# Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Anderson v. Laird

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for A Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1971
- **Citation:** 404 U.S. 865

## Text

COURT. ‘Suoreme Court, U.S,
eh oe FILED:

No. Tete | — JUN 3 197L

a amnl CLERK

70-946

| Bn the |
Souperite Court of the United Suns

OctoreR Term, 1970

PVT. E2 DONALD JACK ANDERSON NG26382581,

ae ~ Petitioner,
- “08.

MELVIN LAIRD, eee of Defense, et al.,
r Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR =

- THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

ai

t

Grorce C. PontTIKEs
11 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
. Attorney for Petitioner

. . ‘~
The Scheffer Press, Inc—ANdover 3-6850

4)

INDEX ©

Crews v. Clones, 432 F. od 1259 (CA; 7s 1970) ..
Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (1969)...
‘Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 i

S Zemes ssc seas cdaeaicaaabecete ol,

, ee i . PAGE
Citation to the Opinion Below ..j.ssssieussmeemenee wae
TIE soiceveerctattsonansrenscissskindapecmuccionizisoomcanes PORE eee 2
Questions Presented ...... PURER Si cts nd AON oo scdte -
‘Constitutional Provision I Involved. . opsteeenmnsnsioenatg Bets 2
Statutes Involved iahencmuivenheidaiiiaud ee remy a
‘Avng Regulations Involved Gata | 3.
‘ Statement DE NG. COO ennisccscosnisicesscnardyreepiciiianerasctasinatens i> if
‘Reasons for Granting the Writ . siniesieciales Sed. signs sauna biein ' i 6 |
OI Sc : sleatlaas sadanscsie 14 -
Appendices : | : ee
-1—Opinion of i U. S. Court of Appeals . hence ae
ed udgment of ‘the U. s. Court of Appeals ... ania lla
3—Army Regulations Involved : smn 12a
. Last Or Avrionimys Crrep |
Cases: = * : Ma re
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U:S. 516, at 524 (1960). 10
Braxton v: Board of Public Instruction of DuVal-’
County, Fla., 303 F. Supp. 958 (1969) wn. 6 |
Breen v. Kahl, 491 F. 2d 1034 (7th Cir., 1969) 784
Burns y. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1958) ....... gl ’ :

il .
= | ; _. > PAGE
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U. “ 111, 89 S. Ct. . |

af ea REN 6

Leslie Tobin Importl, Ine. v. Rizzo, 305 F. Supp.

pr od 1135 (1969) PPITTTTITITITITTITiTITTiTi itr Ee crccccccese

Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. %, 68 Sup.’ Ct. 397
OE a ee 19
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) .......0... 9
Perkins v. State of North Garolina, 234 F. Supp. )
333 (1964) cesscceun iG GRE ere 12

Roberts v: Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835 (1968) :. i
Street v. New York, 394 US. 576, 89 S. Ct. |

SA OG nic neice Tene bear ioral =

Stromberg v. Califo alifornia, $1 ‘ae Ct. 532, 983 US.
359 (1931) iG pals aliccintdeiaednidadaehatiameaiaie scsinek 6. °

Tinker v. Bee Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969) .. 6

Sraruves:

ee ae
28 U.S.C., 1254 (1) . DRA NEL EDEMA MoS 3

- Army REGULATIONS: ames )
-. Army Regulation 600- pa aaa 2, 3, 8, 9, 10; 11, 13.
Army Regulation 135-91-5d(2) ............0. 62, 3, 8, 9; 10, 13

Usrrep Srates ConstItuTION :
Amendment I to the United States Coastituiion ..

‘denies V to the United States Constitution .. 2 °
Amendment IX to the: United, States Constitution

“In THE |
. _ SUPREME COURT OF THE: UNITED ‘STATES
' OOTOBER ee 1970

‘No.

PVT. ‘2 DONALD JACK ee N@26382581,

Petitioner,
vs.
_ MELVIN LAIRD, Secretary of Defense, et al., —
| Respondents.

?

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
“THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
| THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT |

—_— &

Petitioner, Pvt: E2 Donald Jack Anderson, prays that
a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
entered on January 14, 1971, in the above’ entitled cause. —

CITATION TO THE OPINION BELOW.

The opinion of the United’ States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit, printed in “Appendix attached hereto,
infra, pages la- 10a, is reported at aa FF 2d a

st - an

\ oo ;

=

JURISDICTION.

The opinion and. judgment of thé Court: of Appeals
were filed and entered‘on January 14, 1971. On April 20,
1971, an Order was entered extending time to file the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to and including May #4,
1971. On May 18, 1971, another Order was entered ex-
tending time to file the Petition for ‘Writ of Certiorari
to and including May 29, 1971. This Petition for Writ of
Certiorari will be timely filed on or before May 29, 1971.

The Jurisdiction of this, court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Has Petitioner been denied his Constitutional rights
to freedom of expression or personal liberty guaranteed
by the First and Ninth haphatinents | to the United States
Constitution?

