# Brief for Respondent — Larsen v. Air California

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for Respondent
- **Published:** January 1, 1972
- **Citation:** 409 U.S. 895

## Text

i
TOPICAL INDEX

Question Presented for Review ..........---.
Statute Involved .............. cece ce eens
Statement of Case... ee ees

I This Court should not grant petitioner's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider
those Findings of Fact already determined
by the District Court and upheld by the
Court of Appeals ............-0 eee eeee

II This Court should not grant petitioner's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider
those Conclusions of Law already deter-
mined by the District Court and upheld
by the Court of Appeals ..............4..

to respondent's obligations and peti-
tioner’s rights under 50 U.S.C. App.
8 459 (g) (4) are notinesror ........

C. The trial court had justification to
find that petitioner was not entitled
to reinstatement to his position of

employment ............--eeeeee
D. Both the District Court and the Court

of Appeals properly found that peti-
Plas

Co we NY WN WY

15
1S

17

19

ii
TOPICAL INDEX

Argument (cont’d) Page

tioner’s failure to adequately seek

and obtain comparable employment

after his discharge from respondent’s

employ was a failure to properly

a ee eee 23

III This Court should not grant petitioner’s
Petition for Writ of Certiorari based on

its powers of supervision ................ 25
ID Tho ctl VK oe Kh oih oo Actes ooh 28
Index to Appendix
Appendix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases
American Federation of Musicians v. Wittstein,

Pe ee 4.45i 6s etaaedes 17
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) .... ll

Barisoff v. Hollywood Baseball Association,
71 F.Supp. 493 (S.D. Cal. 1948),
aff'd, 166 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1948) ...... 22

Berenyi v. District Director, Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 630 (1967).. 10,11

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) ...... 11

Dacey v. Trusteed Funds, Inc., 72 F. Supp. ©
611 (D.C. Mass. 1947) .............. oT |,

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases (cont'd)

Ferris v. Alaska Airways, 113 F. Supp. 907
ye eer rere wien

Green v. Tho-Ro Products, 232 F.2d 173
CORT HE Fk noe nig neces cewaccasncns

Gregg v. McDonald, 73 Cal. App. 748 (1948) ....
Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) ..........

Hedger v. Reynolds, 216 F.2d 202
0 ee

Helwig v. United States, 162 F.2d 837
SE TT © a vase nlessedecsnseses

Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960) ..
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) ........
Larsen v. Air California, 313 F. Supp. 218 (1970) .

Levine v. Beman, 178 F.2d 440
CE ES ee nee

Marshal v. United States, 36 U.S. 310(1959) ....
Meissner v. Papas, 35 F. Supp. 676

(B.D. Wisc. 1940)... ccc ce eee
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) ....

Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). .

National Labor Relations Board v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc, 396 F.2d 769
a errr Tree Te Teeter

19

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases (cont’d)

National Labor Relations Board v. Plant City
Steel Corp., 331 F.2d 511

(Sth Cir. 1964) 0... eee eee eee erences

Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954)
Sanders v. Leach, 158 F.2d 486

(Sth Cir. 1946) 6... eee eee ees yenes

Smetherham v. Laundry Workers’ Union,

44 Cal. App. 2d 131 (1941) 6. ee ee eee

Smith v. James Irvine Foundation,

401 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1968) ..-..-.--+--

Stacher v. United States, 258 F.2d 112

(9th Cir. 1958) oe eee ee eee eens

Thiel v. Southern Pacific Company,

328 U.S. 217 (1946) _ ....---- a caeetuas

Thompson v. City of Louisville,

362 U.S. 199 (1960)... eee ee eee

Trusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey,

160 F.2d 413 (Ist Cir. 1947) ©... - ee eee
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925) ..

United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,

338 U.S. 338 (1949) ow eee eee
Utter v. Chapman, 38 Cal. 560 (1869) ......--

Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949)

_

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Statutes (United States) Page
EE a4 Genoa nabs deh held baeadueee 2
ae 22
EE | oe oie ceet dabale at 3
a oe a oe she Seb Wadd 2

ee
Sha ea 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22
Rules

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
ee 14, 24

Rules of the Supreme Court
Rule 19 (1) (b) (28 U.S.C. App.) .......... 15

Text

Mr. Justice Harlan, Manning the Dikes,
13 Record of N.Y.C.B.A., 541, 551 (1958) .. 16

1A Moores Federal Practice 0.310 ............ 25
Robert L. Stern, Eugene Gressman,

Supreme Court Practice, Fourth Edition,
Sn EE Ie eA 16

NO. 71-1633

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1971

WALTER L. LARSEN, JR.,
Petitioner,
VS.
AIR CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

OPINIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW
In a decision filed on March 2, 1972 and not yet offi-
cially reported, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California in favor of
respondent [see Appendix, pp. 1 & 2]. A petition for rehear-

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ing was denied, without further opinion, on Apni 13, 1972.
The decision of the District Court, which also included Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, is reported at 313 F.
Supp. 218 (1970) [see Appendix, pp. 2 - 15}.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the District Court was dated May 12,
1970 and entered May 19, 1970 [see Appendix, pp. 14 &
15]. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
March 2, 1972 [see Appendix pp. 1 & 2] and the order deny-
ing rehearing was filed April 3, 1972. The sole issue before
the trial court under petitioner’s First Amended Complaint
was whether or not respondent had violated the provisions of
50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g) (4), of the Military Selective Service
Act of 1967. Jurisdiction of the case is based upon 50 U.S.C.
App. 8 459 (d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether or not an issue of law remains to be de-
cided by this Court and whether or not this Court should
review the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that
were determined by the District Court and upheld by the
Court of Appeals.

STATUTE INVOLVED

50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g) (4), in pertinent part, is as
follows:

“Any employee . . . shall upon request be grant-

aRn

ed a leave of absence by his employer for the
period required to perform active duty for
training or inactive duty training in the Armed
Forces of the United States. Upon his release
from a period of such active duty for training
or inactive duty training . . . such employee
shall be permitted to return to his position with
such seniority, status, pay, and vacation as he
would have had if he had not been absent for
such purposes.”

STATEMENT OF CASE

This action was filed by petitioner on May 15, 1969.
The original complaint contained six alleged causes of
action. On the motion of the respondent, the complaint
was dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend
except as to petitioner’s claim predicated upon 50 U.S.C.
App. § 459 (g) (4) and 50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (c) (3). The
petitioner does not ciaim that such dismissal constituted
error. The case proceeded to trial on the sole issue of
whether respondent violated the rights of petitioner under
50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g) (4).

Respondent is a passenger air carrier operating schedul-
ed service between northern and southern California. Peti-
tioner submitted an employment application on August 8,
1967 for a position as 4 co-pilot. Petitioner’s employment
application was accepted by respondent, and petitioner
commenced employment effective September 16, 1967.
(Rec.! 121.) Petitioner’s employment application had been

Las used herein “Rec.” refers to the Clerk's Record and “Tr.” refers to the
Reporter's Transcript.

a

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intentionally falsified, but this fact was not discovered until
after petitioner's termination. (Tr. 716.)

Prior to September 16, 1967, petitioner and other new
pilot employees attended a pre-employment interview with
rest ondent’s chief pilot (Tr. 57), vice-president of operations
(Tr. 58, 87), and chief dispatcher (Tr. 140). At this meeting
petitioner informed respondent, for the first time, that he was
a member of the Coast Guard Reserve and that he would be
required to attend Coast Guard drills one week end a month.

Petitioner was well aware that respondent’s heaviest
passenger traffic was on the week ends (Tr. 114), and to
alleviate the potential conflict of employee duties and reserve
drills, petitioner suggested that he would trip trade (i.e., ex-
change his week-end duties for respondent with another co-
pilot employed by respondent) and thus be available for week-
end duties once a month for the Coast Guard Reserve. (Tr. 60,
118-119, 636-640 )

Petitioner commenced performing regular employment
as a co-pilot on October 25, 1967, was furloughed by respond-
ent on November 16, 1967 for reasons not germane to the
present action (Rec. 121), and was recalled from furlough on
March 8, 1968. (Rec. 122.)

