# Opposition Brief — Marchetti v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1972
- **Citation:** 409 U.S. 1063

## Text

Question presented... ......................--.-------

CITATIONS
Cases:
Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman Steam-
ship Corp., 333 US. 103_____- aia
E. W. Blias Co. v. United States, 248 US. ‘37.
Freelman v. Maryland, 380 US. 51-. -- ahead
Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F. 2d 1169, certiorari de-
nied «ab nom. Goldwasser v. Seamans, 397 US. 922.
Kegishian ¥. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589___.____-
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 US. 436___- -- =
Maas v. United States, 371 F. 2d 348.

Sd canine

_

7
13

10

9
13
10

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 US. 713. 5.8, 16

National Labor Relations Board +. Giasel en Co.,
GD Ge Ge ccccccnces ,
Pickering ¥. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563_____-
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 US. 75_ ~~ -—-
United States +. Curtiss-Wright — _ 299 Us.
United States v. Hunter, 459 F. 2d 205, certiorari denied,
41 U.S. Law Week 3208____.__-. —_
Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U: ot enaneia

Pa)
4s 36s8—T2

7 Oe er

Constitution and statutes:
United States Constitution:
First Amendment

Miscellaneous:
Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold:

The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev.
271 (1971)

CREAR IT RIE RTE A ee

gn the Supreme Gourt of the Gnited States

Ocroner Term, 1972
>

No. 72-482
Victor L. MARCHETTI, PETITIONER
.

Uxirep STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

Neither the opinion of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria
Division (Pet. App. 19a-28a), nor the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Pet. App.
la-lXa) is reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on September 11, 1972. The petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari was filed on September 21, 1972. This Court's
jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2
QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the courts below properly enjoined peti-
tioner, a former employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency, from violating his agreement with that
agency, made when he entered employment there, that,
without the prior approval of the agency, he would not
publish or disclose any classified information he ob-
tained through his employment.

Section 403(d)(3) of Title 50 of the United States
Code provides:

§ 403(d) For the purpose of coordinating the
intelligence activities of the several Government
departments and agencies in the interest of na-
tional seeurity, it shall be the duty of the
Agency, under the direction of the National
Security Council—

* = = * =

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence re-
lating to the national security, and provide for
the appropriate dissemination of such imtelli-
gence within the Government using where ap-
propriate existing agencies and facilities: Pro-
vided, That the Agency shall have no _ police,
subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-
security functions: Provided further, That the
departments and other agencies of the Govern-
ment shall continue to collect, evaluate, corre-
late, and disseminate departmental intelligence:
And provided further, That the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure ;

3
STATEMENT

The United States brought this suit to enjoin the
petitioner, a former employee of the Central Intelli-
cence Agency (“the Agency’’), from further violating
his secrecy agreement with the Agency, by disclos-
ing, publishing or otherwise revealing certain current-
ly classified intelligence information. The United
States also sought an order requiring petitioncr to
cubeait to the Agency for examination prior to their
release any writings which purport to relate to the
Agency, intelligence information or intelligence
comrees and methods, in order to insure that the dis-
cloatre of such information is not prohibited by the
seerecy agreement.

Petitioner was an employee of: the Agency from
October 3, 1955 until he resigned, effective September
5. 1969. During this time he oceupied various positions
of trust and responsibility, including that of Fxeeu-
tive Assistant to the Deputy Director.

On October 2, 1955, prior to beginning his work at
the Agency and before he was given access to classi-
fied information, petitioner executed a secrecy agree-
ment undertaking not to divulge in any way any clas-
sified information, intelligence or knowledge, except
in the performance of his official duties, unless specif-
ically authorized in writing by the Director or his au-
thorized representative. The agreement also provided

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4

that the undertaking would continue after he left the
Agency.’

At trial, the government presented the testimony of
Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines, a Deputy Director of
the Ageney, and Mr. Howard J. Osborn, Director of
Security for the Agency. Mr. Karamessines testified
that various statements in an article submitted by
petitioner to Esquire Magazine and six book publish-
ers contained classified information which would com-
promise intelligence related operations of the Agency
(Tr. 10-20). He further testified that the disclosures
would have a serious and substantial adverse impact
upon national security interests, and explained in de-
tail why that was so (Tr. 10-20, 40, 69, 72, 77-79, 82-
84, 88-91). Mr. Osborn testified that petitioner, in
the past, had violated his secrecy agreement in the
course of media interviews in which he participated
during 1971 by disclosing classified information (Tr.
107, 109-110).

