laid it near the
headboard. (180). A short time later Meshell began
to create a disturbance. knocking the door in the
bedroom, using profanity, coming into the den area
where Weeden was then sitting in a lounge chair,
going to the bar to get another drink and knocking
over bottles and glasses, and insulting Frances with
a remark. Then at this time Weeden took exception
to his action and told him that they were going to
have to get this straightened out by going outside,
and Weeden pulled off his black undershirt and
threw it on the couch and they went out the back
kitchen door area where they settled their differences.
(182). As Weeden stepped out the back door he
struck Meshell and some blood came from the wound
[see Judy Duke’s testimony supra] dripped down
on the door and what not. and Meshell reached up
and wiped his head with his hand and smeared the
blood on the door facing with his hand. Weeden
whipped him and came back into the house and
Meshell was patting Weeden and putting his arm
around Weeden and stating that they were friends.
About fifteen minutes later the telephone rang and
Weeden thought that he answered the telephone.

8

Mike talked for a while although Weeden did not
know what about. Mike stated that George is here
and whoever he was talking to apparently wanted to
talk to George. Someone awoke George McGann,
he came into the room fully dressed with a revolver
tucked under his belt in front, sat on the stool and
talked to the party on the telephone. Suddenly he
drew his pistol and fired two times into Meshell
standing by the kitchen bar and then aimed the pistol
at us, stating I can’t leave any witnesses, telling
Marshall Perry who was seated in the northwest
corner of the den not to move; further stating to
Weeden, let’s get it all together. He began to back
up east, toward the hall and bedroom and at this
time Weeden obtained a .45 caliber pistol from the
area of Meshell’s body, putting the pistol in his rear
pocket or under his belt in the small of his back.
Weeden began to plead with McGann not to kill
them and asked him what's the matter. Weeden
walked with him up close across the room, and when
they got near the hall and den doorway, Weeden
began to struggle with McGann for his pistol at
which time the gun discharged several times and
Weeden thought that he shot him with the .45.
Weeden thought McGann had told Frances to go to
the bedroom when this took place. Weeden then
called his attorney, called the Department of Public
Safety and the Sheriff's Office by telephone. (185-
186). Meshell was standing at the end of the bar
and McGann was talking the second time. and after
Meshell had talked, pulled his pistol and fired two
times while holding the phone in his left hand.
Weeden moved off the stool to check Meshell on
the floor and he was still breathing. Weeden said,
“he’s dying.” let’s get a doctor. McGann said we
are going to lay the body somewhere, I can't have
any witnesses. McGann pointed his gun at Perry
and told him not to move. At this time Weeden
recalled raising up and seeing a .45 pistol that
belonged to Meshell that was laying on the lower

9

portion of the bar, split level, near the bottom.
Weeden put it in his belt or rear pocket and began
to talk to McGann as he backed across the room
prior to jumping him in the hall area or the door of
his bedroom with the gun going off (4) several
times, he didn’t know how. (199-201).

Singleton testified he talked with Appellant on three
different occasions; once at the house; once at the District
Attorney’s Office, and then again at his home. (192).

> OF OF OFPOPOPO POPO

He told you the same things all three times?
Yes, sir.

You checked it out and proved it to be true?
Later I checked with the party that made the
phone call, yes, sir. (192).

You verified all of it, didn’t you?

Yes, sir.

Everything that he told you was true, wasn’t it?
As far as I know, yes, sir.

You certainly couldn't disprove it, could you?
No, sir.

It was just exactly the way that he said it hap-
pened?

Yes, sir.

Did you file charges against Ronnie Weeden for
Murder?

No, sir.

Because you have verified everything that he said
was true?

I didn’t file any charges against him, no, sir.
(206-207).

The witness Keith, also interviewed by Singleton, which
interview was placed in his offense report, told him:

Information same as above until telephone rang.
Frances Weeden stated that Ronnie Weeden answered

eth GR SS

10

the telephone. It was Robbie asking for McGann
and Weeden handed me the phone. Frances talked
to Robbie for a second and handed the phone back
to Weeden and went into the bedroom to wake up
McGann. His pants were on the floor and Frances
handed him his glasses from the floor and he dressed
and came into the den for the phone call. And
Frances thought that she had to wake him up two
times and she recalled turning the light on and
closing the door when she came out of the bedroom.
McGann had a pistol in his belt, he talked, Meshell
talked and McGann talked. McGann told Frances
to go to the bedroom and she left and did not see
the shooting but heard two shots. She stayed in the
bedroom with the door locked until Weeden came.
(199).

As to the missing two shots, we find the following:

He [McGann] told me [Frances] to go into the bed-
room and go to bed, and I went in and shut the
door, then I heard some shots. I don’t know how
many but I heard one group and then there were
some more later, but not too much later. The second
shots were from another place because I could hear
them better, they were closer to the bedroom.
(240).