After petitioner’s return from furlough, and prior to the
posting of respondent's flight schedule for the week end of
April 20 and 21, 1968, petitioner submitted to respondent’s
chief dispatcher a piece of paper apparently setting forth
the April drill dates to be April 20 and 21, 1968. (Tr. 548.)
The exact form and content of the paper is not clear, as the
paper was never offered into evidence.

Petitioner later learned that he had been scheduled for
flight duties for respondent on the same week end as his

we

aige

April military drills, and trip traded with another co-pilot,
so that he could be present for his Coast Guard Reserve
duties. (Tr. 549, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.) There is no evi-
dence and petitioner does not contend that he was treated
any differently than any other co-pilot with respect to
week-end duty, the crew assignments being on a rotational
basis. (Tr. 132, 146-147.) ’It is also uncontroverted that
during petitioner's employment, there were other employees
of the respondent who were both reservists and flight crew
members, and none of these employees experienced diffi-
culties in accommodating drill obligations to week-end flight
schedules (Finding of Fact No. 5, Appendix p. 10; see, e.g.,
Tr. 99, 110-112, 114, 141-142, 283, 285, 288, 456, 512,
770).

Petitioner’s drills for the month of May, 1968, were
scheduled for the week end of May 4 and 5. A few days
prior to the drill dates, petitioner submitted a note to the
respondent’s dispatcher with the dates of the May drills,
but later learned that he was scheduled for flight duties with
respondent on May 4 and 5. (Tr. 551.)

On May 3, 1968, the day before his military training
commitment, a conference between respondent's president,
Mr. Benscoter, and petitioner was held at the request of the
petitioner in Mr. Benscoter’s office. The conference was
initiated by petitioner pursuant to a letter sent by respond-
ent’s president to all employees, encouraging discussions
between respondent’s employees and the chief executive
officer (Tr. 555). At this meeting petitioner stated that he
indicated his intention of submitting requests for leaves of
absence for military drills (Tr. 555-556). Respondent's presi-

ie.

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dent agreed that such a procedure “might be the thing to do”
and that he would look into the matter (Tr. 556). Petitioner
trip traded with another co-pilot so that he could attend his

May 4 drills, but he did not attend his May 5 drills (Tr. 560).

On May 21, 1968, petitioner submitted to the office of
respondent’s chief pilot a request for leave of absence on a
form provided by the Navy (Rec. 124, Tr. 561). This is the
first memorandum of any kind relating to military drills sub-
mitted to respondent’s chief pilot by petitioner (Tr. 414).
Respondent granted the request for leave of absence, and
petitioner performed his military drills on leave of absence
for the week end of June 1 and 2, 1968. Petitioner returned
to his regular employment duties on June 3, 1968 (Rec. 124),
and on June 4, 1968 respondent gave petitioner notice of
termination effective June 20, 1968 (Rec. 124, Plaintiff's
Exhibit 24, Tr. 276-277).

Petitioner contends that the notes submitted prior to the
April and May 1968 drills constituted requests for leaves of
absence under the provisions of 50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g) (4).
Respondent contends, and the trial court found, that peti-
tioner’s first actual request for leave of absence was the
request of May 21, 1968, which request was granted by re-
spondent (Conclusion of Law No. 2, Appendix p. 12; Tr.
196-197).

On April 27, 1968, approximately five weeks before peti-
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tioner’s termination, respondent instituted a procedure describ-
ed in a document entitled “Discipline and Discharge Hearing
Program” which was mailed to all of respondent’s employees,
including the petitioner (Plaintiff's Exhibit 21; Finding of Fact
No. 14, Appendix p. 11). Although the procedure was not
intended to apply to flight crew members, who theretofore had

a ee Pe aa me

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chosen a union to represent the pilots for collective bargain-
ing purposes, the document was inadvertently mailed to flight
crew employees (Rec. 122).

By virtue of petitioner’s receipt of a copy of the program
and the absence of any formal rescission thereof, the trial
court found that on June 10, 1968, petitioner submitted a
timely request for hearing in an attempt to initiate the hear-
ing procedure set forth in the “Discipline and Discharge Hear
ing Program.” In response, respondent gave notice that peti-
tioner would not be granted a hearing. (Findings of Fact Nos.
16 and 17, Appendix pp. 11 & 12).

The trial court further found that by denying petitioner
a hearing under the proffered program, the respondent did not
restore the petitioner to his position with the same “‘status”
as he had had prior to his military drills of June 1 and 2, 1968
(Conclusions of Law Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 8, Appendix pp. 12 & 13),
and, thus, the reduction in petitioner’s “status” caused by such
denial was in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g) (4).

The trial court awarded the petitioner monetary damages,
utilizing two bases upon which to compute an identical award.
The first method of computation was based on petitioner’s
salary on the date of his termination ($750 per month) for
the period between the date of termination and the time
within which a hearing with respect to petitioner’s discharge
would have been concluded under the “‘Discipline and Dis-
charge Hearing Program” (Exhibit 21, Rec. 200 and 209).

The other computation was founded on petitioner’s salary
for the period between the date of discharge and the time of
the declination by the United States Attorney’s office to
represent hirn in the within action, less the amount petitioner
would have received as salary had he mitigated his damages

—

_g-

during the interim period (Rec. 200 - 201, Tr. 854). (See
Appendix pp. 8 & 9.)

The trial court declined to order reinstatement of
the petitioner by respondent for two principal reasons.
First, the trial court found that petitioner was terminated
by respondent for good faith and for cause (Finding of Fact
No. 20, Appendix p. 12). Petitioner’s termination arose out
_ Of the detrimental effect of petitioner’s attitude and general
~ personality upon his fellow employees (Finding of Fact No.
11, Appendix p. 11); his unsatisfactory technical perform-
ance of flight duties (Findings of Fact Nos. 9 and 12, Appen-
dix p. 11); and, particularly, his falling asleep while at the
controls of a commercial passenger flight on April 23, 1968
(Finding of Fact No. 10, Appendix p. 11).

Secondly, the trial court found that petitioner had
falsified his employment application, and had petitioner
not falsified the application, not only would respondent
not have employed petitioner in the first instance but re-
spondent would not have voluntarily re-employed petitioner
(Conclusion of Law No. 10, Appendix pp. !3 & 14; Findings
of Fact Nos. 18 and 19, Appendix p. 12; see also Tr. 766).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in affirming the judgment of the lower court in its
entirety, stated, inter alia, that the respondent lost his job
for unsatisfactory performance as a flight crew member and
not because he requested leave to attend week-end drills for
the Coast Guard Reserve (Appendix p. 1).

linn
ARGUMENT

I
This Court Should Not Grant Petitioner's Petition
For Writ Of Certiorari To Consider Those Findings
Of Fact Already Determined By The District Court
And Upheld By The Court Of Appeals.

Apparently, the petitioner is again challenging the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to sustain Findings of Fact Nos. 4, 9,
10, 11, 12, 18, 19, 20 and 22, as well as Conclusions of Law
Nos. 2, 6,9 and 10. The challenged Findings concern them-
selves with the following fundamental issues:

(1) Whether petitioner requested leaves of
absence for military drill activities in April and
May within the meaning of 50 U.S.C. App. 8 459
(g) (4);

(2) Whether petitioner was discharged in
good faith and for cause;

(3) Whether petitioner’s employment
records before being hired by respondent, coupled
with the petitioner’s falsification of his application
for employment and subsequent employment per-
formance for respondent, constituted sufficient
grounds to deny petitioner’s claim for re-employment;
and

(4) Whether or not petitioner mitigated his
damages after denial by respondent of reinstatement
of petitioner’s status under 50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g)
(4).

