# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Johnson v. Maryland

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1972
- **Citation:** 409 U.S. 1039

## Text

In the REL PODAK, Jh..CLERK
Supreme Court of the Unite

Octoser Term, 1972

No. wQe4 7]

NATHANIEL JOHNSON, JR.,
PETITIONER,

Vv.

STATE OF MARYLAND,
RESPONDENT.

RN UF PU CEONE Serr Ys he ie akc

Lat eae

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS,
STATE OF MARYLAND -

F. Lee Bamey
ye One Center Plaza
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
Geratp ALCH
One Center Plaza
: Boston, Massachusetts 02108
Wim H. Murpay, Jr.
| 2115 One Charles Center
; Baltimore, Maryland 21201
: Leroy W. Carron
2115 One Charles Center
Baltimore, Maryland 21201

Blanchard Press, Inc.. Boston. Mass. — Law Printers

INDEX

Page
cele ckekcos cess ssh osreb acsaws 1
ee oe ay chen ece sks enee» 2
ian au Wakelin Kan ene esac dues 2
Constitutional Provisions Involved ................. 2
ne ie Cae d i ek eae eke ohn do 3
Reasons for Granting the Writ .................... 10
at 2 Ap UR ng a 18
Appendix — Opinion of Maryland Court of Special

ts a ge Ae, Ee, eae aera 19

Cases CrTep:

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) ..:........... 11
Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 ............. 17
Bridgewater v. State, 153 Ind. 560, 566; 55 N.E. 737,

EGS a 2 OO en 17
Clayton v. State,1 Md. App. 500 .................. 13, 14
Dandrea v. U. S., 7 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. C.A. 1925) .... 14
Giles v. Maryland, 372 U.S. 767 ..................-.. 17
Ingram v. State of Oregon, 445 P.2d 503 (1968) ....... 14
O’Comnor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966) ................ 18
eB eer rere ree 15
Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 63 A.2d 599 ............ 18
Sparf and Hansen v. U. S., 156 U.S. 51 ............ 17
Spinelli v. U. S., 393 U.S. 410 (1969) ................ 11
State v. Cooper,154 A. 423 (N.J. 1931) .............. 14
State v. Gardner, 240 P. 984 (1925) ................ 14
U. S. v. Allen, 147 F. Supp. 955 (D.C. F.D. Kentucky

ee an aa Kentuckian eles ee eh ees 14
U.S. v. Bosch, 209 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. Mich. 1962) .... 14
ey SS 3! ee rer 11

U. S. v. Long, 169 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1959) ........ 14

Index

coe Page
Whitely v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 410
i Se Derr erate ee ihe ste 11

Wyley v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 372 F.2d 742,
cert. den., 389 U.S. 863, reh. den., 389 U.S. 997 16,18

Miscellaneous

Prescott, Juries as Judges of the Law: Should the Prac-

ro aa ky eceem segs 17
Henderson, The Jury as Judges of Law and Fact in
Maryland. 52 Md. S.B.A. 184, 199 (1947) .......... 17

Dennis, Maryland’s Antique Constitutional Thorn, 921
8 ee § FOR errere tere 17

dn the
Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser TERM, 1972

No.

NATHANIEL JOHNSON, JR.,
PETITIONER, ‘

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND,
RESPONDENT.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS,
STATE OF MARYLAND

The petitioner, NatHanrmL JoHNson, Jz., respectfully
prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-
ment and opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, State
of Maryland.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, not yet
reported, appears in the Appendix hereto. No opinion was
rendered by the Court of Appeals, State of Maryland.

2

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals was filed
on March 27, 1972 and Mandate issued thereon on April
3, 1972. A timely petition for certiorari was filed with the
Court of Appeals, State of Maryland and said petition
was denied on June 9, 1972. An application was made to
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the
Fourth Circuit, and order dated
was granted herein extending petitioner’s time for filing
a petition for writ of certiorari to and including Septem-
ber 21, 1972. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under
28 U.S.C. 1257(3).

Questions Presented

1. Whether incomplete and uncorroborated information
of an informant’s credibility can establish probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant as required by the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

2. Whether the lapse of time between an informant’s
observation relied upon, and the application for a search
warrant can be of such length so as to render stale the
necessary element of probable cause required by the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

3. Whether a State’s constitutional provision empower-
ing juries to decide questions of both fact and law de-
prives an individual of due process and the equal protec-
tion of the law as required by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.

Constitutional Provisions Involved
Fourth Amendment, U. S. Constitution:

_ The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

3

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly, de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Fourteenth Amendment, U. S. Constitution:

Section 1. * * * nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process
fiw: *”"”

* * * nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws * * *

Article XV, Maryland Constitution:

Section 5. ‘‘In the trial of all criminal cases, the
Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact,
except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain a conviction.”’