As to the interview between Singleton and Marshall
Perry, Perry related to Singleton the following:

Perry said he was actually seated in d chair at the
time the scuffle took place. Perry said the man
pointed the gun right at his head. (201).

Singleton also testified that he found four (4) gun
shot wounds in McGann and found four (4) expended
cartridges which came from the .38 and the .45. (206).

11

Singleton also testified that he wert to Midland and
talked to Sid Trevino who told him that he had loaned
the .38 pistol to McGann. (211). He also related that
he talked with a Taylor Wayne Hodges who informed
him about a hijacking of a poker game in Lubbock which
McGann was going to commit. (213). A tape recording,
either legal or illegal, was also listened to concerning
McGann’s activities in Dallas. (215).

JIM COOPER, PRESENTLY UNEMPLOYED, was
employed at the time of the occurrence as an investigator
for the Lubbock County Sheriff's Department. He testified
that on the day in question a little after 6:00 O'Clock
A.M. he went to the residence of Appellant. He was met
at the door by Appellant. He had a report of a killing
(prior to being met by Appellant) when he arrived. He
went on inside the residence. Other officers were also
present at this time. (268). When he got to the south
side room of the residence he saw the two bodies of
McGann and Meshell. (287). They were dead as they
were not breathing. Appellant told him the names of the
bodies. (288). Cooper called the Sheriff's Department
and asked for Neeley and Montgomery to come to the
scene. He observed a bullet on the floor. (288).

Cooper was recalled on rebuttal by the State of Texas
and he testified, over objection, to the inadmissible con-
versation he had with Appellant. (527). He testified that
Appellant told him there had been a double shooting and
that McGann and Meshell had shot one another.

The Court’s attention is also directed to Appendix “B”
which contains copies of pages from the Record on Appeal
which pertain to these issues.

12

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner submits that it is mandatory, when first raised
and requested, for a trial court to hold a Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed. 2d 908 (1964),
type hearing, out of the jury’s presence, where the State
intends to introduce into evidence an oral statement of a
defendant.

Petitioner, in any event, submits that the oral statement-
confession of this Petitioner, in this cause, is invalid as
same was not taken in compliance with Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1062, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694
(1966).

In Turner v. United States, 1968, 387 F.2d 333. the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, speaking through
Circuit Judge Bell, adequately put the question when it
held:

Prior to trial defense counsel filed a motion to sup-
press any and all admissions made by appellant to
federal agents while under arrest or detention, con-
tending that she was not fully advised of her right
to counsel or of her right to remain silent within the
teaching of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 1966, 384
U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1062, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694. The hear-
ing on the motion was continued by stipulation to
the time of trial. During the course of the trial and
when the admissions were offered by the prosecution,
defense counsel objected on the basis of Miranda and
moved that the voir dire on admissibility be heard
by the court outside the presence of the jury. Defense
counsel also moved that the defendant be allowed to
testify in rebuttal at that time and prior to her case
in chief. The Court denied the motion for a hearing

13

outside the presence of the jury but did not explicitly
rule on the motion to permit appellant to testify as
requested.

The FBI agent who had obtained the admissions
was examined in the presence of the jury, counsel
argued in the presence of the jury and the court
ruled the evidence admissible in the presence of the
jury. The ruling that she was denied no Miranda
right was based on a combination of advice given
appellant by the arresting officer and waiver on her
part. This ruling on admissibility pertains to the
first assignment of error and we hold that the ruling
was not erroneous. The situation is quite different,
however, with respect to the procedural error em-
braced in the second assignment of error.

The voir dire in connection with the admissibility
vel non of the oral admissions, once the issue was
drawn, should have been conducted outside the
presence of the jury. See Fisher v. United States,
5 Cir., 1967, 382 F.2d 31. 35: and Everitt v. United
States, 5 Cir., 1960, 281 F.2d 429, 434.

It is also reversible error not to permit the defend-
ant, in such circumstances, to testify on the admissi-
bility voir dire and prior to her case in chief, whether
a confession or admission, oral or written, be in-
volved. It is then that a defendant may need to
testify in rebuttal to the prosecution’s proof, and
this, too, should take place outside the presence of
the jury. United States v. Carignan, 1951, 342 U.S.
36, 72 S.Ct. 97, 96 L.Ed. 48: and Schaffer v. United
States, 5 Cir., 1955, 221 F.2d 17, 20-22.