Petitioner has asked that this Court issue a Wnt of Cer-

ye
sear See

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tiorari to review the District Court’s Findings of Fact, all
of which were accepted by the Court of Appeals, on his
theory that those Findings were improperly decided by
the District Court. Petitioner argues at page eight of his
petition that the Facts are still controverted inasmuch as
the Court of Appeals stated that ‘‘(t] he evidence was in
sharp conflict on all material issues” (Appendix p. 1).
What petitioner fails to recognize is that the Court of
Appeals unequivocally affirmed the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law of the District Court.

With regard to those issues of fact again raised by the
petitioner, this Court has stated that it will ‘not grant a
certiorari to review evidence and discuss specific facts.”
United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925).

A fortiori the petitioner concedes in his petition that “‘this
Court does not grant certiorari to correct errors in fact
findings.”

This Court has adopted a “two court” rule which is
directly applicable to petitioner’s brief and cuts against this
Court’s granting certiorari to review Findings of Fact. In
the case of Berenyi v. District Director, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 630, 635, 636 (1967), the
Court succinctly states the rule:

“The petitioner asks us to reject as ‘clearly
erroneous’ the factual conclusion about his Party
membership reached by the District Judge and
accepted by the Court of Appeals. In order to do
so we would be forced to disregard this Court’s
repeated pronouncements that it ‘cannot under-
take to review concurrent Findings of Fact by
two courts below in the absence of a very obvious

EEE DRE GLEE IO LIN ee aR NIE ERR ERNE ELSE

wiles

and exceptional showing of error.’ E.g., Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336
U.S. 271, 275, 69 S. Ct. 535, 538, 93 L. Ed. 672.

. . . The policy underlying the ‘two court’ rule

is obvious. This Court possesses no empirical
expertise to set against the careful and reasonable
conclusions of lower courts on purely factual issues.
When, as here, resolution of the disputed factual
issue turns largely on an assessment on the relative
credibility of witnesses whose testimonial demeanor
was observed only by the trial court, the rule has
particular force.”” (Emphasis added.)

Of course, every rule has an exception. The Berenyi
Court, at 636, states as follows:

“To be sure, this Court has not hesitated to under-

' take independent examination of factual issues
where constitutional claims may depend on their
resolution.”” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the “two court” rule has some elasticity when an
important claim is presented. What, then, are exceptions to
the “two court” rule? This Court has granted certiorari
when it appears that a petitioner’s due process rights may have
been disturbed [e.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S.
199 (1960)] or where there has been a coerced confession
caused by third degree police methods in criminal proceedings
le.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)] or when there was a
denial of counsel in a criminal case [e.g., Hawk v. Olson,

326 U.S. 271 (1945); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S.
697 (1960)] or in the event that the petitioner’s first amend-
ment rights had been violated [e.g., Jacobeilis v. Ohio, 378 US.

—_ ph eR aaa ere

wh.

194 (196A)) of when the lerwer corutt wither withhAds the
case tenn the pity ets nade the jury's verde Leg,
Wilkerion ¥, MeCarthy, V6 U8, 94 CIMA).
bn wih Of thes where examylen, » werienun Kn iConal
inoue has been presenied, A consditutional mous has not
been sAvenced by petitioner herein, and it is wubmitted
that the “two court’ rule should not be ciroumvented
abeent the requisile showing
Petitioner challenges those Findings of Fact with
respect to the cause for petitioner's discharge and the
motives of respondent's management with respect thereto.
(Petitioner's brief, pp. 8-12.) The pivotal issue of fact
around which all other issues of fact revolve was aptly pro-
nounced by the Court of Appeals:
“The crucial issue was whether petitioner
lost his job for requesting leave to attend military
reserve drills or for unsatisfactory performance
as 2 flight-crew member.” (Appendix p. 1.)
During the course of the trial, the tier of fact aad ample
Cpr ental (h eveluale Chk WilneKs enh Che etabybly A
(Mitt ARENA MEY PHAAE NE YA LAAGS & ALLY Hatch hs
samy ridiand with White 15s tt AH Vie At orient, Sh Mmegptr sr
A ramnprnhians itebviey yt barnad 4 thar Tian 1M WaHA
(aatitieh wt Cha ifm Ad a1 Coe “tonaidiad witrn of Che (aahvenertey,
4 WAN 00 the hannamnen Of (ha yatitienar wid tha vostiranity of
hat witnaman, he (tml corer! conchae’ (hat the endance
wotirdantiathy wagered « finding (hat the petitioner's discharge
was in gor faith and without reference to his reserve training
obligations.
At trial, the trial judge, on more than one occasion
commented specifically on his observations of the demeanor

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and nedieility of the petitioner a competed to other wit-
nes (41, 190, ¥A1 - B44), Por example, there wae ove
GENCE EMILE Crim ity Thies ice ot whether on next
per iticnien Wad Ween weeping while Wt the vontiole of one
of rempondent’s wicratl Ons rewHarly heduled paewenyer
tight (Finding of Pact Mo, 10, Appendix p. 11 (eee aloo
Appendix p,. 61;'Tr, 385), Although the plaintiff testified
that he had, at most, experienced a sense of “drowsiness”
while at the controls, the only two percipient witnesses,
the captain and the flight engineer, testified that petitioner
was, in fact, asleep at the controls (see, e.g., Tr. 154, 160-
162, 171 - 173, 281 - 282, 384, 387, 495 - 496). It was
also uncontradicted that the petitioner’s dozing was report-
ed to the respondent's chief pilot both in writing and orally
(Tr. 336, 388 - 389, 400 - 401). It was testified that this
incident was a major factor in causing petitioner's termina-
tion (Tr. 281, 425).

From the foregoing exemple, it is cleas that the trial
Court believed Une testimony of the pilot and the fight
ROR 6h WA the peone: Other Findings of Fact
(SORIA RO, id habit LA GABAA '¢ Cats hated fife WAX sobbed
Wy WHA A YAMATT 6 GANA A “ASA LY Whi phe
WIAA hy Hd Wh nananA Went Wy Ve Fibs wohiyp /

‘Pia Cnet Wn WA Chad wher samen Of Where 674
Wen Wie TEAM, Chie I tiMd judas’ 6 OMrn Tena 94 14 The
Aannemhtrt wi CISA Y Of The witWAKees i6 Cacia HHA
Aner be Teapeoted bonth on mppenl to the Comrt of Appens
anid ultimately before thie Court on a petition for certiorari
As was stated by Justice Jackson in United States v. Yellow
Cab Co,, 938 U.S, ¥98, 94 L, BA. 150 (1949) (on direct
appeal):

IG60, infra, Argument I C., pp. 19 - 23.

a

“Piundinngp #4 10 the design, menive and intent with
which men set depend particnlarly upon the credit
woven 10 witnanaen Wy theme whe we anid hear then
if defendant's witnesses opens the truth, the find
nn wre wAnniiiedby jaw tied ‘ths triad wore beter
£4 10 and ovnarved the officers who made the
records trom which the Government would draw
an inference of guilt and conceded that they bear
a different meaning from that which the Govern
ment contends,” (338 U.S, at 341 » 342,)
The petitioner failed to convince the Court of Appeals
that the findings of the District Court had been “clearly
erroneous.” As has been said:
“The burden on appellant who seeks to reverse a
judgment for error in fact to show that essential
findings are clearly erroneous is, indeed, a heavy
one when, as in this instance, the decision must
turn largely upon the credibility of the witnesses
the trial judge sew and heard testify.”
Hedger». Reynolds, 216 F.24 202 (24 Cx. |
1954)
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thy taiting to meet the “clearly erroneous” test of the
Court of Appeals, an issue of fact does not remain to be
reviewed by this Court, and petitioner's Petition for Writ of

-
wh
Cor tionati Mond we denied

"
‘thie Court Should Pot Grant Petitioners Petition
Bon Wit Of Cortiormn Va Consider Thane Conch:
dons Of Law Alveady Determined By The District
Court And Upheld By The Court Of Appeals

A. Introduction,

Throughout his petition, petitioner states that this
Court is purportedly presented with “troublesome” issues
under 50 U.S.C. App. 8 459 (g) (4), pertinent portions of
which have been set forth at pages 2 and 3, supra.