2. Are Army Regulations 135-91-5d(2) and 600-20 so
vague and uncertain so as to violate due process?

CONSTITIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED.
Amendment I to the United States Constitution pro-
’ vides in pertinent part: |
“Congress shall make-no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press... .”

Amendshent V. to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in pertinent part:. .

~ y

- “No person shall . - bexdeptived of life, liberty or
- property, without due process of law; .. .”
ps ‘ ;

—3— aot
eee IX to the United States Constitution pro-
| vides. ig pertinent part:

“The entmeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny \ or r disparage
others retained by the people.”

STATUTES INV OLVED.

10. U.S.C., Section. 673a(2) (1) provides in material
part as follows: ~ :

«~

_

“Ready Reserve: members not assigned é, or
participating satisfactorily in, unfts

“(a) Notwithstanding any. other provision of law,
the President may order to active duty any member
of the Ready Reserve of an armed force who—

“ (1) is not.assigned to, or a og satis-
factorily. in, a unit of the Ready Reserve. .

ARMY REGULATION s INVOLVED.

Army Regulation 135-91-5(d)(2); Army Regulation 600- -

20, paragraph 31a(2) -( April 1968) ; Army Regulation 600-

20, paragraph 3la(2) (as amended” November 28, 1969) ;

Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 31a(2) (as amended

May 28, 1970); the pertinent texts of whieh are hereafter
set forth in n the Appendix hereto; page 12a.

STATEMENT oF. THE CASE.

On July 10, -1970, a verified complaint in this’ matter
was filed in the Federal District Court for the Northern -
District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The complaint
sought an Order jn the nature of mandamus directing the
- Respondents, Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, Stanley ©
- Resor, Secretary of the Army, and V. P. Mock, Command-
ing General of Fifth U.S. Army, from ordering the peti-

— involuntarily into active duty i in - United States

| }

% |

aio.”
Army; such injunction to remain in effect until petitioner’s
order to involuntary active duty was rescinded: and he
was reinstated as.a member in: good standing of the Illi-
nois Army National Guard. Further, the complaint sought —
_‘a temporary. restraining order or preliminary injunction ,
enjoining the afotesaid Respondents, Laird, Resor and
Mock, from ordering the petitioner into involuntary active
duty in the. Armed: Forces until the issues in the case
were determined. (A. 2a)!

On July .10;-1970, petitioner moved for a preliminary.
injunction before the District Court below seeking the
aforesaid injunction until the issues in the cause were
determined. Tle District Court below heard the argument
of both counsel and at the conclusion, the Court denied
. the motion for a preliminary injunction. Petitioner there-
upon made a motion for.a stay of the order for involun-
tary active service pending. the appeal of the denial of
the motion for a preliminary injunction and that motion
- was denied. (A. 2a).

Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion for a pre-
liminary injunction. On July 13,1970, the United: States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh-Cireuit stayed the
‘involuntary order into active duty in the’ United States
- Army during the pendency of: the appeal. On January
14, 1971, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the
motion for a preliminary injunction. (A. Lla). |

The pertinent facts-are recited in the complaint. > At
the time of the filing of the complaint, petitioner had been
a member of the Illinois Army National Guard for four
years; he had never missed a training assembly; he had’
never sg the annual field training; he had otherwise

16a” fers 13 the Appendix to this Petition.

ae. en ; A

obeyed all rules and regulations and | assumed all obliga- :
‘tions incident to his position in the Illinois Army National
Guard, (A. 3a).

SLES ERNE RRC rT Aaccpotga “ae?
cua 4

Petitioner attended training assemblies on February 14,
“Seg February 15 and March 14; 1970, wearing -his hair in a
style currently: fashionable. Captain Donald Beedle, Com-
mander of Ist Battalion, 202 D Artillery, the unit of the
Illinois Army National Guard of which Petitioner was a
member, was dissatisfied with petitioner’s appearance and;
as a.result, petitioner was declared an- unsatisfactory
participant in more than five training assemblies for a
period of one‘year, and thus he ¢ame immediately liable
~ for. involuntary active duty, in the United States Army.
(A. 3a). |

On March 30, 1970, petitioner was told’ that he would

be ordered for inWluntary active duty into the United

-. ~ States Army because of his unsatisfactory participation
in six training assemblies in one year’s time. Petitioner
appealed through the administrative channels available to
him, on the grounds that -others in his unit had hair as
long as or longer than petitioner’s. Petitioner argued that

. because he was punished and these others were not, he
was the victim of unfair and arbitrary treatment, and’
that his constitutional rights had been violated. Petition-
er’s appeal, however, was denied and his administrative

remedies thus exhausted. (A. 4a).

