# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Wanamaker v. Riley

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1971
- **Citation:** 404 U.S. 986

## Text

LIBRARY
SUPREME COURT. U. S.

In The

Supreme Court of the Hnite

October Term, 1971
~<a

No.

382 °

Petitioner,

Eno
GILES A. jain Pos

U8.«

JOHN C. RILEY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

—_

GILES A. WANAMAKER, Jr.
In Propria Persona
7 Bamfield Road
Rowayton, Connecticut 06853

(203) 838-6840

RALPH B. GUY, Jr.
United States Attorney
HAROLD HOOD
Assistant United States Attomey
Attomeys for Respondent
817 Federal Building
Detroit, Michigan 48226

(4253) LUTZ APPELLATE PRINTERS, INC.
Lew and Financial Printing
South River, N.J. New York, N.Y. Philadelphia, Pa.

(201) 257 -ARSN

Page
Petition for Writ of Certiorari ....... 1
Opinions and Orders Below ......-e+e- 2
Jurisdiction ....-.-ececcrcrercccece 2
Questions Presented ....-++++eee-e 2
Statement of the Case .. 1... ++ ee eee 3
Statement of the Facts... .. 6+ seee-e 4
Argument ... 6+ +e eee eee eeres 9)
Conclusion ....-2eeeeecececereres 10

Appendix A
Order Appealed From SoV¥wae ee ees la
Appendix B

Order Granting Motion for Summary »
Judgment 7 +. o - ° e e . on e e - * e e e 3a

Appendix C

Original Complaint .....+4-.s-e-e-ee-e 8a

it

Indez
Page
Tabie ef Citations

CASES CITED:

Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S. Ct.
1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959) ... 5, 6, 7,8

Bivins v. Six UnknownAgenis, U.S. ,
91S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619(1971) .. 10

Bridges v. I.R.S. 433 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.
i a a a a ee ee ee 9

Denman v. White, 316 F.2d 524 (1st Cir.
1963) e e e e eee ee ee @ e a o e e e 8, 10

Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129 (1st Cir.
1965) ao t e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e es e if 9

Molevar v. Lindsey, 411 F.2d 597 (6th
Cir. 1969) o e e e e e e eo e oe e e * e e e e 5, 7, 8

Off v. United States, 35 F.2d 222(S.D.I11.
1929) e o a . e eeeeeee #@ @ e e e e e 7

Ruderer v. Meyer, 413 F.2d 175 (8th
Cir. 1969) ...... ee ae oe ee 7

State v. Smith, 422 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1965),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 895 ........ 7

tit

Index
Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED:

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts $8183, 189,195... 6
21 C.J.S., Courts §8189a, 189c ....... 7

Prosser, Torts, 8111 at 823 (3d Ed.
1964) @ e e oe e e e . e eo e @ @ e e eo e o 6 10

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term 1971

GILES A. WANAMAKER JR.,

Petitioner,

U8.

JOHN C. RILEY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT

To the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States of America:

Your petitioner, Giles A. Wanamaker Jr., ap-
pearing in propria persona, hereby petitions this
Honorable Court for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit to review an Order affirming an Order Grant-
ing Motion for Summary Judgment by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan.

Opiniotis and Orders Below

The opinions and orders below were not officially
reported. The Order of the Urited States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, containing a reference
to Judge Wade McCree’s dissent therein, was filed
on June 17, 1971, and a copy is annexed hereto as
Appendix “A”, The Order for Summary Judgment
by the United States District Court(E.D. Michigan)
by Judge Fred W. Kaess was entered August 26,
1970 and a copy is annexed hereto as Appendix
ba ad

Jurisdiction

The order sought to be reviewed herein was
handed down and filedonJune 17,1971. There were
no orders or petitions respecting either a re-
hearing or an extension of time to petition for
certiorari. It is believed that this Court has
jurisdiction to review the order kelow pursuant to
U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 19, 28 U.S.C.A.