Although petitioner does not expressly so state, it is
apparent that he contends that a Writ of Certiorari should
be granted pursuant to Rule 19 (1) (b) (28 U.S.C. App.),
which states that a Wnt of Certiorari may be granted:

“(Where the Court of Appeals) has decided an
important question of federal lew which bas not
een, lout should bs, settled ivy (the Supreme
Count...”

the petitioner wits ton « Wik A Corncnan (6
CAN1KA thes eA veratrine Finan Ohe levied CAnettA Of, fi
the Marnatnrs, Chat thie Cont idemop the heathy stomecue”
(aad inn Aeternvining whether ot wert to urant catturtari (Kate
toners wie, 99.17,149,14)

‘The recend clearly indicated the propriety of the deo
sion below. Yet, ever asourminig that the case was wrongfully
decided by the trial court, it has been stated mariy times
that this Court is not primarily concerned with lower court

ae el laa ol ea

stiin

errors. For example, quoting Mr. Justice Harlan:
“The fact that a case may have been wrongly
decided as between the parties is not, standing
alone, enough to assure certiorari, nor, for that
matter is the fact a case may have been rightly
decided in itself enough to preclude certiorari.”

Mr. Justice Harlan, Manning the Dikes,

13 Record of N.Y.C_B.A. 541,
551 (1958).
Commenting on an error in the decision below as a
basis for the granting of certiorari, it has been said:

“The Court’s aim . . . is to resolve the
conflicts among the lower courts and to deter-
mine questions of importance. It is then the
function of the lower court to apply the prin-
ciples established by the Supreme Court to the
great mass of cases. The Supreme Court's burden
and responsibility are too great to permit it to
review and correct every misstep made by the
lower courts in the application of accepted
principles. Hence, the Court generally will not
grant certiorari just because the decision below
may be erroneous.

Robert L. Stern, Eugene Gressman,

Supreme Court Practice, Fourth
Edition, 178 (1969).

Although petitioner feels that the facts and law have
been improperly decided, the evidence clearly shows that
the provisions of 50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g) have practical
applicability and that it was petitioner’s lack of performance
that caused his termination and not military discrimination

APB Ce PF

-

prohibited by 50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g) (4). Indeed, while
petitioner was in the employment of respondent, there were
other crew members employed by respondent who were also
engaged in week-end military drill activities. As to these
flight crew employees, none encountered difficulties with
the respondent with respect to accommodating their drill
obligations to their week-end flight schedules (Finding of
Fact No. 5, Appendix p. 10; see, e.g., Tr. 99, 110 - 112, 114,
141 - 142, 283, 285, 288, 456, 512, 770). Obviously, then,
no unusual problems in application and enforcement of

50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g) (4) exist as has been claimed by
petitioner (Petitioner’s brief, pp. 5 - 6).

Moreover, the case at bar does not present an important
question of federal law first considered by this Court. It is
true that certiorari has been granted to review an important
question of first impression under a statute. American Feder-
ation of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 175 (1964).
In the case at bar, however, petitioner has merely asked this
Court to review the evidence and pass on the District Court’s
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In sum, the peti-
tioner does not raise an important federal question, he only
asks that this Court take a third look at the evidence in his
case.

B. The lower court findings with respect to respondent’s
obligations and petitioner’s rights under 50 U.S.C. App.
8 459 (g) (4) are not in error.

Under the terms of 50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g) (4) a viola-
tion of the statute is established if the employer: (a) fails,
upon request, to grant a leave of absence to the employee for

—_— eee _—— <eeP ie ‘
iS . "8

_18—

the period required to perform training duty, or (b) the
employer fails to permit the employee to return to his
position with the same seniority, status, pay and vacation
that the employee would have had had he not been absent
for such duty.

Petitioner contends that respondent violated the statute
by denying him leaves of absence under 50 U S.C. App. § 459
(g) (4) for training duty in the months of April and May,
1968 (Petitioner’s brief, pp. 5, 6) despite Conclusion of
Law No. 2 (Appendix p. 12) of the District Court to the con-
trary. The only evidence in the record with respect to peti
tioner’s requesting a leave of absence for his April and May
training duties is that petitioner handed to respondent’s dis-
patcher a “note” apparently indicating the prospective drill
dates (Tr. 551, 691 - 692).

Petitioner's own testimony shows that he, himself,
considered his first actual request for a leave of absence
to have been submitted to respondent’s chief pilot on May
21, 1968 (Tr. 561, 695). Further, petitioner testified that
it was not until he had been scheduled for employment
duties coincident with ais May military training drills that
he concluded that he should request leaves of absence from
respondent (Tr. 554). Lastly, petitioner concedes that
pursuant to this request, a leave of absence was granted,
and he performed military drill duties on the scheduled
dates (Rec. 124). Based on petitioner's own testimony, and
the circumstances under which such notes were submitted,
the trial court had ample evidence upon which it could
conclude that the notes did not constitute requests for
leaves of absence within the meaning of 50 U.S.C. App.
8 459 (g) (4).

_19—

C. The trial court had justification to find that petitioner
was not entitled to reinstatement to his position of
employment.

Petitioner argues that certain discharge cases under the
National Labor Relations Act [National Labor Relations
Board v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 396 F.2d 769 (Sth Cir.
1968), and National Labor Relations Board v. Plant City
Steel Corp., 331 F.2d 511 (Sth Cir. 1964)]} should be
applied to the case at bar. (Petitioner’s brief, pp. 14, 15).
These cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar,
since the discharges in both cases cited by petitioner were
found by the court to be discriminatory in nature. In the
instant case, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
found that the discharge of the petitioner was not based on
discrimination of any kind, but was for cause, and that as a
result of this finding, the petitioner should not be entitled
to reinstatement.

The trial court based its conclusion that the petitioner
was not entitled to reinstatement on two factual premises:
First, petitioner’s unsatisfactory job performance while
employed by respondent; and, second, the fact that petition-
er had intentionally omitted from his original employment
application those references of previous employers with
whom petitioner had an unsatisfactory record of employment
—knowledge of which, by respondent, would have precluded
petitioner from being accepted for employment by respondent
in the ‘irst instance (Findings of Fact Nos. 13 and 18, Appendix
pp. 11 & 12; Conclusions of Law Nos. 6 and 10, Appendix pp.
13 & 14; see also Tr. 732, 766).

Despite petitioner’s arguments, the evidence is clear and

a

2.

convincing not only that petitioner on one occasion slept
while at the controls of a passenger aircraft? but that prior
to his termination oral and written reports which reflected
negatively on petitioner’s technical performance had been
submitted to petitioner’s supervisors by petitioner’s fellow
employees (see, e.g., Tr. 150, 152, 170 - 171, 279, 194 - 196,
412 - 415, 416 - 417, 442 - 446). In each instance, such
written reports, whether before or after petitioner’s termina-
tion, were supported by oral reports given prior to the time
petitioner was terminated (Tr. 478 - 479).

In addition, there was testimony from petitioner’s
fellow flight crew members that during his employment
petitioner did not respond to criticism or instruction (Find-
ing of Fact No. 12, Appendix p. 11; Tr. 184, 197, 217, 220
- 221, 280, 421, 423, 435, 439, 441 - 442). The record is
similarly replete with testimony that petitioner’s attitude
and personality had an unsettling and disturbing effect on
his fellow employees, resulting in oral and written reports
being made to respondent. Such reports, combined with
other considerations, caused the final decision to terminate
petitioner from his employment (Finding of Fact No. 11,
Appendix p. 11; see also, e.g., petitioner’s Exhibits 10, 12,
13, 15, 17, 28, and 29, and respondent’s Exhibit D; Tr. 98,
105, 129, 200 - 201, 206 - 207, 280, 392 - 394, 414-415,
449, 455, 465, 476 - 477, 510- 512). Quite clearly, albeit
petitioner’s protestations to the contrary, the petitioner was
not discharged because of his military drill obligations (see
also Tr. 279 -298, 756, 768 - 774).