Statement of the Case

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court
of Baltimore on June 21, 1971 of conspiracy to violate the
Controlled Dangerous Substance Law (Indictment No.
658), possession of heroin (Indictment No. 663), posses-
sion with intent to manufacture and distribute a controlled
dangerous substance, heroin (Indictment No. 665) and
maintaining a common nuisance (Indictment No. 664).
Under the combined Indictments No. 663 and 665, the
Petitioner was sentenced to a term of twenty years and
was fined Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00). The
Petitioner was sentenced to a term of fifteen years and
fined Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) under

—

4

Indictment No. 664, the sentence and fine to run conse-
cutively to those imposed under Indictments No. 663 and
665. Under Indictment No. 658, the Petitioner was sen-
tenced to a term of fifteen years and fined Twenty-Five
Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00), the term to run concur-
rently with the other two imposed but the fine was imposed
consecutively. The total prison sentence received by the
Petitioner as a term of thirty-five years and the total
fine imposed was Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,-
000.00). >

At the trial the State introduced the application for the
search and seizure warrant and the supporting affidavit.
Petitioner’s counsel moved to quash the warrant and the
motion was denied by the trial court.

The following is an exact copy of the search warrant and
affidavit :

‘¢ AFFIDAVIT

Affidavit, in support of search and seizure for the
person known as Nathaniel Johnson N/M 32 aka Junior
Bunk, B of I #197-996 about 5-8 to 5-10, about 175-
185 Ibs. medium bush hair style, and the premises
which he occupies, uses, rents or keeps known and so
described as a two story brick row home type dwelling
known as 818 Wicklow Road, and the vehicles also
used by Nathaniel Johnson aka Junior Bunk so de-
scribed as: a 1969 Mercury Marquis — Green w a
white top, four door sedan bearing Maryland Lice.
GJ-6460, this vehicle is listed to: Shirley Johnson of
1003 N. Woodington Rd., this person is the wife of Na-
thaniel Johnson and is a past address of Nathaniel
Johnson. And the vehicle so described as: 1969 Mer-
cury Cougar Cpe. gold in color bearing Maryland Lice.
GN-4034, this vehicle listed to a: Willie Johnson 3815
Clifton Ave., this also is a past address of Nathaniel
Johnson.

5

Based on the attached information contained herein
this affidavit your affiants believe that probable cause
exist in that Nathaniel Johnson aka Junior Bunk is
presently using above described premises, and the so
described vehicles for the illegal manufacturing, pos-
sessing, distributing concealment and transporting of
the certain controlled dangerous substances and their
related paraphernalia and other tangible items and
goods in violation of th« law pertaining to Article 27,
Sections 276 thru 302 of the Annotated Code of Mary-
land.

The basis for the warrant is the probable cause based
on the information received from various reliable in-
formants, so described herein, the personal knowledge
of your affiants, the personal observations of your af-
fiants and other investigative aids.

Your First Affiant, Detective William Pennington, a
duly constituted member of the Baltimore City Police
Department, currently assigned to The Criminal In-
vestigation Division, Narcotic Unit.

[Page Two] Det. Pennington has been a police officer
for over (8) years, successfully completed the two
(2) week training class in Washington, D.C. which was
sponsored by The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, has attended the local training class also spon-
sored by that same organization, has given lectures to
various social groups has worked in the area of drug
enforcement for over five (5) years. Has worked in an
undercover capacity on many occasions, is familiar
with the methods and materials used by drug violators
in their acts of manufacturing and distributing certain
controlled dangerous substances and their related para-
phernalia, and is also familiar with the various ter-
minology frequently used in those transactions.

Your Second Affiant, Detective Oscar Requer, also

a duly constituted member of The Baltimore City
Police Department, presently assigned to Criminal In-
vestigation Division, Narcotic Unit, Detective Requer
has been a police officer for over seven (7) years and
has experience in the field of drug enforcement, has
completed the three day narcotic training class, spon-
sored locally by The Bureau of Narcotic and Dangerous
Drugs. Det. Requer is also familiar with the methods
and materials used by drug violators, he has also
worked in an undercover capacity and has been the
arresting and or investigating officer in over fifty cases
involving controlled dangerous drug violations.

During the second week of December 1970, Det.
Requer received certain information from a reliable
informant known to members of the Narcotic Unit, this
informant has in the past given information that
proved to be accurate and true, this informant has
identified over 35 different photographs of individuals
known to the Narcotic Unit as being actively engaged in
the illicit drug traffic in Baltimore City. This same in-
formant gave information about each concerning their
activities. This information accurately corresponded
with information [Page Three] that was previously
given by other logally reliable informants. This same
informant gave information and actively participated
in certain investigations that resulted in over five ar-
rest and seizures of certain quantities of controlled
dangerous substances and their related paraphernalia
during the past six months.

This same informant related to Det. Requer that he
has been in the company of a person known to him as:
Junior Bunk N/M 32, the informant was shown a group
of photographs and from the group the informant iden-
tified the B of I photo 4107-996, that being: Nathaniel
Johnson N/M 32, the informant related that during