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.
(1)

This Court-is being asked to. determine an important
a of Constitutional law which it has yet to deter-
min

when it regulates the length of hair of a member of the
Army National Guard without substantial justification for
that regulation? , ; ;

‘This Court has expanded the concepts of ,the First
Amendment to include conduct in the penumbras of .free
speech and association. Freedom of expression as dis-
played in different types of conduct have been given con-
stitutional protection. As far back as 1931 the use of
symbols was protected in Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931), and this was based on the idea that com-
munication’ can be by word or symbol: Other examples of
conduct-which have enjoyed constitutional protection are:
The wearing of beards, Braxton v. Board of Public In-
“struction of Duval County, Fla., 303 F. Supp. 958 (1969) ;
the wearing of buttons, Leslie Tobin Imports, Inc. v.
Rizzo, 305 F. Supp. 1135 (1969) ; marching on Mayor’s
house, Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 US. 111 (1969) ;
contempt of the American flag, Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969) ; the wearing of arm bands, Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent ——— Sthoal Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969). |

This Court has also recognized that the Ninth Amend-
ment and the penumbras of the rights guaranteed by the
ther Amendments create a zone of privacy wherein a
person has the freedom to act, which the Government can
- eurtail only upon‘the showing of a substantial justification
for the interference. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US.

: namely: Does the Armed Forces ‘violate the First:
— “and | Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution

479 (1965). The attempt to regulate the length of peti-

-tioner’s hair is within the same zone of privacy as the
use of contraceptive devices by a married couple.

The force of this concept was brought out ae the
Seventh Cireuit Court of Appeals by Judge Kerner, speak-
ing for the majority in Breén v. Kahl, 419 F. 2d 1034
o 7, 1969), where he stated:

“The: right’ to wear one’s hair at any length or in
any desired manner is an ingredient of personal free-
dom. protected by the United. States Constitution.”
419 F. 2d at 1036. See also, Crews v. Clones, 432

’ F, 2d 1259 (C.A. 7, 1970). |

The facts in the Breen case dealt with the government’s
' right to regulate the length of hair of young men in
school. The facts in this case deal with the \government’s
right to regulate the length of hair of young men in the
Illinois Army National Guard.. The common principle in
both situations is that the government is dealing with
“young men in’ a custodial situation. How much the gov-
ernment can infringe on the personal freedom of these
youngemen depends on the’ amount of justification the)
goverhment has for taking away that freedom.

Whether it is to-be a right of the First Amendment
or a right of the Ninth Amendment, the wearing’ of ‘hair
‘in any style is a personal freedom which has Constitutional
protection. If the petitioner chooses to express. himself
with his hair style, he is protected by the First Amend-
ment. If .the petitioner deems his hair style a private
matter, he is protected by the Ninth Amendment. In
either case, if. the government is going to infringe on
' petitioner’s right, it must have a substantial justification

to do so..

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Nowhere has the government: made any attempt to
justify its position that Army. Regulation 135-91-5d(2)
and 600-20 are valid infringements on petitioner’s Consti-
tutional freedom to wear his hair as he pleases. Petitioner
is not aware of any such justification. Unless and until
the government can demonstrate its justification for in-
fringing on petitioner’ s personal freedom, it must refrain:
from SO doing. 3

A cursory review of the military history of Of ‘a Ties :
States reveals that the Armed Forces have re been ably led

by men with long flowing hair. Apparently, the Armies

engaged in the Civil War and in the frontier wars there-
after did not find it necessary to require that the soldiers -
have short hair. In light of that history, it is difficult to

understand’ what justification, if any, the present Armed

Forces has to require petitioner to have short hair.

The Court of Appeals below did not follow its own deci-
sions in Breen and Crews, because it felt that the mili-

tary was exempt from the constitutional requirement that ~

_ there be a substantial justification for the interference

with the personal freedom of the Petitioner..(A. 5a). It
assumed that the military was exempt without giving any

‘ reasons for such exemption. Petitioner sees no réason for

a distinction between the military and the civil govern-
ment in this regard. Certainly, the Armed Forces could
not require that every man in the military must have’
green hair and then argue that such a requirement could |
not be attacked on constitutional grounds, because the

«- Armed Forces did not have to demonstrate: a substantial .

justification for such a requirement.

The Coutt of Appeals also appears-to argue that this

. regulation of hair -length’ must be upheld as a matter of
enforcing the right of the Armed Forces to set standards |

ge

of discipline. (A. da). This argifinent assumes the validity
of the requirement in question. There is no doubt: that
the Armed Forces can compel adherence’ to regulations
which are valid apart from the necessity to adhere to
them. However, such argument does not establish the
validity of the regulation. An Zunconstitutional require-
_ ment is not made ‘constitutional by arguing that military
discipline requires that it be followed. Such a position

~ is analogous to the argument that an unconstitutional law

is made constitutional by the necessity of having Fenpent
for law and order. .

The reliance of the Court of Appeals on the decisions
in other circuits is not persuasive, because an examination
of these.cases reveals that-they did not deal with the ques-
tion of whether or not Army Regulations 135-91-5d(2) -
and 600-20 violate the First and Ninth Amendments. (A.
6a). Further, fhe reliance of the Court of Appeals on
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) and Orloff v. Wil-
loughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) is not persuasive. In Burns,
this Court refused.to interfere with decisions in the Mili-
tary Courts, where an examination of the proceedings in
those courts demonstrated that persons convicted by those
proceedings were dealt with fairly. In Orloff, this Court
‘declined to interfere with a duty assignment given to a
doctor in the military. Neither of these cases involved a
challenge to the constitutionality ‘of military regulations
interfering with personal freedom.