Petitioner’s performance while employed by respondent
caused his termination. At no time has respondent advanced
the fact of petitioner’s falsification of his employment appli-

3 See, supra, Argument I, p. 13.

——

_

cation as a justification for his termination. Asa matter of
fact, the falsification was not discovered by respondent's
management until after petitioner’s termination. Likewise,
respondent has at no time contended that the difficulties
encountered by petitioner with employers prior to respond-
ent contributed in any way to its decision to terminate (see,
e.g., Tr. 717 - 718, 736).

The evidence of petitioner’s prior employment record,
including petitioner’s falsification of his employment appli-
cation, was received by the trial court solely for impeach-
ment purposes and on the issue of the appropriateness of
the court ordering re-employment (Tr. 612 - 61 3). The
relevancy of petitioner’s unsatisfactory performance with
prior employers to the issue of re-employment is clear,
especially where such evidence indicated deficiencies in
attitude and technical performance virtually identical to
those experienced by petitioner while employed by respond-
ent (see, ¢.g., Tr. 616, 619, 622, 635, 625 - 627, 721 - 723,
765 - 766). The testimony of respondent’s vice-president of
Operations was unequivocally to the effect that had he known
of the circumstances of petitioner’s past employment, peti-
tioner would not have been employed by respondent in the
first instance, or, if he had been employed, he would have
been terminated on the basis of such information (Tr. 766).

The history of the Selective Service Act of 1967, both
legislative and judicial, is devoid of so much as a suggestion
that those who employ military reservists are thereby pre-
cluded from exercising reasonable judgment as to the suit-
ability of these employees. In short, there is nothing in
50 U.S.C. App. § 459 (g) (4) which compels an employer
or this Court to disregard the normal employer-employee

rar " ead
- Malate <4 Ate

—

- =

relationship.

In a case similar to the one at bar, Green v. Tho-Ro
Products, 232 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1956), the plaintiff sued
for re-employment under 50 U.S.C. App. § 459. The Third
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the
defendant-employer, adopting the reasoning of the lower
court that because plaintiff's position required harmonious
relations and mutual trust with other employees, his habit
of annoying such other employees made it unreasonable
for the defendant to be asked to restore the plaintiff to his
original position. (232 F.2d at 174.)

In another analogous case, Trusteed Funds, Inc. v.
Dacey, 160 F.2d 413 (ist Cir. 1947), the plaintiff was a
returning serviceman who brought an action for re-employ-
ment under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940
(54 Stat. 890). The Court of Appeals did not agree with
the trial court that the plaintiff's conduct before he left
for military service was not at issue and reversed and remand-
ed the matter so that the plaintiff's past performance could
be placed in evidence on the issue of re-employment. The
lower court found as follows:

“It would be unreasonable to require the
defendant to reinstate the plaintiff, in view of
his hostility to the officers and directors of the
company, and his inability to work with them in
a relationship of trust and confidence.”

Dacey v. Trusteed Funds, Inc., 72 F. Supp.

611, 613 (D.C. Mass. 1947).
See also Barisoff v. Hollywood Baseball Association, 71 F.
Supp. 493 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 166 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir.
1948).

SRLS PEE TRE NERS HEE EEN TE

= =

The reasoning of the Dacey and Tho-Ro cases has
equal application under the circumstances of the present
matter. As was stated in Ferris v. Alaska Airways, 113
F. Supp. 907 (Alaska 1953):

“Keeping in mind that the industry here in
question is an airline, that defendant’s aircraft fly
over a relatively dangerous and difficult route,
and that human life rests in the hands of the pilot,
the court is of the opinion that personality flaws
may well justify termination of employment where
it affects the willingness to fly, the morale, and the
alertness of pilot personnel.” (Emphasis added.)
(113 F. Supp. at 909.)

On the record before this Court, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the findings of the trial court, as upheld by the
Court of Appeals, concerning the causes for petitioner’s
termination and the issue of re-employment, are unimpeach-
able and that petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari should
be denied.

D. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
properly found that petitioner’s failure to adequately
seek and obtain comparable employment after his
discharge from respondent’s employ was a failure to
properly mitigate damages.

The Court of Appeals refused to disturb the findings of
the District Court with respect to damages. In Sanders v.
Leach, 158 F.2d 486 (Sth Cir. 1946), the court stated the
test at the appellate level:
““ . . . it is not our duty to determine whether,

—

a

if we were triers, we would have awarded damages
in the same or a less amount. It is our duty to de-
termine only whether we can say that the amount
awarded was so inadequate that it was clearly
erroneous, that is, unjust.” (158 F.2d at 488.)
(See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
following Section 723c.) .

In support of the trial court’s findings (Finding of Fact
No. 22, Appendix p. 12; Conclusion of Law No. 9, Appendix
p. 13), the record is clear that between the effective date of

‘ petitioner’s termination of June 20, 1968 and the date of the
commencement of trial on February 17, 1970, petitioner
was not employed by any person or entity and did not receive
any income whatsoever from any employment other than his
military drill activities (Tr. 589 - 595). While petitioner describ-
ed himself as a self-employed inventor (Tr. 589 - 590), his testi-
mony indicated that he considered his present occupation to be
the prosecution of the within lawsuit.

Petitioner’s attempt to obtain new employment is well
documented. His first contact with a prospective employer
occurred approximately six months subsequent to his termina-
tion by respondent. His other efforts were typified by his
response to a newspaper advertisement requesting pilots
having qualifications other than those held by petitioner (Tr.
601 - 603). Petitioner testified that he had not, since his
termination by respondent, contacted any of the well-known
locally-based air carriers, such as Pacific Southwest Airlines
and Flying Tigers Airlines (see, e.g., Tr. 605 - 607; see also
Tr. 795 - 796).

It has been held in the case of Levine v. Beman, 178
F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1949), that the award of damages is

oe

discretionary with the trial court. The question of the correct
measure of damages is one in which the federal courts follow
state law. 1A Moores Federal Practice 0.3 10; Meissner v.
Papas, 35 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Wisc. 1940). Further, it is well
recognized that an employee who claims past wages as dam-
ages resulting from an employment discharge must mitigate
such damages by actively seeking and obtaining comparable
employment elsewhere. Smetherham v. Laundry Workers’
Union, 44 Cal. App. 2d 131 (1941); Gregg v. McDonald, 73
Cal. App. 748 (1948); Utter v. Chapman, 38 Cal. 560 (1869).
Under the law and evidence it is clear that the trial court
properly found that petitioner failed to mitigate damages
resulting from his discharge.

il
This Court Should Not Grant Petitioner's Petition
For Writ Of Certiorari Based On Its Powers Of

Supervision.

The petitioner’s brief half-heartedly urges that this Court
should exercise its power of supervision and grant petitioner’s
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, to avoid what petitioner believes
were adverse rulings in both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals. (Petitioner’s brief, p. 18.)

Due to the variety of situations in which this Court’s
powers of supervision have been invoked, it is difficult to
construct a definition of supervisory power which is compre-
hensive and accurate. Summarized, supervisory power has
been exercised to formulate new rules of general application
as well as to enforce judicial compliance with already existing
standards of fairness. The sole common denominator of the

=

usage of the power of supervision is a strong desire on the
part of this Court to maintain and develop standards of
fair play in the federal court system which are more exact-
ing than the minimum constitutional requirements of due
process.