a
7

the last two days of the 3rd week of December 1970,
he was in company with two other males and Junior
Bunk, they were in a Mercury Cougar, Gold in color
bearing Md. Lic. GN-4034, and same was being op-
erated by Junior Bunk, the informant and the two
other males were picked up at the corner of Fulton
and Baker Sts. by Junior Bunk in the Mercury Cougar.
The informant related that the conversation was about
narcotic drugs. While in the car one of the males, who
is known to members of the Narcotic Unit, whom the
informant identified from B of I photographs, asked
Junior Bunk “‘If he was going to give him his stuff
today?’’ Junior Bunk was then in the area of Edmond-
son Ave. and Pulaski St. and Brice St. and he stated
that he wanted to see if anyone else needed to re-up”’
Junior Bunk stopped the car once reaching that loca-
tion and had conversation with two males at the corner
of Brice and Edmondson Ave. the conversation was
about re-uping. (to the informant and your affiants
this terminology means to re-supply with a quantity
of narcotics) Junior Bunk advised them he would see
them later and that if he didn’t to get in touch with
Jerry or Smoke, (these persons are known to be drug
violaters — Jerry Knox, the brother-in-law of the
Person known as Junior Bunk-Nathaniel Johnson, re-
cently arrested by this Unit for violations of the nar-
cotic laws and is presently awaiting trial. And Henry
“‘Smoke Dope’’ Dawson, also a known drug violator.
These persons are known to be lieutenants for Na-
thaniel Johnson — Junior Bunk. The [Page Four]
informant then stated that Junior Bunk then drove
near the area of Edmondson Village and then to a
street that the informant identified as Wicklow Road,
Junior Bunk told the persons in the car to remain in
the car and that he would be right back. The informant

—

observed Junior Bunk go to 818 Wicklow Road and
enter with what appeared to be a key from his coat
pocket as he did not knock or ring a bell. After about
5 minutes he came out and walked back to the car and
once inside the car he handed to one of the males a
brown paper bag, the male opened it and the informant
saw that the bag contained from 5 to 8 bundles of
glassine bags that contained a white powder — sus-
pected heroin. (a bundle usually contains between 20
& 25 glassine bags) The male examined the bundles
and put them back into brown paper bag and put them
in his coat pocket. Junior Bunk then drove back to the
area of Edmondson and Brice Sts. and said “‘I don’t
_ see them so I guess they'll have to see Jerry or one
of the others.”’ Junior Bunk then drove to the area of
Fniton and Baker Sts. and everyone got out and Junior
Bunk drove from the area.

During the second week of December 1970 Det. Requer
observed the person known to him as Junior Bunk,
Nathaniel Johnson, operating a 1969 Mercury 4 dr.
sedan bearing Md. Lic. #GJ-6460 — Green with a
white top and this vehicle is listed to: Shirley Johnson
— 1008 Woodington Av. this is a past address of Na-
thaniel Johnson aka Junior Bunk, Det. Requer made
observations of Nathaniel Johnson leaving the address
of 818 Wicklow Rd. operate the Mercury Marquis Md.
Lic. GJ-6460, also the Mercury Cougar Md. Lic. GN-
4034 was parked in front of that location. After leav-
ing the area he drove to the area of Edmondson Village
and parked the auto, Det. Requer identified himself
as a police officer and the operator identified himself as
Nathaniel Johnson, and stated that he was living on
Brice St. However he could not produce a valid op-
erators permit. He advised Det. Requer that he would

9

leave the auto parked on the lot and have someone
come and remove the vehicle later on.

[Page Five] During the second week of Dec. 70, Det.
Pennington also received information from various in-
formants that Junior Bunk was presently using 818
Wicklow Rd. as a storage place and from which to
distribute controlled dangerous substances. And fur-
Stephen Tabeling in that one of Sgt. Tabelings reliable
informants while in company with an undercover pol-
ice officer identified the address of 818 Wicklow Rd.
and stated that this was the house used by Junior Bunk
as he has been in the company of Junior Bunk in the
house. This informant identified the B of I photo of
Nathaniel Johnson, as the person known to him as
Junior Bunk. Further information obtained from Det.
Sgt. Arthur Westveer that the telephone number 566-
2850 is in fact listed to a Mrs. Shirley E. Johnson N/F
— of 818 Wicklow Rd. and this person is the wife of
Nathaniel Johnson aka Junior Bunk.

During the last several months your affiant has seen
Nathaniel Johnson aka Junior Bunk in the company
of Jerry Knox, James Wesley Carter, Henry Dawson,
Charles Elliott, Jerry Wynn. All of these persons are
known to the C.LD. Narcotic Unit as being involved in
the illegal sales and distribution of controlled danger-
ous substances. All are in the files of the C.LD. Nar-
cotic Unit and have in the past been arrested for drug
charges. Nathaniel Johnson has in the past (1960)
been arrested for sales of heroin to police agents and
received a four (4) years sentence for that violation.
Det. Pennington has known this person for over a
period of five years (5) and about his activities, and
the C.LD. Narcotic Unit has maintained an active file
on Johnson for over 10 years and during those years

10

has received continuou:; reliable information as to his
activities and places of residence.

Based on the aforegoing probable cause, your affiants
believe that Nathaniel Johnson is presently using the
premises of 818 Wicklow Rd. for the illegal keeping;
concealing, distributing and manufacturing [Page Six]
of certain controlled dangerous substances and fur-
ther that the so named and described vehicles, Md. Lic.
GJ-6460 Mercury Marquis and the Md. Lic. GN-4034
Mercury Cougar is being used by Nathaniel Johnson
aka Junior Bunk for the illegal concealing, distribut-
ing there from and the transporting of certain con-
trolled dangerous substances, in violation of the law.
pertaining to Art. 27, Sections 276 thru 302 of The
Annoted Code of Maryland.

First Affant Der. Oscar Reqver
Second Affiant Der. Wm. Pennineton

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 14 day of
Jan. 1971.
Rosert James Gerstunc
Judge of the Municipal Court of
Baltimore City.’’