That the objection is based on the failure to give
Miranda type warnings rather than on evidence of
physical or mental coercion does not indicate a dif-
ferent result. The rationale of Miranda is that in-
custody interrogation is in itself coercive to the extent
that adequate notice of the right to remain silent and

14

the right to have counsel present must be given in
order to safeguard the constitutional privilege against
self incrimination. Cf. Marion v. Harrist, 5 Cir.,
1966, 363 F.2d 139, 140-142.

The procedure outlined in Jackson v. Denno, 1964,
378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed. 2d 908, and
Sims v. State of Georgia, 1967, 385 U.S. 538, 87
S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed. 2d 593, was followed here of
an independent determination of voluntariness by
the trial judge prior to submission of the question
to the jury. However, the determination should have
been made outside the presence of the jury with
appellant having the right to be heard. Cf. United
States v. Inman, 4 Cir., 1965, 352 F.2d 954.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent herewith.

Petitioner submits and contends that he was deprived
of due process of law in the following particulars:

1.

The trial court, when the issue was first raised,
should have, pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed. 2d 908 (1964),
conducted a hearing out of the jury’s presence on
the admissibility of the oral statement-confession
of Petitioner.

The trial court should have suppressed the oral
statement-confession of Petitioner as it was not
shown that same complied with Miranda v. Arizona,
supra.

Appellant submits that when his trial counsel said:
“Well, we object to it on this [sic] grounds, it does not
conform with the Miranda statute [sic] or any other
statute,” (S.F. 123), that it then became incumbent upon
the Court to conduct a Jackson v. Denno, supra, type

15

hearing. “Upon defendant’s “Miranda” objection to ad-
missibility of statement offered by [State], the trial court
must hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury.”
See U.S. v. Nielsen, Seventh Circuit, 392 F.2d 849.

The decision of Turner v. U.S., supra, was later re-
affirmed in Davis v. Beto, 1970, 423 F.2d 633, where

that

Court said:

The Jackson v. Denno contention, however, must be
considered separately from the issue of voluntariness.
See Smith v. State of Texas, 5 Cir., 1968, 395 F.2d
958. This contention was presented in petitioner's
pro se petition to the district court and there is no
indication that it was ever considered. Also, it is
not clear whether petitioner's state court remedies
have been exhausted on this issue. The case must
therefore be remanded to the district court for a
determination first of the exhaustion of state reme-
dies question. If the petitioner has properly exhausted
his state remedies, then the district court should
consider the Jackson vy. Denno issue. See Smith v.
State of Texas. supra; Fisher v. United States. 5
Cir. 1967, 382 F.2d 31; and Turner v. United States,
5 Cir. 1968, 387 F.2d 333.

This rule of law has also been adopted by other Circuits
of these United States. See U.S. v. Nielsen, Seventh Cir-

cuit,
852:

1968, 392 F.2d 849. where that Court said at page

To avoid the possibility of thus penalizing an ac-
cused for an exercise of his constitutional rights. we
hold that whenever a defendant, by appropriate ob-
jection to proffered testimony concerning his state-
ment made during custodial interrogation, contends
that those statements were made in the absence of
a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights to

:
on |

wo ES

16

remain silent and consult an attorney, the court
must excuse the jury and conduct a voir dire hearing
to resolve the issue. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
366, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed. 2d 908 (1964). See,
Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.
1967); Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 988 (4th
Cir. 1967). A voir dire hearing would prevent the
jury from drawing prejudicial inferences by reason
of testimony that the defendant sought to exercise
his constitutional rights. In addition, such a hearing
would enable the defendant to testify on the issue of
waiver without relinquishing his privilege to remain
silent at the trial. Finally, this procedure enables
the court to make a fully informed determination
on the question of the admissibility of the defendant’s
custodial statements. Because the procedure followed
in the instant case was not compatible with protecting
the defendant in the exercise of his constitutional
rights, prejudicial error occurred.

This Court’s attention is also directed to the decisions
of Sigler v. Parker, 1970, 396 U.S. 482, 90 S.Ct. 667,
24 L.Ed. 2d 672; Morales v. New York, 1969, 396 USS.
102, 90 S.Ct. 291, 24 L.Ed. 2d 299; Procunier v. Atchley,
1971, 91 S.Ct. 485, 400 U.S. 446, 27 L.Ed. 2d 524;
and Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.
2d 31 (1967). Compare also Swenson v. Stidham, 404
U.S. 1058, 92 S.Ct. 732, 30 L.Ed. 2d 745 (1972),' and
see also the Fourth Circuit decision of U.S. v. Inman,
352 F.2d 954.

