# Petition for Rehearing — Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385606_1570%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Rehearing - **Published:** January 1, 1973 - **Citation:** 409 U.S. 1107 ## Text 12500 Dunlap, #247 Houston, Texas 77035 Alpha Law Bruni Co. One Mam Plase, Ne. 1 Mae Si, Routes, rrea2 Now comes Mary Ellen Schattman, Petitioner, Pro Se, and files this her Petition for Rehearing of this Court's denial of her Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, January 8, 1973. Petitioner would show the Court that it erred in denying her Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for the fol- lowing reasons. First, on January 9, 1973, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc reversed the panel decision in Sch. Bd., 467 F.2d 262 (4th 59 (ED. Va. 1971). 2 scope of protection afforded to pregnant government em- Ployees by the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Having first determined to follow the Sixth Cir. cuit’s decision in LeFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Edu., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), the Fourth Circuit abruptly reversed itself. A clear statement of the law and the applicable Four- teenth Amendment standard is necessary to remove any doubt from the minds of the judges and to alleviate the anxiety of working women whose income is critical to their families’ wellbeing. Second, in the intervening decision of Perez v. Gomez, No. 71-575, January 17, 1973, this Court held that Texas had violated the rights of illegitimate children by failing to provide a means to establish paternity and enforce the obligation of support. No matter how difficult, Texas is obligated to provide an opportunity in every case to prove paternity. The administrative inconvenience of requiring individual evaluation and treatment of pregnant Texas employees is considerably less onerous than the obligation of individual treatment imposed by Perez. It is interesting to note that in the District of Columbia, disabled persons be treated equally and with dignity in regard to employment, “unless it is shown that the partic- ular disability prevents the performance of the work in- volved.” P.L. 92-515 §4, October 21, 1972. Third, the Court's denial of certiorari in this case has created an anomaly which should not go uncorrected. Respondent has interpreted this Court’s decision to mean that the termination of employment at the end of the 3 seventh month of pregnancy, without a hearing or con- sideration of the individual’s ability to work, is “reason- able” and not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Houston Chronicle, Sec. 5, p. 4, January 10, 1973. Ap- , the Respondent does not believe that it is bound by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s new pregnancy regulations, 29 CFR §1604.10(b), despite ’ expansion of Title VII to include all state | | : free to terminate employees at the end of the seventh, or other “reasonable,” month of pregnancy. This is com- pletely contrary to the broad Congressional policy against discrimination in state personnel practices. See, 42 U.S.C. 5, 1971. Judicial action has created this inconsistent treatment of public and private employers and employ- ees, and this Court should act to eliminate that incon- 4 in reaching its decision Respondent’s policy, the Be eal tit bt eee ute - and, that in the past he had certified his patients’ ability to work until term for their employers. This reliance upon the personal bias of a witness whom the appellate court had not seen is inappropriate where the trial court found that the Respondent had no factual medical basis for its policy and that the only reason for the policy’s continued existence was the imertia of his- tory. 330 F.Supp. 328, 329. This finding was certainly sufficient to carry Petitioner’s burden of proof under 42 U.S.C. $1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Fifth, it is inconceivable that this Court would be so sanguine as to permit a state agency to summarily fire a black employee on the sole ground that he had contracted a potentially debilitating disease—sickle cell anemia. Yet that is what has happened here—this Court has declined by one sex. Compare, Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971), a Title VII case. This Court’s failure to face the issue of the rights of pregnant women has created a very real threat of econom- ic blackmail. The United States Air Force thought noth- ing of asking Captain Struck to multilate her body to retain her commission by submitting to an abortion. Where abortion is legal, it is not unreasonable to expect both public and private employers to resort to this kind of pressure. It will be especially effective where the wo- man’s threatened income is essential to her family’s finan- cial security. The right to have offspring is a basic human right. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US. 535, 536 (1942). The Respondent’s policy violates this basic right by re- 5 quiring a woman to choose between her child and her job. its policy is as irrational as the Air Force's policy in in Struck’s case, as the policy in LeFleur, supra, and as a policy which would predicate the continued em- ployment of a male with prostate trouble upon castration. In our culture, it does not reflect badly on a wife to “let” her husband work with prostatitis, but husbands are very sensitive about “letting” their wives work while preg- nant. Surely we have left the Victorian Era when hus- bands treated their wives like children. Women are adults, capable of recognizing their capabilities and following a physician’s advice. . If it is true that women become so incapacitated dur- ing pregnancy that they cannot do their work, then wo men whose sole job is housework and the care of children must be similarly incapacitated. Yet no agency demands or provides “protection” for these women who perform one of the most strenuous jobs in the country. Women are allowed to scrub floors or clean clothes for free during but not for money. It is not the doing of the job that is prohibited, but the doing of it for hire. In short, a pregnant woman can be a slave but not an employee. A woman, even a pregnant woman, is a person with individual abilities, defects, needs and desires. She is not a box of film stamped “Do not use after September 1st.” There is nothing magical about the eighth month of preg- nancy that enfeebles a capable healthly woman. I ask no favor, no preference, only that I be judged on my abilities and treated for what I am—an individual. Petitioner prays that her Petition for Rehearing be _ granted and that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals for the 6 Fifth Circuit entered in this proceeding on March 1, 1972, as amended, rehearing denied, June 5, 1972. Respectfully submitted, Mary ELLEN SCHATTMAN Petitioner, Pro Se 12500 Dunlap, #247 Houston, Texas 77035 I certify that this Petition is filed in good faith and not for purposes of delay. Mary ELLEN SCHATTMAN --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385606_1570%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.