Reasons for Granting the Writ

I. Expuication spy tuts Court oF wHat Ixrormation Is
Necessary To Scprort THE CrepisILity oF aN Uxipen-
TIFIED INFORMANT aND Hence to EstasisH PRoBABLE
Cavse ror THE Issvance or a Search Warrant, Is Es-
SENTIAL FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THOSE JUDICIAL OFFICERS
CaLitep Upon to Evatvate Sucu Ixrormation.

The Court below specifically and exclusively utilized as
its predicate for concluding that the informant was cred-
ible the following language in the affidavit:

ll

‘‘This same informant gave information and actively
participated in certain investigations that resulted in
over five arrests and seizures of certain quantities
(sic) of controlled dangerous substances and their
related paraphernalia during the past six months.’’

It is the contention of the Petitioner that the issue here
is not whether the informant had, in fact, given useful and
credible information in the past but rather whether within
the four corner of the affidavit sufficient facts were re-
flected to establish the necessary credibility of the in-
formant. Petitioner contends that such was not the case.

Before a magistrate can issue a search warrant he must
have sufficient information to support an independent judg-
ment that probable cause exists for the warrant. Whitely
v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560
(1971).

To arrive at such an independent judgment the issuing
magistrate must conclude that the knowledge attributed to
the informant, if true, would be sufficient to establish prob-
able cause, that the affidavit is accurately and truthfully
relating what the informant said and that the informant
was accurate both in his description and perception of the
alleged criminal activity. U. S. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 at
587. (Dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan).

This Honorable Court had, in the past, held that it is
of the utmost importance that the informer be both truth-
ful and have personal observation of alleged acts. Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. U. S., 393 U.S.
410 (1969).

One must bear in mind that the affiant swears under
oath but the informer does not, all the more reason to lay
great stress upon the informer’s credibility.

If probable cause is to be determined by the magistrate
and not the affiant, then it follows that the greater the

12

amount ef infermation the magistrate hae about the in-
former, the more accurately will he be able to-.arrive ata
determination of the existence ef probable cause, or not,
This would undoubtedly benefit both sides since the in-
dividual’s 4th Amendment rights would be. well protected
and the warrants issued by magistrates would be less sus-
ceptible to attack on the issue of probable cause.

Petitioner contends that in the case at bar the magistrate
was furnished with insufficient information in order to
find probable cause. The affidavits said nothing about the
number of times the informer had even given imaccurate
information to the police. It did not further specify as to
when ‘‘during the past six months’’ the informant had
supplied information to the police. For all that appears,
the five arrests and seizures mentioned grew out of one
transaction or observation, occurring only on one day
during the prior six months. No mention was made of
what was actually seized, in what quantities and whether
such evidence was uncovered which the informant indicated
would be found. No corroborative information by the af-
fiants with regard to informant’s reliability cum informant
appears within the four corners of the affidavit. The ma-
gistrate was without sufficient foundation to form an opin-
ion regarding the credibility of the informer.

Surely the 4th Amendment should not be stretched to
cover the issuance of warrants upon information given by
unidentified persons whose credibility cannot be deter-
mined and whose names cannot be mentioned. Such a war-
rant, that has heen conceived in ignorance, and born in
secrecy, should be served in darkness.

IL Exp.ication sy THs Court Recarpixe tHe Errect on
Prosastz Cause or THe Lexoru or Tixe Between ay
Invormant’s OBSERVATION AND THE APPLIC. CION FOR A
Seance Wasrast Is or tHe Urmost Inuportance rm
THE GumpaNce oF JupiciaL OFrFricers.

s

—

Thé affidavit ‘reflects that the relied upon informant
made but one observation of: alleged illegal aetivity on the
part of Petitioner, on or about December 19, 1970. Applica-
tion for search warrant was not made until January 14,
1971. Petitioner contends that the lapse of 26 days between
the date of the alleged illegal activity observed and the
date of the search warrant renders the necessary element
of probable cause stale. Within the four corners of the
affidavit there are no facts which rise to a reasonable in-
ference that illegal activity was occurring at 818 Wicklow
Road on a continuing basis. Regardless of the additional
information regarding Petitioner’s past history, the only
information therein about 818 Wicklow Road is that during
the third week of December, 1970, the Petitioner was seen
entering said residence with a key and that five minutes
later he exited with a brown paper bag containing 5 to 8
bundles of glassine bags that contained a white powder
— suspected heroin. There was no information that the
powder was, in fact, heroin. There was no information
that this alleged illegal activity was anything more than
an isolated incident. No information was given to who
lived in said premises or that Petitioner had, in fact, ever
visited said premises prior to or after the observation
made during the third week of December, 1970.

The Court below cited Clayton v. State, 1 Md. App. 500,
to support its position that probable cause existed on
January 14, 1971. In Clayton v. State, supra, observation
establishing the facts set forth in the application for the
warrant were made during a period of 19 days to 12 days
from the making of the affidavit and the issuance of the
warrant. However, Judge Orth, speaking for the Court,
said, inter alia, “During this period the observation on the *
second and third day confirmed that the observations on
the first day were not an isolated instance but part of the
continuing plan and practice.’ 1 Md. App. at 504 (Em-
phasis added). ‘

18

14

The language emphasized indicates that the ‘‘hinge’’ in
the Court’s decision that probable cause existed, was the
confirmatory observations on the second and third day.