Questions Presented

1. Is an opinion by only four justices of the
United States Supreme Court, which advocates an
“absolute privilege against suitfor nearly all federal
government officials when making defamatory
statements but found to be acting within the “outer
perimeter” of their duties, controlling precedent
under the doctrine of stare decisis and thus en-
titled to be recognized as the law of the land?

2. Assuming arguendo an absolute privilege
against suit for federal employees is recognized
under the circumstances of this case,

3

a) was defendant-respondent acting in his of-
ficial capacity in making the defamatory state-
ments attributed to him?

and

b) was a fair and adequate evidentiary hearing
or other opportunity to determine the issue of
official capacity afforded the court and the
parties at the trial court proceeding?

Petitioner contends that the answers to the
questions are “No.”

Statement? of the Case

Petitioner-plaintiff filed the complaint, a copy
of which is annexed bereto as Appendix “C”, in the
instant matter on May 5, 1969, in the circuit court
of Macomb County, Michigan, alleging defamation
by slander (Count 1) and abuse of process (Count
3) against Respondent-defendant John C. Riley, and
defamation by libel (Count 2) against former de-
fendant Robert Hlatky. The action was removed
to the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Michigan by the United States At-
torney pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441 et seq. on the
grounds that respondent was acting in his role
as an Official of the United States government.
Petitioner subsequently consented to the dismissal
of the action as to defendant Hlatky.

Respondent’s motion for summary judgment was
granted by the District Court upon the finding
that respondent was acting within the ‘outer peri-
meter’ of his duties as an official of the United

LARA BIT Fp PETITE NOR OE TOY LM TL OE

States government, and was therefore accorded
an absolute privilege against such actions. Peti-
tioner appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit from only so much of the judg-
ment as applied to the slander count (Count 1);
with McCree, J. dissenting, the District Court
was upheld.

Petitioner comes now petitioning this honorable
Court for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Statement of the Facts

On January 26, 1968, petitioner, an attorney
then residing and practicing in Michigan, and a
major in the Air Force Reserve, was one of
approximately 185 members of the 305th Air
Rescue and Recovery Squadron, a reserve unit
based at Selfridge AFB, Michigan, who were in-
voluntarily recalled to extended active duty for
an unknown length of time in the aftermath of
the Pueblo incident in which a U.S. Navy ship
and its crew were captured by the North Koreans.
Respondent, who was employed at Selfridge Air
Force Base as the supervisor of approximately
70 civil service employees of the 305th, known
as Air Reserve Technicians, was a reserve lieu-
tenant colonel and commander of the unit.

According to the pleadings and the record, on
or about December 24, 1968, and at other times,
respondent made a number of defamatory state-
ments to citizens of Michigan concerning petitioner,
including but not limited to the following: “Major
Wanamaker is a traitor to his country.” “He is
a modern-day Benedict Arnold and is a disgrace

TES PAP IRL IL FIG ERE LS Na RP PG PLE ES ARE IEE AE OLEGORG EEL: AAI PEO La OEE AP AE ee

to the uniform.” “I want to bar him from the
practice of law.”

The record shows that respondent inhis Answer
to the Complaint denied making the foregoing state-
ments, but his answer to certain interrogatories
reflects that he does not recall making them. In
his affidavit in support of the motion for summary
judgment filed with the District Court, respondent
stated that any statements concerning petitioner
were made in his (respondent’s) capacity as an
Air Force officer.

Argument

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI (A) TO DECIDE AN IMPORTANT
QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH HAS NOT
BEEN SETTLED BY THIS COURT; (B) TO RE-
SOLVE A CONFLICT BETWEEN COURTS OF AP-
PEALS ON THIS MATTER; AND (C) TO REVERSE
THE SANCTION OF A DEPARTURE FROM AC-
CEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS. ~

A) On the “authority of Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1434 (1959)
and Molevar v. Lindsey, 411 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.
1969)” (see Appendix ‘A’, p. 1a), the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a 2 - 1 decision
upheld the District Court’s summary judgment or-
der, which also cited Barr as its authority. It
is the contention of petitioner that the opinion in
Barr relied upon by the courts below is not
settled ‘aw and that the summary judgment should
not have been granted.

