# Appendix — J. P. Stevens & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385605_1255%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 1971 - **Citation:** 404 U.S. 830 ## Text ERP ee penne na es FN Ni i Re arets was : ¥ = ms +f af — a a tod r % C : ny INDEX TO APPENDIX oa 7 Page No \ biiiean | ih The Uniited States Court en, \ | CR Appeala\.. 2. Ur cae rene la i Judgment Of The United States Court. ons mo Of Appeals... See NN e , ne. Decision And Order Of: The’ National Labor : < ‘ Relations | Board Pes TS RW e So mags 35a 3 a % » IN THE “Hnited States Court of Sida FOR THE FIFT H CIRCUIT NO. 28,631. oe = ° J. Pp. STEVENS & C6., INc., Pen esa, Me: “ Petitionér-Cross-Respondent * VS. ives LABOR RELATIONS Boarp, ae and-——— 4 . Respondent-Cross-Petitioner . MrpreD G. BAILEY, ET AL, EMPLOYEES, - and ; TEXTILE Workers UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 2s Intervenor - NO. 20s7 Ne TEXTILE Wonkens Unton_ OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, oa : : . Petitioner NATIONAL Langa Ret arions Boarb, Sisk : A. Petitions 1 Fe or tiple And Cross Application For Enforcement Of An Order Of The National Labor on ee ‘Relations Board (March 22, 1971 ) pais re een a ntervenors. . . @ Respondent ee oa° + = - Before THORNBERRY, GOLDBERG, and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges. : weer Jiustena eh Ages mr - “ € ie XN eee GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge: J. P. Stevens & Com- 4 -. _* pany; Ine}, unchastened by and impervious to judicial | | homilies, once again seeks liberation from a National Labor Relations Board order. Taking the opposite posi- — ! tion, the Textile Workers Union of America; AFL-CIO, a -entreats us to broaden the Board’s order to combat Stevens known predisposition to. violate: the law. Re- _ jecting both of these positions, we enforce the Board’s - order in full. r _ + The Textile Workers Union (hereinafter referred to ; | as the Union Ybegan its organizing campaign at J. P. - 7 Stevens’ Statesboro, Georgia, plant.in January of 1968. The Union made intensive efforts to secure authoriza- ‘tion cards from the employees, efforts which met with . determined resistance on the part of Stevens. On Feb- -_Yuary-17; the Union wrote Stevens. letter in which it claimed that it was the representative of the majority of employees in a production and maintenance unit; demanded recognition by Stevens-as exclusive repre- sentative of the employees in that unit; and stressed that if the Company had any doubts of the majority, the Union would subrmit the authorization cards in | its possession to,a disinterested third party. Stevens ~ - "replied to the Union letter by stating that it had in- hig dications that a majority of ‘its employees did not want union representation; that it did not wish a a a it i nk ek a 4 3a Pr third party to check cards: and that it assumed that the Union would refer the matter to the Labor Board ‘for disposition. : _ Thereafter, on February 21, the Union filed an elec- tion petition with the Board, and: an election was scheduled for April 22 and 23, 1968. Prior to’ that elec- gion, on March 18, and again on April 20, the Union affirmed that its recognitional demand was a continu- .ing one and invited Stevens to forego the election proceedings.’ Stevens’ officials declined these. invita- tions. On April 22 and 23, 1968, the Board ey t Wee an election at the Stevens plant. The Union lost by a vote: of 198 to 110 and filed timely objections. In response the Board’s Regional Director, noting that “it is un- Tiecessary to consider thé. [Union’s] remaining ob- jections,” set the election aside because’ the Company had failed to submit an employee eligibility list as mandated by Excelsior.* The Union then filed unfair, labor cnteies charges before the Board. ' | 1There is some s biatibiidi that the Company disputes the Board’s find- _ ing that the Union renewed its recognitional demand on these- two. dates. The Board’s conclusion, sabia is supported by substan- — tial evidence. “In Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N. L. R.B. "1236 (1966), the Board held that an election may be set aside if a company refuses to provide to a petitioning union an address list of all company em- ployees. The Supreme Court recently upheld the validity of the _ Excelsior rule in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 1969, 394 U.S. 759, 89 S.Ct. 1426, 22 L.Ed.2d 709. 3It is now clear that even though a union jhas requested a Board elec- : tion, it is not precluded from obtaining recognition, following its : election defeat, through: the unfair labor practice procedure. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 1969, 395, U.S. 575,615 n. 34, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547, citing with — Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N. i. R.B. 1277 (1964). @ 4a In its unfair labor practice charges the Union al-: leged ( 1) that Stevens’ anti-union conduct during February and March interfered with, restrained, and coerced company employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act; (2) that Stevens’ dis- charges.of three employees and its refusal to hire an applicant for employment, were in violation of sec- tion 8(a)(3) of the Act;* and (3) that Stevens’ re- fusal to bargain with the Union following the recog- nitional demands was in bad faith and in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the Act." These allegations were < 4Section 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (a) (1), provides: “Ca) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — (1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;” Those section 7 stalin guaranteed by section 8(a) (1) are set forth in 29 U.S.C:A. § 157: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ex- cept to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a con- : dition of employment a& authorized in section 8(a) (3).” 5Section 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (3), provides in relevant part as follows: “(a) Itshall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. . *Section 8(a). (5), 29 U'S.C.A. § 158 (a) (5), provides: “(a) Itshall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — . —€5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the repre- sentatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) 6f this title.” > 5a denied by Sieve and by 117 sepia of Stevens who intervened in the proceedings on behalf of the Company. Following a hearing the Board, largely - adopting the Trial. Examiner's. conclusions, found _ that the Company had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) and ordered the traditional remedies.” More- over, the. Board found that Stevens’ unfair labor practices had made a fair rerun election impossible. ; Relying on. what it found to be a card majority for ‘the Union on March 18, the Board ordered Stevens. to recognize and bargain with the Union. In No. 28,631 Stevens and. the intervening employees ask us to set aside this Board order in all respects, while_ in No. 29,037 the Union asks us to compel. the Board to fashion a more far-reaching remedy. The Board, ‘in both actions, cross petitions for enforcement of its — _order as entered. | - TI. Stevens first claims that ihe record is devoid of sub- stantial evidence in support of the Board’s finding of section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) violations. We ‘The Board ordered Stevens (1) to cease and desist Seeiai: the sca labor practices found; (2) to make each employee or employee applicant whole for any loss of earnings resulting from discrimi- . | natory actions; (3) to offer full and immediate reinstatement to ° the three employees discriminatorily discharged’; (4) to offer em- ployment to the employee applicant whom Stevens discrimina- torily refused to hire; (5) to grant the Union access to bulletin boards for a one-year period; (6) to post appropriate notices, mail a copy to each employee, and have a company official read’ thé notice to the employees. These remedies are quite simiJar to those ordered in an earlier Stevens case, J. P. hsicsbha & Co. v. — 5 : Cir. 1969, 417 F.2d 533. 6a ' . disagree. The record reveals, and the Board found, that Stevens engaged in an extensive campaign of © “classic, albeit crude, unlawful labor practices” to de- feat the-Union.* During the organizational campaign waged ‘by the Union in February and. March there were numerous instances of Company misconduct. violative of section 8(a)(1). Supervisory personnel threatened that a Union victory would result in a re- duction of work, extensive discharges, and even. the closing:of the plant. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, 395 U.S. at 617; Textile Workers Union v. Dar- lington Mfg.-Co., 1965, 380 U.S. 263, 274 n,20, 85. — §. Ct. 994, 13.L.Ed.2d 827; NLRB v. Varo, Inc., 5 Cir. . 1970, 425 F.2d 293; NLRB v. Dowell Div. of Dow _Chemical Co., 5 Cir. 1969, 420 F.2d 480; NLRB v. ’ Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 5.Cir: 1967, 375 F.2d Sia - Company officials engaged in blatant surveillance of . _ Union activities. See NLRB v. Southland-Paint Co., 5 Cir. 1968, 394 F.2d 717, 719-20: Hendrix Mfg. Co. v: NLRB, 5 Cir. 1963, 321 F.2d 100.‘Stevens’ supervisors interrogated employees with regard to Union activi- - ties under circumstances that tended to be coercive and intimidating, see NLRB v. Varo, Inc., supra, 425 F.2d at 297-98; Ridgewood Management Co. v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1969, 410 F.2d 738, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833, and made promises of benefits calculated to under- mine Uniqn strength, see NLRB v, Varo, Inc., supra, 425 F.2d at 388-00 During a critical juncture in the 8This language is borrowed from Chief Judge Brown’s characterization of Stevens’ conduct in an earlier case, J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, supra, 417 F.2d at 536.. 7a ¢ - Union campaign the Company granted certain bene-: ° fits which the Board found were designed to destroy ’ Union support. See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co.,. 1964, 375 U.S. 405, 84 S.Ct. 457,11 L.Ed.2d 435; Russell-Newman Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, '5 Gir. 1969, 406 — F.2d 1280, 1283. Finally, when the Union organiz- ing effort began, the Company breathed new life into a long dormarit rule prohibiting all solicita-_ -tion at the plarit, even on nonworking time. See Republic’Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 1945, 324 U.S. 793, _ .65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 1372; NLRB-v. Varo, Inc, supra, 425 F.2d at 297; NLRB v. K-D Mfg. Co., 5 Cir. 1969, 419 F.2d 467; Ridgewood. Management Co. v. NLRB, | supra, 410 F.2d at 740. Equally supported by substan- tial evidence are findings of the Board that Stevens violated section 8(a)(3) both before and after the representation election by discriminatorily discharg- ing employees Connor, Akins, and Cribbs, all active Union supporters, and by discriminatorily refusing to hire applicant Bradley; a relative of an active Union _ - adherent. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 1941, 313. - U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271; Reading & - Bates, Inc. v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1968, 403 F.2d 9; NLRB v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc.,.supra; Sarkes Tarzian, -Inc. v. NLRB, 7 Cir. 1967, 374 F.2d 734, 738, cert.-de- nied, 389 U.S. 849; NLRB v. Albritton Eng’r. Corp., 5 Cir. 1965, 340 F.2d 281, cert. denied, 382 US. — We therefore hold that there is substantial welts in the record as a whole.to support the Board’s finding of section 8(a ( 1) and section 8(a)(3°) violations, see 8a thatversal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 1951, 340 U.S. 474, 71'S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456, and we enforce those por- tions of its order designed to eradicate the violations ’ through what: have been termed “traditional reme- dies. in > oe ~The Board, however, went beyond its traditional remedies and: ordered Stevens to bargain with the Union. Recognizing that a rerun election is “the pre- ferred method for the determination of whether em- ployees shall be organized collectively,” NLRB v.° -Gissel Packing Co., supra, 395 U.S. at 603, the Board here concluded that a bargaining order. was necessary - to effeciuate the purposes of the Act. | In determining whether to enforee the Board’s bar- ' gaining order we. must. be guided by the. Supreme Court’s decision in Gissel. That decision instructs us - that where an employer has committed unfair labor practices a bargaining: order, rather than a Board-con- ducted election, may issue under certain special cir- cumstances. Balancing the sdmétimes conflicting goals of deterring employer misbehavior and effectu- ating employee free choice, the Court found two cir- cumstances which would justify the bargaining order _ remedy. First, even where a union has never demon- strated majority. support in an appropriate unit, the Board may issue a bargaining order where the em- ployer unfair labor practices are so “outrageous” and ‘ 9NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, 395 U.S. at 614; see note 4 supra. 9a : . ‘“pervasive” that their “ ‘coercive. effects cannot. be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable election can- not be had.’” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, 395 U.S. at 613-14, quoting NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 4 Cir. 1967, 386 F.2d 562, 570. Second, where the employer unfair labor practices are less pervasive, - the Board, to protect employee free choice, must de-: termine not only that a fair election is improbable but also “that at one point the union. had a majority.” _ NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, 395,U.S..at 614. Where the unfair labor practices have only a “mini- mal impact on the election machinery,” a bargaining order is inappropriate: ‘NLRB v. Gissel ae Co., supra, 395 U. S. 615. 