Clayton, supra, can be distinguished from the case at
bar since in the latter there was no information tending
to show a continuing plan and practice.

Clayton, supra, appears to be the only Maryland case
in point but several other jurisdictions have confronted
this issue. A lapse of 25 days was held not to vitiate
probable cause since the affidavit included an account of
extended observations in a case involving gambling activ-
ities. U. S. v. Long, 169 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1959). State
v. Cooper, 154 A. 423 (N.J. 1931).

Several jurisdictions have held that a delay in excess
of 25 days poses too great a risk to the accused that the
situation at the locus to be searched had changed during
the interim. State v. Gardner, 240 P. 984 (1925), U. S. v.
Bosch, 209 F. Supp. 15 (D.C. Mich. 1962), Dandrea v.
U. S., 7 F.2d 861 (8th C. C.A. 1925).

Ingram v. State of Oregon, 445 P. 2d 503 (1968) was a
case with a fact situation very similar to the case at bar.
There a defendant was convicted of possession of heroin
with the affidavit in support of the search warrant being
executed after a lapse of 28 days after the only observa-
tion made. The Court found lack of probable cause because
the length of time that had elapsed between the obtaining
of heroin (a sale was made) and the making of the af-
fidavit was too great to permit the magistrate to find that
probable cause existed that narcotics were on the premises
on the date of the affidavit.

In U. 8. v. Allen, 147 F. Supp. 955 (D.CFD. Kentucky
1957), Chief Judge Ford quoted from page 1414 of 162
A.L.R. 1406-1418, to the extent that an interval of not

15

more than 20 days had never been held so unreasonable
as to vitiate a search warrant, whereas an interval of 30
days had always been held to be an unreasonably long
delay. Therefore, the doubtful time zone was, roughly
speaking, the fourth week from the alleged offense.

There must, therefore, be some period of time whereby
the probable cause established by an isolated act on a
premise becomes stale. The only determination to be made
by the Honorable Court is whether the lapse of time in
the case at bar vitiates probable cause. Petitioner submits
that the test must be one of ‘‘continuing activity’’ as sup-
ported by the cases cited. There can be no magic formula
or specified lapse of time to identify ‘‘staleness’’. Rather
the concept of a ‘‘continuing activity or plan’’ becomes
a dynamic rule which can be applied irrespective of the
actual number of days involved.

Petitioner submits that a second argument can be made
by analogy to Article 27 Section 551 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland which provides that, ‘‘. . . Any search
or seizure under the authority of such search warrant
shall be made within fifteen (15) calendar days from the
date of the issuance thereof and after the expiration of
said fifteen (15) day period, said warrant shall be null
and void... .’’.

Petitioner contends that the fifteen (15) day period
should also govern any lapse between the time ef the ob-
servation of the alleged illegal act and the issucmece of
the search warrant. In support of this position, Petitioner
cites Sgro v. U. S., 287 U.S. 206, where, in a concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice McReynolds stated that sinee the
applicable statute declared that after ten days a warrant
not fully executed shall be void, no search warrant should
issue upon an affidavit more than ten days old.

a

16

= — ee
- <t0s Depgives THe Resipents or THAT STATS oF THE
Eeqvuat Prorection or tHe Laws Unper tHe Fovr-
TZENTH AMENDMENT OF THE Unitep States Constitv-
TION. - That ,

The Trial Court instructed the jury as follows:

‘‘Under the Maryland Constitution and Statutes the
jury in a criminal case is the final judge, and the
only judge, of both the facts and the law. I advise you
as to what I believe is the applicable Maryland law,
_but as I have said, under our Constitution and Stat-
utes, you have a right to disagree with my interpreta-
tion of the law.’’

The jury was subsequently instructed on various prin-
ciples of law regarding the definition of reasonable doubt,
the prohibition against inferring guilt from defendant’s
not taking the stand and so forth. However, under the
above quoted instruction the jury was free to disregard
these instructions and arrive at their own definition of
these fundamental principles of law, all to the Petitioner’s
prejudice.

The trial judge was acting in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article XV Section 5 of the Maryland Constitu-
tion which provides:

‘In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall
be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that
the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to sustain a conviction.’’

At the outset, Petitioner concedes that the Constitutional
issue here presented has been raised before this Honorable
Court on several occasions, Wyley v. Warden, Maryland

17

Penitentiary; -372 ‘F.2d: 742, cert. den. .389' U.S. 863, reh.
den. 389'U.S. 997;'as well as Brady v. State of Maryland,
373 U.S.:' 83; in connection with -a collateral. matter. In
Giles v. Maryland, 372 U.S. 767, an appeal was dismissed
which raised this issue along with others, for want of a
substantial federal question.

However, the Court in Brady considered this issue only
by way of deciding the main issue on appeal. Mr. Justice
Douglas commented that this provision of the Maryland
Constitution making the jury in criminal cases ‘‘the Judges
of Law does not mean precisely what it seems to say’’,
373 U.S. at 89. He then noted the limitations added by
state statute in judicial construction.

The rule embodied in Aricle XV Section 5 exists in
only two jurisdictions: Maryland and Indiana. Indiana
has largely eliminated the dangers flowing from such a
rule by holding that the trial court, ‘‘is not required to
neutralize the effect of its instructions by telling the jury
that they are at liberty to disregard them and to decide
the law for themselves.’’ Bridgewater vy. State, 153 Ind.
560, 566; 55 N.E. 737, 739 (1889).