Petitioner admitted that he had submitted an article
to Esquire Magazine and to six publishers in Mareh
1972, as the basis of a book, without previously sub-
mitting it to the Agency (Tr. 156-159). Petitioner
also admitted that for the most part the information

' The agreement is set forth in full in Pet. App. 2la-22a. At
the time petitioner was initially interviewed for employment
with the Agency in March 1955, he signed a secrecy .agree-
ment in which he recognized that the sensitive nature of the
Agency's work required the imposition of, and compliance
with. strict security measures (Pet. App. 20a). Petitioner also
signed an oath of secrecy upon terminating his employment
(Pet. App. 22a-25a).

5

contained in the article was obtained as a result of his
employment with the Agency (Tr. 159-161).’
The district court held that petitioner had entered
into a valid secrecy agreement with the Agency, that
at least five of the items appearing in the petitioner’s
article and at least three items which were taped for
television interviews were classified, and that he had
violated the agreement because the disclosure of the
information had not been authorized by the Director
of the Agency or his representative (Pet. App. 19a-
28a).°

The district court enjoined the disclosure of any
information relating to intelligence activities and any
information concerning intelligence sources and meth-
ods (Pet. App. 30a). The court also ordered (Pet.
App. 30a) :

That the defendant shall submit to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, for examination 30
days in advance of release to any person or cor-

The petition contains various references to statements in an
affidavit and deposition of Mr. Osborn and answers to interrog-
atories by Mr. Helms. (£.g.. p. 11, n. 9). The statements and
answers referred to were not introduced into evidence at the
trial and thus they were not properly before either the district
court or the court of appeals.

* The district court found (Pet. App. 27a): “| CJontrary to the
documents’ proscriptions, the defendant has divulged and pub-
lished and revealed, by writing and by word, information re-
lating to the national defense and security and information of
that nature relating to intelligent [sic] sources, methods, and op-
erations. both classified and otherwise, without first obtaining con-
sent of the CLA.” The sealed brief filed by petitioner in an effort to
demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy a prior re-
straint under Vew York Times Co. v. United States, 403 US. 713,
does not in any way detract from that finding.

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6

poration, any manuscript, article or essay, or
other writing, factual, fictional or otherwise,
which relates to or purports to relate to the
Central Intelligence Agency, intelligence, intel-
ligence activities, or intelligence sources and
methods, for the purpose of avoiding inadvertent
disclosure of information contrary to the pro-
visions and conditions of the aforesaid secrecy
agreements, and such manuscript, article, essay
or other writing shall not be released without
prior authorization from the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence or his designated representa-
tive.
The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that the
seerecy contract is valid and constitutionally enforce-
able, and otherwise reasonable and lawful. The court
held, however, that the injunction against disclosure
entered by the district court was too broad and limited
it to barring classified material in accordance with the
contract.
ARGUMENT
The government obtained an injunction in this case
to prevent petitioner from further violating his con-
tractual undertaking not to disclose classified intel-
ligenee information he obtained during his employ-
ment with the Central Intelligence Ageney, the pub-
heation of which, according to top officials of that
Agency, would compromise the Agency’s intelligence-
gathering activities. By statute, the Director of the
Agency is responsible “for protecting intelligence
sourees and methods from unauthorized disclosure”.
30 U.S.C. 403(d) (3). In carrying out this responsi-
bility, the Agency requires employees as a condition

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of employment to enter into a secrecy agreement. As
the court of appeals held (Pet. App. 13a), such agree-
ments are appropriate to implement the Congressional
direction of secrecy, particularly since the information
developed by the Agency is by its nature highly sen-
sitive to the conduct of foreign affairs and to the na-
tional defense. The court of appeals decision thus
accords With this Court’s consistent recognition of the
need for secrecy in the sensitive areas of foreign af-
fairs and national security. United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320; Chicago cd
Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
232 U.S. 103, 111: E. W. Bliss Co. v. United States,
248 U.S. 37.