On this question; -Petitioner. urges that this Court
rather follow (the pare dissent of District Court Judge —
Reynolds: .
| “The miasovity assumes the ae necessity

of the requirements at issue merely because the appel-
lant has ‘voluntarily’ er himself with the mili-

oak

Se tary. Whether it is correct to Ssilihe the appellant’s

- joining the national guard as ‘voluntary’ aside, the
majority appears to me to absolve the military of
any burden of justification with regard to the abro-
gation of appellant’s constitutional rights. The mili-

tary has such a burden.” ? Yo

- ‘The military has not’ met that burden in this cause.

Petitioner requests that this Court follow the position
-enunciated in Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, at 524
(1960) :

“Where there is a. significant encroachment upon
personal liberty, the: State may prevail only upon
showing a. renee interest which is compel-
ling.”

Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully. submits that this

Court should issue its Writ of Certiorari in order that
it may decide this important question of Constitutional
ge a , Panny

~ (2)

_ The conduct required of a member of the Army Na- |

tional Guard, in regard to his hair style, is set out in

Army Regulations 135-91-5d(2) and 600-:20. 135-91-5d ~

(2) states that a Guardsman must present a neat and
soldierly appearance; this is defined in the regulation
as an appearance satisfactory to his commanding officer.
. 600-20, as in effect. when Petitioner was subject to its
terms, defined the standard of neat and soldierly. How:
‘ever, 600-20 goes further and states that the hair will
be well groomed, cut short or medium length, and neatly

trimmed at all times. Once again, what this means is

left to the discretion of the commanding officer. (A.
12a). There is no reference as to which of these regu-

”

a eo

;

lations pene a other one and theithar of ‘these regu-.

lations defines neat and soldierly.

The: vagueness and uncertainty of 600-20 is demon-
strated by its successive modifications. In 7 “of 1968,
600- 20(2) read:

“The hair. will be well. groomed, cut short. or
meditm length and neatly trigimed at all times, »

On November 28, 1969, the wording was:

“The hair td include sideburns "will he well
groomed, cut short or medium. length and neatly
trimmed at all times.”

* This was the language in effect when Petitioner’ S ap-

pearance was ‘found unsatisfactory. 7 ca
-. On May 28, 1970, 600-20(2) read: |

“Hair cuts, without reference to ‘style, will con- |

'. form to the following standards. The- hair: on the

top of the head will be neatly trimmed but will not

-be cut to less than one inch unless the individual
_ specifically requests that it be cut shorter. The

(maximum). length will not exceed three inches. In.

all cases the bulk of -length of the. hair will not
interfere with the normal wear of all standard mili-

tary headgear required in the performance of duty..

The sides and back will be-trimmed and evenly tap-

.ered. The sides and back of the head will .not be..

shaven or excessively clipped, unless specifically. re-

quested by the individual. The tapering of the hair |

will start from a clear line established by shaving
the base of the side burn, gbove’ and~dround the
ears and the. back of the neck.”
Again, interpretation is left to the discretion of the
commanding officers.

* af

S

The problem is that the only standard presented, neat
and soldierly is vague, as evidenced by the fact. that. the
‘commanding officer of each unit is left to define what
neat and soldierly means. The result of allowing indi-
vidual commanders to set the standards for. “neat and
soldierly” is that there is a vast number of different in-
terpretations of neat and. soldierly.

-» fo insure that. the standard of “neat and soldierly” is i
‘met, 10 U.S.C., See. 673a(a)(1) provides for involun-
tary activation into this United States Army for any —
Guardsman who fails to live up to the standard of “neat
and soldierly”. This procedure is used as a penalty by
the government to force Guardsman ‘to conform to Army
Regulations. ?

The ‘Supreme. Court of the United States has con-
--gistently held that it is’ a violation of due process for a
person to be convicted and deprived of his liberty pur-
suant to a statute that is vague and uncertain. In Musser
v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) the United States Supreme
Court reversed a criminal conviction for ime against
the “public morals” on the grounds thst publc morals
are vague. Lower Federal Courts have “foJlowed this
position. A state statute made it an offense to “operate
a nudist.colony” and the conviction, based on that stat-
‘ute, was reversed; in Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp.
- 834 (1966) the Court held that “such statutes must be
framed so that those to whom they apply may know what
standard is to be required.” A conviction for.a “crime
against nature” was reversed in Perkins v. State of
North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (1964), the Court hold- ~
ing that the law must be clear sq that a man cannot be ,
convicted for a vague statute. In reversing a conviction
under a “state vagrancy statute” in Goldman v. Knecht,
295 F. Supp. 897 (1960) the Court laid down the prin-

e ; :
o* © .

*{—13—

ie

ciple that precision sufficient to give notice of .the pro- -
scribed conduct must be presented, so that a man should

not have to guess at the meaning of the statute.

The principle involved in the above cases is that due

' process will not allow a man to be deprived of: his liberty
for violating a vague and unclear criminal statute. This
same principle applies to all other vague regulations,
ordinances,.or administrative rulings which would deny

a man his liberty.