In federal criminal prosecutions this Honorable Court
held as early as 1895 that juries are the judges of the facts,
under binding instructions by the judges on questions of
law. Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51.

Several Maryland jurists have advocated repeal or modi-
fication of Article XV Section 5. Chief Judge Stedman
Prescott declared it to be, ‘‘archaic, outmoded, and atro-
cious.’’ Prescott, Juries as Judges of the Law: Should the
Practice be Continued? 60. Md. S.B.A. 246, 247 (1955),
Chief Judge William L. Henderson referred to it as, ‘‘our
unique and indefensible procedure.’’ Henderson, The Jury
as Judges of Law and Fact in Maryland. 52 Md. S.B.A.
184, 199 (1947). See also Dennis, Maryland’s Antique
Constitutional Thorn, 92 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 34 (1943).

18

Petitioner contends that Article XV Section 5 empower-
ing the jury, as it does, to decide principles of law re-
garding the definition of reasonable doubt and to draw
inferences of guilt from his right to remain silent and not
testify at his trial operates so as to deny him due process
or violates the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment.

Petitioner concedes that he did not object to the Trial
Court’s instruction at the time of trial. However, he is
not banned from raising the federal constitutionality of
Article XV Section 5, Maryland Constitution, by such
failure. Wyley v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, supra.
Furthermore, under the law as it existed, it would not have
availed him to do so. Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 63
A.2d 599 ; O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 82 (1966).

Conclusion

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to
review the judgment and opinion of the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland.

Respectfully submitted,

F, Lee Barmey
One Center Plaza
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
GeraLp ALCH

One Center Plaza

Boston, Massachusetts 02108
Wii H. Murpay, Jr.
2115 One Charles Center
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Leroy W. CaRRou }
2115 One Charles Center
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Attorneys for the Petitioner

19
APPENDIX
REPORTED

iN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND

No. 536
September Term, 1971

NATHANIEL JOHNSON, JR.
®.
State oF MaryLanpD

ANDERSON
Morton
CaRTER,
JJ.
Opinion by Anderson, J.

Filed: March 22, 1972

The appellant, Nathaniel Johnson, Jr., was convicted by

a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Judge Charles
D. Harris presiding, of conspiracy to violate the Control-
led Dangerous Substance’ Law (Indictment +658), pos-
session of heroin (Indictment #663), possession with in-
tent to manufacture and distribute a controlled dangerous
substance, heroin, (Indictment #665), and maintaining a
common nuisance (Indictment #664). Under the combined
Indictments #663 and #665, the appellant was sentenced
to a term of twenty (20) years and was fined $25,000.00.
The appellant was sentenced to a term of fifteen (15)
years and fined $25,000.00 under Indictment +664, the
sentence and fine to run consecutively to those imposed
under Indictments #663 and +665. Under Indictment

#658, the appellant was sentenced to a term of fifteen (15)
years and fined $25,000.00, the term to run concurrently
with the other two imposed but the fine was imposed con-
secutively. The total prison sentence received by the ap-
pellant was a term of thirty-five (35) years and the total
fine imposed was $75,000.00.

On appeal the appellant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to quash the search warrant.
The appellant makes .a two-pronged attack on the war-
rant. He argues that the affidavit in support of the warrant
was insufficient to establish probable cause. Secondly, the
appellant argues that the time stated in the affidavit for
the warrant of the observation of the offense and the time
when the warrant was issued was so remote as to render
the probable cause stale, thereby invalidating the search
warrant.

On January 15, 1971, at approximately 7:00 p.m., the
police, armed with a search warrant issued the previous
day, entered 818 Wicklow Road in Baltimore, searched the
premises and found heroin. The appellant, who was pre-
sent at the time, was arrested and indicted.

I
Tue Arripavit axp Propaste Cause

The appellant argues that the affidavit in support of
the warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause.

Judge Orth, speaking for this Court, in Moore v. State,
13 Md. App. 711, succinctly set forth the rules governing
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant at
713-716 :

‘*The rules governing probable cause for the issu-
ance of a search and seizure warrant need not be
complex, intricate or perplexing. We said in Buckner
v. State, 11 Md. App. 55, 61-62:

‘A judge may issue a search warrant when
it is made to appear to him by a written applica-

tion signed and sworn to by the applicant, ac-
companied by an affidavit containing facts within
the personal knowledge of the affiant, that there
is probable cause to believe that a crime is being
committed by any individual or in a building
within his territorial jurisdiction, and that evi-
dence of the crime is upon the person or within
the place to be searched. * * * Probable cause
is less than certainty or demonstration but more
than suspicion or possibility. It is to be deter-
mined by the judge to whom application for the
warrant is made. If a prudent and cautious man
would be justified from the facts presented in
the affidavit in believing that the offense has
been or is being committed, the warrant properly
may be issued. In determining the existence vel
non of probable cause, the judge may give con-
sideration to the special significance which ob-
jects, happenings, and individuals may have con-
veyed to a trained, experienced and knowledge-
able police officer making the affidavit accom-
panying the warrant. * * * And the affidavit may
be based on hearsay information, even from an
unidentified informant, and need not reflect the
direct personal observations of the affiant, but
it must contain some of the underlying circum-
stances from which the affiant could be reason-
ably justified in a belief that the hearsay infor-
mation was reliable or the informant was cred-
aoe?