1. Petitioner makes a three-fold attack upon the in-
junctive relief granted by the courts below. First, he
claims that the contractual provision banning unau-
thorized disclosure of classified material is invalid and
unenforceable, and that requiring submission of ma-
terials relating to the Ageney for approval before publi-
cation is an unconstitutional prior restraint on free
speech, even if approval for publication is ultimately
granted. Second, petitioner claims that even if he may
he required to submit materials in advance of publica-
tion for approval, approval can be denied only if in
fact the material has heen properly classified and that
the court of appeals erred in holding that he may ob-
tain judicial review only with respect to whether the
material is classified and in the public domain. Third,
petitioner argues that the terms of the injunction—
allowing the Agency a “maximum” period of 30 days

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in which to approve or disapprove the publication of
materials—“are too broad.”

a. Relying on New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, petitioner claims that in the circum-
stances of this case his right to publish classified ma-
terial is no “different from that of the New York
Times and the Washington Post” (Pet. 18) and that
the prior restraint imposed on him by the injunction
can be justified only by showing that the “disclosure
of the information sought to be restrained would
‘surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable in-
jury to the Nation or its people’’’ (Pet. 16, quoting
the coneurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in New
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730).

Petitioner’s reliance on New York Times Co. vy.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, is misplaced. There the
United States sought an injunction barring two news-
papers from publishing information which they had
obtained from specified classified documents. This Court
held, ina per curiam opinion, that the United States had
net met the “heavy burden” which is required before
an injunction may be obtained restraming a news-
paper from publishing news.

The instant case involves an action against a former
emplovee of the United States who agreed, as a con-
dition of his employment, not to disclose classified
information which caime into his possession during
that employment. There is no injunction against any
publisher. The order of the district court, which was

9

sought only after serious breaches of the agreement
had occurred,’ runs only against petitionersand merely
requires him to comply with the contract into which
he had freely and voluntarily entered.

Petitioner asserts, however, that while “private
parties may agree by contract to waive their rights
under the Constitution, when the government is a
party to an agreement such waivers are unenforceable
if they involve fundamental rights of free
speech * * *” (Pet. 19). Regardless of the reasonable-
ness of the contractual provision and the significant
interest of the United States in maintaining the con-
fidentiality of classified documents, petitioner argues
that the restrictions which may be imposed on his
freedom to publish classified information are no dif-
ferent from those which may be imposed on a news-
paper. While it has been held that “unreasonable”
conditions may not be attached to public employment
(Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-
606). this Court has nevertheless recognized that a
public employee may be subjected to greater restraints
than ordinary citizens. As the Court observed in an

‘The affidavit of Thomas H. Karmessines. which was ad-
mitted in evidence in the district court and which we are filing
as a sealed exhibit. sets forth at least five separate items of
classified information, appearing in an article submitted to /’s-
quire Magazine. which would compromise currently active intel-
ligence sources and jeopardize current intelligence-gathering
operations. See. also, supra, p. 4. Petitioner does not deny that he
possesses such information. but contends that the Agency should
rely on his judgment with respect to the effect that disclosure will
haveon national security (Pet. 15).

|

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analogous context in Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563, 568, cited by petitioner (Pet. 19):

* © * “(T]he theory that public employment
which may be denied altogether may be subjected
to any conditions, regardless of how unreason.
able, has been uniformly rejected.”’ Ke gishian y.
Board of Regents, supra, (385 US.) at G05-an,
At the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the
State has interests as an emplover in rerulating
the speech of its emplovees that differ <ienif.
cantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the specch of the citizenry i»
general.’

