# Opposition Brief — Johnson v. Texas

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385606_0042%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1971
- **Citation:** 404 U.S. 951

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
4a FILED
- 3341
> OcT 14 19M
eee aie E. ROBERT SEAVER, CLERK
IN TEE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1971

MATTHEW DONALD JOHNSON,
Petitioner
Vv

STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent
Eh semaine
MARION ERNEST McMILLAN
as Petitioner
v. :
STATE OF TEXAS,
Respondent

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

CRAWFORD C. MARTIN

Attorney General of Texas

Nota WHITE

First Assistant Attorney General
ALFRED WALKER

Executive Assistant

Rosert C. FLOWERS

Assistant Attorney General
GILBERT J. PcNna

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

P. O. Box 12548, Capi.ol Station
Austin, Texas 78711

VABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
EE oo Ginn ec kane eee a ie ee eee 1
I oe ies ey oa eR EET Se 2
I I onc go cs ee ae ee eke wed 2
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ....... . 2
ee ee eee 3
Argument and Authorities .................0.......... 4
SES 0g RLY Seles Rte tL pa ne Oe 8
re re eet eres 9
I Ps a ok ss eK ee S see eae Oe emai 10

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page
Brown v. State, 353 S.W.2d 425... they ha lee: 7
Brinkiey v. State, 320 S.W.2d 855 ...... .............. 7
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) ............ 5
Johnson v. State and McMillan v. State,

467 S.W.2d 247 et AN Apes art OUR Le tga 1
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) ............. 5
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) __.. eon 5
Streight v. State, 138 S.W. 742 (62 Tex. Crim. 453) ...—s 6

State Statutes

Article 31.04, Vernon’s Annotated Code of Criminal
Procedure ATURE aa ee tee Ce =) 6

Article 7.03, Vernon’s Annotated Code of Criminal

Procedure AREER FR EAC | “WZ
Statutes
United States
28 U.S.C., Section 1257 (3) TeV E Te ee 2

Constitutional Provisions

Fourteenth Amendment a ine Bete 8 es 2

Fifth Amendment ace eee LA ae Ge aiehan ol 8

| IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1971

MATTHEW DONALD JOHNSON,
Petitioner
Vv

STATE OF TEXAS,

;

TG: \ cain

MARION ERNEST McMILLAN
Petitioner

Resnondent

Vv.

STATE OF TEXAS,
Respondent

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING OF
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

Now comes the State of Texas, Kesponaent herein
and files this response in reply to Petitioner’s petition
for Writ of Certiorari heretofore filed herein.

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas, is reported at 467 S.W.2d 247, and also appears
in the appendix to Petitioner’s petition for Writ of
Certiorari.

IS RR AD REP AR has i Ts. ST OT Ws He

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas was entered on April 14, 1971. Motion for Re-
hearing was denied without a written opinion on June
9, 1971, this Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28
U.8.C., Section 1257, (3). Accordingly, the jurisdic-
tional requirements would appear to be satisfied, al-
though Respondent refutes Petitioner’s contention that
any right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States has been denied him.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether under the circumstances of this case it
was a denial of due process to refuse a change of venue.

2. Whether it was a denial of due process, under the
circumstances, to refuse voir dire examination of each
venireman separate from the others.

3. Whether it was a denial of due process, under the
circumstances, to restrict voir dire questioning about
black power and militancy.

4. Whether Texas procedure with respect to jury
prejudices and misconduct, as applied in these cases,
was a denial of due process.

5. (McMillan only) Whether the trial of McMillan
for a felony was double jeopardy after he had already
been placed under a peace bond.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Of concern here is the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution which provides:.

Er wee

‘¢... nor shail any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of
ass”

The other state statutes involved appear as an ap-
pendix at page 14 of Petitioner’s application for Writ
of Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners were convicted of injuring property be-
longing to another, the extent of the injury being over
the value of fifty dollars ($50.00) ; the punishment as
to each Petitioner, ten (10) years.

On July 1, 1968, at about 10:30 p.m., a group of 30
to 50 Negro people, many of them dressed in a manner
somewhat different from the dress of the ordinary cus-
tomer, entered the O.K. Super Market one at a time.
Petitioners McMillan and Johnson were the first of the
group to enter the store. They went to all parts of the
store while Petitioners walked to the back. At this
point, the employees heard glass breaking in the area
in which the Petitioners were standing.