10In what has been termed its g#amous footnote eighteen”, Christensen & Christensen, Gissel Packing and “Good Faith Doubt”: The Ges- talt of Required Recognition of Unions Under the NLRA, 37 U. _Chi. L. Rev. 411, 423 (1970), the Supreme Court in Gissel was . careful to emphasize that it was not deciding * ‘whether a bargain- ing order is éver appropriate in cases where there is no interfer- ence with the election process” by independent unfair labor prac- tices. 395 U.S. at 595, 601 n.18. In short, Gissel simply constituted an approval of Board-compelled bargaining in instances where recourse to a ballot is made impossible by employer misconduct. It did not delineate the precise scope of the duty to. bargain im- posed by section 8(a) €5), or the limits of the Board’s power to enforce that duty, through bargaining orders, when an employer is confronted by an authorization card majority and does not com- mit independent unfair labor: practices. Christensen & Christen- . Sen, Supra, at 424; see NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 5 Cir. 1969, 414 F.2d 661, 668 n.5. The’ logic of the opinion, there. ee fore, Views the bargaining order in situations such as the instant : case not as an enforcement of a duty to bargain, but as a winedy ‘for employer coercive practices. Nevertheless, the Board here has ordered Stevens to bargain not. only as a remedy for violations of Section 8(a) (1) and section: 8(a) (3) but also as a remedy for a violation of section 8(a) (5).. ' The Board’s aw weer is sanctioned vad Gissel, for the Court there ’ i 3 . y bs : -. 4 & é - ; y ” 10a _ | The Board fourid.in the instant case not only that a bargaining ‘order was required to combat Stevens’ “extensive and egregious unfair labor practices”, but - also that reliance on the authorization cards would better effectuate employee free choice than a rerun election" in the coercive atmosphere which obtained at the Stevens plant: i \ : “The record. reveals that upon learning of the presence of the Union, Respondent resorted to a campaign of extensive and egregious unfair labor ‘practices in it®efforts to thwart the Union’s organi- 2 Sie f approved current Board practice which holds that when an em- ployer’s unfair labor practices have destroyed the accuracy of the . election process as a barometer of employee opinion, the employ- _ er’s subsequent refusal to negotiate becomes a section 8(a) (5) 7 violation, 395 U.S. at 594. Since we find that the bargaining order here was justified under both special circumstances outlined in Gissel,-we must also ap- - prove the Board’s conclusion that Stevens violated section 8(a) (5). But such post-décision labeling adds little to what we deem the proper analysis of this case: whether, as a remedy for Stevens’. violations of section 8(a) (1) and section 8(a) (3), a bargaining _order is preferable to a Board-conducted election. See Note, The - Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 Harv. L. Rev. ‘7, 247-52 (1969); cf. NLRB v. Wylie Mfg. Co., ‘10 Cir. 1969, 417 F.2d 192, 196, cert. denied, 397.U.S. 913. Stevens and the intervening employees argue that a, bargaining order is inappropriate since the election which the Union lost was never set aside because ‘of any unfair labor -practices. The Board’s Regional Director set aside the election because of Stevens’ refusal to supply an Excelsior list and thus found it “unnecessary to con- sider” the Union’s other objections, including the allegation that unfair labor practices made the election invalid. This disposition had a practical basis, for it vitiated the necessity for a long evi- dentiary hearing. It did not preclude ms Board from subsequently finding, as it did, that ‘ “[t]he timing of Respondent’s tials un¥air labor prac- _ tices, commencing almost: imnfediately after the organiza- * . tional drive began ahd persisting until after the time éf the election, persuades us that the unfair labor practices were « . lla zational drive. The timing of Respondent’s unfair labor practices, commencing almost immediately - after the organizational drive began and persisting - until after the time of the election, persuades us that the unfair labor practices were calculated to, and in fact did dissipate the majority which the Union acquired between February 18 and March 18, 1968. In these circumstances .we believe that a bargaining order is required to repair the. effects of such unfair labor practices: For this reason, and ‘also because Respondent’s unfair labor practices -.were of such a nature as to make the erasure of. their effects by traditional remedies and holding of a fair and coercion free rerun election improbable if not impossible, we are of the opinion and find ‘that, on | balance the rights of the employees. and calculated to, and in fact did dissipate the. majority which the Union acquired between February 18 and March 18, 1968.” Stevens’ and the intervening employees’ contentions are, there- fore, without merit. : ' Moreover, a finding that an election has — set aside be- cause of. employer unfair labor practices may not always be - a prerequisite to the issuance of a bargaining order. While Gissel requires that the Board determine that employer unfair labor practices have made a fair election improbable; that requisite finding looks predominantly to the future. The fact that.an election has been set aside for reasons other than pre-election unfair labor practices — for example, for failure. to supply the Excelsior list — does not necessarily mean that a fair rerun election may. be held. Post-election unfair labor practices may also destroy laboratory conditions. If so, the. Board must then determine ‘whether a bargaining order, de- spite an absence of majority support, is more appropriate than a rerun election under prevailing coercive. conditions. ‘See NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 7 Cir. 1971, —— F.2d —~—-; cf. Independent, Inc. v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1969, 406 F.2d 203, 207-08. ; ) 12a the policies of the act would better be effectuated © by reliance on the employee sentiment as expressed in the authorization cards. Accordingly, as there is no question that the Union had been validly des- ignated by. a majority of the employees as their represent: e when the Union. renewed its bar- baining d&fand, we find that by refusing to honor the Union’s bargaining demand arid: ‘by engaging ¥ the numerous unfair labor practices found by e Trial Examiner, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, and that the poticies of the“Act will be effectuated by the irhposition of a bargaining order to remedy the Respondent’s re- fusal to bargain, as well as its other unfair labor practices herein found. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing } Compan y, 395 U.S. 575, Sinclair Company y v. * NLRB. 395 U.S, 575.” | e * In agreement with the Board we think that’ the - present proceedings constitute one of those “excep- tional” cases marked by “outrageous” and “pervasive” unfair labor practices which, under Gissel, justify the issuance of a bargaining order despite the absence at one point of a Union-demonstrated majority. Stevens’ intransigent recidivism is patent and overt. Denomi- - nating our case as Stevens VI in deference to histori- - cal accuracy, we note that neither the passage of time — _ nor the admonishments®of judicial tribunals have caused the Company to alter its now all too familiar 13a. pursuance of full-scale war against unionization. Judge Brown's characterization in Stevens V is equal- sf - here: “Stevens has been engaged in a massive mul- tistate ——— to prevent unionization of its _-Southern plants. °This campaign has involved nu- merous flagrant unfair labor practices including coercive interrogat ition, surveillance; threat of plant _ closings, and economic reprisals for Union activity. ; Moreover, the threats have been made good by. ex- - tensive discriminatory discharges. As a result of these practices, several unfair charges have been . brought before the Labor Board (see note 7 supra) and, except for slight variations, the orders of the Board have been enforced by two other Circuit Courts of Appeal in Stevens I, II and‘IIL.and IV (see note 1 supra). As the Fourth Circuit said in panes the Company's conduct in Stevens Ill - — and IV, “the Board property took into considera- ; tion the unfair labor practices that Stevens I and — II, disclosed; and we, in turn, cannot ignore this evidence. Maphis Chapman Corp. v..NLRB, 368 F. 2d .298, 303 (4th Cir; 1966)”. Stevens III and iV at 1019 of 406 F. 2d. Nor can we, in our. subsequent | tum ignore the unfair labor practices disclosed in | Stevens III and IV. To Pr gs we add the incidents; and violations found by the Board to have océurred in the Georgia plants. Thus we assay the order in. "this atmosphere of persistent, long continued, flag- rant violations occurring after and in spite of re- — ls. e peated decieentole of legality ss Board and re- | viewing Courts.” _ §. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, supra, 417 F. Qd at 537. oe | In such an atmosphere the: Board was warranted - in finding that even if the Union never Possessed a valid card majority, a bargaining order was appropri- . ate to combat Stevers’ anti-union conduct. The.ex- . tensiveness of ‘the. unfair labor practices here would clearly support a finding that “their coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable elec- . ‘tion cannot be had.” NLRB v. S.S. Logan ‘Packing Co.. supra, 686 F.2d at 570, quoted with approval ‘in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, -395 U.S. at 614. Such practices, particularly the circumstances of the - dismissals of three leading Union adherents and the ’ campaign of blatant surveillance, interrogation, and © threats are sufficient to bring this case within the pattern of other cases which have been deemed * ‘ex- ceptional.” E.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, 395 U.S. at 579, aff'g NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 1 Cir. _ 1968, 397 F.2d 157; G.P.D., Inc. v. NLRB, 6 Cir. --1970,.430 F.2d 963; NLRB v. Wylie Mfg. Co., supra; see NLRB v~Lou De Young’s Market Basket, Inc., 6 Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 4? ; B. Moreover, we hold that in any event the bargaining order here: was 3 justified because the Union did at 15a - one point demonstrate a card majority. We discussed this second classification of cases in NLRB v. Ameri- can Cable Systems, Inc., supra, 414 F.2d at 668-69: _ “Under the Gissel holding a bargaining. order may issue where: ( ay the union had valid authori- zation cards from a majority of the employees i in an appropriate bargaining unit; (b) the employer's .. unfair labor practices, although not: ‘outrageous’ and ‘pervasive’ enough to justify a bargaining order in the absence of.a card majority, were still serious and extensive; (c) ‘the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair elec- tion (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional rem- edies, though present, is slight’; and (d) employee sentiment can best. be protected in the particular case by a bargaining order.” Stevens and the intervening employees argue, how- ever, that the Union never had a valid authorization card majority. While admitting that as of March 18 the Union did possess enough employee signatures to constitute a numerical majority.'* Stevens and the _intervenors claim that sufficient numbers of these signatures were obtained by coercion or misrepresen- tation to vitiate the ostensible majority. In support of 12The Board adopted the Trial Examiner’s finding that while in Feb- ruary, at the time of the first recognitional demand, the Union did not possess a card majority, it had established majority sup- . port by. March. Thus, on March 18, 1968, the Examiner found - that the Union had secured 224 valid authorization cards from a unit consisting of 343 employees. On April 20, 1968, when an. additional recognitional demand was made, the Examiner found that the Union had secured 222 valid authorization cards from a unit consisting of 326 employees. ; 162 ‘their contentions the Company ‘a the individual in- _tervenors append excerpts from the testimony of 92 Stevens’ employees which, they claim, demonstrate conclusively the presence of —e and coercion. : The conflicting testimony in this case demonstrates. that authorization cards are often a hazardous basis - upon which to ground a union majority. Nevertheless, where emacs unfair labor practices | have under- termining acute sentiment, ‘a Board-conducted election, reliance upon authorization cards may be necessary. In Gissel the Court recognized this fact: “The acknowledged superiority of the election proc- ess, however, does not mean, that cards are thereby rendered totally invalid, for where an employer. engages in conduct disruptive of the election proc- ; ess, cards may be the most effective — perhaps the. only — way of assuring employee choice.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, 395 U.S. at 601. Where courts are forced to rely on authorization _ cards, of course, they must not be oblivious to the cir- cumstances under which the cards were solicited. But . where the cards are, as here, unambiguous on their face,"* the circumstances must show clearly and con- 13Each card read as follows: “Textile Workers Union 8 America Affiliate of the AFL-CIO and CLC ~ I hereby join with my fellow workers at the ........ Arey? saeendeckaigenen mill in organizing a union to better our condi tions of life and secure economic justice, as is my right under | Fy the laws of the United States. To this end I declare that the fia vincingly that they were secured sheesh coercion 4 misrepresentation before they may be disregarded. See Retail Store Employees. Union Local 880 v. NLRB, D.C. Cir. 1969; 419 F.2d 329, 334. The Court in Gissel phrased the test as follows: “+ & “In. resolving the conflict among the circuits in Bide of approving the Board’s Cumberland rule, we . think it sufficient to point out that employees —_____—- - should be bound by the cle he clear language of what they sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly canceled by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the lan- guage above his signature. There is nothing incon- sistent in handing an employee a card that says the signer authorizes the union to represent him then — telling him that the card will probably be used first Textile.Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO and CLC, shall “ - be any representative in collective bargaining over wages, “~ hours and all other conditions of employment: I make this nce pledge of my own free will in the conviction that'the united. ~ action of all workegs through union of their own choosing is the’ way to achieVe the liberty of the individual for the benefit of all. - In addition, these cards had a place for the employee’ s signature, the date, job description information, and the employee’s address. As second type of authorization card distributed by the Union read as follows: Textile Workers Union of America Affiliate of the AFL-CIO andCLC - Cy: ‘ I hereby accept membership in the Textile Workers Union of America of my own free will and do hereby desig- nate, said Textile Workers Union of America as my repre- sentative for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other con- ditions of employment.” . In addition these cards had spaces for the employee’ s signature, .job description, date, and employee’s address. ’ TPAC TEPER Te aaah i ~_ ai i ih ls es 18a to get an’ election. Elections have been, after all, and will continue te be, held in the vast majority __ of cases; the union will still have to have the sign’-. fures of 30% of the employees when an employer rejects a bargaining demand and insists that the ‘union seek an elections We. cannot agree with the employers here that employees as a rule are too unsophisticated to be bound by what they sign un- less expressly told that their act of signing repre- sents something else. In addition to approving the use of cards, of course, Congress has expressly au- thorized reliance on employee signatures alone in other areds of labor relations even where criminal, sanctions hang in the balance, and we should not act hastily in disregarding congressional judgments that employeees can be counted on to take responsi- _ bility for their acts. “We agree, however, with the Board’ S own warn- “ings in Levi Strauss, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338, 1341, and n. 7 (1968), that in hear- ing testimony concerning a card challenge, trial examiners should not neglect their obligation -to ensure employee free choice by a too easy mechani- cal application of the Cumberland-rule. We also ac- cept the observation that employees are more likely than not, many months after a card drive and in response to questions by company counsel, to give testimony damaging to the union, particularly where company officials have previously threaten- ed reprisals for union activity in violation of § 8(a). #} 19a (1). We therefore reject any rule that. saeimea a . probe of an employee's subjective motivations as involving an endless and unreliable inquiry.” 395 U.S. at 606-08. The litany of testimony adduced -by the Company, the individual intervenors, andthe Board convinces * us of the merit of refusing to rely on. “subjective mo - tivations” and of viewing with a critical eye post-solici- tation statements contrary to the language of the \ ; _cards. See also NLRB v. American Art Indus.,-Inc., . ~ 5 Cir. 1969, 415 F.2d 1223, cert.-denied, 397 U: S. 990; NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., supra, 414 — .F.2d at 665-6%. Most of the testimony of the 92em- ployees proferred by the Company and the intervenors f is hazy, imprecise, and contradicted by the testimony of not only of Union solicitors but also of fellow employ s.'* See Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Ameri¢a v. >. NLRB, D.C. Cir. 1969, 420 F.2d. 1296, 1301-02; Re- tail Store Employees Union Local 880 v. NLRB, su- pra,419 F 2d at 335. Other testimony, while perhaps ge 4For example, many of these cards were solicited at t Union meetings. held on February 12 and February 15, 1968. The Trial Examiner, ° relying on the testimony of Union Representative McIver and -numerous employees, foufhd that at those meetings McIver told _the employees that the Union would first ask for recognition and that, only afterwards, if the Company refused to grant recogni- tion, would the cards be used for an election: Much of the oppo- sition testimony proves no more than that an election was men- tioned at the meetings. But as the Supreme Court clearly held in Gissel, mere mention that the cards may be used to secure an _ election is not sufficient to vitiate their efficacy. Such- cards can | be disregarded only where Union organizers solicit them on the explicit or indirectly expressed representation that they will use such cards only for an election. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, 395 U.S. at 607-08 & n. 27. 20a producing a sharper conflict,’* simply raises credibility choices which are within the province of the Trial Examiner and the Board to resolve. NLRB v. Ameri- _can Art Indus., Inc., supra, 415 F.2d at 1227. We there- fore hold that the findings of the Board are supported by substantial evidence and conclude that as-of March 18 the Union possessed a — authorization card majority. 2 The fact that the Union held a valid authorization card majority on March 18, however, is fot sufficient in itself to warrant the issuance of a bargaining order. In Gissel the Supreme Court noted that even if'an em- _ ployer committed serious-unfair tabor practices which might have dissipated a Union majority; the Board, in determining the propriety of a bargaining order, must make a contemporaneous judgement. _ “If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that em: ployee sentiment once expressed through cards, would, on balance, be better protected by a bar- gaining order,#hen such an order shall issue.’ * 395 U.S. at 614-15. See also.NLRB v..American Cable Systems, Inc., 5 Cir. 1970, 427 F.2d 446. . ‘In short, since a Board-conducted election is the pre- ferred mode of determining employee sentiment, the oY 15Most of this enthnany concerns those cards solicited by Union or- ganizers on the access road outside the plant and those cards solicited by employee adherents of the ‘Union. %, Zia _Board should approach the bargaining order remedy _ . with some caution. The touchstone is the protection of employee free choice. If, at the time of the Board proceedings, the conditions at the plant are such that a fair election is probable;-the Board should not issue a bargaining order. But if the Board determines that. the effects of the employer unfair labor pratices make _a fair election improbable, it should order the em- ployer to: bargain on the basis of employee ‘sentiment . expressed in the authorization cards. As we stated the matter in American Gable: _ “Gissel does not apply a nunc pro tunc principle, 7 giving the then sins of the Company a now appli- 7 cation. It requires contemporaneity — a present view, albeit with an historical. prospective. Indus- ~ trial democracy should be allowed. to work its will - if the present conditions are sufficiently antiseptic for an election. On the other hand, if the employer's 1965 violations of § 8(a) (1).and (3) have a 1970 existence, Gissel commands the issuance. of a bar- gaining order... . .” NLRB v. American Cable Sys- tems, Inc., supra, 427 F.2d at 449. The Company and the individual intervenors here argue that since 117 Stevens’ employees now inter- vene and urge an election, employee free choice would . be thwarted by orderiag Stevens to-bargain with a now rejected Union. The Board, on the other hand, -contends that this employee recantation is simply evi- dence of the continuing presence of the polluting 22a effects of Stevens’ unfair. labor practices We agree with the Board. Many of those employees who now intervene on be- ~ half of the Company were active-union adherents dur- ’ ing the organizational drive. We think that the Board could find in its expert judgment that their subsequent recantation was simply a product of Stevens’ unlawful conduct. The anti-union history of Stevens and the ex- tensive unfair labor practices chronicled in this case - ‘provide substantial evidence for such a conclusion. It would be a hardy employee indeed. who would risk dis- charge or a plant shutdown by- actively and overtly supporting the Union. Since the 1968 unfair labor practices continued to have a 1969 vitality, the time -the Board entered its order, the Board was justified in - determining that a fair election was improbable and that a bargaining order was required."* See Ace-Alkire 16The revelant time-period for making: such a determination is when the matter is before the Board for remedial action — October, 1969, in the instant case. If a bargaining order is deemed ap- ‘propriate at that time, the court should not reconsider the matter as of the date it is before it for enforcement. Thus, in NLRB v. L. B. Foster Co., 9 Cir. 1969, 418 aaa 1, 4, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990, the court stated: “We do not think that these facts permit us to refuse to’ _ enforce the Board’s-order. The delay is not the fault of the union; if it is-anyone’s fault, it is that of the employer. But regardless of fault, it is an unfortunate but inevitable result of the process of hearing, decision and review prescribed in the Act. And to deny enforcement, with or without re- mand for reconSideration on the basis of facts occurring . after the Board’s decision, is to put a premium upon con- tinued litigation by the employer; it can hope that the result- ing delay will produce a new set of facts, as to which the - Board must then readjudicate. Suppose that the Board does so, and again finds against the employer. There can then -. be a petition to this court, a decision by it, and a petition > 23a° Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 8 Cir. 1970, 431 F2d 280, 284; G.P.D.,-Inc..v. NLRB, supra; NLRB v. Lou’ De Young’ s Market Basket, Inc., supra, 430 F.2d at 915; ‘NLRB v. Wylie Mfg. Co.; , supra, 417 F.2d at 195-96. ° We realize that as a result of the employer unfair labor -practices the Union has not been able'to;retain _ its majority status. The Board,. therefore, is in one sense imposing a minority Union on the majority of — Stevens’ employees. The Supreme Court in Gissel, _ however, clearly addressed this issue and resolved it in favor of the Board: “Remaining befor’ 1 us is ‘the propriety of a | bar: gaining order as a remedy for a § 8 (a) (5) refusal — to bargain where an employer has committed ind pendent unfair labor practices which have made the holding of a fair election unlikely or which have in faet undermined a union’s majority and. caused an election to be set aside. We have long held that the Board is not limited to a cease-and-desist order’ in such cases, but has the authority to issue a bar- for certiorari to the Supreme Court. By that time ‘there will almost surely be another new set of net. When is the process to stop?” See also NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 9 Cir. 1969, 415 F.2d 360, 367, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915. Nothing we said in NLRB v. ‘American C&Able Systems, ee ‘supra, 427 F.2d 446, is inconsistent with this a In =. case there was. a ‘remand to. te Board in light of Gissel. We simply held that, at the time the Board reconsidered the propriety | _* of a bargaining order on remand under Gissel standatds, it was required to consider the then existing situation at the company to determine whether a fair election was still improbable. The Foster case was en distingiushed on’ this ground. 427 F.2d at 448. Oo | 4 ‘94a gaining order without first requiring the union to show that it has been able to maintain its majority *. status. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n. 16.,. 8 L Ed 2d 230, 239, 82 S Ct 1107 (1962); NLRB v. - Lorillard Co. 314 US 512, 86 L Ed 380, 62 S Ct 397 . (1942). And ° we have held.that the Board has the: same authority even where it is clear that the union, which once had possession of cards from a majority of the employees, represents only a minority when the bargaining order is entered. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321°US 702, 88 L Ed 1020, 64S Ct 817° (1944). We see no reason now to. withde@® this authority from the Board. If the Board could enter only a cease-and-desist order and direct an election or a rerun, it would in effect be rewarding the em- -_ ployer and allowing him “to profit from [his] own “wrongful refusal to bargain,” Frank Bros., supra, at 704, 88 L Ed at 1023, while at the same time se- verely curtailing the employees’ right freely todeter- - mine whether they Jesire a representative. The em- ployer could continue to delay or disrupt the ‘elec- - tion processes and put off indefinitely his obligation ‘to bargain; and any election held under these cir- cumstances would not be likely to demonstrate _ the employees’ true, undistorted desires. _ “The employers argue that the Board‘has ample remedies; over and above the cease-and-desist order, to control employer misconduct. The Board can, they assert, direct the companies to mail notices to employees during plant time and to’ give the union tnt access to employees during working time at . ® 20a plant, or it can.seek a court injunctive. order under § 10(j) (29 USC’§ 160(j) ).as a last resort..In view _ of the Board’s power, they conclude, the bargaining ~ order is an unnecessarily harsh remedy that need- . lessly prejudices employees’ § 7 rights solely for the purpose of punishing or restraining an employer. Such an argument ignores that a bargaining order is designed as much ‘to remedy past election dam- age™ as it is to deter future misconduct. If an em- ployer has succeeded in undermining a union’s strength and destroying the laboratory conditions “necessary for a fair election, he may see no