‘When a search warrant is challenged, the
lower court, and the appellate court when the
determination of the lower court is before it on
appeal, must look for probable cause only in the
affidavit itself and may not go outside it. * * *

However the affidavit should be interpreted in a
common-sense and not a hypertechnical manner,
and the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases
should be largely determined by the preference
to be accorded to warrants. Frey v. State, 3 Md.
App. 38, 45-46, summarizing the observations in
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102. But
* * © this is not to say that probable cause can
be made out by affidavits which are purely con-
clusory, stating only the affiant’s or an inform-
er’s belief that probable cause exists.’ (citations
omitted )

‘*Thus probable cause may be shown in the affidavit
by a statement by the affiant 1) of his direct observa-
tions, or 2) of information furnished the affiant by
someone else, named or unnamed, or 3) of a combina-
tion of the direct observations of the affiant and hear-
say information furnished him. In each instance the
issuing judge must have before him enough circum-
stances to enable him to determine the trustworthiness
of the information, for he must not only evaluate the
adequacy to show probable cause of the facts and
circumstances set out in the affidavit but he must also
»valuate the truthfulness of the source of the informa-
tion comprising those facts and circumstances. Due
to the infinite variety of human conduct, the sufficiency
of any affidavit must necessarily depend upon the
particular facts and circumstances in it contained.”’
[Footnotes omitted].

We note that Moore v. State, supra, paid due homage
to the most important Supreme Court cases dealing with
the rules governing a search and seizure warrant, te.,
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509; Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, and the recent
ease of United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S. Ct.

2075, which somewhat limited the application of Spinelli
v. United States, supra.

In reviewing the five page affidavit in the instant case
we must note that there are many instances in which state-
ments made by the affiants are merely conclusory. A num-
ber of different informants are relied on by the affiants
and in the case of all but one of these informants the
afiants make no showing of their reliability other than
bald statements that the informants are reliable. However,
a warrant which is inadequate in one regard is salvagable
in another. Dawson v. State, 14 Md. App. 18, concurring
opinion by Moylan, J., at 24. In the instant case we feel
that the following passage from the affidavit was sufficient
to establish probable cause :

**During the second week of December 1970, Det.
Requer received certain information from a reliable
informant known to members of the Narcotic Unit,
this informant has in the past given information that
proved to be accurate and true, this informant has
identified over 35 differnt [sic] photographs of indi-
viduals known to the Narcotic unit as being actively
engaged in the illicit drug traffic in Baltimore City.
This same informant gave information about each
concerning their activities. This information accur-
ately corresponded with information [Page Three]
that was previcusly given by other logally [sic] re-
liable informants. This same informant gave informa-
tion and actively participated in certain investiga-
tions that resulted in over five arrest and seizures
of certain quanities [sic] of controlled dangerous
substances and their related paraphernalia during the
past six months.

**This same informant related to Det. Requer that
he has been in the company of a person known to
him as: Junior Bunk N/M 32, the informant was

shown a group of photographs and from the group
the informant identified the B of I photo #107,996,
that being: Nathaniel Johnson N/M 32, the informant
related that during the last two days of the 3rd week
of December 1970, he was in company with two other
males and Junior Bunk, they were in a Mercury
Cougar, Gold in color bearing Md. Lic. GN-4034, and
same was being operated by Junior Bunk, the in-
formant and the two other males were picked up at
the corner of Fulton and Baker Sts. by Junior Bunk
in the Mercury Cougar. The informant related that
the conversation was about narcotic drugs. While in
the car one of the males, who is known to members
of the narcotic Unit, whom the informant identified
from B of I photographs, asked Junior Bunk ‘If ho
[sic] was going to give him his stuff today?’ Junior
Bunk was then in the area of Edmondson Ave. and
Pulaski St. and Brice St. and he stated that he wanted
fo see if anyone else needed to re-up’ [sic] Junior
Bunk stopped the car once reaching that location and
had conversation with two males at the corner of
Brice and Edmondson Ave. the conversation was
about re-uping. (to the informant and your affiants
this terminology means to re-supply with a quanity
[sic] of narcotics) Junior Bunk advised them he
would see them later and that if he didn’t to get in
touch with Jerry or Smoke, (these persons are known
to be drug violators — Jerry Knox, the brother-in-law
of the Person known as Junior Bunk-Nathaniel John-
son, recently arrested by this Unit for violations of
the narcotic laws and is presently awaiting trial. And
Henry ‘Smoke Dope’ Dawson, also a known drug
violator. [sic] These persons are known to be lieu-
tenants for Nathaniel Johnson — Junior Bunk. The
[Page Four] informant then stated that Junior Bunk

then drove near the area of Edmondson Village and
then to a street that the informant identified as Wick-
low Road, Junior Bunk told the persons in the car
to remain in the car and thet [sic] he would be right
back. The informant observed Junior Bunk go to 818
Wicklow Road and enter with what appeared to be
a key from his coat pocket as he did not knock or
ring a bell. After about 5 minutes he came out and
walked back to the car and once inside the car he
handed to one of the males a brown paper bag, the
male opened it and the informant saw that the bag
contained from 5 to 8 bundles of glassine bags that
contained a white powder — suspected heroin. (a
bundle usually contains between 20 & 25 glassine bags)
The male examined the bundles and put them back
into brown paper bag and put them in his coat pocket.
Junior Bunk then drove back to the area of Edmond-
son and Brice Sts. and said ‘I don’t see them so I
guess they'll have to see Jerry or one of the others.’
Junior Bunk then drove to the area of Fulton and
Baker Sts. and everyone got out and Junior Bunk
drove from the area.’’