The definition of neat ma soldierly is left to the —

vidual commanding officers; what it will mean to one is -

. hot necessarily what iti will mean to another: The same
is true of the other’ standards in Regulation 600-20,

e.g., neatly trimmed, short ar medium length, both of .

which are -vague and uncertain.

The same Fiect would be achieved ay aitvwins indi-
vidual peace officers to’ determine what “criminal con-

o

duct” is...Due process of law demands that where a man’s |

liberty. ‘is at stake, the standards of conduct. must be

clear, definite and certain. Army Regulation 135-91-5d
(2) and Army Regulation 600-20 are not. clear, definite
or certain. Due process will not allow the Army to take
away a man’s liberty for failing to ae up to these un-
? clear regulations.

The Court of Appeals below took the pietsion that the ©

definition of neat and soldierly was within the discretion
of the military and, therefore, beyond review by the
civil courts. Further, it stated that Petitioner was per-
sonally informed by his commanding officer that his ap-

pearance was in violation so that he cannot now assert -

- that he was unaware of what conduct rendered lim sub-
ject. to discipline. (A. 7a). @ertainly the observation

_that setting these standards is within the discretion of

— =s

the ‘military ro - render the regulations any more
specific. Also, the fact that Petitioner’ Ss commander in-
formed him that his appearance was in violation in no
way cured the vagueness of! the regulation in question.

. Court should issue its Writ f Certiorari_ in order. that
it may decide this important! question of Constitutional
law." 3

_ Accordingly, Petitioner ip Crt submits that this

- CONCLUSION. .

‘For the reasons severally and collectvely assigned here
. it is respectfully prayed that this Court issue its Writ of
' Certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Ap-:
peals. for. the Seventh Circuit..

Respectfully submitted,

Géorck C. Pontrkss

il South LaSalle weed

" Suite 3200 |
Chicago, Illinois 60603 "4%

“a

. a fger - ?
tf APPENDIX 1

-Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals. .

In'THE . | ie

UNITED STATES: COURT OF /APPEALS —

‘ - For THE SEVENTH™®IRCUIT

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1970 _ SEPTEMBER Session, 1970 -

,

No. 18591 74

Pvr. E2 Donan Jack ANDERSON Appeal from the
_NG26382581, |. United States Dis-

_ Plaintifl Appellant, trict Court for the
Northern . District

; _ of Hlinois, ‘Eastern’
MELVIN" eer et al., 4
os ae ent 2 |

a

Division.

January 14, 1971

_ Before esnees, Senior Circuit Judge, Pe, Circut
Judge and ReyNo.ps, District —

PELL, Circuit Judge. This is one of. an ‘apparently
growing class of cases involving the-claim of interference
with constitutional rights, usually multiple, arising. out
» of an authoritive discouragement or outright prohibition
of the manner and style in which one would adorn him-
self whether- by raiment or natural exfoliation.

‘Judge John W. Reynolds i is sitting by designation
- from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin.

>

y

a,” poe

In the present case the plajntiff, Donald Jack Ander-
son, is appealing from dn order of the United States Dis-

trict Court forthe Northern District of Illinois which; ©

denied ‘his motion for a preliminary injunction which
would . have enjoined Anderson’s induction into the

United States Army pending the determination of. the ©

issues raised in his complaint.

Prior to the events giving rise to his complaint, hades:
son was a member of the Illinois Army National Guard.
As such, he was a member of the Ready Reserve of the
‘United States Army. 10 U.S.C. § 269(b).2 The issues

presented by his complaint deal generally with his right |

to wear his hair “in a style currently fashionable” * with-
out. interference or adverse action against him; by his
superiors in the Guard.

Section 673a(a)(1) of Title 10, United . States ode,
authorizes the. President to order to active duty any
member of the Ready Reserve who is “not *.* * par-

_ ticipating satisfactorily” in his reserve duties.“ Such
authority has - been asi by _the President to the:

# Section 269(b), Title 10 USE. pesivien:
. *(b) The units. and members of the Army Na-
~ tional Guard of the United States and of the Air
National -Guard of the Unifed States are in the
Ready Reserve of the Army and the Ready Reserve
of the Air Force, respectively.”

* The complaint is no more explicit than the refererice
to “a style currently fashionable” and there was.no evi-
dentiary hearing on the motion for preliminary injunc-
tion but merely an argument on the law. We feel, how-
ever, we may: safely assume ‘the currently: fashionable
reference was to a luxuriant growth of hair. ‘

“*“& 673a. Ready. Reserve: members not assigned to, or
participating satisfactorily in, units

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
President may order.to active duty any member of the
Ready Reserve of an armed force’ who—

(1) is. not assigned to,. or’ ‘participating satisfac-
torily in, a unit of the Ready Reserve * * *.”

CO OS RS ANE RET ELE LILA LTE IBOLT LEE LDL ILE ES PLEA RE

, .

a < minim

ate:

defendant Secretary of Defense and by him to the defen-
dant Secretary of the Army. . Exee: Order No. 11366,
3 C.F.R. 312 (Supp. 1967), 10 U.S.C. § 678a.