SIS AAR ITAA A SA ETE RS OR MIE REID PES POT BID, IE LEELA BN I TY

Five separate opinions were announced in Barr,
The decision of the court consisted of two con-
curring opinions, one by Mr. Justice Harlan in
which three other justices joined, as well as an
opinion by Mr. Justice Black in which he specifi-
cally disassociated himself from Mr. Justice Har-
lan’s opinion, although concurring in the result,
360 U.S. at 576. Four justices dissented in three
separate opinions. Thus, an opinion by only four
of the justices, in which an absolute privilege
against lawsuits was advocated for a large number
of federal employees when found to be acting in
the course of their duties, seems to have been
escalated into a binding rule of law when in fact
the so-called ‘rule’ is neither settled law nor is
entitled to binding precedent under the doctrine
of stare decisis.

A mainstay of the Anglo-American legal system
and its reliance on judicial precedent, the doctrine
of stare decisis holds that the determination of
a point of law by a court will generally be followed
by a court of the same or lower rank if a sub-
sequent case presents the same legal problem.
20 Am, Jur.2d, Courts $183. The stare decisis

effect is limited to a judicial opinion of a major-
ity of the court on a point of law in a final deci-
sion, supra, $189, and

. » - where the members of the court unani-
mously or by majority vote reach a deci-
sion but cannot, even by a majority, agree
on the reasoning therefor, no point of law
is established by the decision and it cannot
be a precedent covered by the stare decisis
rule. Supra, $195.

See also State v. Smith, 422 SW 2d 50 (Mo.
1965), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 895, and Off v.
United States, 35 F.2d 222 (S.D. Ill. 1929). Ac-
cording to Corpus Juris Sequndum, where a major~
ity of a court concurs merely in the result, the
principles enunciated in the opinion cannot be con-
sidered as within the rule of stare decisis ...
21 C.J.S., Courts §189 a.

Only an opinion which is concurred in by at
least a majority of the court of last re-
sort constitutes a precedent; if fewer than
the majority concur there is no ruling opin-
ion except as to the disposition of the case.
id at §189 c.

In the circumstances of the instant case, there-
fore, the reliance upon the courts below upon Barr
and upon Molevar v. Lindsey, supra, is misplaced,
as the four justice opinion in Barr is not entitled
to binding precedent, and the opinion in Molevar,
citing Barr as its authority, cannot express the
law of the Sixth Circuit. As this important ques-
tion of federal law has not been settled by this
honorable Court, petitioner respectfully urges ~_
this petition be granted.

B) A conflict between Courts of Appeals is
apparent in an examination of Kelley v. Dunne,
344 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1965). In that case the
First Circuit does not foliow the absolute priv-
ilege rule as is articulated in Molevar v. Lind-
sey, supra, Ruderer v. Meyer, 413 F.2d 175 (8th
Cir. 1969), and other cases.*Chief Judge Aldrich
establishes a “balancing” criteria involving the
weight of the relative importance in each case

of the public interest (absolute privilege for the
federal employee) as opposed to the private in-
terest (the ability to obtain a measure of redress).
“In such a situation we see no compelling need
to superimpose, absolutely, the public interest
upon private rights.” (emphasis added), 344 F.2d
129 at 133.

That the First Circuit has reserved the full
adoption of the absolute privilege rule is further
seen in this citation from Denman v. White, 316
F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1963):

We intimate no view as to whether the
privilege accorded a government official by
Barr ... would permit a collateral per-
sonal attack upon the party he is seeking
to answer when the latter’s character is
not directly inissue. id at 526.

The First Circuit, therefore, has not adopted
the absolute privilege rule as articulated by the
Sixth Circuit in Molevar v. Lindsey, supra, and
the instant case. Petitioner respectfully prays
that this Honorable Court grant this petition to
resolve that conflict.