Recently, supervisory power has been used to over-
tule a trial judge's exercise of discretion where it has pro-
duced ingustice, although not 2 technical abuse of discretion
was committed. Thus, in Marshal ». United States, 36 US.
310, 313 (1959), the Supreme Court overruled a trial judge's
refusal to grant the petitioner's motion for a new trial after
several members of the jury had admitted reading prejudicial
suggests that the power of supervision is inherent in the
Supreme Court and that its availability as a basis of decision
may avoid unjust results in those cases where a just result
cannot otherwise be reached through the application of
already existing legal doctrine.

The Court’s supervisory power has been invoked to
treat a transcript, not technically part of the record on appeal,
as part of the record before it (Mortensen v. United States,
322 U.S. 369 (1944) ). It has been used to relax or even dis-
pense with procedural requirements where strict adherence
to the rules of procedure might produce a miscarriage of
justice (Helwig v. United States, 162 F.24 837 (6th Cir. 1947) ).
Supervisory powers have been exercised to order a new trial
before another judge when a trial judge has engaged in unbe-
coming judicial behavior (Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11
(1954) ). Such mupervisory powers have been invoked to correct
4 defect in the lower court's method of jury selection (Thiel v

~

Southern Pacific Company, 328 U.S. 217 (1946) ) and super-
visory power will be sometimes utilized in a “tainted evidence”
situation (Mesarosh v. United States, 352 US. | (1956) ).

From the foregoing it is clear that the power of super-
vision has been invoked in the areas of the law that are dis-
cretionary and where considerable leeway is presented to
relax both doctrine and procedure in extraordinary cases.
Moreover, the power of supervision is also often exercised

The petitioner herein argues that, in effect, an act of
injustice has been perpetrated on him by both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals. The petitioner does not
argue that he did not receive a fair trial and appeal, or that
the system of court review was inadequate, only that both
courts incorrectly stood behind the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law of the District Court. The case at bar
does not come anywhere near the importance of those cases
cited above. It is submitted that in all instances, the powers
of supervision were never used for the sole purpose of review-
ing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the
District Court but for some higher and more important pur-
pose. The supervisory power should not be used merely
because petitioner exclaims that this case-is one of first
impression to be presented before this Court. With respect
to petitioner's case at bar, it is clear that all of the material
issues of fact and law now presented to this Court have
already been heard and correctly decided by both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals and that an act
Of injustice by the lower courts has not taken place.

ee ema tg a “

_28~

CONCLUSION

Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals have
concluded that the evidence sustained the judgment. The evi-
dence is overwhelming that petitioner was discharged for cause
and not because he was a member of the Coast Guard Reserve
Moreover, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner was dis-
allowed reinstatement because of his unsatisfactory job per-
formance, his prior employment record, and his intentional
falsification of his employment application.
to review the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. No new
issues have been presented.

The District Court had every opportunity to observe the
demeanor and credibility of all of the witnesses and believed
the respondent. It is submitted that this Court should adhere
to its “two court” rule and not set aside the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law of the lower court.

For the reasons stated herein, petitioner’s Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
BROWNELL MERRELL, JR. of

DIETSCH, GATES, MORRIS &
MERRELL

Attorney for Respondent

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

Decision, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of
Law of the United States District Court for

APPENDIX

OPINION OF THE COURT BELOW

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit

No. 26372.

WALTER L. LARSEN, JR., Appellant, v. AIR CALIF-
ORNIA, Appellee.

[Filed March 2, 1972]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California

Before: KOELSCH, TRASK, and GOODWIN,
Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff, a discharged commercial airline copilot, brought
action under 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(g)4), and 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 459(c) (3) (Veterans’ Re-employment Rights), demanding
reinstatement and back pay. He appeals a judgment granting
partial back pay but denying reinstatement.

The crucial issue was whether plaintiff lost his job for
requesting leave to attend military reserve drills or for unsat-
isfactory perfromance as a flight-crew member. The evidence
was in sharp conflict on all material issues. The district judge
Observed the witnesses, heard and weighed the evidence, and
made findings of fact adverse to the plaintiff. The record
reveals no basis for disturbing those findings. Fed. R. Civ. P.
$2(a).

While the trial court found no factual basis for ordering

reinstatement, the court did find the defendant employer
ma CECT REI ARE NT CRY PR IE

Appendix 2.

delinquent under 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(g)(4) in failing to
afford plaintiff a predischarge hearing pursuant to the de-
fendant’s own personnel-policy manual. The court accord-
ingly awarded damages of $2,500 for wages lost during the
time necessary for the hearing to which plaintiff was entitled.
The defendant has not cross-appealed.

Affirmed.

t

DECISION, FINDINGS OF FACT, AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In the United States District Court for the Central
District of California.

WALTER L. LARSEN, JR.., Plaintiff, vs. AIR CALIF-
ORNIA, Defendant.

[Lodged April 30, 1970
Filed May 12, 1970]

Walter L. Larsen, Jr., Plaintiff in propria persona.

Brownell Merrell, Jr. and J. Randolph Huston, Gates,
Morris, Merrell & Stephens, Los Angeles, California, for
Defendant Air California.

Decision
I

This action proceeded to trial on February 17, 1970
on Plaintiff's First Amended Compiaint in which the Plain-
tiff alleged that the Defendant, his prior employer, had

wn

Appendix 3.

violated the provisions of 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(g) (4) of
the Selective Service Act of 1967. The Plaintiff seeks re-
employment and reimbursement of back wages from the
date of his discharge by Defendant. Jurisdiction in the case
is based upon 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(d) and 28 U.S.C. 8 1331
relating to the disposition of federal questions.
bi

The Defendant herein is a regularly scheduled commer-
cial airline transporting passengers within the State of Calif-
omnia. Plaintiff was first employed by the Defendant in
September 1967 as a co-pilot. For reasons unrelated to the
case at bar, he was furloughed by the Defendant in November
1967 and recalled to work in March 1968. On June 4, 1968,
Defendant notified the Plaintiff that he had been discharged
with his termination to be effective on June 20, 1968.

Plaintiff's original Complaint in this action was filed
on May 15, 1969, approximately one year after the Plaintiff
had been discharged by the Defendant. This original Com-
plaint contained claims for relief based on (a) Defamation;
(b) Breach of Contract; (c) Sections 394 and 394.5 of the
California Military and Veterans Code; (d) 42 U.S.C. § 1985;
(e) 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(c) (3); and (f) 50 U.S.C. App. 8 459
(g) (4). All but the last of the foregoing bases of liability
were dismissed by the Court as failing to constitute claims
upon which relief could be granted and the action proceeded
to trial upon the sole question of whether the Defendant had
violated the provisions of Section 459 (g) (4) of the Selective
Service Act of 1967.

ptt

During the period of his emplowment with Defendant.

the Plaintiff was actively engaged ©. reserve training as an

PEL LPO LABEL FELL LEE 0 PL
— so tiaat aaa we

——

Appendix 4.

officer in United States Coast Guard Reserve. He had com-
pleted an extended tour of active duty with the Coast Guard
in 1962 and has since continued his military training on a
voluntary basis. His Reserve duties required him to attend
at least one week end of training drills per month. Plain-
tiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendant
denied him leave of absence for attendance at his Reserve
drills for the months of April and May, 1968, and that the
Defendant did not properly restore him to his job after
granting him a leave of absence for drills conducted on
June | and 2 of 1968, all in violation of Section 459(g) (4)
of the Selective Service Act of 1967. This statute reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
“Any employee . . . shall upon request be
granted a leave of absence by his employer for
the period required to perform active duty for
training or inactive duty training in the Armed
Forces of the United States. Upon his release
from a period of such active duty for training
or inactive duty training . . . such employee
shall be permitted to return to his position with
such seniority, status, pay, and vacation as he
would have had if he had not been absent for
such purposes.”