Merchandise in the store was scattered, broken, mu-
tilated, and commingled by the persons who had en-

tered the store. Describing the scene, an employee
stated :

‘‘There was milk and eggs all mixed together with
cereal and sugar, watermelons and mustard, just
most anything you could imagine was busted and
broken.”’

Five minutes after they entered the store, the group
left. Petitioners were the last to leave. A partial listing
of the destroyed merchandise, which had a value in

pom, Sone

Detect nae

Y ORNS OURS PRELIM RAD

excess of fifty dollars, includes: 3 one-gallon jugs of
milk, 2 five-pound bags of sugar, 2 one-quart containers
of mustard, over seventeen ‘pounds of tomatoes, several
cartons of eggs, four boxes of detergent, many bottles
of pickles, two quarts of cooking oil, many watermel-
ons, and 12 one-pound packages of oleo. An employee
saw Petitioner Johnson break two bottles of grape
juice and drop a watermelon twice. He also saw Peti-
tioner McMillan take a gallon bottle of milk out of the
dairy container and drop it, breaking the container.

Later the same evening, after the store was cleaned
up, Peticioners re-entered the store, bought some beer
and McMillan commented, ‘‘These white people sho
keep a nice clean store.’’

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Petitioners’ first contention is that the trial court
erred in refusing a change of venue and that the trial
judge favored the State in the venue hearing by admit-
ting affidavits in lieu of witnesses. The testimony in-
troduced by Petitioners at the venue hearing showed
that Petitioners had been the subject of items on a
news program of one of the major television stations
in Dallas approximately four times in the preceding
month; that a television newsman had read about them
in the local newspapers eight to twelve times in recent
months; that the Petitioners were newsworthy because
they had opinions diverging from that of the majority
of the public and because they had obtained an option
to purchase a chain of grocery stores, one of which was
the supermarket where the offense took place. Further
testimony indicated that publicity, both in the news-
papers and on television had shown tbat McMillan was

a

a field secretary for the Student Non-Violent Coordi-
nating Committee; that SNCC had a widespread rep-
utation for being militant in black affairs; that there
was publicity involving the incident at the supermar-
ket out of which these charges arose; and that Petition-
ers’ unusual manner of dress and hair style tended to
cause a feeling of resentment among people in Dallas.
Petitiovers also showed that they might be associated
in the eyes of the public with destruction of property,
interruption of business activities and conduct leading
up to riots. All the defense witnesses testified that they
were of the opinion that Petitioners could not receive
a fair trial in Dallas County. However, they all testi-
fied that they could be fair and impartial jurors in
Dallas County in spite of all the publicity with which
they had come in contact.

In connection with the change of venue contention,
it is well to observe that it was shown that Dallas Coun-
ty has a population of over one million persons. Fur-
ther, this record shows efforts on the part of the trial
court to restrict pre-trial publicity.

Rideau v. Lousiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Gropm
v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) and Sheppard v.
Macwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), cited by Petitioners are
readily distinguishable from the case at bar.

There is no showing in this record that there were
inherently suspect outside influences affecting the com-
munity’s climate of opinion as to defendants which
would result in a probability of unfairness. These Pe-
titioners were tried by an impartial jury and Petition-
‘ers failed to show that the population was so saturated
with prejudice that no impartial jury could be se-
Jected.

— =

At the close of the evidence in the hearing on the
motion for change of venue, the State introduced seven
affidavits stating that the Petitioners’ witness did not
have sufficient knowledge on which to base their opin-
ions that the Petitioners could not obtain a fair and
impartial trial in Dallas County. Petitioners. objected
to the introduction of these affidavits into evidence; the
objection was overruled. Such affidavits controverted
the source of knowledge of the Petiticiuers’ witness, as
is permitted by Art. 31.04, V.A.C.C.P. No affidavits
were offered by the Petitioners.

Petitioners next contend that the unusual nature of
the case required individual voir dire examination,
and in light of the record the trial judge’s refusal was
error and a denial of due process. In Streight v. State,
138 S.W. 742 (62 Tex. Crim. 453), reversed «n other
grounds, the Texas Court of Criainal: Appeals held
that in an extreme case it would be reversible error
for the trial court, on motion, to refuse to exclude the
veniremen from the courtroom during the selection of
a jury. That case involved much more pre-trial pub-
licity and prejudice than does the case at bar.