Is there anyway that one could argue that the dictates
of Miranda vy. Arizona, see supra, and Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, do other than require that initially a hear-

1. See also 405 U.S. 913, 30 L.Ed.2d 782, 92 S.Ct. 931 (93 S.Ct.
955) (1973).

17

ing out of the jury’s presence must be held. The issue of
an involuntary confession is separate and apart as to
whether or not a hearing must be held. The issue of the
applicability of Miranda is separate and apart from the
question of an alleged involuntary confession as to whether
or not a hearing must be held. If the trial judge had held
a Jackson v. Denno, see supra, type hearing, and fully
developed the facts at said hearing and entered findings
of fact and conclusions of law, then, unquestionably, if
the matter had not changed during the trial of the case,
then Appellant would certainly be wasting this Court's
precious and valuable time. However, that is the point.
This did not take place. This did not occur. If a hearing
outside the jury’s presence had occurred, then another
question might very well be present. But, this did not
occur. To require this Appellant to develop this in the
jury’s presence would, as in pre-Jackson v. Denno, days,
see supra, be an act without meaning. The horse has left
the barn. Why bother to close the gate?

Appellant submits that where the brooding omnipresence
of the police, even at a person’s home, is present, then
he is certainly under detention and restraint. Also, it is
the subjective and not the objective test which controls;
i.e., what was the defendant thinking or, if nothing from
a defendant, what would a reasonable, prudent man be
thinking at the time? How can it be argued where a man
asks about seeing an attorney where there are two (2)
dead bodies, killed by gunshot, in his home, that he is
not under custody, arrest or under restraint? True, Ap-
pellant was not formally arrested by INDICTMENT
WARRANT FOR SOME TIME. However. merely be-
cause the police do not place a person under “formal
arrest” this should not mean Miranda v. Arizona, supra,

e

18

has no meaning or applicability. Compare People v. Paulin,
New York, 255 N.E.2d 164. The test to be applied is,
was he in fact restrained in any significant way or was
he, “as a reasonable person,” led to believe that his
freedom was restrained in any significant way. See People
v. Rodney P., New York, 233 N.E.2d 255; Windsor v.
U.S., Fifth Circuit, 1968, 389 F.2d 530; and Rosario v.
Guam, Ninth Circuit, 1968, 391 F.2d 869.

Unquestionably, two questions arise, almost simulante-
ously:

1. Why did Singleton give Appellant part of the
Miranda warning if he did not think Appellant
was in need thereof?

2. Why did Appellant ask “would I need an attorney”
if he did not think he was under arrest or under
restraint?

In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22
L.Ed. 2d 311 (1969), the Supreme Court held that a
suspect was the subject of custodial interrogation even
though the questioning was brief and took place in his
own bedroom. Petitioner here was a “virtual defendant.”
See U.S. v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167 (Sth Cir.).

Appellant strenuously urges that Miranda is applicable
and, for this reason, the statement should have been
excluded, and, for the additional failure to either hold a
hearing or exclude the statement, certiorari should be
granted and this cause should be reversed and remanded
for a new trial.

Petitioner was, therefore, by such failures, deprived of
due process of law as provided by the Fifth, Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States of America. (See Appendices “C”, “D” and “E”).

19

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated herein, Certiorari should be
granted in this Cause. The ruling and Judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas, made
and entered on November 7, 1973, should be reversed
and this Cause should be remanded to the said Court
of Criminal Appeals of Texas to enter an Order reversing
its former Judgment and remanding this Cause for new
trial to the 99th Judicial District Court of Lubbock
County, Texas.

Respectfully submitted,

MARVIN O. TEAGUE
Attorney for Petitioner

999 State National Building
412 Main Street

Houston, Texas 77002
222-1728

CERTIFICATE OF PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Marvin O. Teague, Attorney for Petitioner, Ronnie
Weedon, hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari has been deposited in
the United States Mail. postage prepaid, certified. and
properly addressed to Respondent’s Counsel, Honorable
John L. Hill, Attorney General of the State of Texas,
State Supreme Court Building. Austin, Texas, this the
day of January, A.D. 1974.

MARVIN O. TEAGUE

21

APPENDIX “A”

’
t
7 EN OTE Deeg COND —

NO. 46,795

RONNIE WEEDON, Appellant
.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from LUBBOCK County

OPINION

The offense is murder with malice; the punishment,
ten (10) years.

The sufficiency of the evidence both to support the
conviction and to show malice is challenged by grounds
of error twelve and thirteen.

The State’s evidence consisted primarily in what was
found at the scene of this double murder, as analyzed and
explained by expert witnesses and the declarations made
by appellant to the officers who arrived in answer to a
call.

According to Officer Singleton appellant told him “that
he had shot and killed George McGann, possibly with
both guns.”

The bodies of both George McGann (the deceased
named in this indictment) and Mike Meshell were found
dead on the floor of appellant's home. Meshell had been
shot twice. McGann had been shot four times. In their
investigation the officers found five .38 caliber bullets
and an empty five-shot .38 caliber pistol that fired the
bullets. They also found a .45 caliber bullet and the .45

22

caliber pistol that fired it. The .45 bullet was found under
McGann’s body, where the floor tile was indented in the
shape of the bullet.

