# Appendix — Sklaroff v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385606_0319%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1972
- **Citation:** 405 U.S. 920

## Text

. APPENDIX A

INTHE ° :
UNITED STATES COURT OF. APPEALS.
_ FOR THE FIFTH CYRCUIT.

ed

* 29200 :

a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *f:
ol | : -Plaintiff-Appeliee,
tpi Vs. ee
“MORTON. PAUL KANEtand MARTIN SKLAROFF,
i Ae Ree Be | - Defendants-Appellants.

| Appeals from the United States District | Court for the ;
PRES tod dea AB Southern District of Florida

pa : i sche we os

Sf gad Before BELL, THORNBERRY ‘al CLARK,
’ Cireuit Tudges. ;

CLARK, Circuit Judge: Morton Paul Kane and Martin:
Sklaroff were convicted by a jury in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida on
March 22; 19 , of violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 (1970).

: [conducting gal bling-connected telephone communications

‘App. 2 ae scars i aa
basin, Miami, Florida wid paatantiie Kentucky pie of
“eorispiracy to violate § 1952 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084 (1966)°
[transmission of bets and wagers by a wire commuhiecation -
_ .. facility in’ interstate commerce]. Kane was sentenced to |
__- concurrent five-year terms; Sklaroff was sentenced to..
concurrent two-year té?hs. On appeal,-this Coutt, without
* reaching the merits, vacated ‘the judgments and sentences ~
,.. and remanded the cause for further proceedings in light.
= Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 8% S.Ct. 961,
_ 22 L.Ed. 2d 176 (1969). Kane v. United States, = F. 2d °
_ 847 (5th Cir. 1969). ae cof ace
- Pursuant to our mandate, the district coyrt conducted -
‘an Alderman hearing and at its conclusion determined
' thatthe evidence -utilized to convict the defendapts was not
tainted by illegal electronic surveillance. A‘fter. the judg-
ments ‘of. conviction and the sentences were reimposed, -
Kane and Sklaroff moved for new trials. The district court .\ _
- refused to pass on these motions on the ground-that it had:
no jurisdiction to.hear~a motion for a new trial on this
_remand. The. pending second appeal. presents for decision
the issues raised by the Alderman hearing, the’ seven
griginad issues, and two additional issues on the Merits not ©
‘ raised i in the — request for review.!

‘THE ‘ALDERMAN ‘HEARING

¥

~~

is. 1961) the Federal Bureau ‘of Investigation (FBI)
- and the Internal Revenue Service began a \massive five-
Bas epiiae sans of gambling operations in\ the . Miami,

TA third delcndent, Gilbert Lee Beckley, was involved i in he orig-
inal appeal and was similarly resentenced on remand. His appeal oe.

‘such resentencing was dismissed in a,prior order. Hjs rights are not
inwolved here. ~ ic

\ ; cok ae

+ conversatidis monitored on the bugged premises of Frank .

| _ below in the Aldermian hearing was whether the evidence .

_ disclosed instances where no word of either defendant

. : Rosenthal. and McGrath premises | "which, were arguably

1 ee OE Spe oe oes
Floridazarea. As a p&rt.of this in depth inquiry, the:
"premises of gertain suspected gambler$.were placed under.
a form of electronic surveillance, known in the vernacular
as “bugging”. This involved. placing microphone gear in
the premises_ which. would pick up and transmit words
‘spoken there. No attachments were made to any telephones,
therefore, only the conversation: of th@persons on the ,
_ premises were overheard or recorded. TH Silene reveals
* that no surveillance was intended to be made of either Kane — :
or Sklaroff directly, rather they happenef. to:be parties to

Rosenthal and Edward McGrath. The Government admits
_ that these buggings were illegal; the question for the courte”

gathered by these illegal listening devices: tainted the con-
: victions of Kane and Sklaroft, etal ill

; Prior e the icinihiay at the direction of the court, the S
| Gownamint made available to the defendants transerip-
tions of recordgd conversations, called logs, in which the