C) In the dissenting comment to the Opinion
below, Circuit Judge McCree would have remanded
the matter to the District Court ... “for an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the ut-
terances were made ‘within the outer perimeter’
of the duties ...” Appendix p.1A. Petitioner
contends that, in the circumstances of this case,
without such a hearing petitioner-plaintiff has been
precluded from an effective inquiry into the factual

ALLIS RAPA gh NBN a PUES EOSIN et GIN AY SM ON NATE RI ONCE YE IN LORE CAE IO ERIE EB ch AION CEL MORE DEAE RME —a ae

issue of whether the statements were made in an
official capacity. “Since ... motions for sum- _
mary judgment requir(e) construction in plaintiff's
favor,” Kelley v. Dunne, supra, at 130, “Defend-
ant officers may not rely, of course, on bare
conclusory allegations on this issue, for this will
not sustain a summary judgment in their favor.”
Bridges v. I.R.S., 433 F.2d 299, 300 (5th Cir.
1970). :

The record in the instant case shows that
respondent-defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment contained the following conclusory allega-
tion as a part of respondent’s affidavit: “9...
That any statements made by me concerning Ma-
jor Wanamaker were made solely in my capacity
as an Officer in the United States Air Force and
as Majer Wanamaker’s Commanding Officer.”
Petitioner-plaintiff introduced a number of affi-
davits showing that the utterances were made in
casual conversations, in personal contexts, in civ-
ilian clothes, after duty hours, and on a holiday.
One affidavit, by a Michigan attorney, states that
respondent-defendant, while dressed in civilian
clothes, made ithe following statement: “Come
inside, Mac, I want to discuss something per-
sonal. It’s (obscenities ...) important to me
or I wouldn’t take up your time on a holiday...
Al Wanamaker has embarrassed me personally.
He’s a traitor to his country and a modern day
Benedict Arnold. I want to bar him from the
practice of law. If you’re smart Mac, you’ll
help me pretect my tail and cover up this mess.”

Petitioner contends that the record contains
sufficient evidence to rebut respondent’s bare self-

5 Aen ARR ERTIES IR TEE OLE LE LEL LY ISOLDE NADL IO LG ES PELE IEA

10

serving affidavit, introduced with no support. In
Denman_v. White, supra, a similarly claimed
privilege was upheld on motion, but with affi-
davits from two generals, one an immediate
commander of defendant, together with a copy of H
the appropriate Air Force regulation authorizing
the. activity. No such support was pro.erred
here. It remains the respondent-defendant’s bur-
den to show his entitlement to executive immun-
ity, and there is no presumption to aidhim. Pros-
ser, Torts, $111 at 823 (2d Ed. 1964), Respond-
ent-defendant’s affidavit, if it is relied upon ex-
clusively in its present form, creates a presump-
tion that the statements were within the scope
of duty unless plaintiff can prove otherwise,.. .
an impossible burden. See Barr, supra, at 579,
Chief Justice Warren’s dissent.

Petitioner respectfully contends that the re-
fusal of the Court of Appeals below to remand
the proceedings for an evidentiary hearing sanc-
tioned a departure from accepted and usual judi-
cial proceedings in that a bare conclusory affi-
davit, with no supporting affidavits or material,
defeated petitioner’s reply to the motion even
though it was amply supported by three affidavits,
any one of which were sufficient to put the matter
into issue. An unsupported affidavit by the re-
spondent thus becomes the basis for an outcome
— determinative decision by the trial court.

For the foregoing reasons, together with the
parallel rationale expressed by the court and the
concurrence in Bivins v. Six Unknown Named

TENET IE a NTE REN EON —_— & one

11

Agents, US. » 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L.
Ed. 619 (1971), this petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari should be granted, and the Court should
reverse the determination of the court below on
the basis that there is no settled or binding
rule of absolute privilege controlling the instant .
matter, that the alleged utterances were made
outside of respondent’s scope of duty, or, al-
ternatively, that there should have been an evi-
dentiary proceeding to determine the scope of
duty issue at the trial court,

Respectfully submitted,

GILES A. WANAMAKER, JR.
In Propria Persona

abi eaitas: ste vewtenl Lies iny his thm a tnt

la

APPENDIX A
Order Appealed From

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Filed June 17, 1971
GILES A. WANAMAKER, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
JOHN C. RILEY, |
Defendant-Appellee

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, WEICK and
McCREE, Circuit Judges.