The State’s expert witness, a chemist, testified, on the
basis of powder burns, that the bullets penetrating Mc-
Gann’s body were fired from a distance of three to five
feet.

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support
the conviction. With respect to malice, it may be inferred
from the use of a deadly weapon. Jones v. State, 472
S.W.2d 515; Tsamouris v. State, 472 $.W.2d 141; Hart
v. State, 455 S.W.2d 237; Redd v. State, 452 S.W.2d
919; Howard v. United States, 389 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir.
1967).

In grounds of error numbers one through six, appel-
lant complains of the testimony of Ranger Singleton re-
lating to his conversation with appellant when arriving
at appellant's home where he had gone to assist local
officers in the investigation. At the moment of arrival the
investigation had not centered on anyone and no one was
in custody. He first spoke to the local officers who were
present at the residence, observed two dead bodies, and
then was approached by appellant, whom he knew. Ap-
pellant first said, “I would like to talk to you in private.”
The two of them then stepped into another room and
appellant said he “could clear this matter up”. At that
juncture the ranger told appellant “he didn’t have to make
any statement and he could have an attorney if he so de-
sired.” Appellant asked, “Would I need one?” The ranger
asked if he had contacted an attorney. Appellant said he had
tried to contact Mr. Phil Brummett (a local lawyer)
and was unable to do so and had contacted a lawyer in

23

Houston. According to the ranger, without further ques-
tioning appellant stated at that time, “that during his
excitement he had shot and killed George McGann [the
deceased] possibly with both guns.” After this conversa-
tion appellant left the room and the ranger continued in
the investigation.

Before discussing the admissibility of the above state-
ments, we observe that unlike the normal case the testi-
mony did not stop at this juncture; rather appellant was
able to develop on cross-examination of Officer Singleton
for approximately 150 pages his entire defensive theory
of self-defense.

We return to the questioned testimony and conclude
that appellant was not under arrest or in custody, nor
was he deprived of freedom of movement in any signifi-
cant manner at the time of the above conversation. This
conversation occurred on September 29, 1970, and ap-
pellant was not arrested until March 15, 1971. It, there-
fore, follows that these statements were not admitted in
violation of the terms of Art. 38.22, V.A.C.C.P., or the
holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694.

By his seventh and eighth grounds of error, appellant
complains of the introduction of certain photographs of
the dead bodies found at the scene. These exhibits, as far
as we can determine, pictured bodies and some of the
wounds inflicted. The photographs, according to the testi-
mony, do not reflect the results of an autopsy as in Terry
v. State, 491 S.W.2d 161. In Martin v. State, 475 S.W.2d
265, this Court held that a verbal description of a body
and its wounds would be admissible and a photograph
depicting the same would be admissible, overruling prior

24

decisions in conflict therewith. See also Fields v. State,
—__. §.W.2d ____. (4 46,999, 10/24/73), Byrd v. State,
495 S.W.2d 226, Foster v. State, 493 S.W.2d 812, and
Lanham v. State, 474 S.W.2d 197.

In his brief, appellant for the first time complains of
the legilibility of the photostatic copies which appear in
the record and asks this Court to have the trial court send
the originals to us by virtue of Sec. 15 of Art. 40.09,
V.A.C.C.P. We note that appellant failed to comply with
Sec. 7 of Art. 40.09, supra, which requires that he file
an objection to the record in the trial court before the
approval of the record by the trial judge.’

By ground of error number nine, appellant contends
that error was committed when the State was permitted
to cross-examine the defense witness Perry concerning
an extraneous offense involving gambling. Perry was
asked about appellant’s business and replied that he was
not in any business at the time of the homicide. Upon
further questioning he stated that some weeks before
appellant’s business at the house was “gaming” and that
“there was gambling going on in the house”. When the
State asked the further question about “what type of
gambling” the court sustained the objection and the jury
was instructed not to “consider that for any purpose”
and the prosecutor was told to proceed no further. Ap-
pellant received a favorable ruling and requested no fur-
ther relief. Nothing is presented for review. Cazares v.
State, 488 S.W.2d 110.

By ground of error number ten, complaint is made of
questions propounded to appellant on cross-examination

1. This Court has full authority to send for photographs. Also,
trial courts should not send photostatic copies to this Court which
are not legible.

t
¥
:
i
‘

25

concerning his line of business. He stated that in addition
to the automobile business he had some clubs and finally
that “I gambled there” at the house. When for the first
time the objection was interposed that this constituted
proof of an extraneous offense the court sustained the
objection and no further relief was requested. No error
has been shown. Cazares v. State, supra.