need. to violafé a cease-and-desist order by further unlawful -activity. The damage: ‘will have been done, and per- haps the only fair way to effectuate employee rights is to re-establish the conditions as they existed be- fore the employer's unlawful campaign. ) “There is, after all, nothing permanent in a bar- gaining order, and if, after the effects of the employ- er’s acts have worn off, the employees clearly desire’ to disavow the union, they'can do so by filing a rep- resentation petition. For, as we pointed out ‘long ago, in finding that a bargaining order involved no “injustice to employees who may wish to substitute for the particular union some other . . . arrange- ment,” a bargaining relationship “once rightfully -established must be permitted to exist and function for a reasonable period in which it can be given a fair chance to succeed,” after which the “Board may, ... upon a proper showing, take,steps in rec- ognition of changed situations which might make - SS ea °6a appropriate changed bargaining relationships.” Frank Bros., supra, at 705-706, 88 L Ed at 1023.” 395'U.S. at 610-13 (footnotes omitted ). Still it might be argued that many of the recanta- tions were not the product of Stevens’ unlawful con- duct. There may be employees who, uncoerced by the Company's unfair labor practices, now reject the — Union. Employee free choice for them would best be _ served by an election. But the Board’s evaluation of . the propriety of a bargaining order cannot be based on : employee motivations, determined individual by indi- . Vidual. We cannot require the Board to engage in the hopeless and impossible task of evaluating the sub-— jective reasons for each employee recantation. The Board must, ‘on the objective facts, determine the seri- ousness of the employer unfair labor practices and consider the possibility of a fair rerun election. Note, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.: Bargaining Orders and - _- Employee Free Choice, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 318 (1970). Once the Board has done so, if supported. by substan- tial evidence, its bargaining order must be enforced. Since we have found that the Board’s conclusions are indeed amply supported by the record, we also enforce that portion of its order requiring Stevens to bargain with the Union. } IV. - In No. 29,037 the Union asks us to remand the case to the Board for the imposition of more meaningful and far-reaching remedies than those ordered. As we noted earlier the Board’s order, which we have en- 27a- ~ forced in full, requires the Company to cease and.de- sist from its‘unfair labor practices, to employ the dis-. ~ criminatees and make themAvhole, to bargain with . the Union, and to post appropriate notices. Such an order is clearly traditional for the unfair labor prac- tices. found here. In addition the Board ordered, and we enforce, certain supplemental remedies which have become traditional for Stevens’ plants. See NLRB v. J. P. Stevens & Co., supra, 417 F.2d at 534-35. The _ Company is ordered to convene its Statesboro em- , ployees and read them the Board’s notice during work- ing time, to mail a copy of that notice to each States- _ boro employee,.and to grant the Union reasonable access to its bulletin boards for a period of one year. The Union complains of the Board’s failure to — the following additional remedies: “(1) furnish the Union with the names and ad- dresses of all employees in the Company’s plants in North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia; (2) post notices in all of the aforementioned plants; (3) permit a Union representative to enter these — plants for the purpose\ of delivering a one hour speech to employees on the advantages of union membership; (4) furnish the Union with the job . classifications, wage rates and seniority lists for all employees in the Company’s Statesboro, Georgia plant; and (5) make whole all employees in the appropriate unit at the Statesboro plant for those ‘contractual benefits which would have-accrued to them had the Company not unlawfully refused to- cht BH TLRS ET Bed aia BVA cae NTS nb ed And BORNE - 980 e bargain, and had a collective bargaining agreement been consummated.” - The Union acknowledges. that there is a presump- tion that favors the Board, with its expertise, in its selection of remedies. As we noted in Stevens V: “In determining whether a particular. affirmative action ordered by the Board pursuant to its powers under § 10 (c), 28.U.S.C:A. 160(c), is appropriate, the reviewing Court: must pay an unusually high degree of respect-to the Board’s conclusion — these _ remedies are “peculiarly a matter of administrative | competence.” Fibreboard.Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 1964, 379 U.S. 203, 216, 85 S.Ct. 398, 406, 13 L.Ed. 2d 233, 241. In Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 1943, 319 U.S. 533,.63 S.Ct. 1214, 87 L.Ed. 1568, the Supreme Court stated it in stringent “terms: “[The order] should stand unless it can be ~ ‘shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate.the policies of the Act.” at 319 U.S. 540, 63 S.Ct. 1218, 87 L.Ed. 1574. Fresh emphasis on the peculiar respect due Board determination. of - remedies has been given by the Supreme Court in | NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. aul 89 . S.Ct: 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547: . ) “It is for the Board and not the Courts * * * - to make [the] determination [of remedies], based on its estimates as to the effects on the election process _ of unfair labor practices of varying intensity. In fashioning its remedies under the broad provisions 29a _ of § 10(c) of the Act * * * the Board draws ona fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and -. its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing-€ourts.” at 395 U.S. 612, 89 SCE. 1939, 23. L. Ed. 2d 577, n. 32 ae added). And, in upholding a Beard’s order compelling the payment of fringe benefits as a part of the rem- edy for a § 8(a) (5) violation, the Court said of § 10 (c) this “grant of remedial power is’a broad one.” NLRB v. ae 1969, 393 U. S. 357, So S.Ct. 541, 21 L.Ed. 546.” 