Petitioners next contend that the trial court erred
by not allowing defense counsel to ask prospective
jurors certain questions on the voir dire examination.
In the examination of one prospective juror, Petition-
ers’ counsel asked the following question: ‘‘Do you
allow your daughter to wear mini skirts?’’ The juror
answered: ‘‘Yes, she wears —.’’

The court also refused to let the defense question a
venirewoman, who was subsequently a juror, about her
political affiliations, whether she was a Democrat or
Republican. Petitioners have failed to show that the

—

trial court abused his discretion in refusing to allow
those questions and have failed to show how those ques-
tions were relevant to exercising their peremptory
challenges.

Petitioners were allowed to question one venireman,
who subsequently became a juror, at some length about
his understanding of the term ‘‘Black Power.’’ Upon
the State’s objection, the court then instructed that the
venireman be interviewed at the bench rather than -
have the entire jury panel hear the questions. Defense
counsel then refused to ask any more questions regard-
ing ‘‘Black Power’’ and, instead, he began to question
the venireman regarding the range of punishmer. in
the case.

Petitioners’ counsel later questioned another venire-
man, subsequenlty a juror, regarding his idea of what
the term ‘‘Black Power’’ meant. The State objected
and the court sustained the objection. Defense counsel,
however, continued questioning regarding the juror’s
definition of the term ‘‘Black Power.’’ Under the cir-
cumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
This does not present a federal question for review.

Petitioners next contend that the hearing on the mo-
tion for new trial was a nullity because the same was
not held within the 20 days provided by statute, citing
Brown v. State, 353 S.W.2d 425 and Brinkley v. State,
320 S.W.2d 855. Their motion for new trial was based
on jury misconduct and had an affidavit of a juror at-
tached thereto. Petitioners reason that when the mo-
tion was overruled by operation of law, it was auto-
matically reversible error. At the hearing on the motion
for new trial, Petitioners refused to participate due to
their contention that the hearing was a nullity.

—_

In this case, the court gianted the State a continu-
ance of the hearing in order to have more time to secure
evidence that jury misconduct had not, in fact, oc-
curred. At the hearing, the court considered testimony
and affidavits from the remaining eleven jurors, who
stated that such misconduct did not occur.

In the interest of justice, the action of the court was
proper in order to show that the affidavit attached to
Petitioners’ motion for new trial did not reflect the
true facts. This does not present a federal question.

Petitioner McMillan contends that he was subject
to double jeopardy because he had a hearing by a Jus-
tice of the Peace on a peace bond. In Texas a peace
bond is conditioned that ‘“‘he will not commit such of-
fense, and that he will keep the peace towards the per-
son threatened or about to be injured, and toward all
others named in the bond for any period of time, not
to exceed one year from the date of the bond.’’ (See:
Tex. Code of Crim Proe., Art. 7.03.*) It is clearly a
preventative measure taken to insure that the defend-
ant will not repeat the act or acts threatened under
penalty of paying the amount of the bond. This is based
on future acts and is not punishment or determination
of criminal activity. It is by no means a criminal trial
within the purview of the jeopardy provision of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above stated, Respondent says that
there is no violation of due process presented. The Pe-
tition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

*Attached as Appendix “A”.
ca on

a,

: Respectfully submitted,
| CrawrForp C. Martin
| Attorney General of Texas

Rosert C. FLOWERS
Assistant Attorney General

cme eee

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Gilbert J. Pena, Assistant Attorney General of
Texas, attorney for Respondent, do herebv certify that
a copy of the above and foregoing Response In Oppo-
sition To Granting Of Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Court Of Criminal Appeals Of Texas has been
deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
on this the -_ day of October, 1971, to the following
address: Frank P. Hernandez and Vincent W. Perini,
710 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas 75202.

GILBERT J. PENA
Assistant Attorney General .

APPENDIX “A”

Art. 7.03 [80] [125] [115] Accused brought before
magistrate

When the accused has been brought before the mag-
istrate, he shall hear proof as to the accusation, and if
he be satisfied that there is just reason to apprehend
that the offense was intended to be committed, or that
the threat was seriously made, he shall make an order
that the accused enter into bond in such sum as he may
‘ in his discretion require, conditioned thai he will not
commit such offense, and that he will keep the peace
toward the person threatened or about to be injured,
and toward all others name in the bond for any period
of time, not to exceed one year from the date of the
bond. Acts 1965, 59th Leg,., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

— 10—

>

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385606_0042%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