“Satisfactory participation” is defined in Army Regula-
tion 135-91, dealing specifically with reserve components,
and Army.Regulation 600-20, dealing with g!l components.
Paragraph 5(d)(2) of AR 135-91 defines satisfactory
participation to include “attendance at all scheduled unit

training assemblies * * * unless excused.” No credit for:

attendance is given a member physically present “unless

he is in the prescribed uniform, presents a neat and-

soldierly appearance, and performs his assigned dutieg in
a satisfactory manner, as determined by the unit com-
mander.” “Neat and soldierly appeearance” is further de-
fined by AR 600-20 931(a), as it read when plaintiff was
charged with NRE paiaen:

_ -: “The hair to include sideburns will be well groomed,
cut short or medium length and neatly trimmed at all
times.” |

Anderson’s complaint alleges that for four years prior
to February, 1970, he had attended all meetings, obeyed

all rules and assumed all obligations of his position as a _
~ member of the Illinois Army National Guard. On three

separate. occasions during February and March 1970, he
attended training assemblied. while wearing his hair “in a
style.currently fashionable.” His unit commander informed

-him, apparently on each occasion, that his hairstyle vio-
‘lated the regulation. He was declared an unsatisfactory ,

participant.. Such declaration caused him to have more

than five unsatisfactory attendances in one year® and thus ©
made him liable to be ordéred to active duty in the Regular

Army pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §673a, supra.

* The actual count of unsatisfactory attendances was ap-
parently six. We have no explanation of the nature of the
three unsatisfactory attendances other than those attribu-
table to the haireut but. we assume they had no relation to
that particular factor. 7 ;

¢

itn a ot Ci Ea gen id on

ae a

On March 30, 1970, plaintiff was informed by the defen-
‘dant Adjutant General of the Illinois Army National
Guard that he would be ordered fo active duty and that he
could file an appeal. . Plaintiff did appeal, claiming that
others in his unit had hairstyles similar to his but were not »
reprimanded in any way. His appeal was denied on July
1, 1970, and Anderson was ordered to active duty com-
mencing July 11, 1970.

* This action was filed on July 10, 1970. It seeks orders
in the nature of mandamus directing the defendant officers
of the Illinois Army National Guard to reinstate plaintiff
in the Guard and enjoining the other defendants from or-
dering Anderson to active duty in the Regular Army.

The district court denied the request for a preliminary ©
injunction on July 10. It is from this denial alone that
Anderson now appeals.

The scope of our.review of the denial of a temporary
injunction is limited. “[1]t is well established that the issu-
ance of a temporary injunction rests in the sound discretion
of the trial court. On appeal,.an order granting or denying
such an injunction will not be disturbed unless there is a
clear showing of an abuse of the discretion so exercised.”
Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F. 2d 222, 229
(7th Cir. 1961). Diseretion is abused only where no rea-
sonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court.
Particle Data Labaratories, Inc. v. Coulter Electronics,
Inc., 420 F. 2d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1969).

Among the several factors to be ‘weighed by a district
court in granting or denying a preliminary injunction is
the probability that plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the
merits. Tele-Controls, Inc. v. Ford Industries, Inc., 388 F.
2d 48, 50 (7th Cir. 1967).

On the basis of applicable law and the facts as they ap-
pear before us, we are not persuaded that there is any
reasonable probability of plaintiff’s ultimate suecess in his
litigation. :

—5a—

Anderson challenges the action taken against him by the
Army and the National Guard on three grounds: He first
asserts that he has a right under the’ First and Ninth

¢ Amendments to wear his hair as he wishes and that such’

right may not be infringed by the government absent “‘sub-
stantial justification.” See Breen v. Kahl, 419 F. 2d 1036
(7th Cir. 1969). If Anderson were completely in civilian
. status, his position would have legally persuasive stature.

‘ However, “the rights of men in the armed forces must
perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands
_ of discipline and duty.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140
(1953). It cannot be seriously disputed that certain consti-
tutional rights are and must be suspended or “curtailed in
the name of military discipline. Raderman v. Kaine, 411
F. 2d 1102, 1104 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 976.

-And, in matters properly within the area of military
discretion, it is not for civil courts to judge whether the
military has properly determined the balance between mili-
tary needs and personal rights. See Burns, supra, 346 U.S.
at 140.

In Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U:S. 83, 93-94 (1953), the
Court dealt with military duty assignments and said:

“We know that from top to bottom of the Army the
complaint is often made, and sometimes with justifica-
‘tion, that there is discrimination, favoritism or other

objectionable handling of men. But judges are not’

given the task of running the Army. The responsibility
for setting up channels through which such grievancés
can be considered and fairly séttled rests upon the
Congress and upon the President of the United States
and his subordinates. The military constitutes a spe-
cialized community governed by a separate discipline
from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires
that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere

with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be

scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.”