_ defendants were known to have, been overheard. “Fhe
Government also furnished ‘logs to ‘ defendants which

were known to have beert overheard but where one of the
defendants may have been the a = ‘the other end of
‘the telephone. All other. logs obi d. by monitoring the °

relevant to-this case, but not furnished to the: defendants,
were turned. over to the trial judge for an in camera ‘deter-’ .
mination as to whether the Governmerit had furnished all
logs to the defendants as they. had any right to review under _
the standards.of. Aldermari. In addition to having such of
_ the logs as were made available to them at the hearing to —

| demonstrate taint, the defendants were allowed to question
three FBI agents and one former agent who had gathered

evidence for this prosecution, to determine whether their —

igformation as -to defendants’ activities came from elec-
tronic surveillance records or from independent, untainted
sources : > ;- . Rs :
é |

During the course of the hearing the defendants
moved to require the Government to produce additional
items from its files. Their requests covered an administra-
tive review file, such of the logs examined in camera by the
court as contained references to “unknown” voices, physical
‘surveillance notes of the FBI, and its interoffice memo-
randa called airtels. In opposition to this discovery the
Government argued that no administrative review file had
ever existed; that logs containing “unknown” voices could
not possibly have yielded evidence that was used against
the defendants or, alternatively, that the defendants did

not have the requisite standirig to demand. the production “

of such “unknown” voice logs; and that the produgsion of
surveillahce notes or airtels would be extremely burden-
some.to the Government, would be useless to the defendants,
would constitute rummaging through Gayernment files, and
would go beyond the requirements of Alderman. The trail
-court denied the defendants’ discovery motion in n toto, based
on the findings set out in the margin.”

%

- 21. Defendants claim no standing to any premises.
. 2. Defendants claim no standing to any -specific additional on
versations.

« 3. Mere presence on electronically surveilled premises, without
more, affords no standing. United States v. Cavello, 410 F.2d 563 (2
Cir. 1969).

4. The United States delivered to this Court all extant recordings

" OF transactions of recordings of electronic installations disclosed in its

) 5 ~~ __. tions intercepted by police officers were not protected by.
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.”
332 F.2d at 197, The holding in Olnistead has, of course, ©
_ been overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 |
~ -§.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967). Katz doés not how-
ever, necessarily contra this ease. The thrust of Katz was
_ to dispel the notion that in order for Fourth Amendment ,
guarantees to arise there must be a trespass upon a con- |
q , stitutionally protected area. It emphasized that a person’s
ay . vexpectation of privacy is ‘the compelling consideration.
‘Unlike Katz, the defendants here were not. being overheard. -
Therefore, they could. not, have had. an expectation. of
privacy as to a conversation in-which they did not partici-
-* pate. In addition it is important to note that the agent -
as never impersonated the defendants, arid the testimony does ;
not show that any caller was under the misapprehension
_ that he was speaking to one of the defendants. The defend-
~ ants: cannot claim soméone else’s right ‘of: privacy.

» 6

» The évidence Soi from the iddonons calls i is anal-.
ogous to the seizure of evidence not described in a search ~
warrant. Evidence not described in a valid search warrant
but having a nexus with ‘the crime under investigation
may be seized at the samé time the described evidence is f

-. seized. Bryant v. United States, 252 F.2d 746 (5th Cir.
1958) ; United States v. Bridges, 419 F.2d 963 (8th Cir.”
1969) ; Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.

*- 1961). The test is whether the agent had probable cause -
to “believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular
. apprehension or conviction.” Warden, Maryland Peniten-
tiary v: Hagen, 387 U. S. 294, 307, 87 S.Ct. 1 1642, 1650,

\

- @: / App. 15
a Bd: 2-782 ( 1967). . Of ‘hen ourse the warrant here. could
. not have described. pny words to be seized from ‘telephone’.
calls, that had not’ yet been made, but, with equal certain- -
: ty, -an- agent An these- circumstances had probable cause.
. to believe that other evidence of gambling could be obtained
_ by answering’a ringing telephone. in premises that had . .
already yielded warrant authorized evidence of gambling...

| ss “We should ‘not be understood as holding this was not a.