Appellant is a Major in tne Air Force Reserve
and has been on duty at Selfridge Air Force Base
in Michigan since his unit was activated. He
brought an action for damages for defamation
against his commanding officer, a Colonel in the
Reserve, the action arising out of utterances made
by the Colonel at the Base, concerning appellant’s
activities as a dissident, which activities ques-
tioned the call to active duty and were reported
in the press, on television and through other news
media.

The District Court granted summary judgment
on the ground that the utterances of the command-
ing officer were absolutely privileged.

2a

Order Appealed F rom

We affirm on the authority of Barr v. Matteo,
360 U.S. 564 (1959), and Molever v. Lindsey,
411 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1969).

Judge McCree dissents. While he recognizes
the existence of absolute privilege of the com-
manding officer, he would remand for an evi-
dentiary hearing to determine whether the ut-
terances were made “within the outer perimeter”
of the duties of the commanding officer.

Entered by order of the Court.

s/ James A. Higgins
Clerk

a Satyinkt a eM

3a

APPENDIX B
Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

Order entered August 26, 1970
GILES A. WANAMAKER, JR.,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
JOHN C. RILEY AND ROBERT HLATKY,
Defendants.

At a session:of said court held in the Federal
Building in the City of Detroit, Michigan,
on the 26th day of August, 1970,

Present: The Honorable FRED W. KAESS,
United States District Judge.

This case involves a three-count complaint
against two defendants. Count One charges de-
fendant Riley with defamation by slander. Count
Two charges defendant Hlatky with defamation by
libel, Count Three alleges abuse of process on
the part of defendant Riley.

Count Two having previously been dismissed
with the consent of counsel, the present motica
for summary judgment concerns only Counts One
and Three,

44

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

It is the position of the United States, on be-
half of the defendant John C. Riley, that any
defamatory statements alleged in Count One of
the complaint, as well as any actions taken by
him to discipline the plaintiff alleged in Count
Three, were clearly within the perimeter of de-
fendant’s duties as a commanding officer of the
United States Air Force; and that, as such, they
were absolutely privileged, thus precluding any
recovery by the plaintiff in this action.

The plaintiff counters by maintaining that there
is no federal absolute privilege in favor of the
defendant; and that, assuming arguendo there is
such a privilege, it is not available in the instant
case because the statements and actions of the
defendant Riley were outside the perimeter of
his duties.

This kind of case, as frequently has been
observed, touches upon the conflict between two
considerations of high importance, namely, on
the one hand the protection of the individual
citizen against damage caused by oppressive or
malicious action on the part of government offi-
cers; and on the other, the protection of the pub-
lic interest by shielding responsible governmental
officials against the harassment and inevitable
hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits
brought on account of action taken in the exer-
cise of their official responsibilities. Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert denied, 339
U.S. 949.

— van

5a

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

This court, too, has struggled with this con-
flict reflecting upon the various cases cited by
counsel which involve a variety of factual situa-
tions.

The court concludes, however, that the case
at bar falls within the rule laid down in Barr v.
Matteo, supra — that the defendant’s plea of ab-
solute privilege must be sustained.

Relative to Count Three, the action taken was
cleariy within the perimeter of the defendant’s
duties as the commanding officer of the 305th
Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron stationed at
Selfridge Air Force Base. As the commanding
officer, defendant Riley was responsible for the
maintenance of proper discipline and it was surely
within his discretionary power to request an in-
vestigation and subsequent court martial action
against those under his command, “despite the
allegations of malice.” Gregoire v. Biddle, supra,
at p. 525.

The question of sianderous statements in Count
One is a close one, but the court holds that such
statements were made within the discretionary
authority of the defendant. That the defendant
was not required by law or by direction of his
superiors is not controlling, for the same consid-
erations which underlie the recognition of the
privilege as to acts done in connection with a

mandatory duty apply with equal force to discre-—

tionary acts. In this instance, the statements
complained of, as stipulated by the plaintiff in
open court, were made by the defendant to other

6a

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

military personnel while on the premises of
Selfridge Air Force Base. While the language
used was stronger than necessary, defendant Ri-
ley’s statements are within the outer perimeter
of his duty to maintain discipline and inform
those under his command of proscribed conduct.
Such internal statements constitute a part of the
defendant’s official duties and consequently come
under the protective shield of absolute privilege.

