# Memorandum — Clean Air Coordinating Committee v. Roth Adam Fuel Co. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385606_1612%3A5 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Memorandum - **Published:** January 1, 1973 - **Citation:** 409 U.S. 1117 ## Text INDEX Cases : Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers Co., 348 U.S. 511_----- anti Letter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, gE ee ea Mitchum Vv. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 National Labor Relations Board v. Nash- Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 7 United States v. Barrett, 442 F. 2d 642___- ~ Statutes, regulations and rule: Clean Air Act, 77 Stat. 392 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1857 et seq.: Section 109, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-4 Section 110, 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-5___ 3, 4,5, 6, 8 Section 304, 42 U.S.C. 1857h 28 U.S.C. 1331 28 U.S.C. 1337 40 CFR. 51___-_- 42 C.FR. 410___- 42 C.F-R. 420 36 Fed. Reg. 8186__- 1D PP POLO © DD D&O be > Illinois Rule 203(g) (1) (A) (I) 491-135—72 2 mentation plan a local regulation (Rule 203(g) (1) (A)) essentially banning all use of coal for residential and commereial space heating purposes in the Chi- cago metropolitan area.* Respondent Roth Adam Fuel Company moved to dismiss the federal suit on grounds, inter alta, that the district court was without jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1337, and that it was, in any event, precluded by the federal anti-injunction statute (28 U.S.C. 2283) from enjoining the state court proceedings. Follow- ing a hearing, the district court determined that it had concurrent jurisdiction over the matter with the Circuit Court of Cook County; the federal court stayed its hand, however, pending further notice (Pet. App. 3). The court of appeals, ‘‘[t]reating the order appealed from as a denial of an injunction”’ (Pet. App. 7), affirmed. It concluded that the bar in the federal anti-injunction statute against federal court in- junctions of state court proceedings applies in the circumstances presented, and it therefore remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dis- miss.” 4Qn April 27, 1972, the Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County entered a preliminary injunction against the Illinois Pollution Control Board, prohibiting it from adopting Rule 203(g)(1)(A) unless it contained a provision to compensate businesses which would be injured by adoption of the Rule. That ruling is presently pending on interlocutory appeal to the Ili- nois Appellate Court (Pet. App. 3-4). ? Because the court of appeals disposed of the case under the federal anti-injunction statute, it deemed it unnecessary to reach the other arguments relating to the district court's jurisdiction (Pet. App. 7). pgm cmaaeanaaaaaaaaacasaa eee 3 2. The decision below is, in our view, correct and does not warrant further review by this Court. The state court proceedings involved here do not jeopardize “‘a superior federal interest” (Pet. 12), as petitioner contends. Nor is there anything in the Clean Air Act authorizing issuance of a federal injunction in these circumstances. Accordingly, dismissal of the suit is proper. A. Petitioner’s argument rests in part on a limited judicial exception to the federal anti-injunction statute, which recognizes that the United States may obtain an injunction against state court proceedings when it ean show that the state proceedings, if not stayed, will have a direct adverse effect on federal interests. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225-226 ; National Labor Relations Board v. Nash- Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144-147; United States v. Barrett, 442 F.2d 642, 645-646 (C.A. 4). In our view, however, even assuming arguendo that the “superior federal interest” argument is available to private litigants—a point on which the parties divide sharply (compare Pet. 12-13 with Opp. 5-6)*—the proceedings in the Illinois courts present no real threat to a federal project or policy. *It is clear that the Clean Air Act does not itself provide for a private suit of this nature. As pointed out by the court below (Pet. App. 6), the federal statute contemplates “citizen participation” only “by way of public hearings on implemen- tation plans (42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(a) (1), 1857c-5(c)) and by way of suit to enforce substantive emission standards or limi- tations (42 U.S.C. §1857h-2) * * *.” | : i é tor to promulgate national air quality standards nec- essary to protect the public health and welfare.