(SPAS MR Ramee mare eh pantera

ay ae :

Anderson does not raise on this appeal, and, as far as
we can tell, did not raise at the hearing below, the possible |
question of whether any different treatment should be ac-
corded the reservist or Guard soldier inasmuch) as a sub-
stantial portion of his time is spent in civilian pursuits
rather than military. While we perhaps therefore are not”
compelled to consider this matter, it is our opinion that .
no different treatment should be accorded the part-time
soldier. He. has undertaken a type of military duty on a
voluntary basis and cannot be heard ‘to complain if the
legitimate requirements of necessity do curtail to some —
extent the matmer of his appearance in civilian life.

. The Army apparently remains singularly unimpressed

by the strength Samson found in flowing locks, While . °

presumably still concerned with physical ‘capabilities on
the part of soldiers, the Army also has expressed regula-
tory interest in the appearance of its personnel. While
a neat and tidy appearance hy standards somewhat more _
conservative than those adopted by the Beatles may avail
little.in jungle guerrilla warfare, we are not prepared to
say that the Army’s concern for appearance generally is
not one of legitimacy and subject to Army determination.

‘ Thus we can find no justification warranting our inter-
ference with the discretionary decision of the milifary to ;
‘impose certain standards of appearance to govern its mem-
bers. te that other courts have recently reached a
like conclusion in cases substantially similar to the instant
one. Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F. 2d 908 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. den. 39 L.W. 3242 (12/7/70), Byrne v. Resor, 412 F. 2d ©
774, 775 (3d Cir. 1969), Raderman.v. Kaine, supra, 411 F.
2d at 1105, and Smith v. Resor, 406 F. 2d 141 aaa (2d Cir.
1969) and cases cited therein.

In addition to his First and Ninth Amendments argu-
- ment, Anderson asserts that AR 135-91 and AR 600-20 are .-
so vague, and uncertain as to amount to a denial of due
process of law. He finds particularly offensive the use of
‘the standard “neat and soldierly” and the delegation of
the ultimate definition of the standard to-individual unit

— 7a — i

commanders. Anderson asserts that such a standard lacks |
sufficient precision to inform those subject to it of what
conduct on their part will violate it.

By-this standard the military has sought! to grant unit
oT discretion in dealing with the appearamee of:

the men under their command. This, as we have already
indicated, is the sort of discretion that is beyond the re-
_view of civil courts. :

Furthermore, the record discloses that the unit com-
mander exercised this discretion and set the definition of
“neat and soldierly” by personally infgrming plaintiff that
his appearance did not conform to the standard. Anderson
‘cannot-now asseft that_he was unaware of the particular |
conduct that’rendered him subject to discipline. He never-
theless persisted in such conduct until he had accumulated
enough unsatisfactory marks to make him liable for. activa-
tion into the Regular, Army.

’ Finally, “Anderson asserts that his right to equal protec-
tion implicit in the Fifth Amendment, Bolling. v. Sharpe,
. 347 U.S. 497 (1954), has been violated. He asserts that
other men in his unit had a hairstyle similar to. his and
were not reprimanded in any way. We need not reach the-
question of whether this would constitute a legally suffi-
cient ground for relief. It appears from the record that
Anderson. has prosecuted a military appeal on. this same
‘ ground and failed. From this, the district court could
properly conélude that there is no more than a slight proba-
bility of plaintiff’s being able to prove facts to sustain the
~ unsupported allegation of his complaint.

We find the probability of plaintiff’s ultimate success on
the merits so minimal we are unable to say that the district
court has clearly abused its discretion in denying 4 prelimi-
nary. injunction pending trial. We therefore affirm.

“Avrinaen. *

a ee
Reyno ps, J., com rring in part, dissenting in part. .

IT concur in the resvlt because this case involved the ap-
peal from a denial of temporary injunction. There is a
virtually unanimous body of judicial opinions refusing to
intervene in the punitive activation of “civilian-soldiers”
for having long hair. See cases at page 6 herein. Hence,
although the equities appear to ‘be heavily. in appellant’s
favor and it isa convincing case of immediate, irreparable
harm, nonetheless, i in light of the case law, the trial judge
was justified in concluding that the appellant’s chances of
ultimate success on. the merits were slim indeed.

In spite of the fact that the majority opinion, holding,
in effect, that a civilian-soldier may be ordered into active
duty because he has long hair, is backed by considerable
legal authority, I must,.nevertheless, most respectfully take
exception with that portion of the opinion which deals with
appellant’s First and Ninth Amendment rights.

The right to wear one’s hair in any style one desires is
“an ingredient of personal freedom protected by the United

. States Constitution,” Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036

(7th Cir. 1969), and “[t]o limit or curtail this or any other
fundamental right, the state has a ‘substantial burden of

- justification.’ ” Breen v. Kahl, supra, at 1036.. The state
' should be held to this burden of justification even where

the military is involved. In a recent selective service case;

' the Supreme Court stated:

“* * * 9 government regulation i is saffciontiy justi- -
fied if it is within the constitutional power of the Gov-
‘ernment; if it furthers an important. or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
af the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. * * *” United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (4968). (Emphasis: sup-
plied.) -

€

~~.
s

a ¢

~

ss,

Under the Ninth Amendment, the Government, including
- the military, has no right to unnecessarily interfe ere with
the private lives of citizens, whether they be in the military
or not. ¢.-

‘The majority opinion herein alide that the appellant's
~——— assertion of his constitutional rights and his right to enjoy
them absent substantial justification would be persuasive
_ only if he were “completely|in civilian status.” One does
not lose the right to constitutionally -protected freedoms
absent substantial justification even in the. military. A
soldier may lose certain liberties, otherwise constitutionally
protected, when serving in the military. Raderman v.
Kame, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S.
976. The loss of these rights while in military service is
presumably attended in each instance by.“substantial justi-
fications” inherent in the nature of military duty.