The Plaintiff's allegations as to the April and May
Reserve drills are without merit.’ Plaintiff's testimony at
the trial suggested that the “little scraps of paper’’ on which
he had written his drill dates for April and May and had
given to the Defendant’s Chief Dispatcher were not consid-

Lime evidence disclosed that the Plaintiff actually attended both of his
scheduled drill dates in April, 1968 and missed one day of drills in May 1968.

a eR nS

_—_

Appendix 3.

ered by the Plaintiff at the time to be requests for leave of
absence from his employment duties nor could the Defend-
ant reasonably have viewed them as such The Plaintiff
testified that in early May, 1968, he first decided to request
leaves of absence from the Defendant and told the Defend-
ant’s President of this intention at a meeting with him on
May 3, 1968. In addition, the testimony of both the De-
fendant’s management personnel and that of the Plaintiff
himself indicated that the Plaintiff was at all times aware of
potential conflicts between his Reserve duties and his employ-
ment with an airline that carried the bulk of its Passenger
traffic on its week-end flights, and was afforded an opportun-
ity to accommodate his drill schedule to his employment
schedule. Plaintiff's testimony also revealed that he had
missed only two days of Reserve drills during his employment
with Defendant and that he had been able to make up at least
one of these drills at a later date. It was not until May 1968
that Plaintiff submitted a formal request for a leave of
absence for his Reserve drills on June 1 and 2 and this request
was granted by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff's case thus revolves around the circum-
stances surrounding his return to work after attending the
drills on June | and June 2, 1968. The Plaintiff's Complaint
admits that he returned to the service of Air California on
June 3, 1968 and the records of the Defendant indicate that
he participated in routine flight duties on that date. It was on
June 4, 1968, as a cumulative result of various reports received
by Defendant’s management revealing substandard performance
by the Plaintiff, that the Defendant’s Chief Pilot terminated
the Plaintiff effective June 20, 1968.

There was substantial evidence presented at the trial to

7 7 = 2 NEE DI ee I we? ee
— ESR EE NOLS YER ESE I I ais .

Appendix 6.

support the conclusion that the Plaintiff's discharge was
effected in good faith and without reference to his Reserve
training obligations. The evidence in this respect reflected
adversely on the Plaintiff's technical ability, his ability to
respond to criticism and instruction, and revealed a general
demeanor marked by observable personality traits incom-
patible with flight-crew duty. Numerous written reports
from other employees of the Defendant were introduced
which indicated a generally deficient performance by Plain-
tiff in the discharge of his duties. Two witnesses at the trial
testified that the Defendant [sic] had on one occasion fallen
asleep or “dozed” while at the controls of an Air California
passenger flight. None of the testimony or other evidence sub-
mitted supports the Plaintiff's contention that this evidence
was amassed as a subterfuge to justify Plaintiff's termination
and to deny him his rights under the Selective Service Act of
1967. In the face of such overriding evidence, Section
459(g) (4) can hardly be interpreted as entitling one to a
lifetime job. The scheme of Federal re-employment rights
statutes does not require a court to disregard those aspects
of the basic employment relationship which would make
continued or renewed employment unreasonable. Green v.
Tho-Ro Products, Inc., 232 F.2d 172 (3rd Cir. 1956); Dacey
v. Trusteed Funds, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 611 (D.C. Mass. 1947).
This conclusion is buttressed by evidence revealing
that the Plaintiff had intentionally omitted from his August
8, 1967 employment application with Defendant reference
to two prior employers, one of which had discharged the
Plaintiff after five weeks of employment. In fact, Plaintiff's
employment record with his prior employers reveals a con-
tinuing pattern of difficulties and deficiencies similar, if not

wa

Appendix 7.

identical, to those which arose during the Plaintiff's employ-

ment by Air California. In view of the foregoing and in view

of the substantial reasons existing for the Plaintiff's discharge,

it would be unreasonable and inequitable to require the De-

fendant to restore the Plaintiff to his position of employment.
IV

On April 27, 1968, some five weeks prior to Plaintiff's
discharge, the Defendant instituted by means of a letter sent
to all of its employees a Discipline and Discharge Hearing
Program. Although the Plaintiff did receive a copy of the
Discipline and Discharge Hearing Program, the Defendant con-
tended at the trial that the Program had not been intended to
apply to the company’s crew-member employees who had at
that time already Participated in the election of a collective
bargaining agent. The Defendant also contended that the
Discharge Program was not intended to apply to probationary
employees and that it considered the probationary period for
its flight-crew employees to be one year, which was generally
accepted in the industry. Such an intention, however, was not
explicit either in the Program itself or in the cover letter which
was distributed with it. Nor was there any indication that the
Program was subsequently revoked as to Defendant’s crew-
member employees. The institution of this Program and its
distribution to the various employees of the Defendant created
4 contractual relationship between the employer and its em-
ployees and, until revoked, could be justifiably relied upon
by its recipients.

The Plaintiff made timely application for a hearing under
the Program by submitting a grievance letter to the Defendant
on June 10, 1968. The Defendant refused a hearing to the
Plaintiff on the grounds that the Discipline and Discharge

a

Appendix 8.

Hearing Program did not apply to flight-crew members such
as the Plaintiff. This denial was in violation of Section 459
(g) (4) of the Selective Service Act of 1967 insofar as that
section requires an employer to return a veteran who has
been engaged in reserve activities to his position of employ-
ment with the same “status” which he enjoyed prior to his
training period. Accordingly, although Defendant’s discharge
of the Plaintiff was warranted and supported by good cause
and although there is no evidence to suggest that such a hear-
ing would have resulted in reinstatement, the company’s
refusal to grant him a hearing under the Discipline and Dis-
charge Hearing Program was both a reduction in the “status”
of his position and a breach of their implied contractual
obligation to the Plaintiff which had arisen with the dissem-
ination of the Program.
Vv
In view of these facts, the Plaintiff is entitled to be
compensated for lost wages between the final date on which
the Plaintiff was informed by the Defendant company that
it would not grant him a discharge hearing, June 17, 1968,
and the day on which such a hearing, if it had been conduct-
} ~~ &4, would have concluded.” Such a period amounts to 94
days and accordingly the Plaintiff, who was then receiving
a salary of $750.00 per month, is entitled to damages in the
amount of $2,250.00.
Evidence was introduced at the trial concerning the
Plaintiff’s activity after his discharge by Defendant. From

he Discharge Hearing procedure contained maximum time limits for the

various stages of the hearing. These periods totaled 34 days. The final written
decision in in such matters rs is required to be made ‘as soon as practicabl e” and
poate of the opinion that would reasonably have been 60 days The total
period is deemed to be 94 days.

. —
ee eee EPP AS Sara Pe RS IS DAe%

Appendix 9.

the date of his discharge in June of 1968 to the date of the
trial herein, which commenced on February 17, 1970, Plain-
tiff received no income from employment whatsoever other
than the military pay which he received for his attendance
at Coast Guard Reserve drills. Although the Plaintiff testified
that he had engaged in “invention development” at his place
of residence, this work had generated no income for the
Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s own testimony conceded that the
substantial portion of his time had gone into the preparation
for and prosecution of this action against the Defendant.
There was likewise insufficient evidence upon which to con-
clude that the Plaintiff had sought other employment with
sufficient diligence to conclude that he had adequately
attempted to mitigate any damages resulting from his dis-
charge.

As an alternative finding to support the award of
damages in the amount of $2,250.00 to Plaintiff, the Plain-
tiff may be entitled to the sum of $750.00 per month for
the period from the date of his discharge until January 30,
1969, the date on which Plaintiff was informed by the United
States Attorney’s office that it had reviewed his case against
Defendant and concluded that its merits did not warrant their
representation, such representation being discretionary under
Section 459(d) of the Selective Service Act. After a review
of the Plaintiff's complete employment history and the
various salaries which he had received, it is this Court’s
opinion that the Plaintiff would have received a minimum
salary of $450.00 had he successfully mitigated his damages.
Subtracting this sum from $750.00 per month for the afore-
mentioned period of time, one arrives at the net figure of
$300.00 per month or a total of $2,250.00.