As a fina! consideration the court quotes the
final paragravh of the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Barr v. Matteo, supra:

We are told that we should forbear from
sanctioning any such rule of absolute priv-
ilege lest it open the door to wholesale
oppression and abuses on the part of un-
scrupulous government officials. It is per-
haps enough to say that fears of this sort
have not been realized within the wide area
of government where a judicially formulated
absolute privilege of broad scope has long
existed. It seems to us wholly chimerical
to suggest that what hangs in the balance
here is the maintenance of high standards of
conduct among those in the public service.
To be sure, as with any rule of law which
attempts to reconcile fundamentally antag-
onistic social policies, there may be occa-
sional instances of actual injustice which
will go unredressed, but we think that price
a necessary one to pay for the greater good.
And there are of course other sanctions
than civil tort suits available to deter the

7a

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

executive official who may be prone to
exercise his functions in an unworthy and
irresponsible manner. We think that we
should not be deterred from establishing
the rule which we announce today by any
such remote forebodings.”

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.

s/ Fred W. Kaess
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing
Petitioy were served upon counsel for the respond-
ent by depositing same properly addressed with
postage prepaid in the United States Mail on this

day of September, 1971.

8a

APPENDIX C
Original Complaint

Complaint of Petitioner in the Circuit Court for
Macomb County, Michigan - filed May 5, 1969

State of Michigan
In the Circuit Court For the County of Macomb
Giles A. Wanamaker Jr.,

Plaintiff
No. X-69-1991
vs. Noe

John C, Riiey and
Robert Hlatky,

Defendants

NOW. comes the plaintiff in the above entitled
matter, GILES A. WANAMAKER, J”., in proper
personam, and for a cause of action says:

COUNT 1 DEFAMATION (SLANDER)

1. THAT plaintiff is a resident of the City
of Northville, County of Oakland, State of Michi-
gan.

2. THAT defendant RILEY is aresident of the
City of Utica, County of Macomb, State of Michi-
gan and that defendant HLATKY is a resident
of Selfridge AFB, County of Macomb, State of
Michigan.

9a

Original Complaint

3. THAT on certain occasions in November
of 1968 and on certain occasions subsequent and
in particular on December 24, 1968, in the pres-
ence of others, defendant RILEY made defamatory
statements concerning plaintiff, including but not
limited to the following: “Major Wanamaker is
a modern Benedict Arnold. ...... Major Wan-
am*ker is a traitor to his country.......
(a crime punishable by death in both Federal and
State jurisdictions).

4. THAT the above and other statements were
made wilfully, falsely and with the malicious in-
tent to do serious and permanent damage to plain-
tiff, such statements being made in Macomb Co,

5. THAT as a proximate result of defendant
RILEY’S malicious slander, plaintiff has suffered
permanent and substantial damage to reputation,
present and future earning capacity, professional
status, military career, and has endured great
mental suffering and anguish.

(Counts II and III having been dismissed with the
consent of petitioner, they are omitted from
this Appendix)

WHEREFORE plaintiff claims judgment against
defendant RILEY in the sum of five hundred
thousand dollars ($500,000.00) compensatory dam-
ages and five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00)
exemplary and punitive damages together with
costs of this litigation and claims judgment against
defendant HLATKY in the sum of one hundred
thousand ($100,000.00) dollars compensatory dam-

ae

10a

Original Complaint

ages and one hundred thousand ($100,000.00) dol-
lars punitive and exemplary damages together with
costs of this litigation.

s/ Giles A. Wanamaker, Jr.

GILES A. WANAMAKER, JR.
in proper personam
435 Welch Road
Northville, Michigan
349-0504

Date: May 5, 1969

---

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