After noting that appellant apparently failed to raise,
either below or on this appeal, the issue of whether differ-
ing treatment should be accorded a reservist, as opposed
to an active duty soldier, the majority opinion states cate-
gorically that “no differing treatment should be accorded
the part-time soldier” because the appellant has undertaken
this form of military duty “v ofintarily” and “cannot: be
heard to complain if the legiti ate-requirements of neces-
sity do curtail to some extent the manner of his appearance

" in civilian life.” I must respectfull disagree. The majority
assumes the legitimacy and necessity of the requirements
‘at issue merely because the appellant: has “voluntarily”

Ssociated himself with the military. Whether it is correct -
o typify the- appellant’s joining the national guard as

. voluntary” aside, the majority appears to me to absolve

' the military of any burden of justification with regard to the

_ abrogation of appellant’s constitutional .rights. The mili-

- tary has such a burden. Furthermore, the civilian-soldier
status should taken into account because the constitu-
tional rights t circumstances may require an active duty
soldier to give up to complete his mission efficiently and
successfully may not be necessary for a etvilian soldier to

i LS sD AT TAT SA REELS AAO WMS BOD WA! Oe:

— 10a —

"give up to complete his mission efficiently. and successfully.
I can think of many real examples but will cite just one.
In Wisconsin, we have members of the national guard who
are leaders in both of our political parties and take.a very
active role in politics. If they were on active duty, this
would not be permitted by the military. I think it could be
argued that while on active duty, they forego their consti-
tutional rights in that area. Bit no one would seriously
argue that as civilian-soldiers in the national guard they
have to give up such rights.

A civilian-soldier is neither a PE. nor a soldier. He
stands somewhere in between. Accordingly, it is not axio-
matic that because a soldier on active duty surrenders cer-
tain liberties, a-civilian-soldier in the national guard also
surrenders the same liberties to the same degree merely
because both are somehow connected with the military. I
‘ am concerned that the majority opinion appears to hold

ne

that because the appellant is not “completely civilian” he —

is, therefore, to be treated as though he were completely
military and that nothing more need be shown to justify
an’ interference with his private life by a Teserve com-
mander. .

The military has not met its burden’ to justify its inter-
ference with the private life of this particular type: of
“soldier.” I do not say that they could not ever meet the
burden. However, I am presently unconvinced that short

ee

\

hair in the national guard is sufficiently important to the .

orderly administration of our atmed forces to warrartt the

punitive activation of a guardsman who asserts the right -

@

to determine the length of his own hair.

won El cn

APPENDIX 2

Porn

|

|

) } UNITED STATES COURT OF ‘APPEALS
ee _ FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 18591 Sepremper Term, 1970 —_
Pvt. E2 Donald Jack Anderson —
NG 26382581, .
; Plaintiff-Appellant,
V8. ae ;

Melvin Laird, et al, :
Defendants- Appellees.

J UDGMENT ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered and
adjudged that the order of the said District Court in this |
cause appealed from be, and the same is hereby, :affirmed
ith costs, in accordance with the: elaine of this Court.

J anuary 14, 197 1.

y-
Attest: Kenneth Carrick, :
erk, U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit

a ee

_ APPENDIX 3

~

es

ARMY REGULATIONS.

Army Regulation 135-91- 5( d) (2) recites in pertinent avis
as follows:

~ “4. Satisfactory participation is halasa as follows: :

(2) Attendance at all eda unit training assem- ~

& blies as a member of ‘a paid drill unit of the Army. Na-
tional Guard or Army Réserve, unless excused by

proper authority as provided herein. A member pres-

ent at a scheduled unit training assembly will not re-

ceive credit for attendance thereat unless he is in the
prescribed uniform, presents a neat and soldierly ap-
pearance, and performs his assigned duties in a satis-

t

fas Ariay Regulation 600: 20, aa Fe 31a(2), as caieind
April 1968, recites in pertinent part as follows:

“(2) .The hair will be well groomed, cut. short or .
medium length and neatly trimmed at all times. The
face will be clean shaven, with the exception that wear-
ing a neatly trimmed mustache i is Oe all

i?)
’ Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 3Ya(2), as idle :
November 28, 1969,- recites in pertinent part as follows:

“ee The hair to include. sideburns will be well
groomed, eut short’ of medium length -and neatly
trimmed at all times. The face will be clean shaven,
with the exception that wearing a neatly trimmed
mustache is permitted.” -

> *

factory manner as determined by the unit commander. :

°
me
.
’

®

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385605_1454%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