417 F.2d at 537-38. The Board’s discretion, of course, is not unlimited. _ Thus, under section 10(c)’s “affirmative action” man- - date there may be cases where the Board has gone too ° far. See e.g., H. K. Porter Co. v. NERB, 1970, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146. Conversely, there may also be-cases where the Board has not gone far enough. See, e.g., Food Stores Employees Union Local 347 v.. NLRB, D.C. Cir. 1970, 433 F.2d 541; Inter- national Union of Electrical-Radio & Machine Work- ers v. NLRB, D.C. Cir. 1970, 426 F.2d 1243. Consider- ing the plethora. of Stevens’ cases before the Board and the courts, we are convinced that, to the Com- : ‘pany, the words of judicial and administrative ad- _monition are as but “sounding brass or a tinkling cym- bal.” The Board is therefore under an obligation to devise some meaningful affirmative action to-counter ~ the Company’s known predisposition to violate the an SP eee " d . - — 7 ‘ " “ gaat ee tebe dics na tlie il eat tea ~ 30a Act. P ae in. this case, ci: sabia just such an effort by the Board. There has been over. the years a careful tailoring of remedies to meet the pe- ’ cultar problems ‘posed at the Stevens’ plants. .The Union in effect. argues that the Board could have done better. That judgment, however, unless there has been an abuse of discretion, is left for the Board. Finding no such abuse, we reject the Union’s plea and enforce the order as it stands, praying that there will be no Stevens VII. The Board’ s order is ENFORCED. . AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge, specially concurring: : | ’ I concur in the enforcement of the Board’s order in this case, though not without some misgivings as to the propriety here of the Board’s issuance of a bargain- ing order without a-rerun election. When the Union was unsuccessful in the original __. election by a vote of. 198 to110 against representation, the Regional Director set the election aside and order- .ed a second election, for failure of the Company to supply a list‘of names and addresses as required by N.L.R.B. -in the “Excelsior” case (156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966) )..The second election, however, was not held because the Union in the meanwhile-had filed an un- fair labor charge under Section 8(a) (5) of the Act that the Company had unlawfully refused to bargain. After a hearing the Examiner, and later the Board, » - agreed that the charge against the Company should _be sustained. A bargaining. order was issued, without the holding of the second election, on the basis of an 3la o % authorization card majority because of the Company’ S refusal to’ bargain and other unfair labor practices. The Board cited N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 —- U. S. 575, 89 S. Ct, 1918 (1969) as authority ton its _ order. . . a In the ere before the Board, 117 employees * of the Company intervened in the representation part of the hearing, contending that they signed the au- thorization cards on Union representations that they were signing to get an election, and that. the cards could not properly be considered as authorizing col- lective bargaining. Ninety-two employee witnesses then testified substantially to this effect, putting at issue the question of whether the Union ever had a _ card majority. The 3 Union organizers also testified © and denied any misrepresentations in obtaining the cards. The Examiner credited the Union witnesses but declined to believe the employee witnesses. The evidence was, therefore, in sharp conflict, but in the absence of some unusual circumstance, we are obliged to accept the Board’s findings (sustaining the - Examiner) even if another choice might have been @ made had the matter beer before us de novo. See - N.L.R.B. v. Monroe Auto Equipment Company, 5 Cir., 1968, 392 F. 2d 559, 960-61, cert. denied, 393 U. S. 934. Board policy in representation, cases favors the hold- ing of elections — in secret — as the most satisfactory and preferred method of ascertaining whether a Union has majority support. See Gissel, supra;395__ U.S. at 605, 89S. Ct. at 1934 ( — It is obvious that nat nats Det 4 ‘ane aS Ie seca taki t AE ib. . ii iat Ne a wlan sat th 32a such an election is hiettes than the dite and less reliable card authorization method. It is arguable, however, whether ‘tienda condi- - tions, insuring fairness and impartiality, could be had at a rerun election. But under all the facts and circum- stances here, including the sharp conflict in the evi- dence and the recantation of a large number of em- __ ployees of the cards they signed, such an election ‘ could be the best solution here. Then: the troublesome question of whether thé Board is imposing: a’ minority Union on the majority of the Comparty’s employees could be settled. Nevertheless, using the procedure ap- proved by the Supreme Court in Gissel, the Board has ‘issued a bargaining order without an election “and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special re- spect by reviewing courts.” See Gissel, — 395 U.S. at 612, 89 S.Ct. at 1939 n- 32. Since the Board’s order is supported by substantial - evidence, though conflicting, and our review is limited to a determination as to whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings, I. have re- solved the matter in favor of the Board’s decision and concur in enforcement of its order. , | 33a UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ee FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT | 5 _ J.P. STEVENS & CO., INC., GULISTAN DIVISION, Petitioner-Cross-Responde nt, Loa | > No. 28631 | NATIONAL LABOR REE ATIONS BOARD, -+Respondent-Ci sas Dalit: | J _ TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, - Petitioner, ‘ te ~ No. 29037 NATIONAL LABOR RELATION S | BOARD, Res pondent. : JUDGMENT ‘ Before: Thornberry, Goldberg, and Ainsworth, Circuit Judges. masa’ a a, s¢ THIS CAUSE came on to be ened ¢ upon the peti- tions of J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., Gulistan’ Division, and Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, to review an order of the National Labor Relations Board ~ issued against petitioner in No. 28631 on October 22, 1969, and upon cross- application of the National | eel bie Relations Board to enforce. said order. The . -Court heard argunient. of respective counsél on No- vember 17, 1970, and has considered the briefs and . transcript of record filed in this cause. On March 22, _ 1971, the Court being fully advised in the premises, handed down its decision granting enforcement, of _ the Board’s order. , ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF. it is ordered and adjudged by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that the said order of the National . « Labor Relations Board in said proceeding be enforced, — and that J: P. Stevens & Co., Inc., Gulistan Division, its - . . Officers, agents, successors, and assigns abide by and — | perform the directions of the Board in said order con-’ ~ tained.: | ENTERED: Ape. 13, 1971 . ef “~«. - Sd UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS * BOARD L-P.STEVENS&Co,INC. .) >. GULISTAN DIVISION .— | Cases 10-CA-7261 ~ — |. 100-7323 +»: cerns —.-10-CA-7364 TEXTILE WORKERS UNION-| - © 9.47450. OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO ar Me e . J DECISION .AND‘ORDER On June 6, 1969, Trial Examiner Robert E. Mullin’ issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in-and was en- gaging in certain unfair labor practices, ‘and recom- mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set:forth in the attached , Trial Examiner's: Decision. He also found that Re- spondent had not engaged in other unfair labor prac- tices alleged iri the complaint, and recommended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, Respond- -ent, the Charging Party, and the Intervenors' filed ' exceptions to the Trial Examiner’s Decision ‘and sup-