Ground of error number eleven complains of the court’s
failure to grant a mistrial when the witness Singleton
testified that he was looking for a hidden panel in the
wall at appellant’s home. Prior to this questioning Single-
ton had told appellant's counsel that he had been to
appellant’s home looking for a hidden panel. Appellant
may not complain of testimony which he has introduced.
Williams v. State, 484 S.W.2d 842, Art. 38.24, V.A.C.C.P.

Ground of error number fourteen complains “that the
evidence is insufficient in that it shows self-defense as a
matter of law’. In the case at bar, appellant was able to
develop from the witness Singleton on his cross-examina-
tion of said witness most of the matters upon which he
relies to show that he acted in his own self-defense. How-
ever, the rule set forth in Bell v. State, 434 S.W.2d 684,
seems to be that “such testimony of the State’s witness
on cross-examination is not binding on the State”.

Appellant cites no authority, but we observe that re-
cently in Whitfield v. State, 492 $.W.2d 502, we held in
effect that for an appellate court to say that the evidence
showed self-defense as a matter of law the evidence must
be uncontroverted and no issue thereon presented for the
jury’s determination. An issue of fact was raised for the
jury’s determination. Therefore, we cannot hold that self-
defense was shown as a matter of law.

he

MEAN ET

AAS PRPS, AIMEE TS RET BI owe

26

Ground of error number fifteen contends that the evi-
dence is insufficient as a matter of law because the State
failed to disprove exculpatory statements made by the
witness Singleton on direct examination that appellant
had told him “that during his excitement he had shot
and killed George McGann possibly with both guns” and
testimony of Officer Cooper that appellant had told him
“there had been a double shooting out there. These men
shot each other.”

As to Singleton’s testimony, we hold this statement
not to be exculpatory.

As to Cooper, we observe that not until appellant had
testified did Cooper testify in rebuttal as to the statement
set out above.

We note from Otts v. State, 116 S.W.2d 1084. the
following:

“Another exception which should cause no trouble
is where the State does not introduce the confession
or admission containing the exculpatory statements
in developing its case in chief, but offers same to
contradict or impeach accused where he has testified
as a witness, or where it fairly appears that the con-
fession is not relied on for a. conviction, but is
offered to break down some defensive theory which
has come into the case. . .”

We find no basis for holding that the trial court was
required to give any instructions regarding the effect of
the exculpatory statements.

In his final ground of error, appellant contends that
the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s first motion
for continuance on grounds of the absence of a witness.

27

Attached to appellant’s motion for new trial is an unsigned
affidavit prepared for one Frances Keith. This is not
sufficient to require the granting of a new trial. Haggerty
v. State, 491 S.W.2d 916.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
MORRISON, Judge
(Delivered November 7, 1973)
(Seal)

CLERK’S OFFICE, COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS

I, TOMMY LOWE, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court
of Criminal Appeals of Texas, do hereby certify that in
Cause No. 46,795, styled:

RONNIE WEEDON, Appellant
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

the judgment of the 99th Judicial District Court of Lub-
bock County, Texas, was affirmed on November 7, 1973
and on December 5, 1973, “Leave to file the appellant’s
motion for rehearing was denied”.

THEREFORE, with the denying of the leave to file
the appellant’s motion for rehearing, this cause was dis-
posed of by this, The Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas, on December 5, 1973, and the appellant having

28

exhausted all remedies in said Court the judgment has
now become final on the docket of this Court.

WITNESS my hand and seal of said Court, at office,
in Austin, Texas, this the 5th day of December, A.D. 1973.

TOMMY LOWE
Tommy Lowe, Chief Deputy Clerk
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

29

APPENDIX “B”

5
|
]
MPR, CVS GME MS CAT j

[Singleton—direct 119]

Q. Was there a chair over there in the corner?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Would you locate it there on the drawing?

A. I assume this would be it here. It would be a black
leather barcalounger type chair.

Q. Did you at that time determine whether or not
George McGann was dead or alive?

A. He appeared to be dead.

Q. Okay, sir. What did you do after observing Mr.
McGann?
I asked who the other person was.
Did you find out who he was?
He was identified, yes.
Who did you find out the other party was?
He was purported to me to be Mike Meshell.
What did you do then, please?
At this time Mr. Weeden approached me and made
a remark that he had—

POPOPrO>

MR. TARRANT: Excuse me, Your Honor, may we
approach the bench?

(Thereupon, an off the record discussion was
held at bench.)

THE COURT: Mr. Singleton, answer the question

that the District Attorney asked you, in response to this
question.

[Singleton—direct 120]
MR. TARRANT: Your Honor, ask him not to volun-

30

teer anything. We would object to the last answer that
he gave and ask that it be stricken.