—

Appendix 10.

In accordance with the foregoing, which shall also con-
stitute findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court now
makes its formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Findings of Fact

1. The Plaintiff entered into the employ of Defendant
on September 16, 1968 and thereafter adequately completed
the training program of Defendant, Air California.

2. Defendant is a commercial airline specializing in
commuter service between northern and southern California
and whose heaviest passenger traffic occurs on week ends.

3. In September 1967, prior to the commencement
of Plaintiff’s duties with Defendant, Plaintiff and members of
Defendant’s management conducted a “pre-employment
interview”. At this meeting, Plaintiff informed Defendant
for the first time of his Coast Guard Reserve training obliga-
tions and the Plaintiff himself suggested that he might “‘trip-
trade” his assigned crew-duty obligations with other of Defend-
ant’s co-pilots in order to accommodate his drill schedule with
that of the airline’s flight schedule.

4. Plaintiff was at all times afforded an opportunity to
“‘trip-trade” in order to meet his reserve duties.

5. During the course of Plaintiff's employ with Defend-
ant, Air California had at least two other crew-member employees
active in Reserve training programs who successfully employed
“trip-trading”’ as a means of accommodating both their employ-
ment and their military obligations.

6. Plaintiff submitted to Defendant’s management a
formal written request for leave of absence from employment
duties on June | and June 2, 1968.

7. Defendant granted Plaintiffs request for leave of

_
Appendix il.

absence on June | and 2, 1968, and Plaintiff engaged in mili-
tary reserve training on these dates.

8. Plaintiff returned to the employ of Defendant on
June 3, 1968 and engaged in normal employment duties.

9. Prior to Plaintiff’s discharge, oral and written
reports were submitted to Defendant’s management reflecting
negatively upon the quality of the Plaintiff's performance for
Defendant.

10. Onan Air California passenger flight in April of
1968, Plaintiff was “dozing” or “sleeping” while at the
controls of an Air California passenger flight.

11. Defendant’s management received oral and written
communications from its other employees concerning the fact
that Plaintiff’s attitude and personality created a disturbing
effect upon his fellow crew-members on and off the flight deck.

12. During his employ with Defendant, Plaintiff did not
respond constructively to criticism and instruction offered
with respect to his technical competence.

13. Plaintiff, in his August 8, 1967 application for
employment with Defendant, failed to answer completely
a question regarding past employment and, in fact, intention-
ally deleted reference to his past employment with two com-
mercial airlines, one of which had discharged Plaintiff after
five weeks of employment.

14. On or about April 27, 1968, the Defendant instituted
a Discipline and Discharge Hearing Program and mailed a copy
of this Program to the Plaintiff.

15. On June 4, 1968, Defendant gave Plaintiff written
notice of his termination which was to be effective June 20,
1968.

16. On June 10, 1968, the Plaintiff submitted a timely

Barre sss: BE LEBER ogo REE Owe

7

“grievance letter” to Defendant, thus attempting to initiate
the discharge hearing procedure set forth in the Air California
Discipline and Discharge Hearing Program.

17. On June 17, 1968, Defendant gave Plaintiff formal
notice that he would not be granted a discharge hearing pur-
suant to the company’s Program.

18. The difficulties which the Plaintiff realized while
in the employ of the Defendant are similar to problems which
the Plaintiff encountered with his prior employers.

19. Plaintiff would not have been employed by Defend-
ant if Defendant had known about Plaintiff's past employment
which Plaintiff had omitted from his employment application.

20. The Plaintiff was terminated by Defendant in good
faith and for cause.

21. At the time of his discharge by Defendant, Plaintiff
was earning the sum of $750 per month.

22. Subsequent to his discharge by Defendant, Plaintiff
has retained no income producing employment and failed to
diligently seek out such employment.

Appendix 52.

Conclusions of Law

1. The Court has jurisdiction in this matter and the
parties hereto by reason of Section 9(d) of the Military Selec-
tive Service Act of 1967; 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(d) and
28 U.S.C. 1331 relating to the disposition of Federal questions.

2. The notes given by the Plaintiff to Defendant’s Chief
Dispatcher concerning his April and May Reserve drills did not
constitute requests for leave of absence within the meaning of
50 U.S.C. 6 459(g) (4).

3. The Plaintiff justifiably relied upon the promulga-
tion and distribution to him of Defendant’s Discipline and

_

Appendix 13.

Discharge Hearing Program and was thus entitled to the
process and procedures contained therein.

4. Section 459(g) (4) of the Selective Service Act
of 1967 requires that employers, having granted leaves of
absence to reservist employees, return such employees after
their training to their positions with the same “‘status”’ as
the reservist enjoyed prior to engaging in the military drill.

5. Defendant’s failure to grant Plaintiff a hearing
under its Discipline and Discharge Hearing Program was a
denial of such “status” as was contemplated by the statute.

6. Plaintiff’s intentional failure to list all prior
employers on his application for employment with Defend-
ant constituted a constructive fraud and it would be contrary
to the basic principles of equity to require the Defendant to
re-employ the Plaintiff.

7. Section 459(c) (3) of the Selective Service Act of
1967, having been enacted after the controversy in question
occurred and not having been made retroactive in effect, is
not applicable to the case at bar.

8. The promulgation and distribution to Plaintiff of
Defendant’s Discipline and Discharge Hearing Program
creates a contractual relationship between the Defendant
employer and his employee such as to justify Plaintiff's
reliance upon the contents of such program.

9. Plaintiff’s failure to adequately seek and obtain
similar or comparable employment after his discharge by
Defendant was a failure to properly mitigate his damages.

10. A reservist claiming rights under Section 459(g) (4)
of the Selective Service Act, whose employment performance
did not meet the standards of his employer and who intention-
ally falsified his application for employment with his employer,

— PRETEEN SSRI ERAS SONI IE RABIES

Appendix 14.

is not entitled to reinstatement to his position of employ-
ment.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: May 12, 1970.

A. ANDREW HAUK
United States District Judge

tT
JUDGMENT

In the United States District Court for the Central
District of California.

Civil Action No. 69-944-AAH. |

WALTER L. LARSEN, JR., Plaintiff, vs. AIR CALIF-
ORNIA, Defendant.

[Lodged April 30, 1970
Filed May 12, 1970
Entered May 19, 1970]

This action came on for trial before the court, Honor-
able A. Andrew Hauk, District Judge, Presiding, and the
issues having been duly tried, a decision having been duly
rendered in accordance with the Decision, Findings of Fact,
and Conclusions of Law filed herein,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED,

1. The Plaintiff's claim for re-employment is denied.

2. The Plaintiff shall recover of the Defendant the
sum of $2,250.00.

WTS aS

Appendix 15.

3. Each party to this action shall bear his own fees
and court costs incurred in conjunction with this action.

DATED: May 12, 1970.

A. ANDREW HAUK
United States District Judge

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )

)
County of Orange )

I, the undersigned, say: I am and was at all times herein mentioned, a citizen
of the United States and employed in the County of Orange, State of California,

over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action or proceeding;
that

My business address is 3 Street, Huntington Beach, California 92648,
that on AUGUST J “9472, | served the within BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
on the following parties by depositing the designated copies thereof,

enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United
States Post Office in the City of Huntington Beach, California, addressed to said
parties at the addresses as follows:

3 COPIES:

SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543

2 COPIES:
Walter L. Larsen, Jr.
P. O. Box 6212
Seattle, Washington 98188
(PETITIONER)

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

executed on AUGUST / “at HUNTINGTON BEACH, CALIFORNIA.

Dean Standefer, 326A Main St., Huntington Beach, Cal. 92648
(714) 536-7161

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385606_1144%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