The Central Intelligence Agency, whoe principal
function necesscrily touches upon the mest scamitive
and confidential matters bearing on the Executive's
conduct of foreign policy, “has interests as ay em
plover” that differ ~<ignificantly from these pew
sesses in connection with regulation of the speech of

* There are, of course, Numero cases in various conmteus
reaching a similar conclusion, See. cg. f eited Petty Werle n
v. Mitchell, 330 US. 75: Goldwamesr ©. Brown, UT F. od 1,
1176-0107 oCLALDNCL). certiorari denied «64 nom. Goldie ©
Seomans, 397 TOS. 922. Courts have authorized injention
against publications where important: governmental interests
were at stake. Woes v. United States, 371 F. 2d 348 (CAD):
United States ©. Hanter, 4 F. 24 25 (CA. 4). certiorari
denied, 41 US. Law Week 32058: see aleo Vetione!l Lichor Rete
tions Board +. Giseel Packing Co.. 3% US. STh, Gi6-tem,
Henkin. The Right to Know and the Duty to Withheld: The
Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 271 (1971).
Cf. 5 USC. 552(b)(1), which provides an exemption from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act for matters
“specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy * * *.~

the citizenry in general,” in conditioning employment
on a promise by the employee that he net make un-
authorized disclosure of clas<ified information which
coues into his knowledge and pose<<ion during hix
enmplovment, As the court of appeals stated (fet.
App. Waa-I4a):

Confidentiality inheres in the <ituation and
the relationship of the parties. Since informa-
tien highly sensitive to the conduct of forcien
affairs and the national defense was invelved,
the law would probally imply a secrecy agree-
went had there been no formally expressed
agrectuent, but it certainly lends a high degree
of reasonablenes< to the contract in it< pretee-
tien of classified information from unauthorised
di<closure,

Moreover, the Government's need for secrecy
in this area lends justification to a system of
prior restraint against disclosure by employees
and former employees of classified information
dtaine | daring the course of enplovnment, One
may speculate that ordinary criminal sone) ious
might suffice to prevent unauthorized di<clo<ire
of such infonnation, but the rick of harm from
disclo<ure is so great and maintenance of the
confidentiality of the information so neees<ary
that greater and more positive assurance is
warranted, Some prior restraints in seme cir-
cumstances are approvable of course. * * *

b. Petitioner claims that the courts below adepted
an erroneous standard for judicial review of the
Ageney’s refusal to authorize publication of particn-
lar material. The court of appeals held that legal and
practical considerations precluded judicial review of a

decision by the Executive that particular information
be classified (Pet. App. 5a). Judge Craven, in a con-
curring opinion, suggested that conclusive effect
should net be given to the claxifieation, but that a
presumption of reasonableness attached to the class-
fication: and that this presumption could be overcome
only by clear and convineing evidence that the clax<-
fieation ix arbitrary and capricious (Pet. App. Ia).
Petitioner argues that if he sulanit< a proper! pob-
lication for approval and if approval is denied on the
ground that material sought to be published ix classi-
fied, his right to judicial review must cover not only
the ixenes whether the material ix cla<<ified or already
in the public domain, but al<e whether the material
has heen properly classified.

While we agree with the majerity opinion in the
court of appeals, the ice is premature. Petitioner
hax net submitted any material for approval, and the
Ageney has not declined te approve any material for
publication. The question of judicial review of Agener
di<approval of material will net arise unless and until
petitioner submits material and the Ageney disap
proves all or part of it, and petitioner challenges the
action in court. At the pre<ent time that que<tien ix
academic.

e. Petitioner's final claim relates to the terms of
the injunction, which allow the Ageney “a maximum”
of thirty day< in which to determine whether the ma-
terial sulunitted contains clas<ified information. This
provision he claims ix “toe bread”: a one day peried,
he snegest<, would he sufficiently narrow ( Pet. 21-22).

The thirty day peried ix a reasenable “maxim”

perv! for the Agency to evaluate writing< whieh may
inched anything from a detailed article te a complete
colume dealing with its affairs. Unlike determimations<
in obweonity cases, here the material nust be reviewed
te determine whether any of the information ha< as
ee wetter a classified document te whieh petitioner
heel acess during fourteen years of employment.
Kiegdeq Books, Ine. v. Brown, DA US. £36, on
chieh petitioner relie< in support of his <rerestiet
that “one day” would be an appropriate periad, ts
inorenite. Kingsleg Books was net a prior rest ramit
owe, aed the Court in Freedman v. Margland, 330
{S. . in whieh the <tatutery procedure in Kingsley
cox vited, declined “te lay down rigid time limit<”
and recognized that a longer peried of time would be
appropriate in a different context (80 U.S. at 61).
The Court suggested in Fireedman that since films are
<beduled for showing well before actual exhibition,
“[olne possible scheme would be te allow the exhibi-
tor or distributer te <aubmit hix film early enough to
enewre an orderly final dix<pexition™” (380 US. at 61).
Mane<eript< for heeks and draft« of magazine arti-
chs. like files, are generally available well before the
joresaes poll: the limited period of time involved here
Lantiy px an unreasonable burden on the exereixe
of petitioner's First Amendment rights.
Moreover, thix case dees net invelve a general cen-
<orship statute, but an equitable decree always sub-
ject te judicial control and modification should the
cipcomstanees warrant. The court of appeals held that
“the CLA mut act promptly te appreve or disap-