:form of search which must’ be tested by Fourth Amend-
ment-standards of reasonableness. What we find is that |
under these circumstances this search did not exceed those |
standards. The dfficey had a. duty to gather and preserve |
this contemporaneous evidence of criminal activity occur- “
ring in his presence. If a number of the calls had _—:
innocent calls or if the search had been conducted for 2. .
prolonged: period of time, then the standards of nae gs “ti
ness could be t sgressed. But the record before us shows’
the agent it no innocent calls; rather, all of the 58 »
calls receWed during the four-hour period, concerned
‘gambling. One further caveat is appropriate. We in nowise
intend to trench upon the rule which. holds that in every o
search :an officer, should obtain a warrant as. soon as
practicable. We simply cannot fault the. polieg, conduct
disclosed ere. Sa teks |

an

. In. ‘am 7 the defendants concern themiselvés with
charts prepared by the Government purporting to sum- ,
. Marize the evidence and argue that these charts should - —
‘ have been excluded. We disagree. The charts wete based
~ upon competent evidence already before ‘the jury, and the
primary evidence utilized to construct the charts was avail- »
able to the defendants ‘for comparison An order that the
-“eorrectnéss of the: summary: could be tested. In addition‘
_ the agent who prepared the charts. was available for. cross-_

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- 1971). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
allowing these charts into evidence. Sea@-Baines v. United
States, 426 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1970) ; McDaniel v. United ©
_ States, 343 F.20°785 (5th Cir. 1965).

2 .
- App. 16 P
cnienination. Viniity thn Jory wes Given’ deeved testrio--
. tions concerning their consideration of the charts. See
Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858, 876-77 (5th Cir.
THE NEW ISSUES . ‘. :
‘Sins euattiy Gh abbh es peel ee eile &

be considered on the return of a remanded cause, especially
matters which could cause prejudice.by @elay in their ~
assertion, we deem it more appropriate to’ dispose of those
. raised here on their meri ther than to hold that they
come too On this the defendants contend for
- the first t a portion pf the evidence admitted at
trial-eventuated from a search warrant issued upon prob-
able cause that the Wagering Tax Act was being violated. ,
This Act, of course, was found to be fatally defective on
Fifth Amendment grounds. M . United States, 390
U.S.-89, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L. 889 (1968) and Grosso _
v. United States, 390 U.S,42, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906
:- (1968). The defendants thus argue that Marchetti-Grosso .
vitiates this s¢arch warrant and precludes the introduetion
_~ eof any evidence gained therefrom. This gontention was
_ decided adversely to the defendants in United States v.
f° . Seaglioné, .. F.2d‘ (5th -€fr. 1981) [No. 29279
: July 9, 1971]. 7

5 ? - . : :.

_ ‘The last additional point of error urged by -the de-

+ ° . fendants pertains to the admission of ‘the defendants’ ‘in-

come tax returns in order to‘show that. their major source
Ft Re. oe ee Tene

2

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-App. 17 :

deduction for 4 wagering tax stamp which was couched in
o these words: “Stamp tax license.” Defendants argue that
the purchase of the stamp described was compelled ‘in
Violation: of their Fifth Amendment rights under the
Marchetti-Grosso rationale, and thus the returns which
‘e discolsed that they bopght this stamp should not have been.
admitted. This contention is without ‘merit. First of all,
the stamp deduction was only one-item on the complete F
return and it was never specifically brought to the atten-~
tion of the jury. The only way the jury could have been
apprised of the existence of the deduction was by reading

the detajls in the returns. Even had the jury pursued this.
course, we cannot say they would have concluded that-the
defendants were thereby stating they were gamblers. Thus .
our case is distinguishable from Nolan v. United States, -
395 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1968), relied upon sp heavily by
the defendants. In addition, these defendants certainly
Were not compelled to claim a deduction for the stamp. , ‘
Their action in doing so was voluntary and was in po way
compelled by law. Defendants are not ‘constitutionally
excused from any resulting prejudice.

The judgments of conviction are

ee AFFIRMED.

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. App. 19
APPENDIX B
‘ [TrrLe OMITTED] a ¥
No 29200
_- ON PETITION FOR REHEARING :

Before BELL, THORNBERRY and CLARK, Circuit
PER CURIAM: _
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing filed -

on behalf of Martin Sklaroff in the above entitled and
numbered cause be and the same is hereby DENIED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385606_0319%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