‘ Such | : Hil; aie camelienmn, oul camiinne (7) easter wills eouallene inspection requirements; and (8) provimons for revimon. state plan and sent them to the federal agency. With respect to Rule 203(g) (1)(A), whieh is due to become effective May 30, 1975, subject to the state court pro- ceedings challenged here, the Board added the pro- (see n. 1, supra)—that the Rule “should not be con- sidered to ban the use of coal for space heating in residential and commercial buildings in the Chicago 7 Thus, the state court proceedings in Illinois do not, as petitioner suggests, seriously jeopardize the federal clean air-_progr: .a. Congress clearly contemplated that many States would, for various reasons, be unable to submit to the EPA Administrator completely satis- factory implementation plans. It therefore devised a “statutory scheme” calling for a coordimated effort on the part of the federal government and the States te achieve national air quality standards. Where, as in this case, the State implemention pian is in some respects deficient, and the State is unwilling or unable to make the revisions necessary to conform the plan to national standards, the Clean Air Act explicitly provides for the promulgation of federal regulations to remedy the deficiency. Whatever might be the mini- mal delay that is caused by invoking this procedure— a delay that might have been avoided had the state court not been permitted to enjoin the adoption of Rule 203(g)(1)(A)—it is a delay which Congress fully anticipated and took into account in drafting the federal legisiation. Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that “the scheme of the Federal Clean Air Act has located in Chicago, Ill, any solid fuel which contains ash in excess of the following limits: Compliance date Maximum ash content December 31, 1973 (percent, by weight) July 31, 1975 8.0 20 not been thwarted by the state court suit” (Pet. App. 7). Notwithstanding the state proceedings, a suitable implementation plan for the State of Illinois is being devised well within the general time-frame contem- plated for accomplishing the objectives of the federal clean air program. Nor is the development of that plan without state participation. The contested state litiga- tion deals with but one aspect of the plan submitted by the Illinois Pollution Control Board; in all other re- spects the State is integrally involved in implementing a program for Illinois that will enable that State to achieve the national air quality standards. And, even insofar as the ultimate plan concerns control of the particulate emissions involved here, the State still may have an opportunity to participate if the pre- liminary injunction entered by the Circuit Court of Cook County is reversed on appeal in the state courts. For the Clean Air Act provides that, even after the EPA Administrator has promulgated a regulation in this area, that portion of the implementation plan may be revised by the State if the revision satisfies all other statutory criteria. 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-5(a) (3). We therefore do not believe that either the policy or the underlying purpose of the Clean Air Act is ad- versely affected by the pending litigation in the Illi- nois courts. Petitioner’s argument to the contrary, to avoid the anti-injunction prohibition in 28 U.S.C. 2283, fails to appreciate the “statutory scheme”’ on which it is based, and was properly rejected by the court below. 3. The court of appeals also correctly rejected pe- titioner’s alternative contention that the Clean Air Act “expressly authorized” the granting of an in- junction in these cireumstances and thus removed the bar of the anti-injunction statute. As this Court stated in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238, the applica- bility of the “expressly authorized’’ exception in 28 U.S.C. 2283 turns on “whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of the state court proceeding.” In the present context, there is, as we have indi- eated, no need for such a stay to carry out the ob- jectives of the Clean Air Act as Congress intended. Congress has delegated to the EPA Administrator the responsibility in the first instance of reviewing, and, where appropriate, revising,state implementation plans that will achieve clean air standards. Federal judi- cial intervention is, by the terms of the Act (42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(f)(2)(B)), confined to appellate court re- view of the Administrator’s decision to approve or dis- approve the state plan, if suit is filed within 30 days of the contested decision. Nowhere does the statute suggest earlier consideration by the federal courts of implementation plans proposed by the various States. Accordingly, we agree with the court below (Pet. App. 5) that the injunctive relief sought by petitioner in this case finds no “express” authorization in the Clean Air Act “within even the most attenuated meaning of the term” (Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Rich- man Brothers Co., 348 U.S. 511, 516). 10 For the foregoing reasons, it is the view of the United States that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted. Exwin N. Griswop, Solicitor General. Kent FrizzE1, Assistant Attorney General. Ww. Braprorp REYNOLDs, Assistant to the Solicitor General. Epmunp B. CuiakK, MartTmn GREEN, James R. WALPOLE, Attorneys. C.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: (872 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385606_1612%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.