14

prove any material which may be submitted to it”
(Pet. App. 14a). If petitioner is able to establish an
unwarranted delay even within the thirty day period
or if in a given case speed is of the essence, he would
not be without a remedy.

2. Petitioner alleges that “[s]Jince Congress has
never authorized extraction of the secreey agreements
in this case or suit to enforce them”’, the district court
was without jurisdiction to entertain he complaint
(Pet. 23). |

This argument ignores 50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3), sapra
p. 2, which expressly states that “the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protect-
ing intelligence sources and methods from unauthor-
ized disclosure.” Congress obviously intended that the
Director, in exercising his designated “responsibility,”
would formulate reasonable rules and regulations for
protecting intelligence sourees and methods from un-
authorized disclosure. It was within the Director's au-
thority to require a prospective employee to enter
into a contract in which the latter agreed not to dis-
close classified information coming into his possession
during employment. There can be no serious dispute
that under 28 U.S.C. 1345, which confers on the glis-
trict courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions,
suits or proceedings commenced by the United States”,
the district court had jurisdiction to entertain this ae-
tion for specific enforcement of a contract.

Moreover, apart from the claim for specifie per-
formance of a contract, “the United States may sue to
protect its interests.”’ Wyandotte Co. v. United States,

15

389 U.S. 191, 201. Petitioner concedes as much (Pet.
94), but argues that “‘any such attempt to enjoin argu-
ably protected First Amendment activity runs immedi-
ately afoul of the clear prohibition on prior restraints”
( Pet. 24-25). But this argument does not go to the is-
cue of standing or to the jurisdiction of the court to
decide the claim. The United States had standing to
bring this action and the district court had jurisdiction
to decide the case.

4. Petitioner’s final argument is that the govern-
ment “exercised an intolerable degree of control” over
his trial preparation, “thus creating a denial of due
process and a high potential for the miscarriage of
justice” (Pet. 26). Petitioner claims that the govern-
ment improperly required that those assisting him in
the preparation of his defense and prospective wit-
neawes be cleared for access to classified materials be-
fore they could examine the confidential and classified
information involved in this case.

The procedure to prevent further unauthorized dis-
closure of classified materials was approved by the
cmrt of appeals’ order dated April 26, 1972. The order,
however, conditioned the right of the United States to
conduct security clearance of prospective witnesses on
the representation that the government would not at-
tempt to dissuade any witness whose name had been
<ubmitted from testifying.

There is no allegation that this order was disre-
carded; that petitioner did not ultimately obtain ac-
eexs to all relevant materials; or that petitioner was

oe wet

in any way prejudiced in presenting his case. The
charge that the government exercised “an intolerable
degree of control” over his defense is unsupported br

the reeord.*
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be de
nied.
Respectfully submitted.

Erwix N. Griswowp,

Solicitor General.
Haruixctox Woop, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General.

Water H. Fiescuer,
Irwix Go_pBioom,

Attorneys.
Novemper 1972.

* Petitioner claims that the distriet court improperly denied
his application for access to the sealed transcript of the pro-
ceedings in the Vew York Times case and that the “effect of
this order was to deny the defendant access to the record of the
only case in which standards were devised for determining the
scope of the extraordinary exception to the rule against prior
restraints * * *” (Pet. 28). Whether the district court judge
had the power to grant this request with respect to sealed ree-
ords in another district court is debatable. But. in any event.
as we have already demonstrated, the standard applied in the
New York Times case is not appropriate in the context of this
case. Both courts below agreed: hence the denial of access to
the sealed transcript did not interfere with petitioner's defense.

ee

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