Following the aplicable guidelines, we feel that the last
sentence of the first quoted paragraph in the affidavit,
which related that the informant had given information
and actively participated in investigations resulting in over
five narcotic arrests and seizures within the preceding six
months, was adequate for the issuing magistrate to con-
elude that the informant was credible. Frankis v. State,
11 Md. App. 534, 538. We feel further that the rest of
the above quoted passage sets forth sufficient facts and
circumstances so that the issuing magistrate would be
justified from the facts presented in the affidavit in believ-
ing that the offense has been or is being committed. The
second paragraph sets forth observations by an informant

who, as has been stated, could have been considered credible
by the issuing magistrate. These observations, if true,
constitute probable cause to believe that the narcotics laws
were being violated by the appellant at 818 Wicklow Road.

The appellant contends, however, that even the quoted
portion of the affidavit is insufficient because the sequence
of time as to when the informant relayed his observations
to Detective Requer is unclear. We disagree. It is true
that the first paragraph of the quoted passage relates that
the informant first gave information to Detective Requer
during the second week in December, 1970, and that no
other date is given for the passing of information between
the informant and Detective Requer. “Taken literally this
would seem to indicate that the informant gave Detective
Requer information about events which occurred on the
last two days of the third week in December, 1970, during
the second week in December, 1970. This, of course, is an
impossibility and we do not think the magistrate was
required to read the affidavit in this manner. As stated,
the affidavit should be interpreted in a common-sense and
not a hypertechnical manner, and the resolution of doubtful
or marginal cases should be largely determined by the
preference accorded to warrants. United States v. Ven-
tresca, supra; Henderson v. State, 243 Md. 342, 347; Frey
v. State, supra. Further the general rule is that when an
error appears in the affidavit concerning the date of the
observation such error will not vitiate an affidavit. Varon,
Searches, Seizure and Immunities, Sec. 13, at 324. In the
instant case, a common-sense interpretation of the affidavit
could only have led to the conclusion by the issuing magis-
trate that there necessarily had to have been some com-
munication between the informant and Detective Requer
after the secon? week in December, 1970. In fact, this
communication could only have taken place at some time
after the last two days of the third week in December, 1970.

27

II
Tue Issue or Statz Propastz Cause

The appellant contends further that the warrant was
a stale warrant in that the issuance of the warrant occurred
at a time which was too remote from the observation of
the offense. The observations occurred on the 18th and
19th of December, 1970, and the affidavit was made and
issued on January 14, 1971. There is no statute in this
State providing that the facts in the application, set forth
to establish probable cause, must result from observations
made within a designated time before the issuance of the
warrant. Nor do we find any cases which lay down a rigid
rule. However, the remoteness of the facts observed from
the date of the issuance of the warrant is an element to be
considered in each instance by the issuing authority in
determining whether it appears that there was probable
cause. Clayton v. State, 1 Md. App. 500, 503. The issue,
therefore, is whether this lapse of 26 days between the
observation of the facts and the issuance of the warrant, -
was so remote, when considered in the circumstances of
this case, so as to invalidate the search warrant. Clayton
v. State, supra, at 504. See Varon, supra, at 322; 100
A.L.R. 2d 525.

In Clayton v. State, supra, the observations establishing
the facts set forth in the application were made during
a period of 19 days to 12 days from the making of the
affidavit and the issuance of the search warrant. Three
observations were made and the Court in Clayton v. State,
supra, at 504, was of the opinion that the second and third
observations confirmed that the observations on the first
day were not an isolated instance but part of a continuing
plan and practice. The Court considered this continuing
plan and practice an important fact in holding that the
lapse of 19 days to 12 days was not so remote as to render
the warrant invalid. Clayton v. State, supra, at 504.

LUPE RH “Sy

28

It is true that in the instant case that there were only
two valid observations in the affidavit and that the lapse
was one of 26 days. However, in the instant case the
affidavit asserts that the informant was present when the
appellant was making his rounds to determine who was to
be re-supplied with narcotics. It was at this point that
the appelalnt returned to 818 Wicklow Road and brought
back five to eight bundles of glassine bags containing the
suspected heroin. The activity of the appellant when the
informant was in the appellant’s car seemed to suggest a
continuing business in the distribution of narcotics. We
feel, therefore, that under the facts and circumstances of
this case, the facts observed were not so remote from the
issuance of the warrant to invalidate the warrant for lack
of probable cause. Clayton v. State, supra, at 504. In this
regard it is important to remember what we have stated
above and what the Court of Appeals said in Henderson
v. State, supra, when the Court at 347 quoted United States
v. Ventresca, supra:

*** when a magistrate has found probable cause
the courts should not invalidate the warrant by in-
terpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than
a commonsense manner. Although in a particular case
it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit
demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the
resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area
should be largely determined by the preference to be
accorded to warrants.”’

We find no error in the denial of the motion to quash
the warrant.

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED;
APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385606_1423%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