THE COURT: The Court overrules the objection.

MR. TARRANT: Note our exception.

Q. What were you doing in the house, please?

A. I was there to assist the Sheriff's Office in an in-
vestigation.

Q. Okay. Had at that time the investigation centered
on any individual?

A. No.

Q. Was anyone besides police officers—was anyone in
that house in custody, in your custody or in any of the
other officer’s custody?

A. No, sir.

Q. What did you consider—who else did you see there
in the house besides the officers?

A. Marshall Perry.

Q. Okay. Had any part of your investigation focused
on him as to any criminal act?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did any part of your investigation center on Ronnie
Weeden, who I have identified, as to any criminal act?

A. No, sir.

[Singleton— 121]

Q. What did you consider these two men, Marshall
Perry and Ronnie Weeden, at that time?

MR. TARRANT: We will object to that.
THE COURT: The Court will sustain the objection.

=e a _|

31

Q. Was anyone in custody at that time, in your custody
at the house?

A. No.
Q. Okay. You were approached—after you had found

out who this other person was, were you approached by
anyone besides police officers?

MR. TARRANT: Your Honor, excuse me, but is

leading and we object to it. We object to that because
the District Attorney is leading—

THE COURT: The Court will overrule it.
Mr. TARRANT: Note our exception.
THE COURT: Yes, sir.

Q. Who did you talk with after that, please?
A. Mr. Weeden.
Q. What did he say to you, please?

MR. TARRANT: Excuse me just a minute, Your Hon-
or, I think possibly we should have him on voir dire,
probably out of the presence of the jury.

THE COURT: The Court will overrule your request
and you may have your exception.

[Singleton—direct—voir dire 122]
MR. TARRANT: Please note my exception.

THE COURT: Yes, sir. Go ahead and ask your ques-
tion, Mr. Jackson.

ep OLY eG RM

26 I TOR EMITS Pres

32

MR. TARRANT: Your Honor, I think probably I
ought to have a bill and we had better do that out of
the presence of the jury.

THE COURT: All right. The jury will please retire.

(Thereupon, the following proceedings took
place outside the presence of the jury.)

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. TARRANT:

Q. What would be the answer to that question, Mr.
Singleton?

A. To the extent that Mr. Weeden explained to me
the circumstances that occurred prior to our arrival.

Q. What did he say?

A. He related that he had shot and killed Mr. McGann
and possibly used both weapons.

Q. Did you make some kind of report of that at the
time?

A. Yes.

Q. As I understand it now, there was some other offi-
cers there when you got there?

A. Yes, sir.

{Singleton—voir dire 123]

Q. Do you know who they were?
A. Mr. Jim Cooper and Charlie Bowman.
Q. And you say there hadn’t been any—

THE COURT: Mr. Weeden, don’t you leave this court-
room without—just don’t leave this courtroom without
letting your counsel know something about it.

33

Mr. TARRANT: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I had no
idea.

Q. Did you give Mr. Weeden any type of legal warning
before talking to him there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What warning did you give him?

A. To the extent that—

Q. I would like know the exact words?

A. He didn’t have to make a statement and he could
have an attorney present.

Q. Is that all that you told him?

A. Yes.

Q. You told him nothing else other than that?

A. No, sir.

MR. TARRANT: Well, we object to it on this grounds,
it does not conform with the Miranda Statute or any other
Statute. He was not warned of his rights

[Singleton—direct cont. 124]

THE COURT: I believe in the state of the record at
this time that the Court will respectfully overrule your
objection.

MR. TARRANT: We except to the ruling of the Court.
THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. TARRANT: May I object to it now and let him
go ahead, and not object to it while he is on the stand
and have any objections—

THE COURT: Yes, sir. It will be all right for you to

34

make it as a part of your bill without making further
objections to it if you want.

(Thereupon, the jury was returned to the jury
(box and the following proceedings took place
(before the Court and jury.

DIRECT EXAMINATION (CONT)
BY MR. JACKSON:

Q. Mr. Singleton, where were you in the house out
there when you were approached by Ronnie Weeden?

MR. TARRANT: Excuse me just a minute. I object
to the form of the question. I don’t believe there is any
testimony that he was ever approached by Weeden.

THE COURT: The Court will sustain the objection.

Q. All right. Where did you see Mr. Weeden, if you
saw him?

[Singleton—direct cont. 125]

A. The first time that I saw him he was near the bar
area, in the general vicinity right here. (indicating)

Q. Okay. Where were you, please?

A. I had come in this door right here.

Q. Where did you go then, please, where did you go
in the structure?

A. I went to this body and this one. (indicating)

Q. Where was Mr. Weeden at that time?

A. He was still in this area right here.

Q. Okay. After going over here you said that you went
over to this body?

35

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Weeden was here, is that correct?

A. In that area, yes, sir.

Q. Okay. What did you do after going over to this
body, please?

A. That was at the time that I asked who this was?

Q. Okay. And that was related to you by other officers,
is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do then, what was the very next
thing that you did, please?

A. At this time I talked to Mr. Weeden.

Q. Did he say anything to you?

[Singleton—voir dire 126]
MR. TARRANT: Excuse me. May I have him on voir
dire to see if the sequence is properly in line.

THE COURT: All right.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. TARRANT:

Q. Mr. Singleton, I think at that time you gave him a
legal warning, something that you considered a legal
warning, didn’t you?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the warning that you gave him?

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, I believe this is taking
my direct examination.

THE COURT: The Court is going to sustain the ob-
jection.

36

MR. TARRANT: Well, I am just trying to get the
sequence proper, Your Honor. If he said something to
Weeden and if Weeden said something, I want to get it
in properly, if he said something to Weeden first.

THE COURT: Let the State develop it.

MR. TARRANT: I am going to object to the ruling of
the Court.

THE COURT: The Court will overrule the objection.

[Singleton—direct cont. 127]
MR. TARRANT: Note our exception.

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Cont.)
BY MR. JACKSON:

Q. Who was the first one, you or Mr. Weeden, to say
anything right there in that room?
A. Mr. Weeden.
Q. Okay. What is the first thing that he said to you
then?
A. “I would like to talk to you”.
Q. Okay. What did you do then, did you talk to him
right there in that room?
No. I stepped to another room.
Why did you step to another room?
Mr. Weeden desired this in private.
Who desired this?
Mr. Weeden.
Did he tell you that?
Yes.
What did he tell you?

OFPOPOPO?Y

37

A. His exact words, “I would like to talk to you in
private”.

Q. Did he say where any place in private would be?

A. No.

Q. What did Mr. Weeden do then, please?

A. Mr. Weeden and I stepped to another room.

[Singleton—direct cont. 128]

Q. Okay. Did you both go shoulder to shoulder or
did you lead him into that room or what, who went first?
I do not recall.

Okay. Which room did you go into?

In this area here. (indicating)

Okay. In that room that you just pointed out?
Yes.

Did you have any conversation while you were
walking to that room?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. What was the first thing that was said, if anything,
when you reached the room that you pointed out?

A. Mr. Weeden related that he could clear this matter
up and say specifically what had happened.

Q. Okay. What did you do then?

A. I told him that he didn’t have to make any state-
ments and that he could have an attorney if he so desired.
What did he say.

He asked, “would I need one”?

Okay. What was said?

I asked if he had contacted an attorney.

What did he say?

He said, “yes”.

And did he say anything else about an attorney?

OFPOPrO>y

OFOPOPO

MEO TENE LEE ARIEL OS ED SERN IY

hen T4S

POT Ne a

38
[Singleton—direct cont. 129]

A. He said that he had attempted to contact Mr. Phil
Brummett and was not able to do so, and had contacted
an attorney in Houston.

Did you ask him anything else at that very point?
No.

Did he say anything then?

Yes.

What was’ that?

He said that during his excitement that he had
shot and killed George McGann, possibly with both guns.

Q. Okay. Were you and he the only—you and Ronnie
Weeden the only ones in that room that you pointed to?

A. At that time, yes.

Q. Did you leave that room—when did you leave that
room?

A. After Mr. Weeden did.

Q. Okay. Where did you go then?

A. I assisted the other officers in the search of the
residence and general investigation.

Q. Okay. Did you continue your general investigation,
is that what you testified to?

A. Yes.

POPOPO

MR. JACKSON: May we approach the bench, Your
Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

[Singleton—direct cont.—cross 130]

(Thereupon, an off the record discussion was
(held at the bench.

|
|
|

39

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. TARRANT:

Would you tell me your name again, please?
Jim Singleton.

Where are you from, Mr. Singleton?
Lubbock.

Were you born and raised here?

No, sir.

Where are you from?

I was born in Brownfield.

How long have you been here in Lubbock?
I came to Lubbock in September of 1956.

SOPOPOPOPOPO

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there.

Department of Public Safety.

That is the highway patrol?

Yes, sir.

And you were with them for how long?
I believe ten years.

Until °66?

Yes, sir.

And then what did you do?

OFOPOPrOyr

Who did you work—did you work for someone

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40
APPENDIX “C”

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Fifth Amendment

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital
or other infamous crime unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when
in actual service, in time of war or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just com-
pensation.”

41
APPENDIX “D”

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Sixth Amendment

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by and
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense.”

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42
APPENDIX “E”

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.

“* * * nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385607_0162%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.